

STRATEGY OR NO STRATEGY: EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF A
DANISH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

STRATEGY OR NO STRATEGY. EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF A DANISH NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, by Major Nicolai Schat-Eppers, 83 pages.

My thesis integrates findings from the disciplines of strategic studies and institutional analysis to ask two intertwined questions. First, does Denmark--a small sovereign state--need a public national-security strategy? Although there is ample literature debating the merits and necessity of national strategies, no scholar has yet drawn on this literature to ask whether Denmark would benefit from a publicly available strategy. I analyze official texts from Denmark's civil-service community and legislative committees to argue that Denmark needs a grand strategy to produce feasible, harmonious, and prioritized national-security policy. Second, why does Denmark not have a national-security strategy? I apply institutional analysis to explore the incentive structures that have caused Denmark's policymakers to avoid drafting a security strategy. I conclude, contra Williamson Murray, that Denmark does need a strategy; however, significant institutional hurdles within Denmark's legislative committees and civil-service ranks hinder its adoption.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

[G]rand strategy is a matter involving great states and great states alone.
— Williamson Murray, *Thoughts on Grand Strategy*

My argument is twofold. I first argue, contra Williamson Murray, that small states do need a national security strategy. A small nation such as Denmark needs a national security strategy to lead a proactive discourse and maximize its influence given limited resources. If she fails to achieve her goals, resources will diminish faster than it is possible to replenish. Second, I show Denmark's lack of a strategy is attributable to perverse incentive structures within Denmark's legislative committees and civil-service ranks. In closing, I suggest Denmark should approach a national security strategy in the same manner as the Dutch, who invite the whole of society to address the opportunities the nation should pursue.

When deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, I witnessed an interaction between my battalion commander, Danish civil servants, several government officials and our prime minister. My commanding officer requested informal feedback on our ability to achieve the goals set by the Danish government. The reply was professionally and strategically jarring. The Prime Minister vaguely remarked that we were doing a good job and that we must "keep it up." There was no reference to measures of performance or effectiveness, let alone anything substantively linking our tactical actions on the ground to policy outcomes. When the commanding officer attempted to obtain tangible guidance, another

civil servant weakly alluded to Denmark's foreign security policy. What accounts for these high-ranking officials' strategic vagueness?

A second illustrative interaction involved the soldiers of my infantry company as they questioned the long-term effects of our achievements. I had difficulty answering these questions because it was challenging to operationalize the Danish government's vague criteria for success. I spent many hours trying to discern some strategic significance for my soldiers, who had experienced so much death and destruction.

The absence of clear and tangible criteria continued to haunt me after my return home. When asked about what was accomplished, I felt lost. I continue to battle with my integrity and my conscience. During that year, I lost two soldiers, and 16 men were severely wounded with life-altering injuries—and for what? What is the greater good for Denmark?

On reflection, it becomes clear that the absence of a public national security strategy has a grave, demoralizing, and confusing effect on the very people who are trying to protect and advance Danish interests.

These experiences have led me to explore and try to understand the absence of a Danish national security strategy. A national security strategy is necessary to provide clear goals, measures of performance, and accountability for policy makers and practitioners at all levels. Denmark needs a national security strategy. This document shows why we need one and what must be systematically addressed before we can incorporate such an important document into our national security policy.

Background

Denmark has various sub-strategies, defense reviews, security policy statements, contingency plans etc. all focused on specific subjects. These sub-strategies vary greatly in detail and utilization of capabilities, yet there is no national-level document that synchronizes, all of these elements in an integrated fashion.¹ How can a small nation pursue its national interests without a comprehensive national security strategy that addresses all elements of national power?

The Current and Emerging Operational Environment

Globalization and emerging strategic challenges are increasing the complexity of government decision-making, with a dynamic array of actors, actions, and unintended consequences (Command, United States Joint Forces 2012). The emergence of interrelated challenges defies the traditional understanding of security and defense.

As complexity increases, understanding issues and identifying actors is more challenging and complicates policymakers' understanding of their own actions in the global arena. Strategic challenges relate not only to interstate conflict, nuclear deterrence, and transatlantic cooperation, but also intrastate conflict, humanitarian relief, terrorism, failing states, and piracy. It is difficult to plot the right course without knowing how and why actors might react to various interventions and sociopolitical dynamics. Harder still, is the attempt to navigate without a guiding light to plot the course (Blair 1999).

These threats often appear connected and seem to fuel one another by the ripples of their interactions. The emergence of these interrelated issues challenges our

¹DIME–Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic.

understanding of security and defense. These issues challenge us to understand and implement concepts such as hard, soft, and smart power. Smart power especially, reminds policymakers that security policy no longer entails solely military issues, but must capably encompass diplomacy, information, military, economies, development, humanitarian assistance, democracy, and human rights all with an eye towards achieving objectives to advance the national interest (Minister of Foreign Affairs 2013b).

From Neutrality to Activism

Denmark has historically maintained an ambiguous security policy wavering between neutrality and an activist approach. The shortage of a consistent policy often led Denmark to avoid committing to any side or issue until greater powers forced Denmark to act. Lacking a declared strategic policy often resulted in Denmark's failure to achieve its political goals. Often these goals were unknown.

The Napoleonic Wars are an example of Denmark's failed neutrality. France forced Denmark to choose sides, causing Denmark to lose the war (Larsen 1997). Following the Second World War, Denmark embarked on a more active foreign policy and joined several alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) to minimize its power deficit (Mouritzen 2012). During this period, Denmark navigated the international environment on an issue-by-issue basis. Hence, other sovereign states had difficulty assessing Denmark's policies, causing a reduction in Denmark's political influence (Doeser 2011, 224-225). The absence of consistent policy has some degree of political consequences as the following quote explains:

It is assumed that rather intangible phenomena such as prestige, reputation, and resolve are affected positively if there is a high degree of correspondence between words and political action. If there is not a considerable degree of correspondence, the value of credibility, prestige, and willpower will be limited accordingly. (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005, 344)

Denmark's actions did not meet their words because no policy was articulated. For this she suffered the consequences.

An example of suffering these consequences because of unclear foreign policy was evident during the "Footnote Era" (1982–88). An alternative parliamentary majority forced the government to adopt specific national positions on nuclear and arms control issues without integrating them into a larger, well thought out national security strategy. This led to a lack of coherence between words and actions, and caused serious political disagreements with the United States and strained relationships in NATO, the UN, and, to some extent, with the United Kingdom (Petersen 2009).

Following the Cold War, Denmark embarked on an increasingly activist policy to employ Danish military assets (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005). Denmark focused more intently on this discourse of activism and participation after the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the election of Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001). During Rasmussen's administration, troops deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan during 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq in 2003. The Fogh government acknowledged the flaws in past Danish policies. In Fogh's own words:

We must have the courage to break with our inferiority complex of being a small state. We have to understand that a small country can set an agenda and make itself heard on the international scene. We therefore have to make a strategy for our foreign and security policies, which will strengthen Denmark's position in selected fields. (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005, 339)

The decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan and Iraq marked the Danish transition from a security consumer to a security provider, but the strategy Fogh spoke of still does not exist.

Significance of this Thesis

As Denmark pursues a more active foreign and security policy, the human and economic costs associated with the policy changes have become more evident. At the national level, the political and public debate has increased in intensity, as costs are not associated with any tangible goals. The absence of a Danish national security strategy makes a cost-benefit analysis of political activism nearly impossible. Strategic indeterminacy increases the complexity of assessing political decision-making (Minister of Foreign Affairs 2010).

Denmark, as an international actor, has pursued various foreign policy goals. These have primarily aligned with the United States and United Kingdom, but also with institutions such as the UN, NATO, and EU. In parallel, Denmark has pursued specific national values such as human rights. Given these multiple strands of effort, I argue that the external audience perceives Danish foreign policies as ambiguous and Denmark's reputation, credibility, and influence are adversely affected (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

The absence of a national security strategy to guide decision-making on geopolitical issues has also impeded cross-governmental integration and synchronization in places such as Afghanistan. Furthermore, I argue that multiple departments and agencies exert efforts in the same areas with little effect, no effect, or even counter-

productive results.² Similarly, without a national security strategy as guidance, departments work individually and the nation does not speak with one voice. The existing sub-strategies are uncoordinated, inconsistent, and originate from multiple sources.

These observations indicate that Danish politicians have not learned from history, thereby reducing the likelihood of efficiently achieving Danish political goals. However, it is not sufficient to acknowledge that Denmark lacks a national security strategy, or to argue that she should have one. It is also necessary to examine why she is absent of one.

This thesis will inform understanding as to why Denmark has not previously developed a national security strategy. I analyze the causal logics at play through the application of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, identifying how structures and institutions influence decision-making on policy development and implementation. This will show that not only do we need a national security strategy, but we also must first address the unintended reasons why we have failed to develop one thus far.

Problem Statement and Research Questions

The absence of a national security strategy forces Denmark to react to the actions of others. Strategic theory states this deficiency leads to unintended consequences such as excessive spending on security issues, misunderstandings between international as well as domestic actors, and the loss of political influence on the great and middle powers in

²Denmark has tried to resolve this by publishing a specific strategy policy on Afghanistan.

the International Society.³ Therefore, by not developing a comprehensive national security strategy, Denmark falls victim to these unintended consequences rippling off from other actors and agendas with scores of potentially of unforeseeable consequence.⁴

The absence of this comprehensive national security strategy leads to several questions:

1. How can a small state without a national security strategy pursue its national interests and address current and future challenges in the international political environment?
2. Without a national security strategy, can a small nation consider itself a credible participant in the International Society?
3. Is strategic non-commitment part of Denmark's strategy to remain flexible and adaptable as threats or opportunities arise?
4. Do Danish politicians align with strategies already in play among the UN, NATO, and the EU?
5. Does Denmark or any small state need a national security strategy?
6. Are there motivational problems in Danish politics responsible?
7. How can the Danish society hold the government economically and ethically accountable without a national security strategy?

