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THESIS

**INSTILLING A CULTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS):
LEVERAGING THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND
RESULTS MODERNIZATION ACT (GPRA-MA) OF 2010**

by

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September 2013

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LEVERAGING THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND
RESULTS MODERNIZATION ACT (GPRA-MA) OF 2010**

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ABSTRACT

Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability, defined as a culture of high-trust, with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010, may revolutionize the way Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leaders and performance practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance management practices and processes within the department.

This thesis contains twelve (12) recommendations based on the concept of meta-governance, which incorporates “relational webs” and “network power” involving the general public, into departmental performance management and improvement processes. Our next generation solution to creatively implement the GPRA-MA, innovative (democratic) networked governance, integrates social complexity theory epistemologies and best practice principles in an attempt to ameliorate the five (5) cultural conditions identified as contributing to deficiencies within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APG	Agency Priority Goal
APP	Agency Performance Plan
ASP	Agency Strategic Plan
BI	Business Intelligence
BPI	Budget-Performance Integration
BSC	Balanced Scorecard
BUR	Bottom-up Review
CAP	Cross-cutting Agency Priority
CAS	Complex Adaptive Systems
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
CHCO	Chief Human Capital Officer
CIO	Chief Information Officer
COO	Chief Operating Officer
CoP	Community of Practice
CPO	Chief Performance Officer
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CVF	Competing Values Framework
DAD	Decide, Announce, Defend
DDM	Deputy Director for Management
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIAD	Diversity, Interdependence, and Authentic Dialogue
EO	Executive Order
EU	European Union
FGPG	Federal Government Priority Goal
FGPP	Federal Government Performance Plan
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FYHSP	Future Year Homeland Security Program
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
GPRA-MA	Government Performance and Results Modernization Act

HPPG	High-Priority Performance Goals
HQ	Headquarters
HSE	Homeland Security Environment
ICT	Information Communication Technology
KMS	Knowledge Management Systems
LoB	Line of Business
M&A	Monitoring and Evaluation
MBO	Management By Objectives
MI	Management Integration
MIS	Management Information Systems
MPG	Management Priority Goal
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PART	Program Assessment Rating Tool
PBAS	Performance-Based Accountability Systems
PIC	Performance Improvement Council
PIO	Performance Improvement Officer
PMA	President's Management Agenda
PMF	Performance Management Framework
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution
PPBS	Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
RIGO	Reinventing Government
RMO	Resource Management Office
SC	Strategic Context
SES	Senior Executive Service
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Timely
SOAR	Strategic Objectives Annual Review
SPM	Strategic Performance Management
TSA	Transportation Security Administration

UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
US/M	Under-Secretary for Management
ZBB	Zero-based Budgeting

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mindset regarding the role of the average citizen in government affairs is rapidly changing, impacting relational dynamics between public institutions and the American people at the federal, state and local levels. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should begin to position itself now to find ways to translate improved mission effectiveness and efficiency into greater public and organizational understanding, cooperation and collaboration. Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability, defined as a culture of high-trust, with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010, may revolutionize the way DHS leaders and performance practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance management practices and processes within the department.

Establishing public accountability, or creating and maintaining a culture of high-trust, as the main driver behind DHS mission focus and strategy achievement would represent a major paradigm shift, emboldening DHS leaders to break free from the Weberian model of civil service, currently being fed by mechanistic, rules-based, reductionist approaches to public administration. The strategic planning and decision-making practices of the past, involving complex multi-year strategic plans, detailed annual budgets, and quarterly performance reports, as well as the resulting prescriptive, one-directional way of interfacing with the public, should be enhanced with more interdependent and interactive dialogue within organizations, as well as greater collaborative and sustained working relationship(s) with average citizens, increasingly asking for the opportunity to weigh in on problems and solutions that affect their daily lives. Incorporating “relational webs” and “network power” or innovative (democratic) networked governance into departmental performance management and improvement processes would encompass a much broader base of both public and private partners and stakeholders, obligating DHS strategic planners and decision-makers to look for solutions that are more complementary to the task, as diverse and complex as the extended environment in which they operate.

This thesis contains twelve (12) recommendations based on this concept of meta-governance, the “next new thing” in federal government strategic performance management. They represent our next generation solution to creatively implement the GPRA-MA, considering social complexity theory epistemologies and best practice principles in an attempt to ameliorate the five (5) cultural conditions identified as contributing to deficiencies within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA.

Placing organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making within this larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility and responsiveness, would be an inestimable force multiplier to both DHS politically appointed and career officials, having the potential to revolutionize the way the United States of America secures and protects its homeland.

I. INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the definition of insanity is doing the same things over and over again, yet expecting different results. This is not the definition of insanity. It is the definition of bureaucracy.

The saying, attributed to Einstein, rings no truer than when it comes to federal government Strategic Performance Management (SPM),¹ succinctly defined here as the formulation, execution and assessment of strategy, where officials continually opt for simple solutions to tackle complex problems, always with the same expectation of success, and almost always with the same disappointing, lackluster, and transitory results.

In Congress' latest efforts to help agencies gain relevant insights into and improve mission performance, it recently passed the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act (GPRA-MA) of 2010.

We will review this Act in order to obtain a clearer understanding not only of the written requirements of the law but also of its underlying precepts and function.

The main purpose of this thesis, however, is not to provide a simple policy analysis of the legislation or an assessment of the progress and success of its implementation. The goal is to get government decision makers to see the world of performance management differently, to think and act in ways other than they have up to now, and entertain more innovative performance improvement solutions that lead to better, longer-lasting results. To accomplish this, we have placed the law within the overarching concept of public accountability, immediately defined here as a *culture of high-trust*.

Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability with the GPRA-MA may revolutionize the way DHS leaders and

¹ Federal government strategic performance management encompasses strategic frameworks (strategic goals, objectives, strategies, priorities etc.), performance indicators (milestones, metrics, measures, targets, results), and methodologies and processes (governance and decision model analysis) to help organizations formulate, execute and assess strategy, gain relevant insights into progress, and make better-informed decisions to improve results.

performance management practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance management practices and processes within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Redefining the performance improvement discipline in such a way, incorporating democratic governance which encompasses a much broader base of both public and private partners and stakeholders in departmental strategic performance management functions, will obligate DHS strategic planners and decision-makers to look for solutions that are more complementary to the task, as diverse and complex as the extended environment in which they operate. In turn, these more robust responses, leveraging social complexity theory epistemologies and focused on evolving strategy and collaborative decision making, will embolden leaders to break free from the bureaucratic insanity often associated with the Weberian model of civil service, currently being fed by today's mechanistic, rules-based, reductionist approaches to public administration.

A. GPRA-MA OVERVIEW

The GPRA-MA is the culmination of prior legislative, regulatory and administrative requirements.² It is meant to institutionalize the SPM within the federal government by codifying the development, use and reporting of performance information to clarify, assess, implement and continuously improve organizational strategy and its execution by identifying, measuring and then managing what matters in order to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and overall performance of operations. It offers a framework, with guiding principles and a strategy, for achieving greater transparency and understanding of the internal workings of government, hopefully resulting in improved congressional oversight of the use of taxpayer dollars and a better informed and more engaged American public. Its intent is to build strategic frameworks that describe end states rather than activities, performance indicators that speak of outcomes instead of outputs, analytical methodologies and review processes that replace imprecision and/or data overload with informed decision making, and finally, increased accountability

² See Appendix A for an evolution of federal government performance management legislative, regulatory and administrative requirements.

through governance structures harnessing the commitment and engagement of leaders who do not thrive on status quo or indecision, but rather seek to drive innovation and improvement.

This new statute, enacted on January 4, 2011, builds upon the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) performance planning, measurement development and reporting framework of 1993 (Public Law 103-62). It encourages greater use of performance information in program decision making by requiring that the 24 federal agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officer's (CFO) Act of 1990 concentrate their efforts on the following five (5) major focus areas:

- *Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement:* demonstrating leadership commitment to creating a positive learning and performance improvement culture;
- *Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment:* aligning individual, program, and agency priorities through annual planning and goal-setting;
- *Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation:* improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytic capacity to produce and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision making;
- *Performance Reviews:* conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to reduce costs (i.e., efficiency) and improve performance outcomes (i.e., effectiveness); and
- *Transparency and Accountability:* communicating and reporting transparent performance information frequently and effectively to increase accountability and results.³

The first four (4) focus areas contribute to accountability within government agencies, or inter- and intra-organizational trust, whereas the fifth area is geared more toward increasing trust in government through strategic communications with the general public.

³ (1) *Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRA-MA)*, Public Law 111-352; (2) *GPRA Modernization Act*, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 16, 2010); (3) Office of Management and Budget (OMB), *OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6: Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Performance Reports* (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Pre-decisional DRAFT, May 2012).

So What? Why spend such an inordinate amount of time reading about and discussing something that, for the majority of us, is no more than an obscure regulation?

The importance of the GPRA-MA is beholden to the fact that it is currently the only “act” in town. It is the official context within which existing government performance management policy and strategy exists. Policy advisors, strategic planners, performance managers and decision-makers will not feel empowered to venture beyond their current familiar top-down, command-and-control approaches to SPM unless Congressional and OMB intent and requirements have first been considered and included. If one is to encourage government officials to apply principles and solutions from general industry best practices, to seek out and apply unfamiliar, more creative and/or innovative strategies to improve performance, they must first be associated and linked with what is already familiar to them. The officially recognized framework of the GPRA-MA will help DHS leaders and decision makers translate the boundary-less discipline of social complexity theory and related best practices into strategic performance management solutions that are perceived and accepted as rational, legitimate and informed by government decision-makers.

B. PROBLEM SPACE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES OF GPRA-MA DEFICIENCIES

It will be demonstrated, through both empirical evidence and subsequent peer-reviewed literature, that the GPRA-MA, similar to most traditional strategic performance management frameworks, is failing to impact DHS performance and results, due to deficiencies manifested in all five (5) of the legislation’s major focus areas.

We will demonstrate that there is a direct correlation, or causal relationship, between these “symptoms,” or deficiencies in government performance management practices, and the “disease,” or the overarching performance improvement culture. The five (5) primary cultural conditions contributing to the prevailing climate, are (1) the lack of the creation and sustainment of a high-trust culture (i.e., accountability), and (2) the particular challenges/difficulties involved with resolving performance management issues (i.e., “wicked” problems).

Also having a negative impact on success, is (3) the administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control.

The remaining two conditions, (4) political considerations, and (5) insufficient oversight, do not seem to be having the same, direct (i.e., causal), influence on the “symptoms.” This is an important finding, since both political and administrative oversight are major elements of the GPRA-MA, representing the legislation’s current interpretation and primary focus. This may explain why the current approach is having such a limited impact in improving performance and results to date.

An analysis of these five (5) cultural conditions will indicate that DHS’ past failures and current limited successes are primarily due to an inability to relinquish even the slightest control over one’s respective area of influence. This inability to “let go” and entertain more non-traditional solutions, is primarily due to the lack of trust caused by, and further exacerbating, the absence of true public and organizational accountability.

Recommendations will be made in an effort to remedy these conditions, thus alleviating the deficiencies identified in the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, resulting in a positive impact on the effectiveness of the legislation overall.

C. GPRA-MA BACKGROUND AND PRIMARY THESIS ASSERTIONS

Systematic measurement of performance has been evolving within the federal government since the early 1990s, beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, meant to improve overall financial and management processes, and culminating with the 2010 update of the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), the first to underline the importance of clearly defining an end state to promote greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in federal spending. According to most of the literature, the basic tenant of both laws is that successful government performance entails *managing for results*.

For over two decades now, both elected and appointed government officials have expressed the importance of impacting and communicating government performance.

However, in spite of the sustained focus and attention and accompanying optimism associated with the passage of these two major pieces of legislation, results continue to fall short of expectations.

Even though GPRA-MA enhances SPM at the federal level, modernizing and refining the requirements established by the original Act of 1993, it has failed to ensure true accountability, or increased public trust, necessary for ultimate success.

The literature will demonstrate that most public performance management frameworks only associate accountability with improved organizational outcomes, or performance results. These types of systems may satisfy the needs of public administrators responsible for implementing government programs, but they continue to fall short when it comes to ensuring true public and organizational accountability, which Melvin Dubnick and H. George Fredrickson equate with the creation and sustainment of a “*High-Trust Culture*.” They further state that today’s current governmental accountability mechanisms, much in line with the expectations and requirements of the GPRA-MA, are not sufficient to establish and maintain such a culture.

Increasing this type of accountability requires much more than simply “operationalizing” performance management, much more than applying the same traditional, reductionist approaches to strategic planning and resource allocation used in the past, which tend to focus on the achievement of short-term, individual goals and objectives. Strategic performance management models, such as the GPRA of 1993, and its 2010 update, could be improved by applying much more descriptive, rather than prescriptive, solutions based on continual innovation and improvement through learning, communication and relational capabilities. Creating such a management philosophy and performance culture based on transparency, interaction and collaboration will require and result in a *change* in both *attitude* and *behavior*.

Strategic performance management is a complex problem requiring complex solutions. Yet it has often been treated as a simple problem with simple solutions. It is a field that has been understated and undervalued by political and administrative officials, who often prefer to dismissively dither with and/or dabble in it. Where subject matter

expertise is lacking, “face value assumptions, group-think, inherited beliefs, bias, sloppy [or totally absent] logic, and all the other enemies of critical and independent thought,”⁴ including cavalier or casual, offhand and uniformed opinions on the subject, continue to prevent any real and/or lasting progress in this arena.

Challenging federal government officials to believe, think, and behave differently requires sound research, based on best practices in the fields of organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making. In order to compel these same officials to apply tried and true principles from these best practices, they must first be translated into specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely (SMART) recommendations in the context of current government policy and strategy.

Conducting basic, applied, and action research into the GPRA-MA and strategic performance management best practices, informed by social complexity theory, and applying lessons learned to the various performance management and improvement strategies and solutions currently being applied within and across the department, would contribute to the creation of a cultural and organizational environment more conducive to the successful implementation of the Act.

Furthermore, associating the GPRA-MA with improved organizational and public accountability (i.e., trust), requiring much more complex adaptive systems and solutions, would change the way the DHS thinks about these types of federal government strategic performance management frameworks, and how they might better be leveraged to impact and communicate results.

Ultimately, the reason why the GPRA-MA is failing to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS programs is not due to a flaw in the legislation or in its guiding principles. Deficiencies exist because there are missteps in its implementation, a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of its purpose and focus, a disregard of the

⁴ Lauren Wollman, “NS2013: What is Inquiry?,” (Online lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Monterey, CA), (n.d.), https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_inquiry/player.html.

necessity to create and sustain a “*High-Trust Culture*,” where government officials are giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, both intra- and inter-agency and vis-à-vis the American public.

Lasting change and results will only be produced within a culture of public and organizational accountability. The GPRA-MA can contribute to the creation and sustainment of such a culture.

D. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

The vision of the GPRA-MA is not complicated. It is quite simple. The government should be able to clearly, consistently and correctly demonstrate its success to internal and external stakeholders, particularly the general public.

As the focus of a research topic, the GPRA-MA can describe how the federal government is working to ensure that today’s government programs are helping us achieve long-term results in the greater public interest. The GPRA-MA, in fact, proposes a way to do this through the development and implementation of a five-prong approach or strategy.

The purpose of this thesis is not to evaluate how well the DHS is achieving its long-term mission. The intent is not to directly impact program outcomes through specific program analysis or evaluation findings and recommendations. Nor is the research agenda meant to conduct a comprehensive, in-depth assessment of DHS performance management and improvement policies and practices, or make detailed process or procedural recommendations to improve the department’s current GPRA-MA solutions.

The primary purpose of this thesis project is to link the theoretical and practical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability with the GPRA-MA, and make recommendations to instill such a culture at the DHS. If DHS leaders and performance management and improvement practitioners, partners and stakeholders come to realize the current limitations of the legislation due to its primary association with the political and bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials, as opposed to

the greater good of the American public, they might possibly begin to view the Act differently. By providing these same officials with solid empirical evidence that the GPRA-MA and associated best practices can be valuable tools⁵ in better fulfilling their public trust roles, they might experience a paradigm shift in the way they consider and apply strategic performance management within the DHS:

You could say paradigms are harder to change than anything else about a system [...]. But there's nothing physical or expensive or even slow in the process of paradigm change. In a single individual it can happen in a millisecond. All it takes is a click in the mind, a falling of scales from the eyes, a new way of seeing. Whole societies are another matter—they resist challenges to their paradigms harder than they resist anything else. So how do you change paradigms? [...] You keep pointing at the anomalies and failures in the old paradigm. You keep speaking and acting, loudly and with assurance, from the new one. You insert people with the new paradigm in places of public visibility and power. You don't waste time with reactionaries; rather, you work with active change agents and with the vast middle ground of people who are open-minded. Systems modelers say that we change paradigms by building a model of the system, which takes us outside the system and forces us to see it whole.⁶

Placing the GPRA-MA with its agenda to improve mission and program outcomes, or performance results, within an overarching model of accountability or public and organizational trust, will allow us to move beyond the status quo, go beyond the current practice of adopting simple solutions to tackle complex problems, and instead assist us in identifying alternative approaches more meaningful to end users at all levels of the performance improvement continuum.

E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ROADMAP

Even though the GPRA-MA contributes to better framing the discussion pertaining to performance results, defining and achieving true accountability is still largely uncharted territory within the field of federal government strategic performance management. There is no clearly defined vision. There are conflicting, often

⁵ Some of these methodological tools or disciplines include complexity theory, public accountability, public administration, organizational accountability, strategic performance management, and governance.

⁶ Donella Meadows, *Thinking in Systems: A Primer* (Chelsea Green Publishing, 2013), 3078–3088, Kindle edition.

contradictory values. There is no real urgency. And regarding results, few have recommended what actions to take to get us there, or how to know when we arrive.

Up to now, many government institutions have preferred public administration, expressed in terms of government performance and results, to public accountability, or the creation and sustainment of a “*High-Trust Culture*.” This lack of public and organizational accountability has been the primary cause of the failure of traditional strategic performance management frameworks, such as the GPRA-MA, which tend to associate accountability immediately, simply (and uniquely), with improved organizational outcomes through the execution of a political and/or management agenda meant to improve individual program impact. Costs of this preference are measured in terms of the inability to improve and adequately communicate outcome performance and results, as well as to achieve overarching mission effectiveness and efficiency.

Closing the gap between these two non-mutually exclusive and parallel worlds of public accountability and public administration will involve:

- Defining the problem, in terms of how deficiencies in all five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA legislation are primarily attributable to five (5) cultural conditions;
- Reviewing official government policy and external best practices pertaining to the GPRA-MA, SPM, and social complexity theory to define and/or identify current policy requirements and goals and generate a clear set of non-mutually exclusive policy alternatives and solutions; and
- Making specific recommendations, leveraging the Act, to modify current approaches to GPRA-MA implementation, predicting and evaluating the impact such modifications might have on increasing accountability and improving public and organizational trust.

By asking and answering the following research questions, we will be able to (1) understand *why* and *how* the lack of public and organizational accountability has rendered the GPRA-MA ineffective, and how this ineffectiveness is impeding organizational trust, greater awareness, participation, cooperation and collaboration (i.e., condition); (2) understand *how* this situation hinders the improvement and communication of program performance and results (i.e., cost); (3) understand *how* this lack of successful performance management and improvement practices negatively impacts DHS mission effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., consequence); and finally (4) make practical

suggestions on how to apply (i.e., application) SPM best practices, informed by social complexity theory, within all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA to increase public and organizational accountability and improve the overall impact of the legislation.

Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s): How has the lack of true public and organizational accountability rendered the GPRA-MA ineffective and what can the DHS do to instill a culture of greater accountability, or increased trust, by leveraging the Act?

- **Condition (Pure Research):** The lack of accountability has rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective, which in turn impedes organizational trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration, perpetuating a vicious circle. Why? How?
- **Cost (Pure Research):** This situation prevents the improvement and communication of performance and results. How?
- **Consequence (Pure Research):** How are these inadequate performance management practices negatively impacting DHS mission effectiveness and efficiency?
- **Application (Practical Research):** How can DHS leverage the GPRA-MA to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) within the department, and vis-à-vis the general public?

F. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD

Our novel approach to studying federal government strategic performance management in the context of the GPRA-MA and the overarching concept of public and organizational accountability will allow the following to be integrated into current policy and practices as intrinsic elements of the field, resulting in a significant shift in the scope of management resources and (potential) solutions:

- Redefinition of public performance accountability as enduring public and organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration;
- Immediate association of the GPRA-MA with this revised definition along with a more comprehensive understanding of performance-based accountability;
- Acknowledging the utility of social complexity theory and applying it to enhance strategic performance management;
- Diminution of the political-administrative dichotomy between the executive and legislative branches of government, and between public

service and public trust, reconciling direct political influence (i.e., legislation) with administrative discretion and decision making (i.e., policy) and the political/bureaucratic definition/understanding of accountability with the expectations of the general public;

- Greater awareness of the dramatically changing cultural landscape and evolving dynamics involving United States (U.S.) government-citizen interaction;
- Potential for unelected government officials to remain responsive and accountable to the people, and not only to other appointed, and/or elected officials; and
- Concept of innovative (democratic), networked, meta-governance as the “next new thing” in government performance and overarching solution (i.e., holistic, comprehensive, and sustainable framework) for public and organizational accountability.

G. ASSUMPTIONS

There are at least two assumptions on which the research and its conclusions rest:

- An acceptance of the five (5) designated GPRA-MA focus areas as the main purpose and intent of the legislation;⁷
- A correlation and/or causal relationship between the GPRA-MA and strategic performance management;

Throughout this thesis, particular effort will be made to demonstrate how opaque political considerations have placed undue stress on the implementation of the GPRA-MA within and across federal agencies. Eliciting greater commitment from the highest echelons of national leadership within the legislative and executive branches of government to continually place public awareness, transparency, communication, participation, cooperation and collaboration at the forefront of government performance improvement efforts, will strengthen both the public and organizational accountability agendas of elected and appointed administrators.

Absence such commitment, it will be more difficult to implement the new (i.e., innovative) strategies and recommendations proposed within this thesis to mitigate and/or overcome challenges.

⁷ The five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA of 2010 are: (1) leadership engagement, collaboration, learning; (2) strategic planning, clarity, organizational alignment; (3) program evaluation, performance measurement; (4) performance review, improvement; (5) transparency, accountability, decision making.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

Linking the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability with the GPRA-MA, will propel DHS leaders onto a much broader operating stage, that of the public arena, one that is much more complex, diverse and interdependent than the controlled environment within which public administrators have been used to operating. Successfully navigating through such an expanded and dynamic landscape will require much more nuanced/flexible, organic and emergent ways of conducting government business than have been employed in the past.

It will require moving beyond the status quo and the current practice of adopting simple solutions to tackle complex problems. It will require the identification of alternative strategic planning and decision-making approaches more relevant to end users at all levels of the performance improvement continuum, based on public and organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration, and not solely on performance-related issues.

Because of the evolution of the existing cultural climate relative to public accountability, namely, the call for greater government-citizen interaction, we have settled on a single overarching approach to affect change, adopting the emerging philosophy of innovative (democratic) networked governance. Meta-governance leverages the resilient dynamics of (small) group interaction to achieve success, such as diversity, interdependence, collaborative dialogue and boundary-less network learning, involving a multiplicity of stakeholders.

Adopting such a strategy along with relevant solutions will allow us to replace our current simplistic definition of public accountability, as improved government effectiveness and efficiency, with its much broader and more meaningful definition of public trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, both intra- and inter-organizationally, and vis-à-vis the American public.

Closing the gap between public administration (i.e., organizational performance accountability) and public trust, means mitigating and/or remedying the deficiencies identified within all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA, as well as the underlying cultural conditions contributing to them, by:

- Overcoming *resistance* to change and *stagnation* through greater leadership and management *engagement*, committed to transforming standard working groups into performance-focused action learning forums creating *momentum* for continuous improvement;
- Eliminating *confusion* and *doubt* with regards to leadership motive and intent, by seeing complexity and unpredictability, not as overwhelming challenges, but as opportunities to discover more participative ways of achieving strategic *clarity* and organizational alignment, of reaching consensus, and gaining external stakeholder *confidence* in the homeland security enterprise;
- Transforming the *inconsistency* and *indecision* which currently characterize agency performance measurement and evaluation functions into analytical products that enjoy greater *credibility* and legitimacy, leading to improved intra- and inter-agency *collaboration*;
- Replacing the current *indifference* and *passivity* toward performance reviews with *motivation* for and *initiative* toward more innovative management dialogue and cross-organizational interaction; and
- Reconciling organizational performance accountability with public trust by applying transparent and democratic meta-governance structures, systems and processes, turning current public *criticism* and *conflict* into greater *optimism* and *contribution* to the homeland security mission.

Moving from our current state of government strategic performance management to our desired end state will entail adopting best practices, informed by social complexity theory. It is in this way that we can reconcile performance results with public trust, combining both character and competence to find the correct balance between organizational COLLABORATION and COMPETITION, and individual CREATION and CONTROL.

The following twelve (12) recommendations based on the concept of innovative (democratic) networked governance within the greater context of public accountability, represent our “next generation” solution to creatively implement the GPRA-MA. They have incorporated social complexity theory epistemologies and principles in practical

ways to ameliorate all five (5) of the cultural conditions affecting performance management and improvement, alleviating deficiencies in all five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas.

