

Strategy Research Project

Framing Strategic Conflicts: Redesign of the American Negotiating Style

by

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Abstract

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As Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz stated, “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” The politics inherent in this thinking can be viewed as international relations, diplomacy, or, simply, negotiations. Along these lines, America is known for a forceful, results-oriented negotiating style utilizing war as a quick alternative to negotiated agreement. In this manner, conflicts from World War I and II to the Cold War were not correctly framed. The American negotiating style must be restructured to remain successful in the globalized world of this century. Because of the current predisposition, the United States is framing a Cold War situation with China. And the situation should be reframed to engage in a non-confrontational manner. Stability strengthened by partnership must be the ultimate goal of international relations. The superpower must relax the belief that every problem has a military solution and embrace the new world order in which economics are the primary driving force behind change.

Framing Strategic Conflicts: Redesign of the American Negotiating Style

Negotiation is becoming more, not less, important as a tool of American foreign policy, and the nature of international negotiation is rapidly shifting in response to globalization, the emergence of problems that demand a collective response...global breadth of U.S. interests ensures its negotiators are always engaged.

—United States Institute of Peace¹

As Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz stated, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”² The politics inherent in this thinking can be viewed as international relations, diplomacy, or, simply, negotiations. Negotiations entail the process of gaining the best outcome once both sides commence acting on their best interest and focus efforts at those entities that can affect those outcomes.³ As important as negotiation skills may seem, these skills are of utmost importance when the cost of failed agreement results in loss of life and turmoil in the world. Clausewitz completes his thought by explaining, “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”⁴ Ergo, war is the worst alternative to a negotiated agreement and the result of failed attempts at a peaceful resolution to a situation.

When viewed in these terms, America is known for only one negotiating style: “forceful, explicit, legalistic, urgent and results-oriented” with war as a quick alternative to negotiated agreement.⁵ Although this has allowed the nation to become a powerhouse known around the world, this technique was effective in the past because 20th century wars were won primarily through military strength. The new reality is, with declining budgets, interconnected economies, asymmetric threats, and a reluctance for unilateral actions due to both legitimacy and capability, America’s quick, and consistent, disposition to wars of annihilation, as explained by noted historian Russell Weigley as prevailing for most of the country’s existence, must end.⁶ America must stop

“consider[ing] war an alternative to bargaining rather than part of an ongoing process, as in the Clausewitz view.”⁷ Throughout this work, the term America will be utilized to imply all levels of leadership from the President to the Secretaries and all agencies. When a change in thought process of this magnitude is undertaken, all levels must be included.⁸ Furthermore, when America spends close to 20% of the federal budget on the Department of Defense and a mere 1% on the Department of State, leaders must be cognizant of the old adage, “if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”⁹

As America completes two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, future relations with confrontational partners must rely heavily on mutual resolution through proper negotiations and less on armed conflict. This must result in a change of American mentality and skills at the negotiation table. Due to a lack of proper framing, the current American negotiating style is predisposed to aggressive behavior and not sufficient for future relationships in the new world environment. The new world environment involves complex, ill-structured problems ranging from Iran’s determination to serve as a regional hegemony, to the growing world influence of China and regional instability created by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to name a few.¹⁰ In order to examine the American negotiating/framing skillset for the purposes of this monograph, an explanation of how to frame a negotiation will be provided, historical examples of failed American framing that resulted in loss of life will be reviewed, then current and future relations with China will be examined.

American Negotiating Style

To develop a successful negotiation skill set, past American negotiating style and predispositions must first be examined. On the whole, a significant amount of literature

has been written which details the American psyche and reveals a brutally consistent manner in which diplomatic negotiations have been undertaken. These traits “inevitably vary according to personalities and circumstances, [but] a recognizably pragmatic American style is always evident, shaped by powerful and enduring structural and cultural factors.”¹¹ For the purposes of this monograph, an examination will be made of the dominative perceptions of American negotiating tactics.