³Middle powers as defined by International Relations theory are countries like Canada, Australia and more recently the United Kingdom and France (Jackson and Soerensen 2007).

⁴These effects are thoroughly described in complexity theory as in systems thinking.

These questions guide my enquiry and present a road map for determining the need for a strategy as well as the barriers to such a strategy. This thesis is all encompassing and is not without its limits. Such limits are discussed in the following section.

Limitations

No existing literature discusses the relationship between grand strategy and small states, to include Denmark. Despite an exhaustive review of available literature relating to reasons for Denmark's lack of a national security strategy, no viable explanation seems to exist. Very little research exists on Denmark's need to develop a national security strategy. Most of the literature addresses small nations in a collective sense, i.e. Scandinavia or small nations of the EU. No available literature directly discusses Denmark's approach to national security strategy. Thus, the literature review draws on scholarly work with links to Danish national security interests and policies. To understand the reasons Denmark has not publicly issued a single, coherent, and public document, it is necessary to examine the actions and narratives of the open systems that shape Danish political discourse.

The study is purposely limited in scope to an analysis of why Denmark has not developed an overarching document. The main reason for the narrow focus is that the first step of strategy development is to understand the forces at play in collective-action problems. In addition, this thesis has been researched under time constraint, which did not allow for interviews of relevant politicians and civil servants.

This study does not seek to offer conclusive findings. The paper's conclusion is principally a theoretical inquiry with sufficient empirical evidence suggesting my theory's plausibility. Put otherwise, I offer empirical evidence as a plausibility probe.

Chapter 2 will review the available literature on both strategy theory and human behavior to show the shortages in current literature specifically concerning Denmark and the two research questions.

Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and design used, applying this methodology to key themes in chapter 4.

Chapter 4 outlines the findings of the theoretical inquiry providing linkage to the reviewed literature.

Chapter 5 highlights the findings suggesting the plausibility of my theory and offers recommendation for future research and change.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this study is to explore whether small states need a published national security strategy, and to determine why Denmark does not have a national security strategy. Chapter 1 established the foundations for why this research is important and specifically framed the research questions. First, does Denmark, a small sovereign state, need a public national-security strategy? Second, why does Denmark not have a national security strategy? The purpose of this review is to examine available literature discussing grand strategy and small-state theory.

Despite the fact that both subject areas are relatively well researched in general, there is a dearth of literature on these topics concerning Denmark. None of the existing literature discusses the relationship between small states and grand strategy or how a small state's resources should be applied in grand strategy. The literature does not take into account incentive structures or institutional obstacles in domestic politics, nor does it account for how influence and power relationships affect foreign and security policy. The literature fails to examine how alliance policies interact with strategic thinking, or how small states can apply strategy as a leverage to maximize their influence on others while minimizing negative outcomes. There also exists a blackhole in regards to how small-state activism affects traditional small-state theory and the need for a national security strategy, specifically when alliances and partnerships with great powers are brought into the equation.

The Context of Sovereign States–Interactions in International Society

Conventional international relations theory offers competing causal explanations for why states behave as they do. The three dominant international relations theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism explore different aspects of state interaction when explaining the behavior of actors in regards to power, influence, cooperation and governing institutions of the international system. Realists are mainly concerned with the survival of the state and see states as self-interested rational actors. Liberalists build on realism, understanding that states have mutual benefit from cooperation at institutional level. Constructivists see a state action as a result of how the state perceives the system it is a part of. None of these theories manages to explain Denmark's present situation as a small state pursuing a policy of activism without any national security strategy (Jackson and Soerensen 2007).

The theories do expand on actors' actions as their positions and functions vary in a given context of rules and organizations, as well as how actors' thoughts and instinctual elements influence their actions. However, they fail to address how these actions and reasons connect in a myriad of open systems.

Therefore, after reviewing different schools of international relations and finding that none manages to capture the specific situation of Denmark, it is still necessary to find some measures that will satisfactorily account for a state's institutional incentive structures and that drive foreign policy actions.

Hedley Bull's International Society theory incorporates many traditions of international relations comprehensively. It states that the International Society needs world order to support the state's interests and actions (Bull 2002, 21). Bull states that to

reach world order it is necessary to attain six goals. After the six goals are achieved, the five institutions then sustain the new order (2002, 16-18). The intent of International Society theory is to reach some form of durable balance through world order (Bull 2002, xxxii). The theory endeavors to sustain the situation by the application of five international institutions. Bull's theory of world order and status quo has utility in explaining what might drive the actions of all actors, great or small, in the International Society. Bull's six goals are:

1. The preservation of the system and the society of state itself.
2. Maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states.
3. The goal of peace . . . in the sense of absence of war among member states of the international society as the normal condition of their relationship, to be breached only in special circumstances and according to principles that are generally accepted.
4. Limitation of violence resulting in death or bodily harm.
5. The keeping of promises.
6. The stabilization of possession by rules of property.

The five international institutions:

1. The balance of power.
2. International law.
3. Diplomacy.
4. War.
5. The great powers.

The goals and institutions are points to consider to understand Denmark's foreign and security policy objectives when reviewing policies, statements and actions. Bull's theory discusses actions taken in the International Society; however, it does not elaborate on what domestic political incentives drive actions of a state in the International Society.

Grand Strategy Theories–Concepts, Benefits and Outcomes

The literature addressing the concept of strategy is not neat and tidy nor is the definition of strategy as applied to national policy. Basil Liddell Hart was one of the first modern-day scholars to define strategy as a concept of synchronizing the nation's ends and means at the highest level (Liddell Hart 1967).

Harry R. Yarger defines strategy as the art and science of developing and utilizing all elements of national power to protect or advance national interests in accordance with policy guidance, the external, and the internal contexts you are facing (Yarger 2008). Yarger does not precisely address how a small state with limited resources can mitigate its lack of national power when applying its capacities to their maximum. Yarger sees the purpose of strategy as providing the state with a proactive discourse, affording a state the opportunity to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative consequences.

Thus, good strategy seeks to influence and shape the future environment as opposed to merely reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is to a large degree its antithesis. Crisis management occurs when no strategy or the strategy fails to properly anticipate. Thus, the first premise of a theory of strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory, but not predictive. (Yarger 2008, 17)

The absence of a strategy leaves a nation capable of operating in a mode of crisis management without any clear pattern of intent. With no consistency the degree of correspondance between words and action is limited. The follow on affects being limited credibility, prestige and willpower (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

The chosen discourse of a state takes place in a complex and rapidly emergent environment, where the state is either cooperating or competing with other actors pursuing their objectives (Yarger 2008, 15). To maximize or minimize outcomes the state must employ specific elements of power in the most coherent and optimal manner in order to achieve its own objectives. The objectives, according to Yarger are survival, economic well-being, favorable world order and promotion of national values, which can either be of supporting or conflicting nature (Yarger 2008, 17).

Yarger defines the elements and tools of national security strategy; these are abbreviated as DIMEFIL⁵ (Yarger 2008, 72). Yarger's definition and components are comprehensive, but Yarger does not address how a small state can compensate for the absence of resources when attempting to balance risks.

A more elaborate and developed theory of strategy has been compiled by Colin S. Gray in his book "The Strategy Bridge, Theory for Practice." Gray connects grand strategy directly with statecraft and implies that the only way to govern a state is by grand strategy.⁶ Gray contends that strategy is not predictions and does not provide a final checklist guaranteeing a certain result (2010, 27). His theory is an analytical framework, and it is independent of the context's subjective matters such as time, place, the environment, therefore, affording the theory objectivity. It is clear that Gray's theory applies to both great powers as well as small states; otherwise, it would not be a "general theory."

⁵DIMEFIL: Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement.

⁶Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 20--: Statecraft: Skill in managing state and political affairs.

Gray's framework for a systems approach to grand strategy rests on 21 dicta, of these, dictums 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 seem most beneficial for this research. In these dicta, Gray points out that absence of a clear grand strategy means less clarification, poorer coordination, and less chance of success (2010, 28). A state must be cautious not to overreach its resources, remembering that the context is under constant change, and policy is only an intention and cannot drive action. Gray also stresses that grand strategy is at the peril of the humans developing and implementing it.

Gray's general theory defines how to arrive at a grand strategy taking into account the human factor. Nevertheless, it does not add knowledge to how small states with constrained resources should develop and implement grand strategy in a multipolar world.

Adhering to the context surrounding a state in its efforts to compose a national security strategy are Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow. The authors bring valuable understanding to what action situations might be influencing the collective-action process of strategy development. They explain what possible causal mechanisms might be in place channeling the actions of actors and institutions. They give an example of health officials trying to discourage the use of tobacco while other government organizations rely on the tax revenues from tobacco products. The example illustrates what the authors call "self-defeating behavior" and clearly states the purpose for why a sovereign state needs grand strategy (Drew and Snow 2010, 18). It is in order to coordinate national efforts and avoid counterproductive efforts. As the authors' state, "[national strategy] is the process by which a country's basic goals are realized in a world of conflicting goals

and values held by other states and non-state actors. . . . Without coordination, the instruments of power can work at cross-purposes” (Drew and Snow 2010, 17, 31).

However, the authors do not distinguish between collective-action problems of great powers with ample resources and small states with much less. Nor do they consider the dimension of how a small state best achieves maximum influence with little room for maneuver caused by scarcity. They also fail to consider how the concept of time influences a small nation’s action.

Time is a factor Hal Brands considers in his studies. Brands states that grand strategy as a concept connects current actions with short-term, medium and long-term goals. It forms a government's interactions with other external actors, or be it, the execution of grand strategy. Brand does not take into account how these interactions also have a domestic component to them. He argues that applying grand strategy is the act of policymakers conducting business in accordance with a more structured and coherent “idea” of what their nation is trying to achieve rather than reacting to events on a case-by-case basis (Brands 2012).