Our first set of recommendations focus on COLLABORATION, or doing things together, as a means to diffuse and redistribute power, leveraging the almost limitless capabilities of an almost equally limitless pool of talent:

- **Collaborate #1: Require an Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Factor and Indicator of Success in Senior Executive Service (SES) Performance Plans**—With the intent of cultivating public service motivation among employees, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) can further link performance management and strategy achievement with overall public good by adding an additional (public) engagement factor to one of the five (5) critical elements of federal SES performance plans.
- **Collaborate #2: Encourage Internal Agency Communication, Collaboration, Outreach between Performance Improvement Officers (PIOs), and Congressional and Public Affairs Liaisons**—The federal Performance Improvement Officer (PIO) and staff should establish, long-term, collaborative working relationships with the agency’s internal Legislative and Public Affairs Offices in order to better embrace the power of politics and public messaging as positive rather than negative forces impacting the performance management discipline.
- **Collaborate #3: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Crowd-Sourcing at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission**—In partnership and close collaboration with national Congressional representatives and state and local/tribal leaders, PIO, Congressional and public affairs staff should establish DHS information campaigns, “DHS 101 Seminars,” meant to educate and mentor local communities, both individuals and groups (i.e., businesses and non-profits), regarding the DHS mission set, its current programs, projects and activities.

Next, we should concentrate on redefining COMPETITION, or doing things fast, to ensure that inclusive dialogue and teamwork are continually being seen as force multipliers, where two (or three, or four, etc.) minds are better than one when it comes to finding solutions:

- **Compete #1: Select the PIO/Deputy PIO Based on Factors of Trust**—Because of the importance the GPRA-MA places on the contributions of the federal PIO to create a positive learning and performance improvement culture, and oversee all agency performance-related activities, the selection of the PIO and/or Deputy PIO should be based on factors of trust, then placed in a position within the agency that is sufficiently hierarchically influential to affect real change.
- **Compete #2: Develop Innovative Networked (Meta-)Governance Leadership Training for Federal PIOs and Staff**—OPM and OMB should work with agencies to develop and deliver strategic and innovative leadership training for federal PIOs and their staffs, emphasizing the true face of leadership, increasingly showing a preference for meta-governance, abandoning the traditional top-down, closed loop, governance structures prevalent in today's public sector.
- **Compete #3: Develop and Communicate Government Performance Information Tailored to the People**—If knowledge management means producing, analyzing and communicating information in ways that create true value to end users and consumers, then public-facing performance data should provide context and meaning to average citizens and/or their representatives. To ensure that the federal government's performance measure development and reporting processes are serving and satisfying the needs of the taxpayer, transparently communicating public policy and its effects as a means to gain and maintain public trust, publically accessible performance information should be improved through the application of six (6) key attributes of performance reporting.

Next, unleashing true CREATIVITY, or doing things first, freeing (human) resources from the limits of Weberian and Newtonian paradigms, can be facilitated in the following ways:

- **Create #1: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Co-Creation at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission**—Building on the information and momentum gained through the “DHS 101 Seminars” public outreach and crowd-sourcing campaigns, develop a co-creative approach to further tap into the valuable perspective that a more limited and targeted number of average citizens, business and non-profit leaders, and state and local homeland security officials can bring to defining and refining the DHS mission, its continually evolving strategy and program solutions.
- **Create #2: Create an Innovative (Web-Enabled) Networked Community of Practice (CoP) to Inform DHS Strategy and Performance Measure Development**—DHS organizational performance management can be reconciled with the various definitions of transparency and public accountability through interactive, web-enabled

Communities of Practice (CoPs), and their supporting Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), capable of interfacing with a multiplicity of partners and stakeholders, particularly the general public.

- **Create #3: Leverage Web 2.0 Technologies in Policy Development and Decision-Making**—In ongoing efforts to institutionalize processes that establish safe spaces for government officials to create and innovate, agencies should work with their internal public affairs and information technology shops, to identify any current ongoing efforts to leverage advanced internet technologies and applications including blogs, wikis, RSS, and social bookmarking to better engage constituencies and improve the presentation and implementation of specific agency programs.

The final three (3) recommendations shatter the myth that machine-like CONTROL, or simply doing things right, automatically culminates in achieving strategic success:

- **Control #1: Consider A Multiplicity of Program Theory Models to Develop Strategy and Measure Performance**—Whether an agency opts to use the logic model, balanced scorecard, strategy mapping, or a different, uniquely tailored alignment methodology to create a clear line of sight between high-level strategic goals and individual program and personal contributions, preference should be toward the development of counterintuitive governance frameworks that mobilize a diversity of players and remove obstacles to greater collaboration.
- **Control #2: Develop Innovative (Collaborative) Networked Performance Measurement and Evaluation Methodologies**—In order to minimize distrust in executive branch analytical products, and ensure that they are making credible, unbiased representations about how well agencies and programs are performing, include a cross-representation of analysts in working groups (i.e., performance-based action learning forums) dedicated to developing acceptable methodologies and tools that improve the overall analytical capability and capacity of the department and appropriately and accurately define, measure, achieve and communicate what truly constitutes success.
- **Control #3: Reform the Congressional Authorization and Appropriations Processes and Budget-Performance Frameworks**—As the legislative and executive branches work to reconcile their competing and often contradictory agendas and priorities, Congress should consider consolidating the DHS authorization and appropriations structure in order to facilitate departmental comparisons of impact based on like costs across components and offices. This would increase the department's cross-organizational analytic capability and capacity and help DHS leadership better understand the implications of its strategic planning and resource allocation decisions.

The OMB's underlying philosophy in interpreting the GPRA-MA was to institutionalize strategic performance management through the development and implementation of a government-wide infrastructure and associated processes that would reunite/assemble holistic long-range planning with short-term prioritization. In order to encourage commonality at all levels of the performance improvement continuum, while avoiding the linear, prescriptive approach advanced by the former Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), OMB preferred a wider mission-based view of performance, as opposed to the narrower programmatic approach; one that required the establishment of cross-cutting goals and objectives and intra- and inter-agency collaboration to be successful. As a result, the updated A-11 Circular (Part 6), interpreting the GPRA-MA, is more of a high-level doctrinal policy on strategic planning concepts and principles, meant to create "safe" environments for creative performance improvement practices, rather than strict step-by-step guidance to ensure compliance.

At the time OMB set about developing/revising its Performance Management Framework (PMF), there was no reliable management process within the federal government informing the Circular A-11 to consistently interpret the Modernization Act. Previous performance-based strategic management frameworks had been advanced, only to be torn down by subsequent administrations. There simply was not any government-wide performance management, or executive branch decision-making framework, that enjoyed the same stability and legitimacy as the federal budgeting process.

Recognizing that performance improvement is a "wicked" problem requiring multiple approaches and processes, OMB's revised PMF establishes a prerogative for leadership to promote the setting of clear, ambitious goals with supporting empirical data, and the tracking of progress toward those goals through frequent evidence-based reviews. It was meant to be linked with other management models, in an effort to institutionalize a government-wide performance improvement process, mirroring the annual budget cycle, with the primary purpose of getting a somewhat skeptical leadership more frequently engaged in driving and monitoring progress against high-level goals, objectives and priorities.

OMB's current governance approach was influenced by discussions on the Hill and various strands of learning coming from academia and private industry, but most importantly, the PMF was inspired by the United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister's Delivery Unit Report that created one of the most innovative performance management processes to come out over the past few years: the Performance Stat Review, whose primary purpose was to get everyone, particularly leadership, proactively engaged in developing and measuring progress against national strategy and broad, long-term strategic objectives. Short-term capacity was concurrently built through current and projected baselines of government-wide capabilities and requirements, focused on near-term success, needed to achieve priority goals.

The translation of the UK's Stat methodology into U.S. federal government performance management policy reflects this bi-furcated approach. OMB's Strategic Objectives Annual Review (SOAR) process serves as a "mechanism to reinforce long-term strategic thinking, [by asking] tough questions about progress on high-level goals, strategic trade-offs, the most effective allocation of resources, and legislative needs that will enable agencies to achieve higher performance."⁸ At the same time, extensive resources are being dedicated to short-term priority setting associated with these goals. Agency Priority and Cross-Agency Priority Goals (APGs/CAPs) recognize that "improving government performance is hard and demanding work, [requiring] systematic attention to tracking high-quality data closely over a sustained period, identifying patterns and casual factors, and coming up with solutions. It means corralling and managing what is likely to be a diverse network of stakeholders."⁹

The OMB PMF is like seed, dispersed to get people thinking about results-based management, inspiring, rather than mandating, agencies and sub-agencies to incorporate sound performance management principles into their internal processes as standard operating procedure. Describing success, rather than prescribing solutions, it has laid the groundwork for greater fluidity and flexibility in strategic performance management

⁸ Donald Moynihan, *The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act* (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2013), 13.

⁹ Ibid., 12.

systems and practices, providing “top cover” for government officials and performance practitioners who wish to innovate in this arena, if they choose to do so.

Guns don’t kill, people do. Likewise, neither the GPRA-MA mandate, nor the OMB Circular A-11 and resulting strategic performance management framework(s) will automatically, on their own, instill a culture of true public accountability. People can, however, by working together and adeptly wielding its various drivers to produce the kind of success we have always talked about, desired and anticipated, but never truly achieved.

For those of you among us who have no intention of instilling a culture of accountability, or a genuine results-based management culture within the DHS as a standard paradigm for its professionals, then you need read no further. We offer you only one recommendation: dismantle the entire resource-consuming cottage industry, which has built up around the GPRA and GPRA-MA over the past two decades. Instead of paying lip service to a performance infrastructure that is being maintained simply to “protect” the agency from Congressional and/or other external stakeholder “prying,” you should end the hypocrisy and waste now by intentionally limiting your “performance” infrastructure to a bare minimum, in minimal compliance with the strict requirements of the mandate.

As for the others, for those of you who want more, we hope that you will find reassurance in the following chapters that you have been given permission to dream big. Our discussion will culminate with further details pertaining to the twelve (12) above-mentioned recommendations having the potential for far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. They have been written with daring and bold confidence, for bold and daring leaders.

II. DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Before discussing ways the GPRA-MA is advancing federal government SPM, how it is being used to hold agencies accountable to achieve measurable results, and how it might be leveraged to establish and maintain a culture of high-trust within the DHS, it would be beneficial to first obtain a basic understanding of the principles and concepts surrounding public administration and accountability, particularly as they relate to organizational performance.

The Act, as is the case with most public performance management frameworks, would lead us to immediately (and simply) equate accountability with improved organizational outcomes, or performance results.

True accountability, however, is much more.

A. WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY?

The founding fathers, in their search of a “government of the people, for the people, and by the people,” established a federal constitutional republic consisting of three branches of government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each recognizing their limitations on the exercise of power. Respective roles and responsibilities were written into the text of the U.S. Constitution.

A nation’s Constitution describes its very nature. The nature of the American experience and collective social order is one of distributed, balanced and limited power. Implicit in the design of the American Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and subsequent Bill of Rights is the separation of powers (i.e., checks and balances), the federal-state division of sovereignty (i.e., federalism), and the recognition that the ultimate arbiter of all disputes would be the law (i.e., the Constitution). In the United States, both (1) limited government, and (2) citizen participation (i.e., republican liberty) are necessary to maintain public trust. American thought pertaining to national unity and freedom are inseparable from these two pillars and their underlying principles of

federalism, the separation of powers, self-governance, and the rule of law.¹⁰ In the American mind, there are no exclusions, or exceptions to these fundamental requirements.

Such concepts also extend to the realm of public administration, where the separation of powers clause has created a political-administrative dichotomy between the executive and legislative branches of government separating direct political influence (i.e., legislation) from administrative discretion and decision making (i.e., policy).

Beginning in the early 20th century, Woodrow Wilson, in his attempt to reign in the influence of special interests in the affairs of state, defined public accountability as the exercise of administrative power under the control and supervision of non-elected officials (i.e., civil servants). He believed that protection against tyranny would only come through separating political decision making, beholden to special interests, from administrative policy execution.¹¹ Indeed, Wilsonian thought purported that many areas of public administration should be based upon *expertise* and *neutral principles* alone, in order to free the executive branch of government from the more negative influences of partisan politics.¹²

However, in the minds of many Americans, the only legitimate government is the one that remains directly responsible to the people. Therefore, adequate frameworks, based on transparency, open discussion and participative decision making, should be (re)established to ensure true accountability in public administration, where government policy making and implementation remain responsive and accountable to the people, and not only to appointed, or even, elected officials.

What would such a culture of public accountability look like? How can it be observed and measured? What does the lack of accountability look like? Where does DHS fall along this spectrum?

¹⁰ Herman Belz, *Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law in America* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2009), 77.

¹¹ Donald F. Kettle, *The Politics of the Administrative Process* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2012), 12.

¹² Ronald J. Pestritto, PhD, *The Birth of the Administrative State: Where It Came From and What It Means for Limited Government* (The Heritage Foundation: First Principles Series, no. 16, 2002).

B. PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Donald F. Kettle proposes three pillars of public accountability:¹³

- The *legal/political* responsibility to establish and uphold the law (i.e., Constitution);
- The *bureaucratic/administrative ethical responsibility* to be obedient to the law, to hierarchy, and to standards of efficiency and effectiveness; and
- Adherence to *moral standards and values*.

Legality can be expressed in two ways: (1) legislation based on the Constitution, and in conformity with existing law; and (2) public policy influenced by political considerations.

Ethics pertains to the rules and regulations governing public administrators and officials in the implementation of legislation and public policy.

Morality is an individual's internal compass (i.e., what is right and wrong for him/her).

Fortunately, for government administrators these three elements often overlap, but not always. Sometimes there is divergence due to particular circumstances and individuals.

The challenge then becomes how to reconcile freedom and flexibility, or discretion, to act when necessary in order to obtain results in the implementation of public policy, while still remaining accountable to the law, ethics and morals. This involves successfully subjecting administrative/bureaucratic power (i.e., ethics) to legal accountability (i.e., both the law and politics), and ultimately, to a nation's guiding compass (i.e., values and morals). When unaligned, any legal boundaries codified into law will simply result in increasingly complex and difficult to solve political challenges created by poor administrative decisions made in an ad-hoc fashion by individuals on the front lines liberally interpreting ethics-based policy according to their own morals.

It is not only professional training (i.e., bureaucratic/administrative responsibility) nor external controls (i.e., political/legal responsibility) that ultimately hold executors

¹³ Kettle, *The Politics of the Administrative Process*, 10.

accountable, but, also their own internal compasses (i.e., ethical/moral behavior), which take into account situational considerations, systemic forces and the deterrence offered by various mechanisms of reward and punishment. True public accountability must include all three elements, if it is to ensure political legitimacy in nation-states of consent, where government is based on laws established by the governed and not simply on the mere whims, or morals, of individuals.

This is a tall order, but can be accomplished by establishing sound public administration, which ensures legal, ethical, and moral accountability within public service.

C. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

There are, in fact, at least four distinct categories of accountability expectations in public administration today: ethical, democratic, fiscal and performance.¹⁴ Because these perspectives are each based on a common understanding or general concept of public accountability, we begin our discussion with a simple, yet broad definition offered by Melvin Dubnick and H. George Frederickson:

Accountability can be approached as having two major definable characteristics: (1) it is a social relationship between at least two parties; (2) in which at least one party to the relationship perceives a demand or expectation for account giving between the two. This definition highlights the fact that accountability is *social in nature*—it must involve two or more individuals to come into play in any relationship.¹⁵

The authors equate *Accountability* with the creation and sustainment of a “*High-Trust Culture*,” further stating that today’s current governmental performance

¹⁴ Ethical Accountability: Government agencies operate honestly, without conflict of interest, self-dealing, other forms of fraud, or abuse of the power of governmental authority. Democratic: Government agencies do what their citizens want and need, engaging citizens and their elected representatives in understanding trade-offs and making well-informed choices among competing priorities. Government agencies treat people civilly and courteously, unless there are strong justifications not to, so people do not resent or resist government because it has acted in a rude, slow, or inappropriate manner. Fiscal: Government spends its money as authorized, with as little waste as possible. Performance: Government agencies and their employees work intelligently and diligently to deliver effective and cost-efficient government programs. Shelley H. Metzenbaum, *Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices* (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006), 7.

¹⁵ Melvin Dubnick and H. George Frederickson, *Public Accountability: Performance Measurements, the Extended State, and the Search for Trust* (The Kettering Foundation, 2011), 6.

accountability mechanisms are not sufficient to get us to such a desired end state because they lack the necessary characteristics. Their basic argument is that the current problems associated with accountability are “rooted in a widely held but unsubstantiated belief in the capacity of [performance-based] accountability mechanisms alone to bring about the three things we require of our government today—efficient control, democratic legitimacy, and effective performance.”¹⁶ Because of the limitations of these current ‘mechanical’ approaches, disassociated as they are from public expectations, the authors believe that they should be relabeled ‘promises of accountability’ frameworks.

Dubnick and Frederickson continue by saying that, ultimately, most government accountability-based reform models, are about risk-avoidance, or ensuring adequate performance based on pre-defined and properly communicated expectations between public administrators in order to avoid being held accountable for mishaps or missteps down the line. They call these pre-factum (or before the fact) accountability to prevent or preclude post-factum (or after the fact damage control) accountability.¹⁷ Performance-based accountability systems may increase precision and objectivity, resulting in knowing how well a program is performing, and what to do when it is not, but they will not automatically translate into true accountability, or increased public trust.

A report from the Kettering Foundation, *Don’t Count Us Out: How an Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine The Public’s Confidence in Schools, Business, Government, and More*,¹⁸ equates the disconnect between the way public institutions understand accountability, and the way the general public does, by drawing attention to the difference between Public Administration, or policy/program accountability, which falls to non-elected government officials, and Public Accountability, the main responsibility of elected political representatives. They purport that institutions think of accountability in terms of *information sharing to increase*

¹⁶ Dubnick and H. George Frederickson, *Public Accountability: Performance Measurements, the Extended State, and the Search for Trust*, 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., 8.

¹⁸ Jean Johnson, Jonathan Rochkind, and Samantha DuPont, *Don’t Count Us Out: How an Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine the Public’s Confidence in Schools, Business, Government, and More* (Washington, DC: The Kettering Foundation and Public Agenda, 2011).

effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., organizational performance), while citizens tend to think of it in terms of *relationship building, based on trust* (i.e., public service). The general public is less concerned that a government institution is managed appropriately or properly executed, which is more the focus of the typical public servant and his or her bureaucratic leadership. The average American citizen's concern relates to other considerations, less administrative- or management-centric, such as, improved service, responsiveness, trustworthiness, even reprimanding or rewarding individuals based on conduct.

Elia Armstrong proposes an international ethics framework or integrity system for public administrations, defining public service accountability in equally simple terms:¹⁹

- **Integrity:** honesty or trustworthiness in the discharge of official duties, serving as an antithesis to corruption or the abuse of office;
- **Transparency:** unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on decisions and performance in the public sector; and
- **Performance:** the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated performance objectives.

It is only when public service accountability is placed within the greater context of ethics and democratic governance that public officials will be obligated to continually place community interest above their own, thus bridging the gap between policy and practice, rhetoric and results.

D. PUBLIC SERVICE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK

Having thus established, for the purposes of this discussion, a final working definition of accountability in public administration as involving integrity, ethics, transparency, and fiscal and performance responsibility, let us focus our attention of the details of such a framework.

¹⁹ Elia Armstrong, *Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends, Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues* (The United Nations: Economic and Social Affairs, August 2005), 1.

1. Integrity, Ethics and Accountability

Even though there is disagreement regarding whether ethics can be taught, as researchers into child development assert that the values of most children are formed by the age of three,²⁰ an attempt will be made here to point out the major expectations and trends relative to the integrity of government officials in the United States.

As previously stated, individual integrity and ethics speak of a person's internal compass, his or her sense of what's right and wrong. Such concepts, on a public or community level, pertain more to the rules and regulations governing public administrators and officials in the implementation of legislation, public policy and government agency programs. Public ethics result when governments are operating "honestly, without conflict of interest, self-dealing, or other forms of fraud, or abuse of the undue influence of governmental authority."²¹

a. Individual Integrity

We indicated earlier that American ethical values revolve around individualism and republican liberty, and, like a weathervane, are used by the average U.S. citizen to assess fairness and justice within the public arena. Public officials, both elected and non-, exercise legitimate power in the exercise of their functions, only in so far as they are (1) chosen by the people and (2) remain beholden to them, continuing in their representation and advocacy of each individual constituent's unique, even idiosyncratic values, and personal needs. Such a (dis)position is captured well in one of the more famous American sayings, "No taxation, without representation."

b. Public Ethics

With regards to public ethics, and in a world increasingly dominated by globalization, most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, wealthy and mainly located in western Europe and North America, seem to be displacing emphasis on standard anti-corruption safeguards (i.e., conflict-of-interest,

²⁰ Kettle, *The Politics of the Administrative Process*, 509.

²¹ Metzenbaum, *Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices*, 7.

bribery, fraud, etc.), and public access to information (i.e., freedom of information), in order to stress the importance of evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of government programs (i.e., performance). This is because efforts in the first two areas have been largely successful, due in large part to the robust transparency mechanisms that have been built into these countries' accountability frameworks.²²

These OECD countries, which include the United States, identified and adopted 12 Principles to strengthen their national ethics infrastructures “incorporating an ethical dimension into management frameworks, and reviewing the impact of various reforms on the integrity of public sector employees,” by focusing on four (4) areas: (1) general core values of integrity, (2) specific standards of conduct, (3) actions for implementing and promoting integrity values, and (4) standards and methods and procedures to report integrity-related offences.²³

Public websites, such as The Global Integrity Report, transparently display the results of such efforts, using both qualitative analysis and quantitative indicators of success articulated around major concepts of accountability, such as the transparency of political and public administrative processes, media freedom, and conflicts of interest regulations.²⁴

Tables displaying the assessment results of the United States, highlighting the differences and gaps between the official policies, or legal frameworks, and the actual results, or impact of these frameworks, can be accessed on The Global Integrity Report website at the following link: <http://report.globalintegrity.org>.

²² Armstrong, *Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration: Recent Trends, Regional and International Developments and Emerging Issues*, 8–9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁴ Global Integrity Indicators: anti-corruption non-governmental organizations; media's ability to report on corruption; public requests for government information; voting and party formation; election integrity; political financing transparency; conflicts of interest safeguards and checks and balances (executive, legislative, judicial branches and civil service); budget process oversight and transparency; whistle-blowing protections; government procurement transparency, fairness and conflicts of interest safeguards; privatization of public administrative functions transparency, fairness and conflicts of interest safeguards; national ombudsman; supreme audit institution; taxes and customs fairness and capacity; oversight of state-owned enterprises; business licensing and regulation; anti-corruption law, agency or equivalent mechanisms; judicial independence, fairness, and citizen access to justice; law enforcement conflicts of interest safeguards and professionalism.

Results in 2009 found the United States, in comparison with thirty-three (33) other countries, with a “strong” rating, or overall score of 85 out of 100. Similar high scores were received with regards to freedom of the press, public access to information, political participation, election integrity, and civil society organizations serving as effective anti-corruption watchdogs, while high-level lobbying and the corrupting influence of money in politics, official secrecy, campaign finance regulations and *lack of true independence and objectivity in American oversight agencies* topping the list of challenges plaguing accountability frameworks within the United States.

A possible solution to these challenges, still yet to be fully considered, would involve a solid plan to educate the private sector, both individuals and organizations, on their oversight responsibilities (i.e., “watchdog” roles), getting them, as partakers of civil society, more involved in the actual development and evaluation of public policy, goals and objectives. This would involve the establishment of collaborative venues involving the general public, such as “visioning workshops, discussion forums, and stakeholder-based advisory committees.”²⁵

Americans value individual values and can easily make them as binding as law, with their propensity to legislate morality, both at the local and national levels. In America, lack of representation translates into illegitimacy. As a government of consent, the United States has special concerns and expectations regarding the professional (if not personal) integrity and behavior of its elected and appointed officials. As such, it has established institutional stopgaps in its public service frameworks to ensure financial, human resource and information management probity, in the hopes that public trust will be upheld.

2. Transparency, Democratic Governance and Accountability

The second aspect of public accountability is democratic governance, defined as government agencies doing what their citizens want and need, and is dependent upon government’s responsibility to conduct its business transparently. Transparency is

²⁵ David E. Booher and Judith E. Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy* (Taylor & Francis, 2010), 5, Kindle edition.

defined as unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable information on public sector decisions. Indeed, without transparency, or openness in government, citizens would remain detached and unengaged from the efforts of their elected representatives and appointed officials, not knowing whether they were doing what they were expected to do.

The ultimate goal of democratic governance, undergird by government transparency, is to ensure that the common citizen has had a chance to understand and weigh in on what their government is doing, and evaluate how well it is doing it, in time to prevent and/or possibly correct ineffective or inappropriate actions. The logic is simple: the more people are informed, the more involved they will become. The more involved they become, the more they will buy in. The more they buy in, the less they will come to resent or resist their government.

Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, former European Union (EU) Ombudsman, states that democratic governance can only exist where there is government legitimacy, ensured through free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and public access to information.²⁶

He continues by saying that there are primarily two types of democratic government in existence today: pluralistic and egalitarian.

Many European nations have adopted the egalitarian or “leveling” conceptualization of democracy, with their centralized form of government and preoccupation with equality, or homogeneity, as a major organizational principle. The major drawback of egalitarianism is the diminution of local representation and individual rights.

The Americans prefer pluralistic democracy, rooted in their federalist principles and concept of shared power through checks and balances, excluding, by definition, the notion that electoral victory confers a plenary right to exercise power. Because the United

²⁶ European Ombudsman, “Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in the EU,” Lecture by Professor P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, Bologna, Italy, October 17, 2006, <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/en/2006-10-17b.htm>.

States has more robust institutional and societal checks and balances on power than many countries, it tends to demand greater account of its leaders than its European counterparts, and this, more often and throughout the political/administrative process.

Indeed, most Americans would like to see government decision making as open and as close to the citizenry as possible. Without some devolution of power to the lower levels of government, bringing citizens closer to their governmental decision-making structures, public administration has the potential to descend into technocracy and elitism, or worse, corruption. Government that is unconnected and estranged from the governed automatically becomes less legitimate in peoples' eyes, particularly Americans.

In most Western democracies, citizens are free to elect the person they want to represent them, and if he or she does not deliver, the people will hold this individual "accountable" by not reelecting him/her to office. This is referred to as accountability at elections. In governments of consent, such accountability is no longer problematic. However, unless the electorate is continually being provided with enough information to make well-informed evaluations regarding the priorities and decisions of their representatives, what Professor Diamnadourous calls accountability between elections, accountability at elections becomes problematic. Indeed, an uninformed and disinterested electorate makes it easier for public administrators, operating under opaque conditions and with little notion of the will of the people, to become arbitrary and self-serving.

True government legitimacy entails good democratic governance, or ensuring accountability both at and between elections, guaranteed through robust checks and balances, at both the institutional and societal levels. In other words, representative government that is open and transparent before the people:

The basic idea of transparency is that citizens should easily be able to obtain the information they need in order to call public authorities to account, whether at elections, or between elections. At least until recently, many modern democracies have tended to assume that sufficient information would [simply] emerge as a by-product of the exercise of traditional political freedoms, in particular the freedom of expression. However, freedom of expression does not require public authorities to impart information to citizens [voluntarily].²⁷

In order for this type of (official) information to flow freely from the government to the general public, some type of forcing mechanism is necessary.

In the United States, laws designed to ensure public access to information include the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), passed in 1966, and the Ethics in Government Act, passed in 1978.

a. Freedom of Information

Freedom of information is an area of public administration where there seems to be the least amount of divergence, in both principle and practice. The United States expounds on the democratic principles of free nations, where rulers govern with the consent of the governed, on the right of citizenry to know and influence what their government is doing, and where leaders regularly update citizens on their action and progress through inspirational, motivating speeches and public awareness/outreach campaigns.

Unfortunately, such closeness in expression is too often offset by an equally dramatic gap in practice, and much work remains to be done to ensure that freedom of information is being made relevant within the greater concept of democratic governance.

b. Democratic Governance

Democratic governance not only entails freedom and access to information, or transparency, it also requires policies and practices that allow citizens to influence what their government is doing and how they are doing it based on that

²⁷ Ombudsman, “Transparency, Accountability, and Democracy in the EU.”

information. While adequate mechanisms exist to obtain information from government officials on their activities, there are few viable (i.e., effective) options for citizens to meaningfully act upon it once they have obtained it.

Americans, understanding that they currently have no direct control over, and often very little knowledge of, the unaccountable numbers of individual decisions that administrators make every day to make public administration work, seek other avenues to voice their concerns and impact change.

There are several options currently available to the American taxpayer to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances,” a right enshrined in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

To begin with, there are two-way, interactive means of communicating with both elected and unelected government officials at the local level, such as attending town hall or neighborhood council meetings, participating in public surveys and focus groups, serving on boards, commissions, and oversight committees, sponsoring initiatives, volunteering, even running for office, all of which encourages greater public participation.²⁸

At the national level, as well, citizens can influence accountability between elections, by directly soliciting their elected officials (in Congress).

We will focus our attention on the latter, more particularly on how the U.S. Congress sees its role and responsibility to be responsive to American citizens in fulfillment of its obligation to conduct oversight of the executive branch’s administrative programs and activities.

The U.S. Congress accomplishes its oversight responsibilities through a variety of legislative review mechanisms:

²⁸ Sandra Emerson, Royce Menkus, and Kathy Van Ness, *The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide* (CQ Press, 2010), 66–69.

- Authorizing Committees: the regular legislative committees that prepare the laws that authorize government programs;
- Appropriations Committees: standing committees that manage the annual appropriations process, or legislation that commits money to be spent on government programs; and
- Committees on Government Operations: fulfilling the primary purposes of oversight, such as ensuring that administrators follow legislative intent, investigating instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, collecting information, evaluating program effectiveness, protecting legislative prerogatives, personal advocacy, and the reversal of unpopular actions.²⁹

Unfortunately, the task is daunting for Congressional representatives to execute adequate oversight of all government agencies and programs throughout the lifecycle of an authorized and appropriated investment (i.e., pre-, and post-legislation).

Absence the smooth transition between legislation and the corresponding development, implementation, and evaluation of executive branch policy interpreting that mandate, divergence will exist between the law and its enforcement, with deficiencies plaguing the implementation of government programs distanced from the intent of lawmakers and the American values and expectations they represent. As long as there are such diverging interpretations and disagreements regarding the law, Americans will continue to write their Congressional representatives who will dutifully consider their constituents' letters of complaint before forwarding them to the same exact agency where the complaint arose in the first place. Admittedly, such a self-policing approach for the "redress of grievances" is not ideal.

Congressional oversight is not enough to ensure accountability, because today, elected officials are not making the rules, appointed officials are. Therefore, every effort should be made to continually and proactively seek to strengthen and sustain a more open, transparent, and participative relationship between public administrators and the citizens they serve.

At present, there is no system in place where everyone knows what the accountability expectations are for unelected officials, where these expectations apply to

²⁹ Kettle, *The Politics of the Administrative Process*, 488–489.

everyone. It is therefore extremely important to better inform the average citizen, through increased transparency, “making the inner workings of organizations visible,”³⁰ through one-way communications from government agencies to the public, such as posting periodic strategic plans and performance reports on public websites, direct media relations, community education campaigns and e-government.³¹

Getting average citizens, and other impartial/independent stakeholders, more involved in government affairs and operations would create an environment conducive to greater political and administrative accountability, for both policy makers and executors.

This would require the establishment of a context and framework to ensure greater and broader citizenry participation in public policy and program development, implementation and assessment, sustained over time, where the general public is afforded opportunities to offer their perspectives on what they feel constitutes success.³² This would depart from the current practice of one-way marketing types of communication where the government simply informs its constituents on public programs, hoping to convince them of their ultimate utility and benefit. A way to do this would be through an ongoing two-way dialogue with a diverse set of both government and non-government stakeholders established at the local level.

Many public agencies see their role as finding out what the public’s goals are so they can use them to prepare plans in the classic rational planning style. Citizens, especially the marginalized, are not apt to think in terms of goals but rather of daily life. Technical planners are so embedded in their own discourses that they typically do not recognize what citizens have to offer. One of the few ways planning and policy making can tap into the [real] life world, rather than relying solely on the world constructed by professional discourses and colonized by technology (such as the survey

³⁰ Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, *The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide*, 66.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 66–69.

³² *Ibid.*, 65.

method with its closed ended questions), and by powerful state and private interests, is to hear these citizen voices [directly] and respect their knowledge and experience.³³

In democratic nations of consent, power always considers and responds to the concerns of those governed, whether proactively or reactively, positively or negatively, collaboratively or prescriptively, peacefully or contentiously. Government actions must therefore acknowledge the current dynamics and expectations of the public, products of a nation's laws and by-laws, themselves a reflection of its people, culture and history.

Because the United States spends one-third of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on national, state and local government combined,³⁴ Americans tend to expect a lot from their government in terms of products, services, and verified results. These expectations are reflected in our governance systems and underlying philosophy of transparency. Current efforts in this arena include better informing the average citizen, through increased awareness of the inner workings of government.

In order to translate these information sharing mechanisms into true democratic governance, however, where government officials are able to elicit and respond to the needs and expectations of citizens, such transparency needs to be coupled with the establishment of a context and framework for the broader incorporation of citizens in public policy and program development, implementation, and assessment. These types of "outside-the-box" solutions, challenging the current status quo of one-way communication, are required to ensure that public institutions remain accountable to the people, and not simply to their elected and appointed officials. Until this occurs, true accountability, both at and between elections, is neither attainable nor sustainable.

³³ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 173.

³⁴ Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, *The Public Administrator's Companion: A Practical Guide*, 65.

In summary, the highest levels of political leadership should understand public administration as contributing to enduring public trust, communication and cooperation, enabled through our final and primary accountability expectation and the focus of the remainder of our discussions: improved *performance*, or the enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of government operations.

3. Fiscal and Performance Responsibility and Accountability

We conclude our discussion with the third and final definition(s) of public accountability, *performance*, defined as: (1) fiscal responsibility, primarily understood as government spending its money as authorized, with as little waste as possible, and (2) performance results, where government agencies and their employees deliver effective and cost-efficient government programs.³⁵

This third category of public accountability involves the evaluation of program results, or enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and programs, one of the primary purposes of oversight.

E. PERFORMANCE-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY

There is a global trend toward performance- (or results-) based management, focusing on establishing and achieving strategic outcomes, not only in line with the rules and process requirements of public administrators, responsible for implementing government programs, but also in response to the demands and expectations of the general public; more concerned with ultimate outcomes, or what benefits they are actually receiving from public sector expenditures and activities.

In the increasingly constrained fiscal environment in which we are operating, there is external pressure to do better with less, not only coming from civil society, working to ensure that government efforts remain linked to the needs and desires of the citizenry (i.e., democratic governance), but also from the various management and oversight bodies themselves, tasked with ensuring government accountability and results with ever dwindling resources. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are as many different

³⁵ Metzenbaum, *Performance Accountability: The Five Building Blocks and Six Essential Practices*, 7.

definitions, interpretations, and understandings of government performance accountability as there are mission sets, due to the simple fact that being held accountable in such a universe entails that an agreed upon goal or target was set and met or missed.

As such, the GPRA-MA accomplishes this first task in establishing a performance-based accountability system for public organizations, by clarifying accountability expectations, both with those being held accountable and with those holding them to account. It offers a public performance accountability framework that contributes to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and bureaucratic intent (i.e., goals and priorities) of elected and appointed officials.

Success in the GPRA-MA environment, as it is currently being interpreted, therefore, is not being stated in terms of public accountability, or how we're increasing public trust and achieving a better society, but in terms of government performance and results, or how well we are implementing a presidential and/or congressional agenda.

The remainder of this thesis will attempt to bridge the gap between this rather limited concept of organizational performance accountability, and the overarching theory of public accountability, much more comprehensive in its scope and purpose. Our goal will be to find ways to translate improved GPRA-MA efficiency and effectiveness into improved public trust, cooperation and collaboration and vice versa.

In particular, we will make recommendations on how to better leverage the legislation to instill a high-trust culture, first within the DHS, then vis-à-vis the general public at large. The following literature review delves more in depth into the Act, reviewing the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA, as well as best practices contributions to the field of strategic performance management.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The literature review addresses the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA framework in the context of instilling a culture of accountability within the DHS, and vis-à-vis the American public. An inspectional research of legislative³⁶ and executive³⁷ branch requirements, outlined in official government policy related to the mandate, has been conducted in answer to the question: *What does DHS have to do?* This summary of official government policy and recommendations, directly pertaining to the legislation itself, its timeliness, anticipated benefits and immediate and long-term implications, as well as actual and potential opportunities and challenges regarding implementation, has been followed by a point-by-point commentary addressing each focus area. This analysis also incorporates a syntopical reading of a selection of published material on best practices in the evolving field of strategic performance management.

By understanding both the limitations and contributions of existing schools of thought in the fields of organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision-making, organizations will be in a better position to select and apply principles and configurations that are best adapted to their individual requirements and unique context (i.e., internal and external environments). The DHS, as a complex organization, would benefit from incorporating some of these more creative and innovative best practices into its major performance management strategies and functions.

1. Advance Organizer

The first section of the literature review addresses best practices related to leadership and collaborative networks and partnerships, leveraging a multiplicity of stakeholders. Organizational learning techniques, involving adaptability and the utilization of new (i.e., innovative) knowledge, have been emphasized.

³⁶ GPRA-MA of 2010, Congressional Research Service, General Accountability Office (GAO), etc.

³⁷ Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DHS, etc.

The second section focuses on research studies pertaining to the development of strategy, and how best to translate vision, mission and mandate into specific actions at both the tactical and operational levels. Next, there is a section on program evaluation and performance measurement. The fourth section focuses on performance monitoring, reviews and reporting, all still within the context of increasing accountability. Finally, the fifth and final section further ties these two sections together by discussing research related to improving transparency and decision making through sound governance processes.

By more fully understanding the field of strategic performance management, the GPRA-MA can be leveraged to bridge the gap between public organizational performance and public accountability, hopefully resulting in translating improved government effectiveness and efficiency into greater public trust, cooperation and collaboration.

What does this new and improved version of the original Act of 1993 contribute to today's world of federal government performance measurement and improvement practices? What are its underlying concepts, and immediate and long-term implications? And most importantly, what should the DHS be doing to usher in a new era of transparency and public accountability within its own ranks, in line with the precepts of the GPRA-MA and related government performance management policy and private industry best practices?

2. Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 Overview

The original 1993 GPRA purported that agencies could improve the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of federal programs by establishing a system to set goals, measure results and communicate success. For the first time, it required that agencies prepare strategic plans, annual performance plans and annual performance reports with

measurable performance indicators to address the policy, budgeting and (managerial) oversight needs of both Congress and agency leaders, partners/stakeholders, and program managers.³⁸

Even though the GPRA laid the foundation for outcome-oriented government, still lacking were the elements necessary for achieving real improvements in program management and progress toward strategic outcomes. In 1997, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), assessing the effects of the 1993 legislation, noted that federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA, but also that there had been no significant gains in the use of performance information for decision making.³⁹ Official perception was that the GPRA of 1993 had five (5) primary performance management deficiencies: (1) insufficient leadership engagement and cross-organizational collaboration; (2) disjointed goal setting and misaligned performance measures; (3) inadequate application of performance management/measurement analytics; (4) absence of periodic progress reviews; and (5) lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting performance results. These missing elements, according to the mandate's two primary policy experts, Congress and the OMB, are addressed in the GPRA-MA.

The Report of the (Senate) Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs accompanying the GPRA-MA captures the purpose of the new legislation in succinct terms:

H.R. 2142 will modernize and refine the requirements established by GPRA in order to produce more frequent, relevant data, which can then inform decision-makers and agency operations.⁴⁰

This is to be accomplished through the development and application of a practical, data-driven performance management framework that is inquisitive rather than punitive, moving away from the stove-piped strategic performance planning and

³⁸ *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)*, Public Law 103–62.

³⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using Performance Information to Improve Results* (GAO-08–1026T), Washington, DC: GAO, 2008.

⁴⁰ *GPRA Modernization Act*, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142, 2.

reporting, characteristic of the original GPRA of 1993. Achieving more effective and efficient government operations requires a more holistic and comprehensive framework, that goes beyond the simple progress monitoring and compliance reporting of the past.⁴¹

a. OMB Performance Management Framework

(1) Official Policy. Pursuing the three tenets of the Open Government Directive,⁴² transparency, participation and collaboration, the OMB government-wide PMF, inspired by the GPRA-MA, purports that progress can only be made in an environment where senior leaders are personally engaged in the performance improvement strategies of their agencies, continually ensuring cross-organizational collaboration and buy-in, rapid decision making and persistent follow-up. To avoid political hubris and organizational group think, subjective judgments made by internal subject matter experts are now to be complemented by consultations with external and more independent stakeholders, particularly Congress. In order to ensure a comprehensive and accurate depiction of program progress and challenges, evaluations are to be grounded in sound performance management and measurement methodologies that incorporate best practices and feature fact-based empirical data. Finally, further communicating these assessments in publically accessible website forums will not only increase public understanding of how government works, but will also limit the potential for unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts that would have been overlooked under the previous GPRA's decentralized, stove-piped approach to program planning, execution and assessment.

Hoping to successfully steer the new Act through its infancy and realize the promises of increased accountability and improved government performance, the OMB is building a revised PMF, communicating responsibilities through its official

⁴¹ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes* by Clinton T. Brass, CRS Report R42379 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, February 29, 2012).

⁴² Peter R. Orszag, *OMB M-10-06: Open Government Directive* (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, December 8, 2009).

policy document, the A-11 Circular, Part 6.⁴³ Additional supplemental direction and guidance will also continue to be provided in the form of diverse memoranda, such as the OMB M-11-17,⁴⁴ M-11-31,⁴⁵ which emphasized near-term, outcome-focused priority goal-setting and performance reviews conducted by a committed and engaged leadership, and the latest OMB M-13-01, focused on strategic planning and performance reporting, building upon the update to Circular A-11, Part 6, finalized by the OMB on August 3, 2012.⁴⁶

The various objectives and strategies for this overarching federal government performance management framework, reflected in both law and guidance, have been illustrated in Figure 1:




Figure 1. OMB's New Performance Management Framework⁴⁷

⁴³ Office of Management and Budget (OMB), *OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6: Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Performance Reports*.

⁴⁴ OMB Memorandum M-11-17, dated April 14, 2011, "Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010"

⁴⁵ OMB Memorandum M-11-31, dated August 14, 2011, "Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable Government."

⁴⁶ OMB Memorandum M-13-01, dated May 1, 2013, "Updated Strategic Planning and Performance.gov Guidance."

⁴⁷ Moynihan, *The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act*, 14.

See Appendix B for an in-depth schematic overview of the Act, its major focus areas, principle requirements, and underlying performance management strategies, displaying the intent of both Congress and the OMB to shift the focus of government performance and accountability away from a preoccupation with monitoring and reporting on activities to one of achieving better results through the development and use of performance information.

(2) Best Practices. Diverse Congressional oversight and research bodies (e.g., Congressional Research Service, Government Accountability Office, etc.), the Office of Management and Budget, private industry, and the media have begun to holistically review and study the GPRA-MA processes and products in order to determine its potential impact on government operations and how it might be leveraged to achieve better results from government programs.

Reactions have varied. The most important contributions from subject matter experts in the field consist primarily of recommendations to help guide effective implementation of the legislation, allowing Congress and OMB to weigh in on its design and application.

Most recently, a 2013 report produced by Donald Moynihan, Professor of Public Affairs, at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, went beyond the standard historical and/or chronological overviews most commentators have produced for these types of federal performance management systems, beginning with the passage of the original GPRA of 1993.⁴⁸

In addition to detailing the legislation's new requirements, roles, and processes, as well as observing the initial success agencies have had in applying it to improve their program and mission performance, Professor Moynihan comments on the anticipated changes we can expect to see in the field of government strategic performance management, in the coming months and years, as a result of the passage of GPRA-MA.

⁴⁸ *The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act*, The IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2013.

He presages major cultural changes, even a seismic shift in mindset pertaining to government performance and results that will be much more far-reaching than has been seen in the past, affecting relational dynamics between the executive and legislative branches, between the branches of federal, state and local governments, and between the government and the American people.

He makes six (6) recommendations to prepare and transition government leaders and performance management practitioners in anticipation of these coming evolutions. These recommendations represent a bridge between the compliance focus of the past, and the still evolving future landscape of performance management improvement, one that incorporates innovative, collaborative, and networked solutions to produce much more holistic, comprehensive and sustainable frameworks.

The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act <i>Six (6) Key Recommendations</i>	
Recommendation One: Connect the Performance System to Public Service Motivation Action 1.1: Select goals that motivate Action 1.2: Make goals the glue to hold networks together Action 1.3: Connect to beneficiaries Action 1.4: Create a clear line of sight between actions and goals Action 1.5: Celebrate achievement Action 1.6: Align employee recognition systems	
Recommendation Two: Build a Learning Culture Action 2.1: Use quarterly and strategy reviews as learning forums	
Recommendation Three: Balance Top-Down Targets with Bottom-Up Innovations Action 3.1: Learn from network members Action 3.2: Use benchmarking Action 3.3: Disseminate lessons, not just data	
Recommendation Four: Integrate Program Evaluation into the Performance Management System Action 4.1: Create an understanding of program evaluation Action 4.2: Redefine performance information to include program evaluation Action 4.3: Incorporate evaluation expertise into performance discussions Action 4.4: Use delegation of rules as opportunities to evaluate Action 4.5: Link performance goals to evaluation outcome variables Action 4.6: Link evaluations to funding Action 4.7: Make use of administrative data to assess the effects of programs.	
Recommendation Five: Ensure Leaders are Committed to Performance Management Action 5.1: Take advantage of the performance leadership team created by the Modernization Act Action 5.2: Select leaders based on performance management skills	
Recommendation Six: Connect with Congress and Stakeholders Action 6.1: Agencies and OMB should proactively consult with Congress early in the goal-setting process Action 6.2: Speak the language of Congress Action 6.3: Congress has a responsibility to engage Action 6.4: Involve external stakeholders	

Table 1. The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act Six (6) Key Recommendations

B. BODY OF THE REVIEW

Our review of each of the five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA will consist of (1) inspectional research of official government policy, and (2) syntopical research of external best practices related to strategic performance management and how they can inform and impact federal government strategic planning and decision making, in answer to the two questions: *what does DHS have to do?* And *what are others doing?* Each section will conclude with a short summary, abridging the key points within the literature, connecting-the-dots between each section, and discussing how the current research topic contributes to the literature, by filling a gap, answering a question and/or providing a solution.

The literature review will attempt to ask and answer the following questions:

- How have the selected authors defined and framed the issues?
- What are the major principles contained in the best practices?
- What are some of the initial conclusions that can be drawn about these concepts in the context of the GPRA-MA mandate and federal government SPM?

Particular emphasis will be placed on discussing the less tangible, more human-related factors necessary for performance improvement. Namely, the first and last focus areas of the GPRA-MA, leadership engagement, collaboration, learning and public accountability, or how each research document contributes to increasing accountability through improved public and organizational trust, cooperation and collaboration.

Most of the books reviewed covering best practices were written by one, two or three authors, while some were edited collections of relevant topics drafted by a variety of experts in the field. Individual case studies, involving both the public and private sectors, were prevalent. In addition to literature providing the historical context, chronological evolution, and/or foundation of theory pertaining to the various performance management/improvement disciplines, a fair amount of the literature attempted to translate descriptive principle into prescriptive practice. Much more succinct, these documents often resembled practical how-to guides offering specific solutions especially tailored for public institutions. Indeed, if the analyses of Weberian

bureaucracies and criticism of government strategic planning processes are any indication, government organizations usually prefer these easy-to-follow guidebooks, developed by public think tanks, research centers of excellence, government management and oversight bodies, and/or external consultants, to the more fluid and complex theoretical approaches often promoted by academia and considered by private industry, which recommend and offer a much more holistic understanding of disciplines prior to the development and adoption of solutions.

Since the Weberian model of bureaucracy, involving administration in large organizations, tends to build structured environments based on a strict adherence to impersonal hierarchy and rules-based methodologies, it is possible to argue that government administration thrives in simple, stable (i.e., predictable), and controllable environments. Ostensibly, in such a structured, procedurally acquiescent environment, with centralized, formalized, stove-piped functions and functionaries operating under strict (time) constraints, these types of easy-to-follow desk reference guides, with their formal, decomposed, deliberate (i.e., prescriptive) instructions, are particularly well-suited.

- 1. GPRA-MA Focus Area #1: Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement**

- a. Official Government Policy***

One of the main requirements of the GPRA-MA involves the establishment of (a) leadership-driven governance structure(s) to oversee performance improvement activities within organizations.

Sections of the legislation supporting ownership and cross-organizational coordination and collaboration mandate the establishment of a governance structure in each agency led by a Chief Operating Officer (COO), and supported by a PIO. The federal PIO, either a career or non-career member of the SES, works under the direction of the agency head and the OMB. Agency PIOs staff a government-wide Performance Improvement Council (PIC) chaired by OMB's Deputy Director for Management (DDM).

Creating a performance culture that inspires continual learning and improvement requires the commitment and engagement of agency leadership. The GPRA-MA says, in effect, that leadership matters by requiring COOs, in collaboration with PIOs and Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs), to apply performance management best practices in translating policy into strategy, and strategy into action. In particular, the Act makes individual officials responsible for setting and achieving cross-cutting federal and agency priority goals,⁴⁹ distinguishing those that are the highest priority, driving progress on those priorities through inter- and intra-agency collaboration, and holding managers accountable for achieving mission results.⁵⁰

Clearly illustrating the federal government's desire to develop and instill a performance culture that emphasizes learning and results, Mr. Jeffrey Zients, the former OMB DDM and Chief Performance Officer (CPO) stated, "[We're] going to move from OMB sets priorities to the agency sets priorities; from oversight to partnership; from shipping reams of guidance to a two-way dialogue about how we achieve the desired outcome; from transparency not just for accountability, but for idea flow to find and share best practices; from ad-hoc engagement from stakeholders such as Congress, to regular communication. [...] I'm positive we'll make mistakes, we'll slip into some old bad habits, but I commit to you that we will serve you differently than we have in the past."⁵¹

Leadership has a new and unique role to play under the revised law, ensuring accountability and elevating the importance of the performance management and improvement discipline.⁵² Federal government performance leaders are being encouraged to advance the agenda of the GPRA-MA, by adopting the simple change

⁴⁹ Jacob Lew and Jeffrey Zients, *OMB M-11-17: Delivering on the Accountable Government Initiative and Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010* (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, April 14, 2011).