First, this style is chiefly influenced by the preeminent international power currently held by the United States.¹² Because of the “enormous breadth of...global interests and depths of...power,” America currently exhibits an overwhelming force in “numerous negotiating forums.”¹³ This has developed into an abrasive American hubris arising from this superpower status with an “inclination to dictate terms, adopt take-it-or-leave-it attitudes, and flex...muscle in pursuit of national interests.”¹⁴ Further, the nature of the American political and bureaucratic system demonstrates an intense pressure on American negotiators to “increase demands or renegotiat[e] a deal already reached with...foreign counterparts” which is known throughout the world as the “phenomenon of ‘moving the goalposts.’”¹⁵

Next, American negotiators “are less concerned to negotiate...than to persuade their counterparts of the rightness or potency of the American position.”¹⁶ This reveals the American “inclination to moralize, to treat negotiation as an opportunity to reveal unimpeachable truth rather than to understand and respect the other side’s worldview.”¹⁷ This negative trait is further exacerbated by the recent hegemonic status of America. During the Cold War, the determination to contain communism required the United States to concede to interests of regional allies in order to strengthen the forces

against the Eastern bloc. Post Soviet Union collapse, America has not been faced with a peer of comparable strength and had no requirement to build a coalition to the same degree.¹⁸

The final aspect of American negotiating style to be described is the predominant results-oriented, interest-driven American focus. As a culture, American negotiators exhibit weaknesses due to cultural insensitivity and impatience combined with poor listening skills and an inaccurate understanding of small talk.¹⁹ The focus is on achieving results and not building relationships. This predisposition treats military force and diplomacy as separate instruments of power instead of using them in conjunction with one another. The actual cause of this aspect is not clear, but ranges from the systematic electoral cycle to the fact America is a business-oriented, industrial society that measures productivity by watching the clock and rushing results.²⁰

A Negotiation Skillset

Importance of and Doctrinal Teachings on Negotiations²¹

In recent years, the importance of negotiation skills has risen to the forefront of business, military and foreign relations minds. This shift is evident from the highest levels of leadership to the military services. Former Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy highlighted the importance of developing and nurturing strategic relationships and the Air Force recognizes, "Negotiation is one of the most common approaches used to make decisions and manage disputes [and] the major building block for many other alternative dispute resolution procedures."²² The CJCS recently developed the Joint Leader Competency Model (JLCM) which specifically established the requirement of deliberate negotiation skill development.²³ Further, the Air Force developed Leadership Doctrine (AFDD 1-1) listing negotiation skills as an "enduring

Leadership competency.”²⁴ A similar “core leader competency” is established by Army Field Manual 6-22 and references the fact that leadership is purely about the ability to influence others.²⁵ With this explicit investment at all levels of leadership in our military, one must infer the negotiation skill-set emphasis must be continued from the tactical and operational to the strategic levels.

Strategic Framing

Although war should be considered the worst alternative to a negotiated agreement (WATNA), throughout history it seems to be America’s default when framing a situation.²⁶ In its simplest form, framing means to process and organize information.²⁷ Framing an issue in negotiations means that attention is focused on an aspect of an issue while leaving others out.²⁸ This is a key component in the initial stages of declaring war between countries and an ongoing process during the various stages of war. Strategic frames “provide a convenient and powerful way of separating certain phenomena as being more relevant or important than others affecting outcome” and help give shape to complex, ill-structured problems.²⁹ To correctly frame a situation, the issue must be processed and organized with a perspective of all eventualities from initial action to all possible outcomes with potential gains and losses examined.³⁰ This is arguably the most misunderstood aspect of negotiation execution. Because of the unpredictable nature of the new security environment, and the risks and expenses entailed, the United States must be deliberate when framing strategic situations. Negotiation skills are not merely required of a manager leading a business, but a required skill-set for strategic leaders who are shaping the future of the world.

Framing Guidance

When framing is mentioned with respect to international negotiations, more often than not, one thinks of the media and the efforts by high leadership to sway opinion through the use of framing a potential enemy as a true villain. This is often true, as can be seen when President Bush repeatedly depicted Saddam Hussein as another Hitler in February of 1991 or his painting the 'War on Terror' as confronting a mortal danger to all humanity."³¹ Although this type of public affairs framing is important, it is not the same framing efforts that are discussed herein. For the focus of this discussion, framing negotiations involves the deliberate research, analyzation and development of opinion that must occur to make an effective, educated decision. Correctly framing a situation involves complex efforts to eliminate unknowns and understand the variables that are present between the parties. "A good negotiation framework or methodology defines the problem by eliminating irrelevant clutter and clarifies our path towards our negotiation goals."³²