Although the strengths of grand strategy are clear, the relationship between grand strategy and small states is less so. The literature does not take into account the level of resources available, or how alliances interact with strategic thinking, or how small states can apply strategy as a leverage to maximize its influence on others while minimizing negative outcomes. The only connection between small-state theory and grand strategy is a seemingly hybrid body of literature that at first glance attempts to bridge the gap between grand strategy theory and small-state theory.

A Hybrid of Grand Strategy and Small-State Theory

Scholar A. J. K. Bailes claims that none of the Nordic countries needs a grand strategy due to the benign environment's absence of traditional security threats. Bailes's main points are the Nordics are driven by "deep strategy," that strategy can be applied as a useful tool for communicating intent, that small states only really have three courses of action, (1) neutrality, (2) joining strong alliances, and (3) protection or partnership with a great power. In addition, the absence of strategy is due in part to International Society's institutions and history (Bailes 2011, 5).

Bailes's research is valuable, but it does not study how Denmark's policy of activism changes the need for strategy, as Denmark no longer is in a benign environment of the bipolar era.

Small-State Theory

Empirical research on small state national security strategy is sparse. A small but seemingly sufficient selection of study exists on small-state foreign policy. This research attempts to develop a unifying theory while, focusing mainly on small states' strategic dilemmas during two periods of history--the Cold War and the initial period after the Cold War.

The theories do not account for today's constant changing context with unilateral and multilateral aspects, and fail to consider that small states are pursuing a policy of activism. The theories do shed light on action situations in domestic politics and possible institutional incentives at the collective-action level. However, nothing references the collective-action problem of the absence of a national security strategy.

Davis Vital characterizes small state behavior by a relationship of dependence to another actor or actors who are more powerful than the threat facing the state (Vital 1971). Vital does not concern himself with how a small state applies this as a given strategy nor how mixing alliances with great power partners works. Vital's main point is that small states can choose between neutrality and alliance. Vital states, "Small power policies are aimed at altering the external environment by reducing an unfavorable discrepancy in strength, broadening the field of manoeuvre and choice, and increasing the total resources on which the state can count in times of stress" (Vital 1967, 134).

Following this train of thought, Cooper sees the primary beneficiaries of international institutions as being small states. He argues that small states are more prone to a higher degree of participation in international institutions, e.g. the United Nation, for this will compensate for the constrained resources minimizing the power deficit. Therefore small states adopt the policy positions of the collective (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993). Cooper's arguments are valid, but do not identify how a small state should incorporate alignment of own goals with the collective, or how the adoption of policies will affect its own policies. Cooper also fails to consider the course of action where a small nation aligns with institutions but embarks on a partnership with a great power.

So far, the theorists have focused on limited resources. In attempt to remedy this separatist approach, J. K. Hey states that it is necessary to develop a conceptual understanding of the interrelationship between the levels of analysis rather than a compartmental causation model. Unfortunately, Hey's levels of analysis do not account for the power relationships among all actors, or how levels interact in accordance with multiple contexts. Her focus is solely on the actions and interactions of foreign policy not

on national security strategy. Even with the systems focus, Hey does not managed to examine the domestic causation at the collective-action level nor how this level influences foreign policy.

After reviewing Hey and her small-state theory research, a gap still exists on the subject of small state national security strategy, especially in respect to institutional incentive structures and how external actions of small states influence others.

Recently scholars of small-state theory have begun to view smallness in the light of the power they exercise, defining power as both the capacity to modify the conduct of other states while at the same time preventing other from affecting its own behavior (Goetschel 1998). As Jean-Marc Rickli expresses it:

In other words, power represents the ability to remain autonomous while influencing other. Adopting such a definition . . . by relating small-states' behavior to power, which in return is defined by the norms and rules in the international system. More over this relational perspective accounts for the power differential in different relations as a state can be weak in one area but powerful in another. For instance, Switzerland is a small state in all but the financial field where it exerts some global influence. (Rickli 2008)

Rickli introduces the power concept to small-state theory but does illustrate how to synchronize power with national security strategies, alliances or the incentive structures driving the competition for power.

Doesser claims that incentive structures of domestic politics use foreign policy as leverage for retaining political power. His main point is that politicians will use foreign policy as part of their strategy to retain power or gain power, i.e. as a bargaining tool rather than a tool for improving its position in International Society. To quote the research of Volgy and Schwarz (1991), "Political leaders in elective office aim to survive. It is contexts and circumstances when fundamental changes in foreign policy

serve that ultimate end that fundamental alterations of policy are most likely to occur” (Doeser 2011, 225).

What Doeser does not research is how domestic incentive structures are created by institutional reasons nor how the incentive structures account for the void of a national security strategy. Olsen and Pilegaard maintain that small states should focus their resources on participating in international organizations exchanging information which is the real way to gain influence (2005, 357). Their main points are that small states’ power lies in their ability to apply “soft” or non physical resources such as credibility, negotiation skills, resolve and diplomatic manoeuvrability in the absence of sufficient resources to exert power. They examine the ability of civil servants to perform “compensatory work” for what the civil service ranks perceive as the long term good (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005, 333).

The latter scholars do not research the incentives of the civil servants, nor question how a small state gains influence in the absence of a national security strategy and opting-out of the EU security cooperation. In this doing they fail to address the partnership with a great power to maximize the power deficit.

In summary, when analyzing the actions of a small state there are many variables to account for when examining why there is an absence of a Danish national security strategy. The application of small-state theory in the frame of grand strategy shows that a gap exists in the literature. It fails to address how small state resources should be applied in grand strategy while accounting for incentive structures in domestic politics where influence and power relationships affect foreign policy. There is also a blackhole in regards to how small-state activism affects traditional small-state theory and the need for

a national security strategy. This is specifically true when alliances and partnerships with great powers are brought into the equation. These gaps will drive my further research and will build the foundations for the analytical framework needed to fully appreciate the contexts in which actions are executed.

The further development of the analytical framework necessitates a review of other scholarly disciplines that consider the implications and incentives of human actions as a collective-action problem from a problem-solving perspective.

Building the Theoretical Framework of an Interdisciplinary Problem-Based Approach

There is an on-going debate in academia between social/political scientists and philosophers. The contention lies in whether the results of experiments are actually beneficial to social inquiry or not. The present debate questions the validity of scholarly research with reference to which approach a scholar applies to studying the question at hand. A key advocate of interdisciplinary problem-based approach is Ian Shapiro who argues that too many scholars of political and social sciences are method-focused. Shapiro writes that many scholars argue for the correctness of their chosen method rather than trying to discover the regularities of the issue. Arguing for their method may prevent them from considering other aspects of the given issue (Shapiro 2005).

Shapiro contends that if scholars wish to produce valuable work, they must approach research questions with a problem-driven focus, allowing them to entertain a host of unbiased questions through the simultaneous application of various research methods. Only then, will scholars reach a profound understanding of the causal mechanisms interacting in the sphere of the problem and avoid the fallacies of faulty

descriptions influencing the conduct of social science and the shaping of politics outside the academy.

When applying abductive reasoning to problem driven research, one aspect to address is the relationship between interacting entities. This interaction of social power is also known as the “power-over” effect. Behavioralist Jeffery C. Isaac (1987), a realist political theorist, argues in “Beyond the Three Faces of Power” that there exists a fourth face (or type) that is social power. Isaac argues social power deserves interpretation in a structural/relational sense in order to fathom the complexity of the interactions between individuals and groups in their given settings. Isaac desires to raise attention to the structural causality leaving such reasons as institutions, or ideas for others to elaborate.

Craig Parsons develops Isaac’s concepts by adding three more types of causation. “In the spirit of ‘problem-driven research’ and ‘middle-range theory’ I am trying to propose basic categories of the ‘theoretically understandable bits’” (Parsons 2007, 15). Parsons defines a typology consisting of four core explanations for agency. Parsons’s purpose is to direct attention to the most basic elements of the logic of “what causes what” and he wishes to address how political actions of governance, power and the distribution of resources come about. The four causal explanations are actor centric and vary between claims of being man-made, exogenously given, positional, or interpretational.

Parsons's four causalities give conventional causal explanation in stable environments. Political actions of governance often occur in unstable environments such as crisis management situations, where emerging forces suddenly change the context. This instability is not part of Parsons’s theory.

William E. Connolly introduces the theme of emergent causality, viewing the world as comprised of open-systems each with the ability to affect others in what he terms as the “resonance machine.” The resonance machine creates unstable conditions, which have amplifying effects on other open-systems (Connolly 2011, 135). Connolly infers that agents are not only limited by their own agency but by the actions of and interactions with other agents. Looking through this lens, researchers may view political action in the light of emergence. Connolly’s theory of emergence does not account for the creation, sustainment or survival of these systems.

These systems, defined as political communities, are addressed by Roger M. Smith, who states narratives have multiple purposes and it is necessary to understand the aim in order to interpret them as opportunities or threats. He argues that all political leaders, both domestic and foreign, apply narratives in broad-ranging ways in order to gain and allocate power, status and resources. Smith clearly sees the narratives providing for the senses of common identities, purposes and goals, be they either political or religious.

Smith’s focus is on the ideational incentives of human action and not specifically, how narratives work in regards to a national security strategy where institutional incentive structures as well as structural incentives are also present (Smith 2003).

In closing, the very nature of the research question is one of social inquiry and is naturally receptive to theories of human actions. The general appreciation of political actions as power relationships is at the crux of politics.

The theories have relevance for this research as they examine power relationships, incentives, and how political actions of governance and distribution of resources come

about. The theories explain how actions have unintended consequences due to the open-systems, i.e. political communities, are connected. These political communities apply strategies as their narratives in order to gain or allocate power, status and resources.

As this theoretical inquiry studies the incentive structures of Danish politics, the reviewed theories all add to the understanding of how human interactions cause the absence of a national security strategy.