⁵⁰ Jacob Lew and Jeffrey Zients, *OMB M-11-31: Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable Government* (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, August 17, 2011).

⁵¹ Jason Miller, "OMB Wants to Change the Tone of Management," *Federalnewsradio.com*, October 17, 2011, <http://www.federalnewsradio.com/?nid=&sid=1791266>; Elizabeth Newell, "Performance Chief Promises to Help Managers Overcome Challenges," *GovExec.com*, October 5, 2009, <http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/100509e2.htm>.

⁵² Robert Shea, *Principle Grant Thornton LLP. Statement before the Committee on the Budget United States Senate*, March 16, 2011, 6.

management strategies of increased performance-related communication, coordination and collaboration, in efforts to eliminate the inadequacies of the original legislation.⁵³

b. Best Practices Literature

Fortunately, best practices literature can assist in this transformational process by providing useful specifics relating to the general theme of strategic leadership, or how to create collaborative networks to advance organizational learning, transformation, and manage change.

The topic of discussion is introduced quite well by authors Julia Balogun and Steven W. Floyd, in their work *Research in Organizational Change and Development*. They propose a model demonstrating the extensive interconnectedness between the “hard” (i.e., formal structure and hierarchy, governance structures, control systems, processes, etc.) and “soft” (i.e., culture, beliefs, relationships, etc.) components of strategic leadership and management, stating that any hope for lasting organizational change will require a holistic and seismic shift within both of these arenas.⁵⁴ Their model nicely summarizes the bi-furcated philosophical approach to leadership and decision making accepted and adopted by the majority of subject matter experts in the field.

Similar frameworks to better understand such dualism were also found in other works, and followed a typical pattern: first reviewing the existing literature on executive-level leadership styles (i.e., conceptual and behavioral complexity, strategic management, visionary/inspirational leadership, etc.), then discussing how leadership requirements can change as a function of organizational perspective and/or level (i.e., strategic, tactical, operational), and finally focusing on the unique nature of strategic vision and decision making.

⁵³ Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, *A Critical Role at a Critical Time: A Survey of Performance Improvement Officers* (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, April 2011); Shelley Metzenbaum, *Survey: PIOs Slowly Creating a Performance Culture*, Radio Interview by Jason Miller, *Federal News Radio*, 1500 AM, February 1, 2012.

⁵⁴ *Research in Organizational Change and Development*, vol. 18 (Bradford, GBR: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2010).

Strategic decision-making is the ability to think insightfully about consequential events over time, to understand what causes long-range effects in and on complex and dynamic systems, and to bring partisan, competing interests together under shared goals.⁵⁵

This main principle, often repeated, purports that strategic leaders are those who are capable of understanding complex situations and making decisions in the context of long-term, system-wide, vision or desired end-state, rather than simply in consideration of more short-term, stove-piped operations, associated with day-to-day operations and obligations.

Reiterated, as well, and along these same lines, was the requirement of strategic leaders to master various skill sets, such as strategic understanding and vision, team building, organizational analysis, power and politics, negotiations, and consensual decision making. Heuristic frameworks, along with templates and tools were often provided in order to assist in translating these epistemologies into practice.⁵⁶ We will be discussing many of these leadership skill sets throughout our literature review, particularly the importance of decision making in focus area three (3).

Most commentaries were acutely aware of the unique challenges power and politics posed in inhibiting leaders from managing logically, objectively and to the benefit of the overall organization.⁵⁷ The majority of authors underlined the existential requirement for leaders to be adept “politicians,” experienced in dealing with “diversity of thought” caused by ideological biases, special interests and/or competing tensions between and among organizations and their sub-cultures. Accepting this dynamic as a *fait accompli*, even (un)necessary evil, most of the authors, nevertheless, remained refreshingly optimistic, offering suggestions on how to navigate these treacherous waters

⁵⁵ Thomas Fernandes, *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making 1* (Delhi, IND: Global Media, 2009).

⁵⁶ Charles Lusthaus, Marie-Hélène Adrien, Gary Anderson, Fred Carden, and George Plinio Montalván, *Organizational Assessment: A Framework for Improving Performance* (Ottawa, ON, CAN: IDRC Books, 2002); Estrella et al., *Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation* (Ottawa, ON, CAN: IDRC Books, 2000); John Denton, *Organisational Learning and Effectiveness* (London, GBR: Routledge, 1998); Donald Kirkpatrick and James Kirkpatrick, *Transferring Learning to Behavior: Using the Four Levels to Improve Performance* (Williston, VT: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2005).

⁵⁷ Thomas Fernandes, *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making 2* (Delhi, IND: Global Media, 2009).

in ways that would still allow leaders to meaningfully contribute and obtain results for their organizations. Realistic, while avoiding cynicism, these recommendations for appropriately collaborating and managing networks to advance transformation, and manage change, included: marrying both the “will and skill” needed to embrace power politics as a positive rather than a negative force; understanding where the various clusters of interest, in terms of both people and functions, were located; leveraging these multiple power bases to ensure that existing status quo would not be threatened by innovative ideas and/or organizational change; and understanding the difference between formal authority and process, used mostly at the tactical/operational levels, and influence, method and negotiation, employed more often and successfully at the strategic levels.

The term *innovative leadership* was specifically applied to describe the above-mentioned qualities, particularly in the context of forming collaborative partnerships and networks to advance organizational learning and creative change management, both also major themes within the literature.

In one work, organizational learning was defined in simple terms as “the process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding,” and learning organizations as places where “people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”⁵⁸

Even though there were many different definitions and approaches to organizational learning, emphasis was placed, almost universally, on the importance of affecting behavior through *participatory pedagogy*, or learning through *doing things together*. The various works often detailed case studies demonstrating how to operationalize such evolutionary, descriptive learning by transferring various skill sets

⁵⁸ Denton, *Organisational Learning and Effectiveness*, 16.

into specific behavior(s), and then measuring how successful those achieved behaviors were in actually impacting overall mission effectiveness and efficiency.⁵⁹

Perhaps the most compelling work on innovative leadership described understanding the changing role of leadership in the face of an increasingly complex, and decentralized cultural and professional landscape. Authors Ori Branfman and Rod A. Beckstrom in their book, *The Starfish and the Spider*, speak of the unstoppable power of leaderless organizations, which are supplanting more traditional hierarchical configurations, through their ability to decentralize power, organize themselves in concentric circles, and capitalize on preexisting networks by leveraging already well-established platforms to initiate grass-roots change.

Branfman and Beckstrom see true leaders as passionate, ideological catalysts, even champions, willing to let go of their leadership role when necessary, trusting others to take ownership of and responsibility for results. The opposite of “glory hounds,” these altruistic leaders recognize the importance of initiating change, then getting out of the way and letting creative innovation do the rest.

The future lies, they believe, in recognizing the limitations of the typical manager, and beginning to see and embrace the almost limitless horizons that sharing leadership and power can afford.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Estrella et al., *Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation; Organisational Learning and Effectiveness*; Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, *Transferring Learning to Behavior: Using the Four Levels to Improve Performance*.

⁶⁰ Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider* (New York: Portfolio, Penguin Group USA, 2006), 130.

Typical Managers	Innovative Leaders
The Boss	A Peer
Command-and-Control	Trust
Rational	Emotionally Intelligent
Powerful	Inspirational
Directive	Collaborative
In the Spotlight	Behind the Scenes
Order	Ambiguity
Organizing	Connecting

Table 2. Managers Versus Leaders

In summary, the role of leadership in advancing strategic performance management at the federal level, through frameworks, such as the GPRA-MA, was heavily emphasized and cannot be overstated here. Current literature offers various tactics, techniques and tools to understand and leverage specific leadership approaches and skill sets. Some of the more articulate approaches recommended conducting organizational assessments, ensuring situational awareness at the strategic, tactical and operational levels, and leveraging performance monitoring and reporting systems that integrate large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources in order to produce a common operating picture of progress and/or success. Providing leaders with a better understanding of the present state of their organization allows for a more accurate communication of status and, by extension, more informed decision making at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels.

Equally stressed was the important role interpersonal relationships and collaborative networks can play in managing transformation and affecting lasting cultural change. Once again, organizational learning, involving all stakeholders and emphasizing adaptability and the utilization of new (i.e., innovative) knowledge was recommended as the best way to detect and close the gap between current leadership theory and practical management practices applicable in the “real world.”

The GPRA-MA recognizes the importance of creating such a leadership-driven performance culture that inspires continuous learning and improvement through shared understanding. The Act can be used as a driver to ensure that viable best practices

relative to leadership engagement and collaboration and learning and improvement are continually being refreshed and integrated into government organizational performance management and improvement strategies.

2. GPRA-MA Focus Area #2: Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment

a. Official Government Policy

In order to improve strategic clarity and organizational alignment, the strategic and performance planning and reporting portions of the Act require better connectivity among agency plans, programs and performance results. The GPRA-MA requires that the federal government set long-term Federal Government Priority Goals (FGPGs), in the form of (1) Cross-cutting Agency Priority (CAPs) goals that are outcome-oriented and cover a limited number of important policy areas; and (2) Management Priority Goals (MPGs) covering mission support areas, such as information technology, financial management, procurement and acquisition management, real property management, and human capital management. In addition, the legislation requires individual agencies to set near-term Agency Priority Goals (APGs), achievable within a 12–24 month timeframe.

Increased consultation with Congress to address these high-priority policy, management and performance issues is also a major stipulation of the legislation. Both the majorities and minorities of Congressional authorizing, appropriations, and oversight committees, are now afforded opportunities under the law to weigh in on agency goal setting, measure development, program evaluation and results assessment in executing their policymaking, budgeting, and oversight responsibilities.

A very important requirement of the Act, and one that should be valued by both the executive and legislative governing branches, is making sure that Congressional views are being heard when setting government program goals. Mutual agreement and collaboration between the two, however, are becoming increasingly problematic due to partisanship, and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) anticipates that requirements for congressional consultations to establish long-term FGPGs, and short-term APGs will

create additional tension in congressional and executive branch working relationships. This is a bi-partisan problem due to the demonstrated diversity of thought among existing political parties.

Congress may indeed provide suggestions to the Obama Administration on “high-risk” areas they should be focusing their performance improvement efforts on, yet these priorities can often be very different from the President’s management agenda. For example, the OMB admits to studying GAO recommendations in selecting its CAP goals, but they also state that they can choose to place emphasis on selecting goals that reflect current Presidential priorities, as well.

This observation highlights a potential hindrance to effective GPRA-MA implementation. How can Congress and the President collaborate toward a common end if they are unable to find common ground? It is difficult to make progress in a world of competing and often contradictory priorities. The goal-setting performance improvement dynamic of the GPRA-MA framework may be sound in principle, but political realities have the potential to dampen the benefits of this key stipulation. The legislation and its official policy guidance currently lack adequate mechanisms to ensure objective and independent adjudication of the competing and often contradictory agendas and priorities of these two power entities. One authoritative document revealed continuing skepticism about “whether the congressional consultations [mandated by the Act] would [actually] be enough to mitigate some of these challenges, [or] create enhanced opportunities for Congress to influence the direction of agencies, [and, therefore] foster the congressional-executive collaboration and compromise demanded by the legislation.”⁶¹

Real solutions are required to overcome some of these partisan challenges, which, due to the unique nature of our current form of representative government, might not be resolved anytime soon. According to recent studies, the level of political polarization is actually at an all-time high, the highest it has been since the end of

⁶¹ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes*, 19.

Reconstruction between the two major parties within the House and Senate, increasingly moving to the extremes along the liberal-moderate-conservative spectrum.⁶²

Part of the solution to overcoming these challenges and minimize the political-administrative dichotomy created by the diminishing role of moderates in political decision making, may be to singly focus these disparate legislative and administrative efforts on ensuring better strategic planning, clarity and organizational alignment, through the incorporation of best practices.

b. Best Practices Literature

Going beyond the slightly mechanical and rather limited goal of reconciling Congressional legislative and executive branch perspectives, however, the best practices literature recommended, quite radically, a complete departure from any and all types of traditional strategic performance management practices involving complex multi-year strategic plans, detailed annual budgets, and quarterly forecasting and performance reports. In light of the rapidly expanding and seemingly infinite landscape that is today's increasingly competitive, dynamic, and volatile operating environment, most traditional planning and management reporting processes, were believed to be too lethargic, detail-oriented, inward-focused and disconnected from partner/stakeholder expectations to offer any satisfying, long-term solutions. It was thought that they were simply being outpaced by other, more fluid, forms of communication, forcing organizations to radically rethink some of their traditional performance management processes.⁶³

Although business performance management encompasses all the processes, information, and systems used by managers to translate strategy into action through the development of sound strategic, tactical and operational planning and supporting financial processes, special emphasis will be placed, here, on capturing only those ideas, tools and techniques that are related to ensuring strategic clarity and

⁶² See link: [Voteview.com](http://voteview.com), "The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, Updated January 18, 2013, http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp.

⁶³ David A. J. Axson, *Best Practices in Planning and Performance Management: Radically Rethinking Management for a Volatile World*, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 5.

organizational alignment as a means to establish and achieve common goals. Comments, therefore, will be articulated around the following two (2) themes: organizational strategic planning and performance management, and budget-performance integration methodologies.

(1) Organizational Strategic Planning and Performance Management. Prevalent within the literature is a multiplicity of strategic performance management frameworks comprised of integrated processes and tools to manage, develop and translate strategy into operational actions, and monitor and improve the effectiveness of both.

A common challenge and major hindrance to ensuring strategic clarity and alignment identified in the best practices literature, was the lack of sufficient collaboration and agreement once a framework was selected and the actual development of strategy began. These can be important obstacles that can potentially derail efforts, as impactful results are most often the product of collective, as opposed to individual, contributions.

Such discord can take many forms, both intra- and inter-organizationally. Authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton summarize the latter dynamic (i.e., non-alignment within organizations), capturing the majority opinion, by stating “strategy is almost [always] completely disconnected from execution.” Their solution to bridge the gap between intent and results and correct such organizational misalignment is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC).⁶⁴

Other similar alignment models, which create a clear line of sight between high-level strategic goals and individual program and personnel contributions,

⁶⁴ The Balanced Scorecard, by applying clear logic model principles without limiting input to “fixed” cause-and-effect relationships, can take into account additional factors influencing process and outcomes. It provides the increased flexibility required to define and implement the cross-cutting goals of an extended homeland security enterprise scorecard and measure the contribution and performance of its multiple components, stakeholders and partners, and this, according to four (4) distinct perspectives: (1) the customer; (2) financial measurement; (3) internal business processes; and (4) knowledge, education and growth.

include logic models and strategy maps which display the various relationships and processes that exist among diverse elements contributing to goal and measure achievement.⁶⁵

Some of the most common processes reviewed to facilitate strategic clarity and organizational alignment included strategic planning, tactical planning, financial planning, management reporting, forecasting, and risk management, as well as additional sub-processes and tasks associated with internal management control systems. The latter included conducting comprehensive environmental assessments, or SWOT/C analyses (i.e., strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats/challenges), goal selection, priority identification, implementation planning, strategy alignment, performance measurement methodologies, facilitated learning through consistent feedback and benchmarking, and flexible governance and accountability structures.

Almost all of these are alluded to in some form or another in either the GPRA-MA itself or the resulting OMB policy guidance, the Circular A-11, along with prescribed actions to improve results in these areas. Reflective of the best practices literature, they include:

- Engaging the political environment more in actual goal setting and decision making, such as eliciting input from Congress;
- Obtaining White House advocacy and its management and oversight body (i.e., OMB);
- Engaging additional external constituencies (i.e., interest groups and the media); and, finally,
- Cultivating public service motivation among employees.⁶⁶

In addition to engaging external environments, there are also internal keys to success, such as:⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Chris Wye, *Performance Management for Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What You Have Guide* (The IBM Center for the Business of Government, October 2004), 33.

⁶⁶ Steven Kelman and Jeff Myers, *Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government* (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, April 2009), 11–12, 27–30.

⁶⁷ Gary L. Neilson, Karla L. Martin, and Elizabeth Powers, “The Secrets to Successful Strategy Execution,” *Harvard Business Review*, June 2008, 1.

- Centralizing strategy-related functions;
- Breaking down partitions, avoiding work in isolation;
- Ensuring and properly communicating strategic alignment between high-level enterprise-wide strategic/tactical/operational implementation and small group/individual motivations, contributions and reward/incentives;
- Integrating management functions and processes linking strategy to resource allocation;
- Delineating clear responsibilities or “ownership” for execution and decision making; and
- Ensuring both vertical and horizontal review and communication of strategy execution and performance results.

The IBM Center for the Business of Government produced an influential work in 2007 addressed to the current Obama Administration, “Performance Management Recommendations for the New Administration.” Written by Dr. Shelley H. Metzenbaum, the report details several guiding principles and recommendations to improve government performance offered at all levels from the President, to the OMB and the PIC, to Cabinet Secretaries and Agency Heads. Unsurprisingly, since Dr. Metzenbaum was the former OMB Associate Director for Performance and Personnel Management, many of her concepts have been captured in OMB’s Circular A-11, or policy guidance for the GPRA-MA implementation. Those specifically relating to focus area #2, or ensuring a clear line of sight between program development, execution and impact, recommended increased collaboration, communication and consistency in performance goal setting, monitoring and reporting by:

- Clearly identifying Presidential priority targets;
- Establishing performance management/improvement leadership and teams at all levels of government;
- Identifying management cross-agency targets and measures; and
- Redesigning web-enabled federal performance portals.

Presenting information in a way that meets the needs of specific audiences, the third of four guiding principles to improve federal performance management, is perhaps the one that contributes the most to ensuring strategic clarity and

alignment.⁶⁸ People should be met when and where they are, at whatever capability level, in their disparate approaches to managing for results. If practitioners are not able to package information in meaningful ways to satisfy the needs of end users, becoming true value added, then it becomes more difficult for them to recognize where they stand in relationship to the overall strategy and what the significance of their individual contributions might be. Without such clarity, alignment becomes opaque and chimerical.

One recent work expounded on the development of performance measures and targets as a *means* to develop strategy and align implementation efforts, rather than as a *consequence* of it.⁶⁹ As a remedy to misaligned strategy, the author quite radically recommended establishing the following 3-prong approach to ensure that measurement was driving strategy, rather than the other way around:

- *Define Outcomes:* What are the specific outcomes that we aim to achieve?
- *Create the Action Plan:* What actions do we need to take in order to get there?
- *Add Clarity through Metrics:* How will we measure our progress?

With regards to intra-organizational alignment, or alignment between organizations, Chris Wye attempts to reconcile diverging interests among various independent stakeholders by linking performance management and strategy achievement with the overall public good, or, as previously stated, cultivating public service motivation among employees:

To talk about improving government performance alone, without connecting it to a higher vision of public service, is more often than not, to focus on all the things that need to be fixed—to see the glass as half empty.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Principle One: Communicate Performance Trends and Targets, not Target Attainment and Ratings; Principle Two: Encourage Performance Improvement with Increased Diagnostic Analysis, Data-Driven Discussion, Practical Experiments, and Knowledge Sharing; Principle Three: Present Information to Meet the Needs of Specific Audiences; and Principle Four: Structure Accountability Mechanisms to Encourage and Inspire, not Embarrass, Reprimand or Punish.

⁶⁹ Cheryl Davenport, *Measurement Drives Strategy, Not the Other Way Around: A Guide to Outcomes-based Strategic Planning and Program Design*, Mission Measurement, 2011.

⁷⁰ Wye, *Performance Management For Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What You Have Guide*, 4.

Wye places the onus squarely on the shoulders of leaders demonstrating how career executives can overcome common problems in the design, alignment, use, and communication of performance information by developing effective responses to common obstacles frequently encountered within public institutions when attempting to implement performance management/measurement systems.

Providing and responding to a common set of pessimistic and/or cynical comments often made by federal government leaders and managers, Wye offers up several antidotes to various forms of passive and active resistance toward the performance management discipline. Rather than respond to each individual objection contributing to the stagnation of performance improvement efforts within and across agencies, he attempts to change the overall thought dynamic, collectively raising the bar for everyone, by equating true public service with a *results-based* mind-set that continually seeks to improve performance.

There is a great need to develop a management culture that cultivates new ideas and better practices. If we simply monitor [and reproduce] the practices of others, we can be no better than good imitators. But if we create a climate in which new and better ways of doing things is valued and encouraged, we can generate a culture of improvement where the pursuit of quality become[s] an overriding mission.⁷¹

In order to create such an innovative climate/culture more conducive to performance improvement, he encourages public service (i.e., servant) leaders, as a normal “no frills” part of their duties, responsibilities, and the high-trust environment inherent with their professions, to apply several best practices approaches in response to the most common “knuckle dragger” objections. These counter responses relate to specific performance-related functions, such as designing performance indicators, aligning performance processes, and using and communicating performance information, and are intended to be useful in overcoming resistance within each of those specific areas.

⁷¹ Wye, *Performance Management For Career Executives: A Start Where You Are, Use What You Have Guide*, 12.

We see here, once again, an emphasis on leadership, a recurring theme throughout all five (5) focus areas, to anchor, then drive, performance management frameworks that facilitate strategic clarity and organizational alignment.

Kaplan and Norton recommended the establishment of a centralized office of strategy management reporting directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or his/her equivalent. They underlined the importance of interactive leadership, properly wielding influence and staying informed through collaborative, participatory management styles, as keys to success in overcoming barriers, obstacles and objections to change:

While many people believe that the chief executives wield direct and easy influence, the reality is that any [CEO] has a difficult time influencing his or her organization. A [CEO's] attempts to command and control undermine the authority of senior executives. I want to exert my influence indirectly and in a way that empowers my executive and creates an environment in which they can lead and manage their parts of the organization. I set the tone, and I define the strategic agenda, communicate it, and ensure that it gets undertaken, but I don't command any parts of the organization.⁷²

Finally, and once again, the influence of politics, or more particularly, of political appointees, to ensure overall performance and democratic responsiveness was highlighted. One study found that understanding and communicating political considerations could actually contribute to the likelihood of change toward mission integration, by ensuring greater flexibility when faced with it. On the other hand, the same study also determined that most of the current traditional public and non-profit change or transformational management strategies proposed by political leadership (i.e., reorganization, "burning platform," quick wins and pilots) really don't significantly impact change, because such strategies tend to focus on individual short-term pet projects, as opposed to emphasizing the general improvement of overall management processes or long-term organizational performance.⁷³

⁷² Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, "The Office of Strategy Management," *Harvard Business Review*, October 2005, 6.

⁷³ Kelman and Myers, *Successfully Executing Ambitious Strategies in Government*, 41–44.

(2) Budget-Performance Integration (BPI) Methodologies. In studying our second strategy to ensure greater strategic clarity and alignment, we revisit here one of our previously defined categories of performance accountability, *fiscal responsibility*, or government spending its money as authorized as efficiently and effectively as possible.

The GPRA-MA is, in fact, first a tool for both Congress and the President to better inform the executive budget process, which consists of three main phases: development of the President’s budget proposal, submission and justification of the President’s budget proposal, and execution of enacted appropriations and other budgetary legislation.⁷⁴ When executive agencies submit their requests and justification materials to OMB for examination and review before final Congressional submission, they are required to provide statements of the President’s policy priorities along with a unified plan for the allocation of federal budgetary resources toward those goals, all supported by reliable (i.e., verified and validated) performance information displaying past, current and projected results.

In compliance with OMB Circular A-11, Part 6, agencies submit this integrated budget-performance information in what is called a “Performance Budget Strategic Context.” The purpose of the Strategic Context (SC) is to describe how the resources and performance of DHS components contribute to the mission of the department, in answer to question: *How does the component help the department accomplish its mission set?* Within each departmental mission, the SC highlights the ways and means components achieve strategic objectives through individual programs, known as the Future Year Homeland Security Program (FYHSP). The SC also communicates specific resource requests, their associated performance impact, and how program resources and planned performance results contribute to the accomplishment of the department’s overarching strategic goals and objectives.

⁷⁴ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *The Executive Budget Process: An Overview* by Michelle D. Christensen, CRS Report R42633 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 27, 2012), 1.

Because of this, budget preparation is a time and data intensive process for agencies, involving detailed analysis and estimation of past and future budgetary resources, aligned to strategic and performance plans and reports, in the hope that these analyses will attest to the overall effectiveness and cost-efficiency of funded government programs either seeking to maintain current or obtain future taxpayer dollars.

Understandably, multiple resources have been developed over the years to assist OMB and federal agencies in completing this important task. Unfortunately, many of these resources also prefer to maintain the philosophy of formal rules-based compliance reporting in developing their guidance, missing important opportunities to provide advice on how to use performance information more liberally at other important stages of the budget process. One resource, in particular, breaks away from this standard approach of staying within the strict Congressional and OMB confines for budget-performance integration in the context of the preparation, approval, execution, audit, and evaluation of the budget.