As with preparation for any negotiation, strategic framing must follow some simple guidelines. First, the negotiation's mission or purpose must be explicitly determined. It must be understood what the driving force is and what changed in the world to cause this area to be of extreme importance to the United States. Along the same lines, the goals of the negotiations should be clearly spelled out. A common error in negotiation is to enter without a clear determination of the desired outcome.³³ With the lack of exit strategy in Vietnam, the Gulf War and Afghanistan over recent years, it appears the same principle applies to the United States in conflicts.³⁴ This can involve anything from preventing formation of a communist state in Vietnam to swaying the trade policies of China.³⁵ As a further example, the U.S. 'wanted' to defeat Iraqi

insurgency in 2003 and, in 2010, President Obama hailed victory on this front with the end of US combat operations in Iraq.³⁶ The reality of this is the fact that an average of seven Iraqis die each day from bomb attacks and executions.³⁷ “The “want” requirement for every agenda requires clear analyzation of the whole negotiation—where it stands and what happens next in order to make progress.³⁸ If parties do not understand what is desired out of a negotiation, “...you have no right to ask for it. And if you can’t ask for it, you put yourself completely at the mercy of the other side.”³⁹ Did the U.S. truly achieve victory when the Iraqi countryside is still rife with violence?

Next, it must be determined if an issue is of enough importance to bring it into the international realm. America must determine the importance of each issue with respect to nation wealth, including resources, money and lives. Further, the U.S. must ensure a realistic view of what happens next. With respect to Iraq, the U.S. vocalized regime change and the fear of dangerous weapons. What unfolded was “war unlike any it [had] fought in the past...turned much of the world against America...big majorities view it as the impetuous action of a superpower led by a bully.”⁴⁰ This is a critical step to framing which the United States appears to routinely fail to fully examine. In the view of many, the “U.S.-led invasion was launched recklessly, with a flawed plan for war and a worse approach to occupation.”⁴¹ This was made possible through the “intellectual acrobatic” framing of “simultaneously ‘worst-casing’ the threat presented by Iraq while ‘best-casing’ the subsequent cost and difficulty” of the engagement.”⁴²

After the initial steps have been accomplished, the truly tough part of framing must begin. Each side’s perspective must be thoroughly understood. In an “increasingly globalized, interdependent world...cultural diplomacy is critical to fostering peace &

stability” and in the ability to see the issues from the perspective of the other side.⁴³ This assessment must be without the cultural biases the United States continually fails to shed. The importance of this principle can best be viewed when examining each side of the recent 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the lack of depth, or history, that the American method exhibits. Shortly after the attacks, President Bush rallied the nation by declaring to Congress of the terrorist, “they're the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.”⁴⁴ Although the speech was very moving, it gave insight to the shallow depth of research Americans were placing in framing the conflict with al Qaeda. This is in contrast to Bin Laden’s Fatwah, which was anchored much further in history:

Today we work from the same mountains to lift the iniquity that had been imposed on the Ummah by the Zionist-Crusader alliance, particularly after they have occupied the blessed land around Jerusalem, route of the journey of the Prophet (ALLAH'S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) and the land of the two Holy Places.⁴⁵

Although this seems like a small concern, to correctly frame any situation the issue must be examined through the eyes of the opponent. This does not imply agreement with the other perspective, only awareness of it. President Bush related the incident merely across the past century while al Qaeda’s framing encompassed the time since the journey of Muhammad. As the Art of War says, “know your enemy and yourself, and you will not lose even in one hundred battles.” The American public has largely missed the point of 9-11. “America does not know her enemy” because [Americans] did not correctly frame the confrontation.⁴⁶