Conclusion and Chapter Summary

To capture the variables of the various theories and address the gaps in the literature, it is necessary to either construct or find an appropriate framework. The framework must account for the influences of institutional incentive structures and human interactions, while addressing the collective-action problem of not having a national security strategy.

To meet the need for an interdisciplinary approach, I apply a modified version of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. I use this IAD framework to examine relationships and interactions between multiple agencies at play in light of institutional incentives. The framework facilitates the ability to encompass the discoveries of multiple academic disciplines at multiple levels of analysis. The framework's focus is on collective-action situations that lay at the heart of development aid. Its design attends to the action arena in question in order to shed light on the interactions and outcomes that are taking place. It also explores the surrounding context, which frames and affects the action arena (Anderson et al. 2005). The framework can help us determine if Denmark needs a national security strategy, and why we currently do not maintain a national security strategy.

In closing, the review has shown that current studies and theories fail to address four areas:

1. How small states with limited resources apply grand strategy theory.
2. The relationship between grand strategy and alliance membership.
3. The incentive structures in domestic politics with asymmetric power relationships in regards to the absence of a national security strategy.
4. The relationship between Denmark's policy of activism with limited resources and small-state theory.

The review also shows that an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates social science is an appropriate method for investigating this problem. The next chapter, Research Methodology, will modify the framework by exchanging the variables of development aid with the variables from the reviewed theories addressing small states.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The literature reviewed in chapter 2 highlights the need for grand strategy and the application of an interdisciplinary-systems level approach to investigate multi-faceted causality. This chapter develops a method for investigation of the two intertwined questions outlined in chapter 1. It describes the research design and methodology employed to close the gap in literature identified in chapter 2. My overall aim is two-fold. First, this thesis explores whether Denmark will benefit from producing a national security strategy. Second, this thesis identifies those obstacles that are obstructing the creation of a strategy.

Research Design

To answer these two very different questions, I arrange my analysis in two parts. In part one, I analyze official texts produced within Denmark's civil-service community and legislative committees to argue that Denmark needs a grand strategy to produce feasible, harmonious, and prioritized national-security policy. I focus on three elements drawn from grand strategy literature. First, I examine officially declared aims, goals, objectives and ends. Second, I look at the role of the recognition of scarcity of resources and the chosen priority given to obtaining and preserving those resources. Third, I discuss priorities, which attempt to balance identified risks. Drawing on these three elements, I create the argument based on Williamson Murray's defined purpose of grand strategy,

that Denmark must develop a publicly available national security strategy to achieve its strategic goals while conducting an active strategic discourse.

The data set is from the following sources:

1. Government level speeches on national security policy to include annual speeches to the diplomatic corps assigned to Denmark and annual speeches to the UN.
2. Government level statements concerning the elements and instruments of national power, including capstone documents outlining Danish policies.
3. Danish responses to various security events.

In part two, I perform a theoretical inquiry with sufficient empirical evidence to describe why Denmark does not have a national security strategy. I apply institutional analysis to examine the incentive structures of the stakeholders that compose Denmark's political committees and civil service ranks. My aim is to offer empirical evidence as a plausibility probe to illustrate how rational Danish officials within both committees and government conduct actions within an obstacle course that generate a suboptimal outcome.

To understand the greater context discussed by Gray and the motives developed by Bull, I apply the term "External Context." In this context, due to the nature of social inquiry and the many types of actors, I add to the IAD Framework's context by taking the expanded actor-centric view offered by Parsons's causal logics. By analyzing the context for structural, institutional, ideational and psychological causality, it can explain incentive driven actions. The possible outcomes highlighted by small-state theorists are attaining or retaining power in order to maximize influence vis-à-vis autonomy seen

through a power deficit situation (Vital 1971; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993; Rickli 2008). In order to gain an understanding for Danish incentives and self-understanding through an external context, it is necessary to review the actors, their roles and purposes, and independent institutions' reports that compose the context. The next step in the analysis is to identify the relevant action arena, and analyze actors, action situations and narratives at play.

The analysis of the actor examines how individuals make decisions to derive inferences about possible patterns of behavior. By applying IAD Framework to the actors, one reviews how and what actors value, what information they have, how they select courses of action and what resources they have available. The basic assumptions of actor analysis are that they make rational choices and that all political action is a competition for power and influence. To determine if influence and autonomy drive the incentives for the outcomes of actions, Olsen and Pilegaard apply the variables of coalition power, credibility and civil-servants compensatory work. (2005). Additionally, I examine the incentive to retain the power of government (Doeser 2011), and then how power and influence are applied to modify behavior (Rickli 2008).

To bring depth to the domestic context, a review of all actors' specific narratives (in this case, party agendas for attributes of broad-based consensus and security policy), explain how actors interpret their position in reference to others and how it affects actor's undertakings. One must understand how power will be exercised and what are the obligations of the actors. These are signs which help us interpret actions (Smith 2003).

As for action situations, the focus is primarily on the collective-choice level where a desired joint outcome requires the input of several individuals. At the collective

choice level, the absence of a national security strategy demonstrates that actors choose actions that produce outcomes that are evaluated to be less desirable than others available to them. Motivational problems caused by asymmetric power relationship contribute to suboptimal outcomes. There are seven variables of the IAD Framework: (1) set of actors, (2) specific positions to be filled by actors, (3) allowable actions and their linkages to outcomes, (4) potential outcomes that are linked to individual sequences of actions, (5) the level of control each actor has over choice, (6) the information available to actors about the structure of the action situation, and (7) the costs and benefits which affect perceived incentives assigned to actions and outcomes (Anderson et al. 2005, 27-47). Understanding these variables leads us to understanding of the environment, the actors, and what influences their choices.

These seven variables of the IAD framework are weighed against the value actors assign to possible outcomes such as entering electoral alliances. By comparing the lists of ministers, the distribution of parliamentary mandates, the distribution of party mandates on committees, and the list of the “Koordinationsudvalget” members, there is the possibility that this might uncover incentives driving motivational problems within the legislative committees and civil-service ranks.

Conclusion and Chapter Summary

The dual nature of this study, one normative in nature and the other one of social inquiry, naturally inclines the methodology towards a qualitative approach. For the first question, I apply a normative analysis of empirical evidence. The second question requires a framework able to support an interdisciplinary research design, utilizing an

actor-centric approach of interpretive analysis in order to produce findings relevant to the research question. Chapter 4 outlines and presents an analysis of these findings.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The research shows that Denmark does need a national security strategy to support its policy of activism. Significant institutional hurdles, specifically within Denmark's legislative committees and civil-service ranks, which, through counter productivity, lead to suboptimal results, cause the absence of a national security strategy.

The purpose of this research emerged during chapter 1,--to decide if Denmark, as small sovereign state, needs a public national security strategy, and to discover why Denmark does not have a national security strategy. The literature review uncovered an absence of inquiry regarding how small state resources should be applied in grand strategy while also accounting for incentive structures in domestic politics, where influence and power relationships affect foreign policy. Chapter 3 developed two separate research methods, the first to examine the chosen discourse of Danish polity by theoretical reasoning for the necessity of national security strategies. The second, to facilitate an interdisciplinary research approach by adjusting the variables of a tested analytical framework. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data collected in order to extract meaning and significance from the findings.

This analysis takes its point of departure in the understanding that all systems are open, complex, and constantly undergoing change (Connolly 2011).

Part One -Does Denmark need a Public National Security Strategy?

In the following section, I analyze official texts produced within Denmark's civil-service community and legislative committees to argue that Denmark needs a grand strategy to produce feasible, harmonious, and prioritized national-security policy. I focus on three elements. First, I focus on the aims, goals, objectives and ends desired by the official producing the text. Second, I examine the recognition of the scarcity of resources and the requisite need to choose how to marshal these resources to achieve the ends. Third, I evaluate priorities stated in policies to balance identified risks. Drawing on these three elements and the proponents of grand strategy, I argue that in accordance with Williamson Murray's defined purpose of grand strategy, the only way for Denmark to achieve its strategic ends and conduct an active strategic discourse is to have a grand strategy.⁷

Williamson Murray argues that, "No small state and few medium-size states possess the possibility of crafting a grand strategy. For the most part their circumstances condemn them to suffer." He supports his reasoning by drawing on a historical quotation from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War: "the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Murray 2011, 2, 33).

Murray's argument of small state resource scarcity stands in contrast to other renowned scholars such as Gray or Yarger. The proponents state that insufficient resources and the need to balance risks are precisely why small states must have a grand strategy. As Hew Strachan points out:

⁷Williamson Murray defines the purpose of grand strategy as achieving the right balance in those areas that matter the most.

In resource constraint times the need for Grand Strategy is clear in order to avoid wasted resources. 'The successive editions of the British National Security Strategy have continued to assert London's global ambitions, despite its diminishing resources. It is the relationship which lies at the heart of the dilemma confronting the status quo power; if ambition outstrips resources, the need for grand strategy, and for a coherent grand strategy at that, is all the greater because waste is both unaffordable and unforgivable.' (Strachan 2011, 1285)

The global economic recession also affects Denmark. Her growing ambitions of activism, combined with her limited resources, support the need for producing a national security strategy. From studying statements, speeches and documents it is apparent that government officials have begun to articulate elements of grand strategy. The polity is exhibiting an understanding for the changing context and attempting to connect the elements of national power

In a speech to the Diplomatic Corps in 2010 the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Lene Espersen, addresses the objectives of and the resources available to Danish foreign policy. She identifies that fighting terrorism and reducing global warming are both objectives of the traditional security policy, and part of economic security. She goes on to discuss the rippling effects of the world's interconnectivity and the need to rebalance the risk of global repercussions and then expresses concern for the resources available by stating that the Danish taxpayer deserves value for their money when funding Danish activism. The former Minister touches on all three elements in the current context. Her understanding, in light of Hew Strachan's quotation, articulates the need for grand strategy. The former Minister goes on to quote Professor Timothy Garton Ash who advocates the need for a common foreign policy in Europe in order to protect and advance European interests in a challenged world.