Philip G. Joyce, in his report, “Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal Budget Process,” proposes a workable framework that allows public performance practitioners to better link performance information to funding decisions, at different junctures in the process and in a way that might actually impact policy and resource allocation decisions. His systematic and integrated framework shifts the focus of the debate from inputs to outcomes and results, in order to ensure that performance information is applied in ways other than to simply justify current funding levels. Achieving a more results-oriented and accountable government means increasing the capacity of the federal government to link resources to actual results, also reiterating what Professor Behn of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government says about the use of performance measures in the federal budgeting process:

Performance measurement can help public officials to make budget allocations. At the macro level, however, the apportionment of tax monies is a political decision made by political officials. [...] Thus, political priorities, not agency performance, drive macro budgetary choices. [...] Nevertheless, line managers can use performance data to inform their

resource allocation decisions. Once elected officials have established macro political priorities, those responsible for more micro decisions may seek to invest their limited allocation of resources in the most cost-effective units and activities. And when making such micro budgetary choices, public managers may find performance measures useful.⁷⁵

Moving beyond the former and current logic-model based federal budgeting systems, such as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) and zero-based budgeting (ZBB) leading to the original GPRA in 1993, and the subsequent Bush Administration's PART supporting the BPI component of the President's Management Agenda (PMA), the Joyce model has advocated for a more systematic use of performance information in the budget process, further reconciling macro- and micro-views of success and the various strategic, tactical and operational actions contributing to that success. His basic premise is elementary, yet essential: if information is not used to make decisions, then it is neither important, nor necessary. He proposes making performance-informed budget data available and useful by:

- Further integrating planning and budgeting processes, supporting them with better performance and cost information;
- Identifying ways/approaches to use performance information at every stage of the budget development, execution and audit and evaluation process; and
- Reforming the Congressional authorization process to better communicate legislative performance expectations and free agencies of the current constraints placed upon them by ineffective and inefficient authorization and appropriations frameworks.⁷⁶

Making performance measures useful, not only to ensure strategic and organizational alignment but also for more informed decision making, is one of the main purposes of the GPRA-MA and the subject of our next focus area.

⁷⁵ Robert Behn, "Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures," *Public Administration Review* 63, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 586–606.

⁷⁶ Philip G. Joyce, "Linking Performance and Budgeting: Opportunities in the Federal Budget Process," in *Managing for Results*, ed. John M. Kamensky and Albert Morales (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2005).

3. GPRA-MA Focus Area #3: Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation

a. Official Government Policy

To address shortfalls in the use of performance information in program decision making, the legislation calls for strengthened measure development methodologies, undergird by more rigorous data verification and validation processes to ensure the quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data. Accompanying OMB policy places an emphasis on improving analytical capability to accurately measure the achievement of both near- and long-term goals. Program evaluations, incorporating qualitative and quantitative performance data and other evidence, are encouraged to help better understand what is working and what isn't and to take measures to improve results and achieve success.

The usefulness of improving analytical capability, through performance measurement and program evaluation, cannot be overstated. However, special attention is called for in order to avoid flawed executive branch measurements and evaluations due to politicized bias and selectivity. Examples of this have already been highlighted and pertain primarily to deficiencies in the methodologies selected or preferred by presidential administrations in their eagerness to display success, as opposed to measuring actual program progress.⁷⁷ Since GPRA-MA requires many products to be developed by the executive branch and submitted to Congress to inform its legislative policy and resource allocation deliberations, issues involving credibility are primarily attributed to the perceived bias or the lack of objectivity, as a result of the often competing Congressional oversight and executive branch policy-making roles.

Congress' role makes it naturally wary of accepting evaluations from the executive branch at face value. Recognizing that the establishment of mission and associated goals is often a political adventure, defining and measuring success against these standards can be politically motivated as well, lacking the independence and

⁷⁷ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Obama Administration Agenda for Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress* by Clinton T. Brass, CRS memorandum (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 19, 2011), 21.

objectivity required. Congress may hold the purse strings, but the President as the chief manager of federal funds has competing and sometimes contradictory priorities. Data the executive branch collects and evaluates does not always meet Congress' requirements or comply with the criteria set by the legislative branch.

Once again, collaboration and trust comes into play when attempting to identify acceptable methodologies and tools to appropriately define and achieve "success," ensuring that analytical products are making credible, unbiased representations about how well agencies and programs are performing, without totally divorcing metrics from politics, which would be to produce another form of tyranny, that of the technocrats.

Hoping to mitigate some of these challenges, a few institutions have already begun providing helpful suggestions in the form of hands-on practical and tested performance measurement aids and techniques.⁷⁸ These supplement OMB's guiding philosophy contained in their official policy and are meant to enhance existing evaluation tools and methodologies.⁷⁹

b. Best Practices Literature

The urgency pertaining to this one major focus area of the GPRA-MA, performance measurement and program evaluation, seems to have dramatically increased.

"Efficiency and effectiveness" has become the new mantra of many federal agencies, including the DHS. In the increasingly constrained fiscal environment in which we are now operating, it is becoming more and more problematic to "spend whatever is necessary to secure the homeland."⁸⁰ Because we are now required to do more, do better, and, especially, [do] with less, the original GPRA's initial focus on long-range planning, priority setting, and establishing "clear performance-based measures of

⁷⁸ U.S. Government and Accountability Office, *Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA-MA to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making* (GAO-12-621SP), Washington, DC: GPO, June 2012.

⁷⁹ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Obama Administration Agenda for Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress*.

⁸⁰ President George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Office of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, July 2002), 63.

effectiveness,”⁸¹ is no longer enough to achieve success in today’s world of diminishing budgets. The performance measurement and assessment requirements of the GPRA-MA are an indication that GPRA’s initial efforts are increasingly being undergirded by the development of more robust program analysis and evaluation capabilities.⁸² Since “future resource constraints are seemingly unavoidable, at least for the foreseeable future,”⁸³ and “years of rising fiscal and trade deficits will...necessitate hard choices in the years ahead,”⁸⁴ emphasis is being placed on ensuring that not only risk-based performance plans, but also actual program results are informing decision making.

The quasi-totality of ready-made best practices for the public sector are expressing this philosophical shift using similar terms as well, such as “data-driven decision making,” “real-time data transparency,” or “business/predictive analytics” which combine a wide variety of technological tools, techniques and tactics. The intent is for performance measurement practitioners and data analysts to (1) *collect better information*, (2) *conduct better data analysis*, and (3) *make better decisions*, hopefully resulting in real solutions to “big,” seemingly intractable, problems.

Often the final package resulting from this three-prong effort is what is referred to as the “performance-stat” approach, based on systems and models developed in city and state governments, but increasingly being adopted and adapted by federal agencies. This so-called “Stat” approach is based on frequent goal-focused, data-driven meetings that support decision makers in reaching priority goals, and is the focus of our next section.

⁸¹ President George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 69.

⁸² Chapter 8 of the Analytical Perspectives of the Budget “Program Evaluation and Data Analytics” states that “Evaluations do what performance measurement, alone, cannot. Evaluations determine whether programs produce outcomes superior to alternative policy choices, or not putting into place a policy at all. This is in contrast with performance measurement, which tracks implementation and progress toward intended program outcomes, but typically does not compare outcomes to alternative programs or the status quo.” Executive Office of the President of the United States, “Fiscal Year 2013 Analytical Perspectives Budget of the U.S. Government,” *Office of Management and Budget*, 2013, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/spec.pdf>, 91.

⁸³ David J. Kaufman, “Crisis Response and Disaster Resilience 2030: Forging Strategic Action in an Age of Uncertainty Progress Report Highlighting the 2010–2011 Insights of the Strategic Foresight Initiative,” *Federal Emergency Management Agency*, January 2012, 2.

⁸⁴ Mr. Y, *National Strategic Narrative* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 9.

Before we begin our discussion of data-informed performance reviews, the current “new thing” in government performance improvement, let us look more closely at some of the solutions the best practices literature is offering public executives to improve the quantity, quality and application of program data to communicate progress and success, both internally and cross-organizationally.

(1) Collecting Better Data. In order for governments to use performance data to make decisions, it must be “good,” in terms of quantity, quality, and accuracy. Current literature is placing an emphasis on ways to ensure the availability, applicability and veracity of performance data, in the face of increasing external skepticism and scrutiny.

However, because the focus is still on the public *manager* and not the public *citizen*, the general public continues to remain mistrustful of official government data due to their lack of understanding and/or participation in government decision making.

This lacuna has been recognized in current guidance, which recommends that performance data be developed in collaboration with all partners and stakeholders, particularly the end users or final consumers, as well as tailored to their unique purposes. It is important for public performance practitioners to keep this in mind, as data combined with analysis seen as useful to program managers will be very different from the same information considered useful by members of Congress and/or the American public.

(2) Conducting Better Analysis. Understanding who these end users are and what kinds of data and data displays are necessary to provide real meaning to particular stakeholders should be supported by robust analysis and evaluation. Both are essential if government is to begin to use this type of information in actual decision making contributing to public trust.

In a recent report, “From Data to Decisions: The Promise of Analytics,”⁸⁵ and its follow-up how-to guide, “From Data to Decisions II: Building an Analytics Culture,”⁸⁶ several government agencies and programs were studied by the Partnership for Public Service and the IBM Center for the Business of Government. Several myths, believed to contribute to success, were debunked, such as the necessity to have direct control over activities in order to develop measures; that measures alone represent the outcomes; that everything has to be measured; or that leadership in analytics starts at the top. By creating a decentralized, bottom-up, managerial “data analytics” framework emphasizing collaboration, transparency (or accessibility), and accountability (or clear “line of sight” between individual employee/program contributions and organizational outcomes), performance management practitioners can get data to “tell a story,” turning it into real value-added knowledge that can be used by any and all stakeholders to inform and drive their decisions.

Creating the necessary analytics culture to support such a framework requires identifying up front what data is needed to measure the achievement of desired results, as well as creating ownership of the process. Gaining acceptance and buy-in from all relevant parties, including the general public, will allow leaders to incorporate relevant and meaningful data analytics into their daily operations as a standard operating procedure and a means to achieve success through more informed (and trusted) decision making.

(3) Making Better Decisions. As previously mentioned, the original GPRA was refreshed in 2010 in order to get public executives to use data and analyses to make decisions and set priorities. Even though, as a result of the original Act, agencies had produced and/or collected better data, the challenge remained to translate that information into real knowledge necessary to take effective and timely action.

⁸⁵ *From Data to Decisions: The Power of Analytics* (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service and the IBM Center for the Business of Government, November 2011).

⁸⁶ *From Data to Decisions II: Building an Analytics Culture* (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service and the IBM Center for the Business of Government, October 2012).

To meet such a challenge, the literature reviewed often recommended the development of an overarching PMF, comprised of some version of the following elements: logic modeling, performance measurement, and program evaluation.

Clinton T. Brass of the CRS discusses these three policy implementation and oversight tools in his report on the Obama Administration's Government Performance Agenda.⁸⁷ Like the GAO, he sees program evaluation as much broader in scope than performance measurement, the latter often simply being a subset of the former. He concludes that the three taken together, offer a viable solution to measure strategy because it raises questions about what exactly constitutes success and monitors progress toward this end-state.

c. Logic Modeling

Most DHS agencies assess results of programs after the fact based on pre-established criteria and goals, using the Logic Model to associate the WHAT with the SO WHAT, the HOW with the WHY.

Development of an effective PMF begins with the selection of some form of program theory, such as the logic model, and/or balanced scorecard, which can integrate program development, implementation and evaluation and performance measurement into one consistent framework. The logic model provides a reductionist rationale behind each mission/program activity, process, program, or investment and displays the strategy behind how a program is intended to achieve policy-level goals. It describes the causal relationships among current activities, future outcomes, and the strategies and measurements in between. The logic model is created by working back from the expected high-level outcomes (which justify the investment), through the outputs, processes, and inputs that are believed to produce these outcomes. The logic model also provides a useful structure to identify, develop and/or improve performance measures, introducing indicators along its cascading spectrum to determine whether logical connections actually exist and how they impact each other.

⁸⁷ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Obama Administration Agenda for Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress*, 12–13.

The following visual display of a logic model clarifies this logical sequence of agency activities, programs and their intended results.




Figure 2. Logic Model

d. Performance Measurement

Performance measurement provides quantitative data in the form of different levels of performance indicators associated with individual steps along the logic model sequence: activities and/or *inputs* detailing the process of completing a good or service; *outputs* representing tangible accomplishments; *intermediate outcomes* pertaining to changes in behavior or practice; and *end outcomes* demonstrating actual accomplishments or value added.

Best practices recommendations include identifying or developing various performance measure sets, in line with sound program theory (i.e., logic modeling, balanced scorecards, strategy mapping etc.), then tailoring them to the needs of the end users, based on at least one of the following eight (8) main purposes for measuring performance:⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures,” 586–606.

- *Evaluate:* How well is my public agency performing?
- *Control:* How can I ensure that my subordinates are doing the right thing?
- *Budget:* On what programs, people, or projects should my agency spend the public's money?
- *Motivate:* How can I motivate line staff, middle managers, nonprofit and for-profit collaborators, stakeholders, and citizens to do the things necessary to improve performance?
- *Promote:* How can I convince political superiors, legislators, stakeholders, journalists, and citizens that my agency is doing a good job?
- *Celebrate:* What accomplishments are worthy of the important organizational ritual of celebrating success?
- *Learn:* Why is what working or not working?
- *Improve:* What exactly should we do differently to improve performance?

Program effectiveness expressed in terms of achieving long-term performance goals can be demonstrated through the development and continued improvement of program performance measures. Performance measures determine whether desired results are being achieved and where resources and efforts should be (re)allocated to ensure continued effectiveness. Additionally, performance measures keep the agency focused on key goals, justify budget increases, and help focus planning and implementation efforts.

e. Program Evaluation

Properly assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of a strategy or program requires additional qualitative data that goes beyond the hard facts contained in quantitative data sets, such as performance measures. This type of “softer” analysis integrates additional evaluation factors, such as subject matter expertise and subjective judgment.

Qualitative program evaluation, much wider in focus than quantitative performance measurement, offers fuller visibility of program performance. Program evaluation is “the application of systematic analytic methods to address questions about

program operations and results,”⁸⁹ and is a cumulative learning process that utilizes a diverse palette of methods, studies and analyses to measure and understand a program’s results in order to better inform enterprise-wide, as well as individual office and program level leadership decision making. It answers questions about how programs work, how well they are performing (i.e., achieving their objectives), and how they can be improved.

A 2001 report entitled, “Using Evaluation to Support Performance Management: A Guide for Federal Executives,” provides an assessment of how program evaluation is being used in the federal government, along with practical recommendations to support performance management and improvement in compliance with GPRA requirements. There are, in fact, many ways in which managers can improve accountability and results through the use of program evaluation and more robust performance information and data.

We see that, even more than 10 years ago, emphasis was already being placed on transitioning from simply producing performance data, for external compliance reporting purposes, to actually using it, in order to impact results.

The report offered a conceptual framework to assist agencies in using program evaluation tools and supporting analytical staff to institutionalize program evaluation and performance measurement in the context of strategic and program planning, implementation and assessment. It provided various types and methods of program evaluation to:

- Define measurable program outcomes;
- Design or discover tools to measure these outcomes;
- Collect valid data;
- Analyze these data; and
- Present results in formats useful to a variety of audiences.

They demonstrated the usefulness of program evaluation to ensure organizational alignment between strategies and outcomes. By revealing causal

⁸⁹ Kathryn E. Newcomer and Mary Ann Scheirer, *Using Evaluation to Support Performance Management: A Guide for Federal Executives* (The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, January 2001), 4.

effectiveness or how agency programs actually contribute to achieve end results, program evaluation methodologies and tools can be applied to make mission and program improvements.

Most best practices tailored for the use of public institutions, advocated for such objective performance management methodologies and tools to assess overall posture and measure the effectiveness of federal investments. Many stated that the previous focus on measuring success in output alone (e.g., accomplishing action milestones) was insufficient in determining future outlays of resources. Limiting assessment to lessons learned and best practices may allow agencies to determine whether they did things right, but not whether they did the right things.

In summary, a more comprehensive performance measurement solution (i.e., performance management framework) is increasingly being seen as a counterweight to the role and influence of politics, as a way to (re)define and/or frame the discourse. Many of the practitioners reviewed were staunch proponents of this third GPRA-MA focus area, advancing their epistemologies as the “truth” and “proof” limiting the (political) “spoof,” and a means to prevent government leaders from cherry-picking priorities and programs based on political agendas, rather than on mission and operational efficiency and effectiveness. Materials available on this topic, therefore, were meant to provide agencies with the necessary tools to develop, apply (i.e., analysis) and report more objective, empirical data in ways that would promote mutual benefit to a multiplicity of stakeholders, viewpoints and objectives, in an apolitical environment.

Even though it is a difficult task to mandate the pursuit of common interest, in addition to the self-interest so prevalent in the hearts of men, real objectivity, the bedrock of accurate assessment and evaluation, and necessary for true performance accountability, requires it.

Without such independent, non-partisan oversight coupled with specific performance management solutions to supplement current official guidance, agencies will continue to emphasize compliance and “politicized” performance analysis and reporting

rather than focusing on actual results and improvement. In other words, they will continue to default to their preferred stance of *proving* success rather than *improving* performance.

Definitions of Types and Methods for Program Evaluation
<i>Conceptual Development</i>—Methods (i.e., logic models and program theory) for detailing the pathways by which programs are intended to work.
<i>Development of Evaluation Methods and Quality Control</i>—Detailing the procedures and specifications to be used for collecting data, for evaluation study designs, and for verification and validation of data quality (i.e., surveys, field observations, interviews, management information systems, focus groups, expert panel judgments, case studies, etc.).
<i>Use of Data Systems</i>—Using data from available statistical indicators (e.g., state-collected “vital statistics” or regularly collected surveys), from program-specific Management Information Systems, and/or from Geographic Information Systems.
<i>Process and Impact Evaluation Studies</i>—Systematically conducted assessments, usually on a one-time basis, of the activities or interventions undertaken by a program, and/or of the results attributable to that program.

Table 3. Definitions of Types and Methods for Program Evaluation

4. GPRA-MA Focus Area #4: Performance Reviews

a. Official Government Policy

Mr. Zients, the Obama Administration’s former OMB Deputy Director for Management and CPO, said that the “ultimate test of our performance management efforts is whether or not the information is used,”⁹⁰ underscoring OMB’s shift from focusing on planning and reporting performance to using performance information in decision making.

The GPRA-MA significantly changes how agencies prepare, discuss and communicate progress in their GPRA-mandated performance plans and reports, and the periodic and structured review of progress.

The Act stipulates that enhanced information be used to drive both cross-cutting and individual program improvements through quarterly in-person data-driven

⁹⁰ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes*, 19.

reviews. Each agency head and COO, with the support of the PIO and PIC, will analyze and discuss previous and current data in an open, transparent, and diagnostic manner. COOs are responsible for making sure that program managers regularly communicate actionable performance indicators, supported by value-added analysis, to both internal and external stakeholders in order to highlight promising practices, identify problems and recommend solutions. These reviews are conducted on programs identified by GAO as “high-risk,” or selected by agency leadership as contributing to the accomplishment of long-term federal government priority goals (i.e., FGPGs, CAPs, MPGs), overarching agency strategic goals, or near-term priority goals (i.e., APGs). Including key personnel from other components, programs, or agencies, these quarterly reviews are meant to eliminate program duplication, overlap, and fragmentation, and identify “low priority programs” for possible reprogramming or termination.⁹¹

Even though GPRA-MA does not specify any oversight or deliverable requirement for the quarterly reviews themselves, the OMB has formed an Internal Reviews Working Group, primarily consisting of representatives from multiple agencies across the federal government who meet on a monthly basis to discuss leading practices in the areas of data-driven reviews, as well as associated topics, such as business intelligence, risk management and performance measurement. The group recently led a baseline study of internal agency review practices across the federal government and has benchmarked numerous review processes and associated performance management tools for government-wide application.

In 2011, this working group conducted a baseline study of how the 24 CFO-Act agencies were conducting their internal performance reviews. This survey was repeated in 2012 to monitor trends in learning, improvement and other challenges, such as the availability of data, and the ability to detect quarterly progress and provide timely reporting. The study concluded that over 80% of federal agencies were realizing the

⁹¹ (1) Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRA-MA); (2) *GPRA Modernization Act*, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 2142; (3) Office of Management and Budget (OMB), *OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 6: Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual Performance Reports*.

impact of performance reviews, up from 30% in 2011. Success was attributed to COO engagement and an evolving culture of data-driven analysis and decision making, organizational collaboration and increased goal tracking. Business Intelligence (BI) was also a keen area of focus, with 75% of agencies signaling that they were currently using BI solutions. The role of technology in planning and performance management will be discussed much more detail in the last section of this literature review, or the fifth GPRA-MA focus area covering transparency and accountability.

In addition to the cross-agency priority goals that are reviewed quarterly by the OMB deputy director with support from the PIC, OMB is expected to annually determine whether an agency has met the performance goals in its performance plan. Holding agencies accountable to achieve measurable results, GPRA-MA also requires OMB to annually identify goals agencies failed to achieve, and to require remedial action. To accomplish this requirement in a way that encourages learning, OMB applies the SOAR process. SOAR offers a supportive, non-confrontational, non-punitive environment that serves as a mechanism to reinforce strategic thinking and decision making by asking and answering tough questions about progress on high-level goals, and the most effective allocation of resources that would allow agencies to achieve higher performance.⁹² Strategies to meet any unmet goals are captured in supplemental plans and reports (i.e., PIPs). OMB and Congress monitor PIPs over a period of three years, with each year requiring specific and progressive action. If a performance goal remains “unmet” for either two or three consecutive fiscal years, the agency and OMB are required to take additional measures, including proposing statutory or legislative changes, reauthorizations, reprogramming or transfers. For goals that remain unmet for three consecutive years, programs are identified for termination or reduction.

Finally, on an annual basis, each agency is required to eliminate unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) reporting by reducing and/or consolidating agency strategic and performance plans and reports.

⁹² Moynihan, *The New Federal Performance System: Implementing the GPRA Modernization Act*, 10, 13.

Various approaches, tools and techniques are currently being offered in the best practices literature to improve both the performance planning, review and reporting processes.

b. Best Practices Literature

Harry Hatry and Elizabeth Davies of the Urban Institute, in a 2011 report entitled “A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews,” provides yet another practical “how-to” guide, especially tailored for public institutions, with specific solutions related to implementing data-driven performance reviews.⁹³ The report sheds light on how federal agencies can benefit from conducting periodic reviews leveraging several of the elements within the GPRA-MA, such as an interested and engaged leadership, timely and tailored performance measures, and sound analytics. It provides specific guidelines on how to set up and run a review, laying out who needs to be involved, what kinds of performance information should be collected, analyzed and assessed, and how to follow up afterwards in order to ensure performance improvement.

Highlighting several examples of reviews at the local, state, and federal levels, the authors demonstrate how the Act can best be leveraged to instill a culture of results-based accountability. Incorporating successful elements from various review processes, in addition to best practices, this “how-to” guide provides performance practitioners with the basic core components of successful regular and structured data-driven performance reviews. These recommended components can be tailored by asking and answering several pre-determined questions that determine the actual needs of each organization.

GAO recently published its own report, GAO-13-228, in its Managing for Results series, entitled *Data-Driven Performance Reviews Show Promise but Agencies Should Explore How to Involve Other Relevant Agencies*. Their findings and recommendations mirror the Hatry and Davies framework, identifying nine leading

⁹³ Harry Hatry and Elizabeth Davies, *A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews* (The IBM Center for the Business of Government and the Urban Institute, 2011).

practices that promote successful data-driven performance reviews, assessing their impact in achieving agency high-level goals.

Two significant recommendations, reflecting the federal government's increasing focus on intra- and inter-agency interaction and collaboration, involve (1) the identification and sharing of best practices and (2) the establishment of cross-agency performance reviews to achieve common goals.

Closely linked with these performance review processes are the mechanisms an agency uses to report on the success and challenges of mission and program achievement, effectively communicating any progress and improvement identified during the review process to a wide range of internal and external partners and stakeholders, including the American public.

Questions to Address When Implementing Data-Driven Performance Reviews
The Core Team: What type of leadership is needed? Who should be included in start-up activities? What staffing is needed? The Meeting Structure: Should meetings focus on reporting units or on specific themes? How frequently should the meetings be held? How long should meetings last? The Performance Indicators: Which performance indicators should be reviewed? Does existing technology support regular reporting of performance indicators? Meeting Preparation: What pre-meeting preparation is needed? Should the leader notify units of major issues and questions in advance? Running the Meeting: Which individuals inside the organization should attend the meetings? Should meetings be open to individuals outside the organization? What is the content and typical agenda of these meetings? What should be the tone of the performance review meeting? What should be the physical set-up of the meetings? Following Up after the Meeting: What follow-up should be undertaken? Sustaining the Process: Who needs to support this process? What did managers recommend to sustain this process? Does the use of data-driven performance reviews deliver improved services and cost savings?

