

# Inspector General

United States  
Department of Defense



## Special Plans & Operations

Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans  
to Train, Equip, and Field the  
Afghan National Security Forces

# Report Documentation Page

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INSPECTOR GENERAL  
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September 30, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces

We are providing this report for review and comment. We performed this assessment in response to requests from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

After receiving client comments to the draft report, we have made the following changes, which are reflected in this report:

- Added new Recommendation 9.h.
- Revised Recommendation 13.
- Deleted draft Recommendation 21.c.
- Renumbered draft Recommendation 21.d. to new Recommendation 21.c.


We request additional comments and information by November 15, 2009 as follows:

- Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller): We request your comments to Recommendation 13, which has been changed from the draft.
- Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness: We request your comments to Recommendation 9.h., a new recommendation that was not in the draft report.
- Chief of Naval Operations: We request your comments to Recommendations 7.c. and 9.d.
- Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force: We request your comments to Recommendations 7.b. and 9.c.
- Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps: We request your comments to Recommendation 9.e.
- Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan: We request your comments to Recommendations 9.b., 19.b., 20.a., and 20.b.
- Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command: We request the additional information as stated in Recommendations 6.a. and 6.b.
- Director, Defense Contract Management Agency: We request additional information to Recommendation 3.c.

- Commander, Security Transition Command-Afghanistan: We request your comments or additional information to Recommendations 4.a., 4.c., 8.a.(1), 8.a.(2), 8.b.(1), 8.b.(2), 8.b.(3), 8.b.(4), 9.a., 11.b., 12., 14.a., 16.a., 17.a., 17.c., 18.a., 18.b., 19.a., 20.c., 21.a., 21.b., 22.b., and 23.a.

If possible, please send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to spo@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Joe A. Baker at (703) 604-9170 (DSN 664-9170) or Mr. Stanley E. Meyer (703) 604-9130 (DSN 664-9130).



Kenneth P. Moorefield  
Assistant Inspector General  
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COMMANDER, SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN



# Executive Summary: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces

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## Who Should Read This Report?

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate commands in Afghanistan, the Military Departments, and Agencies that are responsible for and engaged in training, mentoring, equipping, and other aspects of capacity development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should read this report.

## Background

Congress provided approximately \$18.25 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) and approximately \$18.95 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, and 111-32. These Public Laws define the “train and equip” mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specify that the funds be used in support of the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

On April 2008, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) assembled and deployed a team which conducted an assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives accountability and control, security assistance, and logistics sustainment with respect to the Afghan National Security Forces. The results of that assessment were published on October 24, 2008 in DODIG report No. SPO-2009-001.

The fieldwork for this latest assessment was conducted during March 2009. The team evaluated whether DOD, Coalition, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, equip, field, and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were prepared, issued, operative, and complete.

## Results

The report is divided into four parts: (1) Notable Improvements; (2) Afghan National Security Forces; (3) Afghan National Army, and (4) Afghan National Police. The report makes 23 observations and 68 recommendations. The results are discussed therein.

### *Notable Improvements*

The report notes 14 examples where progress had been made in the areas of ANSF doctrine, training, leader development, material/logistics, and international cooperation. They include, among others:

- Strong rapport established between ANA Commanders Corps and below and their mentors/trainers

- ANA leading approximately 54 percent of current combat operations
- Maturation of the Focused District Development (FDD) police training program
- Establishment of Non-Commissioned Officer schools in the ANA, and
- Establishment of an Integrated Civil-Military Assistance Group (ICMAG), to coordinate interagency actions in support of ANA and ANP development

While these and other focus areas require continued careful attention in the future and much work remains to be done, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), their Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), and Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) merit recognition for their significant progress made to date conducting an extremely complex and difficult mission.

### ***Challenges—Areas of Concern***

**Oversight of Contracting and Contractors.** CSTC-A continues to face challenges with the contracting process and the quality of materials and services procured for the ANSF. The lack of appropriate oversight support for CSTC-A contracts has been reflected in an ongoing failure to ensure that contractors selected had the capability required to meet the standards set in the contract; and to monitor contract performance to ensure contractual services delivered were in compliance with contract specifications. The underlying factors contributing to these oversight shortcomings are: (1) Insufficient experienced and trained contracting officers (COs) and contracting officer representatives (CORs) in-country to provide appropriate contract oversight, and (2) Insufficient Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) personnel directly supporting CSTC-A to monitor performance on contracts. We made recommendations in this area.

**Strength of the Afghan National Security Forces.** As of May 2009, the Afghan National Army (ANA) end strength was approximately 86,558, with approved plans to expand to 134,000 by the end of calendar year 2011. In May 2009, the Afghan National Police (ANP) end strength was approximately 81,509, with approved plans to increase its strength to 96,800. Expansion of the ANSF beyond currently approved levels will face major challenges because of issues associated with:

- Insufficient ANSF leadership capability (specifically junior officers/non-commissioned officers [NCOs])
- Shortages of certain lines of essential unit equipment (howitzers, mortars, communications, and engineer)
- Insufficient training facility capacity
- Limited capacity to construct ANSF permanent bases/facilities “down-range”
- Limited ANSF logistics capability lagging operational requirements, and
- Time necessary to develop ethical, competent leaders

Overcoming these challenges will require additional resources from the U.S., ISAF, and the greater international community with respect to financing, personnel, equipment, facilities, and time. We have made several recommendations in this area.

**Logistics Development and Sustainable Capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces.** Development of the logistics capability of the ANSF significantly lags its operational capacity. U.S., ISAF, and Coalition trainers and mentors, staff members in the MoD and MoI, as well as ANSF commanders in the field uniformly described fundamental shortcomings with the ANSF logistics system. Several factors have contributed to this situation, including the previous priority given to combat force generation, lack of availability of equipment, difficult geography and terrain, facilities construction problems, the lingering effects of Soviet-imposed military logistics doctrine, and Afghan cultural tendencies. Consequently, much work remains to be accomplished to build an appropriate, sustainable ANSF logistic capacity, upon which the ability of the Afghan security forces to eventually operate independently relies. CSTC-A will require the necessary support to provide the logistics-related training, equipping, and mentoring required by the Afghan security forces.

**Community Policing, Rule of Law, and the Counterinsurgency Fight.** The professional coordination and cooperation between the ANP and the criminal justice/Rule of Law (ROL) system at the district level in Afghanistan was tenuous at best. This presented a serious impediment to establishing a local environment characterized by effective civil policing, in support of the ROL, and, therefore, to achieving the establishment of security and order necessary for the protection of the population in support of counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives.

Without an effective link between the local police and Ministry of Justice personnel responsible for implementing the system of justice at the district level, Afghan Uniformed Police efforts to implement Focused District Development (FDD) program objectives of providing enhanced security for the population, including the ability to conduct community policing of criminal activities and respect for the ROL, have been undermined when they return to their districts after their training. As a consequence, FDD-trained Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) were unable to build and sustain public confidence in the police and government.

**Lack of Accountability at All Levels of Afghan National Security Forces.** Lack of accountability for funds, equipment, and personal actions remains problematic throughout the ANSF. Inspectors General and Internal Affairs personnel ranging from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, to ANA Corps and ANP Regional commands reported what they described as substantiated cases of corruption that resulted in little, if any, disciplinary action. Equipment has been consistently damaged, lost or diverted to other uses through non-combat actions without any systematic process to hold ANSF personnel accountable, when appropriate. Processes and procedures were generally not established to be able to determine individual accountability for equipment. Those accountability processes and procedures in place were generally ineffective or not followed. We made recommendations for corrective action in this area.

**U.S. and International Security Assistance Force/Coalition Trainers and Mentors.** CSTC-A ETTs, PMTs, and ISAF/Coalition Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) have historically been and still are under-resourced against required personnel levels, which has delayed the development of the Afghan Army and Police. Moreover, further expansion of the ANSF beyond the current approved ceilings for the ANA and ANP will require additional U.S., Coalition, and ISAF personnel resources assigned in support of the train and equip mission.

The ANSF train and equip mission is complex, broad-scoped, and especially difficult. It is challenging at both the field and CSTC-A headquarters staff levels. In the case of the latter, almost all of the officers and NCOs assigned are “dual-hatted,” e.g. they have two primary missions. While serving as full-time CSTC-A staff members planning and directing the train and equip assistance mission for the ANSF, they also have responsibilities as mentors to senior Afghan officials in the MoD, General staff, and MoI. CSTC-A staff personnel reported that they lack sufficient time to perform both missions. Even if assigned personnel reach full-authorization, CSTC-A headquarters would not appear to have the personnel capability it requires to carry out all of its missions.

The situation in the field where trainers interacted directly with their ANA and ANP counterparts was equally concerning. There was about a 51 percent overall fill rate against the combined ETT/PMT/OMLT requirement.

U.S. forces have recently committed significant additional manpower to support the ANSF train and equip mission, which will result in the deployment in the fall of 2009 of an additional Brigade dedicated to the mentoring and training mission, doubling the size of that force capability. However, mentor and trainer personnel challenges will likely still remain. We made recommendations in this area.

For detailed discussions of the foregoing observations and recommendations, please refer to the respective sections in the report.

We request that you provide management comments in response to this report. Please see the recommendations table on the following page.

## Recommendations Table

Client	Recommendations Requiring Additional Comment/Information	No Additional Comments Required
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff		21.c.
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)	13	
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness	9.h.	
Chief of Naval Operations	7.c. and 9.d.	
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force	7.b. and 9.c.	
Commandant of the Marine Corps	9.e.	
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan	9.b., 19.b., 20.a., 20.b.	
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command	6.a., 6.b.	
Chief, National Guard Bureau		9.f., 15.a., 15.b., 15.c.
Chief, Army Reserves		9.g.
Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers		2.a., 2.b.
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency	3.c.	
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan/ Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission—Afghanistan	4.a., 4.c., 8.a.(1), 8.a.(2), 8.b.(1), 8.b.(2), 8.b.(3), 8.b.(4), 9.a., 11.b., 12, 14., 16.a., 17.a., 17.c., 18.a., 18.b., 19.a., 20.c., 21.a., 21.b., 22.b., and 23.a.	1., 3.a., 3.b., 3.d., 4.b., 4.d., 5.a., 5.b., 5.c., 6.c., 7.a., 10.a., 10.b., 10.c., 10.d., 10.e., 11.a., 16.b., 16.c., 17.b., 22.a., 23.b., 23.c.

**Please provide comments by November 15, 2009.**



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# Introduction

## Background

On April 4, 2008, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) announced an assessment to determine:

- Whether the accountability and controls over the distribution of conventional military arms, ammunition, and explosives provided to the security forces of Afghanistan were adequate
- Whether security assistance processes were responsive to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) equipment requirements
- Whether the ANSF logistics sustainment base was being effectively developed
- Whether mentoring and building the Afghan military health care system was taking place effectively.

The results of that assessment were published in DODIG report No. SPO-2009-001 on October 24, 2008.

## Public Laws

Congress has provided approximately \$18.25 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and approximately \$18.95 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, and 111-32. These Public Laws define the “train and equip” mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specify that the funds be used in support of the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan to provide:

- Funding
- Equipment, supplies, services
- Training, and
- Facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction.

## Objectives

On February 3, 2009, the DODIG announced the “Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000). The objectives of this assessment were to determine whether U.S. Government, International Security Assistance Force, Coalition, and Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) goals, objectives, plans, guidance, operations, and resources to train, equip, and field the Afghan National Forces (ANSF) were:

- Prepared
- Issued
- Operative
- Relevant



# Part I – Notable Improvements

## Introduction

We found that the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had made significant progress in the ANSF train and equip mission when compared to the development of the Afghan Army and Police assessed during DODIG Special Plans and Operations visits in September 2007 and April 2008.

Although much work remains to be accomplished in many areas of the ANSF train and equip mission, particularly as the size of these forces are increased, notable advances were identified. CSTC-A and the Afghan National Army (ANA) have surpassed their goal of fielding 84,000 soldiers by the end of FY 2009, and the ANA is on-track for expansion to 134,000 by December 2011. The ANA has established a reputation with their ISAF/Coalition and U.S. counterparts as ready and capable fighters. The ANA now participates in almost all combat operations and takes the lead in more than fifty percent of them. As of May 2009, the Afghan National Police (ANP) had approximately 81,509 personnel assigned against a recently increased authorized size of 96,800. Pay and rank reform initiatives were largely completed in 2008 and 52 selected districts are gaining or have already gained more advanced capability via the Focused District Development program. And, the MoD and ANA and MoI and ANP are beginning to make progress in addressing what has been the endemic problem of corruption.



*Figure 1. U.S. ETTs provide instruction to ANA soldiers on use of NATO weapons. (Source: CSTC-A)*

## Doctrine and Performance

- The MoD and the General Staff (GS) are making progress in developing a foundation of essential internal management systems and controls which will provide the foundation for longer-term MoD and ANA independent institutional capacity. This is largely the result of the continuing effort by CSTC-A mentors, with USG contractor support.
- CSTC-A Ministerial Development Plans and Annual Action Plans were previously determined in an OIG assessment to be incomplete. During this assessment, the team observed notable improvements with respect to providing plans that were clear, concise,

set target milestones that could be readily measured, and which assigned specific implementing responsibilities.

- Cooperation and rapport between U.S. mentors and the ANA were generally strong. Afghan Army Corps Commanders uniformly praised the dedication, quality, and contribution of their CSTC-A mentoring teams.
- A Mission Essential Task List (METL) has been developed for Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) by the Regional Police Advisory Command (RPAC) in Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-South (ARSIC-S). The METL is specifically tailored for training police in the hotly contested southern region of Afghanistan.
- ARSIC-E established the Regional Border Assistance Command (RBAC) to give more visibility and priority to Afghan Border Police (ABP) issues, especially along the border with Pakistan. The RBAC regularly partners with the U.S. battle space commander to coordinate ABP issues. The RBAC also developed its own ABP Readiness Assessment Forms to evaluate ABP operational capability.
- Despite the challenges, the Operations Coordination Center-Regional (OCC-R) concept was being implemented in each Regional Command. With significant mentoring assistance, these centers were bringing together all key ANSF and intelligence-related security nodes for the Regions. ANP, ANA and, to a lesser extent, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), were sharing information and coordinating their respective operational efforts. A model Standard Operating Procedure for the coordination center had been developed in RCC East-Gardez.



*Figure 2. MoD National Military Command Center in Kabul.  
(Source: DoD IG - Special Plans and Operations)*

- The ANA have demonstrated consistently that they will fight. There are still challenges in building officer and NCO leader capacity, but ANA units now take the lead on 54 percent

of all combat operations. As of May 2009, 41 percent of the fielded ANA organizations had reached Capability Milestone (CM) 1 (the unit, agency, staff function, or installation is capable of conducting primary operational mission[s], with the support of Coalition enablers—air support, medical evacuation, logistics, and intelligence).

## Training

- Current FY 2009 ANA fielding will produce nine additional kandaks (battalions) at an acceptable readiness level. CSTC-A plans have been developed to accelerate the fielding to 12 to 13 kandaks per fiscal year to meet the 134K level target by the end of calendar year 2011. “War stoppers” have been identified which could prevent achieving this objective. Also included in the fielding plans are provisions to generate various higher level headquarters, as well as expansion of the ANA Air Corps.
- The ANP Focused District Development (FDD) Program decision process is maturing. The methodology currently used prioritizes which districts will receive the training and engages the appropriate U.S. and ISAF/Coalition, and Government of Afghanistan stakeholders. The Minister of Interior makes the final selection of the districts which will be trained next.

## Leader Development

- Having completed the first four-year program, the National Military Academy of Afghanistan, patterned after West Point, just graduated a class of 84 officers in January 2009.
- With CSTC-A assistance, the ANA has established a system of NCO schools that will develop a professional NCO corps, essential to providing unit leadership, over the long-term. The last key component, the Sergeant Major Academy, opened in June 2009.

## Materiel/Logistics

- The CSTC-A Logistics Embedded Training Team (Log-ETT) was established in the past year and has made considerable headway, especially in standing up the mentoring effort for the ANP. Major challenges remain, but the initial steps appear to be on the right track.

## International Cooperation

- The Integrated Civil-Military Assistance Group (ICMAG), a U.S. interagency coordinating body, stood up in November 2008 and brings together all the key U.S. interagency stakeholders to coordinate efforts on behalf of ANA and ANP development. This cooperation could be leveraged to address a number of key issues in the “train and equip” and COIN fight.
- The European Union Police (EUPOL)



*Figure 3. EUPOL officer training an Afghan policeman.  
(Source: EUPOL)*

and CSTC-A are cooperating extremely well. Each is leveraging the others' resources and skills in coordinated training and mentoring initiatives. An example of this cooperation was the special training jointly conducted for ANP in Kabul by EUPOL and CSTC-A that focused on developing ANP effectiveness in manning checkpoints to handle and report incidents of terrorism and civil emergencies.

While these focus areas will continue to require careful attention to maintain positive momentum, and much work remains to keep the ANSF train and equip effort on-track, CSTC-A and its Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) merit recognition for the considerable progress made to date in the face of a formidable set of challenges.

# **Part II – Afghan National Security Forces**

## **Introduction**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations for improvement that apply, to a greater or lesser extent to the ANSF: both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). For purposes of this assessment, the ANSF includes the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), ANA, Afghan National Army Air Corps, the Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK), and the ANP, which includes the Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Counternarcotics Police, and the Afghan Public Protection Force.



## **Observation 1. Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Command Implementation of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Campaign Plan**

The Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Commands (ARSICs) do not have fully developed training, equipping, and mentoring plans to implement the CSTC-A Campaign Plan in their respective regions.

This results from myriad factors, to include staff shortages, personnel turnover, competing warfighting, training, and mentoring requirements, and insufficient CSTC-A direction.

This could result in a lack of synchronization in standardized implementation of CSTC-A's training, mentoring, and equipping mission for the ANA and the various ANP organizations, and degrade necessary synergy between the ANSF and the ISAF/Coalition Force (CF) battle-space owners, thereby limiting the accomplishment of CSTC-A Campaign Plan objectives.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009.** This document examines the theory and principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), the components of an effective COIN strategy, and interagency COIN assessment, planning and implementation.

### **Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, 20 September 2008.**

This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (Mol). The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and the wider International Community. The plan lays out the guidance and the processes for security ministry and Afghan security forces generation and development. It also takes into account the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (AN DS) dated April 2008 and the altered circumstances since these agreements and strategies were conceived, including changes to the security environment. It is complementary to COMISAF OPLAN 38302 and supports the ISAF security effects.

### **Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Operations Order 08-006, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Development Program, 14 January 2008.**

This order provides guidance for the development and execution of the current United States Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 CSTC-A program to generate the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). It bridges the gaps between strategic aims of the CSTC-A campaign plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution with program guidance focused on annual operational objectives. The order describes a program to develop the currently approved ANSF force structure and is a document that serves as a basis of record to direct changes to the program as required.

## ***Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Command's Implementing Plans***

While the CSTC-A Campaign Plan lays out goals, objectives, and metrics for development of the ANSF, and CSTC-A OPOD 08-006 bridges the gaps between strategic aims of the CSTC-A campaign plan and subordinate development strategies at the ISAF regional command/ANA Corp levels, most ARSICs have not prepared a fully developed plan for each of their respective regions to support implementation of the CSTC-A campaign plan and operational order.

The ARSIC programs and personnel we assessed were vigorously pursuing the primary objectives of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. However, implementation of the Campaign Plan has not been documented and institutionalized in ARSIC regional plans to ensure that there is a cohesive and integrated effort between them. Without a common plan for CSTC-A which includes ARSIC staff and field mentors' operations, there may not be cohesiveness and synchronization of the respective regional and national training and mentoring efforts. This could also lead to a lack of consistency and continuity in planning guidance for integrating new training and mentoring personnel that arrive would be made more difficult.

The various ARSICs have parts of such plans under development, but only the ARSIC–North Commander had prepared the core elements of a complete plan that laid out, among other parameters, the milestones for meeting the objectives and metrics in the CSTC-A Campaign Plan. However, even this plan was admittedly not yet fully developed or officially promulgated.

The current ARSIC organizational construct was scheduled to be replaced the second half of calendar year 2009 by the new “2-Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Concept.” mentoring initiative. Task Force Phoenix, currently comprised of one National Guard BCT, will be transformed into a new concept and structure consisting of two task forces. Task Force Phoenix East will cover regional commands north and east, while Task Force Phoenix West will be responsible for regional command west and south. According to this plan, a new National Guard Brigade will rotate in as scheduled to comprise TF West, and an active duty advise and assist U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team will be deployed to assume responsibility for TF West. Each will act in coordination under CSTC-A command and control to support the overall CSTC-A mission to train, mentor, and equip the ANSF.

In support of this restructuring and augmentation of resources, each of the two regional task forces under the new mentoring plan of operation will, of course, need to have parallel plans for their respective areas of operation which are complementary and integrated into the implementation of CSTC-A's Campaign Plan and relevant OPODs.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

1. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, direct the respective Commanders, Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Commands to coordinate with the in-bound Brigade Combat Teams that will replace them to prepare supporting plans for their task forces which implement the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Campaign Plan in each of their areas of operation.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that the two BCTs that recently arrived in Afghanistan had collaborated with TF Phoenix and the ARSICs during pre-deployment preparation, developing supporting plans for both the BCTs and their subordinate task forces. Consistent with the new theater Command and Control structure, these BCTs will be transferred to the ISAF Joint Command on October 12, 2009.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



## **Observation 2. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District**

The Afghanistan Engineer District (AED) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) does not have sufficient personnel to provide adequate oversight for the scope of its mission, both current and projected, with respect to the management and coordination of the acquisition, design, and construction of facilities in support of the ANSF. As of May 2009, only 411 personnel were assigned to AED of 641 authorized on the Interim Manning Document (IMD). Additionally, the number of AED personnel that will be required to support further expansion of the ANSF has not been established.

The shortage of personnel assigned to AED has resulted from the USACE not filling authorized positions as outlined in the AED IMD. In addition, USACE has not yet provided personnel to AED for it to be able to address the construction challenges presented by the current, more difficult operational security environment. In addition, USACE has not planned additional personnel to support the new infrastructure construction required to support further expansion of the ANSF.

This could result in AED not having the capacity to meet its construction support objectives on a timely basis and impede providing the required oversight of current and future projects for which it remains responsible. As a result, the expansion of the ANSF and its ability to progressively assume security responsibilities from U.S. and ISAF/Coalition forces could be delayed.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Program Management Plan (PgMP) for the Afghan National Army (ANA) Program, for various Facilities throughout Afghanistan, Afghanistan Engineer District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 2009.** The purpose of this document is to ensure successful design and construction of facilities supporting the fielding of the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers throughout Afghanistan. This PgMP outlines the procedures and responsibilities Afghan and U.S. military and civilian organizations will undertake during the acquisition planning, management, design, construction and closeout of the programmed facilities.

**The Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, Interim Management Document, May 2009.** This document lists personnel authorized and personnel assigned to the AED with position title.

### ***Afghanistan Engineer District Personnel Shortages***

AED has projects ongoing throughout Afghanistan, and it forecasts additional construction projects that will require more than the 634 personnel authorized in its IMD, of which only 436 had been assigned as of the end of May 2009. Although this shortage is somewhat offset by 593 on-hand contract personnel at the AED headquarters performing functions ranging from life support to security, AED does not have the core personnel with the skill sets required to provide adequate execution and oversight of the expanding scope of its mission to implement current and

planned construction projects in Afghanistan. Although the decision has not been finalized, AED expects to divide into two districts in the summer of 2009, and if approved, personnel authorizations for AED are projected to increase to approximately 820.

ANSF end-strength could increase substantially from its current level of around 170,000. AED will need to have the personnel capacity to prepare for and respond to this increased construction challenge. For purposes of comparing personnel resources committed in our respective Southwest Asia contingency operations with the scope of construction responsibility, AED already plans, executes, and oversees approximately \$4 billion worth of projects with 1029 personnel, including contractors, while the U.S. Army Engineer's Gulf Resources Division in Iraq and Kuwait manages approximately \$3 billion worth of projects with three districts and 3,326 personnel, including contractors.

The AED has three major program areas:

- Afghan National Army (ANA) facilities construction
- Afghan National Police (ANP) facilities construction
- Installation management and sustainment (O&M) for ANA and ANP facilities



*Figure 4. From left: Gym facility being erected at Kabul Military Training Center; Safety training in Pol-e-charki; Digging sewer lines in Kandahar.  
(Source: USACE – Afghan Engineer District)*

ANA projects include brigade garrisons, kandak billeting, and support facilities throughout the country. The responsibility also extends to ANP projects, which tend to be even more widely distributed geographically. ANP projects include facilities for border police, uniformed police, and civil order police.

Oversight responsibilities are diverse; AED has staff embedded with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) at major ANA and ANP facilities, and with the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). On-site responsibilities include reporting of construction progress to ensure contractor compliance with their Quality Control Plan, resolving routine problems, maintaining progress logs, conducting weekly construction coordination and tailgate safety meetings, updating weekly construction status reports, and maintaining control over project sites until the projects are accepted from the construction contractors and transferred to the CSTC-A representative by DD Form 1354. AED was at least 10 percent behind on 62 percent of their projects as of March 2009.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

2.a. Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, accelerate assignment of currently authorized personnel against the current Interim Manning Document authorization.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) concurred with the recommendation, noting that AED is increasing staffing levels to meet the ANSF workload and that USACE is aggressively filling positions on AED's IMD. AED's assigned strength increased from 411 in May 2009 to 491 in August 2009. USACE reports that an additional 104 personnel have been selected to fill vacant AED positions and that they are starting to see a larger pool of candidates as requirements in Iraq begin to drawdown.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USACE comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. We will follow-up to track progress on assignment of personnel against the authorizations in the AED IMD.

2.b. Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, evaluate the adequacy of the current Afghanistan Engineering District personnel authorizations against current and projected infrastructure requirements and challenges in support of Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan's mission.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concurred with the recommendation, noting that, due to the expected surge in the ANSF workload projected in FYs 2010 through 2012, they established a second district in Afghanistan (AED South). The latest manning document establishes 854 positions for AED, an increase of about 200 from the March 2009 time period.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USACE comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



### **Observation 3. Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Contracting Program—Continuing Oversight Issues**

Hazeb Emerging Business (HEB), contracted by CSTC-A to perform country-wide maintenance service on weapons provided the ANSF under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weapons program initiative, did not meet its obligations, lacking appropriate skills, tools, and kits. This particular problem concerning contract performance reflected an ongoing and systemic issue with respect to insufficient contract oversight support provided by CSTC-A.

The lack of appropriate oversight support for CSTC-A contracts has been reflected in an ongoing failure to ensure that contractors selected had the capability required to meet the standards set in the contract; and to monitor contract performance to ensure contractual services delivered were in compliance with contract specifications. The underlying factors contributing to these oversight shortcomings are: (1) Insufficient experienced and trained contracting officers (COs) and contracting officer representatives (CORs) in-country to provide appropriate contract oversight, including quality assurance; (2) Insufficient Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) personnel directly supporting CSTC-A to monitor performance on contracts.

The failure to provide appropriate oversight of this particular contract to support the fielding of NATO weapons resulted in poor contract performance, reduced readiness in the use of NATO weapons already provided to the ANSF, an inefficient use of Afghan National Security Force Funds, and a potential delay in the effective expansion and sustainment of properly equipped Afghan National Security Forces. But, it is indicative of an ongoing lack of oversight support regarding CSTC-A contracts that could have had a detrimental effect on the ANSF train and equip mission.

#### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 46.201, “Quality Assurance: General.”** This subpart states that the contracting officer should include appropriate contractor quality performance requirements in the contract solicitation and in the contract itself. These requirements may range from inspection at the time of acceptance to a comprehensive program for controlling quality during contract execution.

**FAR Subpart 46.4, “Government Contract Quality Assurance.”** This subpart states that Government contract quality assurance must be performed at such times (including any stage of manufacture or performance of services) and places (including subcontractors’ plants) as may be necessary to determine that the supplies or services conform to contract requirements. Quality assurance surveillance plans should be prepared in conjunction with the statement of work. The plans should specify all work requiring surveillance and the method of surveillance. FAR Subpart 46.4 (e) states that Government inspection must be performed by or under the direction or supervision of Government personnel.

**FAR Subpart 46.402(e), “Government Contract Quality Assurance at Source.”** “Agencies shall perform contract quality assurance, including inspection, at source if

government inspection during contract performance is essential.” Quality assurance surveillance plans ensure effective Government contract quality assurance.

**FAR Subpart 46.5, “Acceptance.”** This subpart states:

Acceptance constitutes acknowledgement that the supplies or services conform with applicable contract quality and quantity requirements, except as provided in this subpart and subject to other terms and conditions of the contract. Acceptance may take place before delivery, at the time of delivery, or after delivery, depending on the provisions of the terms and conditions of the contract. Supplies or services shall ordinarily not be accepted before completion of Government contract quality assurance actions.

**Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” 23 January 2009.** This document establishes the policy through which an appropriately sized subset of the DOD civilian workforce is pre-identified to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements. These requirements are typically away from the normal work locations of DOD civilians, or in situations where other civilians may be evacuated to assist military forces where the use of DOD civilians is appropriate.

**Defense Contract Management Agency Mission Statement.** For those contracts delegated to DCMA through the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCCI/A) concept of operations and delegation process, DCMA provides contract administration services to USCENTCOM and subordinate commands in Southwest Asia to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the warfighter; on time and on cost. Additionally:

**Before contract award,** DCMA provides advice and services to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, and write contracts that meet the needs of DOD customers in Federal and allied government agencies.

**After contract award,** DCMA monitors contractors’ performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts.

### ***Continuing Contracting Issues***

**Hazeb Emerging Business (HEB)—A Recent Example.** The contract performance failure by HEB regarding maintenance of NATO weapons (M4, M16, M203, M240, and M249) included:

- Lack of knowledge—a U.S. contractor, MPRI (not an acronym), had to teach HEB personnel how to maintain NATO weapons
- Lack of tools—one ARSIC Deputy Commander described how HEB had to mount M-203 grenade launchers on M-16s



**Figure 5.** ANA inventory of M4 rifles.  
(Source: DoDIG - SPO)

using hammer and nails, because they didn't have the proper tools. Reportedly, the appropriate tool kits have been ordered

**Lack of Sufficient Contract Oversight--The problems with HEB Contract Performance Were Not Unique.**

Concerns with respect to contracting and quality of supplies provided to the MoD and ANA by CSTC-A were first brought to OIG attention during a team visit with the Afghan MoD Inspector General in April 2008. The Inspector General was then concerned about contracting and delivery procedures. He stated that his office did not always review the contracts written by CSTC-A in support of the ANSF, and, therefore, often did not know the terms and specifications of CSTC-A contracts that provided material and equipment to the ANA.

The Afghan MoD Inspector General specifically noted that, previously, some uniforms provided to the ANA had been substandard. Additionally, he believed that blankets had been ordered for the ANA based on samples shown at the time the contract was being developed. However, when the blankets were delivered, they allegedly were smaller than the samples shown and were made of inferior cloth. He stated that this also had happened with boots, which came apart when worn by ANA troops for only a short period of time.

During the March 2009 visit by OIG, some of the specific contract supply issues concerning the ANSF raised previously, such as those related to poor quality uniforms, had been addressed by CSTC-A. Specific examples of improvement were newly purchased appropriate quality boots and uniforms that had been provided to the ANSF, although some of the previously purchased inferior products were still in the Afghan supply system.

However, the MoD Inspector General again expressed concern with quality of uniforms being provided the ANA and also raised what he said was a problem with timely issuance. He cited the example of what he said was the recent late issue of winter gear and field jacket liners to the ANA. Furthermore, the MoD Deputy Director of Financial and Technical Department indicated that he has asked to review contract documents and samples of materials before they are contracted for by CSTC-A. He claimed that this request has not yet been met. Thus, while it was clear that CSTC-A and the MoD had made progress in addressing the latter's contracting issues and concerns, some problems appeared to be remain unresolved.

CSTC-A agreed that there had been difficulties contracting for ANSF uniforms, but it was not clear whether this was because the initial statement of work and contract specifications had not been properly prepared or whether contracting officers or their representatives had accepted inferior products from the manufacturer that did not meet the contract specifications, or both. CSTC-A further stated that the some of the materials and items in question were provided by Afghan contractors through the "Afghan First" program, which emphasizes using contracting with Afghan suppliers, whenever feasible. However, CSTC-A has been having difficulty finding sufficient qualified Afghan contractors with which to work, and has often had performance issues when contracting with Afghan companies they have used.

**Shortage of Contracting Officers and Contracting Officers' Representatives.**

The history of CSTC-A contracting challenges, including the recent HEB

example, points to a lack of DOD quality assurance in the various phases of the contracting process. This appears to have been caused by a shortage of trained, in-country, COs and CORs, their rapid turnover, and the resultant lack of continuity.

In April 2008, the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) reported that there were shortages of qualified and experienced contracting personnel in-theater and in-country. JCC-I/A pointed out that COs spent about 30 percent of their time just ensuring that CORs were in place and had not rotated out of theater. JCC-I/A also expressed concern about the adequacy of the basic COR on-line training, noting that JCCI/A offered training in addition to the basic online courses in an attempt to raise COR capability to an acceptable level.

During the latest OIG team visit, CSTC-A reported once again, as it did to the OIG team in April 2008, that there was a continuing shortage of experienced COs in Afghanistan, and a critical shortage of trained and experienced CORs. This deficiency was exacerbated by the constant turnover of these personnel, caused by three to six month tours.

In addition, DCMA has recently had, on average, only three personnel who directly support CSTC-A contracting. Moreover, their high turnover rate and assignment “under-lapping” produces a lack of continuity in supporting CSTC-A. According to CSTC-A, DCMA could improve its support of CSTC-A by specifically increasing the number of its contract specialists to provide assistance with statements of work, quality control, and acceptance of goods, particularly on pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases.

DCMA has significantly increased their presence throughout Southwest Asia from an assigned strength of 175, against a requirement of 195 in January 2008, to 240, against a requirement of 281 in May 2009. They are currently at 100 percent fill against a requirement of 155 in Iraq, but only at 59 percent fill against a requirement of 98 in Afghanistan. DCMA reported that it has recently received approval for an augmentation to their Joint Manning Document for an additional 57 personnel with specific skills needed for contract oversight requirements in Southwest Asia, to include Afghanistan. Those positions have yet to be resourced by the Services, however, and will require at least 120 days from resourcing until there are actual boots on the ground.

### ***The Way Ahead***

Providing appropriate oversight, including quality assurance assistance, in all aspects of the contracting process will become even more essential to CSTC-A supply operations in the coming months as it supports a significant acceleration and expansion of the ANA and, potentially, the ANP. Additionally, critical recurring contracts will come up for renewal, such as that with MPRI, estimated to be in the range of \$800 million.

In conclusion, there was and is a pressing need for additional oversight assistance in support of CSTC-A at the “grass roots” level for its contracting in support of the ANSF. There were also indications of continuing communications and coordination problems between CSTC-A and the MoD regarding contracting and logistical supply issues.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

3.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, ensure that the contract for maintaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization weapons includes specifications that ensure appropriate quality of products/services and that contractors hired are able to produce/perform to those standards.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, noting that contracting and contract performance monitoring has been a problem in the past. The Command has taken the following steps:

- Required HEB to hire qualified personnel for the NATO weapons maintenance contract
- Required HEB to provide the appropriate tools for their employees to conduct work to contract standards, less some specialized tools and gauges, due in late September or early October 2009
- Requires CORs to track equipment arrival, contractor personnel training qualifications, perform periodic inspections, and monitor reports from subordinate units and Technical Officer Representatives.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. We will follow-up on the arrival of the specialized equipment for the HEB contract and ask the Command for an analysis of the effectiveness of the actions outlined with respect to CORs.

3.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, ensure that local Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer Representatives, in coordination with their Ministry of Defense counterparts, perform a quality screen of inbound contracted commodities upon receipt, but before Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan transfer to the Afghan National Security Forces’ logistics system; and ensure follow-up to achieve contract compliance with respect to quality of services delivered.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred. CSTC-A continues to work to improve the quality of its contracting process and oversight of contractor performance, appointing Technical Officer Representative at Depot 1 to perform quality assurance checks to verify contract compliance. Additionally, CSTC-A is finalizing a SOP that provides “cradle to grave” guidance on developing requirements and defining measurable performance criteria when preparing Performance Statements of Work.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

3.c. Director, Defense Contract Management Agency evaluate an internal realignment of personnel resources from Iraq to Afghanistan in order to support changing and increased contract priorities on the ground, and review Defense Contract Management Agency personnel requirements necessary to support the expanding Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan mission.

### ***Client Comments***

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency partially concurred with the recommendation. DCMA noted that, as circumstances permit, it does realign its resources based on theater requirements, available resources, and overall theater leadership priorities that flow through JCC I/A to DCMA as delegations. DCMA noted that a recent review had caused some incoming personnel to be redirected to Afghanistan over the ensuing months. DCMA had also established a new O6 command team and a staffing increase of 55 personnel in Afghanistan to support the expanded mission. Specifically, DCMA reported that an additional three persons had been assigned to the existing three person team at CSTC-A for the emerging contract administration and oversight mission.

DCMA further stated that it did not have oversight authority or responsibility for all theater contracts. DCMA’s contract oversight responsibility in theater, per OSD direction, was directly linked to the delegations received from JCC I/A in accordance with the joint DCMA and JCC I/A CONOPS and delegation process.

Furthermore, DCMA stated that its ability to meet its resourcing needs in both Afghanistan and Iraq was hampered by its reliance on external sourcing. As indicated on page 20 of the [draft] report, the DCMA request for 57 subject matter experts with specialized oversight capabilities remained unfulfilled by the military services. Of the number requested, only 13 Subject Matter Experts had been sourced (an additional 6 were provided for one cycle only). This shortfall of 38 experts imposed operational challenges.

### ***Our Response***

The DCMA comments were responsive. The comments clearly indicate difficulty in filling contract oversight positions, but there is no mention of the number of authorized positions. We request that DCMA provide us an update describing assigned strength versus authorized strength in Afghanistan. If difficulty in manning to authorized strength is a problem that persists, continued oversight may be in order.

3.d. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, develop a plan to improve communication and coordination between Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan logistics and contracting personnel and the Ministry of Defense, including its Inspector General office.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, noting the recent focus with MoD's 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Minister and MoI's Deputy Minister for Logistics to improve coordination in logistics and contracting activities. The CSTC-A IG is also active in this effort, coordinating with the MoD IG.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



## **Observation 4. Effectiveness of the ANSF Logistics System**

The Afghan National Security Forces' logistics<sup>1</sup> systems that support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), respectively, remained institutionally immature and insufficiently effective. Army and Police personnel have not become proficient in applying the established logistical model and did not demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the logistics system's capacity to perform as designed. To ensure the supply system worked somewhat effectively, the ANA and ANP often depended upon U.S. mentors and trainers to "push" them needed equipment and supplies by mobilizing the support of U.S. counterparts in the ANSF supply chain.