It is apparent that Danish officials are articulating the elements which grand strategy is composed of, but they have yet to bring these elements together as a coherent whole. On the Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage, it states that Denmark now has connected the necessary policies to achieve its objectives.

Efforts have thus been made to link the objectives of promoting security and stability with efforts to promote democracy, development and reconstruction. From the Danish point of view, security and development must go hand in hand. This is why the Danish foreign, security and development policies are interlinked. (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a)

The statement reveals that the Danish policymakers are motivated to coordinate policies, but it is not apparent how the Danish Government wishes to achieve these objectives. A possible explanation for this could be as Paul Kennedy points out: “The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in *policy*, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term, that is, in wartime *and* peacetime best interests” (Kennedy 1991, 5). I argue that Danish politicians and civil-service ranks cannot currently achieve a coherent application of all elements as the polity lacks the structural capacity to lead the development and implementation.⁸ Though much of the recent Danish political rhetoric displays signs of wanting to apply systems thinking to Danish policy, as well as the elements of strategy, action towards achieving that end has not been initiated. The next example will demonstrate this.

In a joint statement on the peace support mission in Mali, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, and of Development Cooperation, articulated the first step towards

⁸The observation furthers investigation. It will be brought to attention later in this analysis.

applying the instruments of national power in a coherent manner. The Minister of Foreign Affairs addresses the general context and position of Denmark: “The Danish contribution to AFSIMA represents further strengthening of Denmark’s already large, broad-based efforts for the stabilization of Mali. There can be no development without security; . . . this is why it is so important that we make use of all our instruments—both hard and soft.”⁹ The Minister articulates the need for applying all of the elements of national power to resolve an external security issue as its foreign policy dictates (Minister of Foreign Affairs 2013a).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs goes on to clearly express the Danish objectives, whereas the two other ministers specifically address the ways and means of achieving the ends. The latter statement also mentions that the intervention in Mali as an example of the Government’s “New Security Policy,” “where all relevant civilian and military instruments are flexibly brought into play to stabilise and prevent armed conflicts, with an emphasis on local solutions” (Socialdemokraterne 2012). This document does not constitute a national security strategy; it only describes policies on foreign policy issues. It does not clearly address tangible objectives, ends, ways, or means. It does demonstrate that the Danish Government, in one respect, understands the value of coherence between its instruments to resolve challenges, but does not understand what elements constitute such a national security strategy.

The 2010 and 2013 speeches, together with the New Security Policy, demonstrate a presence in the minds of the politicians for developing and implementing a national security strategy.

⁹AFISMA: African-led peace support mission in Mali

Pursuing a policy of activism means a state must be proactive. To be able to act a state must have a plan. A national security strategy is exactly the tool needed to go from being reactive to proactive (Yarger 2008, 17). Denmark has stated the need for the International Society to develop collective strategic approaches to global challenges but paradoxically lacks one itself. In a speech to the UN, the Danish Ambassador, Carsten Staur, clearly states the power of having a strategy at the collective choice level. “Strategic approaches, focusing on prevention and early action to dismantle problems, rather than on belated responses and interventions to deal with them when it is too late, too inefficient, and much too costly” (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012b).

A national security strategy offers exactly what the ambassador is advocating, the ability to be proactive, to intervene in a timely fashion influencing and shaping the environment, instead of just reacting to it (Yarger 2008, 17). As Strachan states in reference to the very purpose of grand strategy, “In an age of uncertainty, we need to be able to act quickly and effectively to address new and evolving threats to our security” (Strachan 2011, 1286). Being active in International Society only fortifies the need for articulating a national security strategy.

A national security also builds trust with both the domestic audience and the external audience by serving as a much-needed narrative communicating intentions and methods (Smith 2003; Bailes 2011). The strengthened policy of activism, both in rhetoric and in actions, and wanting to be a reliable, reputable and resolved actor in the international community, demonstrates that Denmark needs to publish a national security strategy (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005). This point is supported by Daniel Drezner who claims that a grand strategy can “offer an interpretative framework that tells everybody,

including foreign policy officials themselves, how to understand the administration's behavior" (Drezner 2012).

Such a narrative would have a positive resonating effect on the actions of other agents in the International Society (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005; Connolly 2011). By publishing, a national security strategy Denmark has the opportunity to build trust with other actors as long as it follows the announced intent and promised methods.

Conclusion and Summary of the need for Strategy

As identified from the reviewed policies and political statements, Danish rhetoric clearly articulates the needs defined in Williamson Murray's definition of grand strategy. They address the components and reasoning for a grand strategy. Danish activism combined with multiple aspects such as the complexity of the context, the need for communicating clearly and concisely to be perceived as a credible actor, and to the need to efficiently coordinate resources, strongly displays the requirement for a public Danish national security strategy. As a recent report by the Centre of Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen demonstrates:

The security capacity of the Danish state is the aggregated ability of state authorities and civil society to contribute to coordinated analysis, prevention and action in relation to the threats and risks that Danish citizens and Danish society are faced with in an open, complex international system that is constantly undergoing change... creating security for Danish citizens and the Danish society depends on the state's ability to use various instruments in a cohesive manner so that the limited resources available can be combined in the best possible way to create the best possible effect. (CMS 2012, 4)

Having analyzed the Danish polity discourse in the light of Williamson Murray's definition of grand strategy, I have argued that Denmark does in fact need a clearly communicated national security strategy especially considering the scarce resources

available, and the need to balance these against the growing number of risks identified in official texts.

Having established the need for a national security strategy, the next step of this analysis is to unveil why Denmark does not have a public national security strategy.

Part Two-Why does Denmark not have a Public National Security Strategy?

This question is the very genesis of this study. It is also difficult to discern in a clear and coherent fashion exactly why the Danish national security strategy does not exist.

In the following section, I perform a theoretical inquiry with sufficient empirical evidence to suggest my theory's plausibility of why Denmark does not have a national security strategy. I will apply the institutional analysis as described in chapter 3.¹⁰ My goal is to examine the incentive structures of the stakeholders that compose Denmark's political committees and civil service ranks in order to illustrate how rational Danish officials conduct actions that generate a suboptimal outcome. Specifically, the outcome entails an absence of a national strategic narrative and culture because of the nature of political institution.

An Institutional Analysis of the Danish Political Arena–System of Government

Due to minority governments and negative parliamentarianism, Danish politics has a long history of broad-based consensus decision-making (Denmark 2013). The multi-party system consists of 10 parties, with eight represented in Parliament at present.

¹⁰See Appendix D for modified institutional analysis framework.

The Danish tradition of minority governments is a result of the negative parliamentarianism principle and Denmark's proportional representation system.¹¹ The present parliamentary representation is based on the results from the 2011 elections. To provide for how narrowly a majority is elected in Danish government the recent election exemplifies this. The Red Alliance won over the Blue Alliance 50.2 percent to 49.3 percent, a mere 0.9 percent majority.¹² Because of the slight majority, which is common in Danish elections, there is a great need for coalition governance. For this reason, Danish politics are consistent over time with very few fluctuations.

This study considers the relationship between actors at the collective-choice level of politics. The actors include The Danish Parliament, Committees of the Danish Parliament, the numerous political parties in Parliament, and lastly, the Government.¹³ The latter is included due to its legislative power and ability to influence the collective action level in accordance with the Danish Constitution. More importantly, it represents all ministries, agencies, and civil servants outside the parliamentary and committee spheres that can influence the decision-making from the operational level.

Influences on the Action Arena

The action arena constitutes the actions of statecraft, influenced by the political culture and controlled by Parliament. Denmark's conduct of statecraft has changed over

¹¹Negative parliamentarianism. A system whereby the Government does not need to have a majority in parliament but must not have a majority against it.

¹²Red Alliance consists of Social Democratic Party, Social Liberal Party, Socialist People's Party, Red-Green Alliance, two mandates from Greenland and one mandate from the Faroe Islands.

¹³See Appendix A Open systems analysis of the domestic context.

the last decade. Now Denmark applies a soft approach rather than the typical mix of diplomacy and military means. The soft approach is evident from the position the Ministry of Defense has on the official list of Danish Government Ministers. The Ministry used to be at number 3 or 4 on the list just after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but now the Ministry of Defense is number 18 of 22.¹⁴ Traditionally strategy has been purely a military endeavor. The changes in the perception of the military as a means to enforce policy might have a direct influence on policymakers' evaluation of the need for a national security strategy (Denmark 2013).

During the course of the last seven years, it is apparent that the top seven ministries have changed. This list is not in alphabetical order, and therefore I presume it exhibits a listing by importance.¹⁵

Comparing the list of Government Ministers with a governmental committee called the "Koordinationsudvalget" (Folketinget 2011), which addresses all current and future issues, the seven full time members of the Koordinationsudvalget are also at the top of the official list of Danish Government Ministers.¹⁶ The comparison demonstrates how the Government values the instruments and elements of power. In addition, when correlated to the official documents, speeches, and texts reviewed in part one of this analysis, it infers what order the elements and instruments will prioritized and applied.

¹⁴I thank Lieutenant Colonel Michael Engholm, Danish Army, for bring this to my attention during a telephone conversation May 2013.

¹⁵It has not been possible to get this assumption verified in any manner.

¹⁶Denmark does not have a National Security Council as the USA. The National Security Council of the USA consists of the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense. To this list can be added others as appropriate (Yarger 2008, 99).

This finding, combined with Parliament's statement that the Finance and EU committees are the most influential committees in Parliament, supports the perception of Denmark's emphasis on the softer elements and instruments of power (Folketinget 2011). Both the politicians and the institutions governing politics are coherently attempting to maximize Danish influence through a soft approach to activism. The change in policy will have consequences for the political culture of Danish politics. Can this culture embrace the change?