Table 4. Questions to Address When Implementing Data-Driven Performance Reviews⁹⁴

(1) Performance Reporting. In addition to requiring that public authorities react promptly and positively to requests from members of the public for access to information and documents which have not been published (i.e., Freedom of Information Act), there is also an obligation for the government to proactively “volunteer” or provide information on its operations in formats that are easily accessible and understandable to the average citizen. This often comes in the form of *one-way* communications from government agencies to constituents, such as posting periodic strategic plans, annual budgets and performance reports on public websites, direct media relations, community education campaigns and e-government.⁹⁵ One particular type of

⁹⁴ Hatry and Davies, *A Guide to Data-Driven Performance Reviews*.

⁹⁵ Emerson, Menkus, and Van Ness, *The Public Administrator’s Companion: A Practical Guide*, 66–69.

such public information sharing is mandated by the GPRA-MA: the reporting of data on government priorities, programs and performance results.

In a recent IBM report, “Performance Reporting: Insights from International Practice,”⁹⁶ Richard Boyle, head of research at the Institute of Public Administration in Dublin, Ireland, identifies the following six (6) key attributes of good performance reporting:

- Consistency and comparability in performance reporting structures;
- Inclusion of qualitative narrative to accompany quantitative performance indicators;
- Existence of clearly identified outcome measures;
- Availability of both target and baseline data to guide assessment(s) over time;
- Good formatting/presentation and effective use of technology platforms; and
- Inclusion of output and activity indicators.

Incorporating such elements would improve the quality of the federal government’s performance planning and reporting processes, particularly as they relate to the establishment of goals, the prioritization of interests, allocation of resources, and the evaluation of success.⁹⁷ An interim step in using data to make decisions is ensuring that the transparency of data, which naturally breeds self-correcting behavior and action, is being proactively used to influence decisions on a daily basis, perhaps even indirectly eliminating the need for corrective action down the line.

These criteria reflect much of the literature’s current focus on communicating the effectiveness of two very important American political and administrative accountability processes, fiscal responsibility, and performance results.

⁹⁶ Richard Boyle, *Performance Reporting: Insights from International Practice* (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2009), 6–7.

⁹⁷ Kettle, *The Politics of the Administrative Process*, 51–52.

In conclusion, performance practitioners should be more forward leaning in ensuring that government operations are conducted openly and transparently, voluntarily providing the American public with the necessary information along with sufficient data to judge for themselves whether the investment of their taxpayer dollars is not only delivering the results intended, but the ones they actually need and desire.

The debate regarding the transparency of public policy and its effects as a means to ensure accountability is the focus of our next section.

5. GPRA-MA Focus Area #5: Transparency (in Decision Making and Governance) and Accountability

a. Official Government Policy

Transparency and accountability are two of the most important requirements of the Act with the greatest potential to impact government performance.

GPRA-MA requires that performance information (e.g., federal and agency strategic plans, annual performance plans and reports, performance updates, and list of programs) be streamlined and posted in online formats useful to Congress and relevant to the general public. Quarterly updates of agency progress toward the achievement of near- and long-term goals are posted on the federal government's single official website, Performance.gov, established by the OMB.

The accountability requirements of the Act have been well-received by most performance practitioners based on everyone's high expectations that such an emphasis on creating open and transparent processes will revolutionize the way government does business. Senator Mark Warner, a member of the Senate Budget Committee, and one of the original crafters of the legislation, said that GPRA-MA of 2010 will "achieve unprecedented levels of transparency by providing the public with access to planning and performance information."⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Senator Mark Warner, Virginia, Chair on Senate Budget Committee Performance Task Force (letter to Acting OMB Deputy Director Management, February 3, 2012).

However, in spite of the initial enthusiasm and goodwill, the accountability aspect of the law, which calls for increased consultation with Congress, is promising to be one of the most challenging to operationalize.

Similar to issues regarding the accuracy and relevancy of performance information produced and used by the executive branch, there are concerns involving accountability due to the inherent tension existing between the two branches of government.⁹⁹ Because neither branch will agree to relinquish legitimate authority or control over government affairs, there is potential for lack of collective, comprehensive support for the management priorities coming from either branch; thus negating the intent of the Act to build upon past successes and maintain continuity beyond individual administrations.

GAO recently produced a report to alleviate some of the tension when such policy disagreements and/or competing priorities arise. One of Congress' most recent handbooks *Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA Modernization Act to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making*¹⁰⁰ was developed to encourage constructive communication between bipartisan and bicameral congressional leaders and officials of the administration, as part of their requirement to produce help guides at regularly scheduled intervals to guide implementation of the Act.

Not surprisingly, many public and private sector organizations have already developed or are developing similar help guides to assist federal agencies engage Congress and identify and address management and performance challenges. Understandably, Congress is looking for better and less expensive ways of doing business in light of the growing public concern over unsustainable spending and rising debt and deficits. Proactively looking for innovative and flexible ways to fund government programs, they have shown themselves eager to embrace such recommendations on how to better leverage the Act's requirements to fulfill their oversight roles.

⁹⁹ U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Obama Administration Agenda for Government Performance: Evolution and Related Issues for Congress*.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Government and Accountability Office, *Managing for Results: A Guide for Using the GPRA-MA to Help Inform Congressional Decision-Making*.

What lessons learned from best practices can be applied to improve the transparency of government initiatives and programs, not only to enhance operations and results, but to facilitate more innovative democratic governance processes, as well, ultimately contributing to greater public accountability?

b. Best Practices Literature

We defined public administration and accountability in Chapter II, mentioning the challenges involved in bridging the gap between various concepts of accountability, public service and public trust, in reconciling the political/bureaucratic definition/understanding of accountability with the expectations of the general public.

In this last section of our literature review, which focuses on transparency, decision making and governance, we will begin to discuss how ideas, increasingly prevalent in today's best practices, and pertaining to resilient governance, or meta-governance, can contribute to reconciling the GPRA-MA concept of organizational performance with these various definitions of public accountability.

Authors Booher and Innes in their book, "Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy," identifies the following components of resilient governance, typically operative in small working groups: diversity and interdependence, collaborative dialogue and development of knowledge, networks, boundary spanning, and, finally, closed-loop monitoring and feedback.¹⁰¹

The most important positive benefit of meta-governance involves networks, which naturally form and cross-jurisdictional and sector boundaries. Successful application of these types of governance techniques within the public sector would mean inspiring greater communication and collaboration between seemingly irreconcilable entities, between the various branches of government, between the public and private sector, and between government officials and the general public. This coming together of

¹⁰¹ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 209–211.

diverse and disparate stakeholders is the real game changer, with the potential to completely and dramatically alter the dynamics of how government monitors, obtains feedback, and ultimately communicates results to the public it serves.

Greater diversity allows us to move beyond the zero sum calculation, prevalent in most negotiated exchanges today, and embrace more shared (i.e., mutual) gains. When participants engaged in public performance improvement efforts are equally concerned about resolving difficult issues, shared understanding based on common investment can culminate in more innovative solutions previously overlooked. Such collaborative knowledge management can have an exponential effect, wherein several sources of information collide to create more comprehensive, holistic solutions. Moreover, solutions that have taken into account multi-faceted perspectives, based on the interdependence of multiple contributors, will be more readily trusted and accepted.

In Chapter VI, “Innovative Networked Meta-Governance,” we will demonstrate how agencies can practically leverage some of these concepts and related complexity theory best practices to improve inter- and intra-organizational accountability, within the larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility.

More specifically, we will see how interactive, web-enabled CoPs, and their supporting ICTs can be leveraged to reconcile organizational performance with the various definitions of transparency and public accountability. Such approaches can bring civic participation and learning back to the forefront, through the cultivation of more productive relationships based on trust and collaboration between the public and national leadership. Translating crowd-sourcing and co-creation into networked solutions, creating forums for information and idea exchange, web-enabled CoPs/ICTs can contribute to closing the gap in the misconception(s) regarding accountability by establishing an ongoing dialogue between average American citizens and their public officials.

We will see how, in shifting away from the idea that technology should be a goal in and of itself and recognizing that information only becomes real value added through human interaction geared toward mutual discussion and decision making, DHS officials can instill a culture of accountability, focusing on people and end-users, through

the creation and maintenance of virtual communities/teams, and performance-based social networks and organizational learning forums, as opposed to the simple, one-directional technological communication tools prevalent today.

C. SUMMARY

The GPRA-MA of 2010 modernizes and refines the requirements established by the original GPRA of 1993 by promoting a performance management framework built on five (5) principles. Its purpose is to replace the stove-piped strategic performance planning and compliance reporting mechanisms, characteristic of the original Act, with a more holistic approach to outcome-oriented government, focused on performance improvement or achieving more effective and efficient government operations through results-based management.

In view of the anticipated changes we can expect to see in the coming months and years, as a result of the passage of the GPRA-MA, as well as the continually evolving political, cultural and professional landscape of the homeland security environment, the DHS would benefit by more fully understanding best practices in the field of government strategic performance management and social complexity theory.

Indeed, because of the increasing shift in mindset regarding the role of the average citizen in public affairs, affecting relational dynamics between the government and the American people at the federal, state and local levels, the DHS should begin to position itself now to begin bridging the gap between organizational performance and public accountability, by finding ways to translate the improved effectiveness and efficiency of its programs into greater trust, cooperation and collaboration between and among its partners and stakeholders, including the general public.

The strategic performance management practices of the past, involving complex multi-year strategic plans, detailed annual budgets, and quarterly performance reports, as well as the resulting prescriptive, one-directional (i.e., dictatorial) way of interfacing with the public, will need to at least be supported by (if not replaced with) a more interactive

dialogue based on a collaborative and sustained working relationship(s) with average citizens, increasingly given the opportunity to weigh in on problems and solutions that affect their daily lives.

The role of innovative leadership is essential in leveraging the full benefits of the Act, not only to ensure accountability but also to elevate the importance of the performance management and improvement discipline.

Due to the changing role of leadership in the face of an increasingly complex, and decentralized environment, government performance leaders are being encouraged to advance the GPRA-MA agenda, by creating a performance culture based on continuous learning and improvement.

In addition, more innovative ways of ensuring organizational alignment both within and between organizations, necessary to manage strategy, develop and translate it into operational actions, and monitor and improve effectiveness should be favored by public managers.

We discussed how the development of an overarching PMF, comprised of some form of the following elements: logic modeling, performance measurement, and program evaluation can enable performance measurement practitioners and data analysts to collect better information, conduct better data analysis, and make better decisions.

Conducting regular and structured data-driven performance reviews and reporting out on results also contributes to instilling a culture of results-based accountability by ensuring that government operations are conducted openly and transparently.

Finally, the true face of leadership is no longer hierarchical and one-directional, but is becoming a reflection of “relational webs” of “network power” where complex problems are resolved through interdependent and interactive dialogue. Up and coming leaders are showing a preference for meta-governance, increasingly abandoning the traditional top-down, open loop, governance structures prevalent in the world of today’s public sector. Because, “policy, defined as the attempt to achieve a desired outcome, is a result of governing processes that are no longer fully controlled by the government, but

subject to negotiations between a wide range of public, semi-public and private actors,”¹⁰² these types of collaborative or networked governance processes are promising to soon be the norm.

Incorporating some of the more creative or innovative strategic performance management best practices referenced in this literature review, will allow the department to identify alternative solutions more meaningful to end users at all levels of the performance improvement continuum.

Emphasis cannot be placed enough on how public accountability, or creating and maintaining a culture of high-trust, should be the main driver behind DHS mission focus and accomplishment. Placing organizational management, strategic planning, program evaluation, performance measurement, governance, accountability and decision making within this larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility and responsiveness, would result in greater public trust, cooperation and collaboration, and would be an inestimable force multiplier to both DHS politically appointed and career officials, having the potential to revolutionize the way the United States of America secures and protects its homeland.

¹⁰² Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 7–8, 205.

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IV. METHODS

A. INTRODUCTION

As previously stated, the primary purpose of this thesis is to bridge the gap between organizational performance and public trust by linking the theoretical/practical conceptualization of accountability with the GPRA-MA of 2010, encouraging DHS leaders and performance practitioners, partners and stakeholders to view the legislation differently and begin to consider and apply more innovative performance management and improvement strategies and solutions in light of this revised mindset.

The overarching qualitative research goal(s) are to:¹⁰³

- **Interpret** the GPRA-MA in terms of strategic performance management best practices;
- **Describe/Evaluate** some of the current performance management dynamics, systems, processes, relationships, and individuals within the DHS;
- **Demonstrate** that there are performance management deficiencies at the DHS, manifested in all five (5) focus areas of the GPRA-MA legislation;
- **Verify/Prove** that these barriers to successful performance management and improvement are caused by or resulting in various cultural conditions, primarily a lack of accountability; and
- **Recommend** how to better leverage the GPRA-MA and strategic performance management best practices to remedy these conditions and instill a culture of accountability within the DHS.

Addressing these various topics and issues will allow us to answer the overarching, fundamental research question; namely, how public and organizational accountability is impacting the success of the GPRA-MA and how it might best be leveraged moving forward to instill a culture of accountability within the department and vis-à-vis the general public.

¹⁰³ Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 9th ed. (Pearson HE, Inc., 2010), 4647–4656, Kindle edition.

B. RESEARCH METHOD

Closing the gap between the two worlds of public administration (i.e., federal government SPM/GPRA-MA), and public accountability (i.e., organizational and public trust), will involve establishing a solid theoretical foundation for the development of more innovative frameworks and practices.

The research method selected follows the *Multi-Goal Policy (Options) Analysis* approach, involving various types¹⁰⁴ of qualitative research methodologies¹⁰⁵ and consisting of six (6) phases.

1. Analytical and Explanatory (Qualitative) Research

a. Problem Statement Definition (Basic Research)

- Defining the problem, in answer to the question, “*What is DHS not doing,*” by demonstrating, using a Hypothesis Testing Matrix, how deficiencies in all five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA legislation, are primarily attributable to the five (5) reasons/conditions (i.e., hypotheses/propositions) listed below:
 - There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture” (i.e., public accountability);
 - Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” particularly difficult to resolve, requiring non-traditional solutions, uncommon/unfamiliar to most government institutions;
 - Political considerations, wherein management decisions are sometimes being made based on political issues or hot topics instead of based on evidence that points to a particular alternative that would actually improve performance, rather than simply prove success;
 - There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control, which produces stagnation; and
 - There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., management oversight).

¹⁰⁴ Types of Research: Exploratory, Descriptive (i.e., inspectional, syntopical), Analytical, Explanatory, and Predictive (i.e., basic, both deductive and inductive).

¹⁰⁵ Research Methodologies: Multiple, Collective Case Studies, Semi-structured Interview, Judgment Sampling.

b. *Exploratory and Descriptive (Qualitative) Research*

- Inspectional Research of Legislative (i.e., GPRA-MA of 2010/GAO) and Executive Branch (i.e., OMB) Requirements.
 - A literature review of official government policy pertaining to the GPRA-MA of 2010 to define and/or identify the five (5) impact focus areas of the GPRA-MA legislation and its current policy requirements/goals in answer to the question: *What does DHS have to do?*
- Syntopical Research of External Best Practices.
 - A literature review of external best practices pertaining to the GPRA-MA of 2010 and SPM, to generate a clear set of non-mutually exclusive policy alternatives and lay out (i.e., construct) alternative goals and solutions for the existing legislation and its policy in answer to the question: *What are others doing?*
- Analytical Research of current DHS strategic performance management processes.
 - A discussion of DHS implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010, reviewing how the department is complying with its requirements through an annual, reiterative resource allocation planning process, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) cycle in answer to the question: *What is DHS already doing?*

c. *Predictive (Qualitative) Research*

- Recommendations (Basic Research, both Deductive and Inductive).
 - Specific improvement recommendations that leverage the Act to modify current approaches to policy implementation, based on the qualitative criteria (i.e., alternative goals) identified in the best practices research and supplemental social complexity theory, predicting and qualitatively evaluating the impact that such a modification of the policy would have, in answer to the question: *What should DHS be doing?*
- Implementation (Applied Research, both Deductive and Inductive).
 - Providing high-level guidance on how to implement the specific improvement recommendations to achieve the alternative policy goals (i.e., end state) relative to increased accountability and improved public and organizational trust in answer to the question: *How should DHS do it?*

The first three chapters of this thesis have sought to initially answer the questions in sections (a) and (b), namely “What is DHS not doing?” and “What does DHS have to do?” and “What are others doing?” The following chapters, supplementing our analysis, will be dedicated to answering the remaining questions.

In weighing best practices against current practices pertaining to the GPRA-MA within and across the DHS, we will be able to determine any gaps, and make recommendations on how the department should be applying this legislation to instill a greater culture of accountability. We will accomplish this by adding to our syntopical research of external best practices the additional concept of social complexity theory and how less simplistic, more nuanced, creative approaches can inform and impact federal government strategic planning and decision making.

The major outcome of the research is to make specific improvement recommendations to increase accountability by improving performance management strategies and solutions within the context of the GPRA-MA framework. Providing these end state outcome recommendations will require predictive (qualitative) research and problem statement resolution, in answer to the question: What should DHS be doing (differently) to improve its performance management strategies and solutions with the intent of increasing accountability within and across the department and vis-à-vis the American public? The recommendations will be based on the research results of the literature review, and analysis using the hypothesis testing matrix, and focus on both the philosophical/theoretical, as well as the practical applications of strategic performance management and complexity theory within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA, and the five (5) conditions impacting the legislation’s effectiveness.

In order to move beyond the status quo, and ensure that the Act is improving performance results within the DHS, focus will be placed on actions that create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., high-trust). This involves improving the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA by impacting conditions contributing to those inefficiencies, and selecting more flexible, creative and innovative strategic performance management solutions to increase public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation. It will mean focusing on how the DHS can better leverage the GPRA-MA,

as well as public and private best practices, to bridge the gap between traditional definitions of public accountability, or government effectiveness and efficiency, and its more non-traditional interpretations of improved organizational and public trust.

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V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND COMPLEXITY THEORY

Having obtained a better understanding of the GPRA-MA of 2010, we will now discuss how the DHS is complying with its principles and requirements.

We will start by reviewing DHS implementation of the GPRA-MA, highlighting any perceived deficiencies resulting from the department's current mindset and approach. Then, we will further discuss these deficiencies in the context of social complexity theory, in the hopes of remedying them by encouraging the DHS, as a complex organization, to move beyond the existing traditional, reductionist Newtonian approaches to strategic planning and resource allocation to consider more descriptive, self-organized, adaptable and resilient ways of establishing its performance management policies and frameworks. By applying complexity theory to better understand the limitations and contributions of existing schools of thought in the field of strategic planning and decision making, DHS will see the value in selecting more creative, innovative approaches and configurations from among current industry best practices, tailoring them to its unique security context.

A. DHS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GPRA-MA OF 2010

Because the DHS is a large institution with over 250,000 employees and seven (7) separate, operationally independent components, each with their own unique approach to performance management, compliance with GPRA-MA requirements has been patchwork. Indeed, DHS, similar to most major reorganizations, has encountered challenges in demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency in its Management Integration (MI) efforts in general.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines MI as "the development of consistent and/or consolidated processes, systems, and people...for greater efficiency and effectiveness." U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Department of Homeland Security: Actions Taken Toward Management Integration, but a Comprehensive Strategy Is Still Needed* (GAO-10-131), Washington, DC: GPO, 2009).

The GAO Progress Report on *Implementation of Mission and Management Functions*, published on August 17, 2007 (GAO-07-454), highlighted that the “lack of a comprehensive strategy and integrated management systems and functions [was] limit[ing] DHS’s ability to carry out its homeland security responsibilities in an effective, risk-based way.” It recognized that “DHS has generally made more progress in implementing its mission activities than its management functions, reflecting an initial focus on efforts to secure the homeland.”¹⁰⁷ GAO continued to identify certain of these DHS management functions as high-risk in its follow up report “High-Risk Update,” published in January 2009 (GAO-09-271). These included planning and priority setting; accountability and oversight; as well as a broad array of additional management, programmatic, and partnering challenges, such as acquisition management, financial management, human capital management, information technology management, administration management, and security management.

Following the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) and the Bottom-up Review (BUR), DHS became even more intent on making progress in these designated areas, particularly in its planning and priority setting and acquisition management functions. It developed an *Integrated Investment Life Cycle Model*, to begin the formalization of a PPBE structure at the strategic level, aligning investments with mission priorities.¹⁰⁸ Such strategic integration of all of its investments, combined with enhanced acquisition management, and more mature financial and human capital management initiatives, has led to a significant culture change within the department’s budget formulation process. By maturing the strategic phase of its investment management processes, DHS continues to make progress toward ensuring that “mission needs drive budget submissions instead of budget submissions driving mission needs.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *High-Risk Series, An Update* (GAO-09–271), Washington, DC: GPO, 2009, 49.

¹⁰⁸ DHS PPBE, originally designed by the Department of Defense, is a management and resource planning process aimed at articulating DHS goals and priorities; aligning DHS programs, financial resources, personnel, and assets to accomplish those goals; and assessing whether those goals have been accomplished efficiently and effectively.

¹⁰⁹ Department of Homeland Security, *Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management: Report to the Government Accountability Office* (Washington, DC: January 2011), 8.

It is one thing to make progress in terms of aligning investments with mission priorities, through more mature strategic planning and acquisition processes. Determining the actual impact of those investment decisions, is quite another. Even though DHS has made significant strides in developing departmental strategic frameworks and aligning its investments, like many federal agencies, more work remains to be done to improve the execution of DHS organizational strategy through the development of performance management methodologies that apply empirical data to the planning, programming and budgeting phases.

1. DHS SPM Context and Challenges

Hoping to close this gap, the DHS has developed its own PMF integrated with the department's PPBE processes. The strategy respects the intentions of the official OMB GPRA-MA policy guidance, and currently consists of a DHS performance management community, an annual process to review and improve the quality and accuracy of its performance measures, and a quarterly review and reporting platform for performance results. By linking the QHSR strategic framework with DHS program results summarized in the FYHSP,¹¹⁰ the department has established a solid foundation to guide its homeland security activities toward achievement of its strategic goals, objectives, and planning priorities.

We will now look at how various organizational and system complexity factors, particularly political and administrative leadership constraints, are impacting DHS strategic performance management processes in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA/OMB performance management focus areas.

a. Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement

So far, the role of departmental leadership in executing its performance-related activities has emphasized outreach, education and information sharing to drive

¹¹⁰ FYHSP displays the DHS programs and associated resources (investments, construction, human capital, IT, and other support and operating expenses) for the budget year plus four years. *DHS CFO Policy Manual: Chapter 5.0 "DHS Performance Guidance"* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, June 2012).

improvement. The DHS Office of the CFO within the Under Secretary of Management (US/M) supports the department's COO and PIO by producing official performance measurement planning, development, analysis and reporting policy and procedures. Responsible for overseeing the department's GPRA-MA activities, they also chair the DHS PIC to facilitate information sharing and best practices across the department through various communities of practice, training and consultation activities.¹¹¹ This more focused role can be attributed to the department's bureaucratic complexity (i.e., multiple layers of review and lack of cohesive and consistent leadership engagement, management processes and operational coordination) impeding the cultural shift called for in the GPRA-MA.

With increased leadership engagement demonstrated at the top Tier 1 level headquarters (HQ), the DHS COO and PIO are beginning to see some usefulness of the Act. Unfortunately, we are not experiencing the same type of engagement at the lower Tier 2 levels (i.e., components, front line staff, etc.). People seem content to simply make progress, but not necessarily achieve ultimate success, continuing to measure themselves in relative terms, as opposed to absolutes, toward comprehensive end states.

Tier 1 leadership engagement, however, can be a catch-22 situation. Elevation of performance to higher levels may draw attention to issues and challenges, but it can also hinder the purity of solutions, due to the role of politics and/or the personality and approach of leaders. Group think is usually not prevalent except when senior leaders are present, as subordinates tend to defer at these higher levels. Therefore, top leaders that display flexibility, creativity and innovation can go a long way in eliminating hierarchical resistance to change. Senior attitude determines the level and tone of contribution, either discouraging people to participate, through counter-productive micro-management and the preference to direct, control, and "prove success," or by encouraging actual performance improvement at the lower levels through the practical application of sound data analysis.

¹¹¹ *DHS CFO Policy Manual: Chapter 5.0 "DHS Performance Guidance."*

The role of leadership within the department, as it pertains to performance improvement functions, needs to be better defined, emphasizing mentorship towards a performance-based culture, with both political and career executives comprising the agency's PIC and supporting staff.

On the topic of high-level political appointees, of which the DHS PIO is one, a few challenges also remain. Focused on communications and political considerations involving DHS programs and projects that fall within the 1st Quadrant of the Covey time management framework (i.e., important/urgent), leaders do not always have the time or resources required to make performance management a success. In many DHS organizations, SPM/GPRA-MA is often too administrative and process-oriented, not sufficiently linked with higher-level policy and decision-making frameworks, typically falling within the 2nd or 3rd Covey quadrants (i.e., important/not urgent or not important/urgent, respectively) and, therefore, not readily assisted by individual agency political leadership in the way that it should. Additional processes and tools need to be developed to help DHS leadership focus on this discipline, associating it. More quickly and easily, with high-visibility stakeholder concerns, and in ways that add value.

b. Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment

A possible cause of leadership hesitation in making recommendations to improve cross-cutting programs as a means to achieve strategic clarity in mission integration, a major push of GPRA-MA, is the lack of a viable roadmap to coordinate the many duplicative areas of Congressional oversight.¹¹² Mr. Robert Shea pointed out that “getting different agencies to agree on common goals and a coordinated approach to achieving them is hard. Agencies or programs with common goals often have different congressional authorizing and appropriations committees. Such programs also have separate constituencies who [...] fight to preserve the status quo. If program managers

¹¹² Robert Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” *The Public Manager*, Summer 2011, 39.

don't agree with the coordinated approach, agencies have multiple outlets they can use to get their way.”¹¹³ And indeed they often do.