This occurred because the ANA and ANP logistics functions were still in an early stage of development, with the ANP significantly lagging the ANA. Neither the ANA nor the ANP had enough trained and experienced logistics personnel to make their logistics processes and procedures function properly. Moreover, trained logistics personnel and units had been periodically diverted to "front line" security roles, which has been the ANSF and Coalition forces' priority.

In addition, CSTC-A did not have an overarching strategic plan with corresponding operational implementation plans for developing logistics capability within the ANSF, and has not, until recently, sufficiently emphasized the importance of developing a sustainable ANSF logistics function appropriate to its growing operational capability. In addition, CSTC-A did not have enough mentoring personnel to address effectively both security forces expansion and logistical development issues.

Finally, establishing modern military and police logistical systems will require overcoming the still strong legacy among ANSF leaders of the former Soviet-style, highly centralized, logistical mindset, as well as the cultural tendency to hoard, resulting from the country's prolonged experience with poverty. Corruption, which has been endemic in the ANSF supply system and continues to be problematic, undermines the potential effectiveness of the Army and Police logistical systems.

As a result, the ANSF systems were unable to reliably meet army and police logistical needs. Moreover, a widening gap has developed between the logistical and operational capabilities of the ANSF. This has limited the capacity of the ANSF to support its current force size, which could lead to a growing logistical gap, prolonged ANSF dependence on the U.S and ISAF/Coalition, and delayed building of a logistically sustainable Afghan security force.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, 20 September 2008.**

"The end state for Phase 3 is national military forces and police services correctly configured and

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<sup>1</sup> JCS Pub 1-02 refers to logistics in terms of materiel, personnel, facilities, and services. For the purposes of this observation, we limit our treatment of logistics systems to those systems and processes that deal with the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel.

resourced for the security needs of the country. The forces will be postured to defend national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against prospective enemies, with internal security and law enforcement bodies capable of sustaining themselves either unilaterally or with the international community's support.”

**MoI Policy “Process for the Management of Logistics”, January 6, 2009.** This decree prescribes common procedures, formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organization/activities of the ANP.

**MoD/ANA Decree 4.2 “Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures,” June 2009.** This MoD decree establishes the basic policies and procedures to account for military materiel in the ANA.

### ***Background***

The separate<sup>2</sup> logistics systems used by both the ANA and ANP were relatively undeveloped and immature, and were not yet capable of adequately supporting their respective security forces. CSTC-A logistics mentors explained that the Afghan security forces had never had a functional logistics system and the western-style logistics concepts and processes being implemented were still relatively new and alien to the ANSF.

The Soviet-style system of top heavy command and control continued to influence decision-making and had not been overcome, therefore limiting the effectiveness of the current supply system which relies on a degree of fluidity up and down the supply chain. The current ANA logistics model was first introduced in 2002 and 2003. But, although the ANA model has served as the conceptual basis for establishing the ANP logistics system, the ANP system only began to be formally initiated after the DoD assumed the training and equipping role for the ANP in 2005.

Prior to 2007, CSTC-A had only provided logistics mentoring at the senior ministry levels for both the MoI and MoD. They relied upon U.S military logisticians entrenched in the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) to provide limited operational logistics assistance and training at the Corps and Kandak level for the ANA. Because of an extreme shortage of mentors, CSTC-A was never able to provide adequate logistics mentoring for the police, other than at the MoI level.

It was not until 2008 that CSTC-A began to organizationally coordinate and synchronize its logistics mentoring resources, with the objective of establishing a logistics mentoring organization capable of integrating and focusing logistics training for the ANA and ANP. The continuing shortage of logistics mentors – particularly for the ANP – has limited the impact of this effort.

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<sup>2</sup> While both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are implementing a similar western-based logistics model, their logistics systems are not interconnected or shared. They do have some storage facilities co-located, but the logistics operations at these sites are independent of one another.

## ***Challenges within the ANSF Logistics System***

Notwithstanding organizational efforts by CSTC-A in the last two years to improve the efficiency of its logistics mentoring in support of the ANSF, the logistics system of both the ANA and ANP have continued to be inefficient and ineffective. Interviews with U.S. mentors, trainers, and ANSF personnel indicated that developing an overarching logistics system with an effective requisition and distribution process was still a major challenge and a top priority. One CSTC-A logistics mentor stressed its importance by stating that “a logistics system that works is what is going to allow us to be able to go home some day – helping the ANSF to become functional and sustainable.” While the CSTC-A Campaign Plan provides some broad logistics guidance and goals, CSTC-A has not yet created a strategic road map that can be operationally implemented for developing the ANSF logistics capability to an end state that will enable it to become independent and self-sustainable. Other key challenges that have impeded the development of a functional and sustainable ANSF logistics system include:

- An inefficient and ineffective materiel requisition process
- The lack of trained ANSF logistics personnel
- An insufficient number of logistics mentors and advisors

Those challenges have been magnified by other Afghan-unique contributing factors, such as the low rate of literacy, the legacy of the highly centralized Soviet-style logistical system, cultural impediments, and endemic corruption.

**No Strategic Plan for Developing Logistics Capability.** Although CSTC-A leaders and field mentors acknowledged the urgency to establish an effective ANSF logistics capability, CSTC-A had not yet developed an overarching strategy and operational plans for establishing that capability within the ANA and ANP. The CSTC-A Campaign Plan included logistics sustainability as an end state, but did not provide an integrated, synchronized, implementation strategy for achieving that goal. Neither did the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013), nor the Afghan National Security Policy include logistics capability development within the ANA and the ANP as a strategic priority. And while the MoD and the MoI had issued logistics policies within their respective organizations, neither had produced a strategic vision defining what logistics capability they would need to develop and sustain in consonance with the growing ANA and ANP force structure.

Not having an overarching ANSF logistics development strategy with operational plans describing specific actions, resources, timelines, and metrics for achieving that capability has delayed building a sustainable logistics system capable of supporting the operational needs of the ANA and ANP fielded forces. Creating a roadmap for developing that logistics capability within the ANSF and implementing it in a cohesive, systematic, and focused way to achieve an end-state of ANSF logistics self-sufficiency within an acceptable timeframe will be essential to ensuring the accomplishment of this important objective.

**Difficulties in the Requisition Process.** The ANA uses the MoD-Form 14 to requisition and the MoD-Form 9 to issue supply items. The ANP uses a separate, but almost identical process with the MoI-Form 14 used for requisitions and the MoI-Form 9 to document issuance of items. Both requisition and issuance systems are derived from the U.S. military supply system. The requisition and issuance process for both the MoD and MoI is

straightforward (Figures 1 and 2), but in order to work with transparency and accountability, it must be linked to an accurate stock record accounting and property book system. The challenge thus far has been to synchronize all three elements of the system. When operating as designed, the ANSF supply system would be capable of providing management with fundamentally necessary status reports on inventories, requisitions, and asset visibility.





Figure 6. MoD Requisition Process  
(Source: CSTC-A)



*Figure 7. Mol Requisition Process  
(Source: CSTC-A)*

However, CSTC-A advisors reported that because there was little transparency in ANSF supply distribution, each step in the requisition and distribution process was vulnerable to significant inefficiency, as well as outright blockage of supplies due to corruption from bribes or from pilferage. This has led to chronic supply delays or failure to receive ordered supplies. U.S. mentors to the ANA and ANP chains of command have sometimes been able to determine the cause of a supply problem and address the issue. But, because supplies were often not delivered to ANSF units in a timely fashion, if at all, CSTC-A and ANSF personnel reported widespread frustration with the supply requisition and issuance process and a lack of confidence in using it as designed.

Some U.S., ISAF/Coalition, and ANSF field personnel stated that the respective MoD and MoI supply systems were overly bureaucratic, inefficient, and generally ineffective. Some U.S. logistics mentors opined that the strategy of replicating the U.S. logistical system within the ANSF had thus far been unsuccessful. However, CSTC-A leadership expressed confidence that the new logistical system could be made to work, once ANSF personnel receive sufficient training and mentoring to understand how to use it properly. Senior CSTC-A logistics mentors explained that since the Afghan security forces had never had a truly functional logistics system before, it would take time to institutionalize the new concepts, processes, and procedures.


Despite the significant challenges to effective operation of the MoD and MoI supply systems, CSTC-A reported that progress was being made. Although the systems had flaws, they were

moving slowly in the right direction. For example, our team discovered major improvements in weapons accountability in both the ANA and ANP. CSTC-A mentors said that an ANP transportation unit established in 2008 was already successfully transporting 10 percent of ANP supplies with a goal of expanding that distribution capability. One mentor explained that, “The MoD/MoI-14 system, which is modeled on our own system, may not (ultimately) work (as presented) for the Afghans, but it gives them a place to start. It is up to the Afghans to develop their own system that works for them. They need to find their way. The MoI-14 system gives them a starting point.”

**Insufficient Numbers of ANSF Logistics Personnel.** U.S., ISAF/Coalition, and ANSF personnel emphasized the importance of developing specialized logistics training and logistics competency at all levels within the ANSF. The Commander of Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-North observed that lack of basic competency was one of the main reasons the ANSF supply system did not work. He observed that in the ANP, the effectiveness of the logistics system was especially dependent on the capability level of the provincial headquarters, through which all ANP requisitions passed.

To address the issue of the lack of logistics capability at all levels in the ANP, and at most levels of the ANA, CSTC-A had recently initiated a contractor-run two-week logistics course. Some ANA as well as ANP personnel, including battalion-level Border Police, had already attended. However, actually transporting ANSF personnel to the training site presented formidable challenges given the long distances, difficult terrain, and lack of security.

Developing and also maintaining a core capability of logistics personnel in the ANA has been a particularly challenging problem. U.S. mentors reported that there had been instances where logistics-trained graduates reporting to a Combat Service Support Battalion had been reassigned to an operational infantry kandak. In part, this has been due to the previous priority to grow the front line fighting force. In several instances, this problem was highlighted by the fact that units originally established as Combat Support and Combat Service Support kandaks were switched over and fielded as infantry kandaks. An additional contributing factor has been that ANA soldiers in combat units receive extra pay incentives, whereas supply personnel may not.



*Figure 8. U.S. ETT mentors ANA soldiers at Logistics Support Center in Kabul. (Source: U.S. Air Force)*

CSTC-A intended to build new ANP Central Supply Depots and Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs) that would be finished by the end of 2009. However, there was still a shortage of trained Afghan logistics personnel to manage them. U.S. logistics mentors exclusively operated two of the ANSF supply depots we visited. Because of the shortage of trained ANSF logistics personnel, U.S. mentors did not appear to be very optimistic about being able to turn over the management of the planned logistics facilities to the ANSF on schedule.

The SY 1388 *Tashkil* for the MoI, signed in late March 2009, included 1,628 logistics positions throughout the MoI and ANP.<sup>3</sup> However, CSTC-A noted that recruiting and training civilians would be a challenge, given the shortage of literate Afghan personnel. Even candidates with basic literacy skills will not necessarily be qualified to manage the western-based logistics system the ANSF has adopted until they demonstrate that they can actually assimilate the necessary technical training.

**Insufficient Numbers of ETT and PMT Logistics Mentors and Advisors.** When our assessment team visited Afghanistan in April 2008, there were few CSTC-A officer or NCO mentors with logistics expertise assigned to the MoI and the ANP. In addition, there were no Logistics ETTs working with the ANP below the provincial level. A CSTC-A contractor provided most ANSF logistics mentoring, particularly for the MoI. CSTC-A has been addressing that challenge. By March 2009, it had assigned 37 U.S. logistics personnel to the MoI and the ANP to train and mentor at the ministry and provincial headquarters levels. In addition, CSTC-A had organized four, two-man mobile logistics training teams to deploy to police units at the provincial and district levels to help train the ANP to use the MoI logistics system.

CSTC-A had previously submitted several Requests for Forces to obtain the U.S. military manpower required for its training and mentoring requirements, especially after it had been given the mission of training the ANP in 2005. Since CSTC-A did not receive the police mentor personnel requested in its Request for Forces, it could not make up the shortfall in Police Mentor Teams (PMTs), including with respect to embedded logistics personnel. Therefore, in order to create the minimal essential PMTs, mentors were transferred from existing ANA Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). This resulted in PMTs that were staffed with skeleton crews and that were not as robust as intended. In addition, the PMTs often had to mentor more police units (usually, district headquarters) than originally planned. Transferring ETT personnel to establish PMTs had the further effect of increasing the shortage of ETTs. Therefore, both PMTs and ETTs were under-resourced, under-staffed, and had to mentor more units, with less than sufficient time devoted to each. The pending deployment of a second Brigade Combat Team to Afghanistan to provide additional mentors for the ANA and ANP will help address this problem. The CSTC-A Commander indicated that he was hopeful that this increase in dedicated U.S. training forces would alleviate much of the mentoring shortfall.

The lack of a trained logistics corps within the ANSF, and particularly within the ANP, resulting in part from a shortage of U.S. logistics mentors and advisors to assist in its development, has been one of the biggest obstacles to achieving an effective ANSF logistics system.

### ***Other Contributing Factors***

There are several other factors that have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the ANSF logistics system.

**Low Literacy Rate.** Most of the skill areas associated with logistics requires a certain degree of literacy. This is true for a mechanic using a maintenance manual, or a supply clerk processing

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<sup>3</sup> Civilians would constitute 1002 of the 1628 positions. The remainder would be uniformed police logisticians.

a requisition or maintaining a property book. Consequently, the low literacy rate in the ANSF has limited the development of an effective ANSF logistics system. Although ANSF logistics officers were supposed to be literate many of them were not, according to U.S. mentoring staff. Because of this factor, U.S. mentors often have filled out the MoD/MoI-9 and MoD/MoI-14 forms and performed required follow-up.

**Afghan Culture: A Culture of Poverty.** Thirty years of turmoil caused by invasion, civil war, and repressive government left Afghanistan with dysfunctional governmental institutions and an impoverished population. This “culture of poverty” has created distrust among the Afghan people toward their leaders in the government and toward each other. Mentors explained that ANSF are so afraid that they will be left with nothing (again) that they have a hard time “giving up” or distributing items that come down the ANSF supply chain. U.S. trainers reported that the mindset of not wanting to give up supply items for fear that no more would follow was pervasive throughout the ANSF supply system.

**Corruption.** In 2009, the MoD and MoI initiated major efforts to reduce corruption. It will take time, political will, and committed leaders, however, for new policies and procedures to become institutionalized and therefore to have a significant effect. In one region visited, mentors reported that the ANP logistics system was rife with corruption, and that most corruption was perpetrated frequently by those at the higher ranks. Even when corruption was caught and well-documented, it was very difficult to get senior officers removed or otherwise sanctioned. U.S. logistics mentors explained that in the past, some officers found guilty of corruption were simply reassigned to another location, rather than removed from service or otherwise sanctioned, thus contributing no deterrent effect and setting a very poor example to the rank and file police personnel.

CSTC-A reported that, largely because of corruption, fuel availability and distribution within the ANP was proving to be a systemic problem. Corruption, combined with hoarding of fuel, has repeatedly created a bottleneck in the ability to distribute fuel from the provincial to the district police headquarters. Numerous reports from mentors in the field bore witness to the problem of fuel hoarding at the provincial level with the result that police districts had to curtail vehicular patrols because of lack of fuel.

In early 2009, the Ministers of Defense and Interior issued strong guidance requiring accountability and control of equipment, including weapons. These actions should significantly strengthen oversight over time and make corruption increasingly difficult, if the government and ANSF chains of commands consistently apply these standards. Because of the proliferation of corruption within the ANP, the MoI IG informed our assessment team that he had just completed a preliminary “Anti-Corruption Plan” at the Minister of Interior’s direction. The Minister’s anti-corruption initiatives included publishing the new MoI Logistics Policy, the implementation of which had been delayed for some time because some senior MoI personnel allegedly feared that doing so would provide “too much” transparency to the logistics process. In addition, the Minister was initiating reforms in the contracting, logistics, and fuel programs, and was standing up a formal Anti-Corruption Task Force.

Although the MoD and MoI, with the assistance of CSTC-A, have begun moving against corruption to reduce its impact on the logistics and supply system, CSTC-A staff indicated it would likely be at least another year before the ANSF would be able to demonstrate measureable progress.

**Transportation and Infrastructure.** Logistics mentors indicated that the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, combined with the lack of functional roads and the narrowness of village streets, made transporting supplies to locations outside of city centers very difficult and dangerous. Police mentors reported that some police units were only accessible by goat path or air transport, and some logistics facilities and regional supply centers were in locations that were far from the receiving unit. Although CSTC-A reported that several new supply facilities were in the process of being built or had just been completed, those facilities were concentrated in geographic areas that were relatively accessible and secure. The lack of infrastructure and supply stability in some of the more remote or “active” areas was still problematic for ANSF units who operated there. A shortage of personnel and transportation equipment, poor or no roads, and the security threat, which required additional convoy security force protection, further compounded transporting supplies.

**Consumable Supply Shortages.** Because of the difficulty in applying the MoD/MoI-requisition systems, some ANA and ANP units did not consistently receive necessary supplies such as ammunition, generator fuel, firewood and, at times, winter clothing. In addition, explaining a not uncommon condition, one district police chief said that he did not have enough weapons for each of his policemen, and therefore all of the unit’s weapons were in constant use. At some posts, there might be 10 policemen and only 5 weapons. Weapons were turned over from one shift to the next and, because of that, the weapons were poorly maintained.

## **Conclusion**

Logistics development in the ANSF is immature and numerous challenges must be overcome before the ANSF has the capability to become self-sustaining. Some of those challenges include the lack of a strong and capable ANSF logistics corps, the lack of logistics ETT/PMT trainers and mentors, corruption, and the Afghan culture itself. Despite the many challenges in the logistics arena, the mentors and trainers with whom we spoke indicated that progress was being made and that they were very committed to succeeding in their mission. However, until the ANSF have a functional logistics capability, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition mentors and trainers will have to continue to “push” needed equipment and supplies out to the field and provide the enabling forces to make the ANSF logistics process work.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

4.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, establish an overarching Strategic Plan for developing a comprehensive Afghan National Security Forces Logistics Capability, with accompanying operational Action Plans for each logistics area, including acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of material, that will enable the Afghan National Security Forces to become operationally independent and self-sustainable within a mutually acceptable timeframe.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that they had developed Ministerial Development Plans and supporting action plans for the MoI and MoD to improve sustainable capacity and capability. The Commander also reported that, at his invitation, the U.S. Army Materiel Command, the U.S. Army Central Command, and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff/G-4 had dispatched a joint team to assess the Afghan logistics system and to propose a strategy for greater ANSF self-sufficiency. He stated that the ANA portion of that assessment was to be completed in September 2009 and the ANP portion would be completed by October 2009. These plans would then be coordinated with and implemented by the MoD and MoI.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that Commander, CSTC-A, forward to OIG a copy of the proposed logistics plans for the ANA and the ANP when they are completed.

4.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, determine the Afghan National Security Force logistics personnel requirements and develop a cadre of trained Afghan National Security Forces logisticians who are recognized and rewarded for developing, maintaining, and increasing their logistics skills.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, stating that CSTC-A was currently conducting an in-depth assessment of the ANA logistics capabilities, to include an analysis of the future organizational and personnel requirements that will be required to sustain the planned end-state for growth of the ANA.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

4.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and the Afghan National Army General Staff, develop personnel policy requiring that soldiers with logistics specialty skills be assigned to positions and organizations requiring those skill sets.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation. He reported that establishment of improved ANSF personnel management systems that clearly identify training and military occupational specialties attained by soldiers and police was a top priority for CSTC-A. He indicated that development of such a system was part of a broader CSTC-A approach to improve several ANSF systems, including personnel management, logistics, financial management, and force management.

## ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. Development of personnel management systems that can track individual assignments, training, and skills of ANA soldiers is part of a long-term solution toward ensuring that specially qualified personnel are assigned to and report to the units where their skills are in demand. This holds true for many specialty areas, not just logistics. Yet development of a systems approach to personnel management for the ANSF seems to be several years in the offing. In the meantime, soldiers and officers who have completed formal courses in logistics and who may have been designated as skilled logistics technicians may be assigned wherever the immediate perceived need of the ANSF is greatest, and, unfortunately, the assignment may not be to a job where their specialized skills will be put to good use. We request that the Commander, CSTC-A comment on what actions are being taken in the near-term within the ANSF to ensure that officers and soldiers who have received specialized training in logistics are indeed being assigned to billets where their newly acquired logistics skills can be effectively applied in support of the ANSF logistics mission.

4.d. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan, determine the number of dedicated U.S. and other international force logistics trainers and mentors necessary to develop the required logistics capability within the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

## ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, relating that CSTC-A had recently performed a top to bottom review of the National MoD and MoI logistics trainer requirements as part of an ISAF-led “resources to task” analysis and will be considered as part of any forthcoming COMISAF\USFOR-A request for additional ANSF trainers.

## ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



## **Observation 5. Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Personnel Issues**

The CSTC-A headquarters and its staff was insufficiently resourced to execute the broad-scope and complexity of its mission, which entails the multiple tasks of training, equipping, and mentoring to generate, develop, and sustain ANA and ANP security forces, as well as the mentoring of senior Afghan MoD, General Staff, and MoI personnel.

Furthermore, there are insufficient numbers of U.S. and ISAF/Coalition mentors (ETTs/OMLTs and PMTs/POMLTs) supporting the ANSF to effectively accomplish the in-the-field train and equip mission. Additionally, the Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) skills and specialties required of the ETTs/OMLTs and PMTs/POMLTs are not always analogous with the functions they are mentoring.

Because the U.S. effort to build the ANSF has been an “economy of force” operation, and, consequently, has not been adequately resourced with the appropriate number and skill sets of personnel, progress in creating the ANA and ANP has been less expeditious than it potentially could have been.

Failure to provide the personnel resources the ANSF train and equip mission requires has delayed and will continue to delay building the sustainable capability of the ANSF to successfully fight this war, and, unless addressed, will prolong the duration of U.S. and Coalition/ISAF security responsibilities in Afghanistan.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Request for Forces 937 and 938.** These are classified documents.

**CSTC-A Joint Manning Document.** This document authorizes the unfunded temporary duty positions for CSTC-A while in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom*.

### ***U.S. and Coalition/International Security Assistance Forces Train and Equip Mission***

**Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan: Headquarters and Staff Personnel Requirements.** The ANSF train and equip mission is complex and broad-scoped at all levels. It is particularly challenging at the CSTC-A headquarters and staff level. Almost all of these officers and NCOs are dual-hatted, not only serving as full-time CSTC-A staff members orchestrating the greater train and equip mission, for a force engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign, but also mentoring senior Afghan officials in the MoD, General staff, and MoI. CSTC-A personnel readily admitted that they do not have sufficient time to properly carry out their senior ANSF leader and staff mentoring roles because of the often urgent priority demands associated with their positions as CSTC-A staff officers and NCOs.

For example, the CSTC-A CJ7 section responsible for Focused District Development program planning and implementation only had four personnel assigned, which appeared to be less than

actually required. They had the dual responsibility of supporting this key program as part of CSTC-A's staff, as well as mentoring selected staff personnel at the MoI. The majority of their time was spent planning and arranging logistical ANSF movements not related to mentoring the MoI. Personnel shortfalls on the CSTC-A staff decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of their mentoring mission and have consequently delayed the development of their MoD and MoI counterparts.

Additionally, there were indications that the Combined Fielding Center (CFC) that provides kankak (battalion) unit level training had insufficient numbers of U.S. and ISAF/Coalition trainers assigned to effectively carry out that mission's responsibilities. Combined Training Advisory Group (CTAG) and CFC trainers expressed concerns that they did not have sufficient U.S. and ISAF/Coalition personnel assigned, especially given the accelerated ANA fielding schedule to meet increased ANA end-strength requirements.

The manpower requirements for the CSTC-A headquarters and staff, as well as for trainers assigned to the KMTC, are documented on the CSTC-A Joint Manning Document (JMD). While changing the JMD would be the usual procedure to increase personnel authorizations in this situation, routine processing of such a change request, even if approved, would not likely result in additional personnel actually on the ground until 2011. This would not provide the timely assistance required to support the full scope of CSTC-A operations, including plans to increase the ANA fielding to 134,000 soldiers by the end of 2011.

CSTC-A agreed that additional manpower at the CSTC-A headquarters and staff level could be required and that an expedited JMD change request might be needed. However, this request would depend on the outcome of an ongoing review of CSTC-A roles and functions to first ensure overall efficiency was being achieved in the organization.

### **Embedded Training Teams and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams.**

ETTs and ISAF OMLTs provide the ANA with mentoring and training support of all unit functions and capabilities that enhance the ability of the ANA to operate effectively and, eventually, independently. The ETTs and OMLTs also provide direct access to essential U.S. and ISAF resources and enablers, such as close air support and medical evacuation. In addition, ETTs and OMLTs assess ANA unit capability, and identify strengths, shortfalls, and opportunities for improvement.



*Figure 9. From left: U.S. ETT personnel advise ANA counterparts; British OMLTs mentor ANA soldiers.*

*(Sources: Virginia National Guard; NATO ISAF)*

The personnel challenge for CSTC-A increased significantly in 2005 when it was assigned the mission of training and equipping the ANP in addition to the ANA, causing already short ETT manpower to be diverted to support establishing PMTs. These shortfalls have not been filled in response to previous Requests for Forces (RFFs). Consequently, ETT and PMT personnel limitations have slowed the rate of development of the ANA and ANP.

As of May 2009, CSTC-A needed approximately 5,688 personnel for ETTs and PMTs when compared to the requirement stated in RFF 920 and 937. However, only about 2,097 had been assigned. Additionally, as of June 2009, ISAF and Coalition partners had provided 54 OMLTs (about 831 personnel) out of the current requirement of 65, as established in the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR). Combining the ETT/PMT/OMLT assigned strength (approximately 2,928) against the 5,688 requirement provided CSTC-A with about a 51 percent overall fill rate.

CSTC-A determined that the OMLT requirement to support an ANA force of 134,000 would be 103. However, CSTC-A expects the OMLTs to stabilize at only about 70 teams against that requirement.

TF Phoenix regional commanders stated that these personnel deficiencies in CSTC-A ETT and PMT field training mentoring personnel had presented significant problems in carrying out their mission. Specifically:

- In ARSIC-E, ETTs are at less than 50 percent strength, staffed with four to six personnel, far short of the required 16.
- ARSIC-C reported that ETTs have an average of only four of 16 personnel required and are forced to “borrow” the necessary support and security personnel from nearby U.S. combat units.
- ARSIC-S reported that its operations have been stressed by the lack of personnel resources. For example, the minimum force protection requirement for movement off of a Forward Operating Base (FOB) by an ETT to conduct an outreach operation is nine personnel. However, some teams are comprised of as few as four soldiers. Because of this, some ANA units in outlying FOBs in ARSIC-S have not received the ETT mentoring support required. Those FOBs were visited whenever possible, but the ETTs could not provide the overwatch actually needed.
- Staff from the Regional Corps Advisory Command (RCAC) in ARSIC-E stated that replacement individual augmentees were rarely assigned by CSTC-A to the billet against which they were requisitioned, apparently due to a combination of combat and non-combat losses, as well as the changing situation on the ground. And, in many instances, personnel who were trained at Ft. Riley did not know whether they would be assigned as ETTs or PMTs until arrival in-country.
- CSTC-A staff assigned to the CFC noted that ETTs accompanying Afghan infantry battalions (kandaks) were invariably under-strength.
- Many of the ARSICs reported that MOS skills and specialties required of the ETTs/OMLTs and PMTs/POMLTs are not always analogous with the functions they are mentoring; personnel did not have the skill sets required for their positions.

## Police Mentors

Afghan National Police (ANP) organizations fall under the authority of the MoI. CSTC-A, along with a civilian contracting organization hired by the State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, have the critical mission of training and mentoring the growth and development of a professional national police force of 96,800. It was anticipated that the size of this force would be further increased.



*Figure 10. U.S. PMT advises ANP officer.*

*(Source: CSTC-A)*

However, the current lack of PMTs has significantly impeded building ANP capacity because CSTC-A PMT personnel levels have been insufficient to effectively support the ANP training and mentoring mission. The target number of teams to be fully operational was 635, while CSTC-A had only 90 operational, and they were under-strength. The actual personnel present compared to the RFF stated requirement for PMT personnel was only 39 percent; 922 personnel were assigned against the 2,375 required.

A full strength 14-person PMT would be comprised of four military members (leader, personnel, operations, and logistics), two civilian or military police (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL] contract employees), two linguists, and a six member U.S. military security force element. Among the key duties of PMTs are regular assessments of a particular district or districts, training and mentoring the ANP organizations assigned to that district(s), and checking on their monthly progress until they reach a readiness level capable of functioning independently. Further, the PMTs are especially critical to the ANP in a district or province when they have been selected for the Focused District Development (FDD) program. In the FDD process, PMT teams actually participate in the training program with their ANP counterpart units. Insufficient numbers of PMTs thus limit the scope and rate of FDD training.

Without enough PMTs, commanders are forced to cut down on their mentoring missions. For example, the U.S. Commander responsible for the 31 Kabul police districts indicated that, during his tour, a combination of personnel shortages and realignments had reduced operational capability from four to two 12-person teams. With four teams, he was able to conduct missions to each district every few days. With only the two teams, they were only capable of visiting districts about once every seven to ten days, and their understaffed PMTs had to cover multiple districts.

In another example, five PMTs in RC North have had to support nine provinces and 10 districts. Moreover, the PMTs reported that personnel shortages prevented them from supporting any police companies at the provincial level. Consequently, when provincial police companies were selected for FDD training, established plans called for PMTs to accompany the police and to continue mentoring them once they returned to the province after completion of training. However, there were no PMTs available to do either of these tasks, degrading the effectiveness of the FDD training.

## ***Ongoing Corrective Actions***

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently taken steps to mitigate the shortfall of ETTs and PMTs against the force requirements established in RFF 937 by tasking the Army to deploy an active duty Army Brigade Combat Team to deploy and provide additional mentor and trainer support for the ANSF train and equip mission. This “second” BCT will reinforce the one National Guard Brigade (TF Phoenix) that has been carrying out the bulk of the mentoring mission, supplemented by an additional number of individual mobilization augmentees.

The second BCT will almost double the ETT and PMT personnel presently on the ground in support of the ANSF train and equip mission. In addition, the ETTs and PMTs provided by the active duty BCT are expected to benefit from the synergy and cohesion that comes from being supported by their parent battalion and brigade headquarters.

The RFF 938 for a Military Police battalion to provide additional personnel for PMTs has also been approved and sourced.

The assignment of the National Guard Brigade, an active duty BCT, and an additional Military Police battalion will significantly expand the number of personnel available to organize and man ETTs and PMTs. However, the differences in the rank structure of U.S. military personnel in these new mentoring units and that previously provided by individual augmentees deployed in response to RFF 920 and 937 will result in a net decrease in the number of field grade and senior NCO mentors. For example, an Afghan General Officer, who had formerly been mentored by a U.S. colonel, may now be mentored by a U.S. lieutenant colonel or a major. The overall shortfall in senior rank structure under the new 2-BCT mentoring concept will be approximately 136 field grade officers and senior NCOs. The impact of this shortfall on overall mentoring effectiveness cannot yet be determined. .

CSTC-A indicated it was not yet concerned about this mentoring seniority shortfall, noting that the mid-grade officers of the U.S. active duty Army BCT come with the resources of a battalion and staff to back them up. This support was not afforded to individual mobilization augmentees who staffed senior mentor positions in the ARSICs under TF Phoenix.

Nonetheless, CSTC-A may still need additional senior officers and NCOs as mentors for senior Afghan personnel. CSTC-A noted that they would re-evaluate the need for additional senior officers and NCOs beyond those provided by the two BCTs, although they believed that the actual requirement would likely be less than 136.

USFOR-A, in coordination with CSTC-A, has continued to implement a partnering program that pairs U.S. combat units with specific ANA units to reinforce the overall mentoring effort. The U.S. combat unit, the ANA unit, and the ETT participate together in staff planning, rehearsals, and execution of combat operations in their assigned areas of responsibility. Increasingly, with this and ETT support, ANA units have developed sufficient experience and capability to take the lead in combined combat operations.

USFOR-A has also taken steps to enhance the ISAF/Coalition ability to develop the ANP by specific mission-tasking of inbound U.S. brigades and battalions to provide police mentors in their battle space.

The Commander, CSTC-A was recently “dual-hatted” to provide him with the additional authority of Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. The result of this integration of command and control over both U.S. and ISAF mentor elements should facilitate achieving enhanced coordination and standardization of the ISAF efforts with that of U.S. forces and improve mentoring performance of the ANSF.

## **Conclusions**

There have been insufficient personnel assigned against the ANSF train and equip mission since its inception. The CSTC-A staff authorization falls short of the requirement and the personnel assigned to the ETTs and PMTs fall well short of the authorization. The JCS, in coordination with CSTC-A and USCENTCOM, has taken some recent steps to correct this deficiency by assigning an active duty BCT and active duty Military Police battalion to bolster the effort provided by the National Guard Brigade that has historically been in place. While this will greatly offset the shortage of ETTs and PMTs, there will still be selected shortfalls of senior grade mentor and trainer personnel. The CSTC-A headquarters will also remain short of the required personnel to effectively conduct their dual mission as CSTC-A staff and mentors to the MoD and MoI.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

5.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and Commander, U.S. Central Command, conduct a Joint Manning Document review to address potential staff and mentor shortages within headquarters and staff of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, reporting that an out of cycle JMD request to source necessary key requirements had been submitted in May 2009. However, any growth of the CSTC-A JMD will be factored into an overall request for ANSF trainers that may result from the COMISAF strategic assessment.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

5.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, United States Forces–Afghanistan, and Commander, U.S. Central Command, develop a plan to request the necessary number of field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers on a continuing basis as individual augmentees that will not be sourced by the 2 Brigade Combat Team concept in order to ensure acceptable rank compatibility with Afghan National Security Force senior personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that the ANSF train and advice effort had been greatly enhanced by the arrival of the second BCT. Both BCTs have been augmented with senior grade officers and NCOs.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

5c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Central Command, Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, and the Commander of the inbound active duty Brigade Combat Team, take action to ensure appropriate skills and training are provided to the personnel from the active duty Brigade Combat team who will be assigned to Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that USFOR-A had recently established a J-7 with the responsibility to provide specific training requirements for the ANSF training mission to the CONUS based training programs. CSTC-A provided detailed training information to 4-82 BCT prior to their deployment, to include a handbook developed by TF Phoenix tasks associated with the ETT/PMT mission set.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



## **Observation 6. Pre-Deployment Training of Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams**

The Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) pre-deployment training, currently conducted at Ft. Riley, Kansas for all U.S. military services except Marine personnel, has largely focused on combat survival skills, without sufficient emphasis on Afghan-centric mentoring and training skills. An effort to rebalance the course more in favor of mentor training was implemented the spring of 2009, but the results will not be evident until later in the year.

ETT and PMT soldiers interviewed in Afghanistan who trained at Ft. Riley also believed that the course is unnecessarily long (approximately 72 days) in terms of its relevance to what they have learned about their actual operational needs on-the-ground. In addition, some mentors observed that the course was too Iraq-centric in its focus and needed to better incorporate the reality of the Afghanistan expeditionary force environment. Also, logistics mentors noted that the training did not prepare them to mentor ANSF logistics personnel, an increasingly key area of CSTC-A focus.

Moreover, some personnel who trained at Ft. Riley as ETTs were subsequently assigned as PMTs on arrival in Afghanistan. Therefore, they do not receive special emphasis on their PMT mentoring role in the training.

The Program of Instruction (POI) at Ft. Riley, Kansas was developed to train 93 combat survival tasks and 12 mentoring/advising tasks. These tasks are mandated by U.S Forces Command (FORSCOM) training guidance.

The assignment of personnel trained as ETTs to PMT positions resulted from a lack of coordination between FORSCOM, USCENTCOM, and CSTC-A.

As a consequence, of receiving insufficient training on their specific mission, mentor personnel have not arrived in-country sufficiently prepared to carry out their responsibilities and their Army or Police counterparts may not have been supported as effectively as required.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DOD Directive 1322.18.** DODD 1322.18, “Military Training”, January 13, 2009, states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training, conducted in a safe manner, to enable performance to standard during operations...

**FORSCOM Message: Subject/2008 Revised Transition Team Training Guidance, DTG 080257 Mar 08, Unclassified.** This message provides updated training guidance for transition teams deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia (SWA). This document replaces IAG training guidance DTG 182148Z Jan 07 and aligns

previous guidance for transition teams deploying to Southwest Asia with FORSCOM training guidance for follow on forces deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This message directs that all transition team personnel are to conduct pre-deployment training in accordance with this message.

**FORSCOM Message: Subject/FORSCOM Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia (SWA), DTG: 172053Z Nov 08, Unclassified.** This message provides a stand-alone document which does not require referencing prior messages and incorporates requirements and procedures identified in Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order 150-08, Subject: “Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy. It guides development of plans for unified and collaborative reserve component deployment training.

### ***Embedded Training Team/Police Mentoring Teams Pre-Deployment Training***

The majority of the military personnel that are currently assigned to ETTs and PMTs in Afghanistan went through pre-deployment training at Ft. Riley, Kansas. (Marine personnel usually train at one of their own training facilities.) To date, these personnel have mainly been Reservists or Guardsmen from the various Services or active duty personnel sourced from the Air Force or Navy. Including in and out-processing, the training lasts about 72 days and, in the case of Army Guard and Reserve personnel, counts toward their year-long mobilization tour of duty. The training is currently a Forces Command (FORSCOM) mission and is conducted by the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division. The training will be transferred from Ft. Riley to Ft. Polk, Louisiana no later than September 2009. FORSCOM will retain responsibility for the training, at least temporarily, with advice and assistance from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.



*Figure 11. From left: Airmen at the Advanced Contingency Skills Training Course at Fort Dix, NJ; National Guardsmen participate in pre-deployment training at Fort Drum, NY. (Sources: U.S. Air Force; NY State Division of Military and Naval Affairs)*

This training is critical to the preparation of ETTs and PMTs for their important role in the key ANSF train and equip mission. Soldiers and leaders we interviewed in Afghanistan generally believed the training was excessively oriented on the “kinetic”, e.g. light infantry aspect of the preparation, and insufficiently focused on the skills, tactics, techniques, and procedures needed

for training and mentoring the Afghan Army and Police, especially in specialty functions such as logistics.