The political culture of Danish politics is dependent on a host of factors. The one constant factor influencing legislative culture continually is the civil-service branch. However, the political culture is missing an important part-strategic culture. The absence of strategic culture affects the ability of Denmark to produce a national security strategy. Denmark is deprived of a strategic culture for three reasons. First, the historical context of Denmark prevents adoption of a strategic culture. Second, the asymmetric power relationship between the civil-service ranks and the politicians negatively influences the adoption of strategic culture. Finally, the concept of "Deep Strategy" prevents cognitive realignment of strategic interests.

The powerful legacy of the simple, bipolar context of the Cold War produces civil servants who are not educated in the alternatives to traditional small state behavior. They meet the future as they did the past. The civil-service ranks do not seem to have changed cognitively in accordance with the paradigm shift in foreign policy. There does not seem to be any divergent thinking-taking place. Consequently, there is a great reluctance among the community to work towards a national security strategy. In addition, the civil-

service ranks are sending distorted signals to the politicians as to the value of a national security strategy.

The reluctance to investigate alternatives might be due to motivational problems stemming from the paradox of choice. Choice involves loss and the fear of a national security strategy stripping the civil service of its powers over the politicians and policy might be a key driver (Anderson et al. 2005, 35-46). For example, civil servants attribute Denmark's positive position in the EU, to the compensatory work done behind the scenes by the civil service ranks (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

The absence of a strategic culture to drive strategy development and implementation is evident through the sparse electronic correspondence I have had with Danish civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Ministry of Defense.¹⁷

In the correspondence with a civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he argues that Denmark has conscientiously chosen not to have a strategy, and states it does not need one when organizing the Danish Armed Forces. This statement is evidence of the Danish way of regarding security at the operational level. It is a traditional approach, and not appreciative of the value of strategy from a practitioner's point of view. The civil servant from the Ministry of Defense offers a different explanation to the absence of strategy. He states it is primarily due to very little parliamentary interest to pursue such a development.

¹⁷I have had sparse email correspondence with two Danish civil servants during April 2013.

The third aspect affecting the development of a strategic culture is termed “Deep Strategy,” which addresses the beliefs and values of a state. In many of the reviewed policy documents, Denmark continuously expresses that it is “pursuing an active foreign policy combining Danish core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law with a willingness to act” (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). According to Bailes a small state might perceive that by openly communicating values and beliefs it is sufficiently providing guidance to all audiences, domestic and foreign, as to how it will prioritize and utilize its national power (Bailes 2011). If this is true, and combined with the absence of clear ways and means, then Denmark considers its beliefs and values sufficient to guide its elements and instruments of national power. It also leaves our national intentions open to the interpretation of multiple foreign partners.

The main influences for why a Danish strategic culture is non-existent are the powerful legacies of the Cold War, the motivational incentives of the civil service and the element of deep strategy.

Another aspect of political culture is the ability of Parliament to control the actions of government. The structure of parliamentary control provides incentives that could be at odds with the set of rules that govern legislation. Members of Parliament have five tools at their disposal for controlling the Government and scrutinizing its enterprises: control through questioning; weekly question hour and question time; interpellations; resolutions of criticism to a vote of no confidence; and finally, committees can call a Minister to answer questions at a committee meeting, also known as a consultation. (Folketinget 2012b).

The institutional control of the government creates a power relationship, and provides for strong structural incentives for motivational problems. Some Members of Parliament might wish to exercise political power based on personal interest counter to the common good they were elected to provide.

Patterns of Interaction: Incentives and a National Security Strategy

The characteristics of the action arena, the actors, and their interactions have created incentives that obstruct the adoption of a national security strategy. To best illustrate this, we must understand how draft legislation is processed. The way actors apply the set of rules is dependent on the structure of decision-making.

For a bill to become law, it needs three presentations in Parliament. After the first presentation, Parliament votes if the bill can proceed to one of Parliament's 26 standing committees for further scrutinization. After the committee has carefully reviewed the draft, it forwards the bill with an attached report stating the committee's findings. It proposes possible amendments to the bill or direct parliamentary resolution on behalf of the committee members' parties. During the second presentation, Parliament debates on the details of the bill based on the report.

Again, the bill can either be forwarded for resolution or amended in accordance with the debate, and possible elements of the constitution. After this step, the draft is put forward for the third and final presentation and vote. This whole process assures the greatest level of consensus between political parties.

From this process, it is evident that there exists an asymmetric power relationship between Parliament, political parties and the committees. The committees have a great deal of influence on the success of passing a bill. The power lies mainly in the

committee's report. The nature of the report will influence the remaining legislators to either pass or reject the bill. The asymmetric power relationship causes motivational problems as the powerful may resist a more efficient design due to their privileged status. The members may wish to retain control of policy on subject matters because their positions help them to enhance personal qualifications, and thus gain personal power and recognition. The asymmetric power relationship is one of the institutional hurdles obstructing a national security strategy suggesting the plausibility of my theory.

Incentives of the Committees—the Workings of a Standing Committee

The political power of a committee due to structure of parliamentary decision-making is an important determinant of the set of rules practiced at committee level. The practice of electoral alliances on committees lead to perverse incentives for influencing or retaining asymmetric power in regards to political outcomes.¹⁸ There are strong incentives to seek the support from other committee members or political parties that can support individual party agendas. It is apparent in Appendix C that parties have created alliances and that there has been a ceding of mandates between parties. However, nothing concrete can be established as to what incentives are behind these actions.

The asymmetric power relationship between members of committees, the committees, Parliament, and government produces motivational problems. The individual's motivation to contribute to joint benefits arises. The power relationship between actors contributes to the powerful resisting of arrangements that are more

¹⁸Electoral alliances lets parties seed mandates on committees to one another. There are no limits to these actions. Therefore, a party can pursue a certain agenda by trading mandates with other parties if it deems the cost-benefits favorable.

efficient since this would minimize their influence and power. This common practice of coalition power has effects on party policy and possible outcomes for committee policy (Doeser 2011; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

The motivational problems are due to the individual politician on a committee having four conflicting incentives: (1) Retaining political power, i.e., in order to influence policy as an individual (public recognition/appreciation); (2) As representative of a political party enforcing the party political agenda on committee issues; (3) Performing his/her job for the common good of the represented constituents; and (4) Preserving the power and influence of the committee they are on (Isaac 1987).

The existence of motivational problems to retain as much political power at committee level as possible is having a direct effect on the development and implementation of a national security strategy. A national security strategy will force committee members to follow a set discourse, forcing them to coordinate with other committees and jeopardizing their position of power, such as the ability to affect policy directly.

An overarching discourse would most likely place a great deal of power on the operational level, such as ministers and civil servants, since they are free to act as long as they act within the parameters of the national security strategy. The latter arrangement, changes the asymmetric power relationship that exists between the committees and civil servants and maximizes the operational level's influence while decreasing the committees' level of power. The committees in general might not be motivated to change the rules in place, as they will lose their political power advantage and autonomy.

Rational choices and perverse motivational incentives are governing the actions of individuals, committees and political parties.

Incentives of the Political Parties in the Parliament Narrative Analysis

Studying the incentives driving each party leads us to examine the distribution of mandates in Parliament and in the committees. This distribution identifies the political power and influence that each party is able to manifest.¹⁹

The Conservative People's Party is in a power deficit because it is the smallest political party and is dependent on other actors for support. It has strong incentives to enter electoral alliances to have influence on legislative matters. They strongly support international institutions as a method for Denmark to maximize influence on foreign policy and security issues.

The Danish People's Party, with the third largest voting bloc, possesses the power to influence decision-making at the committee level, but is dependent on electoral alliances due to their politics on immigrants. The party openly states it is willing to enter alliances to further the pursuit of its interests. The incentives for this might be power driven or an interpretation of what the constituents recognize as credible politics. It is against ceding Danish sovereignty to the EU, but firmly supports the UN and the Danish policy of activism.

The Liberal party has sufficient mandates to withhold from entering any electoral alliances or broad-based consensus decision-making. The party does advocate for broad-based parliamentary consensus and endeavors to work on a constructive basis with the

¹⁹See Appendix C.

opposition. The party strongly supports Danish activism through international institutions and believes in intervention for the benefit of the greater good. However, military intervention should be the last resort. The party's political strength provides for incentives to resist efficient policies that may reduce its political capacity on decision-making.

The Liberal Alliance is another one of Parliament's minority parties. It views broad-based consensus as counter-productive to achieving its main political agenda. The party supports all international institutions and supports the abolishment of the Danish EU opt-out on military cooperation. The reluctance to seek support of other parties through electoral alliances due to strong ideational beliefs, suggests inadequate motivation for solving collective-action problems such as producing a national security strategy.

The Social Democrats are the second largest party in the Parliament, and at the head of government. The party leads a minority government and is dependent on support from others to help sustain them. This provides for strong incentives to retain power at any cost. The party states it will align its policies with other parties in order to secure a broad-based consensus decision. It also suggests that powerful political incentives exist to use foreign policy as a mechanism to retain domestic political power (Doeser 2011). For this reason alone the party might view the production of a national security strategy as counter-productive to its ultimate goal.

The Danish Social Liberal Party has to compensate for its political power deficit, and sees broad-based consensus as a must in order to produce its political goals of joint benefits. The party possesses incentives to enter electoral alliances to help achieve and

sustain their policies. It supports the membership of the UN, NATO, EU, and the OSCE in order to create a collective security system to sustain world order. The party's power deficit affects its ability to achieve its "world order agenda" as it cannot change other parties' inadequate motivation for developing a national security strategy.

The Red-Green Alliance wishes to maximize its level of influence without compromising its political goals. It will seek broad-based decisions in parliament to improve society as a whole, and it is motivated to contribute to generate joint benefits. It views the UN to be the platform for achieving global peace and equality. It strongly rejects the actions of the USA in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo. The low number of mandates suggests the party will have to enter electoral alliances to be influential at committee level. The party's dual approach to cooperation makes it less clear what the true incentives are. It holds ideational reasoning high at committee level, but is willing to compromise on broad-based consensus.