Understandably, the current departmental congressional oversight structure, with its conflicting demands and requirements, allows each of the various DHS components to march to the sound of a different drum, rather than together in one accord, impeding the department's ability to consolidate programs and eliminate duplication and redundancy. Unfortunately, resolution in this arena is currently beyond agency control. It lies elsewhere, at the doorstep of Congress.

DHS internal efforts to reorganize haven't fared much better to eliminate silos either, and 10 years in, we're still trying to complete the challenging task of mission integration. As a result, DHS performance results have been primarily couched in terms of outputs, rather than outcomes, meant to gauge the performance of individual programs as opposed to providing a holistic vision of overarching mission success, and/or the achievement of broader strategic goals. DHS is really now just beginning to ask and answer the following questions: Are we making progress toward achieving overarching goals? Are we receiving the value intended with the dollars we are spending, across the board?

Cross-organizational collaboration is as important to achieving strategic clarity, organizational alignment and mission integration, as it is difficult to do. The complexity and interdependency of the DHS mission make alignment particularly challenging. Innovative meta-governance, or more democratic (i.e., representative) governance structures that allow for all diverging perspectives and opinions to be seen and heard, would be one way to avoid the current reductionist approaches to creating the clear line of sight required for effective strategic and operational decision making. Without cross-organizational collaboration, intra- and inter-agency problems, even so-called cross-cutting initiatives, can very quickly devolve into isolated and insulated little discussions and stove-piped efforts, rather than across-the-board exportable best practices and comprehensive solutions.

¹¹³ Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” 39.

These types of interactive debate are also required to identify true priorities, an important task in the planning phase, and essential for successful programming and budgeting. GPRA-MA processes may contribute to the transparency of priorities, knowing whose programs are being put forward and who's agreeing/disagreeing with them, but it struggles with to find commonality among them.

Even though we have made some progress toward the streamlining of priorities, due to the QHSR, the DHS Strategic Plan and the resulting FYSHF Line of Business (LoB) frameworks and program, sub-program and activity measures, better mission integration, which logically should be the result, still tends to be rather happenstance. Because the GPRA-MA mandate to develop strategic plans, performance plans and reports and annual performance goals is not required at the DHS component-level, performance management/improvement efforts continue to occur in disparate ways, at different levels of maturity throughout the department, negatively affecting DHS strategic clarity and organizational alignment overall.

Mission integration is extremely important and necessary if the department is to take a much broader and rigorous look at its future, moving away from the here and now of day-to-day operations, in order to proactively consider more comprehensive, longer-term solutions to securing the homeland. We have been told for so long to simply continue doing the things we have been doing, but only better, that many have come to associate strategic planning with intelligence-based operational action.

Common operational planning, based on standard doctrine and supported by central databases creating a common operating picture, would mitigate some of these challenges, as they would facilitate finding the appropriate mix between centralization and decentralization, between strategic and operational decision making, to define, prioritize and measure success.

c. Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation

Even though most organizations are not naturally interested in performance evaluation, because of the increased Congressional/OMB interest in DHS operations, departmental officials are now understanding that empirical data analysis is

necessary to adequately discourse with external oversight bodies. However, because there is still so much emphasis on the budget driving strategy, and the tendency to associate performance measures strictly with increased or decreased funding (i.e., reward or punishment), there is little room for focusing these efforts on non-punitive performance planning and improvement, much less, on impacting public and/or organizational accountability and trust.

Constantly wavering between the influences of “messy” democratic governance with its resulting complexity, and the strict confines of bureaucratic processes preferring simplicity, DHS continues to display pockets of both success and failure regarding the use of performance measures to evaluate mission and program effectiveness. Sometimes, on certain occasions, there are timely, accurate/objective, and relevant measures adequately informing decisions and improving performance, and at other times and on other occasions, there is a total lack of robust performance-based analysis.

In spite of this volatile cultural dynamic, there is general consensus that some progress has been made in the arena of performance measurement due to improvements made in both the quality and accuracy of the department’s externally-reported organizational performance data.

Thanks in large part to the recent QHSR and subsequent BUR individual programs are now linked to overarching goals. In addition, through its annual, reiterative performance measure development and improvement cycle, coordinating multiple stakeholder views,¹¹⁴ DHS continually refreshes its GPRA-mandated strategic- and management-level measures. The intent is to develop much more outcome-oriented performance indicators that reflect the consolidated perspective of the QHSR mission areas, replacing many of the programmatic measures developed for the former Bush Administration’s PART gauging the results of the individual FYHSP programs.

Questions pertaining to subjectivity and risk aversion, exacerbated by political considerations and/or the fear of failure, have been raised regarding the setting

¹¹⁴ Shea, “Go For Results Rather Than Reorganization,” 39.

of annual targets for DHS' public-facing (i.e., GPRA) performance measures and targets. Some even suggest the department has developed many of these, solely based on externally imposed political expectations and a push to demonstrate progress. Indeed, leadership and staff, desirous to prove success and downplay shortcomings, will sometimes purposely and/or unconsciously insert bias into their performance measurement processes, "gaming the system" by establishing easily achievable measures and targets in order to prove success.¹¹⁵ DHS has a robust performance measurement verification and validation program that determines the completeness and reliability of its performance data, in compliance with GPRA-MA of 2010 stipulations, to mitigate some of these challenges involving objectivity and bias. It should be expanded to encompass all departmental GPRA measures, supported by internal component self-assessment initiatives.

Regarding the use of empirical data in program evaluations, and similar to themes previously iterated, there are limitations in the DHS organizational capacity to process, organize and understand performance information in a way that leads to meaningful analysis. This may be attributed to the multiplicity of bureaucratic layers and the lack of integration of DHS performance data with other cross-cutting policy and management processes. The inability to make performance data relevant to decision-makers is further exacerbated by the GPRA-MA requirement to produce high-level outcome-oriented performance measures, which often separate or distance the processes and products required by the Act from the data that is actually used and/or needed by agency leaders and program managers in their day-to-day management and operational decision making.¹¹⁶ As a result, most measures developed by departmental subject matter experts are not considered in developing policy or making long-term strategic decisions, but rather used to inform short-term day-to-day operations. This may be attributed to the lack of forward looking, cross-cutting, outcome-based perspective in existing (operational) measure sets.

¹¹⁵ John Peery, *Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act at DHS: A Study in Organizational Change*, Field Project Report for the University of Maryland Baltimore County, 2012, 18.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 12–14.

To remedy this, DHS is working in collaboration with internal PPBE partners and stakeholders to integrate its GPRA-mandated performance measures with additional empirical data used in other management and resource allocation processes and decision making. Attempts are being made to place measures within some type of overarching strategic context to get conversations going and define success in layman's terms based on a direct understanding of the current operating environment, future projections of the environment (i.e., how it might look different in 4 years), and what might be needed to plan for it. Applying logic modeling methodologies and supporting information technology systems, the department hopes to improve its analytical capabilities through quality data sets, sufficiently granular to inform strategic, tactical and operational decision making.

As we segue into our next section pertaining to performance reviews, it is important to note that successful departmental performance measurement and evaluation functions require two fundamental perspectives: keeping sight of the intended use of the data, and ensuring that it is relevant, accurate, and timely enough to inform decisions. If there are no decisions to make, then it is impossible to determine whether data is sufficient in either quantity or quality. A lot of the performance information currently available is simply not useful. More is not always better. If you do not need to make a decision, then NO data is more than enough.

Finally, other sources of qualitative evidence, such as evaluations, subject matter expert judgments, narrative, storytelling, analogies, etc. are just as important as quantitative data. Counter-intuitively, data sets that contradict and teach are preferable to empirical data that is meant to justify strategic direction already taken and/or decisions previously made.

c. Performance Reviews

Regarding the performance review stipulations of the Act, the OMB philosophy for agency internal performance reviews has been to focus on studying and resolving any and all challenges involving the achievement of long-term goals through regular data-rich performance progress reviews and relentless follow-up.

Even though we are making progress and improving both the quality and the usefulness of our performance data, there is general consensus that DHS capabilities in this arena are still primarily focused on structured leadership-driven review processes and top-down compliance monitoring and reporting. The DHS Deputy Secretary conducts quarterly reviews with component senior leadership to discuss the department's cascading performance measures aligned with its mission (strategic-level measures), priority goals (strategic- and management-level measures), and FYHSP programs (management- and operational-level measures), but still does not make any real operational decisions based on the information discussed.

Likewise, DHS promotes transparency through annual and quarterly performance reports, accompanied by representation and advocacy of DHS mission success and performance measure results with both internal and external stakeholders, but it does not always draw conclusions or make recommendations for further improvement.

Concerns have been raised that this limited, minimally compliant engagement from leadership is creating a vicious circle of cynicism as to the usefulness and benefits of the GPRA-MA of legislation within the DHS.¹¹⁷

Next steps would include moving beyond simply reviewing the implementation status of performance goals in order to embrace a continuous (performance) improvement mind-set through robust program analysis and evaluation processes integrated into overarching governance frameworks and supported by DHS-wide institutional dashboards and data-mining capabilities able to provide a holistic, strategic view of mission performance in real time.

The common institutional failure speeches, along with their standard excuses as to why we cannot improve, are increasingly falling on deaf ears. Federal government leaders and strategic planning and performance management decision-makers across the board have accepted the fact that executing the DHS mission involves

¹¹⁷ Peery, *Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act at DHS: A Study in Organizational Change*, 21.

coming together to solve “wicked” problems requiring the *relentless* pursuit of success, pushing through in spite of challenges, set-backs, and/or seemingly intractable situations.

d. Transparency and Accountability

Even though public transparency and accountability are basic requirements of democratic governance, many within the DHS believe that they are not necessary to ensure agency performance. The common observation is that public accountability is not our responsibility, but rather mission success. Moreover, the “public” in most DHS officials’ minds does not refer to average citizens, but to government management and oversight bodies, such as OMB and Congress, GAO, etc. To them, “publically” reporting information simply means “politicizing” discussions. It is believed that we can be entirely successful in executing our mission, while entirely unsuccessful in communicating, showcasing this success to these external stakeholders. It is easy to see how such a mindset might result in hubris.

In spite of this, most people feel that we can do a better job explaining to external constituencies what we do, as well as the challenges we face. Current recommendations include using plain language that is both meaningful and relevant, in an attempt to educate, rather than simply inform, various government stakeholders on what DHS is actually doing and/or meant to do as opposed to what it can and/or should be doing.

There is also some talk that DHS analytical products should be used to somewhat inform the direction political decisions on the Hill might take, providing topics or focus areas for discussion, while still stopping just short of saying that DHS analyses and evaluations would actually be used to influence these macro-level decisions in any meaningful way. In other words, any conclusions and/or recommendations made by the department would simply be seen as good ideas or suggestions by our powerful political overlords, rather than impactful game changers.

In the end, because (public) transparency and accountability are seen as outcomes beyond the influence and control of most departmental leaders and decision-makers, it remains a secondary focus, a collateral (un)intended consequence of success, but not an actual contributor to it.

e. Summary

Even though it appears that DHS is displaying a commitment to increasing the quality and consistency of its performance information, significant challenges remain regarding the use of data in meaningful ways. This would lead one to conclude that DHS performance management and improvement methodologies and processes continue to lack the necessary governance structure, implementation tools, and communication and reporting venues to provide the independent, objective analysis needed to drive true performance improvement.

Satisfying a political rather than a public agenda and proving success, rather than reflecting actual program outcomes that can lead to improved performance, continues to influence the DHS performance management framework, stifling the full intent and effect of the legislation within the department.

2. GPRA-MA Deficiencies and SPM Culture within the DHS

a. GPRA-MA Deficiencies

More specifically, in spite of ongoing efforts and recent progress, the GPRA-MA of 2010, similar to most of the traditional strategic performance management frameworks of the past, is failing to significantly impact DHS performance and results, due to deficiencies manifested in all five (5) of the legislation's major focus areas:

(1) Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement. Insufficient leadership engagement and lack of commitment to drive performance improvement has prevented the creation of a positive learning and performance management culture at the department. Insufficient cross-organizational collaboration and group think has resulted. Also noted, has been a persistent resistance to change perpetrated by hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces within the various DHS

organizations. This lack of flexibility, creativity and innovation has often contributed to best practices, necessary to tackling the particularly difficult challenges inherent with managing for results, being neglected to the preference of common, more expedient, practices.

(2) Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment. DHS' ability to align individual, program, and agency priorities is often hindered by a lack of connectivity among agency plans and performance results, resulting in competing, and often contradictory priorities, unintentional gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. Consistent and integrated performance management frameworks allowing for the successful development and monitoring of strategy, are replaced with top-down, prescriptive, and stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting that open the door to unnecessary political considerations, and/or negotiated compromise, negatively influencing decision making toward mission achievement.

(3) Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation. The goal of improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytical capacity to produce and analyze, timely, actionable performance information for decisions, is thwarted due to the inadequate application of performance management/measurement/evaluation principles and insufficient quantity and quality of data. There are also credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity, where responsible parties sometimes game the system by establishing easily achievable measures and targets.

(4) Performance Reviews. There is an absence of periodic, data-driven reviews to improve performance outcomes and reduce costs. When discussions do occur, the default perception and reaction is more often than not punitive rather than inquisitive, resulting in performance information that is produced but rarely used in strategic, management and operational decision making. In addition, there is insufficient feedback and/or follow up due to the bureaucratic complexity of multiple layers of review and non-cohesive or inconsistent management processes and/or operational coordination.

(5) Transparency and Accountability. Communicating and reporting transparent performance information frequently and effectively to improve decision making and results, is impeded by inadequate governance structures, systems and processes. This results in compliance reporting rather than accountability, leadership disengagement, and by extension, a lack of internal and external (i.e., public) understanding of how government works. Political/bureaucratic hubris fills the gap between public accountability, or what the public needs and expects, and public administration, or what elected and appointed officials are actually accomplishing with taxpayer dollars.

b. Cultural Conditions

The lack of success demonstrated by deficiencies in these five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA legislation is primarily attributable to the five (5) performance management cultural climate/conditions (i.e., hypotheses/propositions) listed below:

- There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture” (i.e., public accountability) (H_A1);
- Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” particularly difficult to resolve, requiring non-traditional solutions, uncommon/unfamiliar to most government institutions (H_A2);
- Political considerations, wherein management decisions are sometimes being made based on political issues or hot topics instead of based on evidence that points to a particular alternative that would actually improve performance, rather than simply prove success (H_A3);
- There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control, which produces stagnation (H_A4); and
- There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., management oversight) (H_A5).

(1) Accountability/High-Trust. Reiterating several of the themes previously highlighted, the general consensus at the department appears to be: never sacrifice the good in search of the perfect.

The idea of instilling a culture of accountability, or trust, is understood as part of the entire change of government that has been occurring over the past several years to make it more customer-orientated and service-based. As a result, DHS officials understand that they are simply to be good stewards of the government resources they have been (temporarily) entrusted with. They may have been given permission to manage or shepherd programs, but not make dramatic or “revolutionary” changes to them. Public trust, therefore, entails concentrating on being good at what we have been empowered to do, rather than focusing on creating or maintaining a culture of accountability; a “revolutionary” change to come later, as a collateral consequence, a by-product of success, a result of having made improvements in all the other areas, but not as a main focus.

Another common obstacle to promoting trust as a principle objective of departmental efforts is the lack of a clear, widely accepted, definition of trust, or the absence of shared values in this arena. What exactly is a high-trust culture? Is it only integrity (i.e., upholding/enforcing the law)? If so, we are doing great. Is it doing things better with less money? If so, we are trying. Does it mean, trust, but verify? If so, then trust is not really an important factor since we can empirically and analytically prove that we are right. Does it mean getting the benefit of the doubt from Congress so that we do not have to continually justify ourselves and/or the utility of our programs? If so, then Congress has already extended such trust, having authorized our programs in the first place. All of this boils down to one rejecting argument: Who needs accountability and trust anyway? We are doing things well, and GPRA-MA is simply a tool for us to showcase our success.

(2) Complexity of Performance Management Challenges. OMB distinguishes between performance management and performance improvement when speaking of challenges, as well as solutions. The former is not recognized as a “wicked problem,” but simply as measuring progress toward strategy achievement, facilitated by established frameworks and processes, such as the GPRA-MA, the OMB

Circular A-11 and the PMF. Performance improvement, on the other hand, is considered a wicked problem, one that requires innovative, outside-of-the-box solutions requiring the free flow of information and more creative ideas.

OMB's SOAR process, meant to provide continuity across administrations, even decades, is an attempt to stay out of the dogmatic PART-type approach with its reductionist, short-term prescriptive solutions to complex, multi-faceted and difficult/persistent problems. This stat-based performance review process involves the integration of multiple partner/stakeholder perspectives, even multiple approaches, pushed up and down the decision-making chain, and is meant to get people fully recognizing how complex performance improvement can be.

We are just starting, at the department, to conceptualize such concepts. We understand that we need good data to conduct good reviews, and that we need to apply sound analytical products and resulting discussions and decisions to overcome challenges. However, we are still applying common practices, such as benchmarking, in our attempts to do so. The idea that "non-traditional" can also mean, changing mindsets in our approach to doing business, such as pooling all resources together, giving up unjustified budget monies to other programs that may need them, relinquishing control over, or even ratcheting down, programs in order to combine or set aside funding for future investments, hasn't quite fully entered into departmental psyche.

(3) Political Considerations. Most government officials like to see themselves as apolitical, even tone deaf to political dynamics, preferring to focus on mission first, and sometimes only. Everyone seems to accept political considerations as a simple fact of life when working within the DHS mission space; something that is, and always will be. Many feel, however, that politics should not be seen as constraints, but rather as opportunities to affect change, a challenge to work around, even overcome, as a normal part of one's job.

Bureaucracy, as well, is also often seen in a positive light by many DHS agents. In our democratic world of complexity, bureaucracy, as standard operating procedure, creates stability. However, we still seem to struggle with knowing when we

have gone too far in our efforts to simplify the world, with knowing when to catch ourselves in our attempt to solve paradox with conundrum through ill-conceived initiatives “standardizing innovation.”

(4) Administrative Tendency to Direct and Control. Surprisingly, even though DHS officials generally recognize that, as bureaucrats, they have the tendency to direct and control, most increasingly appear willing to embrace change in this area.

Because traditional leaders tend to contribute to status quo, even stagnation, whereas more collaborative leaders can change mindsets and paradigms, leadership that is more conducive to innovative meta-governance needs to be encouraged.

OMB agrees, which is why they have emphasized the importance of senior leadership adopting interdependent and interactive dialogue to cut through hierarchical stove-piping, resolving complex problems through “relational webs” and creative “networked power,” replacing the current centralized, command-and-control model, where power is mostly concentrated at the top. As a step in this direction, they have extended the timeframe of short-term priority goals to cover 24 months, rather than the former 18-month period, pushing them beyond the tenure of political appointees, still allowed sufficient time to contribute to results, but not singularly “own” success.

Even though some bureaucracy is considered useful, as a check and balance protecting us from “rule breakers,” we are beginning to see major cultural change in this arena and a call for courageous leadership to evolve beyond existing conditions.

(5) Insufficient Management Oversight. One of the main purposes of the GPRA-MA and the resulting OMB A-11 guidance and PMF, is to establish an executive branch decision-making framework that would ensure government-wide management oversight. Many people feel that we have been successful in reaching the initial goals we have set for ourselves in this arena.

Everybody now seems to be working on finding the correct balance between external and internal oversight, reconciling these two diverging perspectives along with their differing informational requirements. Recognized as equally challenging, is the building of supporting governance structures that enable decisions to be made as close to operations as possible, as opposed to directing components and functions from afar.

In Chapter VI, “Innovative, Networked Meta-Governance,” we will propose a creative, “next generation” way to find such a balance, between controlling and monitoring, between micro-managing and empowering.

c. Analysis Using the Hypothesis Testing Matrix

Having just reviewed the specific deficiencies manifested within the department across the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, as well as the five (5) conditions believed to contribute to those deficiencies, let us now look more closely at the causal effect between the two in an attempt to influence outcome and obtain better results.

There is more than just a simple *correlation* between the previously referenced deficiencies (i.e., evidence), displaying lack of success, and the five hypotheses (i.e., climate/conditions) contributing to those deficiencies. There is, in fact, a *causal relationship*, demonstrating, more *consistently*, than *inconsistently* or *ambiguously*, that the conditions are actually causing the failure(s).

Using the Hypothesis Testing Matrix below, the initial premise was that all five hypotheses/conditions directly contribute to and result in the noted deficiencies, particularly the first hypothesis relating to accountability. As such, they were initially annotated H_A, or *alternative* hypotheses. Following analysis, some were proven to be *null* hypotheses. Null hypotheses, or H_O, exist where there are more *inconsistent* (I) or *ambiguous* (?), than *consistent* (C), causal linkages between the reason/condition and the evidence of failure. When such was the case, the hypotheses in question were re-categorized as null.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Hypotheses 101 and other social science concepts by Lauren F. Wollman, PhD.

Evidence of Failure <i>DEPENDENT Variables</i>	Hypotheses <i>INDEPENDENT Variables</i>				
Initial Premise=>	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _A 3	H _A 4	H _A 5
GPRA-MA of 2010 Focus Areas					
#1 - Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _A 3	H _A 4	H _O 5
Insufficient leadership engagement/commitment to drive performance improvement (i.e., limited, minimally compliant leadership engagement)	C	?	?	I	C
Insufficient cross-organizational collaboration	C	C	?	C	?
Organizational group think	?	C	C	?	?
Common (vs. Best) Practices	C	C	?	C	?
Lack of flexibility, creativity, innovation	C	C	C	C	I
Hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically resisting change	C	C	C	C	?
#2 - Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _A 3	H _A 4	H _O 5
Lack of connectivity among agency plans, programs and performance results (i.e., disjointed goal setting and misaligned performance measures)	?	?	?	C	C
Competing and often contradictory priorities	C	C	C	?	?
Unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts	?	C	C	?	C
Top-down (vs. bottom-up) goal (and/or priority) setting	C	?	C	C	I
Prescriptive vs. descriptive strategic performance management (i.e., centralized, formalized, stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting)	C	C	?	C	?
Politics or negotiated compromise, inadvertently resulting in mission slippage and drift	C	?	C	C	?
Lack of consistent/integrated frameworks, processes, sub-processes and tools to develop strategy, translate it into operational actions, and monitor progress and improve performance	I	C	?	I	I
#3 - Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation	H _A 1	H _O 2	H _A 3	H _O 4	H _O 5
Inadequate application of performance management/measurement analytics	C	C	?	?	?
Credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity (i.e., subjective vs. objective judgments)	C	?	C	C	?
Insufficient quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data	C	?	C	?	C
Output- vs. outcome-oriented performance measures	C	C	C	C	?
"Gaming the system" by establishing easily achievable measures and targets	C	C	C	C	C
#4 - Performance Reviews	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _O 3	H _A 4	H _A 5
Absence of periodic progress reviews	C	C	?	C	C
Punitive (vs. inquisitive) performance reviews	C	C	?	C	?
Information/data is produced, but not used (i.e., in management and operational decision making)	C	C	?	I	C
Insufficient feedback and/or follow through (i.e., improvement plans)	C	C	?	I	C
Bureaucratic complexity (i.e., multiple layers of review and lack of cohesive and consistent management processes and	C	C	C	C	I

Evidence of Failure <i>DEPENDENT Variables</i>	Hypotheses <i>INDEPENDENT Variables</i>				
Initial Premise=>	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _A 3	H _A 4	H _A 5
GPRA-MA of 2010 Focus Areas					
operational coordination)					
#5 - Transparency and Accountability	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _A 3	H _A 4	H _O 5
Lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting performance results	C	?	C	C	?
Stove-piped strategic performance planning and reporting	C	C	?	C	C
Political hubris (i.e., decisions influenced by power politics, rather than purely objective and neutral decision making	C	C	C	C	?
Lack of public understanding of how government works (i.e., lack of public access to agency planning and performance information)	C	?	C	C	?
Proving success (i.e., compliance reporting) vs. improving performance and results (i.e., accountability)	C	C	C	C	?
~~Ad hoc Congressional engagement~~	C	C	C	C	C
Unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) strategic and performance plans and reports	?	?	C	C	?
Multiplicity of congressional authorizing and appropriations committees	C	C	C	C	I
~~Inadequate performance monitoring and reporting systems integrating large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources to provide situational awareness (i.e., common operating picture)~~	C	C	C	C	C
Concluding Premise=>	H _A 1	H _A 2	H _O 3	H _A 4	H _O 5

Table 5. Hypothesis Testing Matrix¹¹⁹

Deleting evidence that was consistent with *all* of the hypotheses, as well as conditions for which there was significant inconsistent evidence, demonstrates that there is indeed a correlation between the “symptom” (i.e., insufficiencies in government performance and results) and the “disease,” primarily identified as both a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust/Accountability Culture” (i.e., H_A 1), and the particular challenges/difficulties involved in resolving the “wicked” problem of performance improvement (i.e., H_A 2).