After a thorough understanding of perspectives, a full understanding of the importance of all issues to the United States, pertinent allies and perceived enemies must be developed. For every action or decision, there exist 2nd, 3rd, and nth order

effects. Every issue must be analyzed for other interrelated issues, overlap, possible trade-offs, synergies, and so forth to the extent that can be predicted or forecast. For example, it is proposed by scholars at the U.S. Army War College that the “second-order effects of U.S. Cold War strategy experienced by Lebanon in the 1950s ultimately contributed to the root causes of its Civil War in 1958.”⁴⁷ Similarly, many worldviews see that recent drone strikes suggest, “The US act is stoking terrorism and extremism” vice countering it.⁴⁸ This determination of importance must also identify stakeholders, decision makers and blockers on the issue. To preserve peace, American leaders must look beyond the military instrument of national power to fully incorporate the other elements of the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) and Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) or any other model used to determine strategic goals.⁴⁹

Now that the main parts of the story have been examined, previous relations must not be neglected. Many believe the second Iraq war was the product of “unfinished business on the Tigris that Saddam remained in power and still had his weapons.”⁵⁰ This is just one example of baggage from an earlier failed negotiation. The final two areas that must be examined when framing a situation are to determine the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) and the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA).⁵¹ Once all of these areas are thoroughly researched and understood, a strategic analysis and resultant decision may successfully be made.

Historical Litany of American Framing

As noted in many academic writings, “the United States is a relatively young country, with relatively little sense of, or interest in, history.”⁵² This naïve persona, coupled with an arguably ethnocentric view of the world, is likely the overarching reason

Americans are reluctant to adapt framing techniques and negotiation strategies to the emerging new world order. Although many historical examples have been incorporated throughout this monograph, a few require specific examination because of their dire consequences. This will be done with the understanding that the examples presented here are exceptionally simplistic to allow incorporation of volumes of historical works in this composition. In most every case, many lesser events ultimately led to the outbreak of conflict and these examples are merely contributing factors.

The first example occurred during the outbreak of World War I when America declared neutral then failed to frame the scope of involvement when a German submarine killed 128 Americans on the Lusitania. As a result, over 100,000 Americans lost their lives.⁵³ Later, when framing the situation leading up to World War II, the United States did not consider the option of Japan attacking Pearl Harbor because it was “widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal.”⁵⁴ In a similar manner, the American nuclear attack on the Japanese people, which followed years later, could also be considered irrational behavior. When framing and estimating the BATNA, a different methodology must be used when the survival of a culture is at stake. What one nation perceives as irrational behavior may be viewed by the other as a viable alternative when the only other option is extinction.

Arguably the most obvious example of war as a direct result of framing, and potentially a similar path to that currently being chosen regarding China is the Cold War. Simply, it was a “decades-long struggle for global supremacy...[and] pitted the capitalist United States against the communist Soviet Union.”⁵⁵ Two allies, who “fought side-by-side against Nazi Germany in the Second World War,” allowed a standoff to develop

which ultimately bankrupted one side and yielded arguable economic devastation on the other.⁵⁶ Because an armed engagement would likely involve use of nuclear weapons which might destroy everything, the two players “fought each other indirectly...using words as weapons” and taking the security dilemma to levels never before seen in history.⁵⁷

This ‘Cold War’ mentality forced two world powers to devastate their economies in a military buildup to preclude traditional or nuclear war. The spark that ultimately lit the fire of emotion leading into this standoff was “entitled ‘United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’ and frequently referred to as NSC-68.”⁵⁸ This previously Top-Secret “58-page memorandum is among the most influential documents composed by the U.S. Government” quite possibly since the Declaration of Independence was written.⁵⁹ The Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff argued the most pressing world threat to the United States was the “Hostile Design” of the Soviet Union exacerbated by their addition of weapons, including nuclear, and the only feasible course of action “was to respond in kind with a massive build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry.”⁶⁰ The document framed the Soviet Union as “animated by a new fanatic faith antithetical to that of the United States...driven to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.”⁶¹ High-level Soviet Union experts argued the validity of the proposed Soviet goal of achieving world domination through military force and that the American response should be through political and economic measures vice military alone. These expert views were cast aside amid accusations the administration of the time had been soft on Communism and the Truman Administration nearly tripled

defense spending to comply with the world situation framed by United States Objectives and Programs for NSC-68.