The Socialist People's Party wishes to achieve the greatest degree of its politics through a practical and result driven cooperative approach to democracy. The party's low number of mandates in Parliament provides strong incentives to adjust its position on political goals in favor of power and political influence. From this perspective, the party will enter alliances in order to gain influence. The party fully supports the membership of and the continuous development of the UN, NATO, and the EU as international institutions. Due to its power deficit, it is in much the same position as the Red-Green Alliance, willing but unable to force others to agree on a national security strategy to achieve its agenda on international institutions.

The North Atlantic Parties from the Faroe Islands and Greenland are automatically entitled to two mandates each in the Danish Parliament. The mandates have relatively little political power or influence, and have strong incentives to pursue support from others who will sustain their politics. These incentives suggest the mandates work on an issues-to-issue basis creating electoral alliances from a rational action perspective. The mandates can be powerful in regards to the Danish tradition of minority governments, since they can ultimately possess the power to keep a government in office.

Incentives of the Government

The asymmetric power relationship between government, the committees, and the Parliament provides for inadequate motivational incentives of the government because it will go to great lengths to retain power. It will align its policies domestically with the common broad-based consensus (Doeser 2011).

The Government states Denmark must lead an active and responsible foreign policy discourse, and visualizes Denmark participating in the whole spectrum of operations, ranging from development aid to full-scale military operations (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).

The Government acknowledges that Denmark is a small state, and must focus on the continuous development of intergovernmental organizations and the international legal system to secure Danish influence. The incentives for this are due to the motivation to create efficient arrangements in the International Society. It is evident that there exists an asymmetric power relationship between states due to the disparity of resources. The Government sees the UN, NATO, EU, and the close relationship to the USA as fundamental to Danish security-and defense policy. The will to stay in power as a

minority government provides incentives that could be at odds with the official Danish foreign policy and the motivation for generating joint benefits for the nation, such as a national security strategy.

Outcomes: Implications for Developing and Implementing
a Danish National Security Strategy

An analysis of the incentives at the collective-action and operational level provides sufficient empirical evidence to be doubtful of the motivation for contributing to the production of a national security strategy, indicating my theory's plausibility. The situation leads to a collective-action problem because actors are choosing actions that produce an outcome, which is counter-productive to the joint benefits. The de-facto mechanism of legislative control lets the committees retain a high degree of power, which produces motivational problems because committees resist methods that are more efficient as this will distort the asymmetrical power relationship, which they enjoy. In the Danish political context, the following points causing an absence of a national security strategy were discovered:

1. Denmark lacks a strategic culture to produce a national security strategy.
2. Institutional structures create and support asymmetric power relationships fueling counter-productive incentives.

Finally, it was not possible to establish concrete findings from studying the distribution of mandates on the committees. The reasoning for why, who and when this happens needs further research. Nevertheless, an inference is that this happens in regards to power and influence.

An Institutional Analysis of the International Political Arena–International Society

The nature of International Society as a multilateral system where global power structures are changing makes it difficult to achieve world order in all six of Hedley Bull's goals. The International Society as a system has created the five necessary institutions to sustain world order. However, the balance of power is contestable since multiple aspects such as military might and economic power, are possible measurements.

The International Society is transitioning from a legacy of great global powers to the changing role of the hegemony of the USA. The latter is still the military hegemon, but emerging powers are overtaking it on economic and financial perspectives.

Influences on the Action Arena

The action arena constitutes the actions of multiple actors such as international institutions, great powers, coalitions and non-state actors.²⁰ The following quotation captures what aspects are influencing the action arena:

Globalization produces new opportunities and threats, and it creates a new framework for foreign policy. With the new communication channels, trade and investment intensity has increased. However, it has also furthered political globalization with the rise of new non-governmental players and serious cross-border problems such as terrorism, climate and environmental problems. (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013)

To govern these interactions the International Society has established global and regional institutions to maintain sovereignty of states and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The principle governing body is the UN, which imposes the rules in place, known as the UN Charter, and enforces via the UN Security Council. International

²⁰See Appendix B

Society has recently begun to follow a discourse of intervening in sovereign states' domestic affairs. The willingness to intervene influences the incentives of the actors in the arena, adding to the complexity of the action arena.

Patterns of Interaction: Danish Incentives and the International Society

Incentives of Denmark

As a small state Denmark has strong incentives to influence global politics through the international institutions due to its scarce resources. Her motivation for the continuous development of these institutions arises from the multiple asymmetric power relationships in the International Society. These circumstances force Denmark to pursue arrangements that are more efficient through the international institutions governing interactions. Denmark needs a forum where the strength of the collective helps sustain small states' political agendas where all members are equal.

Denmark's goal is to maximize its influence on international developments through the multilateral platform provided by the institutions such as the UN, EU, and World Bank.²¹ Denmark seeks influence through the application of coalition power by joining what she perceives to be winning coalitions or institutions (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005). The preservation of the multilateral system and the legitimate application of international law is in Denmark's view the best method to challenge the rising cross-border threats and embrace the changing power structures.

The strong incentives to influence the global power structure compels Denmark to pursue a discourse of "cooperation through alignment of national policy to the common

²¹Influence capability is defined as 'the state's ability to influence its external environment" (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

policy of the joined alliance” (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005, 345). The discourse of cooperation is a change in the last decade’s discourse of “bandwagoning” with the USA. Relying heavily on the “Great Power” choice, Denmark was forced to pursue a relational approach to the USA in order to gain geopolitical influence through security cooperation. The need arose from the change in Danish policy going from “defencism” to “cosmopolitanism” The consequence was the Danish opt-outs from the EU common defence and security policy (Petersen 2009).

The Danish government’s strong domestic incentives of retaining power also affect its actions in the International Society. The fear of losing power or ultimately office because of creating more efficient domestic arrangements, such as a national security strategy, creates inadequate motivation for Denmark to contribute wholeheartly to the production of a stronger world order which is the paradox of the International Society.

Incentives of Denmark’s Policy on International Institutions and the USA

As a small state, Denmark has strong incentives to seek the support from international institutions or individual great power partners who can advance Danish policies. Denmark is very motivated to contribute to the joint benefits an institution can offer. For this reason, Denmark is actively seeking to strengthen the UN as a worldwide forum to compensate for its power deficit and to achieve maximum influence on other actors’ behavior in international events (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012b).

Denmark hopes to reduce the asymmetric power relationship to great and middle powers, and strongly supports any effort to improve the legitimacy and operational reach of the UN. The strength of the UN for Denmark lies in the fact that every state is equal.

“All the Member States—large or small, rich and poor, with differing political views and social systems—have a voice and a vote in this process” (United Nations 2013).

Regionally, Denmark has strong incentives to renew its commitment to the EU. This is in part due to Denmark’s attempt to minimize its hard security power deficit and secure economic stability. The deficit has arisen from Denmark’s great power partner, the USA, shifting its focus to Asia and Pacific. Danish politicians now realize that Denmark’s opting out of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy creates a regional asymmetric power distribution. To compensate for this deficit, Denmark must realign with the EU and its policies. The realigning is also due to a change in Danish political motivation. Many political parties state Denmark must contribute to the EU in all aspects. Denmark might also have incentives for trying to regain lost recognition and credibility, which arose after the Danish opt-outs. A point that is difficult to prove due to possible civil servant compensatory work (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

Danish incentives for NATO originates from the need for a strong military alliance during the Cold War. Denmark’s policy has previously led to motivational problems, and Danish governments have actively used the membership as a point of leverage domestically to retain power. These incentives have changed. Denmark now promotes NATO as a global security provider in the framework of the UN Charter. NATO possess the power to intervene in international affairs as and when required. The Danish military deficit is the key incentive driving Danish policy to play an active role in transitioning NATO. As an institution NATO mitigates this deficit enabling Denmark to lead a policy of greater activism.

Denmark's incentives for a strong relationship with the USA are because the USA possesses the power to change the behavior of other actors by force. Because of Denmark's opting-out of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, she became dependent on the USA for minimizing Denmark's security deficit. At present Denmark still has strong incentives to sustain a good partnership with the USA and sees itself as an enabler improving US-European relations through both NATO and the EU. Denmark is of the opinion that the US and Europe need each other in order to tackle many current and future challenges (Danmarks Radio 2011; Socialdemokraterne 2012b). Thus, Denmark is still attempting a policy of great power partnership with alliance alignment (Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

Danish Incentives and the World's Views on Denmark

Denmark has strong incentives to improve its legitimacy and independence in the pursuit of its policy of activism. Recent reports indicate Denmark's legitimacy and global power position are improving, and affording a greater degree of influence on international events in non-military ways.

The American think tank "Center for Global Development" announced that Denmark is leading the field of international development cooperation amongst the 27 richest countries in the world (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a).

This report, combined with other positive statements on Denmark, can add understanding as to why Danish actions have gone from traditional small-state alignment to a greater degree of activism. Influenced by independent reports, actors might develop incentives to seek cooperation with Denmark in order to improve their goodwill. This new status can provide incentives for Denmark to push its policies on more institutional

governance such as the UN Charter. This can explain why Denmark's actions have changed from one of structural to one of ideational causation. The framework given by the institutions of the International Society supports this change (Wooldridge 2013).

There are also critical reports of Denmark issued by both the UN and the EU. These reports do not seem to have a lasting negative effect on Denmark's ability to improve its influence (Denmark 2011; Olsen and Pilegaard 2005).

Outcomes: Implications for Danish National Security Strategy

Denmark has strong incentives to seek the support of institutions and great power partners in order to pursue arrangements that are more advantageous for the governing of interactions in the International Society. Her chosen discourse of alignment with other actors' policies has disturbed her development of a strategic culture. She aims to achieve her goal of reducing the asymmetric power relationship caused by resource constraints by support from other actors. The resources to influence and possibly change the distribution of power lie in Denmark's ability to utilize her improving legitimacy through soft power.