CSTC-A and Task Force (TF) Phoenix have been developing a process to capture ETT and PMT member's lessons learned and will recommend course improvements based on these insights to pre-deployment training personnel at Ft. Riley/Ft. Polk. This process is just being implemented and consists of a survey at the beginning, mid-point, and end of a service member's tour. CSTC-A intends to provide this feedback to the trainers at Ft. Riley/Ft. Polk via CENTCOM.

**Status of Pre-Deployment Training.** A review of the current status of pre-deployment training for ETTs and PMTs determined that:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division at Ft. Riley has had the training mission since 2006. The Brigade has about 820 personnel to support the training mission.
- The Program of Instruction (POI) is derived from FORSCOM training guidance. These documents mandate training on 93 combat survival tasks and 12 mentoring/advising tasks.
- Starting with Class 70, which began training on March 30, 2009, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade at Ft. Riley has focused more attention on the mentoring/advisory tasks and counter-insurgency (COIN), increasing the Program of Instruction (POI) emphasis in these areas from three to 12 days. This was accomplished within the confines of the 72 days total at Ft. Riley. (None of the ETT/PMT personnel interviewed in Afghanistan had the benefit of this training change.) The effectiveness of the new increased emphasis on mentoring/training tasks may not be evident until about December 2009, when those trained under the revised POI complete CSTC-A's mid-tour surveys.
- The 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Operations section at Ft. Riley has been closely linked with the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) and had a system initially established for personnel deployed to Iraq to routinely receive feedback used to adjust the training. This process appeared to have been less successful with CSTC-A and TF Phoenix in Afghanistan.
- In the past, CSTC-A did not send training information and lessons learned back to Ft. Riley for possible adjustment to the POI. For example, personnel assigned to PMTs had not been trained on the use of the Capability Endorsement form submitted monthly to CSTC-A to assess the level of competency and readiness of ANP units. Most of the trainers had not seen the forms before they arrived at their ANP organization.
- However, the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade recently assigned a senior Sergeant and Lieutenant Colonel as liaison staff to TF Phoenix in Afghanistan to improve the coordination/feedback effort. There have also been recent exchange team visits to each location by 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade and CSTC-A personnel.
- Regional Police Assistance Command (RPAC) members indicated that the training they had received at Fort Riley did not adequately prepare them for the police training mission. The training was Iraq-centric. If they were taught anything about Afghanistan, it was from an ANA perspective vice ANP. They also said they needed more training on the ANP logistics system.

- The ETT/PMT training mission will move from Ft. Riley, Kansas to Ft. Polk, Louisiana in the fall of 2009. Class 78 will be the last class trained at Ft. Riley and will graduate in mid-September 2009.
- The 162d Infantry Training Brigade will be activated at the JRTC at Ft. Polk to conduct the ETT/PMT training. Class 81 will start arriving at Ft. Polk in mid-August and will start training on 31 Aug 09. The POI for the instruction at Ft. Polk will be the same POI that has been taught at Ft. Riley for at least two or three rotations. About 140 personnel from 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade at Ft. Riley will transfer to the 162d Infantry Training Brigade at Ft. Polk to provide continuity. While there may be some unresolved range structure issues at Ft. Polk early on in the training, the transfer of the mission appears to be on-track.
- U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) plans for key U.S military leaders and planners at all levels to attend the in-country COIN Leader's Course, including those involved in the train an equip mission. However, it was acknowledged that this will be a difficult goal given the difficulty of travel in-theater. USFOR-A also intends to submit quarterly training recommendations through CENTCOM and JFCOM to FORSCOM for possible incorporation into the ETT/PMT training POI.

Recently, DOD decided to increase the number of personnel supporting the ETT and PMT missions in Afghanistan by deploying an active duty Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to support the Afghan train and equip mission. The additional BCT, which will be uniquely trained and staffed, would roughly double the one National Guard Brigade that has traditionally comprised TF Phoenix, the organization with oversight for ANA and ANP mentoring for CSTC-A. The ETT and PMT training mission will be a new requirement for this active duty BCT. Mobile training teams will be sent from Ft. Riley or Ft. Polk to the Army Brigade's home base to conduct training, including situational training exercises.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

6.a. Commander, U. S. Army Forces Command, in coordination with Commander, Joint Forces Command, Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, review the program of instruction at all continental United States military service facilities that are training Embedded Training Team and Police Mentoring Team personnel for Afghanistan to ensure that the mentoring/training is adequate to meet on-the-ground operational needs in Afghanistan and that training is standardized across services.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) concurred with this recommendation, noting that Programs of Instruction for ETTs and PMTs at all training facilities were developed to meet the requirements published in the FORSCOM Southwest Asia (SWA) Training guidance. This document was developed in coordination with USCENTCOM and Army Central Command. It is updated in coordination with them every six months. Additionally, FORSCOM hosted a working group on September 9 and 10, 2009, that addressed ETT/PMT training for units sourcing those requirements. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan J7 was present and concurred with the recommended adjustments to ETT/PMT training developed by the working group.

Those adjustments will be captured in a Task Order and the next update to the SWA training guidance.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command comments were responsive. We request a copy of the Task Order and the next update to the SWA Training guidance, when published.

6.b. Commander, U. S. Army Forces Command, in coordination with Commander, Joint Forces Command, Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, develop the system to capture lessons learned specific to Afghanistan and ensure these lessons are appropriately incorporated into the program of instruction for Embedded Training Team and Police Mentoring Teams personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) concurred with this recommendation. The USFOR-A Deputy Commanding General, Support, hosted an Afghan Trainer’s Community of Interest video teleconference (VTC) on September 9, 2009. This VTC was a part of an ongoing series of weekly VTCs between the Training Team Training Mission and the theater, designed to capture and build on lessons learned. As noted previously, FORSCOM will use this data to regularly update training guidance.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command comments were responsive. We request a copy of the Task Order and the next update to the SWA Training guidance, when published.

6.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, U. S. Army Forces Command, coordinate training and assignments so that individuals and teams are trained as either Army or Police trainers and then are assigned to the position they trained for upon arrival in Afghanistan.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation and will implement to the extent practicable. Changes in the mission, the operational environment, and available resources often require the Commander to task organize available assets.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.



## **Observation 7. U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force Re-Missioning Caveats**

Official caveats applied by their respective services to U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel assigned as CSTC-A mentors and trainers restrict the on-site Commander from reassigning them to in-country duties or positions more appropriate to the needs of the train and equip mission.

These Service caveats have, in some instances, prevented on-site commanders of U.S. Navy and Air force personnel from assigning them to perform duties that would serve essential needs of the unit, but which may not have been included in their parent Service's specific description of their duty position. Some examples include reassignment to perform a related specialty skill, and general security-related military duties required to support the forces in-theater, such as guard or convoy security duties.

Due to the limitations imposed by Service caveats, U.S. commanders and leaders have been hampered in achieving the full capability of teams and units to which U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel have been assigned in Afghanistan. In addition, because Navy and Air Force personnel cannot perform certain unit functions that U.S. Army personnel must carry out, unit cohesion and morale has been negatively impacted.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**House Armed Services Committee Hearing on "The Use of In-Lieu-Of, Ad Hoc, and Augmentee Forces in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom," July 31, 2007.** This hearing discussed the Services' positions regarding the employment of airmen and sailors in combat and combat support roles outside their services' traditional core missions, and whether airmen and sailors are adequately trained and equipped for performing predominantly Army missions.

**U.S. Air Force Memorandum "Air Force Policy Supporting Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMI), July 11, 2008.** This memo, signed by the USAF Chief of War and Mobilization Planning Policy Division, delineates the Air Force's position on re-missioning units in support of CENTCOM requirements.

**USNAVCENT Re-Missioning Memo, May 14, 2009.** This memo, signed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, delineates the Navy's position on the re-missioning of Navy personnel in support of Joint Manning Document, ad-hoc Request for Forces, and Force Tracking Number requirements.

### ***CSTC-A Re-Missioning Requirements***

The U.S. military is fighting a persistent, counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency conflict in Southwest Asia in which combatant commander force requirements and capability do not always match the DOD-developed, in-lieu-of (ILO) force provider solutions. In the ILO process, the military services provide personnel capabilities in mission areas outside of their traditional roles and functions. ILO solutions include re-missioning, defined as taking an existing unit or individual personnel and retraining that unit or individual for a different mission that is outside

the unit or individual's core competency. For example, the Army routinely re-missions transportation units against a requirement to provide a security force for U.S. and ISAF/Coalition convoys. In Afghanistan, U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel are assigned as medical and logistical mentors and trainers throughout the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). According to the former CENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations, ILO units and individuals have demonstrated an exceptional level of professionalism, while providing capabilities that are often in very short supply in the Army.

The number of personnel actually assigned to CSTC-A to support the ANSF train and equip mission have been consistently less than the requirement stated in the Request For Forces (RFFs). Units have been, therefore, consistently under-manned. As of May 2009, U.S. ETTs required a total of 3,313 personnel; however, only about 1,175 had been assigned. Additionally, as of January 2009, U.S. PMTs required 2,375 personnel, yet only 922 had been assigned. This has caused DOD to use ILO force provision solutions to augment their on-the-ground personnel requirements with members representing all the Services.

### ***“In Lieu Of” Re-Missioning Guidelines***

#### **U.S. Navy**

Once CENTCOM identifies the required skills in a Unit Request Form or an RFF, the Navy then works with Army HQ/Training Command to tailor training appropriate for the projected mission and threat. All Navy personnel, active and reserve, with orders to support OIF/OEF receive basic combat skills training at a variety of Army locations designed to meet theater-specific requirements. Sailors assigned to CENTCOM missions that operate “outside the wire” receive expanded combat skills training, focusing on self-defense in addition to a comprehensive package of “warrior skills” training and associated drills.

In USNAVCENT's re-missioning memo of May 14, 2009, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations recognized and supported the need to recast forces in place to perform critical missions. However, he also recognized that some Sailors may have volunteered for missions for which they may not be properly trained, qualified, or equipped to safely perform, presenting potential risks to friendly forces, Coalition partners, unarmed civilians, and the Sailors themselves.

In those instances where a Sailor, due to re-missioning, is assigned to duties for which he is judged to be unsuitable because of lack of training and/or experience, USNAVCENT proposes a corrective course of action such as:

- Redeploy the Sailor to their original pre-deployment assignment
- Reassign the Sailor to another Navy-tasked, in-theater requirement for which they are properly trained, qualified, and equipped
- Redeploy the Sailor to another assignment altogether

#### **U.S. Air Force**

The Air Force works to ensure that, prior to deployment, Airmen are organized, trained, and equipped to perform CENTCOM'S ILO requirements with the required skills and competence. To that end, Airmen receive combat skills training at a variety of locations by Army certified

instructors, plus specific technical training, if required, all of which meet the operational requirements of the mission the Airmen will be assigned to support.

However, an Air Force policy memo dated July 11, 2008 states the following:

The Air Force will continue to leverage our Airmen's capabilities within their core competencies and does not intend to remission existing units or personnel to perform missions outside their core competency in an ILO capacity.

### ***Navy and Air Force Limitations on Personnel Duty Assignments***

Several Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands (ARSICs) raised concerns that certain U.S. Navy and Air Force personnel were limited in the duties they were able to perform due to caveats imposed by their respective services. Specific examples included the inability to assign them to perform guard/watch duty, convoy security, or to serve on crew-served weapon teams. Already hampered by a severe shortage of personnel, the U.S. commanders expressed frustration with also having to work around these duty limitations during mission planning.

According to the Navy's and Air Force's protocol for supporting CENTCOM's ILO forcing solutions, as described in their July 31, 2007 testimony, all Sailors and Airmen deploying in support of CSTC-A's ETT/PMT mission should be appropriately trained prior to arrival in theater. This training should encompass all duties ETT/PMT personnel should reasonably expect to perform, including guard/watch duty, convoy security, and manning crew-served weapons. This pre-deployment training is provided to Sailors and Airmen at Ft. Riley, Kansas to enable them to perform these functions.

However, the July 11, 2008 Department of the Air Force and May 14, 2009 Department of the Navy memos seem to contradict their July 31, 2007 testimony, which attested that all Sailors and Airmen were being properly trained and equipped for ILO taskings. Additionally, the Navy and the Air Force seem to be taking different positions on what are acceptable duties for an ILO assignment. The Navy seems to allow more leeway for ILO duties, as long as the Sailor has been properly trained, while the Air Force limits duty to core competency. However, most of those ILO Navy and Air Force personnel assigned against ETT and PMT positions received the same 72 days of training at Ft. Riley to prepare for their assignments as did their Army counterparts.

Service policy and caveats could cause Sailors and Airmen to perceive that some of the normal duties carried out by ETT and PMT members are outside their core competencies, even if they are not, thus presenting a problem to their Commanders when they are assigned to those billets. When these Service members are part of an ETT or PMT and are unable to share the responsibility for carrying out all of the team's assigned duties, the team's ability to effectively carry out its mission can be severely hampered.

### **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

7.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, direct all personnel serving as mentors/trainers at any level, regardless of military service, to carry out general military duties, such as guard, watch, or convoy security.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation. However, he has determined that he currently does not have the authority to direct these actions regarding non-Army personnel and will address the recommendation with USFOR-A and USCENTCOM.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comment is required. We subsequently addressed this issue with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations, in Recommendation 7.b and 7.c.

7.b. Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, ensure that personnel assigned to mentor/trainer positions are sufficiently trained in general military duties and eliminate caveats precluding assignment to duties such as guard, watch, or convoy security. Any perceptions that personnel have regarding what duties they may or may not be authorized to perform should be clarified by their parent Service before deployment to Afghanistan for ETT or PMT duty.

### ***Management Comments Required***

The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force did not provide comments on the draft report. We request that the Chief of Staff respond to the final report.

7.c. Chief of Naval Operations, ensure that personnel assigned to mentor/trainer positions are sufficiently trained in general military duties and eliminate caveats precluding assignment to duties such as guard, watch, or convoy security. Any perceptions that personnel have regarding what duties they may or may not be authorized to perform should be clarified by their parent Service before deployment to Afghanistan for ETT or PMT duty.

### ***Management Comments Required***

The Chief of Naval Operations did not provide comments on the draft report. We request that the Chief of Naval Operations respond to the final report.

## **Observation 8. Personal and Professional Responsibility and Accountability in the Afghan National Security Forces**

The efficacy of the U.S. and ISAF/Coalition’s advisory efforts to build the ANSF into an effective security force has been hampered by the prevailing lack of personal and professional responsibility and accountability throughout the ANA and ANP.

The MoD and MoI Inspectors General and some ANA Corps Commanders reported cases in their ministries and commands in which allegations of corruption had been substantiated but no, or relatively minor, sanctions were ever imposed on the army or police offenders.

This has occurred due to the ANSF’s failure to establish a visible, credible, and enforced standard of army and police conduct and performance, and to create a culture of accountability at the highest levels of the leadership.

As a result of this systemic problem within the army and police, the population often distrusts ANSF personnel, especially the police, and confidence in the government has been undermined.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**MoD/ANA Decree 4.2 “Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures,” June 2009.** This MoD decree establishes the basic policies and procedures to account for military materiel in the ANA.

**MoI Policy “Process for the Management of Logistics”, January 6, 2009.** This policy prescribes common procedures, formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organization/activities of the ANP.

### ***Afghan National Army***

#### **Accountability/Responsibility as Defined by the Ministry of Defense**

MoD Decree 4.2 clearly defines property accountability and responsibility as it relates to ANA uniformed military and MoD civilian personnel. It states that:

Resources are provided by the Government in the name of the citizens of Afghanistan to the Ministry of Defense with the expectation that we will use these resources for Afghanistan security. The Afghan National Army (both military and civilian personnel) has the responsibility to utilize resources for the intended purpose, neither for personal gain or betterment, nor in ways harmful to the MoD’s interest. This is especially true of materiel resources to include food, ammunition, trucks, and fuel, which must be accounted for. The MoD is merely the custodian of the Afghan Government’s hard earned money and trust. Let no member of the ANA betray this trust by being a poor steward of its resources.

Accountability and responsibility are defined in this decree as follows:

- Accountability is the obligation of a person to keep records of materiel, equipment, and supplies. These records show identification data, gains, losses, due-in materiel, due-out materiel, and balances on hand or in use. Records include supporting documents to address discrepancies.
- Responsibility is the obligation of an individual to ensure materiel and funds entrusted to their possession, command or supervision are properly used and cared for, and proper custody and safekeeping are provided.

Decree 4.2 also defines command responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and personal responsibility:

- **Command Responsibility.** A Commander's obligation is to ensure materiel within his command is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping are provided. Command responsibility is inherent in command and cannot be delegated. It is present by assignment to a command position at any level and includes:
  - Observing subordinates to ensure their work contributes to the proper custody, care, use, and safekeeping of all materiel within their command
  - Enforcing all security, safety, accounting requirements and proper record keeping
  - Taking disciplinary measures when necessary
- **Supervisory Responsibility.** A supervisor's obligation is to ensure materiel issued to, or used by their subordinates is properly used and cared for, and that proper custody and safekeeping are provided. It is inherent in all supervisory positions and cannot be delegated. It arises because of assignment to a specific position and includes:
  - Providing proper guidance, direction, and training
  - Enforcing all security, safety, and accounting requirements
  - Maintaining a supervisory climate that will facilitate and ensure proper care and use of materiel
- **Personal Responsibility.** An individual's obligation is to exercise reasonable and prudent care and safekeeping of property in their physical possession. It applies to all materiel issued for, acquired for, or converted to a person's personal use, with or without receipt.

Decree 4.2 also notes that commanders or supervisors who determine that the cause of loss, damage, or destruction warrants adverse administrative or disciplinary action should take appropriate action. These actions include, but are not limited to:

- An oral or written reprimand
- Appropriate remarks in evaluation reports
- Removal from position
- Non-judicial punishment
- Suspension of privileges

Additionally, the nascent ANA court martial system provides a process and penalties for incidents that are criminal in nature, although it currently seems to be sporadically functioning, mainly at Corps and below.

## **Lack of a Culture of Responsibility and Accountability within the Afghan National Army**

At the regional commands the team visited, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition trainers and mentors repeatedly expressed their frustration with what they perceived as a pervasive lack of personal and professional responsibility and accountability throughout the ANA.

### **ARSIC-Central ETTs:**

Some corrupt ANA leaders appear to be getting around the Electronic Pay System (EPS) process in order to continue extorting soldiers' pay. For example, there are reports of officers and NCOs devising methods to "get around the EPS system" to extort part of a soldier's pay. This would occur, for example, when the soldier is required to give up his military ID card to the officer or NCO to obtain permission to go downtown to the bank. On his return, the soldier is required to pay to get the ID card back.

### **ARSIC-South, J3 Staff:**

There is a problem in the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps with accountability and responsibility, not only for weapons and equipment, but also for personal behavior. There is no system in place for soldiers to be held accountable for their weapons, uniforms, assigned vehicles, or other equipment. There should be a functioning process and procedure for discipline at the Corps-level.

### **ARSIC-East, RCAC Mentors:**

There is little accountability (e.g., clothing/inventory records), poor quality assurance and control, and virtually no consequences for loss or damage to equipment.

### **ARSIC-East, HQ Personnel:**

For every 100 units of supply ordered by an ANA unit, on average, only about 80 or 90 will make it to the company. Additionally, 300 percent of the necessary cold weather gear had to be fielded to the 1<sup>st</sup> brigade, with no explanation for the duplication and no consequences to anyone for the loss and/or theft of the gear. And with no inventory records to document what has been issued to each soldier, the situation will not improve. ISAF/Coalition forces need to emphasize mentoring the concept of personal responsibility and accountability.

### **ARSIC-South, OMLT Mentors (Canada):**

Very rarely is anyone punished for corruption or for losing equipment or uniforms, and if someone is reprimanded, it is usually quickly forgotten. A kandak commander from 205<sup>th</sup> Corps was caught stealing items from the unit's mosque. When confronted, he blamed the interpreter, despite the fact that the items in question were found in the commander's quarters. Although he was verbally reprimanded by the Corps Commander, supposedly court-martialed, and relieved of his command, the kandak commander went back to his

unit and is still in command. Reportedly, a Corps Commander does not have the authority to relieve a kandak commander. That authority is held at the MoD.

In another case, a kandak was issued 25 new vehicles, but while transporting them from the depot to the unit location, 21 of the vehicles were damaged or destroyed. No one was held accountable.

The problem is not unique to the “rank and file,” but starts at the highest levels of the MoD and General Staff. For example, it was reported that a number of allegations of corruption have been substantiated against individual senior civilians and General Officers in the MoD and General Staff, but they have generally not been held accountable. More often than not, the corrupt official was simply moved to another position and sometimes even promoted.

## ***Afghan National Police***

### **Accountability/Responsibility as Defined by the Ministry of Interior**

The MoI’s January 2009 Logistics Policy sets forth the Ministry’s procedures on accountability and responsibility as it relates to the ANP. It states that,

...accounting for all materiel and property...is of the highest priority in the MoI. All property within the MoI and ANP organizations/units and activities belong to the Government of Afghanistan. Receipt for and use of materiel and property does not constitute personal ownership. It does however require that all materiel and property be accounted for and used in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan.

The MoI Decree also states that all Ministry of Interior leaders and Police organization/unit commanders are responsible for the proper accountability of materiel under their control. In addition, all leaders and commanders are required to develop procedures that provide visibility and accountability of resources within their unit or organization.

In addition, the loss of accountability for Government resources by any MoI personnel will result in financial liability, disciplinary action and/or termination of employment. Theft or intentional misuse of resources will be referred to the Criminal Investigations Division or Internal Affairs for criminal investigation and prosecution. The Ministry of Interior fully supports the Government of Afghanistan’s efforts to eliminate corruption by Government employees.

The MoI’s list of requirements for command responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and personal responsibility are identical to those of the MoD, reiterating the concept that anyone utilizing government materiel or property is responsible for its proper use, care, custody, and safekeeping.

### **Lack of a Culture of Accountability within the Afghan National Police**

MoI internal reports and briefings by the MoI IG revealed a comparable or greater lack of accountability within Afghan police organizations. The MoI IG’s assessment and analysis of the Ministry’s Inspection Reports for Solar Year 1387 (2008) revealed the following:

- Senior officials lack control of their personnel and do not regularly monitor their performance
- Units are not implementing the Reward and Punishment Process to incentivize and discipline personnel
- Police forces have a weak level of professional training and there are no disciplinary units at the provincial level to control them
- A number of police vehicles have not been recorded and registered to the drivers' accounts. Additionally, out of 2,083 police drivers, only 775 (37 percent) have licenses

The MoI IG brief gave an example of a provincial Traffic Police Director who has been assigned to his position for the past 17 years. During that time, he was transferred from his post on seven occasions, presumably due to substandard performance and allegations of corruption, but was eventually reassigned to the same position each time. Due to recent allegations, the MoI IG once again recommended transferring him out of the Traffic Police Director position.

### **Conclusion**

The MoD and MoI have taken appropriate action to codify their Ministries' policies on accountability and responsibility in exacting detail. However, it will require equally exacting leadership oversight and sustained political will to enforce these standards.

Without leaders at all levels in the ANSF actively setting an example with respect to accountability and responsibility, soldiers and patrolmen are unlikely to adhere to accountability policies and procedures, or to depend on, trust, or loyally support in their leaders. Strong compliance by the chain of command to all the inherent obligations in the MoD and MoI policies and standards, combined with vigorous enforcement, could, over time, significantly reduce the incidence of accountability issues.

Moreover, if U.S. and ISAF/Coalition forces have to replace or repair less materiel and property lost or damaged due to soldiers' and patrolmen's negligence, irresponsibility, or corrupt activities, a significant cost savings could result. Moreover, such measures, if fairly and effectively implemented, could result in development of a more professional ANSF.

Development of a stronger culture of personal and professional responsibility and accountability, implemented through effective leadership that consistently enforces related policies and procedures, will also be necessary to ensure the accountability of supplies of all types and categories, including sensitive equipment items such as weapons.

### **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

8.a.(1) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff, mentor the development and institutionalization of civil and military judicial policy and procedures that will enable senior MoD and MoI civilian officials and military officers to be held accountable for their actions.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. CSTC-A published an order to all its personnel to report on incidents of corruption and is now including in ANSF training civil and military judicial policy and procedures that enable senior MoD and MoI personnel to be held accountable for their actions.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A were responsive. We request that Commander, CSTC-A forward a copy of the order requiring reporting of corruption. We also request that CSTC-A further describe the training referenced in their comments, including who is receiving the training and at what level is it being given.

8.a.(2) Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff, develop a process to track case progress and disciplinary action taken against senior officials who have allegations of corruption substantiated by the Ministry and/or General Staff Inspectors General or other investigative authorities.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, noting that the issue will require a concerted and synchronized effort over time by all levels of command and in all activities of the U.S. government effort in Afghanistan. The CSTC-A IG and SJA are actively engaged with their Afghan counterparts to improve on these efforts. CSTC-A personnel have been directed to report suspected/alleged corruption or bribery by Afghan government officials or by the ANSF.

### ***Our Response***

The comments were partially responsive. While the steps outlined are important in the anti-corruption effort, they do not address the specific need to develop a transparent process to track case progress, including any disciplinary action taken against senior officials as a result of corruption substantiated by the Ministry and/or General Staff Inspectors General or other investigative authorities. We request additional information on development of such a tracking system.

8.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff to enforce a system of accountability across the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan Police organizations that:

(1) Ensures senior Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Afghan National Army, and Afghan National Police leaders set the example with respect to their personal and professional conduct.

(2) Empowers commanders within the Army and Police chains of command to take appropriate non-judicial punishment action against subordinate officers and, as appropriate, refer serious cases for criminal charges.

(3) Delegates to commanders the authority to relieve and/or court martial subordinate commanders and soldiers/police officers for corruption and substandard performance.

(4) Recognizes and rewards examples where units/individuals in the Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police have met the highest standards of responsibility and accountability.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with these recommendations. He noted that CSTC-A continues to train the MoD and MoI to enforce a system of accountability. Specific actions include:

- Advising and training ANSF leaders and IGs
- Leveraging CONUS-based training venues
- Increasing emphasis on face-to-face interaction among IGs in Afghan organizations, and
- Monitoring Afghan-led assistance visits, inspections, and investigations.

However, progress is slow. Efforts to delegate to subordinate commanders the authority to deal with offenses through relief, court-martial, or non-judicial punishment are hampered by resistance of senior Afghan officials. The policies and laws to allow subordinate commanders to investigate and dispose of allegations of misconduct using a form of non-judicial punishment are in place, but not uniformly employed.

An awards and recognition policy has been drafted and is awaiting Ministerial approval at the MoI. CSTC-A will assist the MoD in developing a similar policy.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request a copy of the policies and law mentioned in the Client Comments. We also request a copy of the MoI and MoD awards policy, when they are completed.



## **Observation 9. Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force Mentor and Trainer Tour Lengths**

The CSTC-A mission, which including the U.S./ISAF/Coalition mentoring, training, and equipping challenges, is multi-faceted and extremely complex. At present, only U.S. Army active duty soldiers serve 12-month mentor or trainer tours in Afghanistan. U.S. Army Reservists and Guardsmen, Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel, and ISAF international force personnel assigned as mentors or trainers serve anywhere from three to nine month tours.

This has occurred because of a failure to recognize that achieving success as a trainer or mentor requires sufficient time on the ground to gain the experience required and to build effective partner relationships. In addition, the U.S. military departments, and ISAF militaries have not established tours of sufficient length to optimize the train and equip mission.

The lack of a standardized tour length of sufficient duration has contributed to uneven mentor performance and effectiveness by ETTs, OMLTS, PMTs, and POMLTs, and has limited their ability to build sustainable ANSF partnerships and improve performance. As a consequence, it has also slowed the development of an independent and sustainable ANSF.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Secretary of Defense Memorandum, dated January 19, 2007, Subject: Utilization of the Total Force.** This document establishes tour length policy for the various DoD military components.

**Request for Forces 620, 937, and 938.** These are classified documents. They establish a minimum tour length of 365 days.

### ***Current ETT/PMT Personnel Tour Lengths***

CSTC-A's ETT and PMT personnel (except for the Logistics and Medical Logistics ETTs) are assigned to TF Phoenix. At present, TF Phoenix' personnel serve varying tour lengths, depending on service (Army, Navy, Air Force) and component (active, guard, reserve). For example, within the Army, active duty service members deploy for 365 days "boots on the ground" (BOG).

U.S. Army Reservists and Guardsmen serve on 400-day mobilization orders which include 130 days earmarked for training, leave, and demobilization, which results in their having only 270 days BOG—over three months short of the one year requirement established by the RFFs.

The average U.S. Marine Corps tour length is seven months, while both the Navy and Air Force tours range from four to six months.

Prior to the recent approval of the 2-BCT mentoring concept, which will be in effect by September 2009, almost all of the ETT and PMT personnel consisted of Army National

Guardsmen on one-year mobilizations, or 270 days BOG. The second BCT to be deployed to Afghanistan in support of the train and equip mission will be an active duty BCT; ETTs and PMTs formed from this brigade will serve 365 days BOG.

### ***Standardization of Tour Length Leads to Greater Continuity of Effort***

Establishing relationships of confidence with ANA and ANP counterparts is a process that takes time and becomes fruitful over an extended period. The varying tour lengths of the different U.S. military services, Coalition, and ISAF forces has caused disruptions in continuity and impeded the establishment of effective mentor relationships with ANSF counterparts. Consequently, it has made it difficult for mentors to learn their job and duties, and still have sufficient time to contribute at a high level of mentor performance. Moreover, the frequent and uneven rotation of personnel has slowed ETT or PMT OPTEMPO in order to integrate newly-deployed troops constantly into the mentor/trainer team and its mission. The troops nearing the end of their tour are further limited in what they can accomplish because they are training their replacements, assuming there is an overlap, which is not always the case.

In an October 2008 NATO mission report, a former CSTC-A commander recommended that tours of duty in Afghanistan should be no less than 12 months, since he considered that to be the minimum tour length necessary for personnel to develop the trust required for effective collaboration with Afghan personnel. The NATO 2009 Spring Session Committee Report echoed that view: several NATO and Afghan sources commented on the difficulties posed by the relatively rapid rotations of ISAF personnel. Tours of as little as four months have limited ISAF personnel's ability to master their duties and achieve an in-depth knowledge of Afghan society. The report observed that in such a complex operating environment, it is essential to put a premium on field experience and building relationships with local populations and officials, which can only be developed over time.

There has also been extensive research by U.S. military analysts that supports tours of at least twelve months. A recent U.S. Air Force study reported, for example, that extending tours for all personnel supporting critical mission requirements to one year could reduce the mission degradation caused by personnel turnover by seventy five percent. Thus, assuming it takes four to six weeks to establish a sufficient knowledge base to become effective (learning curve), a significant portion of a service member's deployment could be converted from learning the job to production by extending all U.S. and ISAF/Coalition mentor and trainer tours to 12 months in-country.

In 2008, Britain and the Netherlands agreed to extend the tour length of all their units in Afghanistan to 12 months. However, this change in policy has so far not been replicated by other European nations in ISAF, which typically have tours of only three to six months.

Twelve month deployments have been standard for U.S. Army tactical units. The extended tour length is critical as well for those serving in advisory capacities with Afghan forces in order to have sufficient time to build a relationship of mutual trust and confidence. Such relationships are critical to mentor and trainer mission accomplishment, as is gaining sufficient hands-on experience in such a unique operational assignment.

## **Conclusion**

The differing tour length of U.S. mentors assigned from the respective military services and components has made it difficult to establish continuity within ETT and PMT teams and to achieve full effectiveness. ETTs and PMTs are usually made up of personnel from different components who are in theater for disparate lengths of time and do not deploy/redeploy together. The continual rotation of team members has made it difficult to keep up a U.S. mentor/trainer unit's OPTEMPO, plus it has hindered the relationship-building process with the trainers' ANSF counterparts.

The tour length issue is also applicable to ISAF and Coalition personnel serving on OMLTs and POMLTs.

A number of studies of mentor personnel effectiveness in Afghanistan have recommended that troop tours, regardless of service, should be, at a minimum, one year in length, to promote unit stability, and to maximize mentor/trainer effectiveness. By standardizing and lengthening tours in-country, U.S. ETTs/PMTs and ISAF/Coalition OMLTs/POMLTs would have more time and opportunity to establish effective mentoring procedures and strengthen their Afghan partnerships.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

9.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a requirement that all U.S. mentors, including those serving on Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams, as well as logistics and medical mentors, be assigned to their positions for 12-months.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, noting that a document that codifies this requirement would be provided to USFOR-A. CSTC-A noted that current policy limits Army National Guard personnel to a one year mobilization. After conducting necessary training, they serve about 9 months in Afghanistan.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that Commander, CSTC-A forward a copy of the requirements document noted in the Client Comments. We have addressed the “one year mobilization” policy with an additional recommendation to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

9.b. Commander, International Security Assistance Force, coordinate with the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization to establish longer in-country tours, ideally lasting 12 months, for all Operational Mentor Liaison Teams and Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, USFOR-A, dual-hatted as COMISAF, concurred with the recommendation.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USFOR-A comments were not responsive in that he did not specify which actions he planned to take to implement the recommendation. We request that Commander, USFOR-A, in his dual-hatted role as COMISAF, respond by describing what efforts have been or will be taken to standardize 12-month tours of duty for NATO personnel assigned to OMLTs and POMLTs.

9.c. Chief of Staff, Air Force, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

### ***Management Comments Required***

The Chief of Staff, United States Air Force did not provide comments on the draft report. We request that the Chief of Staff respond to the final report.

9.d. Chief of Naval Operations, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

### ***Management Comments Required***

The Chief of Naval Operations did not provide comments on the draft report. We request that the Chief of Naval Operations respond to the final report.

9.e. Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps non-concurred with the recommendation, citing support for the USMC 270-day Boots on Ground (BOG) that included:

- The initial Joint Forces Command OEF Order 06-08, authorizing service rotation down to 210 days.
- Ease of meeting dwell time goals given a 270-day BOG deployment vice a 365-day BOG deployment.
- The two week rest and recuperation leave authorized for 365-day deployments actually translates into about 330-day BOG.

### ***Our Response***

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps comments were responsive. We continue to maintain, however, that the importance of the ANSF advise and train requirement and the significant role in Afghan culture placed on establishing personal relationships with their mentors supports a 12-

month BOG tours for Marines assigned to this mission. We note that the January 19, 2007 SECDEF memorandum titled, "Utilization of the Total Force" states "The planning objective for the Active Force remains one year deployed to two years at home station." We request that the USMC reconsider its non-concurrence to the recommendation.

9.f. Chief, National Guard Bureau, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

The Chief, National Guard Bureau concurred with this recommendation, but noted that the January 19, 2007 SECDEF memorandum titled, "Utilization of the Total Force" limited involuntary mobilization of reserve component personnel to one year at any one time.

### ***Our Response***

The Chief, National Guard Bureaus comments were responsive. We have addressed the "one year mobilization" policy with an additional recommendation to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

9.g. Chief, Army Reserve, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

The Chief of the Army Reserve non-concurred with the recommendation noting that DA and SECDEF policies limit total mobilization time to 12 months.

### ***Our Response***

Chief of the Army Reserve comments were responsive. We have addressed the "one year mobilization" policy with an additional recommendation to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

***Added Recommendation.*** As a result of an assessment of client comments to Recommendations 9.a., 9.f., and 9.g., we have added the following recommendation for the attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

9.h. Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness coordinate an exception to the policy in the January 19, 2007 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Utilization of the Total Force, that will direct 365-day "boots on ground" tours of duty for all U.S. personnel, regardless of their Service or Component, when assigned as mentors and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.

### ***Management Comments Required***

This is a new recommendation that did not appear on the draft report. We request that the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and readiness respond to the final report.



## **Observation 10. Afghan National Security Forces' Pay Issue**

Despite several years of Rank and Pay Reform initiatives, the ANSF continues to face challenges ensuring pay is regularly provided in the appropriate amount to its Army and Police personnel.

This has occurred because there are not enough banks throughout Afghanistan to support the Electronic Pay System (EPS) that has been initiated throughout the ANA and ANP. As a consequence, many ANSF personnel still have to be paid in cash. Further, the EPS is not adequately updated with personnel and payroll information to maintain 100 percent payroll accountability and disbursement. In addition, there are payment difficulties because of dysfunctional legacy computer systems, as well as other infrastructure challenges, such as lack of electricity.

As a result of these pay problems, ANSF personnel do not receive their pay regularly, and are not always able to reliably support their families. Consequently, ANSF morale has been affected. Some ANSF personnel have resorted to corrupt practices, driven at least in part by the need to have sufficient money for their families to survive. Corruption is more prevalent within the ANP where personnel are paid less, on average, than ANA personnel, who often draw additional combat pay.

Corrupt behavior that exploits the population has caused the Afghan people to distrust the police, undermined government credibility, and created vulnerability to expanded insurgent influence.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, 20 September, 2008.** This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

### ***Afghan National Police***

Some pay issues are endemic within the ANP, but less so within the ANA. This is partially due to the geographic dispersion of many police districts throughout Afghanistan and the difficulty of getting pay to them. The ANA generally have centrally located brigades and battalions confined to one area. The dispersion of police districts makes it difficult for police personnel to get access to banks and for ANP units to transmit payroll information to their Provincial Headquarters, which may be miles away. Since many ANP personnel are locally recruited, they do have the advantage of being nearer their families to provide them cash.

### **Electronic Pay System**

As of February 2009, the MoI had 76,000 personnel enrolled in the EPS out of 80,000 assigned, based upon Human Resource information received by the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOTFA). LOTFA manages the funds received from international donor countries, including the United States, which provide ANP salaries and also oversees the EPS on behalf of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance. LOTFA receives reports from the MoI provincial offices and accumulates this information into a central database.

The EPS that has been implemented within the MoI and the ANP is decentralized and not connected in “real time” with the financial offices at the MoI Headquarters. This electronic decentralization of the payroll system is reflected in a stand-alone payroll data base at each Provincial Police HQ. Since there is no corresponding electronic personnel data base, payroll entries must be made manually. Local precincts and districts have to collect and forward personnel changes to the Provincial HQ for updating into the payroll system. Frequently, update of this information does not happen in a timely manner, with the result that some policemen have not received pay for months.

Until payroll performance is monitored through a centralized system, and the personnel rolls continuously validated, CSTC-A and MoI will be unable to effectively manage fund allocation for the ANSF. CSTC-A has a planned initiative to address this issue in order to provide better management control over payroll actions and develop accountability. Parwan Province has been designated as a prototype location to institute a new centralized pay process.