Although the United States ultimately declared victory for this “strategy of dissuasion,” the actions that permitted this victory were extreme and detrimental.⁶² To ‘fight’ this war, America “lavish[ed] stupendous resources on the arms race, [weakening] the economic and educational base upon which our long-term military might depended.”⁶³ One may deduce from this survey of historical examples that the unfortunate reality is the manifestation of this Cold War mentality in the search for a new enemy and China should not be framed to fill the void.⁶⁴

Coincident with the Cold War, and along the same lines, America entered the Vietnam conflict with the purpose of intervening to prevent the domino-like spread of communism. With an ultimate goal of intervention, influence must be measured since it is the true heart of intervention.⁶⁵ When influence is the measure, “changes in political behavior must be charted, and the changes must be related to a set of factors.”⁶⁶ The risk to measuring influence is the fact one can never know how the situation might have turned out without the intervention and if the behavior modification might have occurred autonomously. This, from the beginning, is a tough goal for any negotiation or conflict. Also overlooked in American framing of the conflict was the fact that Vietnamese society considered the Vietnam War a “direct successor to the French Indochina War” and viewed the aggression as a “War Against the Americans and to Save the Nation.”⁶⁷ What America viewed as a small foreign intervention, the Vietnamese viewed as a fight for survival. These two views are not equal and clearly detail the differing levels of effort that both sides were willing to expend.

The final lesson learned from past wars to be presented involves the fact critical thinking must be used to ensure all pertinent factors are considered and the projected outcome is one that presents a better situation than the one currently in existence. In this manner, it is commonly felt that President Bush and his team of advisors poorly framed the second Iraq war. In making the decision to engage, many believe “the U.S. government went to war in Iraq with scant international support and on the basis of incorrect information—about weapons of mass destruction and a supposed nexus between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda’s terrorism.”⁶⁸ This was a failure of framing’s primary step of determining mission or purpose. Further, the nexus between Iraq and al Qaeda is a soft justification, one that was never proven or measured.⁶⁹ This is a clear example of a situation in which the true motivations for entering conflict were not admitted, or even realized, and the outcome after expending significant American treasure is one which Iraq is perceived by its people as no better than when America entered.⁷⁰ Brookings Institution findings suggest that certain groups of Iraqi people feel the country is in fact less secure after the occupation.⁷¹ Time will tell how the country evolves in the years following American intervention, but some have framed Iraq in current times as developing into a dictatorship worse than that the one led by Saddam.⁷² This exhibits a definite cause to investigate the initial American framing and plan for the conflict. As the U.S. withdraws from Afghanistan and shifts attention to the Asia Pacific region, the U.S.-China relationship must be reexamined to determine more peaceful outcomes.

Framing of China

As the current hegemon, the United States must carefully consider relationships on both the bi-lateral and global level. Since the dramatic end of the Cold War and the

downfall of the Soviet Union, many Americans seem to have been presented with and carry the perception the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a harmful nation with detrimental motives to negatively influence the world.⁷³ As a result of this sentiment, the containment techniques of the Cold War have been thrust to the forefront as a response to Chinese growth and influence. Some of this may have been unintentional and due to the fact, "many U.S. officials in charge of China affairs were Soviet experts [and, as a result] tended to adopt a similar Cold War approach toward the PRC [focusing] on the development of China's economic strength and military buildup."⁷⁴ This stance is contrary to the consistent position established by seven consecutive American presidents, a record any political scientist would be hard pressed to prove similar congruity on another issue.⁷⁵ Since the term of Richard Nixon, every president has "affirmed the importance of cooperative relations with China and the U.S. commitment to a one-China policy."⁷⁶ Of recent, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "described relations with China as the best since the opening to Beijing in 1971."⁷⁷ Although this is a clear message, American ambivalence is emanating once again from both Congress and news outlets and, as such, needs to be realigned so that actions correctly support policy narratives.