Counter to the growing resource of legitimacy, Danish government still carries the incentives of retaining domestic power into the external context. These two aspects are paradoxical and cause motivational problems for Denmark. The policy of pursuing stronger international institutions might also be the very instrument, which will force a government out of office. Therefore producing a national security strategy has domestic implications, which clearly seem counter-productive for a government.

The compensatory work of the civil-service ranks distorts the understanding of Danish politicians for the necessity of a national security strategy. The politicians are

blinded by the civil services' ability to counter-balance the consequences of an absent national security strategy.

Conclusion and Chapter Summary

After analyzing the need for a national security strategy in part one and the incentive structures in part two, the main findings are as follows:

The need for a national security strategy is clearly articulated in the rhetoric of official Danish texts. Danish activism combined with multiple aspects portrayed by Danish officials such as the complexity of the context and the ability to efficiently coordinate resources, strongly display the requirement for a public Danish national security strategy. External factors such as the need for communicating clearly and concisely to be perceived as a credible actor also support the production of a national security strategy.

Why Danish policymakers avoid drafting a security strategy concerns both the domestic and external contexts. The factors influencing the policymakers are in part attributed to the main finding, the asymmetric power relationships of politics.

Domestically there are two reasons for the absence of a security strategy:

1. Denmark lacks a strategic culture to produce a national security strategy.
2. Institutional structures create and support asymmetric power relationships fueling counter-productive incentives.

Externally, three aspects have explanatory power: (1) The strong incentives to seek the support of institutions and great power partners by aligning its own policies with common policies have disturbed the development of a Danish strategic culture, (2) Danish polity carries an asymmetric power relationship of domestic politics into the

external context, and (3) The compensatory work of Danish civil-service ranks in external politics distorts the understanding of Danish politicians for the necessity of a national security strategy.

The findings of this thesis have important implications for Denmark, and reveal areas for intervention, which are worth considering in further research. These implications and conclusions, coupled with recommendations, will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

My pursuit to understand Danish national security strategy application developed during chapter 1 into two intertwined questions. First, does Denmark, as small sovereign state, need a public national security strategy? Second, why does Denmark not have a national-security strategy? The literature review uncovered that previous scholarship had not addressed how small state resources should be applied in grand strategy, while also accounting for incentive structures in domestic politics, where influence and power relationships affect foreign policy. My research findings in chapter 4 have identified implications for the adoption of a national security strategy and possible areas for intervention. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the implications of Danish incentive structures and propose a number of recommendations.

Conclusions

My argument was twofold. First, I argued that small states do need a grand strategy. A small nation such as Denmark needs a grand strategy if it is to lead a proactive discourse and, thereby, maximize its influence given limited resources. Second, Denmark's lack of a strategy is attributable to perverse incentive structures within Denmark's legislative committees and civil-service ranks.

The need for a Danish national security strategy is present within the statements, speeches and documents published by Denmark. Officials clearly articulate all the three elements which grand strategy encompasses. I have created the argument that the only

way for Denmark, to achieve its strategic ends and conduct an active strategic discourse is to have a grand strategy. The context stresses this by repeatedly mentioning that the world is in an era of uncertainty and limited resources. I have argued that no matter how few resources are available to a state, the only way to conduct an active strategic discourse and meet the strategic ends is to have a national security strategy.

The perverse incentive structures embedded in the institutional structure of Danish politics obstructs the production of the joint benefit, which a national security strategy provides. First, in the domestic context the de-facto mechanism of legislative control creates an asymmetric power relationship producing motivational problems among the politicians. None of the involved wish to change the present circumstances for fear of losing influence on decision-making.

Second, Denmark does not have a strategic culture due to the motivational problems between politicians and the civil-service ranks. The civil servants are not capable of seeking alternative methods for statecraft, which in part is due to the powerful legacy of a simple bipolar environment and the lack of parliamentary interest in debating the production of a security strategy. In addition, the concept of “deep strategy” has a role to play in the absence of strategic thinking.

The first two findings directly influence the external actions of Danish politics. The missing strategic culture keeps Danish politicians and civil servants mindset in the traditional policy of alignment. Reinforcing this mindset is the compensatory work performed by the civil-service ranks in order to counter possible unintentional consequences of intentional actions. Intentional actions in domestic politics to retain

power also have unintentional consequences on the external context. All three findings are connected and they reinforce one another.

The nature of this study has not sought to offer conclusive findings. The study's findings are principally a theoretical inquiry with sufficient empirical evidence suggesting my theory's plausibility. Put otherwise, I offer empirical evidence as a plausibility probe.

Recommendations

For Denmark to produce a national security strategy, the following changes to institutional and ideational aspects are worth considering:

1. The constitution should be changed in regards to the legislative structure creating the power asymmetric relationship. This would avoid the inadequate motivation of individuals, committees and political parties to contribute to a more efficient design of government control.
2. Members of Parliament should be limited to two terms.
3. Encourage the development of a strategic culture among the civil-service ranks and legislative community.

To inspire the development of a national security strategy the Dutch approach of whole society is a comprehensive method and addresses many of the same issues facing Denmark. The Dutch are approaching national security strategy based on values and capabilities and not threats (Rademaker 2008). Such an approach resonates well with the Danish rhetoric of values and beliefs.

Denmark should adjust its institutions to put value on a comprehensive national security strategy and subsequently develop a strategy to guide national policy.

Developing a national security strategy would undoubtedly balance the Danish active strategic discourse with the limited resources available and would increase Denmark's ability to remain secure at home while expanding global influence in accordance with her values.

GLOSSARY

Dictum (pl. dicta). A statement that expresses something that people believe is always true or should be followed (Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2005).

Grand Strategy. Grand Strategy is the direction and use made of any or all the assets of a security community, including its military instrument, for the purpose of policy as decided by politics (Gray 2010, 1).

An overarching strategy summarizing the national vision for developing, applying and coordinating all the instruments of national power in order to accomplish the grand strategic objectives of: preserve national security, bolster national economic prosperity, and promote national values. Grand Strategy may be stated or implied (Yarger 2008, 21).

National Security Strategy. The art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and informational) to achieve objectives that contributes to national security (Yarger 2008, 21).

International Society. International Society (or society of states) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull 2002, 13).

Policy. A plan of action agreed or chosen by a political party, a business, etc. (Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2005).

Politics. The activities involved in getting and using power in public life, and being able to influence decisions that affect a country or a society (Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2005).

Polity. A society as a political unit (Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2005).

Power. In international relations, power is seen as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence an actor possess in an action situation.

Strategy .Strategy can be better understood as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, socio-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects and set conditions that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances (Yarger 2008, 4).

System of States. A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on

one another's decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole (Bull 2002, 9).

World Order. By world order, I mean those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole.
International Order. International order is order among states (Bull 2002, 19).

APPENDIX A


OPEN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT



Source: Created by author.

APPENDIX B

OPEN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT



Source: Created by author.

APPENDIX C

DISTRIBUTION OF MANDATES

Committee/Party	Parliamentary distribution %	Finance Committee, seats=17 distribution acc to Parliament/actual distribution	European Affairs Committee, 29	Foreign Policy Committee, 17	Foreign Affairs Committee, 29	Business - Growth and Export Committee, 29	Legal Affairs Committee, 29	Defense Committee ,29	Research – Innovation and Further Education Committee, 29	Climate – Energy and Building Committee, 29	Cultural Affairs Committee, 29	Environment Committee, 29	Faroe Islands Committee, 29	Greenland Committee, 28	For (+) or Against (-) Broad Consensus	Foreign Policy Agendas for or against IGO's e.g. UN, NATO, EU
Liberal (V)	26.7	4/4	8/7	4/3	8/8	8/8	8/8	8/8	8/7	8/7	8/7	8/8	8/7	8/8	+	+ **
Social Democrats (A)	24.8	4/5	7/7	4/4	7/7	7/7	7/6	7/6	7/7	7/7	7/7	7/7	7/7	7/6	+	+ **
Danish People's Party (DF)	12.3	2/2	4/4	2/2	4/4	4/4	4/4	4/4	4/4	4/3	4/4	4/4	4/4	4/4	+	+, - EU
Danish Social Liberal Party (RV)	9.5	2/1	3/3	2/1	3/3	3/4	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/3	+	+
Socialist People's Party (SF)	9.2	2/1	3/2	2/1	3/2	3/2	3/2	3/2	3/3	3/3	3/3	3/2	3/2	3/2	+	+
Red-Green Alliance (EL)	6.7	1/2	2/3	1/1	2/3	2/2	2/3	2/2	2/2	2/3	2/2	2/2	2/2	2/2	-	+, ***
Liberal Alliance (LA)	5.0	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/2	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/0	-	+ **
Conservative People's Party (C)	4.9	1/1	1/2	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/2	1/2	1/1	1/1	1/1	?	+ **
Faroe Islands				1		/0							/2		?	
Greenland				2			1	2				1		/2	?	

Source: Created by author. Note: The number of mandates in each committee stands after the committee's name. The numbers in the table, e.g. 4/5, the left number represents the initial number of mandates secured by the party during election. The number to the right is the number after electoral alliances are in play.


APPENDIX D

THE MODIFIED IAD FRAMEWORK

Collective – action problems – motivational: asymmetric power relations

Six “general elements of institutional analysis” compose any decision structure:
context, action arena, incentives, interactions, outcomes, and evaluations.

Actor centric: Man-made (MM)/Exogenously given (E)
(P) Positional/(I) Interpretational
Logics of causal explanation – Apply to stable/conventional causality
Structural: actions vary as position in a landscape varies (E)/(P)
Institutional: actions as a function of position in manmade orgs and rules (MM)/(P)
Ideational: action as a function of the cognitive/affective elements (MM)/(I)
Psychological: action as function of the cognitive, affective, instinctual elements, general across humankind (E)/(I)



Source: Created by author.

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