### **Afghan National Police Hazardous Duty Pay**

Hazardous Duty Pay is authorized in Afghanistan for members of the ANP deployed in dangerous areas. However, not all ANP assigned to hazardous areas receive this benefit, only districts with EPS direct deposit capability. This has created an inequity in the ANP payroll system. There are only approximately 50 banks in Afghanistan, so direct deposit is not available to most districts. For example, two districts in Gardez qualify for hazardous duty pay, but only the police in the district with a bank receive this benefit.

### ***Afghan National Army***

Although pay issues are not as prevalent in the ANA as the ANP, the ANA does have some pay-related problems. For example, not all battalions, or kandaks, have banking capability nearby. Therefore, roving teams of ‘cash men’ are used to pay those soldiers in areas without electronic banking capability. In a ‘cash man’ operation, a team of three Army officers draw money to pay the soldiers. Any money that is not paid out is supposed to be returned. Reportedly, this does not always happen. ETTs in the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps learned that cash men had allegedly pocketed the equivalent of approximately \$20,000 from ANA payroll funds in recent months. In addition, some soldiers in the 205<sup>th</sup> Corps have been required to pay fees to these payroll personnel to receive their pay and/or to make electronic cash transfers to family members. Further, there have allegedly been instances where a soldier’s pay was fraudulently diverted by using someone else’s thumb print in the pay book.

### ***Ongoing Corrective Action***

The judicial and court-martial systems have been relatively ineffective in negating pay corruption. Apparently, it has proven difficult to investigate ANA and ANP personnel in these cases and to develop sufficient proof for administrative or judicial action under their respective systems. Victims are often reluctant to complain and perpetrators cover for each other. Additionally, the perpetrators often take active steps to commit these crimes “out of sight” of ETTs, OMLTs, PMTs, and POMLTs. However, some individual corruption cases involving pay issues in the ANA have been addressed using court martial procedures under “failure to secure soldier’s pay.”

The CSTC-A Commander and staff, in coordination with MoD, and MoI, are attempting to address problems with troop and police pay-related corruption. The CSTC-A Campaign Plan notes that key elements of ANSF pay reform initiatives include:

- Improving pay accuracy and timeliness
- Automating payroll execution and electronic funds transfer
- Ensuring special and hazardous duty pay for eligible elements of the forces
- Achieving equality of pay between the ANP and ANA

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

10.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to ensure focused priority on instituting a centralized electronic pay process for the Army and Police that is integrated with their personnel data systems.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation. He stated that CSTC-A was partnering with the Afghan MoI and MoD to develop and institutionalize an electronic pay process that is integrated with the personnel system. He explained that the MoD had conducted a pilot test to examine the potential for implementing an electronic payroll system across the ANA. He reported that CSTC-A would work with both ministries to integrate their centralized pay systems with the personnel data system.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

10.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to enroll all Army and Police personnel in the Electronic Pay System.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that 95% of the police force and 93% of the Army had been enrolled in the electronic payroll system and that over 60% of all ANSF received their pay through electronic funds transfer. The Commander predicted that percentages would increase as security and stability increased and as banking facilities become more accessible.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

10.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to coordinate with the appropriate Ministries to establish access to banks or equivalent financial facilities for all Army and Police personnel.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, commenting that CSTC-A collaborates with the MoI and MoD to expand bank access for the ANP and ANA. He reported that the ANP was conducting a “pay by phone” test to increase the potential for cashless salary payments across remote areas where banking facilities are not readily available. He stated that the MoD, Ministry of Finance, and banks were working to expand access by increasing banking infrastructure and electronic connectivity.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

10.d. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to institute controls in the ANA and ANP to manage and monitor payroll performance.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation. He affirmed that the MoI and MoD leadership acknowledged the need to implement controls to manage and monitor payroll performance. He stated that to strengthen the ANP pay system, CSTC-A and MoI were developing regional support teams to provide greater expertise in budgeting, payroll, and accounting. The ANA had recently approved a manning document to create a management team for internal reviews and to augment the efforts of the MOD and General Staff Inspector General auditing capability.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

10.e. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to vigorously apply non-judicial or judicial procedures to punish offenders responsible for payroll corruption.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, stating that CSTC-A seeks all opportunities to reinforce with the MoD and MoI the need to prosecute those who violate the law.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

## **Observation 11. Impact of Illiteracy on Afghan National Security Forces Development**

The low literacy rate of the Afghan population in their native languages, and therefore among ANSF Army and Police recruits, significantly limits the development of systems, processes, and functions necessary to improve significantly the operational and logistical effectiveness of the ANA and ANP.

Of necessity, CSTC-A has had to emphasize heretofore what has been the more immediate priority of generating sufficient ANSF personnel to help counter the growing insurgency and other illegal activities. Literacy training to ensure the long-term success and sustainability of the ANSF has not been emphasized, and CSTC-A has only recently begun to implement literacy training programs in the ANSF, which will take time to produce results.

As a result, about 70 percent of recruits for the ANSF are functionally illiterate. Without the ability to read and write, junior soldiers or police patrolmen cannot be trained to perform effectively in many fundamental skill areas, including logistics, maintenance, and medical support. Nor can they progress into more responsible technical and supervisory positions, such as those held by NCOs, which require at least a basic degree of literacy to participate in the tactical planning process, orders development, and execution.

### ***Applicable Criteria:***

#### **Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces.** September 20, 2008,

Objective 3.2: An enduring training base that can provide military and police personnel with basic and initial training; professional training and education with a focus on officer and NCOs; and literacy education at all stages.

#### **Afghan National Development Strategy.** Islamic Republic of Afghanistan:

Afghanistan National Development Strategy: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction, 1387-1391 (2008–2013). The Government has set a target to enable at least 1.8 million Afghans to attain demonstrated literacy by 2010.

### ***The Challenges of Illiteracy in the ANSF***

Out of an Afghan population of approximately 34 million people, only 28 percent are literate—13 percent of females and 43 percent of males.<sup>4</sup> These rates are reflected in the applicants that are recruited for the ANSF. The low rate of literacy has resulted from a 30-year history of political turbulence and civil war, exacerbated by five years of control by the restrictive Taliban, who did not allow females to go to school.

Literacy training is a critical factor in building self-sustainment within the ANSF. For example, CSTC-A has provided vehicles and related equipment to enable the ANSF to transport personnel and supplies, but the ANSF does not have enough trained mechanics to properly maintain the

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<sup>4</sup> CIA World Factbook: Afghanistan.

vehicles. It is difficult to train additional mechanics because of the shortage of personnel who can read, write, and do basic math. The sophistication of the vehicles and equipment being supplied to ANSF, with computerized ignition systems and various electronic modules, requires trained technicians who can read repair manuals and operate diagnostic equipment.

CSTC-A confirmed that providing technical training to the ANSF was a particular challenge because of the lack of literacy and math skills. While some PMTs and ETTs reported insufficient maintenance manuals, the manuals were often of little use to ANSF personnel anyway because of their low literacy rates. The resulting difficulty in developing trained mechanics contributes to the low readiness level of Afghan-maintained equipment. Until this problem can be addressed, the ANSF will continue to rely on U.S. and Coalition logistics support.

Low literacy rates are also a major impediment to developing an NCO Corps within the ANSF. Literacy is supposed to be a requirement to become an NCO or an officer, but this standard can not always be maintained. One Kabul District Police Chief informed the team that four of his NCOs had received no formal training at all, mainly because they were illiterate. Of the 325 Border Police students that were in training at the Regional Training Center in Gardez, only 24 were literate, which was not considered enough to develop an effective NCO base. The shortage of qualified NCO candidates from the junior ranks and new recruits has created a gap in ANSF succession planning and force development, which are critical elements for its sustainment, progression, and continuity.

### ***Literacy Efforts***

CSTC-A had at least two previous contracts to teach literacy to ANSF personnel, but they were only marginally effective. Due to shortages of qualified teachers and ETTs/PMTs and the general security situation, those contracts had little oversight and little impact on improving literacy within the ANSF.



***Figure 12. Literacy course administered by German trainers in Mazur-e-sharif.  
(Source: German Federal Foreign Office)***

In October 2008, CSTC-A awarded two new contracts for literacy training—one for ANA personnel and another for the ANP.

The ANA contract was focused on more in-depth instruction and provided opportunities for ANA personnel to attain Level 3 literacy—the Afghan equivalent of 8<sup>th</sup> grade. The ANP contract was broader-based, aimed at educating more policemen, but only intended to raise their literacy to Level 1—the Afghan equivalent of 4<sup>th</sup> grade. Both programs involved training local Afghans to train the ANSF—a “train the trainer” program. CSTC-A CJ-7 planned to assess the outcomes of the two contracts in 12 to 18 months to see which was most effective and then expand the more effective program throughout the ANSF.

As of March 2009, literacy training was getting off to a slow start at several ANP Regional Training Centers and at select ANA Commands. Those training efforts faced a number of challenges, including the lack of space for classrooms, the lack of supplies (pencils and paper), and in some cases, the initial training materials supplied were not in the appropriate language for the students training at that site. In addition, some ANA Commanders were requesting that contractors provide a letter of authorization from MoD before they would be let onto the ANA compound. These letters had not yet been issued.

In remote areas where literacy training had not yet been delivered, such as the Baglan Provincial Police headquarters in RC-North, the police chief had taken the initiative on his own to create a literacy course. That training was being conducted at the police headquarters by local Afghans.

The Minister of Interior admitted that, although literacy was a top priority for developing the ANP, because of the shortage of policemen, there was no time for many police to attend literacy training. The Minister believed that if the ANP significantly increased in size beyond its current authorization, he would be able to permit regular rotations for literacy training. The Minister did state that he intended to incorporate literacy training within the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP)—a pilot project to create local security forces that was recently initiated in Wardak Province.

On February 23, 2009, CSTC-A issued WARNORD 09-036, “ANSF Literacy Training Information,” which instructed the Combined Training Advisory Group (CTAG) and Afghan National Army Training Command (ANATC) with publishing Literacy Program Implementing Guidance.

Although a number of concurrent literacy programs for the ANSF were being implemented or about to be implemented, there was no comprehensive CSTC-A plan prepared in coordination with the MoI to develop a uniform literacy program across the ANSF that would provide a pool of literate personnel for follow-on technical and leadership training.

### ***Literacy as a Readiness Indicator***

Literacy was not yet a readiness indicator on the Capability Assessment Forms (CAFs), the Training Readiness Assessment Tool (TRAT), or the Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool (PTRAT) rating systems. When determining the readiness level of a unit, and its ability to perform independently, literacy could be a meaningful readiness indicator, especially at the NCO level and in Combat Support and Combat Service Support kandaks.

## **Conclusion**

CSTC-A has awarded several recent contracts in an effort to increase the level of literacy in the ANSF. However, it has not yet published a literacy development plan, with metrics to measure performance, nor issued clear guidance to its trainers and mentors on program oversight responsibilities. CSTC-A indicated it intended to address these issues. A comprehensive scoping study and data collection plan that included a needs analysis study had been developed by CJ-7 for consideration by CSTC-A's leadership.

## **Follow up**

CSTC-A Training & Education Division has reportedly been reorganized since this field assessment and was transformed into a branch in each of the ANA and ANP Divisions within CSTC-A. The points of contact for the ANA and ANP contractor-provided literacy programs stated that both programs were operational as of April 8, 2009.

The ANP contract Statement of Work indicated that the literacy program for ANP consisted of two phases—the primary phase (phase one) would last six months and take students to the Afghan grade six level. The secondary level (phase two) would last three months and take the students to the Afghan grade eight level. The CSTC-A ANP literacy program was designed to gradually transition responsibility to the MoI Training and Education Directorate. Additionally, a MoI Directive on literacy training issued in late March 2009 provided the program with much needed support and directed commanders to enroll their illiterate policemen in it.

The ANA contract Statement of Work had four levels of instruction that progressed from the Afghan grade 4 (Level One) to the Afghan grade 12 (Level Four). Level Four training, which included some specialized computer training, was only for senior NCOs at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). Training will be given in both Dari and Pashto languages.

Additionally, the Scoping Study that was available in draft form at the time of this field review was subsequently revised and briefed to the CSTC-A Commanding General. A literacy analysis study team deployed from the United Kingdom in May 2009 to conduct the detailed analysis called for in the Scoping Study. The results of that analysis were briefed to the CSTC-A CG on July 13, 2009.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

<p>11.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, add progress in improving literacy rates as part of the Current Operations Briefings to senior commanders and track literacy progress as an Afghan National Security Forces readiness indicator in the Training Readiness Assessment Tool and Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool databases.</p>
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### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, reporting that literacy rates were now tracked and briefed as part of the Current Operations Briefings held weekly. CSTC-A

further related that CSTC-A had conducted detailed analysis to identify roles, responsibilities, and metrics as required by a literacy scoping study conducted by the United Kingdom.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

11.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, establish a plan and publish Literacy Program Implementing Guidance that clearly identifies roles, responsibilities, and metrics for the Afghan National Security Force’ literacy programs, to include oversight of both Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police contracts.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation and stated that CSTC-A will publish Literacy Program Implementing Guidance in October 2009.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request a copy of the Literacy Program Implementing Guidance when it is published.



## **Observation 12. Construction of Facilities to Support Afghan National Security Force Fielding and Expansion**

Forward operating bases and other facilities supporting the growth of the ANSF have been generally built to U.S. standards. In some cases, this construction was behind schedule, necessitating “work around solutions.” Furthermore, Afghan security forces personnel were unable to maintain the facilities once they were built, thus making them unsustainable without U.S. funded contractor support.

There are multiple reasons why the “build” of facilities is behind schedule and will continue to be a challenge. Key among them are lack of skilled Afghan contractors and in-country supply of construction materials, difficulty of readily acquiring land, the security threat, and insufficient Afghanistan Engineer District (AED) oversight personnel. These challenges are exacerbated by construction of the new ANSF facilities to a U.S. standard.

These obstacles have delayed completion of permanent facilities necessary to support the ANSF and, therefore, progress in its development and operational readiness. With further ANSF expansion already planned to occur over the next several years, the lack of ability to build the necessary facilities to support this expansion could become a serious obstacle, unless the primary issues are addressed. Otherwise, development of ANSF operational and logistical sustainment capability could be significantly delayed, as a result.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Program Management Plan (PgMP) for the Afghan National Army (ANA) Program, for various Facilities throughout Afghanistan, Afghanistan Engineer District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 2009.** The purpose of this document is to ensure successful design and construction of facilities supporting the fielding of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers throughout Afghanistan. This PgMP outlines the procedures and responsibilities Afghan and U.S. organizations will undertake during the acquisition planning, management, design, construction and closeout of the programmed facilities.

**Afghanistan Engineer District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Command Brief, December 2008.** This document provides an overview of the AED mission in Afghanistan to include a command introduction, command relationships, AED workload history/forecast, Afghan National Security Forces, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition forces, roads, Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) and support for others, and construction execution and challenges. This brief was presented to the DODIG during our visit in March 2009.

**“Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, Department of Defense, June 2009.**

This report, prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration,

the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture, provides a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stabilization in Afghanistan. It is the third in a series of reports required to Congress every 180 days through fiscal year 2010.

### ***The “Build” of Facilities to Support ANSF Fielding Faces Challenges***

AED has three major program focus areas:

- The Afghan National Army (ANA)
- The Afghan National Police (ANP)
- Installation operations and maintenance (O&M) for ANA and ANP facilities

AED’s stated goal is to work in concert with CSTC-A and the Government of the Islamic



Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to build facilities, on schedule and within budget, that safely meet mission requirements. However, due to a series of construction-related issues--lack of in-country materiel, problems encountered with procurement of land, lack of skilled contractors and labor, and security problems--construction gets delayed or stopped altogether. In areas where security concerns are at their worst and protection is difficult to provide, hiring contractors and retaining a local work force has become especially problematic, if not at times impossible.

*Figure 13. AED personnel discuss facility plans. (Source: USACE - Afghan Engineer District)*

So far, construction of facilities for the ANA and ANP has generally kept pace with fielding requirements, although some shortfalls have occurred. AED reported that 69 percent of their projects were 10 percent delayed. As a result, some fielded ANA units have had to live in tents, funded by AED, while their new permanent base facilities were finished. The facilities already built for the ANSF have not been well-maintained because of the lack of skilled labor in the Army and Police, and among the general Afghan population. In addition, the GIROA cannot pay for contracted maintenance, so the U.S and/or the ISAF/Coalition currently finance this support of ANSF facilities, often hiring non-Afghan contractors because no qualified Afghan contractors or personnel are available. Further expansion of the ANSF will likely contribute to additional “shortfalls” in facility completion and readiness against unit fielding schedules; operations and maintenance (O&M) expenses can also be expected to increase.

O&M costs will continue to be a responsibility for the U.S. and ISAF/Coalition partners for the foreseeable future. CSTC-A’s “Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009,” report to Congress stated, “It is estimated that the GIROA will cover less than 20 percent of its total recurrent expenditures, including core and external budgets, in FY 2009.” The current value of contracts to provide O&M for existing ANSF facilities is approximately \$75 million a year, funded mainly by the United States. As the ANA grows to 134,000, projected O&M costs, just for the ANA, are expected to be \$60 million in FY 09 and \$75 million in FY 10. AED

program managers have not yet projected O&M costs for a possible significant expansion of ANP end strength.

New ANSF facilities the team visited were being constructed to a standard that differed from what the Afghans needed or were accustomed to in the past. Moreover, they were not prepared to maintain them as built. In many cases, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition-provided facilities observed already indicated signs of disrepair. Examples included sinks that had been torn off barrack walls so ANA soldiers could sit in them to wash their feet before prayers, which is important in the Afghan culture. ANA soldiers were also building fires on the floor of their new barracks to cook and to provide heat, even though the building had a heating system installed and a dining facility that fed them.

CSTC-A is responsible for providing project definition to AED. Together they work in concert with U.S. and Coalition/ISAF mentors, the MoD, and the MoI to define issues related to strategic planning, land use, operations, communications, security, and force protection. Given the difficulties associated with construction of infrastructure in Afghanistan and the finite capacity in this area, along with the current and future costs associated with O&M for the ANSF infrastructure, consideration should be given to developing ANSF facilities which address what the Afghan security forces operationally “need” and which they can more readily maintain and sustain.. Any future de-scoped construction would still have to maintain appropriate safety and security standards, of course.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

12. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Afghan Engineer District, evaluate courses of action to build Afghan National Security Force’ facilities to an appropriate standard which meet ANSF mission requirements and that they can sustainably maintain. Courses of action must incorporate appropriate safety considerations.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. CSTC-A reported that, in coordination with AED and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), they are planning and designing standard, more austere and operationally functional ANSF facilities constructed to a minimal military standard, similar to those utilized by NATO. This standard design results in low maintenance requirements. While meeting International Building Code and National Electric Codes, these standard designs are intended to directly reduce design and procurement time, as well as costs.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request a copy of the standard building designs.



# **Part III – Afghan National Army**

## **Introduction**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations for improvement that apply to the MoD, ANA, the Afghan National Army Air Corps, and the Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK).



## **Observation 13. The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund**

CSTC-A found it difficult to effectively and efficiently obligate the FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation, provided under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252), by the end of FY 2009.

This occurred because the FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation, provided under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252), initially made Title 10 Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) available through September 30, 2009 and CSTC-A did not receive this funding until the second quarter of FY 2009.

This problem was partially corrected by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), which made ASFF available through September 30, 2010, vice 2009. However, the fact that these funds were not provided CSTC-A until the second quarter, and the unpredictability from year-to-year in terms of the funding life of ASFF, will continue to hinder CSTC-A's ability to flexibly manage and efficiently obligate these funds in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) train and equip mission. Without greater timeliness of availability and assured flexibility in the use of ASFF funding, CSTC-A may be unable to provide equipment and build infrastructure consistent with its operational plans, which could delay the build-up of ANSF capability and extend reliance on U.S., Coalition, and ISAF combat forces.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Public Laws.** Congress has so far provided approximately \$18.25 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and approximately \$18.95 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, and 111-32. These Public Laws define the train and equip mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specified that the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund funds be used to provide funding; equipment; supplies; services; training; facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction for the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

**31 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1502(a).** This U.S.C. generally requires that appropriated funding only be used for expenses properly incurred in the same fiscal year.

**National Labor Relations Board—Funding of Subscription Contracts, B-309530 (September 17, 2007).** This decision provides possible exceptions to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a) based on future need.

**Afghan National Army Fielding Plan.** This Ministry of Defense/CSTC-A document provides information on plans to develop and field kandaks through the end of December 2011, with a target of 134,000 ANA personnel (122,000 in kandaks and 12,000 in training, hospital etc.)

## ***Near-Term Funding Issues Impacting on Expansion of the Afghan National Army***

Current planning calls for expansion of the ANA from the previous authorized ceiling of 84,000 soldiers to 134,000. The target date for completion of the expansion has been moved up from December 2013, to December 2011. Having ASFF financing available on a timely and flexible basis to support this ANA force expansion therefore becomes a more necessary condition to meet this objective.

However, CSTC-A reported that they have had a continuing problem with ASFF monies arriving well into the FY, affecting their ability to ensure support to the ANSF on a reasonably timely basis. For example, CSTC-A received their initial FY 09 ASFF money in February 09, over four months into the fiscal year. This made it difficult to plan and execute its budget in support of the planned expansion of the ANSF and to meet the need of ensuring a steady-state flow of equipment with long procurement lead times.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (C) confirmed that the initial FY 2009 \$1.4B bridge funding provided in Public Law 110-252 (FY 2008 Supplemental) was only available for obligation until September 30, 2009. This was a one-time occurrence, to date, and was corrected by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), making ASFF available through September 30, 2010. They also reported that they have taken steps to expedite fund availability to CSTC-A in support of the ANSF, once appropriated by Congress. They report that, under the most recent appropriation, Public Law 111-32, ASFF was released 21 days after enactment.

Due to the complexities of changing purchasing requirements in the wartime Afghan contingency environment, and the long lead time associated with procurement of certain critical items of equipment for the ANSF, CSTC-A could manage ASFF funding more efficiently in support of its mission if all such funding were appropriated as multi-year on a continuing basis and consistently made available early in the Fiscal Year.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

***Revised Recommendation.*** Based on an assessment of comments provided by the Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, we have revised draft Recommendation 13 as follows:

<p>13. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), take appropriate action to request that future Title 10 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund money is requested as multi-year in Congressional DoD appropriations, and that Department of Defense processes are in place to expeditiously make these funds available to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.</p>
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### ***Client Comments***

The Deputy Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, partially non-concurred with the observation and recommendation as written in the draft. The Deputy Comptroller

recommended edits to reflect that the Department already requests and has received the ASFF as an appropriation available for more than one year. The FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation, provided under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252), which made ASFF available for only one year, was the sole exception. The situation was corrected by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), making ASFF available through September 30, 2010.

### ***Our Response***

The Deputy Comptroller comments were responsive and no additional comments are required. To address the comments provided by the Deputy Comptroller, we modified the observation and adjusted the recommendation.



## **Observation 14. Potential Expansion of the Afghan National Army Beyond 134,000 Personnel**

The accelerated fielding plan increasing the size of the ANA to 134,000 by the end of CY 2011 has presented challenges that have stretched CSTC-A's current train and equip system to the edge of acceptable limits.

This has occurred because of issues associated with:

- Insufficient ANA leadership capability (specifically junior officers/non-commissioned officers [NCOs])
- Shortages of certain lines of essential unit equipment (howitzers, mortars, communications, and engineer)
- Insufficient training facility capacity
- Limited capacity to construct ANSF permanent bases/facilities "down-range"
- Limited ANA logistics capability lagging operational requirements and
- Time necessary to develop ethical, competent leaders

Unless the U.S. and international partner forces provide additional resources to address these issues, expansion of the ANA beyond the currently approved 134,000 personnel could diminish force quality and its long-term viability.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **"Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan," Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, Department of Defense, June 2009.**

This Department of Defense Report, prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture, provides a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stabilization in Afghanistan. It is the third in a series of reports required to Congress every 180 days through fiscal year 2010.

**Afghan National Army Fielding Plan.** This Ministry of Defense/CSTC-A document provides information on plans to develop and field kandaks through the end of December 2011, with a target of 134,000 ANA personnel (122,000 in kandaks and 12,000 in training, hospital, leave, etc.)

### ***Expansion of the Afghan National Army Beyond 134,000 Personnel***

"Establishing security in Afghanistan is a prerequisite for achieving our strategic goals."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> "Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan," Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, Department of Defense, January 2009, page 17.

Tasked to expand the ANA to 134,000 personnel, CSTC-A determined they could obtain the resources needed to complete that mission by the end of December 2011, vice the original target of December 2013. The generation of the 134,000 ANA force has begun with the acceleration of eight light infantry kandaks and one division support unit into FY 2009. However, any expansion of the ANA beyond the 134,000 could prove problematic.

Were the ANA to be expanded beyond the current authorization of 134,000, several issues must be addressed to ensure future force generation and development produces operationally effective and logistically sustainable forces on a timely basis. The primary potential challenges are:

- **Personnel:** The ANA has historically been and continues to be critically short of trained and qualified junior officers and NCOs, personnel essential to providing sound unit leadership. While some of the senior Afghan leadership still supports the mujahedeen model of one leader among a band of equals, in which no NCO corps existed, the current ANA force has not been organized this way. Today, a viable, sustainable ANA capable of winning the COIN fight requires a sufficient quantity of quality leaders. Since illiteracy is widespread, recruiting and developing ANA soldiers who can read and write at a level acceptable to be trained as an NCO is problematic. While additional resources for literacy training within the ranks will help, this is an issue that will take time and cannot be significantly impacted in the near-term.
- **Equipment:** There have been difficulties providing certain types of basic equipment essential for fielding units and sustaining their readiness, such as howitzers, mortars, communications, and certain types of engineer equipment. This equipment is critical to the effectiveness of combat, combat support, and combat service support kandaks. Even with procurement funding available, planners expect supply delivery lead times as long as two years.
- **Training:** The Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) and the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC), where new ANA recruits undergo basic training and units are organized



*Figure 14. ANA soldiers training at KMTC.  
(Source: NATO)*

into kandaks for equipment issue and limited collective training, respectively, will be operating at their maximum capability and capacity to generate the 134,000 size ANA force by the end of CY 2011. Further acceleration of ANA fielding will require additional facilities, trainers, and funding support.

- **Physical Infrastructure:** Facilities on forward operating bases or outposts, which house, train, and sustain fielded security forces, are fundamental to any future expansion of the ANA, as well as the ANP. Almost all such facilities have to be built over a large geographic area with few connecting roads. Lack of security makes it even harder for contractors to carry out construction projects. The Afghan Engineer District (AED) already reports difficulty completing projects on-time—62 percent of projects were at least 10 percent delayed. There will be a need for additional base and outpost growth if the ANA expands beyond 134,000, but, a finite construction capacity and lack of security has disrupted planning in the past.
- **Logistical Capacity:** The ANA logistics system has not developed in tandem with its operational growth; the demands of generating combat units previously took priority over building logistical capacity. Implementing this “hurry-up offense” has resulted in the ANA tactical capability growing more rapidly than its logistical capacity. Due to this imbalance in force development, ANA logistical capacity is unable to provide necessary support to effectively support and sustain its combat forces. This presents a significant challenge to current and future force development, which senior Afghan MoD and ANA leadership view as a significant weakness. The system currently functions with significant assistance from U.S. and ISAF/Coalition enablers who facilitate a number of basic logistical functions, ranging from the supply system, to transportation, and other primary expertise. In some cases, due to shortage of necessary mission essential equipment, units formed to be in direct logistical support of ANA combat brigades—support battalions—have been fielded instead as infantry kandaks. CSTC-A and MOD are working to build logistical system capacity in line with ANA operational needs.
- **Time:** Further expansion of the ANA beyond 134,000 soldiers will, of course, require sufficient time to build and field a quality force capable of defeating the insurgency. For example, developing an additional cadre of quality officers and NCOs is a process not easily foreshortened. Furthermore, long lead time requirements for certain types of critical equipment cannot be ignored. Furthermore, construction of necessary facilities is already constrained by factors and forces not easily overcome.



*Figure 15. Afghan National Army soldiers.  
(Source: NATO)*

Due to the significant challenges faced, the expansion of the ANA beyond the 134,000 objective could diminish force quality and its long-term viability, unless additional U.S. and international resources are made available well in advance. CSTC-A is evaluating several scenarios for further expansion of the ANA to determine what resources will be required, given various timelines.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

14. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and U.S. Central Command, develop a plan for any further expansion of the Afghan National Army that identifies the resourcing necessary to meet requirements, while maintaining the quality of the force. The plan should include developing the logistics capability of the Afghan National Army to sustain and support operations based on the size of the expanded combat forces.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, reporting that a plan has been developed that supports COMISAF’s Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and enhanced sustainable capacity and capability of the ANSF.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request a copy of the plan to support expansion of the ANSF.

## **Observation 15. U.S. Army National Guard Partnering with International Security Assistance Force Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams**

U.S. Army National Guard military personnel assigned to combined Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) via the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) have sometimes arrived in Afghanistan without sufficient training and equipment commensurate with their mission requirements.

This occurred through lack of sufficient preparation and coordination by U.S. National Guard authorities at the national and state levels prior to the unit's departure from the United States and because the Guard soldiers did not attend the ETT/PMT training at Ft. Riley, KS, leaving them unprepared to execute the train and equip mission.

As a result, CSTC-A's Task Force (TF) Phoenix has had to divert resources to address the Guard unit's deficiencies and the deployment of the combined U.S.-ISAF OMLTs had to be delayed until they became operationally ready.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Request for Forces 937 and 938.** These are classified documents.

**Title 10 USC 168, (10 U.S.C. 168), amended on February 10, 1996.** The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities designed to encourage a democratic orientation of the military forces of other countries. To carry out the program, Title 10 states that funds appropriated and made available for carrying out the authorized activities may be used for, among other things, U.S. activities and expenses for military liaisons and traveling contact teams as well as for seminars and conferences held in the theater of operations.

**NATO Partnership for Peace Program.** This NATO program provides assistance to countries who want to develop cooperative military and peacekeeping relations with it. The overarching goal of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), as defined by the member countries of NATO, is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe and Eurasia by forging strong partnerships between the NATO Alliance and partner countries. Partnerships are based on practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles. Full participation in PfP is essential for countries that want to join NATO because the partnership allows those countries to develop interoperability with NATO forces and to prepare their force structure and capabilities for possible future membership.

**S. HRG. 110–506, NATO: Enlargement And Effectiveness Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, March 11, 2008.** The Honorable Daniel Fried, Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State said:

We also need allies and partners to do more to train and equip the Afghan national security forces—the Army and the police. NATO is providing small embedded teams directly into Afghan forces to serve as coaches, trainers, and mentors to the Afghan Army units. Currently, there are 34 NATO training and mentoring teams (called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams—OMLTs) deployed in Afghanistan. But we need at least 22 more by this time next year and we are asking all of our allies and partners to step up and do more.

**Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Execution Order (EXORD) 171-09, US Forces Augmentation to NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), date time group 220426 Zulu April 2009 (classified).** This document establishes training requirements and other criteria for assigning U.S. National Guard soldiers to NATO OMLTs via the National Guard’s SPP.

### ***U.S. Embedded Training Team and Coalition Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams Joint Train and Equip Mission***

As of June 2009, there were 54 ISAF and Coalition OMLTs deployed in Afghanistan. Four of these OMLTs were combined teams consisting of U.S. National Guard personnel and ISAF forces from affiliated SPP countries. This program links a U.S. state’s National Guard with the military of a foreign nation to promote enhanced bilateral relations. The mission of the SPP is to enhance the Combatant Commanders’ ability to establish enduring civil-military relationships that improve long-term international security, while building partnership capacity across all levels of society. Today the program encompasses all geographic Combatant Commands and includes 61 SPP partnerships.

When an SPP country’s government elects to participate in the train and equip mission in Afghanistan, a contingent of soldiers from its military is linked to 11 to 15 soldiers from their partner U.S. state’s National Guard. The U.S. Army requires that all U.S. military personnel being assigned to the mentor/trainer mission attend training at Ft. Riley, Kansas. This includes U.S. National Guard soldiers. (An alternative to attending training at Ft. Riley is training conducted at the units’ home station by Mobile Training Teams from Ft. Riley.) They then join



*Figure 16. Serbian soldier receives U.S. jump wings from National Guard site commander as part of an SPP military exchange.*

*(Source: Ohio National Guard)*

their Coalition partner in their home country for additional individual training, followed by final team training at the Joint Training Forces Center NATO training facilities in Bidcus, Poland. Once that training is complete, the combined OMLT, including the Guard contingent, ships their equipment from the Joint Forces Training Center to Afghanistan and deploy directly. The entire training process takes about four months and counts toward the U.S. National Guard soldiers’ twelve-month deployment.

In at least one instance, the U.S. National Guard soldiers by-passed the training at Ft. Riley and processed through the CONUS Replacement Center at Ft. Benning, GA instead. However, the Ft. Benning program is organized to process individual augmentees and does not provide the in-depth training necessary for soldiers to serve as mentors and trainers in the train and equip mission.

The U.S. National Guard soldiers have also experienced problems with the lack of NATO standard ammunition while training in their partner force's country, as well as the inability to provide secure storage for their weapons. For Guard forces that by-passed Ft. Riley, they also lacked training on some of the equipment they would be required to use once deployed to Afghanistan, like the latest secure radios and the various vehicular anti-IED systems.

Occasionally, when U.S. Guard soldiers deploy via commercial air carriers to attend training with their SPP countries' OMLT forces, they have had to initially pay out-of-pocket to transport their individual weapons. Furthermore, the combined force OMLTs have sometimes arrived in-country before their equipment, to include weapons.

Task Force Phoenix has then had to divert resources to complete the necessary Guard training and provide weapons and other equipment for the combined OMLTs to use until their shipment arrives from Poland.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

15. Chief, National Guard Bureau, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command and Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, develop and implement a plan for support of U. S. Army National Guard contingents partnering with International Security Assistance Force Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to ensure that:
- a. The U.S. National Guard contingent conducts appropriate training at Ft. Riley/Ft. Polk prior to joining their partner Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.
  - b. Appropriate equipment and ammunition support is provided to the U.S. National Guard contingent during it training with the partner country's Operational Mentor and Liaison Team.
  - c. The Guard's weapons arrive in Afghanistan prior to the combined OMLT/U.S. force.

### ***Client Comments***

The Chief, National Guard Bureau concurred with these recommendations, noting that "HQDA EXORD 171-09 US Force Augmentation to NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), published on April 22, 2009, addressed the identified issues. Prior to this guidance, and during the DoDIG field work, the Army National Guard had no DoD requirements to resource against, relying instead on NATO guidance.

### ***Our Response***

The Chief, National Guard Bureau comments were responsive and no additional comments are required. We will follow-up to determine the effectiveness of the criteria published in HQDA EXORD 171-09.

## **Observation 16. M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles Supplied to the Afghan National Army**

There were unresolved issues with respect to the fielding of M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the ANA. Some of the problems we found included:

- Some HMMWVs supplied to the ANA, equipped with a cupola, did not have mounted weapon systems authorized in the *Tashkil* for the vehicle, e.g. M-2 50 Caliber, M-240, or M-249 machine guns.
- For those HMMWVs that were authorized weapon systems, some had been fielded without them at all, or their fielding was incomplete.
- HMMWV-compatible weapon systems were being fielded to ANA units that were only authorized Light Tactical Vehicles (Ford Ranger pickup trucks), while, in some cases, the more capable and survivable HMMWV they received had no weapon system.
- HMMWVs that did have authorized and fielded weapon systems were missing an adapter (pintle) needed to mount the weapon
- HMMWV weapons training was not occurring as scheduled or not even being presented due to a lack of the appropriate weapon systems.

This occurred because the ANA *Tashkil* did not properly identify weapons and matching equipment requirements for each type of unit. Additionally, HMMWVs were not consistently arriving with their required weapon systems, and the parts necessary to mount the weapons.

As a result, some ANA units were not able to use HMMWVs with the intended weapon systems, thus eliminating this essential operational capability. And, training could not be provided to the ANA soldiers on the HMMWV weapons to prepare for combat operations.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **“Progress Toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181, Department of Defense, June 2009.**

This Department of Defense Report, prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture, provides a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stabilization in Afghanistan. It is the third in a series of reports required by Congress every 180 days through fiscal year 2010.

**Afghan National Army *Tashkil*.** This document establishes the end strength, rank and skill structure, and equipment requirements for the ANA and subordinate units. It is similar to a U.S. Army Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE).

## ***Issues with the HMMWV Fielding Program***

The ANA was in the process of fielding the M-1151 HMMWV to selected units, with the assistance and oversight of CSTC-A. The primary ANA transport vehicle previously had been the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV), a Ford Ranger Truck. This conversion program, according to CSTC-A in their “*Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*,” January 2009 report to Congress, includes more than 4,100 HMMWVs and is scheduled to be completed in mid-2010.

The Afghan *Tashkil* identifies ANA unit-specific requirements, to include personnel, weapons, vehicles, and is very similar to the U.S. Military Table of Organization. It should identify and authorize the appropriate weapons, along with radios and other equipment to be fielded, to make the HMMWVs fully combat ready.

In some cases, however, the ANA *Tashkil* did not authorize mounted weapon systems for units receiving HMMWVs. For example, the team found HMMWVs fielded to recon platoons and mortar platoons in each of the infantry kandaks, but the *Tashkil* had not authorized any of the necessary M-240, M-249, or M-2 machine guns. The heavy machine gun platoon in one weapons company was authorized M-2s, but the unit was mounting them in LTVs because they were not authorized HMMWVs.

For those HMMWVs authorized weapon systems, the fielding of these systems was sometimes incomplete. In Gardez, the ANA infantry kandak visited had over 30 HMMWVs with cupolas for mounted weapons systems parked and not being used. The weapons had not arrived, so the vehicles were of no combat use. In Kandahar, the G3, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, ANA 205th Corps reported that, “HMMWVs are arriving and this is good, but they are not coming with the crew-served weapons needed to operate them properly.”



***Figure 17. ANA HMMWVs in Gardez.  
(Source: DoDIG – SPO)***

Furthermore, at Gardez, most of the HMMWVs that did have authorized and fielded weapons systems were reportedly missing the pintle, an adapter needed to mount the weapons. Depot 1 had recently received some pintles, but none had arrived at the unit level yet. Reportedly, some ANA soldiers were fabricating their own pintle-like mounts for Russian 12.7mm machine guns (similar to a U.S.50 caliber M2) in the HMMWV cupola so they could use the vehicle in combat.