This divergence from policy involves political words and opposite actions. President Obama routinely uses ambiguous commentary and alludes to a policy that "strengthen[s] our relationship... enhance[s] our trade and our commerce, and make[s] sure that we have a strong relationship with China," yet the military is framing another Cold War scenario with a growing super power.⁷⁸ This point is reaffirmed with the military recent rebalance to the Pacific and originated in 2006 when then-Secretary of

Defense Rumsfeld opined that since no nation was threatening China, there was no rational reason they should be increasing their military investment.⁷⁹ At the same time, Admiral Mullen acknowledged a predominant driver to our military budget was concern over the Chinese threat. On a military scale, a concurrent Pentagon strategy review “singled out China as having ‘the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter-strategies.’”⁸⁰ This policy development was further cemented in late 2011 when President Obama addressed Australian parliament with the bold comments “that the United States was not about to quietly relinquish its hegemony in East Asia and let the PRC become the leading power.”⁸¹ The containment policy was further exacerbated with direction to develop a training hub in Australia to protect American regional interests.⁸²

In similar fashion, the House Intelligence Committee recently advised American companies to “avoid sourcing network equipment from China’s two leading technology firms because they pose a national security threat to the United States.”⁸³ This drew immediate and harsh criticism from China’s commerce ministry, who “warned that relations between the two countries would be hurt by [the] congressional report.”⁸⁴ The bi-partisan Huawei report confirms the United States is embedded in a Cold War with China. Open accusations such as this should be handled delicately since China is a member of the World Trade Organization. Their addition to the membership in 2001 was noted by World Trade Organization Director-General as a “defining moment in the history of the multilateral trading system...[with] near-universal acceptance of its rules-

based system [that] will serve a pivotal role in underpinning global economic cooperation.”⁸⁵

Finally, the United States has deliberately framed the relationship with China in terms of military capability. This is eerily similar to the framing exhibited in the development of the Cold War. The U.S. must be careful in this endeavor because, due to current world influence, when “the United States develops an interest in an issue, that issue automatically becomes internationalized.”⁸⁶ This results in second and third order effects around the world when America expresses a concern. Relevance here is seen through recent and recurring emphasis as demonstrated when “the Pentagon voiced alarm of China’s military buildup, saying it... could one day pose a challenge to U.S. dominance in the western Pacific.”⁸⁷ This is even more disconcerting “in the Asia-Pacific, where any powerful, regional multilateral security regime like North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is lacking [and] the security dilemma is really the major cause for practical and potential hot spots and issues.”⁸⁸ Further, the United States has exacerbated this security dilemma to contain China as seen through America’s continued arms sales to Taiwan, which influences the military balance between the two.⁸⁹ The current relationship with China is extremely slanted toward a confrontational relationship instead of presenting the opportunity for international partnership. To ensure peaceful relations and success in the world environment, the current relationship between the U.S. and China must be redefined.

Goals

First, American leadership must determine the purpose of the relationship with China. General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently discussed the

fear of a 'Thucydides Trap' with China.⁹⁰ Not allowing fear of a growing China to force a military conflict must be America's first goal. In similar terms, America must realize that to continue success in the changing world environment, "the emerging global system is rapidly eroding old boundaries between foreign and domestic affairs as well as between economics and national security."⁹¹ This exponential increase in global interdependence yields a world environment in which any major military conflict would be detrimental to many countries beyond those exchanging military fires. In the recent words of the American Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, "The U.S.-China relationship is the most complex and vital relationship in the world today...we must not allow our disagreements to negate aspects of our relationship that are so critical to the region and the world."⁹² Statements such as this make clear the development of a stable international system must be the guiding factor in American relations with China.⁹³ High-level government officials on both sides have expressed similar goals for the relationship and the sentiment must be carried through with actions to develop it. China's stated core interests are the development of a "stable, harmonious and prosperous society" with a leading role in shaping the global community.⁹⁴ Similarly, the United States desires a cooperative and complete relationship with China.⁹⁵

Perspectives and Importance to US, Allies, and Enemies

The examination of each side's perspective on the relationship is the focus of many recent political science and international relations discussions. This topic goes even further to examine each side's assumption of the other's perspective as well as the importance to all parties. The ultimate goal of the United States, as established by President Obama in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, is to ensure the security of the Nation, allies and partners and "seek the prosperity that flows from an open and free

international economic system.”⁹⁶ The United States also values a “just and sustainable international order where the rights and responsibilities of nations and peoples are upheld.”⁹⁷ These priorities have been stated many times over by American leaders in various forums, but always return to the same basic guidance. In a similar fashion, China has many times prioritized their core interests as regional stability, specifically China’s territorial integrity with respect to situations in Taiwan, Tibet and XinJiang, and the “legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party as the Ruling party of China.”⁹⁸ This issue is further exacerbated as America continues to build “an anti-China coalition consisting of the USA, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Southeast Asia could put China in a desperate situation.”⁹⁹ In addition, America is conducting negotiations with various stages of implementation to re-establish bases in the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia.¹⁰⁰ At a time when the world is worried about China’s actions in the South China Sea, America is building the capacity to quickly close the Strait of Malacca. This circle of containment has been speculated as a strangle hold which, if implemented, which would shut down the Chinese economy within a month. This strength-based coercion, even the threat of or prepositioning for such action is detrimental to the peaceful partnership between the two powers. As the perspectives of each nation are examined, each must remember Newton’s Third Law of Motion. China must “be careful about policies seeming to exclude America from Asia and...sensitivities regarding human rights, which will influence...the U.S. stance toward China.”¹⁰¹ In similar fashion, America must be cognizant that a “hectoring tone evokes in China memories of imperialist condescension and...is not appropriate in dealing with a country that has managed 4,000 years of uninterrupted self-government.”¹⁰²

Issue Importance

The next aspect of framing involves examining the importance of the issue to both sides. For America, focus has been placed on the increase of China's military expenditures and the perceived threat this might pose to the region and the United States.¹⁰³ This must be considered in perspective. Many outlets are portraying the Chinese military growth against that of the United States' level of growth (Figure 1). What must be also taken into consideration is the scale of defense spending.




Figure 1. Military Spending¹⁰⁴

The increase in Chinese defense expenditures remains only a portion of that spent by the United States (Figure 2). Their increase in military spending still only peaks at a level of 2.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the United States remains at 4.8% of a GDP currently twice the size of China's.¹⁰⁵

Defense Spending




Figure 2. Defense Spending¹⁰⁶

Of similar importance, American rhetoric has also focused world attention on human rights issues in China. Although this is of significant importance, the first goal of international relations should be “Improving the human condition for people in both...countries [which] should always drive the priorities on which our relationship is based.”¹⁰⁷ As the U.S. Secretary of State proclaimed in 2009, “U.S. pressure on human rights issues “can’t interfere” with dialogue on other crucial topics.”¹⁰⁸ This view results in prioritizing the development of international relations over resolving human rights issues at the current time.

During recent times, China has placed importance on the economic front by first purchasing \$2.2 trillion in American debt and other foreign paper then refocusing foreign exchange reserves to “support and accelerate overseas expansion and acquisitions by Chinese companies.”¹⁰⁹ These actions made China significant wealth, but also made the two economies inextricably linked for success.

Stakeholders, Decision Makers, Blockers and Baggage

The unique dilemma about the relationship between America and China is the exorbitant worldwide implications of either a successful bilateral relationship between the two or devolution into another Cold War. In addition, the framing concepts of stakeholders, decision makers and blockers drastically intermingle with the concept of negotiation baggage. These two countries affect most every issue on the world stage. Recently, Tom Donilon, national security advisor to President Obama, acknowledged, “there are few diplomatic and economic challenges that can be addressed in the world without having China at the table: from North Korea, to Iran, to Syria, to global economic rebalancing and climate change.”¹¹⁰

Along these lines, the Korean Peninsula constitutes both a stakeholder and blocker. “Almost sixty years after the end of the Korean War, the peninsula remains one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world.”¹¹¹ The United States has significant concern with the way China is dealing with nuclear weapons in North Korea. This frustration lies in the framing of the Korean Peninsula issue as well. America has a simple view of this issue that involves nuclear weapons and is short on patience while China’s more complex concern also involves the “potential for chaos along its borders.”¹¹²

The many years of fear developed through the Cold War’s bipolar struggle between the expansion of Communism and pursuing the freedom the west worked hard to obtain in World War II resonates deeply in the U.S. culture. But it must not be an obstruction to progress in the emerging era of shared economic and security issues. The emerging relationship between the U.S. and China must be based on the needs of

global governance and interdependence and should not be necessitated on shared ideology.¹¹³