Because of the failure to supply HMMWVs with their associated weapon systems, the weapon portion of the HMMWV training program in Gardez could not be conducted. The Program of Instruction (POI) included weapon live fire exercises scheduled for two weeks at the end of the HMMWV training cycle. ARSIC East leadership indicated they were working to address this problem.

## **Conclusion**

The deployment of M-1151 HMMWVs into the fight was being delayed because the *Tashkil* was not aligned with mission requirements for the different types of ANA units, and weapon systems were not being provided to the right units at the right time. As a result of poor planning and organization, ANA soldiers were not receiving the proper vehicles, weapon systems, spare parts, and training to utilize the M-1151 HMMWV's full combat capability.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

16.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that the *Tashkil* authorizes M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles with appropriate weapons systems for units requiring them for combat operations, based on the unit mission.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation. CSTC-A completed a detailed mission analysis to determine the mobility requirements and ancillary equipment requirements of the 134,000 ANA and 96,800 ANP in comparison to *Tashkil* documentation. CSTC-A is carefully reviewing requirements and resources for further growth of the ANSF.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. It is still unclear whether action has been taken to document in the MoD *Tashkil* the appropriate weapons systems for M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles for units requiring them for combat operations, based on the unit mission. We request that CSTC-A provide additional comment on this issue addressing the concern stated.

16.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that authorized weapons systems for the M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles are delivered with all ancillary parts, equipment, and adapters required to make the systems operational.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, noting that a full review of all ancillary parts, equipment, and adapters for M-1151 weapons systems had been completed. CSTC-A stated that they will ensure such items are placed on FMS cases or locally procured.

### **Our Response**

Commander CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

16.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that once weapons systems arrive, units and personnel receive weapons familiarization instruction and conduct live-fire exercises to develop M 1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles’ crew capability and maximize combat effectiveness.

***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation and is currently implementing this training.

***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

## **Observation 17. Afghan National Army Soldiers and Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment**

ANA soldiers were arriving at the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC) or their unit's home station either missing some or completely without any of their initial issue of Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE). Neither the chain of command nor the soldiers were being held accountable for OCIE losses.

OCIE was issued to all ANA soldiers upon entering Basic Warrior Training at Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). This OCIE was then supposed to be brought with each soldier to the CFC and then on to the home duty station. Missing OCIE resulted from ANA soldiers allegedly losing or selling their OCIE while on leave after completing basic training or after the end of CFC training. In addition, the soldiers were arriving at the CFC or their kandak's new home-base without their clothing records, making it difficult to establish accountability.

This lack of accountability for OCIE caused delays in preparing soldiers for unit training and operational missions, and created additional expense for CSTC-A since ANA soldiers had to be reissued OCIE to become effective.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**MoD Decree 4.2 “Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures,” June 2009.** This MoD decree establishes the basic policies and procedures to account for military materiel in the ANA.

**Afghan National Army *Tashkil*.** This document establishes the end strength, rank and skill structure, and equipment requirements for the ANA and subordinate units. It is similar to a U.S. Army Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE).

**ANA Form 3645, Personal Clothing Record.** This form is used to document the issue of OCIE to individual ANA soldiers.

### ***U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces/Coalition Forces Train and Equip Mission***

A significant number of soldiers reportedly have arrived at CFC for unit training without complete OCIE. In addition, many did not have the ANA Form 3645, Personal Clothing Record, provided to them at KMTC. This prevented verification of what had been issued. Soldiers have also arrived at their kandak's home station after CFC lacking OCIE and also missing the Form 3645.

After completing Basic Warrior Training (initial/basic training) at KMTC, ANA soldiers were given a two-week leave prior to reporting to the CFC. ANA soldiers will usually travel back to their homes across Afghanistan during this time. Due to the lack of adequate mass transportation, it can take ANA soldiers up to a month to complete the round trip journey from home and back to their duty stations. Returning home was crucial to many ANA personnel so they could provide money/support to their families.

However, by the time soldiers returned to the CFC to begin unit training, some of them were missing part or all of their OCIE. Many did not travel on leave with OCIE due to the extremely high threat of violence against them from insurgents and terrorists who might identify them as part of the ANA. However, OCIE left behind at the KMTC while the soldier went on leave was often poorly secured and sometimes stolen. Those ANA soldiers that did depart KMTC with their OCIE would sometimes leave it at home for their families to use. Or, due to the high poverty and poor standard of living conditions, ANA personnel also sold or pawned their OCIE for money.

Another factor contributing to missing equipment and uniforms has sometimes been the inferior quality of the product issued. Some boots and blankets issued to the ANA have been sub-standard, according to the MoD Inspector General. Consequently, when the equipment became unserviceable, the soldiers discarded it. CSTC-A was assessing how to best address the contracting issues related to the purchase and issuance of sub-standard boots and blankets.

Additionally, the only copy of the soldier's ANA Form 3645, Personal Clothing Record that has historically been available to the chain of command is the one the soldier is supposed to hand-carry from Basic Warrior Training, on to CFC, and, finally, to the home duty station. The soldier often loses this paperwork or throws it away. Because there has been no administrative process by which Form 3645 was separately passed to CFC and to the soldier's receiving unit, it has been difficult to hold the soldier accountable for missing OCIE.

CFC reportedly initiated an administrative procedure with KMTC to address the problem. U.S. and ISAF/Coalition trainers at CFC said they were now making three copies of the ANA Form, 3645 Personal Clothing Record, and distributing them as follows:

- One for the soldier,
- One for CFC records, and
- One that is forwarded to the gaining unit.

In the meantime, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition trainers are reportedly maintaining and transferring OCIE records, while they mentor the Afghans on the process.

While individual soldiers were apparently "losing" their OCIE and ANA Form 3645 during periods of leave after basic training and CFC, accountability of sensitive equipment items, including weapons, was being rigorously enforced during KMTC basic training. Inventories were conducted:

- Upon receipt of the sensitive equipment,
- Every 30 days during training,
- During unit validation, and
- When command-directed (kandak commander and/or mentor).

With respect to accountability for OCIE, ANA officers and NCOs were gradually learning to enforce the ANA requirement promulgated in MoD Decree 4.2. "Until the ANA leadership

systematically implements investigation and punishment procedures, ANA leaders and their soldiers will not recognize the importance of accounting for their equipment.”<sup>6</sup>

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

17.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Chief, Afghan National Army General Staff, develop a process to ensure that the Afghan National Army Form 3645, Personal Clothing Record, is prepared for each Afghan National Army soldier documenting issue of clothing and equipment at the Kabul Military Training Center and that a copy of that record is transmitted to the Consolidated Fielding Center and the soldier’s gaining unit.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, noting that KMTC had initiated corrective action and had implemented an ANA Consolidated Soldier Record that includes an ANA Form 3645.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. It is unclear what process is in place to transmit the Consolidated Soldier Record from KMTC to CFC and then beyond to the soldier’s gaining unit. We request that CSTC-A provide additional comments addressing this issue.

17.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan/Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, ensure that Embedded Training Teams and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams mentor the Afghan National Army on the importance of developing/maintaining individual accountability records and conducting regular and timely inventories of Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment to enforce established standards.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. CSTC-A stated that they were training ANA units at all levels to improve accountability of OCIE and other equipment. CSTC-A noted that this area required their constant attention. It would also require the constant attention of the ISAF Joint Command when it assumed responsibility for the development of the fielded ANSF.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. We plan to follow-up on this series of recommendations in a future assessment.

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<sup>6</sup> Combined Training Advisory Group Briefing Slides,” Proposed CFC Sensitive Item & Equipment Accounting Training System,” (draft) February 28, 2009.

17.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan/Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission—Afghanistan, coordinate with the Minister of Defense to ensure accountability procedures are in place and implemented by the Afghan National Army chain of command to address the loss of Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. MoD Decree 4.2 “Material Accountability and Procedures,” signed in June 2009, clearly outlines accountability procedures and mandates use of MoD form 3465 to record OCIE transactions. At the conclusion of winter 2009, CSTC-A provided storage space to allow ANA units to properly secure winter OCIE during summer months to enhance accountability. CSTC-A reported that they planned to conduct inspections to ensure accountability of these items.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that CSTC-A provide a summary of the results of the planned CSTC-A inspections designed to enhance accountability of winter OCIE in the ANA.

## **Observation 18. D30 122-Millimeter Howitzers**

All four ANA Corps Commanders visited reported that they did not have the quantity of D-30 122-millimeter (mm) howitzers authorized and that some pieces had been inoperable an excessive amount of time waiting for repair parts.

This has occurred because the in-country D30s were left over from the Soviet occupation or were more recently donated to the Afghan government by other countries. Obtaining additional D-30s and repair parts from these sources has been difficult.

Continued shortage of D30s and lack of parts to service these howitzers deprives the ANA of a critical combat enabler that will have to be provided by the U.S. and the ISAF/Coalition on a continuing basis, and limits the operational capability of the ANA forces.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**ANA Fielding Plan.** This document provides information on plans to develop and field kandaks through the end of December 2011, with a target of 134,000 ANA personnel (122,000 in kandaks and 12,000 in training, hospital, or on leave.)

### ***CSTC-A Planning for ANA Artillery in Combat Support Kandaks***

CSTC-A acknowledges the problem related to current ANA shortages of D30 122-mm howitzers and the parts and serviceability issues with the ones on-hand.

- The total requirement of D-30s for the 134,000 end strength ANA is 283.
- The ANA currently has in their inventory 86 of the 96 howitzers authorized by the Solar Year 1388 *Tashkil* (effective March 2009).
- Of the 86 on-hand, 65 are operationally ready (75.5 percent operationally ready vice on-hand/67.7 percent operationally ready vice currently fielded authorization).
- CSTC-A evaluated the option of replacing the D30 howitzers with the U.S made 105-mm howitzer, but decided against it for the following reasons:
  - The ANA already have a significant number of D30s on-hand.
  - The D-30 is simple to maintain and operate.
  - The ANA is already trained on and familiar with the system.
  - The ANA already has the ammunition stocks on-hand.
  - The truck fleet that CSTC-A is procuring for the ANA will be capable of moving the D-30s, but not the M105s.
- The D-30s in country are a combination of both donated D-30s and D-30s left in the ANA inventory from the days of the Soviet occupation. CSTC-A is currently working on acquiring additional D-30s via purchase or donation, but has not concluded any international offers or contracts.
- There is reportedly a supply of artillery pieces and repair parts available through both donation and FMS procurement, although to date, CSTC-A has had limited success in

this area. If parts were available, both HEB and the ANA Logistics Command Central Workshop are capable of repairing D-30s.

- CSTC-A is currently developing a \$12.5 million contract to repair and refurbish the D-30s in-country, which is expected to be awarded in September 2009, with work to begin this calendar year. The contract will refurbish up to 200 D-30s that are serviceable enough to qualify.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

18.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force and the Minister of Defense, develop a plan to procure the additional D30 122-millimeter howitzers that are authorized on the *Tashkil*.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. FMS Case E5-B-UDC and MOR# 09-E1A-311 were submitted for procurement of 44 D30 artillery systems. The Request for Proposal was provided to potential vendors on August 17, 2009. As part of this contract, Afghan personnel in the ANA central workshop will be trained to maintain the D30s.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request a copy of the contract, once let, for the procurement of the D30s.

18.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force and the Minister of Defense, develop a plan to repair the unserviceable D30 122-millimeter howitzers and to secure a reliable supply of repair parts.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation. FMS Case E5-B-UAW and MOR# 09-S1A-307 were submitted to procure a contract to service, repair, refurbish, and convert D30 artillery to NATO standards. This contract will be awarded in late September/early October 2009.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. We ask that CSTC-A clarify whether these FMS cases and contracts include provisions that ensure a steady supply of repair parts.

# **Part IV – Afghan Police Organizations**

## **Introduction**

This section contains a series of observations and recommendations concerning the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police (ANP, which includes the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).



## **Observation 19. Size and Capability of the Afghan National Police**

During the stability phase of U.S. military counterinsurgency strategy, building a viable police constabulary to provide sufficient security for the population, support the rule of law through community policing, and develop the confidence in national government authority is critical to success. However, the number and capability of the Afghan National Police (ANP) currently authorized does not enable it to accomplish the broad scope of both the counterinsurgency and community policing challenges.

The U.S. Government and GIRoA, along with the international community, have not yet agreed on the size ANP force required to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan, and have not committed to providing the funding that would be required to support any needed expansion.

However, as a result of insufficient numbers and therefore police capacity, especially among the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), the ANP is unable to play a sufficiently effective role in providing local security to defend the contested areas of the country and, at the same time, deliver the community policing services to control an increase in crime and fortify the nascent national system of justice.

Further, this limitation in ANP personnel and capability has impeded the GIRoA and international partner forces' ability to make sufficient progress in protecting the population and stabilizing the country. Achieving these objectives are necessary pre-conditions for establishing effective governance and rule of law, and sustained economic development, in order to gain and maintain the loyalty of the populace, and defeat the insurgency. Moreover, until the ANP becomes sufficiently effective, U.S. and other international partners will have to continue the presence of their security forces in Afghanistan.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DoD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005.** This document provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. It also establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DoD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential

services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces....

**U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5, "Counterinsurgency,"** December, 15, 2006, establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

### ***Afghan National Police in the Forefront of Counterinsurgency Struggle***

Unlike the ANA, which conducts operations throughout Afghanistan in tactical groups, the ANP and, especially the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), live and work in the communities in which they serve. By operating within the communities, the police have an ongoing and direct impact on the security reality experienced by the local population, and their respect for the law and order-based environment the government needs to establish. When the police are capable of providing both COIN-related security protection and traditional community policing services,



*Figure 18. ANP officers participate in marksmanship training in Pashmul. (Source: Canadian National Defence)*

they can also develop closer relationships with the populace and gather the necessary intelligence about criminal and insurgent activities upon which even more effective policing operations must be based. Ultimately, the success of the ANP at the local level depends on being able to play its role in both countering the insurgents and supporting the rule of law, since together they are key to developing the commitment of the Afghan people in support of the national government.

However, precisely because the Afghan policemen operate in relatively small numbers among the populace, they make easier targets for insurgent and criminal elements. To demonstrate the contrast, between January 2007 and October 2008, international forces suffered 464 personnel killed in action, the ANA lost 505 personnel, and the ANP lost 1,215. Trends indicate that the ANP continue to suffer casualties at three to four times the rate of the ANA.

That the police suffer a significantly higher proportion of casualties accounts for the direction the coalition has taken in its priority focus in ANP training on developing tactical operational capability, sometimes at the expense of training in community policing activities. The focus of training for the ANP has been the source of an ongoing debate among international partners and organizations for several years. The tack taken by CSTC-A has been to train the police so that

they are “fit for purpose” – trained sufficiently in both counterinsurgency skills (to be able to defend themselves), and in community policing (to be able to conduct essential civil policing activities).

## **Police Force Generation**

### **Historical**

Establishing a consensus regarding the appropriate size of ANP needed to provide effective policing in the counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan has been elusive. From 2002 through 2007, the size of the ANP was arbitrarily set by the international community at 62,000 – a reasonable number of police that they believed the government could sustain. Due to the resilience of the insurgency, however, in late 2006 the MoI requested an incremental increase in ANP personnel strength to 82,000, which was subsequently approved. In June 2009, the authorized ANP strength was further increased to 96,800. According to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)<sup>7</sup>, in 2007, a multi-national threat assessment conducted by the German Police Program Office, in coordination with CSTC-A, the Norwegian Police Project, and the United Nations Assistance mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), concluded that a force size of 94,000 to 99,000 ANP would be needed to protect the civilian population in all parts of the country. The current Minister of Interior has stated that he believes the size of the current police force is insufficient and should at least be increased to approximately 160,000 personnel.

### **Solar Year 1388 *Tashkil***

The Solar Year 1388 ANP *Tashkil* that became effective in March 2009 again authorized a total ANP force of 82,000. Of the 82,000 authorized positions, 47,384 were AUP.<sup>8</sup> In June 2009, the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) approved the Minister of Interior’s request for an ANP increase of 15,000, which raised the authorized ANP ceiling to 96,800. This increase was intended to boost the numbers of police in advance of the August 2009 presidential election. According to the Minister, the 15,000 policemen would be deployed to the most vulnerable provinces before the elections. In addition, additional police were needed to strengthen police capacity in Kabul, the target of increasing insurgent attacks..

### **Counterinsurgency Planning Ratios**

Successful strategies for population security and control in past counter-insurgency operations have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 – the Counterinsurgency Manual – recommends a total security force ratio that falls within a range of 20 to 25 security personnel for every 1,000 residents in the area of operation. Based on Afghanistan’s 2009 population of approximately 33.5 million, providing a ratio of 20 security

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<sup>7</sup> The JCMB was established by the Afghan Government and the international community to coordinate implementation of the Afghanistan Compact after the endorsement of the Afghanistan Compact and the Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy at the 2006 London Conference. The JCMB consists of 28 members – 7 representatives of the Government of Afghanistan and 21 representatives of the international community.

<sup>8</sup> According to figures provided by CSTC-A, the distribution of ANP personnel resources in the 1388 *Tashkil* was: AUP (47,384), Traffic (2,646), Fire (882), ABP (17,621), ANCOP (5,365), Medical (393), Customs (600), Special Police (1,108), Training (1960), Counternarcotics Police (2,519), MoI HQ (2,615), Public Protection (524), Anti-Crime HQ (303), Major Crimes TF (100).

personnel per thousand inhabitants would yield an Army/Police force of over 650,000. This ratio approaches what Iraq, a smaller, less populated country, is developing for its security structure. Of course, Iraq has an internal economy strong enough to bear the cost of a force this size.

U.S. COIN planning emphasizes the importance of the role of the police as the direct government interface with the population. Typically, the 20:1,000 ratio of security force personnel to population is roughly 10 times the ratio required for simple policing in a tranquil population. In a historical analysis of troop ratios in contingency operations, however, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth Kansas has posited that 13.26 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants should be the basic planning factor for determining troop density in executing a contingency operation. Of these, at least 4.1 soldiers (or police) per 1,000 inhabitants should be devoted specifically to police duties.

The fielding ratio of police to population in Afghanistan with the current *Tashkil* is approximately 2.4 police per thousand, compared to a ratio of between 4.3-5.1 per thousand in Europe, 4.9 per thousand in New York City, and 4.1 per thousand in Los Angeles, none of which are in an environment at war. With the recent police increase of 15,000, raising the ceiling to 96,800 police, the ratio of police to population for Afghanistan approaches 2.88 per 1,000. An increase in ANP to 135,300 would be required to achieve the ratio of 4.1 police per 1,000 population – a figure that approaches the ratio for tranquil policing in western countries. But, this would still be far short of the ratio achieved in Iraq, and it would not represent the number of police to population that would be required, historically, to be effective in a counterinsurgency.

Remarks by senior Afghan officials, ANP commanders, and coalition police mentors support the strongly held perception that there were too few policemen on the ground to provide adequate local security for the population. Minister of Interior Atmar reported that in many contested locations it was impossible for the police to “hold” areas that had been “cleared” by the ANA because the ANP in these districts did not have a sufficient number of well-trained and equipped policemen. Two Kabul District Police Chiefs with whom our team spoke both complained that the paucity of policemen within their districts prevented them from manning all their required checkpoints and from establishing neighborhood walking patrols. One of these Chiefs stated that he was authorized 136 policemen, and he had 136 on hand. Nevertheless, he said that this number was insufficient and equated to less than 1 policeman per 1,000 citizens in the district.

Similar concerns regarding insufficient numbers of police have been frequently reported in monthly Capability Endorsements submitted by the Police Mentoring Teams for those districts that had completed the FDD process. The Deputy Commander of one of the U.S. Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands opined that “If we don’t build ANP to a large and competent entity, we will never get out of here.”

### **Afghan Public Protection Force**

To help meet the requirement for increased security at the local district level, especially in the most threatened areas of the country, the Afghan MoI, with support from the U.S. and the ISAF/Coalition, has initiated the development of an Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). This Afghan-led initiative relies on increased community responsibility for security. Local candidates for the force are selected by the local tribal council, or “shura,” vetted by the MoI and

the National Directorate of Security (NDS), and trained by ANP Regional Training Center instructors (with U.S. Special Forces assistance) for three weeks before assignment to their home district to supplement the ANP. They are commanded by the local District Commander of the AUP. Although in initial stages of development, with the first phase targeted on Wardak Province near Kabul, this program has the potential, U.S. commanders believe, to significantly reinforce the formal Afghan security force structure at the local level. It should be noted, however, that the APPF will serve in a public protection security role rather than in a law enforcement capacity. They do not have arrest powers.



*Figure 19. APPF graduation ceremony.  
(Source: NATO – ISAF)*

The APPF is modeled on a traditional Pashtun tribal force structure called the *Arbakai*, which traditionally enforced the settlement of tribal disputes. As of March 2009, over 243 recruits from Saydabad district in Wardak province had completed training, while 200 recruits from the neighboring district of Jalrez had begun training. The program was set to be reviewed by CSTC-A before the end of summer of 2009. If found to be effective, the APPF model would likely be expanded in an attempt to quickly bolster security for the population until sufficient ANP and ANA forces can be fielded and deployed.

### ***Fiscal Realities***

The GIRoA is currently unable to pay its police forces, which are funded by the international community through the UN’s Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan. In its 2007 assessment regarding a possible increase in ANP personnel, the JCMB Task Force noted that:

The primary mitigating factor on any proposal to increase the size of the ANP is the effect of this increase on the financial situation of both the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). The GOA does not have sufficient funds to pay the salaries of even a 62,000 police force, yet it is under pressure due to its international commitment under the International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility program to gradually take on this fiscal responsibility. Moreover, LOTFA constantly struggles to find enough funds even for 62,000 police, and it has historically not been able to keep a reserve for emergency payments.<sup>9</sup>

The March 2009 UN annual report on the LOTFA reflects a similar assessment of Afghanistan’s inability to fiscally sustain its security sector today, stating that: “Given the security situation and low rate of government revenue collection...donor contributions may be needed within a medium-longer time framework than anticipated at [the] time of setting up of LOTFA.”

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<sup>9</sup> JCMB Task Force on Afghan National Police Target Strength, March 2007.

Despite the challenge of funding the ANP, there is, nevertheless, a clear savings both financially and in terms of saved human lives to the international community and its security forces in developing a sufficiently effective Afghan police force capability, rather than having international security forces have to play this role. CSTC-A estimates the cost (in 2010 dollars) to generate ANA forces to be \$1B/10,000 personnel, and the cost to generate ANP forces to be \$.35B/10,000 personnel. They also estimated that the annual sustainment costs for the ANA would be \$210M/10,000 personnel; and the ANP would be \$182M/10,000 personnel. By contrast, the Congressional Research Service in 2005 estimated that the annual cost to field and sustain U.S. forces in Afghanistan was \$267,000 per soldier, which amounts to \$2.67B/10,000 soldiers. In addition to the incalculable value of lives saved, it is therefore more economical and cost-effective to the U.S and the ISAF/Coalition forces to transfer the security responsibility, including for the police, to the GIRoA as quickly as is feasible by building their forces to a sufficiently effective size and capability.

### ***Conclusion***

The Minister of Interior has indicated that the size of the ANP should be increased to meet the current security requirements of Afghanistan. He has recommended building an ANP force size of approximately 160,000. However, since the GIRoA is unable to finance its current ANP force, the international community will have to shoulder any additional fiscal burden incurred with an ANP expansion. Nevertheless, the ANP, even more than the ANA, is on the front lines of the COIN battle in Afghanistan, taking the highest number of casualties, and the ANP is the most visible and accessible face of the government to the population. An effective police force of sufficient size will be key to winning the COIN fight, and developing a stable, economically and politically sustainable Afghanistan. Having this ANP capability will enable U.S. and other international forces to be able to leave behind a stable Afghanistan sooner rather than later.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

19.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, propose to Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force and the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, an increase in the authorized size of the Afghan National Police consistent with an updated analysis of the security needs of Afghanistan.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation and reported that CSTC-A had developed and submitted a plan supporting the COMISAF Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive. We request that CSTC-A provide us a copy of the plan they developed that supports the acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF.

19.b. Commander, United States Forces–Afghanistan / Commander, International Security Assistance Force, coordinate with the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, and the appropriate international agencies to initiate those actions necessary to increase the authorized size and fund the expansion of the Afghan National Police.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, USFOR-A, dual-hatted as COMISAF, concurred with the recommendation, but with no comment.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USFOR-A comments were non-responsive. While the Commander, USFOR-A concurred, he did not specify any actions he planned to take to implement the recommendation. We request that Commander, USFOR-A, in his dual-hatted role as COMISAF, respond by describing what efforts will be taken to coordinate with the appropriate international agencies to initiate the actions necessary to increase the size and fund the expansion of the ANP.



## **Observation 20. Afghan National Police and Rule of Law**

The professional connection and cooperation between the ANP and the criminal justice/Rule of Law (ROL) system at the district level in Afghanistan was tenuous at best. This presented a serious impediment to establishing a local environment characterized by effective civil policing, in support of the ROL, and to achieving the establishment of security and order necessary for the protection of the population in support of COIN objectives.

The institutional and local level coordination between the police and the justice sector has not yet been bridged effectively by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan supported by USG and international ROL/ANP training/mentoring efforts. Another factor contributing to the slow development of effective community policing was that the district AUP who had completed the FDD program had not received sufficient training in the skills necessary to investigate and present judicially sustainable criminal cases.

Moreover, without an effective link between the local police and Ministry of Justice personnel responsible for implementing the system of justice at the district level, AUP efforts to implement FDD program objectives of providing enhanced security for the population, including through the ability to conduct community policing of criminal activities, have been undermined when they return to their districts after their training. As a consequence, FDD-trained AUP were unable to build and sustain public confidence in the police and government, or respect for the ROL.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, 20 September 2008.**

This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the MoD and MoI. The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the MoD, MoI, CSTC-A, and the wider international community. The plan lays out the guidance and the processes for ministerial development, and for the generation and development of the Afghan security forces.

**Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013), “A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.** The section on the National Justice Sector provides three goals for the government to achieve: (1) Improved institutional capacity to deliver sustainable justice services, (2) Improved coordination and integration within the justice system and with other state institutions, and (3) Improved quality of justice. This document identifies the Ministry of Interior (police) as an institution with justice-related mandates and functions, and states, “[b]y including the MoI (police) and the National Directorate for Security...this strategy covers parts of the security, coercive, and law enforcement aspects of the rule of law.”

**The Afghan Constitution.** Chapter 7, Article 19 states, “[d]iscovery of crimes is the duty of the police and investigation and prosecution are conducted by the Attorney’s Office in

accordance with the provisions of the law. The Attorney’s Office is part of the Executive branch, and is independent in its performances.”

**The Afghanistan Compact, 2006.** The Afghanistan Compact of 2006 identifies three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity for the next five years from its adoption: (1) Security, (2) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and (3) Economic and Social Development. The Compact specifies four Rule of Law Benchmarks, including #3:

A review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process, and miscarriage of justice will be initiated by the end of 2006 (1387) and fully implemented by end of 2010 (1391); by end 2010 (1391), reforms will strengthen the professionalism, credibility and integrity of key institutions of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-General’s Office, the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security).

**Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, “Counterinsurgency.”** This document on counterinsurgency operations and planning emphasizes the importance of ROL in COIN operations

### ***Focused District Development and Rule of Law***

The goal of the FDD training and reform program has been to produce a professional AUP capable of winning the respect and confidence of the Afghan people by setting stable conditions for maintaining law and order and, in coordination with the ANA, to achieve victory in the ongoing COIN fight. A critical parallel objective of the FDD process was to mount a comprehensive effort to establish a system supporting a functioning system of justice and Rule of Law (ROL) at the district level. CSTC-A OPOD 07-455, which established CSTC-A’s support for the FDD initiative, lists the objectives of FDD as:

- Develop MoI capabilities
- Enhance AUP capabilities
- Transform AUP loyalties
- Build the ROL
- Build a prosecutorial justice system
- Strengthen AUP linkages to higher headquarters
- Enable the government of Afghanistan and the MoI to project success



**Figure 20. Afghan Uniformed Police officers.**  
(Source: CSTC-A)

Within the ANP, the uniformed district police were clearly identified as the centerpiece for establishing the legitimacy of the government with the population. The district police are the most visible face of the government to most people at the local level, and are responsible for providing the first line of security for the people and to protect Afghan national values. The objective of reforming the ANP in the FDD program, therefore, has been to train and equip the district uniformed police to be professionally capable, thereby having the greatest possible impact on building confidence and trust among the Afghan people in their government. Such local loyalty to the national government is critical in defeat of the insurgency.

FDD reform was planned to have a comprehensive and deliberate approach to reforming the basic building block of the ANP – the district police services – while simultaneously establishing stronger institutional linkages between the police and the judicial system in support of ROL in the districts.

From a broader COIN perspective, for the FDD program to succeed, the various U.S. agencies and international entities also would have to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their respective efforts to improve governance and the ROL, and promote economic development and reconstruction. Concurrent with the FDD process, the AUP receive more advanced training, upgraded equipment, improved facilities, better command and control linkages, streamlined procedures, and reorganized leadership. Justice sector reform was supposed to have simultaneously advanced at the district level to enable the AUP to fulfill their community policing role upon returning.

Upon completion of FDD, therefore, the intent was to have functioning and mutually reinforcing investigative, prosecutorial, detention, judicial, and penal systems within the district. The police would require a working knowledge of the law and civil policing procedures, and the populace would be made aware of how the legal system worked and how to access elements of that system. Governors and community leaders would be knowledgeable and supportive of justice system development, and there would be tangible improvements in the personnel, process, and facilities necessary to support the operation of the justice system. However, progress in these areas has been limited, including with respect to forging stronger ties between the AUP and judicial personnel and processes in the districts.

### ***Disconnect Between the Afghan National Police and the Rule of Law***

Unfortunately, the plan to coordinate and synchronize police reform with justice and ROL reform has met with limited success. In many districts, there are no judges or prosecutors. Capability Evaluations completed by CSTC-A's PMTs for those districts that have undergone the FDD process all too frequently report unsatisfactory coordination between the police and prosecutors – if prosecutors are even present at the district level. Because the Afghan Interim Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC) requires that a criminal suspect must be formally charged within 72 hours of arrest or be released, the lack of effective police coordination with prosecutors or failure of prosecutors to perform their responsibilities at the district level results in the police not accomplishing their civil policing function, and also prevents development of a credible criminal justice system. For example, Regional Command-West PMTs reported in their monthly Capability Evaluation that in one district there was no prosecutor or judge available locally and, therefore, the police were unable (or unwilling) to arrest any suspect because a prosecutor's guidance was required. Another report on a district in Regional Command-Central simply stated that its district AUP had no coordination with the prosecutors, and therefore conducted no investigations and no arrests. As a consequence, the AUP does not develop the effectiveness intended or the credibility with the population.

The difficulty in developing effective ROL practices at the local level has been further hampered by a shortage of police with adequate training in criminal investigations. The police are responsible for detecting crimes, collecting evidence, and seeking suspects in the pursuit of

justice. The ICPC requires the police to report crimes to the prosecutor's office within 24 hours. The prosecutor then has 48 hours to interrogate suspects. Many of the PMT Capability Endorsements analyzed indicated that there were no police in those districts capable of conducting criminal investigations and that the requirement for initial investigation often had to be referred to the Provincial Police Headquarters for action.

Not having a sufficient number of police qualified to conduct criminal investigations, coupled with prosecutors' offices that do not have the capacity or will to conduct a thorough investigation, has resulted in judges receiving case files upon which they were unable to reach decisions. In this scenario, criminals all too often have had to be set free. And, there has been therefore little inclination for the police to make arrests, even in clear-cut cases, because the justice system cannot be relied upon to play its role. Until the judicial system at the district level and the civilian police force are working in tandem, the police, no matter how well trained and equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote the ROL. This negatively impacts the public's perception of police capability and intentions, and undermines police morale.

Representatives of the ROL Office at Embassy Kabul reported that, "prior to 2005, the police were not treated as part of the justice system in Afghanistan" and that "the police have been primarily trained as a military force, not a police force." They explained that the relationship between the prosecutors and police has historically been difficult, at best, and the police were viewed by officials in the Ministry of Justice as "thugs and non-professionals." The emphasis on training the police in COIN tactics, given the importance of their security role, to the possible exclusion of learning traditional policing skills, has reinforced this lack of confidence in the AUP's civil policing capabilities.

Numerous external reports have highlighted the continuing weaknesses of the Afghan justice system. The three main permanent institutions – the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General's Office (Saranwali) – are co-equal in stature, but have fractious relations with each other. While the police perform a central role in criminal justice by making arrests and conducting preliminary crime scene investigations, the MoI has not played an active role in the justice rebuilding process. Nevertheless, there are indications that the lack of coordination at the ministerial level may be changing. Embassy Kabul ROL advisors reported that members of the MoI and the Attorney General's Commission had been meeting monthly to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) to increase the efficiency of case hand-offs. However, of the 12 planned SOPs only two had been developed, and neither of those had been approved by the Minister of Interior at the time of this assessment mission.

### ***Focused District Development Training for Police***

The eight weeks of instruction that the district police received while undergoing FDD training was deficient in civil policing and ROL instruction. A review of the basic eight-week ANP Program of Instruction revealed that of the total 263 hours allotted, only 28 hours were collectively devoted to topics such as ethics, the Constitution, penal code, criminal procedures, and human rights. The preponderance of instruction was directed at safety/survival instruction, terrorist tactics, counterterrorism, defense, and weapons qualification. Training in criminal investigations during basic police training received little attention.

The Regional Training Centers (RTCs), where the FDD training for the police is being accomplished, were also used to train Ministry of Justice personnel (prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) through the State Department’s Justice Sector Support Program. Despite using common facilities, there had been no overlapping training between Justice Ministry students and ANP students. While at the RTC, in effect the two groups did not formally interact through receiving any joint training on how to professionally cooperate to assist one another in their respective functions to achieve common goals. This compartmentalized operational and training philosophy has repeatedly been identified as a potential problem by PMTs, PRTs, and Justice Training Teams.



*Figure 21. RTC graduates in Kandahar.  
(Source: NATO – ISAF)*

U.S. police training advisors reported that the RTC eight-week basic police training course for rank and file policemen, many of whom were illiterate, was not designed to create a highly skilled, professional police force capable of preventing and investigating crimes. FDD training, on the other hand, was focused on developing a police force that was “fit for purpose” – providing them with the basic skills to perform either civil policing functions or to support military-styled operations. PMTs were expected to provide follow-on training to further develop specific additional policing capabilities. Advanced policing courses such as Criminal Investigations would be provided periodically at the Central Training Center in Kabul. In addition, EUPOL has offered advanced training within some of the provinces on criminal investigations.

## **Conclusion**

The AUP success at the district level depends on its ability to counter criminality, as well as to defend against and fight insurgents. Thus, the district police have to be able to both serve as light infantrymen and conduct community policing activities, if they are going to meet the needs of the government to establish local stability and also build the necessary support within the populace to succeed in COIN operations.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

20.a. Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, and Chief of U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, develop and implement a coordinated action plan to strengthen the cooperation between the police and criminal justice/Rule of Law at the district level, and ensure that PMTs and PRTs mentor this outcome.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, USFOR-A, dual-hatted as COMISAF, concurred with the recommendation, but with no comment.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USFOR-A comments were non-responsive. While the Commander, USFOR-A concurred, he did not specify any actions he planned to take to implement the recommendation. We request that Commander, USFOR-A, in his dual-hatted role as COMISAF, respond by describing what efforts will be undertaken to develop and implement a coordinated action plan to strengthen the cooperation between the police and criminal justice/Rule of Law at the district level, and ensure that PMTs and PRTs mentor this outcome.

20.b. Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, ensure coordination between law enforcement and criminal justice/Rule of Law is emphasized in all ANP training and mentoring.

### ***Client Comments***

The Commander, USFOR-A, dual-hatted as COMISAF, concurred with the recommendation, but with no comment.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, USFOR-A comments were non-responsive. While the Commander, USFOR-A concurred, he did not specify any actions he planned to take to implement the recommendation. We request that Commander, USFOR-A, in his dual-hatted role as COMISAF, respond by describing what efforts will be undertaken to ensure coordination between law enforcement and criminal justice/Rule of Law is emphasized in all ANP training and mentoring.

20.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, prepare and implement a plan to enhance Afghan National Police’ civil policing skills in investigating and presenting criminal cases.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, relating that CSTC’s current emphasis in developing the police is on those skill sets needed to successfully conduct counterinsurgency operations. He stated that enhancing ANP civil policing and investigations skills, and the capacity to present criminal cases, will be included as part of an overarching strategy to improve Rule of Law in Afghanistan and will include efforts of other USG and international partners.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. We understand the need for emphasis on counterinsurgency training for the ANP, but we also consider that a major failing in developing a workable Rule of Law system in Afghanistan has been the inability of the ANP to engage effectively in civil policing actions, to include a more robust participation in criminal

investigations. We request that Commander, CSTC-A provide the substance of plans, and their timetable, to improve and enhance the ANP's civil policing skills in investigating and presenting criminal cases and to integrate ANP community policing activities more fully within the overall Afghan criminal justice system.



## **Observation 21. Focused District Development–Reformed and Trained Afghan Uniformed Police**

Given the current authorized size of the ANP, now at 96,800, and the current and projected rate of producing personnel in this initiative, the Focused District Development (FDD) program will not complete the task of training and reforming the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) for Afghanistan’s 365 districts until late 2012. This length of this process could be further prolonged if the AUP force level were to significantly expand, and if the FDD program were to assume responsibility for the Provincial Police, in addition to the District Police.

Of the 365 districts, only 56 (through FDD Cycle 7) had so far entered or completed the FDD process. The rate at which the FDD program can train District Police forces has been constrained by: (1) lack of a sufficient number of PMTs to embed with the district AUP before, during, and after the training; (2) limited capacity at existing ANP Regional Training Centers; and (3) an insufficient number of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) available to replace the AUP in their districts while they undergo the FDD training program.

Creating a reformed, well-equipped, and trained police force, which is the goal of the FDD program, is essential for providing a stable and secure environment for the Afghan people and enhancing the credibility of the GIRoA in order to win the COIN fight, as well as address the growing problem posed by organized crime. The FDD program would have to increase its capacity in order to be able to accelerate the current rate of graduation or to be capable of expanding the AUP beyond its current authorized strength.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

#### **Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, September 20, 2008.**

This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the MoD and MoI. The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the MoD, MoI, CSTC-A, and the wider international community. The plan provides guidance for the development of the security ministries and the generation and development of the Afghan security forces.

#### **Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Operations Order 08-006 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Development Program, 14 January, 2009.**

This OPOD describes the ANSF structure and bridges the gap between strategic aims of the CSTC-A Campaign Plan, other development strategies, ANP program guidance and annual objectives. The plan also describes the FDD objectives and the courses taught at the RTCs, outlines the Concept of the Operation and Execution of the FDD program; explains how districts are selected, and projects the FDD Planned Operational Schedule.

#### **Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Fragmentary Order 08-038 to OPOD 08-006, April 08.**


This FRAGO provides guidance for necessary adjustments to accelerate the ANCOP fielding program because additional personnel requested

in CSTC-A RFF 620, dated 1 February 2007, to keep up with increased requirements of an expanding ANSF force structure were not provided.

### **Afghan National Police Focused District Development Training**

The FDD Program is a MoI/ANP, CSTC-A managed training and reconstitution program to reform the AUP to improve their tactical ability to defend the population and themselves, while improving their understanding of the basic elements of civil policing, ROL, and local governance.

Districts are nominated for the FDD program by the U.S. Embassy, USAID, UNAMA, CSTC-A, ISAF, the Regional Commands, USFOR-A, and the MoI. Nominations are sent through an iterative and integrated process, with the Minister of Interior making the final selection of participants in each FDD cycle. FDD districts to be reformed are selected approximately every six months, planning ahead 12 months in order to remain synchronized with projected ISAF operations and other organizational planning requirements.



*Figure 22. Typical FDD Time Phases  
(Source: CSTC-A)*

The six phases in the FDD process (Figure 3) are as follows:

1. District assessment—approximately six to eight weeks.

2. Relief in place by a covering security force (usually ANCOP) – occurs over a 10 to 14-day period.
3. Reconstitution of the district police force – reorganizing, retraining, re-equipping, reviewing the renovation/construction of facilities – eight weeks plus movement time.
4. Reinsertion of the trained and reformed police force back into their district – one week.
5. Close overwatch by the PMT – focused overwatch and mentoring by the PMT with continued collective training in the district; concludes when the district police force is validated and rated at Capability Milestone-1<sup>10</sup> – 2-4 months.
6. Operational overwatch by the PMT – continued overwatch and sustainment training using Qualified Police Mentor (QPM) resources embedded within the ANP Regional Command structure – indefinite.

One full cycle of FDD should span approximately 10 months. Once the embedded PMT rates the district police at CM-1, they are validated by an independent, joint CSTC-A and ANP process in accordance with the CSTC-A OPOD “Authorization, Organization, and Conduct of Operations.” The district police are then moved into Phase 6 for an undetermined period of continuous monitoring, reassessing, retraining, and sustainment training by QPMs working out of the nearest Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) location.

### ***Focused District Development Status to Date***

There are currently 365 police districts. CSTC-A reported that by the end of February 2009, six cycles of FDD had been completed with 52 districts having undergone the reform training. In addition, 25 city precincts had completed reform training. Over 1,600 policemen had been trained in the Kabul “Capital Jump Start,” a training program similar to FDD that is conducted at the Kabul Central Training Center. At the time of this assessment in March 2009, FDD Cycle 7 had begun to train the AUP from an additional four districts and eight provinces. CSTC-A planned for 15 to 20 districts to be accommodated in FDD cycles 7 through 12, and they continued to project that given the current size of the AUP, 2012 would be the earliest that training for all districts in Afghanistan can be completed. The need to complete the FDD training throughout the country as soon as possible is compelling – in those districts that had completed FDD, there had been a 60 percent decrease in police casualties.

### ***Focused District Development Training Rate Constraints***

Minister of Interior Atmar has identified acceleration of the FDD program as one of six ministerial priorities in developing a “competent, professional, effective national police in the service of the people.”<sup>11</sup> There are significant challenges that serve as impediments to accelerating the FDD, however, including:

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<sup>10</sup> Capability Milestone 1 is defined in CSTC-A OPOD 07-455 Annex A, Appendix 3, but is summarized as: 85 percent capable of basic law and order operations and leadership tasks appropriate to local circumstances without external assistance (except specific operations such as counterinsurgency or narcotics interdiction). As the insurgency threat decreases and Justice Sector Reform takes place, IC assistance may be required to increase the professionalism of the police to a higher standard mandated by the GoA, in accordance with the aspirations of the people of the IRoA.

<sup>11</sup> The Minister’s six priorities include: (1) accelerating FDD and other programs, (2) anti-corruption, (3) police intelligence, (4) increased police authorizations, (5) securing key cities and highways, and (6) providing security for the elections.

- shortage of PMTs
- limited training capacity at the RTCs
- shortage of trained ANCOP units

## Police Mentoring Teams

CSTC-A indicated that the greatest impediment to providing FDD training has been the critical shortage of PMTs. A PMT, designed to consist of 16 persons (but rarely meeting that manning objective), is intended to be assigned to every district and each provincial and regional police headquarters. PMTs are additionally required for the ANCOP and the Afghan Border Police units. The overall PMT requirement calls for approximately 2,375 personnel. As of May 2009, only about 39 percent of that requirement had been met.

Without a significant increase in the number of PMTs, it will not be possible to expand the FDD program. Additionally, the long-term plan for post-FDD trained districts was to replace PMTs with oversight from the PRTs and to partner with ISAF forces, when possible and appropriate. With predictably less follow-on mentoring once in this phase, however, there is a risk that ANP units that had completed the initial stages of FDD could revert back to pre-FDD performance levels.

The recent decision to send an additional U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Afghanistan to train and mentor the Afghan National Security Forces will significantly mitigate the PMT manning shortfall in Afghanistan, but it will not eliminate it. Current analysis indicates that even with the additional trainers provided by the new BCT, there will still be a shortage of over 200 PMT personnel. Unless DoD takes the necessary steps to fill all the military mentor force requirements for PMTs for the ANP, as well as ETTs for the ANA training and mentoring mission, as requested by previous CSTC-A Requests for Forces, PMTs and ETTs will continue to be unable to fully accomplish their intended mission.



*Figure 23. From left: U.S. PMTs discuss training with local police officers in Bagram; British Royal Marines participate in ANP officer training in Sangin.*

*(Sources: National Guard Bureau; British Ministry of Defence)*

With the April 2009 dual-hatting of Commander, CSTC-A as Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, it may be possible to engage ISAF forces to help overcome remaining shortages in the ANP mentoring mission. In Regional Command-North, Swedish and Finnish Military Observation Teams were reportedly providing uncoordinated but effective police district training for the AUP in Jawzjan, Sari-Pul, Balkh, and Samangan Provinces. EUPOL has provided four PMTs at the Provincial level. Germany, the UK, the Dutch, and Canadians have

supplied bilateral police mentoring support through their respective PRTs. Indeed, because of the PMT support that these bilateral partners provided, CSTC-A was able to maximize the training capacity for FDD Cycle 7.

The bulk of civilian police (CIVPOL) support for mentoring the ANP has been provided by DynCorp through its contract with the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). In March 2009, there were 498 DynCorp contractors serving as trainers and mentors at various levels, a large number of whom were embedded in the PMTs with the FDD district police. These CIVPOL advisors are critical in ensuring the ANP training has the correct proportion of and emphasis on community policing instruction, in addition to small unit tactical training. They have also been essential in detecting and correcting corrupt practices.

### Training Center Capacity

The following is a list of the 18 ANP training facilities currently operating throughout Afghanistan.

Location	Type Training	ANP Branch	Capacity
Kabul CTC	Kabul Jump Start	AUP	500
Jalalabad RTC	FDD	AUP	315
Kandahar RTC	FDD	AUP	315
Herat RTC	FDD	AUP	315
Konduz RTC	FDD	AUP	315
Bamyan RTC	CID, Basic 8	AUP	90
Gardez RTC	FBD	ABP	400
Lonestar	FBD	ABP	500
Sheberghan	FBD	ABP	300
Spin Boldak	FBD	ABP	200
Mazur-e-Sharif RTC	National Police	ABP and ANCOP	315
Adraskan NPTC	National Police	ANCOP	800
Rushmore	FDD Sustainment	AUP	100
Shaheen	FDD Sustainment	AUP	100
Shouz	FDD Sustainment	AUP	300
Ghazni	FDD Sustainment	AUP	100
Costell	FDD Sustainment	AUP	150
Camp Parsa	FDD Sustainment	AUP	150

**Table 1. ANP Training Facilities**

The Kabul CTC was dedicated to training the Kabul Uniformed Police in the Kabul Jump Start Program. It was additionally used for specialized group and advanced individual training courses. Of the remaining centers listed above, four – Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Konduz – were devoted to FDD training. These FDD-only centers had a combined capacity of 1,260 AUP trainees per cycle. RTC Gardez had been designated as a training site for the Focused Border Development program. RTC Mazur-e-Sharif was used to train both the ABP and ANCOP, and was projected to be available by September 2009 for FDD training. CSTC-A reported that they were building a National Police Training Center (NPTC) in Wardak Province with a targeted

completion date of March 2010. The initial annual capacity for the NPTC was projected to be 500, growing to 2,000 within two years. The addition of the NPTC will significantly improve the police training capacity throughput.

The FDD Sustainment Sites trained new recruits and replacement police for those districts that had already completed their group FDD training. The current capacity per cycle of the sustainment sites is 900 with a goal of 1,200 by March 2009. This is considered adequate to cover new recruits in FDD-certified districts. Sustainment sites provide the same training curriculum as that received by districts undergoing FDD as a group.

There were competing requirements for the training facilities. Mazur-e-Sharif and Gardez had been converted from exclusively AUP training sites to also include emergent needs for ANCOP and Afghan Border Police training. By converting these facilities back to exclusively FDD training by September 2009, annual FDD throughput could be increased by approximately 1,430 AUP. This increase in training capacity becomes particularly important in view of recent and further potential increases in the authorized strength for the ANP.

### **Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)**

CSTC-A projected that the ANCOP force of 5,375 would be fully fielded by January 2010. If the FDD program were accelerated or expanded, however, there could very well be a shortfall in ANCOP units to backfill the district police while they are in training. Early plans had investigated the possibility of using Police Provincial Reserve Companies to “fill in the “gaps” in ANCOP coverage of districts undergoing FDD training. But, most of the Provincial Reserve Companies had not themselves been FDD-trained.

Efforts to train district police without replacing them with ANCOP units in the districts during the absence of the AUP have not proven successful. For example, in some high-threat districts in the south, the Marines conducted In-District Reform in which half of the district police were sent to FDD training, while the other half remained on the job, supplemented by the Marines. While



the police received some worthwhile training from the effort, many of the other important facets of FDD (such as infrastructure development, prosecutorial training, and police organizational restructuring) could not be accomplished as envisioned. The initiative therefore met with mixed results and, reportedly, those districts that underwent the In-District Reform generally have not demonstrated much improvement in capability.

*Figure 24. Afghan National Civil Order Police officers.  
(Source: German Federal Foreign Office)*

## ***FDD for Provincial Police***

The initial concept for FDD identified the AUP at the district level as its focal point, without seriously considering the ramifications of not providing similar reform and training at the provincial level. To reform and train a district force only to send it back into a province where the Provincial Police had not been similarly trained and reformed could be counterproductive since they would have been trained and equipped to different standards.

In a recent FDD cycle, eight Provincial Police units received training, and CSTC-A indicated that FDD Cycle 8 would include another four Provincial Police units.

## ***Conclusion***

The FDD program appears to have produced successful results thus far in reforming the police at the district level. Program throughput, however, has been slow, and all districts will not complete the process until 2012 at the current rate of training. It would be advantageous to accelerate the FDD process; however, acceleration is constrained by RTC capacity, the number of CIVPOL available to be embedded as PMTs with the police districts, and by the availability of ANCOP to relieve the AUP while they undergo training at the RTC. The recent designation of a second U.S. Brigade Combat Team for deployment to Afghanistan as a training brigade will double the current number of military PMTs and should have a significant positive impact on the FDD program capacity. The limitations imposed by the capacity restrictions of the RTCs remains an impediment until the new NPTC is completed in 2010.

## **Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

***Revised/Deleted Recommendation.*** As a result of comments received to draft Recommendation 21.c., we have deleted the draft recommendation and we renumbered draft Recommendation 21.d. to Recommendation 21.c.

21.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and Embassy Kabul (for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement contractor support), request the resources necessary to build the capacity to increase the rate at which Afghan National Police are trained by the Focused District Development program.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred. He related that CSTC-A had developed a plan supporting COMISAF's Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF. He stated that arrival of the 4-82 BCT enables FDD to be initiated in twice the number of districts than in the past; however, plans to reform the police will be formalized as part of COMISAF's overall strategy for reforming the police.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. We acknowledge that arrival of the 4-82 BCT substantially increases the training capability with respect to the ANP; however, the

response does not indicate what plans are in place to increase the capacity of training facilities, nor does it state what is being done to increase the number of civilian police trainers and/or mentors. We request that Commander, CSTC-A provide a more detailed response to this recommendation that discusses the number, size, and capacity of police training centers (and any plans thereto), and the numbers of civilian police instructors (current and future). Further, we ask that the response describe the coordination that has taken place with Embassy Kabul and INL and/or international agencies to provide civilian police instructors to provide civilian police training and mentorship.

21.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Interior, plan for the Focused District Development training of provincial police companies in provinces where district police will or have participated in the Focused District Development program.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred, stating that CSTC-A had developed a plan supporting COMISAF's Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. We request that CSTC-A specifically indicate what plans are in preparation or being implemented to train the provincial police companies in those provinces where district police will or have participated in the FDD program.

21.c. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommend approval and resourcing of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Request For Forces 937 and 938 that requested an increase in the manning for Police Mentoring Teams to the level required to complete the police mentoring mission.

### ***Client Comments***

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, reporting that RFF 938 has been fully resourced. RFF 937 had been 97.5 percent sourced, with the remaining personnel requirements still being examined.

### ***Our Response***

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff comments were responsive, and no additional response is required.

## **Observation 22: Afghan Border Police Training Issues**

The Afghan Border Police (ABP) did not receive a standardized Program of Instruction (POI) in the Focused Border Development (FBD) training program.

In order to accomplish the FBD training in the timeframe required, two different contractors were used to conduct the training – one, under contract to DoD/CSTC-A, and another, contracted by the State Department. The contractors used two separate and distinct POIs to conduct the training. Each contractor trained the ABP trainees at their respective training facilities for different lengths of time. In addition, contract restrictions and other limitations on one of the contractors prevented its trainers from training the Border Policemen on some of the authorized ABP equipment.

As a result, the training provided to the ABP in the FBD program lacked unity of effort and was not based on a uniform standard. In addition to being inconsistent, the POI was not completed by the end of the training cycle, in some instances.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, 20 September, 2008.** This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the MoD and Mol.

**Afghan National Development Strategy, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Afghanistan National Development Strategy: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction, 1387-1391 (2008–2013).** This document discusses goals and policy directions, the National Development Strategy, cross-cutting issues, and the monitoring framework.

### ***Afghan Border Police Mission and Structure***

The ABP provides the MoI with an interdiction and law enforcement capability at international borders, including 14 Border Crossing Points, and at four international airports. The ABP are responsible for protecting Afghan borders from illegal entry by insurgents, arms and human traffickers, and drug smugglers, as well as for controlling pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Their mission is highly kinetic as they patrol some of the most dangerous areas of the country. Mission implementation is complex and elusive since it entails monitoring over 3,500 miles, within a Border Security Zone that stretches 34 miles into Afghanistan, with relatively limited ABP personnel resources.

The most current 1388 *Tashkil* authorizes 17,621 ABP, organized into five Border Police zone headquarters corresponding to the five ANA regions in Afghanistan. There are 33 Border Police battalions (kandaks) consisting of 122 companies. As of March 2009, there were 12,660 ABP assigned to the force. Securing the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan with an effective Border Police force is an essential objective of the COIN effort and is a goal of the Afghan National Development Strategy.

## ***Focused Border Development Program***

In October 2008, recognizing a growing problem with corruption and the need for improved training to increase effectiveness within the ABP, CSTC-A initiated the FBD program as a means to reform and improve its performance. The FBD program was modeled after the Focused District Development (FDD) program, with which it shares common objectives, in that selected companies of ABP would be removed from their assigned duty stations and sent to one of four training locations to complete group training. Like the FDD program, the ABP receive improved equipment and uniforms in conjunction with their training. Initially, the program was slated to train a total of 52 ABP companies (approximately 4,200 ABP) from Regional Command-East, but that number was expanded to include additional ABP companies from RC-North and RC-South. As of mid-March 2009, 24 ABP companies had received FBD training.

Unlike FDD, the FBD program did not have a standardized POI. Also unlike FDD, in which the entire Afghan Uniform Police district force attended as a unit, in the case of the FBD, the kandaks did not attend the FBD training at one time. A kandak commander selected 30-40 men from various companies to attend FBD training. That has been the procedure since the border could not be left without an ABP presence, and unlike FDD, there were no Afghan National Civil Order Police to take the place of the ABP while they attended training. The ABP also did not have assigned PMTs, relying instead on irregular mentoring by military teams provided by the local Coalition battle space owner. These military ABP mentors did not accompany the ABP during the FBD training, unlike the PMTs who were embedded with the AUP throughout their FDD training and afterwards.



*Figure 25. Graduates of the Focused Border Development Program in Spin Buldak.  
(Source: NATO – ISAF)*

In some zones, the security firm, Blackwater, under contract by DoD/CSTC-A, was the FBD training contractor for the ABP. In other zones, DynCorp, under contract with the Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), was the FBD training contractor for the ABP. Each contractor had its own POI, and even though both programs were eight weeks in total duration, the training provided to the ABP through these two POIs was not standardized and consistent.

## **Blackwater Training**

To accomplish the expanded ABP training, CSTC-A initially added the requirement as a task order to an existing counternarcotics training contract it already had with the firm Blackwater. The CSTC-A Program Manager explained that the goal was to train 2,700 ABP during each FBD cycle. However, because Blackwater did not have the capacity to manage that scale of training at its facilities, CSTC-A expanded FBD training to include the INL/DynCorp-run Regional Training Center in RC-East to achieve the overall ABP training goals.

Although the training provided by both contractors was eight weeks in duration, the Blackwater POI called for six weeks of instruction at its facility followed by two weeks of tactical field training that Blackwater instructors would deliver at the ABP duty location. Blackwater trained the ABP on all weapons and equipment authorized by the *Tashkil* and issued them at the Blackwater training site. CSTC-A reported, however, that the ABP were not receiving the final two weeks of training in all cases, due to command and control issues with the local battle space commander. In at least one zone, the battle space commander reportedly did not allow the Blackwater contractors to conduct the final two weeks of tactical field training outlined in its POI that included night operations and collective unit training, which are critical tactical modules for ABP operational development. The CSTC-A program manager explained that when this field training had been presented, it had been very effective in increasing the ABP unit's capability.

### **DynCorp Training**

At the DynCorp RTC in RC-East, the POI called for ABP training to be conducted for eight weeks on-site at the RTC. However, training on certain types of equipment, such as weapons and operating all terrain vehicles was not included, even though that equipment was authorized by the *Tashkil* and issued to ABP during FBD. As a result, the ABP trained by DynCorp at the RTC in RC-East did not receive instruction on the use of some of their authorized equipment. CSTC-A indicated that it was negotiating with INL to adjust the DynCorp contract to include that training in the future POI. In the meantime, some CSTC-A military mentors had to be selectively detailed to the RTC to provide training on certain types of equipment, such as crew-served weapons. The DynCorp Regional Commander verified that changes to the POI were being negotiated, but believed those changes would not be quickly made or easy to implement.

### **Summary**

To prepare the ABP in the FBD training initiative to become an effective force in the COIN fight, it was important that its training be consistent and thorough. Because two U.S. contractors were applying two different POIs to train the ABP, standardized training was not provided.

It was not evident that the two POIs were properly vetted to ensure they were comparable in terms of providing standardized ABP training, for example, with respect to training in the use of authorized equipment. In addition, one contractor had contractual restrictions that prohibited its ability to provide instruction on some of the weapons and equipment issued at the BP training site.

Finally, the inability of one of the contractors to provide two critical weeks of FBD program field training to some ABP personnel, due to lack of battle space owner cooperation, diminished the operational readiness of those particular police and prevented the contractor from completing its training obligations.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

22.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, coordinate with the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (for the DynCorp Regional Training Center Focused Border Development program) and with the Department of Defense Contracting Officer Representative (for the Blackwater Focused Border Development program) to ensure that the two Focused Border Development training programs of instruction meet mission requirements and are standardized across Afghanistan.

### ***Client Comments***

CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, noting that they had adopted and implemented a single standardized FBD Plan of Instruction.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

22.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, coordinate with the Commander, Regional Command-East, to ensure that Blackwater contractors are allowed to conduct the two weeks of tactical field training required for the ABP, as provided in the contract.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-a concurred with the recommendation, reporting that CSTC-A had incorporated an investigation and criminal case presentation skill set in Phase I of the Border Development POI, and had trained police professionals as part of its mentor teams.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. We request that the Commander, CSTC-A explain whether Blackwater police trainers are now being allowed into RC East to conduct the final phase of ABP instruction, per their contract, and confirm that no further impediments exist to their conducting this instruction.

## Observation 23. Ministry of Interior Inspector General

The Inspector General (IG) Directorate<sup>12</sup> within the Afghan MoI is understaffed and under-trained to adequately perform its inspector general oversight functions, including internal auditing and anti-corruption missions.

This occurred because the MoI has not committed an adequate number of appropriately trained personnel and resources to execute its mission. Additionally, CSTC-A mentoring has not ensured that appropriate assistance was given to the timely development of doctrine, policy, and planning, and that the necessary training of individual skills required to accomplish the Ministry's oversight and anti-corruption mission was provided.

As a result, the IG Directorate has not developed its capabilities as quickly as it could have and, specifically, has not had as significant an impact on corruption within the MoI and the ANP.

### ***Applicable Criteria***

**DOD Directive 3000.05.** DODD 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

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<sup>12</sup> The MoI Restructure Implementation and Development Plan for Internal Affairs dated October 25, 2008, states that the Minister of Interior approved a change in title from "Internal Affairs Directorate" to "Inspector General Directorate." Under the proposed structure, Internal Affairs was projected to become a department within the Inspector General Directorate. As the new organizational nomenclature had not become effective at the completion of this assessment, we use both terms interchangeably.

## ***IG Role in Anti-Corruption***

In recent years, corruption within the ANP has been a systemic problem and a significant concern of the GIRoA and international community. Corruption within the ANP, including at senior levels and within the MoI, has affected everything from promotions to assignments, to the resolution of criminal cases, and has prevented the development of a culture of accountability for professional conduct.

Systemic corruption has also negatively impacted the public perception of the GIRoA, and damaged its legitimacy. Moreover, by diminishing trust of government authority, police corruption has opened the door to increased Taliban influence, especially in the rural areas in the eastern and southern regions of the country where the reach of government authority is already tenuous.

The 2006 DOD/DOS Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training recognized shortcomings in the MoI's internal affairs capability and pointed out that it needed an active internal affairs or inspector general oversight capacity to detect, investigate, and report allegations of mismanagement, abuse of authority, fraud, waste, and corruption. Recognizing the importance of a fully operational internal affairs oversight function, the CSTC-A and the U.S. Embassy's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement representatives committed initial resources to what was supposed to become a robust internal affairs/inspector general capability within the MoI.

Unfortunately, the original commitment to creating a fully capable MoI IG has not been realized due to lack of sufficient personnel resources and training allocated to achieving the objective. An effective and credible IG within the MoI that could have had a more significant deterrent effect on corruption within the ministry and the ANP has not yet developed.

## ***IG Personnel Quantity and Quality***

From an initial authorization of 61 MoI internal affairs positions on the 2005 *Tashkil*, the 2009 *Tashkil* now authorizes 131 positions for all the IG components. Of these, 19 positions at the MoI headquarters are in the anti-corruption unit; another 42 positions are designated as Internal Affairs officers, with duty at one of the six regional police headquarters. Other positions within the IG's office are devoted toward administrative and document inspections and professional standards. The audit function in the MoI IG has yet to be fully established, with inspections personnel fulfilling dual roles in a nascent combined inspections and audit office.

Despite the increased manpower authorization for the IG, many of the positions have not been filled. In addition, even with its full complement of authorized personnel, the IG only has 19 positions assigned exclusively to departmental anti-corruption efforts. Recent priority tasking by the Minister to focus on anti-corruption has taxed the capacity of the department to accomplish its mission, requiring the IG to double task other inspectors to engage in anti-corruption investigations. Even by double tasking personnel, the IG reported he had only 53 staff available to accomplish country-wide anti-corruption investigations for the entire 81,509-strong ANP. There were no corresponding internal affairs positions within the ABP, the ANCOP, or the Counternarcotics Police (CNP). The MoI IG's anti-corruption investigators must cover those sub-organizations, as well as the AUP.

Minister of Interior Atmar recently cited system-wide anti-corruption and leadership reform within the MoI and ANP as two of his top priorities. His staff is now focused on improving administrative accountability, such as eliminating corruption related to electronic funds transfers, and “ghost police,” who do not in fact exist but have been maintained on the payroll of some police units. The Minister planned to assign one IG to each provincial police headquarters to provide oversight and accountability for weapons. Moreover, he has undertaken specific initiatives to establish property accountability among MoI and ANP leadership, including requiring mandatory disclosure of assets for all police leaders, establishment of a major anti-corruption task force within the IG, and creating a new merit-based appointment system.

Under the direction of the Minister, the MoI IG recently drafted a MoI Anti-Corruption Plan, and also sent several teams of inspectors into the provinces to inventory weapons, verify personnel payroll lists, and account for assigned vehicles. As a result of the Ministry’s new police leader financial disclosure program and anti-corruption emphasis, the IG identified over 90 criminally suspicious activities. Consequently, more than ten police general officers were relieved of command on corruption charges, along with 400 policemen.

### ***Increased IG Resources Needed***

CSTC-A, in coordination with INL, has provided one full-time civilian mentor to the MoI IG’s office. The CSTC-A IG, an Army O-5, additionally serves as a part-time mentor. Although EUPOL provides some mentoring capability to the MoI Headquarters, neither it nor CSTC-A, nor ISAF had yet provided sufficient mentoring, coaching, and training resources to the MoI IG’s office, even though it was recently designated as the permanent body within the MoI to investigate allegations of police corruption. To address the mentoring shortcoming, the Minister asked the international community to provide 34 IG mentors, one for each province, to assist the ANP in developing its internal affairs inspection capability.

In principle, to maximize effectiveness, IG personnel should be selectively detailed from among the ranks of the most accomplished and professional personnel within the MoI. Each person within the IG should be individually vetted and screened for professional expertise, ethics, and integrity. In coordination with the MoI and the IG, CSTC-A should increase the MoI IG *Tashkil* authorizations to include internal and financial audit capabilities. Along with providing additional qualified mentoring staff, CSTC-A should consider providing more vigorous technical training for the IG’s anti-corruption investigators, to better develop their capacity for corruption detection, as well as providing specialized training to improve the audit and inspections capability.

If adequately empowered, trained, and resourced, the MoI IG’s Office could serve as a positive vehicle to detect, investigate, and report mismanagement, abuse, and corruption. An independent, professional internal audit, investigations, and inspection organization could make a significant positive impact in combating corruption within the ANP. In view of the vigorous approach to anti-corruption and ethics development undertaken by the current Minister, the MoI and ANP have an unprecedented opportunity to initiate a sustained attack on corruption’s corrosive effect and improve their relationship and credibility with the population.

## Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

23.a. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan mentor the Minister of Interior to initiate appropriate internal personnel selection policies and procedures that ensure only the most experienced, professional, and ethically qualified personnel are vetted and selected for positions within the MoI Inspector General’s Office.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, stating that the MoI IG is in the early stages of implementing a merit-based promotion system.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were partially responsive. While a merit-based promotion system is to be desired, and should be a part of an overall personnel management strategy going forward, it does not satisfy the full intent of the recommendation. The MoI IG needs to recruit, as well as retain, only those personnel who maintain an appropriately high standard of professionalism, especially ethical. We request that Commander, CSTC-A explain what actions are being or will be taken to mentor the Minister of Interior to ensure that personnel who are recruited or retained within its Inspector General directorate meet a high ethical standard.

23.b. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan mentor the Minister of Interior to conduct a detailed review of authorized IG positions against requirements to ensure that the *Tashkil* provides sufficient manpower to properly accomplish the anti-corruption and internal audit missions for the ANP and MoI.

### **Client Comments**

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with the recommendation, noting that his (CSTC-A) IG continues to personally mentor the MoI IG with respect to this matter. He states that the MoI IG has officially requested the Minister of Interior to increase the *Tashkil* by 300 inspectors for the Office of the MoI IG. He reports that the request is under consideration.

### **Our Response**

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. We will assess the size, composition, qualifications, and makeup of the MoI IG office as part of a follow-on evaluation.

23.c. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan identify and provide a sufficient number of additional U.S., International Security Assistance Force, or Coalition mentors and trainers to enable the Ministry of Interior Inspector General to build its institutional capacity in support of the Ministry’s audit and inspections functions and to accommodate its enhanced anti-corruption role.

### ***Client Comments***

Commander, CSTC-A concurred with this recommendation, stating that CSTC-A had recently completed a top to bottom review of the MoI trainer requirements as part of the ISAF-led “resources to task” analysis and the results of that analysis would be considered as part of forthcoming requests for additional trainers.

### ***Our Response***

Commander, CSTC-A comments were responsive, and require no additional comments. We will assess the number of U.S. and international mentors and trainers assigned to the MoI IG as part of a follow-on evaluation.



## Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from December 17, 2008, to August 10, 2009, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspections*. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations, conclusions, and recommendations, based on our objectives. Site visits to Afghanistan were conducted from March 10, 2009 to March 31, 2009.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Security Assistance manual, and appropriate CENTCOM, ISAF, USFOR-A, and CSTC-A guidance.

The scope of our assessment in Afghanistan was to determine whether U.S. Government, Coalition, and Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior goals, objectives, plans, guidance, and resources to train, equip, and field the Afghan National Forces (ANSF) were prepared, issued, operative, and relevant.

We visited or contacted organizations in the U.S., the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, and in Afghanistan that are responsible for planning and accomplishing the training, equipping, and fielding mission for the ANSF. We also visited with leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with partner-nation representatives involved in this process. We reviewed the processes involved in the train and equip mission and spoke with leaders and managers at all levels, ranging from general officers, to staff officers, to embedded training team and police mentor team members in the field. We met with Afghan leaders from the ministry level down to the kandak and district police. We also met with Afghan Inspectors General at various levels.

The ANSF Team chronology was:

January – February 2009	Research and fieldwork in CONUS
February 2009	Fieldwork in Europe (NATO, Britain)
March 10, 2009 to March 30, 2009	Fieldwork in Afghanistan
March 31, 2009	Outbrief to CSTC-A
April 13, 2009	Outbrief to CENTCOM
April – May 2009	Analysis and report writing
August 2009	Draft assessment report issued
September 2009	Management comments received and evaluated

## Limitations

We limited our review to DOD-funded programs, NATO-funded programs, and international donation programs supporting the security forces of Afghanistan.

## Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not utilize any computer-processed data in this assessment.

## Use of Technical Assistance

We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

## Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

AA&E	Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
ABP	Afghan Border Police (also Border Police [BP])
AED	Afghanistan Engineer District (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANATC	Afghan National Army Training Command
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
APPF	Afghan Public Protection Force
APPP	Afghan Public Protection Program
ARSIC	Afghan Regional Security Integration Command
ASFF	Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BOG	Boots on Ground
BP	Border Police (also Afghan Border Police [ABP])
CAF	Capabilities Assessment Form
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CF	Coalition Forces
CFC	Consolidated Fielding Center
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CM	Capability Milestone (a readiness level)
CMA	Central Movement Agency
CNIK	Counter-Narcotics Infantry Kandak
CO	Contracting Officer
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander, International Security Assistance Force
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan
CTAG	Combined Training Advisory Group

DATES	ISAF Directorate of ANA Training and Equipment Support
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DODD	DOD Directive
DODI	DOD Instruction
DTG	Date / Time / Group
EPS	Electronic Pay System
ETT	Embedded Training Team
EUPOL	European Union Police
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulations
FBD	Focused Border Development
FDD	Focused District Development
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FORSCOM	Forces Command (U.S. Army)
FY	Fiscal Year
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HEB	Hazeb Emerging Business
HMMWV	High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
IAG	Iraq Assistance Group
ICMAG	Integrated Civil-Military Action Group
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IG	Inspector General
ILO	In lieu of
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPTF	International Police Task Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
JCC-I/A	Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JMD	Joint Manning Document
JRAC	Joint Regional ANP Center
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTD	Joint Tables of Distribution
JMETLs	Joint Mission Essential Task Lists
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
LOA	Letter of Offer and Acceptance
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MM or mm	Millimeter
MoD	Ministry of Defense (Afghanistan)
MoI	Ministry of Interior (Afghanistan)
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MRAP	Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected
NDS	National Directorate of Security

NPTC	National Police Training Center
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
OCC-R/P	Operations Coordination Center (Region or Province)
OMLT	Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
OPORD	Operations Order
OSD (C)	Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
PfP	Partnership for Peace (a NATO program)
PMT	Police Mentoring Team
POI	Program of Instruction
POMLT	Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PTRAT	Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool
QPM	Qualified Police Monitor
RBAC	Regional Border Assistance Command
RC	Regional Command
RCAC	Regional Corps Assistance Command
RFF	Request for Forces
RoL	Rule of Law
RPAC	Regional Police Assistance Command
RTC	Regional Training Center
SAO	Security Assistance Office
SWA	Southwest Asia
TF	Task Force
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (U.S. Army)
TRAT	Training Readiness Assessment Tool
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces–Afghanistan
USJFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command
VTC	Video Teleconference

## Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last three years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) have issued a number of reports and testimony discussing either (1) the accountability and control over munitions and other equipment provided to the ANSF, (2) the development of ANSF logistical capability, or (3) the development of ANSF medical capability.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DODIG reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports> or at <http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ie/reports>.

Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report have included:

### Department of Defense Reports

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2008.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” June 2008.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” January 2009.

Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), “Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2009.

### Government Accountability Office

GAO-08-661, “Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces,” June 2008.

GAO-08-883T, “U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” June 18, 2008.

GAO-09-263SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan,” February 2009.

GAO-09-280, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,” March 9, 2009.

## **Department of Defense Inspector General**

DODIG Report No. IE-2007-001/DoS Report No. ISP-IQO-07-07, “Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness,” November 2006.

DODIG Report No. IE-2007-005/DoS Report No. ISP-I-07-34, “Interagency Assessment of the Counternarcotics Program in Afghanistan,” July 2007.

DODIG Report No. SPO-2009-001, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces,” October 24, 2008.

## Appendix C. Glossary

This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.

**Accountability** - DOD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, states that accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest. However, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.

**Foreign Military Sales Program** - The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is that part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

Those agreements, called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), are signed by both the U.S. Government and the purchasing government or international organization. The LOA provides for the sale of defense articles and/or defense services (to include training) usually from DOD stocks or through procurements under DOD-managed contracts. As with all security assistance, the FMS program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

DOD Financial Management Regulation Volume 15, Definitions, April 2002 (current as of July 17, 2008), defines a FMS case as a U.S. DOD LOA and associated supporting and executing documents.

**Foreign Military Sales Pseudo Cases** – According to personnel at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the pseudo LOA or case is used by the U.S. Government to track the sale of defense articles and/or services (to include training and design and construction services) and are generally funded by a U.S. Government entity (for example, the U.S. Government DOD funding provided to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund is used to fund pseudo FMS cases for Afghanistan).

The pseudo LOA itemizes the defense articles and services included in the Letter of Request. However, the pseudo LOA is not signed by the foreign purchaser or international organization receiving the articles and/or services. The pseudo LOA is authorized by public law and the Arms Export Control Act.

**Joint Manning Document** – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01C, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004 (current as May 1, 2006) states that a manning document of unfunded temporary duty positions constructed for or by a supported combatant commander that identifies the specific individual augmentation positions to support an organization during contingency operations.

Joint manning documents (JMDs) for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution or joint table of mobilization distribution should only identify individual augmentation positions for temporary military or DOD personnel.

JMDs for activities without a joint table of distribution (JTD) or joint table of mobilization distribution (JTMD) (e.g., some joint task forces) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit fill, ISAF/Coalition fill, civilian/contractor fill, or individual augmentation fills on the JMD.

**Kandak** – An organization in the Afghan National Army (ANA) that is roughly the equivalent of a U.S. Army battalion.

**Logistics** - Joint Publication 1-02 states that logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.

**Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction** - DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, defines military support to SSTR as DOD activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

**Security** - Joint Publication 1-02 defines security as a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from unintentional or directly hostile acts or influences. For the purpose of the Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Strategic Plan, security entails visibility over and physically keeping AA&E in the custody of only those with specific authorization, and the ability to quickly identify and respond to situations or incidents of actual or potential compromise of AA&E while in the logistics chain.

**Security Assistance Organizations** - DOD Directive 2055.3, “Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel,” March 11, 1985, defines security assistance organizations as all DOD component elements, regardless of actual title, located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions under Section 515 of Public Law 87-195, “Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,” September 4, 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

**Stability Operations** - DOD Directive 3000.05 defines stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.

# Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following NATO, U.S., and Afghan organizations:

## Europe

### ***North Atlantic Treaty Organization***

Officials assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

## Afghanistan

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan
- U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and key staff members
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, International Security Assistance Force
- European Union Police key staff members

## United States

### ***Department of State***

- Officials assigned to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau
- Officials assigned to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA)

### ***Department of Defense***

- The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

### **Joint Staff**

- Officials assigned to the J5 Afghan desk, Europe/NATO desk, and Current Operations
- Officials assigned to the J4 Health Services Support Division and Future Plans Division.