It must not be overlooked that issues such as the one involving Taiwan lie at the heart of Chinese core values. In this situation, Taiwan would be considered both a stakeholder because of direct interest and involvement as well as a blocker because the issue has terminated the relationship in the past. Finally, Taiwan is also a decision maker with respect to the fact it is the “most sensitive issue at the core of the normalizations of China-U.S. relations” and arms purchases from America could be detrimental to the issue.¹¹⁴ In this unique situation, Taiwan’s future is increasingly dependent on the progressing interactions with the mainland and, although the United States does not always get a vote, they are committed to the Taiwan Relations Act.¹¹⁵ Of Chinese concern here are the recent western arms sales to Taiwan and the potential to infringe on their core interests. Although American acknowledgement in 1972 that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintains there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China” allowed relations between the two countries to open, America must be very cognizant of current and future Taiwan interaction so as not to preclude a peaceful China relationship.¹¹⁶

What Happens Next: Realistic View, BATNA and ZOPA

As the future is mapped out, American leaders must determine which of the two emerging international relations paths to pursue. Trend one “stands for peace, development, and cooperation,” while the second yields “confrontation and conflict.”¹¹⁷ It is clear the current American negotiating style is predisposed to aggressive behavior and not sufficient for future relationships in the new world environment. As a result, the relationship with China must be dramatically reframed and the American negotiating

style must evolve from the confrontation-centered model of the past century to a cooperation model required in the new interlinked world. The current generation of leaders must realize “the relations between China and the United States may well determine whether our children will live in turmoil even worse than the 20th century's or will witness a new world order compatible with universal aspirations for peace and progress.”¹¹⁸

To complete the framing of this negotiation, the U.S. must develop a realistic view of what happens next along with determining both the ZOPA and the best alternative to a BATNA. In situations with the magnitude of world impact as the U.S.-China relation entails, there exists no BATNA that would be considered a success for world stability. If the United States stays on the containment path for China, it cannot be assumed the countries in the region that rely on Chinese imports and exports would stand united with the U.S. at the expense of their own economy. In the new century of complex intermingled economies, this is not a realistic option for the United States. Many political scientists have speculated on widespread neutrality on the issue in the region. The United States must forego a Cold War with China, make every effort to engage in a non-confrontational economic partnership and present China with the opportunity to become an international partner. Further, this teamwork will allow the global economy to continue development and “reap the rewards of integration in a more multipolar, interdependent world.”¹¹⁹ The United States must not continue, as the RAND Corporation recommended in the past, a containment policy with China.¹²⁰ Not only must the United States cease the current arms race and evolution of the security dilemma with China, it should embrace “Defense Diplomacy” as an element of conflict

prevention.¹²¹ This term, which traditionally has implied realpolitik peacetime military cooperation and assistance, has in recent years developed to include “strategic engagement with former or potential enemies.”¹²²

As this strategic relationship is reframed, the U.S. must plan to fully utilize the economic instrument of power to strengthen the world economy. The more interdependence is developed between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, the less likely each will resort to military aggression. This is a principle clearly established and explained by Friedman’s “Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention.”¹²³ In this manner, America must use “comparative economic strength to defeat any threats to stability,” not military might.¹²⁴ Stability must be the new predominant goal of international relations. It is obvious that the era of waging war between nationalistic ideals is over. No longer are nuclear weapons the only method of mutually assured destruction around the globe. The interwoven economies of nations prevent the destruction of another without coincident destruction of both economies...not unlike the events that would have unfolded if first launch occurred during the Cold War. The outcome would be fiscal devastation instead of nuclear fallout. Stability strengthened by partnership must be the ultimate goal of international relations.

As this manuscript opened with Clausewitz, so it will close. It was previously stated that when framing a negotiation, the perspective of each side must be fully examined and understood. America operates on four-year plans tied to the political election cycle while China has a 50-year plan. In similar fashion, the leading Western strategic theoretician, Clausewitz, focuses teachings on the preparation and conduct of a central military battle while his Chinese counterpart, Sun Tzu, focuses on the

psychological weakening of the adversary.¹²⁵ As Henry Kissinger recently noted, China is a patient study of growth with incremental advances and they will not likely risk a winner-take-all global military conflict.¹²⁶ The United States must develop sincere long-term plans for partnership around the world as the way forward. The superpower must relax the belief that every problem has a military solution and embrace the new world order in which economics are the primary driving force behind change.

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