### **U.S. Central Command**

- Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, and key senior staff members
- Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan
- Assistant Division Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 101 (Bagram)
- Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan and key staff members
  - Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix and key staff members
  - Commander, Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-Central, South, East,

- and North, their subordinate elements, and key personnel
- Regional Training Centers at Gardez and Mazur-e-Sharif
- Counter-Insurgency Academy (Kabul)
- Consolidated Fielding Center (Kabul)

- Commander, Afghanistan Engineer District and key staff members (Kabul)
- Deputy J7-Regional Command-South (Kandahar)

### **Defense Agencies**

- Officials assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency
- Officials assigned to the Defense Contract Management Agency

## **Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan**

### ***Ministry of Defense***

- Minister of Defense
- Ministry of Defense Inspector General
- Ministry of Defense General Staff Inspector General
- Ministry of Defense National Military Command Center
- Kabul Military Training Center
- Depot 0 and Depot 1 (Warehouse Facilities)
- 22 Bunkers Ammunition Storage Facility
- Forward Support Depots in Kandahar and Mazur-e-Sharif
- 201<sup>st</sup> Corps
  - Chief of Staff
  - Combat Service Support Kandak and Embedded Training Team
- 205<sup>th</sup> Corps
  - Corps Commander
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Commander, G3, and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
  - Corps Deputy Inspector General
- 203d Corps
  - Corps Commander
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade and Embedded Training Team
  - Commando Kandak and
  - 3d Brigade Embedded Training Team
- 209<sup>th</sup> Corps
  - Corps Commander
  - 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade and Operational Mentor and Liaison Team

## ***Ministry of Interior***

- Minister of Interior
- Ministry of Interior, Inspector General
- Ministry of Interior, Commander of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
- Ministry of Interior, National Police Command Center
- Provincial Police Headquarters – Kandahar and Mazur-e-Sharif
- Regional Police Logistics Center-Kandahar and Mazur-e-Sharif
- Joint Regional Afghan National Police Center (Kandahar)
- Kabul Afghan Police Districts 1 and 2
- 7<sup>th</sup> Kandak, 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) – Kabul
- Operations Coordination Center – Region (Gardez and Mazur-e-Sharif)
- Afghan National Detention Center – Kabul



# Appendix E. Afghan/U.S. Policy, United States Code, Federal Regulations, and DOD Policies

## Part I – Policy and Plans

**NATO Partnership for Peace Program.** This NATO program provides assistance to countries who want to develop cooperative military and peacekeeping relations with NATO. The overarching goal of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), as defined by the member countries of NATO, is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe and Eurasia by forging strong partnerships between the NATO Alliance and partner countries. Partnerships are based on practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles. Full participation in PfP is essential for countries that want to join NATO because the partnership allows those countries to develop interoperability with NATO forces and to prepare their force structure and capabilities for possible future membership.

**The Afghan Constitution, Article 43, [Education].** Establishes education as the right of all citizens of Afghanistan, obliging the state to devise and implement, free of charge, effective programs for a balanced expansion of education all over Afghanistan, and to provide compulsory intermediate level education.

**Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013), “A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction,” Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.** This document discusses goals and policy directions, the National Development Strategy, cross-cutting issues, and the monitoring framework.

**The Afghanistan Compact, 2006.** The Afghanistan Compact of 2006 identifies three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity for the five years from its adoption: (1) Security, (2) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and (3) Economic and Social Development.

**U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009.** This document examines the theory and principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), the components of an effective COIN strategy, and interagency assessment, planning and implementation.

**Afghan National Army Fielding Plan.** This Ministry of Defense/CSTC-A document provides information on plans to develop and field kandaks through the end of December 2011, with a target of 134,000 ANA personnel (122,000 in kandaks and 12,000 in training, hospital etc.)

**Afghan National Army *Tashkil*.** This document establishes the end strength, rank and skill structure, and equipment requirements for the ANA and subordinate units. It is similar to a U.S. Army Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE).

**Afghan National Police *Tashkil*.** This document establishes the end strength, rank and skill structure, and equipment requirements for the ANP and subordinate units.

**MoD/ANA Decree 4.2 “Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures,” June 2009.** This MoD decree establishes the basic policies and procedures to account for military materiel in the ANA.

**MoI Policy, “Process for the Management of Logistics,” January 6, 2009.** This policy prescribes common procedures, formats, forms, and time standards for the logistics management processes of the MoI and movement of logistic information between supporting and supported organization/activities of the ANP.

## **Part II – Federal Laws**

**Public Laws.** Congress provided approximately \$18.25 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and approximately \$18.95 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, 110-161, 110-252, and 111-32. These Public Laws define the train and equip mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specified that the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund funds be used to provide funding; equipment; supplies; services; training; facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction for the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Title 10 USC 168, (10 U.S.C. 168), amended on February 10, 1996.** The Secretary of Defense may conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities designed to encourage a democratic orientation of the military forces of other countries. To carry out the program, Title 10 states that funds appropriated and made available for carrying out the authorized activities may be used for, among other things, U.S. activities and expenses for military liaisons and traveling contact teams as well as for seminars and conferences held in the theater of operations.

## **Part III – Federal Regulations**

**Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 46.201, “Quality Assurance: General.”** This subpart states that the contracting officer should include appropriate contractor quality performance requirements in the contract solicitation and in the contract itself. These requirements may range from inspection at the time of acceptance to a comprehensive program for controlling quality during contract execution.

**FAR Subpart 46.4, “Government Contract Quality Assurance.”** This subpart states that Government contract quality assurance must be performed at such times (including any stage of manufacture or performance of services) and places (including subcontractors’ plants) as may be necessary to determine that the supplies or services conform to contract requirements. Quality assurance surveillance plans should be prepared in conjunction with the statement of work. The plans should specify all work requiring surveillance and the method of surveillance. FAR Subpart 46.4 (e) states that Government inspection must be performed by or under the direction or supervision of Government personnel.

**FAR Subpart 46.402(e), “Government Contract Quality Assurance at Source.”** This subpart states: “Agencies shall perform contract quality assurance, including inspection, at source if government inspection during contract performance is essential.” Quality assurance surveillance plans ensure effective Government contract quality assurance,

**FAR Subpart 46.5, “Acceptance.”** This subpart states:

Acceptance constitutes acknowledgement that the supplies or services conform with applicable contract quality and quantity requirements, except as provided in this subpart and subject to other terms and conditions of the contract. Acceptance may take place before delivery, at the time of delivery, or after delivery, depending on the provisions of the terms and conditions of the contract. Supplies or services shall ordinarily not be accepted before completion of Government contract quality assurance actions.

## **Part IV – Department of Defense Policies**

**Secretary of Defense Memorandum dated January 19, 2007, Subject: Utilization of the Total Force.** This document establishes four length policy for the various DoD military components.

**Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, “DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” 23 January 2009.** This document establishes the policy through which an appropriately sized subset of the DOD civilian workforce is pre-identified to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that facilitates the use of their capabilities for operational requirements. These requirements are typically away from the normal work locations of DOD civilians, or in situations where other civilians may be evacuated to assist military forces where the use of DOD civilians is appropriate.

**DOD Directive 1322.18, “Military Training”. September 3, 2004.** This DODD states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations...

The DOD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.

**DOD Directive 2055.3, “Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection of USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel,” March 11, 1985.** This DODD provides guidance for the staffing of security assistance organizations.

**DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005.** This directive

provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. It also establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The DODD also states it is DOD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

### **DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.64 “Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006.**

This DODI:

- Provides policy and procedures for DOD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.
- Requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DOD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

### **DOD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program**

**Procedures,” January 4, 2006.** This DODI states that management internal control procedures are basic to U.S. Government accountability and are specified in this instruction. DODI 5010.40, E3.14, identifies operational and administrative controls for Security Assistance Management of Foreign Military Sales.

**DOD 5105.38-M, (Security Assistance Management Manual, October 3, 2003.)** This manual provides guidance for the administration and implementation of Security Assistance<sup>13</sup> and related activities in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and related statutes and directives. It states that:

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<sup>13</sup> Security Assistance is defined in Appendix C.

...[T]itle to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG [U.S. Government] to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DOD supply activity<sup>14</sup> (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government's or international organization's Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the consignment.

...[T]he maximum processing time between Implementing Agency receipt of the Letter of Request and release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance should normally be no more than 120 days, with no adjustments for hold times, additional work needed to clarify requirements, or any other consideration. Although delays may occur while processing some LOAs [Letter of Offer and Acceptance], Implementing Agencies should process at least 80 percent of their total number of LOAs within 120 days.

**CJCS Manual 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures,” September 29, 2006.)** This manual sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing a Request for Forces (RFF) or Request for Capabilities (RFC) message.

**Defense Contract Management Agency Mission Statement.** The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) provides “Contract Administration Services to the Department of Defense Acquisition Enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the warfighter; on time and on cost.” Additionally:

**Before contract award,** DCMA provides advice and services to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, and write contracts that meet the needs of our customers in DOD, Federal and allied government agencies.

**After contract award,** DCMA monitors contractors' performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts.

**U.S. Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24), December 2006/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) No. 3-33.5, “Counterinsurgency,” December, 15, 2006.** This document establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment.

**Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Execution Order (EXORD) 171-09, US Forces Augmentation to NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison**

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<sup>14</sup> DoD 5105.38-M states a supply activity can be either a DoD storage depot or a commercial vendor that furnishes materiel under a DoD-administered contract.

**Team (OMLT), date time group 220426 Zulu April 2009 (classified).** This document establishes training requirements and other criteria for assigning U.S. National Guard soldiers to NATO OMLTs via the National Guard's SPP.

**FORSCOM Message: Subject/2008 Revised Transition Team Training Guidance, DTG 080257 Mar 08, Unclassified.** This message provides updated training guidance for transition teams deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This document replaces IAG training guidance DTG 182148Z Jan 07 and aligns previous guidance for transition teams deploying to Southwest Asia with FORSCOM training guidance for follow on forces deploying in support of operations in Southwest Asia. This message directs that all transition team personnel are to conduct pre-deployment training in accordance with this message.

**FORSCOM Message: Subject/FORSCOM Training Guidance for Follow-On Forces Deploying in Support of Southwest Asia (SWA), DTG: 172053Z Nov 08, Unclassified.** This message provides a stand-alone document which does not require referencing prior messages and incorporates requirements and procedures identified in Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order 150-08, Subject: "Reserve Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre and Post-Mobilization Training Strategy." It is used to guide development of the unified and collaborative reserve component deployment training plans.

**Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Security Forces, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, 20 September 2008.** This document provides an overarching strategy for the development of the Afghan Security Forces, to include the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (Mol). The plan aims to synchronize security sector development efforts across the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and the wider International Community. The plan lays out the guidance and the processes for security ministry and Afghan security forces generation and development. It also takes into account the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (AN DS) dated April 2008 and the altered circumstances since these agreements and strategies were conceived, including changes to the security environment. It is complementary to Commander, International Security Assistance Force Operations Plan (COMISAF OPLAN) 38302 and supports the ISAF security effects.

**Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Operations Order 08-006, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Development Program, 14 January 2008.** This order provides guidance for the development and execution of the current United States Fiscal Year 2008 CSTC-A program to generate the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). It bridges the gaps between strategic aims of the CSTC-A campaign plan, subordinate development strategies, and budget execution with program guidance focused on annual operational objectives. The order describes a program to develop the currently approved ANSF structure and is a document that serves as a basis of record to direct changes to the program as required.

**Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Fragmentary Order 08-038 to OPORD 08-006, April 2008.** This FRAGO provides guidance for necessary adjustments to accelerate the ANCOF fielding program because additional personnel requested in CSTC-A RFF 620, dated 1 February 2007, to keep up with increased requirements of an expanding ANSF force structure were not provided.

**Program Management Plan (PgMP) for the Afghan National Army (ANA) Program, for various Facilities throughout Afghanistan, Afghanistan Engineer District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 2009.** This document seeks to ensure successful design and construction of facilities supporting the fielding of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldiers throughout Afghanistan. This PgMP outlines the procedures and responsibilities Afghan and U.S. organizations will undertake during the acquisition planning, management, design, construction and closeout of the programmed facilities.

**The Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District, Interim Manning Document, May 2009.** This document lists personnel authorized and personnel assigned to the AED with position title.

**Afghanistan Engineer District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Command Brief, December 2008.** This document provides an overview of the AED mission in Afghanistan to include a command introduction, command relationships, AED workload history/forecast, Afghan National Security Forces, U.S. and ISAF/Coalition forces, roads, CERP funded projects and support for others, and construction execution and challenges. The brief was presented to the DODIG during our visit in March 2009.

**Request for Forces 937 and 938.** These are classified documents dealing with manning requirements.



# Appendix F. Client Comments

## Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)

### Comments

Final Report  
Reference




COMPTROLLER  
(Program/Budget)

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces  
(Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this draft DoD-IG assessment. We partially non-concur with the recommendation accompanying observation number 13 and recommend edits to the observation and recommendation to accurately reflect that the Department already requests, and has received the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) as an appropriation available for more than one year. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) makes ASFF available through September 30, 2010. The FY 2009 Bridge Appropriation, provided under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252), which made ASFF available for only one year, was the sole exception. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report.

  
John P. Roth  
Deputy Comptroller

Recommendation  
13 Changed

# Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Comments

Final Report  
Reference

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**DOD Inspector General Report – Dated 10 August 2009  
Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)**

**Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the  
Afghan National Security Forces**

## **CJCS COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS**

**(U) RECOMMENDATION 21.D:** We recommend that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, approve and source the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan Request For Forces 937 and 938 that requested an increase in the manning for Police Mentoring Teams to the level required to complete the police mentoring mission.

**(U) RESPONSE 21.D:** Concur. Request For Forces (RFF) 938 referenced in the report has been fully resourced. RFF 937 has been 97.5% sourced with remaining personnel requirements still being examined. The above information is validated in JOPES.

(U) As a policy clarification, the CJCS reviews and *recommends* approval of RFFs to the Secretary of Defense. The SecDef *approves* each RFF.

Wording of  
Recommendation  
21.c. changed to  
reflect clarification.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Comments



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
1000 NAVY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000

SEP 14 2009

## MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: DoD Inspector General Draft Report D2009-D00SPO-0113.00: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces

The Department of the Navy (DON) has reviewed the August 10, 2009 draft DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) report entitled, "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces," and provides comment at attachment one.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Patricia C. Adams", is positioned above the typed name.

Patricia C. Adams  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
(Civilian Human Resources)  
Performing the Duties of the ASN(M&RA)

Attachment(s):  
As stated

Copy to:  
Navy Inspector General

Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report  
D2009-D00SPO-0113.000, "ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND COALITION  
PLANS TO TRAIN, EQUIP, AND FIELD THE AFGHAN NATIONAL  
SECURITY FORCES," DATED 10 AUGUST 2009

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMENTS  
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

**RECOMMENDATION 9e:** Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in-country for mentor/trainer personnel.

**USMC RESPONSE:** Non-concur with recommendation.

**Discussion:**

The USMC deploys Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) for 270 days Boots on the Ground (BOG) rotations, which was first, authorized in the JFCOM OEF 06-08 DEPORD that authorized service rotations down to 210 days BOG. Based on the recommendation of the Commander, Marine Forces Central Command, Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) set the policy of 270 BOG for ETTs.

The 270 days BOG was adopted because it best supports the Marine Corps sourcing methodology described above because it allows the force providers to cast a wider "net" in identifying individuals who are available to serve on a team. To find a qualified Marine who is available for 4-6 months Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP), has the requisite skills/experience and has sufficient dwell to deploy for 365 BOG, severely limits who can be selected. At 270 BOG, we open sourcing to include Marines available to commit a year to the requirement (PTP+ BOG).

Additionally, individuals who deploy 365 days BOG are entitled to two weeks Rest and Recuperation leave (R&R). The two-week "R&R clock" does not start until the individual arrives at his R&R destination and stops when he begins his travels back to theater. It normally takes one week on either end of the R&R block to move to/from theater. So 365 BOG in reality becomes 330 BOG for the individual. Because the ETT cannot stop functioning, R&R of members on a 365-day team must be staggered. R&R is normally not taken during the first few months of deployment for obvious reasons, and is not normally taken during the last few months of the deployment in order to prepare for the transfer of responsibility within the area of operation. This leaves six months to rotate everyone on the team out on leave, creating significant gaps in capability during the entire 6-month period. 270 day deployers' are not entitled to this leave and remain deployed as part of the team for the entire deployment.

Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report  
D2009-D00SPO-0113.000, "ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND COALITION  
PLANS TO TRAIN, EQUIP, AND FIELD THE AFGHAN NATIONAL  
SECURITY FORCES," DATED 10 AUGUST 2009

The operational continuity and effectiveness afforded through our way of supporting the Combatant Commander (COCOM) ETTs requirements is demonstrated by the fact the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) leadership of the 201st Corps does not want to sever their relationship with Marine advisors in order for the USMC ETTs to remission into Regional Command - South (RC-S). This is a relationship that has been built over 4 years and based on mutual trust and respect.

While not tied to BOG, another significant difference to USMC ETTs is that we source teams above the joint requirement as approved by CMC. We do this because our service component identified deficiencies in the joint manning which, if left uncorrected, would impact the quality of support provided by the teams. Our teams deploy with 5-10 additional personnel than is required. To extend USMC ETT tour lengths would negatively impact their effectiveness.

**Commander, USCENTCOM  
Commander, US Forces-Afghanistan  
Commander, CSTC-A Comments**



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101


14 Sep 2009

FOR: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG)

SUBJECT: Review of DODIG Draft Report "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces" (DODIG Project D2009-D000SPO-0113.000)

1. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the DODIG draft report.
2. Attached are the CENTCOM Staff, USFOR-A/CSTC-A responses, and JCC-I/A comments to the recommendations and report.
  - a. CENTCOM partially concurred with the one recommendation for our command.
  - b. USFOR-A and CSTC-A concurred with all 50 recommendations for their commands.
  - c. JCC I/A concurred with comment to the one recommendation addressed to JCC-I/A.

3. The Point of Contact is [REDACTED]

  
JAY W. HOOD  
Major General, U.S. Army

Attachments:

- Tab A: CENTCOM Staff Response
- Tab B: USFOR-A/CSTC-A Responses
- Tab C: JCC-I/A Response

**DODIG DRAFT REPORT – DATED August 10, 2009**  
**Project No. D2009-D000SPO-0113.000**  
**"Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan**  
**National Security Forces"**

**CENTCOM RESPONSE AND COMMENTS**  
**TO THE DRAFT REPORT**

**RECOMMENDATION 1. (page 109, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, approve an appropriate increase in resources to accelerate production of FDD training for district and provincial police.

**CENTCOM RESPONSE:** CENTCOM partially concurs with recommendation 21.c.

- a. This recommendation should be rewritten to specify what type of resources the DODIG is recommending be approved. This section of the audit report's conclusion notes that Focused District Development throughout has been slow and recommends accelerating the process. It then identifies the constraints on the FDD, regional training center capacity, the number of CIVPOL availability of ANCOP to relieve the uniform police.
- b. The Commander, CENTCOM is not the approver for all resources. This recommendation should be rewritten more clearly to understand the DODIG's comments. The approver could be Commander ISAF, CENTCOM or SECDEF.

Draft  
Recommendation  
21.c. has been  
deleted from final  
report



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A DCDR-S


11 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General (Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans and Operation), 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: USFOR-A and CSTC-A Response to Draft Report on Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (DOD IG Project No. D2009-D000SPO-0113.000)

1. Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan concurs with the (4) recommendations that are specific to his dual-hatted responsibilities as COMISAF and CDR USFOR-A.
2. I endorse and fully concur with the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan responses to the (46) recommendations for CSTC-A.
3. Point of contact for this action is USFOR-A IG, [REDACTED]

Encl  
CDR CSTC-A Response Memorandum  
Combined USFOR-A/CSTC-A Response

  
JOHN A. MACDONALD  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Commander, Support  
United States Forces- Afghanistan



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN  
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

CSTC-A-CG

12 Sep 09

MEMORANDUM THRU

United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356  
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR United States Department of Defense Inspector General, Office of the Assistant Inspector  
General for Special Plans and Operations, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-  
4704


SUBJECT: CSTC-A Response to the Draft Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition  
Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-  
D00SPO-0113.000)

1. Reference: Draft Report, dated August 10, 2009, Department of Defense, Assistant Inspector  
General for Special Plans and Operations, subject as above.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to the recommendations listed in the  
referenced draft report. CSTC-A has continued to improve the training, equipping, and fielding  
of the Afghan National Security Forces since the Special Plans and Operations (SPO) out-brief  
that occurred on 30 March 2009. The Command has enclosed responses which reflect  
significant efforts to address the shortcomings noted in the draft report.

3. Point of Contact for this action is [REDACTED]

Encl

  
RICHARD P. FORMICA  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commanding General

**DODIG DRAFT REPORT – DATED August 10, 2009**  
**Project No. D2009-D000SPO-0113.000**  
**“Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces”**

**USFOR-A / CSTC-A RESPONSES AND COMMENTS  
TO THE DRAFT REPORT**

**RECOMMENDATIONS (4) FOR USFOR-A**

**RECOMMENDATION 1. (9.b., page 51, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, International Security Assistance Force, coordinate with the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization to establish longer in-country tours, ideally lasting 12 months, for all Operational Mentor Liaison Teams and Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

**USFOR-A RESPONSE:** USFOR-A concurs

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**RECOMMENDATION 2. (19.b., page 96, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, United States Forces–Afghanistan / Commander, International Security Assistance Force, coordinate with the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, and the appropriate international agencies to initiate those actions necessary to increase the authorized size and fund the expansion of the Afghan National Police.

**USFOR-A RESPONSE:** USFOR-A concurs

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**RECOMMENDATION 3. (20. a., page 101, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, and Chief of U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, develop and implement a coordinated action plan to strengthen the cooperation between the police and criminal justice/Rule of Law at the district level, and ensure that PMTs and PRTs mentor this outcome.

**USFOR-A RESPONSE:** USFOR-A concurs

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**RECOMMENDATION 4. (20. b., page 101, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, ensure coordination between law enforcement and criminal justice/Rule of Law is emphasized in all ANP training and mentoring.

**USFOR-A RESPONSE:** USFOR-A concurs

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**RECOMMENDATIONS (46) FOR CSTC-A**

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**RECOMMENDATION 1. (1, page 10, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, direct the respective Commanders, Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Commands to coordinate with the in-bound Brigade Combat Teams that will replace them to prepare supporting plans for their task forces which implement the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan Campaign Plan in each of their areas of operation.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. Both Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are now in theatre and are executing their assigned missions. During preparation for deployment, each Brigade collaborated with TF Phoenix and the ARSICS to prepare for the ANSF training mission, and the BCTs prepared supporting plans for their subordinate task forces. Consistent with a new theater Command and Control structure approved by GEN McChrystal, these BCTs will be transferred to the ISAF Joint Command (JC) upon its activation on 12 October 2009. The tasks to train and develop fielded ANSF will shift to the ISAF Joint Command at that time.

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**RECOMMENDATION 2. (3.a., page 17, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, ensure that the contract for maintaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization weapons includes specifications that ensure appropriate quality of products/services and that contractors hired are able to produce/perform to those standards.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. This has been a problem in the past. CSTC-A has taken three steps to improve performance of this contract. First, CSTC-A required HEB to hire qualified personnel for this contract. Second, the company has provided their employees with the right tools to perform their tasks except for several specialized tools and gauges that are due to arrive in September 2009. Thus, CSTC-A enhanced its contract oversight on HEB. Today, the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) tracks equipment arrival, training qualifications, and does periodic inspections – and also monitors reports from subordinate units and the assigned Technical Officer Representatives.

**RECOMMENDATION 3. (3.b., page 17, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, ensure that local Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer Representatives, in coordination with their Ministry of Defense counterparts, perform a quality screen of inbound contracted commodities upon receipt, but before Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan transfer to the Afghan National Security Forces’ logistics system; and ensure follow-up to achieve contract compliance with respect to quality of services delivered.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A works with local vendors and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to enhance quality of purchased commodities. For example, CSTC-A assesses quality of locally manufactured ANA and ANP uniforms and boots with vendors. As a result, inferior boots were collected and replaced with a higher quality product that meets contract standards. CSTC-A has also appointed TORs at Depot 1 to perform quality assurance checks to verify contract compliance. While CSTC-A fully embraces the JCC I/A “Afghan First” contracting initiative designed to spur the local Afghan economy, the command has experienced difficulty in finding qualified contractors to perform the work. CSTC-A will continue to support this initiative, and to monitor performance and quality. Finally, CSTC-A will finalize an SOP that provides “cradle-to-grave” guidance on developing requirements and defining measurable performance criteria when preparing Performance Statements of Work.

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**RECOMMENDATION 4. (3.d., page 17, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, develop a plan to improve communication and coordination between Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan logistics and contracting personnel and the Ministry of Defense, including its Inspector General office.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A has focused efforts with both the MOD’s 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Minister Akram and the MOI’s Deputy Minister for Logistics Bashir to improve coordination and collaboration in logistics and contracting activities. The CSTC-A IG also maintains active links with both Ministries to promptly address emerging logistics related challenges.

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**RECOMMENDATION 5. (4.a., page 28, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, establish an overarching Strategic Plan for developing a comprehensive Afghan National Security Forces Logistics Capability, with accompanying operational Action Plans for each logistics area, including acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of material, that will enable the Afghan National Security Forces to become operationally independent and self-sustainable within a mutually acceptable timeframe.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A has Ministerial Development Plans and supporting action plans for the MoI and MoD to improve sustainable

capacity and capability of the ANSF. These plans have been coordinated with the ANSF logistics leaders. These include plans and ongoing actions to improve the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materials. Additionally, at the invitation of the CSTC-A CG, the U.S. Army Material Command, the U.S. Army Central, and the U.S. Army G-4 dispatched a joint team to assess the Afghan logistic system and to propose a strategy for greater ANSF long term self-sufficiency. The ANA portion of this assessment will be complete in September 2009 and will be the basis for a comprehensive strategic plan to improve sustainable capacity and capability. The ANP portion of this assessment will occur in October 2009. We will develop and implement these plans in conjunction with MoD and MoI.

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**RECOMMENDATION 6. (4.b., page 28, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, determine the Afghan National Security Force logistics personnel requirements and develop a cadre of trained Afghan National Security Forces logisticians who are recognized and rewarded for developing, maintaining, and increasing their logistics skills.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A is currently conducting an in-depth assessment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics capabilities, including the current capacity of logistics organizations to meet the forecasted supply, distribution, and maintenance requirements to sustain fielded ANA forces. This analysis will also focus on the future organizational and personnel requirements to sustain the currently planned end-state for growth of the ANA.

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**RECOMMENDATION 7. (4.c., page 28, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and the Afghan National Army General Staff, develop personnel policy requiring that soldiers with logistics specialty skills be assigned to positions and organizations requiring those skill sets.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. One of CSTC-A's top priorities includes ensuring personnel management records are established and clearly identify training and military occupational specialties attained by Afghan soldiers and police. This is part of a broader CSTC-A approach to improve ANSF systems with a focus on personnel management, logistics, financial management, and force management.

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**RECOMMENDATION 8. (4.d., page 28, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan, determine the number of dedicated U.S. and other international force logistics trainers and mentors necessary to develop the required logistics capability within the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs this recommendation. CSTC-A recently performed a top to bottom review of the National MoI and MoD logistics trainer requirements as part of an ISAF-led "resources to task" analysis and will be considered as part of any forthcoming COMISAF/USFOR-A requests for additional ANSF trainers.

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**RECOMMENDATION 9. (5.a., page 34, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan, and Commander, U.S. Central Command, conduct a Joint Manning Document review to address potential staff and mentor shortages within headquarters and staff of the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A identified the key requirements and submitted an out of cycle JMD request for these resources in May 2009. However, as part of COMUSFOR-A's force optimization efforts, any growth in CSTC-A's JMD will be factored into an overall request for ANSF trainers that may result from COMISAF's strategic assessment.

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**RECOMMENDATION 10. (5.b., page 34, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, United States Forces–Afghanistan, and Commander, U.S. Central Command, develop a plan to request the necessary number of field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers on a continuing basis as individual augmentees that will not be sourced by the 2 Brigade Combat Team concept in order to ensure acceptable rank compatibility with Afghan National Security Force senior personnel.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. The requirements to properly train and advise ANSF are being accomplished by two brigade combat teams. They have been augmented by senior grade officers and NCOs. Their efforts will be enhanced by the implementation of close, embedded partnering by coalition forces at all levels of command with the right rank and skill sets.

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**RECOMMENDATION 11. (5.c., page 34, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, United States Forces–Afghanistan, and Commander, U.S. Central Command and the Commander of the inbound active duty Brigade Combat Team, take action to ensure appropriate skills and training are provided to the personnel from the active duty Brigade Combat team who will be assigned to Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. Since this audit, USFOR-A has stood up a J-7 with the responsibility to provide specific training requirements for the ANSF training mission to CONUS based training programs, including the U.S. Army's

Combat Training Centers. CSTC-A provided detailed information to 4-82 BCT prior to their deployment. TF Phoenix developed a handbook to provide specific information about the tasks associated with the ETT/PMT mission set. This handbook was provided to 4-82 BCT. USFOR-A efforts have been made to provide relevant information to US and Coalition trainers to enhance their preparation for deployment to Afghanistan.

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**RECOMMENDATION 12. (6.c., page 38, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Commander, U. S. Army Forces Command, coordinate training and assignments so that individuals and teams are trained as either Army or Police trainers and then are assigned to the position they trained for upon arrival in Afghanistan.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. However, changes in the operational environment, shortages in required resources, and changing priorities will require that commanders task organize to accomplish their missions. The two BCTs assigned the ANSF development mission will operate according to requirements established by the operational commander.

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**RECOMMENDATION 13. (7.a., page 42, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, direct all personnel serving as mentors/trainers at any level, regardless of military service, to carry out general military duties, such as guard, watch, or convoy security.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. Currently, CSTC-A does not have the authority to direct these actions. We will address this recommendation with Commander USFOR-A and Commander U.S. Central Command.

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**RECOMMENDATION 14. (8.a.(1), page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff, mentor the development and institutionalization of civil and military judicial policy and procedures that will enable senior MoD and MoI civilian officials and military officers to be held accountable for their actions.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A recognizes that senior Afghan military and police officials must be held accountable for the performance and behavior of their organizations, and there is significant work to do in this area. CSTC-A supports and will advise ANSF leader efforts to fight corruption and to implement anti-corruption efforts in each ministry. CSTC-A published an order to all personnel to report on incidents of corruption and is training civil and military judicial policy and procedures that enable senior MoD and MoI civilian officials and military officers to be held accountable for their actions.

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**RECOMMENDATION 15. (8.a.(2) page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff, develop a process to track case progress and disciplinary action taken against senior officials who have allegations of corruption substantiated by the Ministry and/or General Staff Inspectors General or other investigative authorities.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. This issue will require a concerted and synchronized effort by all levels of command and in all activities of the U.S. government. CSTC-A IG and CSTC-A SJA are engaged with their Afghan counterparts to improve on anti-corruption efforts. CSTC-A directed subordinates to report suspected/alleged activities of corruption or bribery by Afghan government officials or by the ANSF. CSTC-A personnel train and encourage their Afghan counterparts to report and pursue allegations of corruption using established Afghan reporting channels. COMISAF's initiative to have embedded partnering at all levels of ANSF structure will facilitate these efforts.

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**RECOMMENDATION 16. (8.b.(1) page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff to enforce a system of accountability across the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan Police organizations that ensures senior ANA and ANP leaders set the example with respect to their personal and professional conduct.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation in this report. CSTC-A trains the MoD and MoI to enforce a system of accountability. Specific actions include advising and training leaders and Inspectors General (IGs), leveraging CONUS based IG training venues, increasing emphasis on face to face interaction among IGs, and monitoring Afghan led assistance visits, inspections and investigations. COMISAF's initiative to have embedded partnering at all levels of ANSF structure will facilitate these efforts.

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**RECOMMENDATION 17. (8.b.(2) page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff to enforce a system of accountability across the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan Police organizations that empowers commanders within the Army and Police chains of command to take appropriate non-judicial punishment action against subordinate officers and, as appropriate, refer serious cases for criminal charges.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A trains, advises and encourages the MoD and MoI to enforce a system of accountability. However, progress is slow. Efforts to improve accountability throughout the ANA and the ANP, and to delegate

authority to subordinates to deal with lesser offenses are hampered by the resistance of senior Afghan officials. The policies and laws to allow subordinate commanders to investigate and dispose of allegations of misconduct using a form of non-judicial punishment are in place but not uniformly employed. CSTC-A seeks all opportunities to enhance the authority of commanders to create transparency and integrity in their organizations.

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**RECOMMENDATION 18. (8.b.(3) page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff to enforce a system of accountability across the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan Police organizations that delegates to commanders the authority to relieve and/or court martial subordinate commanders and soldiers/police officers for corruption and substandard performance.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A is encouraging the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, ANA General Staff to enforce a system of accountability that includes delegating to commanders the authority to relieve and/or court martial subordinate commanders and soldiers/police officers for corruption and substandard performance. The policies and laws to allow subordinate commanders to investigate and dispose of allegations of misconduct using relief and courts martial are in place but not uniformly employed. CSTC-A seeks all opportunities to enhance the authority of commanders to create transparency and integrity in their organizations. COMISAF’s initiative to have embedded partnering at all levels of ANSF structure will facilitate these efforts.

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**RECOMMENDATION 19. (8.b.(4) page 48, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and the Chief, General Staff to enforce a system of accountability across the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Afghan National Army, Ministry of Interior, and Afghan Police organizations that recognizes and rewards examples where units/individuals in the Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police have met the highest standards of responsibility and accountability.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation. An awards and recognition policy has been drafted and is awaiting Ministerial approval at MOI. CSTC-A will assist the MOD to develop a similar policy.

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**RECOMMENDATION 20. (9.a., page 51, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a requirement that all U.S. mentors, including those serving on Embedded Training Teams and Police Mentoring Teams, as CSTC-All as logistics and medical mentors, be assigned to their positions for 12-months.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation that the requirement that U.S. mentors, including those serving on ETTs, PMTs, and logistics and medical mentors serve tours of at least 12 months. However, personnel in the Army National Guard should continue to serve in Afghanistan for a minimum of 9 months due to the fact that total time of mobilization for National Guard soldiers spans a 12 month period. CSTC-A will provide USFOR-A a requirements document to codify this requirement.

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**RECOMMENDATION 21. (10.a., page 55, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to ensure focused priority on instituting a centralized electronic pay process for the Army and Police that is integrated with their personnel data systems.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A is partnering with the Afghan MoI and MoD to develop and institutionalize an electronic pay process that is integrated with the personnel system. The MoI, in partnership with CSTC-A and the Law and Order Trust Fund Association (LOTFA), is working on a web-based electronic pay system. It will allow a more interactive, real-time data to process and report payroll information to the MoI. The MoD is considering implementing an automated payroll system that will supplant the current manual process and has conducted an initial pilot test at the ministry staff level to examine the potential for implementing a computerized payroll system across the ANA. CSTC-A will work with both Ministries to implement a standard centralized pay system between the MOD and MOI and then integrate that system with the personnel data system.

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**RECOMMENDATION 22. (10.b., page 55, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to enroll all Army and Police personnel in the Electronic Pay System.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. The MoD and MoI leadership have embraced the concept of enrolling all Army and Police personnel in electronic pay systems. Ninety-five percent of the Police force and ninety-three percent of the Army is enrolled in the electronic payroll system; over sixty percent of all ANSF receive their pay via electronic funds transfer. CSTC-A is confident that these percentages will continue to increase as the security and stability improves throughout the provinces and accessibility to banking facilities flourishes.

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**RECOMMENDATION 23. (10.c., page 55, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to coordinate with the appropriate Ministries to establish access to banks or equivalent financial facilities for all Army and Police personnel.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A continues to collaborate with the MoI and MoD to expand bank access for the ANA and ANP. For the ANP, a “pay-by-phone” test concept currently underway may allow increased level of “cashless” salary payments across remote areas where bank facilities are limited or not readily accessible. The MoD, MoF, and commercial bank enterprises are working to expand access and capabilities, such as increasing physical infrastructure and electronic connectivity.

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**RECOMMENDATION 24. (10.d., page 55, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense to institute controls in the ANA and ANP to manage and monitor payroll performance.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs and the MoI and MoD leadership acknowledge the need to implement controls to manage and monitor payroll performance. For the ANP, CSTC-A is partnering with MoI to develop regional support teams that will provide subject matter expertise in budgeting, accounting and payroll. For the ANA, the General Staff Budget and Finance directorate has an approved manning document to create a management team to conduct internal reviews. This team will focus on internal financial management controls across the ANA, and will augment the audit capability resident in the MoD and GS Inspector General Directorates.

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**RECOMMENDATION 25. (10.e., page 55, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, mentor the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defense vigorously apply non-judicial or judicial procedures to punish offenders responsible for payroll corruption.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and seeks all opportunities to reinforce the need for MOD and MOI to prosecute those who violate the law.

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**RECOMMENDATION 26. (11.a., page 60, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, add progress in improving literacy rates as part of the Current Operations Briefings to senior commanders and track literacy progress as an Afghan National Security Forces readiness indicator in the Training Readiness Assessment Tool and Police Training Readiness Assessment Tool databases.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation to track and brief literacy rates as part of the Current Operations Briefings. CSTC-A has implemented literacy programs in both the ANA and ANP. CSTC-A has conducted detailed analysis to identify roles, responsibilities, and metrics as required by a literacy scoping study conducted by the United Kingdom. Literacy is a key metric for ANSF development and progress will be monitored closely.

**RECOMMENDATION 27. (11.b., page 60, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, establish a plan and publish Literacy Program Implementing Guidance that clearly identifies roles, responsibilities, and metrics for the Afghan National Security Force' literacy programs, to include oversight of both Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police contracts.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation, and will publish Literacy Program Implementing Guidance in October 2009.

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**RECOMMENDATION 28. (12, page 63, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Afghan Engineer District (AED), evaluate courses of action to build Afghan National Security Force facilities to an appropriate standard which meet ANSF mission requirements and that they can sustainably maintain. Courses of action must incorporate appropriate safety considerations.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A, AED and AFCEE are planning and designing standard, more austere and operationally functional ANSF facilities. These facilities will be constructed to a minimum military standard, similar to those utilized by NATO. These standard designs low maintenance and contain details such as common block, simple steel truss rafters, sheet metal roofs, fans, few finishes, baseboard heating and other necessities. Most of these items are locally available and reduce cost and sophisticated logistics. The result of these standard designs for common facilities will be a direct reduction in design and procurement time, in addition to a reduction in costs. Additionally, facilities are required to be constructed to International Building Code (IBC) standards and in compliance with National Electric Codes (NEC).

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**RECOMMENDATION 29. (14.a., page 73, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and U.S. Central Command, develop a plan for any further expansion of the Afghan National Army that identifies the resourcing necessary to meet requirements, while maintaining the quality of the force. The plan should include developing the logistics capability of the Afghan National Army to sustain and support operations based on the size of the expanded combat forces.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and has developed a plan that supports COMISAF's Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and enhanced sustainable capacity and capability of the ANSF.

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**RECOMMENDATION 30. (16.a., page 81, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that the *Tashkil* authorizes M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles with appropriate weapons systems for units requiring them for combat operations, based on the unit mission.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and conducted a detailed mission analysis on the ANSF growth to identified mobility requirements and ancillary equipment to include in the *Tashkil*. The CSTC-A staff has identified the equipping, training, maintenance, and sustainment requirements to support both the 134K ANA and 96.8K ANP growth, and is carefully reviewing requirements and resources required for further growth of the ANSF.

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**RECOMMENDATION 31. (16.b., page 81, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that authorized weapons systems for the M-1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles are delivered with all ancillary parts, equipment, and adapters required to make the systems operational.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A conducted a full review all ancillary parts, equipment, and adapters for M-1151 weapons systems and will ensure all items are placed on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases or locally procured.

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**RECOMMENDATION 32. (16.c., page 81, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense, ensure that, once weapons systems arrive, units and personnel receive weapons familiarization instruction and conduct live-fire exercises to develop M 1151 High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles' crew capability and maximize combat effectiveness.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A is currently implementing this recommendation.

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**RECOMMENDATION 33. (17.a., page 85, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Defense and Chief, Afghan National Army General Staff, develop a process to ensure that the Afghan National Army Form 3645, Personal Clothing Record, is prepared for each Afghan National Army soldier documenting issue of clothing and equipment at the Kabul Military Training Center and that a copy of that record is transmitted to the Consolidated Fielding Center and the soldier's gaining unit.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. Kabul Military Training Center (KMTCC) initiated corrected actions on this and is fully implementing an ANA Consolidated Soldier Record that includes the ANA Form 3645.

**RECOMMENDATION 34. (17.b., page 85, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan/Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, ensure that Embedded Training Teams and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams mentor the Afghan National Army on the importance of developing/maintaining individual accountability records and conducting regular and timely inventories of Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment to enforce established standards.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and is training ANA units at all levels to improve accountability, and monitoring ANA accountability efforts of OCIE. This area requires the constant focus and attention of CSTC-A, and will require the attention of the IJC, Regional Commanders and assigned partner units when IJC assumes responsibility for the development of fielded ANSF.

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**RECOMMENDATION 35. (17.c., page 85, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan/Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan, coordinate with the Minister of Defense to ensure accountability procedures are in place and implemented by the Afghan National Army chain of command to address the loss of Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and is training ANA units at all levels to improve accountability, and monitoring ANA accountability efforts of OCIE. Accountability procedures are clearly outlined in MoD Decree 4.2 "Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures," signed in June 2009. Chapter 11 stipulates the use of MoD Form 3645 to record OCIE transactions and outlines an in-depth process to ensure Soldiers maintain accountability for their issued OCIE. At the conclusion of Winter 2009, CSTC-A provided storage space to allow ANA units to properly secure winter OCIE during the summer months to enable better accountability. CSTC-A will conduct inspections to verify accountability of these items.

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**RECOMMENDATION 36. (18.a., page 88, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force and the Minister of Defense, develop a plan to procure the additional D30 122-millimeter howitzers that are authorized on the *Tashkil*.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. FMS Case E5-B-UDC and MOR# 09-E1A-311 were submitted for procurement of 44 ea. D-30 Artillery systems. The Request for Proposal (RFP) was provided to potential vendors on 17 August 2009. As part of this contract, personnel will train Afghan technicians on the refurbishment of 80 ea. D-30s

commencing in 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter, 2010. These technicians at the ANA Central Workshop will be trained to maintain the D-30s.

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**RECOMMENDATION 37. (18.b., page 88, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force and the Minister of Defense, develop a plan to repair the unserviceable D30 122-millimeter howitzers and to secure a reliable supply of repair parts.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. Case E5-B-UAW and MOR# 09-S1A-307 were submitted to procure a contract that will service, repair, refurbish and convert D-30 artillery to NATO standards. This contract will be awarded in September 2009.

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**RECOMMENDATION 38. (19.a., page 96, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, propose to Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan/Commander, International Security Assistance Force and the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan, an increase in the authorized size of the Afghan National Police consistent with an updated analysis of the security needs of Afghanistan.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and has developed a plan that supports COMISAF Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF.

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**RECOMMENDATION 39. (20.c., page 101, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, prepare and implement a plan to enhance Afghan National Police civil policing skills in investigating and presenting criminal cases.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation. CSTC-A's current focus of delivering police is on those skill sets to successfully conduct counterinsurgency. Enhancing ANP civil policing and investigation skills, and presenting criminal cases will be included as part of the overarching strategy to improve Rule of Law in Afghanistan and will include efforts of other U.S. Government agencies and international partners.

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**RECOMMENDATION 40. (21.a., page 109, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, and Embassy Kabul (for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement contractor support) request the resources necessary to build the capacity to

increase the rate at which Afghan National Police are trained by the Focused District Development program.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs and has developed a plan that supports COMISAF's Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF. The arrival of the 4-82 BCT enables FDD to be initiated in twice the number of FDD districts than in the past, however the plan for reform of police will be finalized as part of COMISAF's overall strategy for developing ANP.

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**RECOMMENDATION 41. (21.b., page 109, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, in coordination with the Minister of Interior, plan for the Focused District Development training of provincial police companies in provinces where district police will or have participated in the Focused District Development program.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs and has developed a plan that supports COMISAF's Strategic Assessment in terms of acceleration, growth, and reform of the ANSF.

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**RECOMMENDATION 42. (22.a., page 113, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan coordinate with the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (for the DynCorp Regional Training Center Focused Border Development program) and with the Department of Defense Contracting Officer Representative (for the Blackwater Focused Border Development program) to ensure that the two Focused Border Development training programs of instruction meet mission requirements and are standardized across Afghanistan.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and has a single, standardized Focused Border Development POI and no longer uses the DoS-INL (DynCorp) supplied POI. The CSTC-A controlled POI was published in July 2009.

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**RECOMMENDATION 43. (22.b., page 113, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan coordinate with the Commander, Regional Command-East, to ensure that Blackwater contractors are allowed to conduct the phase two of tactical field training required for the ABP, as provided in the contract. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Interior, prepare and implement a plan to enhance Afghan National Police' civil policing skills in investigating and presenting criminal cases.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with this recommendation and has included investigation and criminal case presentation skill sets in Phase 1 of the Border Development POI, and have trained police professionals as a part of the mentor teams.

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**RECOMMENDATION 44. (23.a., page 118, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan mentor the Minister of Interior to initiate appropriate internal personnel selection policies and procedures that ensure only the most experienced, professional, and ethically qualified personnel are vetted and selected for positions within the MoI Inspector General’s Office.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation in this report. The MoI IG is in the early stages of implementing a merit based promotion system.

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**RECOMMENDATION 45. (23.b., page 118, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan mentor the Minister of Interior to conduct a detailed review of authorized IG positions against requirements to ensure that the *Tashkil* provides sufficient manpower to properly accomplish the anti-corruption and internal audit missions for the ANP and MoI.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs with the recommendation in this report. The CSTC-A IG has and continues to mentor the MoI IG with respect to this matter. The MoI IG has officially requested to the Minister of Interior to increase the *Tashkil* by 300 inspectors for the Office of the MoI IG. This request is under consideration and CSTC-A encourages its implementation.

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**RECOMMENDATION 46. (23.c., page 118, DODIG Draft)**

DODIG recommends that the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan identify and provide a sufficient number of additional U.S., International Security Assistance Force, or Coalition mentors and trainers to enable the Ministry of Interior Inspector General to build its institutional capacity in support of the Ministry’s audit and inspections functions and to accommodate its enhanced anti-corruption role.

**CSTC-A RESPONSE:** CSTC-A concurs this recommendation. CSTC-A recently performed a top to bottom review of the MoI trainer requirements as part of an ISAF-led “resources to task” analysis and will be considered as part of any forthcoming requests for additional ANSF trainers.

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### GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. (Page 16, DODIG Draft) The Way Ahead states, "Additionally, critical recurring contracts will come up for renewal, such as that with MPRI, estimated to be in the range of \$800 million." This comment should be considered for rewrite, as the MoD ANA mentoring contract will be CSTC-All less than \$800 million and subject to full and open competition, nor do CSTC-A know if MPRI will be awarded the contract.

2. **RECOMMENDATION 10 (5.b., Page 34, DODIG Draft)** The recommendation states "...develop a plan to request the necessary number of field grade officers on a continuing basis through the RFF process to ensure acceptable rank compatibility with ANA/ANP senior officers." This comment should be amended to read "...develop a plan to request that force providers source RFF 937 with the necessary number of field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers on a continuing basis to ensure acceptable rank compatibility with ANA/ANP senior officers."

3. **RECOMMENDATION 11. (5.c., page 34, DODIG Draft)** The observation states, "in the event a second BCT dedicated to ANSF mentoring is approved." This comment should be deleted. The contribution of 4/82 IBCT to the CSTC-A effort is approved. 48<sup>th</sup> IBCT is also deploying in support of CSTC-A. All comments regarding 4/82 IBCT support are also true for 48<sup>th</sup> IBCT.

4. **RECOMMENDATION 26 (11.a, Page 60, DODIG Draft)** The recommendation states that, "...add literacy rates as an ANSF readiness indicator tracked in TRAT and PTRAT databases..." The TRAT is comprised of the ATRAT, which is an Afghan National Army (ANA) briefing, and the PTRAT, which is an Afghan National Police (ANP) briefing. Given that the reference to TRAT refers to the ANA, recommend changing the term "TRAT" in the recommendation to "ATRAT."

5. **RECOMMENDATION 27 (11.b, Page 60, DODIG Draft)** The recommendation states that, "...add literacy rates as an ANSF readiness indicator tracked in TRAT and PTRAT databases..." The TRAT is comprised of the ATRAT, which is an Afghan National Army (ANA) briefing, and the PTRAT, which is an Afghan National Police (ANP) briefing. Given that the reference to TRAT refers to the ANA, recommend changing the term "TRAT" in the recommendation to "ATRAT."

6. **RECOMMENDATION 46. (23.c., page 118, DODIG Draft)** The recommendation states that, "...ensure that the two Focused Border Development training programs of instruction meet mission requirements and are standardized across Afghanistan" does not apply, and appears to be a "cut and paste". This text was not reflected within Recommendation 23.c., page 111 of the draft report.

USFOR-A REVIEWED BY:

[REDACTED]

CSTC-A REVIEWED BY:

[REDACTED]

**DODIG DRAFT REPORT – DATED August 10, 2009**  
**Project No. D2009-D000SPO-0113.000**  
**“Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces”**

**JCC I/A RESPONSE AND COMMENTS  
TO THE DRAFT REPORT**

**RECOMMENDATION 3.a. (page 17, DODIG Draft)** Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, ensure that the contract for maintaining North Atlantic Treaty Organization weapons includes specifications that ensure appropriate quality of products/services and that contractors hired are able to produce/performance to those standards.

**JCC-I/A RESPONSE:** JCC-I/A concurs with this recommendation. Regarding the underlying factors noted as contributing factors in the failure of CSTC-A to provide appropriate oversight of the Hazeb Emerging Business (HEB): (1) Insufficient experienced and trained contracting officers (COs) and contracting officer representatives (CORs) in-country to provide appropriate contract oversight, including quality assurance; (2) Insufficient Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) personnel directly supporting CSTC-A to monitor performance on contracts ... JCC-I/A has taken and continues to emphasize the necessary steps to improve contract oversight and to correct the deficiencies identified in the DoDIG's observations.

JCC-I/A, along with DCMA and the Army contracting organization, continues to pursue adequate numbers of properly qualified CORs to provide contract oversight. Emphasis on completion of required Defense Acquisition University COR courses, in-country training presented in conjunction with the 408<sup>th</sup> AFSB, and senior level communications on the progress of COR assignment and training are all having positive effects on contract oversight

Regarding the particular finding, a request was made for more DCMA personnel to help monitor performance of contracts, including additional Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) and Quality Assurance Personnel (QAPs). As a result, DCMA assigned an O-5 as the Lead ACO along with two more ACOs/QAAs to the Kabul Team which supports CSTC-A. The Kabul DCMA Team also performed a review of over 250 CSTC-A service contracts and provided the CSTC-A Deputy Commanding General (DCG) an assessment of COR coverage for each of these contracts.

DCMA has also begun accepting delegation of contract administration from KRCC for 10 CSTC-A large multi-year service contracts and is in process of delegating 10 additional contracts. CSTC-A CJ-4, KRCC and DCMA have also combined their efforts to improve contract oversight through the creation of a joint Contract Oversight Cell. For example, through the joint Contracting Oversight Cell, CJ-4, DCMA and KRCC joined forces to draft a new COR Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP provides Commanders and CORs guidance on the contracting process from cradle-to-grave, defines roles and responsibilities, and provides CORs a quick reference guide for performing their duties/responsibilities.

On 6 Aug 2009, the DCG chaired a Management Internal Control Board, which reviewed/assessed COR coverage for over 200 CSTC-A contracts. CSTC-A leadership is committed to improving contract oversight, and as a result, this issue is getting the appropriate focus and attention throughout the entire command.

In the case of HEB, KRCC utilized full and open competition to award the contract. HEB is an Afghan owned company, which is managed by retired Indian military officers. The workers are Afghan. The contract started 1 Sep 2008. The contract is for up to 29 sites repairing and maintaining approximately 550 ASNF armorers. The contract was delayed at least three months until 27 Aug 2008, when it was finally awarded. This resulted in HEB losing preorders for tools and vehicles, which led to HEB having to rebid orders, so tools did not arrive until March 2009. HEB failed to meet initial operational capability (IOC) by 1 Oct 2008 as required by the contract, and as a result, HEB's invoice was reduced \$136,486.60. A cure notice was drafted but never issued due to the fact HEB began to correct their issues and provided a viable plan to address the Government's concerns. Some of the steps HEB took included adding more management and replacing the project manager. HEB also hired a retired U.S. Army Warrant Officer, who has trained HEB armorers on NATO weapons since last February. In Dec 2008, the contract was delegated from KRCC to DCMA. According to the DCMA ACO for this contract, 13 DCMA audits at various locations have been accomplished since then, and all indicate the contractor has steadily improved and is very responsive when issues are discovered. There are still issues but they relate to the ANA's usage of the contractor as opposed to contractor performance. The ACO considers HEB very responsive and committed to providing excellent service under the contract. As a result of increased DCMA and COR oversight, HEB hired additional management and implemented an effective get well plan, which has led to great improvements in their level of service. DCMA exercised HEB's next option year because of the steps HEB has taken to improve performance, and the fact they've demonstrated the capability to meet the Government's standards and expectations.

# Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command Comments



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES COMMAND  
1777 HARDEE AVENUE, SW  
FORT MCPHERSON, GEORGIA 30330-1062

AFDC-IR

SEP 11 2009

**MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704**

**SUBJECT: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)**

1. Reference Draft Assessment Report, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, 10 August 2009, subject as above.
2. Forces Command (FORSCOM) has reviewed the subject report and concurs with comment with the recommendations contained in the report.
3. Forces Command provides the following comments to the recommendations:
  - a. Recommendation 5.c. Forces Command will provide appropriate assistance to the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan to ensure that appropriate skills and training are provided to the personnel from the active duty Brigade Combat team who will be assigned to Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and Police Mentoring Teams (PMT).
  - b. Recommendation 6.a. Training for ETTs and PMTs is conducted across a spectrum of venues. Many of the individual and collective pre-deployment training requirements fall to the Active Component (AC) Brigade filling the ETT/PMT requirement. This training is provided by First U.S. Army for the Reserve Component (RC) Brigades. The Advisor specific training requirement is conducted by the 162d Infantry Training Brigade (ITB) via resident training or Mobile Training Team. The PMT training is conducted by U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) for AC units and First Army for RC units. First Army uses instructors validated through the Train the Trainer (TT) Course at USAMPS to conduct training. This is a 5-day course and USAMPS updates the Program of Instruction (POI). The issue with PMT training is that the course is designed for Military Policemen and all too often we find ourselves training infantry, engineer or other In-Lieu-Of (ILO) personnel. Currently, FORSCOM is working an initiative with USAMPS to upgrade this POI and assume the training role through the 162d ITB.

AFDC-IR

**SUBJECT: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)**

Programs of instruction at all training facilities include the training directed in the FORSCOM South West Asia (SWA) Training Guidance. This document is updated approximately every six months and is staffed through U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) for concurrence. ETTs also receive additional training covered in the TT Training Guidance through 162d ITB (formerly 1/1 Infantry Division). On 9-10 Sep 09, FORSCOM hosted a Modular Brigade augmented for Security Force Assistance (MB-SFA) work group. The work group addressed ETT/PMT training for units sourcing these requirements as well. The U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) J-7 was present and concurred with the recommended adjustments to training to be published in the TASKORD this work group was established to create. The general agreement is that most of the required training is covered in the POIs. Tasks that are not will be addressed in the TASKORD and SWA Guidance. Intent and application to task down to the lowest echelons of command appear to be what is missing. Acceptance that we can only win the war in Afghanistan through the Afghans must be integrated into training at all levels of individual, leader and collective training.

Forces Command will publish guidance emphasizing the issues addressed in the Afghanistan Trainer's Community of Interest VTC hosted by MG McDonald on 9 Sep 09 to all subordinate units and training venues. We estimated that this will be completed by 31 December 2009. The system is in place to capture lessons learned and incorporate them into POI. This is accomplished through regular VTCs between the TT Training Mission and theater. Additive to this we now have the USFOR-A Training Community of Interest weekly meetings attended by the major training venues.

4. For further information, please contact the undersigned at [REDACTED].

FOR THE COMMANDER:



**THOMAS C. RICHARDSON**  
Director  
Internal Review

# Chief, U.S. Army Reserve Comments

U.S. Army  
Reserve



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF-

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE  
2400 ARMY PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2400

DAAR-IR


09 SEP 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations; Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 20202-4704

SUBJECT: Draft Report, Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project Code D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

1. Reference Draft Report, Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, August 10, 2009, subject as above.
2. The US Army Reserve has reviewed the subject report and appreciates its insight on ways to improve plans to train, equip, and field the Afghan National Security Forces. However, the Army Reserve nonconcurs with the report's recommendation addressed to the Chief, Army Reserve and provides the enclosed comments.
3. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact [REDACTED]

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE:

  
JON J. MILLER  
Brigadier General, US Army  
Chief of Staff

Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Draft Report: "Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces" (Project Code: D2009-D00SPO-0113.000), August 7, 2009.

**US ARMY RESERVE COMMENTS:**

RECOMMENDATION 9.g: Chief, Army Reserve: Support a standardized requirement for 12-month tours in country for mentor/trainer personnel.

Command Comments. Non-Concur. Current DA and SECDEF policies limit total mobilization time to 12 months. Many initiatives are ongoing to maximize the boots on ground (BOG) portion of that 12 month period.

This policy would conflict with higher headquarters directives limiting the total mobilization period for an involuntarily mobilized Army Reserve Soldier to a total of 12 months, with a BOG of less than 12 months accounting for all time spent at the mobilization station. SECDEF Memo dated 19 JAN 2007, SUBJECT: Utilization of the Total Force, directed from that point forward, involuntary mobilization of Reserve forces would be for a maximum period of 12 months. Further, DA EXORD 150-08 with FRAGO 2 provides implementing guidance on mobilization.

The Chief, Army Reserve would be unable to support a requirement for 12 months BOG for mentor/trainer personnel unless the DA and SECDEF policies were amended.

# Chief, National Guard Bureau Comments

National  
Guard Bureau



**NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**  
1636 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1636

NGB-ZA

SEP 14 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, Kenneth Moorefield,  
400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-4704

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the  
Afghan National Security Forces

1. Reference DoD IG D2009-D00SPO-0113.000.
2. Purpose: Respond to request from Office of the Assistant Inspector General for  
Special Plans & Operations Department of Defense Office of Inspector General for  
comments on Observations #9, and #15.

Bottom-line: Concur with Observation #9. Concur with comment with Observation  
#15 a, b, c.

3. Observation #9 contends the differing tour length of U.S. mentors assigned from the  
respective military services and components has made it difficult to establish continuity  
within Embedded Training Team and Police Mentoring Teams and to achieve full  
effectiveness. Specifically, the 12 Month boots on the ground (BOG) time for ARNG  
and USAR mentors only equates to 270 days of actual time as a mentor, which this  
observation finds insufficient.

On 19 January 2007, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum titled  
"Utilization of the Total Force" which changed policy regarding the mobilization of the  
Reserve Component Forces. Key changes included limiting involuntary mobilizations of  
reserve component personnel to one year at any one time, with an objective goal of five  
years demobilized time between mobilized periods, and managing RC mobilization on a  
unit basis to allow greater cohesion and predictability for training and deployment.  
Under the Secretary of Defense's guidance, meeting the objectives of the Operation  
Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force Mentor and Trainer  
Tours is not possible utilizing ARNG and USAR Soldiers without exception.

Recommendation. NATO could adjust their training requirements and HQDA  
subsequently adjust EXORD 171-09 reducing the requirements, and/or post-  
mobilization training time, freeing-up longer BOG time.

4. Observation #15 a, b, c, contends U.S. Army National Guard military personnel  
assigned to Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) via the National Guard's

NGB-ZA

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces

State Partnership Program (SPP) have sometimes arrived in Afghanistan without sufficient training and equipment commensurate with their mission requirements.

The fieldwork for this latest assessment was conducted during March 2009. On 11 March 2009, NATO published its concept of the operations which enabled HQDA to publish EXORD 171-09 (US FORCE AUGMENTATION TO NATO OPERATIONAL MENTOR AND LIAISON TEAM (OMLT) on 22 April 2009. Prior to this guidance, the ARNG had no basis for requirements to resource against except for NATO guidance. Fiscal and materiel resources necessary to support this program were funded largely from other program residual funds which constrained ARNG leaders from supporting this to the expected standard. The State Partnership Program enables NATO Countries to augment their forces with U.S. Soldiers to perform mentorship and liaison duties attached to that NATO participating State in Afghanistan. National Guard Bureau, and each U.S. State or Territory, does not deploy its own forces or resource them once they assume Title Ten status. This is done by the Department of the Army. Without the DA EXORD, OMLTs experienced significant challenges getting appropriate resources for Phase II and Phase III training once attached to another country's Army.

Recommendation for Observation 15a. HQDA EXORD 171-09 provides sufficient guidance to repair historical challenges.

Recommendation for Observation 15b. HQDA EXORD 171-09 corrects disconnects between USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USAEUR and ARCENT to assign specific responsibility for training resources during all three phases of training.

Recommendation for Observation 15c. Weapons have always accompanied troops. Historical issues were isolated to individual replacements. Some replacements were instructed at the CRC in Fort Benning, GA that they would receive their weapons once in theater. Some individual replacements were sourced from the Individual Ready Reserve, a pool of Soldiers not assigned to a particular unit and subsequently, not assigned a weapon. These issues have been addressed with participating states and NGB does not expect this condition to persist.

5. Summary. Adjustments to NATO CONOP and HQDA EXORD 171-09 reducing post-mobilization training requirements will alleviate the concern of DOD IG's assessment that ARNG and USAR BOG time is insufficient. In reference to Observations 15a, b, c. HQDA EXORD 171-09 is the mechanism necessary to correct these conditions. It was published coincidentally during the same month as the field work for the IG's assessment was being completed. ARNG leadership at NGB believe this was an isolated incident and each State has the tools to provide future support.

NGB-ZA

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the  
Afghan National Security Forces

6. The point of contact is [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

  
CRAIG R. MCKINLEY  
General, USAF  
Chief, National Guard Bureau

# U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Comments

U.A. Army  
Corps of  
Engineers



**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
441 G ST. NW  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314-1000

CEIR

8 September 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY (SAAG-PMO-L)  
ATTN: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS DIVISION

SUBJECT: USACE Response to DODIG Draft Report on Assessment of the U.S. and  
Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the Afghan National Security Forces  
(D2009-SP-0113)

1. Reference DODIG Memo dated, 10 August 2009, requesting comments to subject report.
2. The USACE response is enclosed.
3. My point of contact is [REDACTED] or email at [REDACTED].

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Encl

  
DONNA F. JOHNSON  
Acting Chief Audit Executive  
HQUSACE Internal Review Office

CF:  
CEMP  
CEAED-IR



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
AFGHANISTAN ENGINEER DISTRICT-NORTH  
APO AE 09356

CEAED-IR


29 August 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ATTN: CEIR (Ms. Terri Jackson),  
441 G Street NW, Washington 20314-1000

SUBJECT: Comments on DoDIG Draft Report on Assessment of the U.S. and Coalition Plans  
to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (D2009-SP-0113)

1. This memorandum contains the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District – North (AED) response to the subject report.
2. Based on our review of the draft report, AED concurs with its recommendations. Please see the attached comments for details regarding our concurrence, including descriptions of actions taken to increase staffing levels.
3. My points of contact for this action are Mr. James R. Greene, CEAED-IR, at (540) 667-2122 or email at [james.r.greene@usace.army.mil](mailto:james.r.greene@usace.army.mil) and Ms. Denise Mason at (540) 667-6603 or email at [denise.k.mason@usace.army.mil](mailto:denise.k.mason@usace.army.mil).

Encl

  
MICHAEL McCORMICK  
COL, EN  
Commanding

Response to draft DODIG Report dated 10 August 2009. Subject: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

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**Observation 2. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan Engineer District**

*The Afghanistan Engineer District (AED) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) does not have sufficient personnel to provide adequate oversight for the scope of its mission, both current and projected, with respect to the management and coordination of the acquisition, design, and construction of facilities in support of the ANSF.*

2.1 Support to the Afghan National Security Forces program is a top priority for the Afghanistan Engineer District (AED). Since March 2008, AED has greatly enhanced our ability to provide adequate oversight for the design and construction mission in support of the ANSF. There are many challenges involved in delivering facilities in support of the ANSF and we feel that lack of personnel is not a limiting factor at this time. The security situation in Afghanistan continues to significantly impact our ability to deliver projects for the ANSF. A discussion of areas of improvement follows:

2.2 As of the beginning of May 2009, our onboard strength was 411 and as of 21 August 2009, our on-board strength was 491, an increase of 80 personnel. We currently have 104 personnel selected to fill vacant positions on our Integrated Manning Document (IMD) and are starting to see a larger pool of candidates now that Iraq is starting to turn away potential deployees.

2.3 Due to the expected surge in the ANSF workload projected in FY10-12, we established a 2<sup>nd</sup> District (AED South). The new Interim Manning Document totals for each District are summarized below:

<u>IMD v4.0</u>	
AED-North	555
AED-South	299
AED Total	854 positions

2.4 Staffing. We continue with our multi-faceted approach to staffing – USACE fills, hires from within the Department of Defense/Federal Government, hires from the private sector (Schedule A) and use of contractors. A brief discussion of each follows as we drive towards our 854 total IMD requirement:

USACE Hires. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers added two additional Major Subordinate Commands (MSC's) to the two MSC's responsible to fill all USACE positions on the IMD. This provides greater command emphasis and a larger pool of USACE volunteers focused on support to Operation Enduring Freedom. We continue to receive a large volume of volunteers and work to match the skill sets to the job requirements.

Enclosure

Response to draft DODIG Report dated 10 August 2009. Subject: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

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DoD/Federal Government/Retiree Hires. As a true "joint" organization, we continue to leverage the talent and skills from all services, both active duty and civilian, to staff our positions. In addition, we employ personnel from other federal agencies and also several retirees. There are currently 55 non-USACE DoD, Other Federal Government, and Retiree employees serving at AED.

Schedule A Hires. We currently employ 58 personnel from the private sector and continue to utilize this source of talent to fill our positions that do not require USACE personnel. A recent policy change will allow AED to offer a recruitment incentive of up to 25% of salary for a one year deployment.

Contractors. We continue to leverage our contractor workforce to source our mission needs. Our Information Technology, Security & Transport, and Data Management functions are out-sourced and we are in the process of hiring Architect-Engineers to provide Title I services here in country. In addition, we utilize a Local National service contract that provides construction Quality Assurance and other types of support.

2.5 Standard Austere 'Site Adapt' Designs. AED is working with CSTC-A to generate standard site-adapt drawings that will be used to award design-bid-build contracts. The application of site adapt drawings will remove a significant burden from the pre-award and post-award management of construction contracts. Designers will be able to focus on unique requirements and not be consumed by the many iterations of design review that are required when applying design-build delivery methods. This initiative will improve AED's ability to deliver facilities faster and reduce the burden on our engineering staff.

2.6 Human Capital Planning. We are currently working aggressively to refine our FY10 program and projects in partnership with CSTC-A, AFCEE, and the Kabul Regional Contracting Command. We feel very strongly that the allocation of work between the design/construction agents should consider geography and centers of gravity (personnel and workload), to maximize the projects in a given area for a given agent. This approach will allow for maximum Quality Assurance (QA) support for the assigned projects with the minimum of security risk to our employees. We continue with our three year look-ahead analysis of workload to insure that we are positioned to handle the future work.

2.7 Additional Area Office. AED is planning to establish another Area Office at FOB Shank in FY10 to handle the large/growing workload in that area. This additional Area Office will provide additional construction resources in support of the ANSF mission.

2.8 In summary, AED concurs that more resources and people are required to handle the ongoing ANSF construction workload and the surge of ANSF new workload in FY10-12.

Response to draft DODIG Report dated 10 August 2009, Subject: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

USACE is aggressively filling positions on AED's IMD and AED is increasing staffing levels to meet the ANSF workload demands.

Recommendations:

2.a. Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, accelerate assignment of currently authorized personnel against the current Interim Manning Document authorization.

Response: Concur. As stated above, USACE is aggressively filling the authorized positions on the new Interim Manning Document (version 4.0) to meet the needs of the ANSF Program.

2.b. Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, evaluate the adequacy of the current Afghanistan Engineering District personnel authorizations against current and projected infrastructure requirements and challenges in support of Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan's mission.

Response: Concur. We are in partnership with the CSTC-A and are planning the execution strategy for the ANSF future workload. As stated above, we are advocating a work allocation strategy amongst the design-construction agents in theater (AED, AFCEE, KRCC) that is based on geography and centers of gravity for assigned work that will maximize construction Quality Assurance while minimize the security risk to U.S. personnel.

Response to draft DODIG Report dated 10 August 2009, Subject: Draft Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces (Project No. D2009-D00SPO-0113.000)

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**Observation 12. Construction of Facilities to Support Afghan National Security Force Fielding and Expansion**

*Forward operating bases and other facilities supporting the growth of the ANSF have been generally built to U.S. standards. In some cases, this construction was behind schedule, necessitating "work around solutions." Furthermore, Afghan security forces personnel were unable to maintain the facilities once they were built, thus making them unsustainable without U.S. funded contractor support.*

Austere 'Site Adapt' Designs. AED is working in partnership with CSTC-A to generate standard site-adapt drawings that will be used to award design-bid-build contracts. The site adapt drawings will be designed to an austere standard that meets the ANSF mission requirements and is easier to operate and maintain. The site adapt austere standards are already being used for the Afghan National Police (ANP) facilities we are delivering and we are working closely with CSTC-A and AFCEE to deliver austere site adapt designs for the Afghan National Army (ANA) facilities. We expect to apply site adapt designs in the 2Q FY10.

12. Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Afghan Engineer District, evaluate courses of action to build Afghan National Security Force facilities to an appropriate standard which meet ANSF mission requirements and that they can sustainably maintain. Courses of action must incorporate appropriate safety considerations.

Response: Concur.

# Director, Defense Contract Management Agency Comments

DCMA



**DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY**  
**DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY INTERNATIONAL**  
6359 Walker Lane, Suite 220  
Alexandria, Virginia 22310-3259

IN REPLY  
REFER TO DCMAI

September 18, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR SPECIAL  
PLANS AND OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan  
National Security Forces Project D2009-D00SP0-0113

Please find attached the Headquarters Defense Contract Management Agency response  
to subject report.

The DCMA point of contact is [REDACTED] or  
[REDACTED]

  
DAVID J. GRAFF  
CAPT, SC, USN  
Commander

**DCMA Response - DoDIG Draft Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, Project D2009-D00SPO-0113.000**

**Recommendation 3c:** Director, Defense Contract Management Agency evaluate an internal realignment of personnel resources from Iraq to Afghanistan in order to support changing and increased contract priorities on the ground, and review Defense Contract Management Agency personnel requirements necessary to support the expanding Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mission.

**DCMA Response:** Partially Concur. As circumstances warrant, DCMA does realign its resources based on theater requirements, available resources, and overall theater leadership priorities that flow through JCC I/A to DCMA as delegations. For amplification, DCMA does not have oversight authority or responsibility for all theater contracts. DCMA's contract oversight responsibility in theater, per OSD direction, is directly linked to the delegations received from JCC I/A in accordance with the joint DCMA and JCC I/A CONOPS and delegation process. DCMA actively and continuously validates its current and future workload and staffing requirements with the theater leadership, JCC I/A staff and LOGCAP staff. As emerging delegated workload exceeds the capability of DCMA's theater team staffing, DCMA will work with JCC I/A to prioritize workload requirements, assess existing staffing levels, and align theater personnel accordingly.

Currently, the DCMA on-site team leader at Camp Eggers/CSTC-A conducts informal daily assessments to re-affirm the adequacy of the DCMA support team capabilities that provide a real-time assessment of potential future workload. Our DCMA Iraq Commander also conducts quarterly resource reviews to ensure we are continually adjusting our resource footprint for the DCMA Iraq mission. Based on a recent review, we are initiating efforts to redirect some incoming personnel into Afghanistan over the ensuing months.

Furthermore, DCMA's ability to meet its resourcing needs in both Afghanistan and Iraq is hampered by our reliance on external sourcing. As indicated on page 16 of the draft report, our request for 57 subject matter experts with specialized oversight capabilities remains unfulfilled by the military services. Of the number requested, only 13 SMEs have been sourced (an additional 6 were provided for one cycle only). This shortfall of 38 experts imposes operational challenges. DCMA is working with CENTCOM and the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to address this situation.

**Technical Comments - DoD IG Draft Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, Project D2009-D00SPO-0113.000**

References:

- Executive Summary, Page ii, and again on page 13, Observation 3. The report attributes a lack of appropriate oversight of CSTC-A contracts in part to: "(2) Insufficient Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) personnel directly supporting CSTC-A to monitor performance on contracts."
- Draft report page 16: "In addition, DCMA has recently had, on average, only three personnel who directly support CSTC-A contracting."

DCMA Comments: Partially Concur. DCMA has oversight authority for only those contracts delegated to DCMA through the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and delegation process. DCMA's delegated mission requirements drive its theater staffing requirements. DCMA actively plans and forecasts its staffing requirements with respective theater leadership, agencies, and units. For example, with the Afghanistan mission expansion/surge, DCMA Afghanistan worked with the requiring theater (i.e., JCC I/A and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)) leadership to identify and forecast future workload requirements. This effort resulted in DCMA establishing a new 0-6 command team and a staffing increase of 55 personnel in Afghanistan to support the expanded mission.

As part of the JCC I/A delegated workload expansion, DCMA added three additional personnel to the existing three person team at Camp Eggers (CSTC-A) for the emerging contract administration/oversight mission. The current six person team of contracting and quality assurance specialists has been very successful in assessing, organizing, managing, and improving the oversight of both incoming and on-going delegated contract activity in support of CSTC-A. In support of the dynamic and volatile nature of theater operations, DCMA actively and continuously validates its current and future workload and staffing requirements with the theater leadership, JCC I/A staff and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOCAP) staff. Part of this process is the strong daily interface of DCMA's theater commanders with JCC I/A and the theater leadership.

**Technical Comments - DoD IG Draft Report on the Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National Security Forces, Project D2009-D00SPO-0113.000**

References: Executive Summary, Page ii, and again on page 13, Observation 3. The report states: "(2) Insufficient Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) personnel directly supporting CSTC-A to monitor performance on contracts."

References: Page 14 within the section of Observation 3, the report states: "DCMA provides "Contract Administration Services to the Department of Defense Acquisition Enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of quality products and services to the warfighter; on time and on cost. Additionally: **Before contract award**, DCMA provides advice and services to help construct effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, and write contracts that meet the needs of DOD customers in Federal and allied government agencies. **After contract award**, DCMA monitors contractors' performance and management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts."

DCMA Comments: Incorrectly Stated. DCMA does not have oversight authority or responsibility for all theater contracts. DCMA has oversight authority for only those contracts delegated to DCMA through the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC I/A) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and delegation process. DCMA's delegated mission requirements drive its theater staffing requirements. DCMA actively plans and forecasts its staffing requirements with respective theater leadership, agencies, and units. For example, with the Afghanistan mission expansion/surge, DCMA Afghanistan worked with the requiring theater (i.e., JCC I/A and the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)) leadership to identify and forecast future workload requirements. This effort resulted in DCMA establishing a new 0-6 command team and a staffing increase of 55 personnel in Afghanistan to support the expanded mission. As part of the JCC I/A delegated workload expansion, DCMA added three additional personnel to the existing three person team at Camp Eggers (CSTC-A) for the emerging contract administration/ oversight mission. The current six person team of contracting and quality assurance specialists has, to date, been very successful in assessing, organizing, managing and markedly improving the oversight of both incoming and on-going delegated contract activity in support of CSTC-A. In support of the dynamic and volatile nature of theater operations, DCMA actively and continuously validates its current and future workload and staffing requirements with the theater leadership, JCC I/A staff and Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOCAP) staff. Part of this process is the strong daily interface of DCMA's theater commanders with JCC I/A and the theater leadership.



# Appendix G. Report Distribution

## Department of State

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan  
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs  
Inspector General, Department of State

## Office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense\*  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
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Deputy Chief Financial Officer  
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Under Secretary of Defense for Policy\*  
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)  
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation  
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy  
Director, Joint Staff  
Director, Operations (J-3)  
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

## Department of the Army

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Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology  
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command\*  
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command  
Chief, National Guard Bureau\*  
Chief, U.S. Army Reserve\*  
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\*  
Commander, Afghanistan Engineer Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers\*  
Auditor General, Department of the Army  
Inspector General of the Army

## Department of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations\*

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\* Recipient of draft report

Commandant of the Marine Corps\*  
Naval Inspector General  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs)

## **Department of the Air Force**

Chief of Staff of the Air Force\*  
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)  
Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center  
Inspector General of the Air Force

## **Combatant Commands**

Commander, U.S. Central Command\*  
    Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan\*  
    Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan\*  
Commander, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan\*  
Commander, Joint Forces Command\*

## **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency\*  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

## **Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations**

Comptroller of the United States  
Office of Management and Budget

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

Senate Committee on Appropriations  
    Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
House Committee on Appropriations  
    House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations  
House Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
    House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement  
    House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs  
House Committee on International Relations

\*Recipient of the draft report

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



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# Inspector General Department of Defense