¹¹⁹ Morgan D. Jones, *The Thinker's Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving* (Random House, Inc., 2009), 2823–2824, Kindle edition.

Also noteworthy, is how the bureaucratic tendency to direct and control remained an alternative hypothesis (i.e., H_A 4) further linking it to the lack of accountability or trust, thus upholding the original premise. Namely, that our past failures and current limited successes are primarily due to our inability to relinquish even the slightest control over our respective areas of influence, and that this inability to “let go” is due to a lack of trust caused by, and exacerbating, the absence of true accountability, both significantly diminishing opportunities to find innovative solutions to solve “wicked” problems.

Of particular interest, as well, was the “elimination” of conditions 3 and 5, as alternative hypotheses, or those directly impacting results (i.e., evidence). Both political considerations and insufficient oversight, respectively H_{O3} and H_{O5} , were relegated to the status of null hypotheses. In other words, they were identified as not necessarily having any direct influence on the results. As both of these considerations are major elements of the GPRA-MA, currently representing the legislation’s interpretation and primary focus (i.e., political and administrative oversight), this finding goes a long way in perhaps explaining why these types of strategic performance management frameworks have had such a limited impact in improving performance and results to date.

By extension, then, working to create, then sustain a “High-Trust Culture” (i.e., Public Accountability), as well as treating performance management and improvement as a “Wicked Problem” that requires non-traditional solutions, would alleviate the identified deficiencies of the GPRA-MA framework, since these two elements were demonstrated as having a direct impact on its performance.

Likewise, seeking to mitigate the bureaucratic tendency to direct and control could plausibly contribute to improved results, in light of the fact that this condition remained an alternative hypothesis, having a direct correlation on the efficacy of the GPRA-MA strategy.

Finally, redirecting the GPRA-MA emphasis on the role political and management oversight plays in improving public performance accountability, and placing it on the other above-mentioned elements, could paradoxically contribute to greater

accountability. This is an important finding and possible solution/remedy, since it is widely accepted that increasing oversight, as opposed to increasing true accountability, is believed to be one of the most important factors in obtaining results. Analysis, using the Hypothesis Testing Matrix, however, demonstrates that this might not be the case, and that in fact, quite the opposite is true.

Improving performance within the Department will “counter-intuitively” require paying particular attention to certain GPRA-MA focus areas and conditions that have been minimized and/or neglected to date. That means recognizing GPRA-MA focus areas 1, 4 and 5, and conditions 1, 2 and 4 as significant leverage points, which is contrary to and contradicts the legislation’s primary emphasis on performance measurement in support of strategic clarity and organizational alignment, and political/administrative governance and oversight, as being the key factors affecting change.

“Counterintuitive” is often the most appropriate word to use when describing complex systems, however, because as systems become complex, their behavior can become surprising, having leverage points that are frequently not intuitive, and when they are, often used “backward” to maintain status quo, as opposed to improving or innovating, systematically worsening whatever problems one is attempting to solve.¹²⁰

Even though we are stuck with working within the strict parameters of the Act to affect federal government performance, we should at least attempt to move its “levers” in a more radical fashion than has been attempted before.

It is not that parameters are not important— they can be, especially in the short term and to the individual who’s standing directly in the flow. People care deeply about [...] variables [...]. But changing these variables rarely changes the behavior of [...] system[s]. If the system is chronically stagnant, parameter changes rarely kick-start it. If it is wildly variable, they usually do not stabilize it. If it is growing out of control, they do not slow it down.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Meadows, *Thinking in Systems: A Primer*, 2734–2736.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 2774–2778.

In summary, moving beyond the status quo will require radically focusing on creating, then cultivating a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust) within the department, and vis-à-vis the general public in order to positively affect the overall cultural climate. Improving the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA will involve placing special emphasis on how more flexible, free-flowing and creative solutions to increase external public and internal organizational engagement, collaboration, and cooperation can be brought to bear on the discipline of strategic performance management. In particular, social complexity theory and the study of complex adaptive processes have much to contribute in terms of changing the status quo regarding GPRA-MA implementation. Along with strategic performance management best practices, they can provide direction for DHS to change the overall cultural climate by bridging the gap between traditional definitions of public performance accountability (i.e., improved government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-traditional interpretations of organizational and public trust.

B. DHS GPRA-MA IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLEXITY THEORY

The basic tenants of the law—*leadership participation, cross-organizational communication and collaboration, transparency and accountability*—make up the foundational management philosophy adopted by legislators and executive branch officials in their efforts to improve government performance. But how realistic and effective is DHS’ current approach to implement such a philosophy?

There are reputable schools of thought that would put into serious question the efficacy and the feasibility of the department’s methodologies to adopt the law’s underlying principles and guiding policy. In the midst of self-congratulatory encouragement, we might want to consider measuring the DHS’ current reductionist, predictable and linear strategies against more nuanced, creative approaches. There are indeed alternative ways to build mission and program resiliency and maximize organizational effectiveness.

The GPRA-MA can very easily become, like its predecessor(s), a mere political or bureaucratic solution to the more creative and critical thinking required to identify and

communicate real paths toward continuous improvement and sustainable success. We have already determined that building a bridge, or appropriate strategy, between the mandate (i.e., the GPRA-MA) and the policy (i.e., OMB Circular A-11) that will lead to real world performance improvement solutions within agencies requires a valid road-map based on *best* practices, as opposed to simply *common* practices.

In “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist,” Gregory D. Foster states that strategy is ultimately about exercising power.¹²² Having authority conferred by either the American people or the President of the United States often has the effect of squashing any real dialogue and/or critical analysis within government institutions. “If it’s the law of the land, then do we really have any choice?” seems to be the default mindset. If this is true and we are operating in such a hierarchical environment where ideas and the ability to generate them seem increasingly unlikely, then how might performance management and improvement be advanced within government organizations? What mechanisms can we put in place to facilitate more out-of-the-box thinking as opposed to more of the same top-down, command-and-control structures, such as the PPBE solutions currently being adopted by the DHS?

The fact that we are not even asking these questions, much less attempting to answer them, suggests political and bureaucratic stagnation, or worse, hubris.

A simple definition of a politician (and/or proxy bureaucrat) is “someone who has been given power to implement a mandate,” irrespective of “objective truth,” the latter having been replaced with a subjective agenda. The objective truth is that the GPRA-MA of 2010, as it is currently conceived, is simply a framework with a governance structure that will contribute to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials. Success in the current GPRA-MA world of government performance and accountability is not being stated in terms of how we are achieving a better society, but in terms of how well we are implementing a presidential and/or congressional agenda. Perhaps couching the GPRA-MA in the truly

¹²² Gregory D. Foster, “Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1996, 111.

political environment from which it issues and currently lies, is the start of recognizing the limitations of the focus and approach of the legislation, so that we can begin to look for alternative options elsewhere.

Performance management and improvement is a “Wicked Problem.” Much like diagnosing a disease, a problem is deemed “wicked” if it meets any one of ten (10) criteria.¹²³ The term “wicked” is used, not in the sense of evil, but rather to designate situations or problems that are extremely difficult or impossible to resolve due to incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements and the complex interdependencies that define them. The best way to tackle “wicked problems” is to create forums where data-informed discussions can occur and generate insights into what’s working and what’s not working within well-defined environments, build a consensus of what exactly constitutes the problem and then gather momentum toward finding (a) solution(s). The danger lies, not in attempting to limit the universe in order to reach consensus about a problem and elicit engagement to obtain resolution, but in thinking that a specific configuration represents actual reality. It may reflect one reality, but not another.

¹²³ Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, *Policy Sciences 4, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973), 155–169.

10 Characteristics of Wicked Problems

Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, in their article “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” identified 10 characteristics that would determine whether a problem would be categorized as “wicked.” “Wicked Problems” are particularly difficult to resolve and require non-traditional solutions.

1 There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.

Defining the problem requires a complete understanding of all its possible solutions, as they alone can frame the problem.

2 Wicked problems have no stopping rule.

The problem will never be fully resolved due to the complexity of the variables. Making progress, rather than achieving perfection, is the definition of success.

3 Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad.

There are no objective, scientific formulas to weigh solutions, which will largely be based on subjective opinion or non-verifiable “proof.”

4 There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.

Determining the validity of a solution requires indeterminate time to discern the repercussions of choices. The “fruit” of one’s efforts must ripen before it can be tasted (i.e., tested) and appreciated (i.e., evaluated).

5 Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot” operation; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.

Every solution, or choice, will have long-lasting repercussions that can undermine success. There is very little room for error, and bad decisions quickly close windows of opportunity.

6 Wicked problems do not have an exhaustively describable set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan.

There are no common criteria to limit the working framework of solutions.

7 Every wicked problem is essentially unique.

There are no standard best-practice solutions.

8 Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.

Symptoms are unrecognizable from causes, and it is extremely difficult to identify the actual source of problems.

9 The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways.

There is no rule or procedure to identify, beyond any reasonable doubt, the reasons for problems, or by extension, their solutions.

10 The planner has no right to be wrong.

Failure means not resolving the problem, no matter how much effort was applied. There are no second chances because the consequences of failure are grave.

Table 6. 10 Characteristics of Wicked Problems

Social complexity theory provides a possible way out of this conundrum by causing us to understand that the world is much more complicated than we first thought, requiring responses that go beyond the simplistic, top-down, command-and-control, machine-like systems and approaches we have created and deferred to in the past.

Just as it takes a leaderless network to defeat and/or compete with another leaderless network, only a complex system, able to continually learn, (re)organize and adapt to dynamic environments will be equipped to “solve” wicked problems. Performance management policies and frameworks that are designed to encourage self-organization, system-wide learning and adaptability will contain the following characteristics:

Features of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) ¹²⁴	Summary Description
Agents	The system comprises large numbers of individual agents connected through multiple networks.
Interactions	The agents interact dynamically, exchanging information and energy based upon heuristics that organize the interactions locally. Even if specific agents only interact with a few others, the effects propagate through the system. As a result the system has a memory that is not located at a specific place, but is distributed throughout the system.
Nonlinearity	The interactions are nonlinear, iterative, recursive, and self-referential. There are many direct and indirect feedback loops.
System Behavior	The system is open, the behavior of the system is determined by the interactions, not the components, and the behavior of the system cannot be understood by looking at the components. It can only be understood by looking at the interactions. Coherent and novel patterns of order emerge.
Robustness and Adaptation	The system displays both the capacity to maintain its viability and the capacity to evolve. With sufficient diversity the heuristics will evolve, the agents will adapt to each other, and the system can reorganize its internal structure without the intervention of an outside agent.

Table 7. Characteristics of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

Decision-making frameworks, such as Cynefin,¹²⁵ can help leaders organize issues and problems involving Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) into categories of complexity, ranging from the simple to the chaotic, so that they can select solutions based on contextual/relative *reality*, rather than situational *preference*. Indeed, as cavalier creatures of habit, we tend to simplify the world we live in to make things easier on ourselves. Often choosing paths of least resistance, we prefer expedient “sense-making,”

¹²⁴ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 32.

¹²⁵ The Cynefin Framework, created by Cognitive Edge PTE LTD., categorizes issues into five contexts as determined by internal factors of cause and effect. Four of these, simple and complicated (ordered), and complex and chaotic (disordered), can be resolved once causal effect has been determined, with the ordered context having more readily visible cause and effect linkages, and the disordered categories less so. The fifth category, disordered, is simply a placeholder for issues until the accurate context can be identified.

quickly judging where people and things belong, as opposed to suspending judgment until everyone and everything has weighed in or been weighed. Moreover, in our zeal to seek reassurance that “all is well” so we can get back to doing what we enjoy, rather than what we must, we will artificially categorize issues and problems to quickly “solve” them, instead of letting them evolve naturally, and perhaps even resolve themselves. Like Cinderella’s wicked step sisters before the glass slipper, we say over and over again that “we’ll make it fit,” often hobbling ourselves in the process.

Achieving true success will involve more ethereal models that shatter “control” in the traditional sense. True leaders have the capacity to admit that their subordinates might be better at resolving problems than they are. It takes humility to select a leader other than oneself or adopt a different leadership style than what one is used to, as a better fit for an evolving situation. Acknowledging the utility of social complexity theory and applying it to enhance strategic performance management practices will require such leadership. Such leadership entails relinquishing *control*.

True leaders are capable of admitting to the existence of uncertainty without giving way to the fear of failure by overly compensating with dictatorial power. Current policy and practices, unfortunately, encourage just the opposite. Even though the world is complex, with multiple and constantly evolving theories of knowledge, modern Western societies, and their institutions built on the expectations of certainty, continue to demand of its professionals, precise calculations and certainty in predictions. However, true resilience would demand that these same experts be allowed to adopt mindsets involving greater ambiguity and volatility.¹²⁶

Complexity theory offers a way to calm our anxieties as we set out on our journey into the uncharted domain of the uncertain, by letting us know that there are legitimate alternatives to definitive conclusions and rigid courses of action toward pre-set outcomes; that recommendations based on contingent conclusions and experimentation are also viable options toward success.

¹²⁶ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 175.

Government should begin to embrace this mentality as part of the standard paradigm of its professionals.

A complex system has many components, free elements or agents, capable of interfacing with each other and their environments, independent of any standard expectations of cause and effect, rationality, and/or intentionality.¹²⁷ In other words, the behavior of complex systems can neither be predicted, nor their actors expected to act in predictable ways. It is particularly challenging to prescribe solution sets for complex systems, where traditional analysis and approaches to solving problems often break down. Moreover, complex systems cannot be understood by studying various parts in isolation. The only way to discern the true identity and impact of a complex organization is to comprehend how the numerous and multifaceted interactions between multiple parts can lead to certain behaviors, actions and/or decisions. Therefore, complex systems must be analyzed holistically and in movement.

DHS is a complex system. Unfortunately, PPBE and logic modeling are not. They reduce the myriad of actions and influences of a multiplicity of different directorates and offices and seven (7) separate components, many with their own individual culture, history and legacy, into a simplistic framework of programs, sub-programs and activities. And we haven't even mentioned the overall Homeland Security Environment (HSE), or the macro-level within which DHS functions.

Like many complex organizations, DHS is not simply the sum of its parts, and deconstructing them into malleable pieces, subjecting them to microscopic review and laboratory experimentation may only result in simplifying the complex and complicating the simple, with unintended consequences. The real question is: can reductionist (i.e., deconstructive) "Newtonian-type" frameworks, such as PPBE, improve decision-makers ability to observe complex homeland security systems at sufficient levels to increase understanding of interrelationships that can contribute to improved system behavior, robustness and adaptation? Or, will these models continue to maintain and strengthen

¹²⁷ C. F. Kurtz and D. J. Snowden, "The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense Making in a Complex and Complicated World," *IBM Systems Journal* 42, no. 3 (2003).

status quo by oversimplifying stove-piped mission sets lacking adequate coordination and integration, believing end states are simply the result of linear cause and effect relationships?

Author Philip Anderson, in his article “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” stated, “the task of those responsible for the strategic direction of an organization is not to foresee the future or to implement enterprise-wide adaptation programs, because nonlinear systems react to direction in ways that are difficult to predict or control. Rather, good managers **establish and modify the direction and the boundaries within which effective, improvised, self-organized solutions can evolve** [emphasis is the author’s]. They set constraints upon local actions, observe outcomes, and tune the system by altering the constraints, all the while raising or lowering the amount of energy injected into the dissipative structure they are managing.”¹²⁸ He also stated that “there does not yet exist a theory that will help managers predict the type of emergent outcome that will result from altering the configuration of a network in a particular way.”¹²⁹ In other words, the man behind the curtain, somehow moving the levers in just the right way to get us back to Kansas, is a myth.

Will DHS PPBE allow us to study the organization at *all* levels and fully grasp the whole, in order to appropriately frame a strategy that drives operations where “effective, improvised, self-organized solutions can evolve?” Or will it continue to be a matter of hit-and-miss, of programmatic “whack-a-mole,” where leaders prescribe solutions rather than discern them by describing what’s actually happening and working on the ground?

Instead of dictating patterns to constitute strategy, managers should understand and shape the context within which natural patterns emerge and are sustained in the dynamic and constantly changing real-world environments we actually operate in. This would facilitate movement from chaotic contexts, to complex, complicated, and then simple ones. In other words, it would facilitate finding and managing workable, yet

¹²⁸ Philip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” Special Issue: Application of Complexity Theory to Organization Science, *Organization Science* 10, no. 3, (May–June 1999): 228.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 229.

innovative, solutions, as espoused by the Cynefin Framework. Being able to manage dynamic change well is particularly important in the public sector, due to the transient nature of political leadership which places organizations in a constant state of flux, where programs, projects, and activities are continually being created, dismembered, and dismantled.¹³⁰

Because the GPRA-MA is not looking to detect patterns, but rather to manufacture them, the legislation will require more to contribute to true “success,” by encouraging agencies to identify and measure the best or even better solution, rather than the good enough solution. The GPRA-MA, like its predecessors, is currently mostly a political instrument, a marketing tool for those who have been conferred power in order to make a difference for the better, if not the best.

The question remains: will future DHS solutions be able to evolve beyond this?

C. SPM AND COMPLEXITY THEORY

It is believed that the systems and processes adopted and/or currently being developed within the DHS will provide effective and efficient top-down command-and-control frameworks and bring increased oversight and accountability of operations. They are in full compliance with the basic requirements of the GPRA-MA. However, many of these approaches still lack the proper mechanisms to facilitate out-of-the-box thinking that could lead to more innovative solutions.

As already stated, these types of governance-based approaches, like the Act itself, simply contribute to a common understanding of and commitment to the political and bureaucratic intent of elected and appointed officials.

Current DHS efforts to implement GPRA-MA should be assessed against additional criteria and best practices in the field of strategic planning and decision making, informed by social complexity theory, as a possible means to develop alternative

¹³⁰ Gary M. Grobman, “Complexity Theory: A New Way To Look At Organizational Change,” *PAQ*, Fall 1973, 355.

solutions more meaningful to end users at *all* levels of the performance improvement continuum (e.g., civilian, political, executive, managerial, operational, etc.).

The following section offers suggestions on how to apply the concepts of social complexity theory within the realm of strategic performance management, in the hopes of providing DHS leaders with encouragement to choose evolution, the first step in finding worthier strategic planning and decision-making solutions.

1. Strategic Planning and Decision-Making Best Practices

Authors Ahlstrand, Lampel and Mintzberg, in their groundbreaking work *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management* rendered service to all strategic planners and managers, both seasoned practitioners and neophytes, in writing their in-depth and painstaking analysis of the various strategic management schools of thought that have been around since the beginning of the 1960s. By framing the discipline using five (5) definitions and ten (10) different schools or philosophical approaches to strategy formation, the authors established a solid foundation to conduct a serious assessment of exiting practices, not only in public and non-profit organizations, but also in private industry.

The authors define strategy simply, as a “plan, pattern, position, perspective, or ploy”¹³¹ that allows someone to get from here to there. They whimsically compare strategic management to an elephant, and strategists to blind men, who, each in their separate corners and through tactical means alone, attempt to comprise a mental picture of the whole beast based on its disparate parts.

In their metaphor, each member represents a separate school of thought reflected in current management practice, each with its own unique perspective focusing on one major aspect of the process. Ten (10) distinct schools are detailed along with their limitations and contributions to the field:

¹³¹ Bruce Ahlstrand, Henry Mintzberg, and Joseph Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management* (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2001), 163–231, Kindle edition.

- The Design School: strategy formation as a process of *conception*
- The Planning School: strategy formation as a *formal* process
- The Positioning School: strategy formation as an *analytical* process
- The Entrepreneurial School: strategy formation as a *visionary* process
- The Cognitive School: strategy formation as a *mental* process
- The Learning School: strategy formation as an *emergent* process
- The Power School: strategy formation as a process of *negotiation*
- The Cultural School: strategy formation as a *collective* process
- The Environmental School: strategy formation as a *reactive* process
- The Configuration School: strategy formation as a process of *transformation*

The authors further categorize the ten schools into three groups. The first three schools are *prescriptive*, or more concerned with how strategies should be formulated than with how they actually form and are implemented in the real world. Schools four through nine, concentrate on specific aspects of the process by *describing* actual strategy formation. The final school combines aspects of all nine approaches, and therefore, is considered to be both prescriptive and descriptive in nature.

Achieving success in strategic performance management (i.e., strategy development, implementation and assessment) involves much more than the rational or prescriptive side of a process captured by the first three schools of design, planning and positioning). Yet this has been and remains the primary philosophical approach of both public and non-profit organizations seeking to direct and improve their operations at the formal corporate or governance level.

GPRA-MA does relatively little to change this status quo. This is because, the GPRA-MA “plan, pattern, position, perspective, or ploy” is also primarily prescriptive in nature.

Those who work in the field of strategic performance management, the “strategy freaks” who have visions of sugar plums, or smell food for the killing, every time the words “strategic plan” or “performance measures” are mentioned, will find a valuable ally in the descriptions of the ten schools in their attempts to apply the discipline within their own organizations.

Each school will be reviewed below from the performance perspective in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the current GPRA-MA universe. For our discussion, we have adopted a different metaphor, however, likening successful strategic performance management to *building a home from the ground up*.

2. The Design School: A Process of Conception

In the Design School, strategy formation is a process of formal design or essentially that of a master ARCHITECT’S mental (re)conception of reality. Through the application of a simple two-step process involving the identification and reconciliation of internal capabilities (i.e., strengths and weaknesses) and external possibilities (i.e., opportunities and threats or challenges), strategies are conceived in controlled (i.e., stable) environments, and are thus ordered, clear, expedient, and fully representative of the unique vision, or “bird’s eye view” of leadership.

Here, as we shall see is the case with all three prescriptive schools, strategy formation is a process of *conception* rather than *learning*. Since there is really nothing to learn (because we already know-it-all), there is a tendency to dismiss the inherent complexity of strategic development by overly simplifying reality in order to seek premature closure. This type of planning is leadership dominant, where learning is bypassed, and thought (i.e., formulation) is separated from action (i.e., implementation). In this delineable, stable, and machine-like, centralized/formalized environment, there is very little room for flexibility, for “incrementalism” or “emergent” strategies, where formulation is allowed to continue on, during and after implementation. This is “grand strategy” development: formulaic, quickly and easily done.

The Design School approach seems to have been adopted in order to develop a plan that is externally (top-down) compliant rather than internally (bottom-up) useful. Its theory makes good shelf-ware products, but not necessarily feasible, implementable or impactful strategy. Strategy is simply a recommendation, made, but not implemented; unwanted and unneeded data, produced, but not used.

a. *GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations*

The GPRA-MA requirement to eliminate “duplicative” or “redundant” reporting by reducing and/or consolidating agency strategic and performance plans and reports, is a subtle (and unflattering) admission that many of the strategic planning documents produced by government agencies in the past were done so unnecessarily.

The GPRA-MA, similar to the Design School approach, is limiting in its emphasis on a top-down, leadership formulation of success. Even though it attempts to interject differing perspectives into its processes, by advocating for more collaborative approaches to strategic performance management, it still remains somewhat simplistic, or insufficiently complex to tackle the “wicked problems” of strategy formulation, implementation and assessment.

GPRA-MA of 2010 buys into the erroneous premise of the Design School that simply because information reported up the hierarchy has been verified and validated by lower levels, as in an echo chamber, it must be an accurate reflection of reality. On the contrary, forcing someone to *prove* success using empirical data, does not necessarily translate into *improved* performance. In fact, the two have separate and often competing goals, reconcilable only in a world where true transparency, objectivity and accountability exist. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case where Design School power players are involved. Operating in various halls of power, their GPRA-MA frameworks and models are often only being developed to service the needs of powerful clients with pre-established agendas.

This preference for order and obedience “through standardized bureaucratic procedures, carefully limited agendas, use of specialized discourses, carefully defined problem frames, and invitations for participation to individuals whose

contributions are predictable,” is what currently characterizes DHS strategic planning and decision-making processes. This state of affairs can be explained by an increasing anxiety over uncertainty, resulting in a call for even greater control.¹³² Unfortunately, this type of twentieth century executive decision making will not suffice in the communication and information highway of the twenty-first century. Increasingly, power in an interconnected world is no longer synonymous with hierarchical leadership, but rather with a diversity of knowledge and information, even if that knowledge is called into question or resisted by skeptical experts and professionals. Because of the challenges to traditional power and the changes in interactional dynamics caused by the general public, enlightened by the (new) media, policy and planning professionals should be proactively seeking ways to question the status quo, that of bureaucratic reign and the tyranny of the subject matter expert, kept in place by established standard operating procedures based on simplistic, increasingly obsolete paradigms and methodologies.

b. Summary

The GPRA-MA framework offers a sufficiently controlled environment that will allow government leaders, managers and strategic management subject matter experts to question their current epistemologies in a “safe environment” as they strain to entertain alternative approaches to performance improvement.

3. The Planning School: A Formal Process

The Planning School emphasizes the *process* behind the *design*. In oxymoron fashion, it “institutionalizes innovation” seeing strategy making as a detached and systematic process of formal planning.¹³³

Now that the ARCHITECT has conceptually designed the house, capturing its major features on blueprints, the REAL ESTATE BROKER enters the scene to pre-sell it, developing brochures with in-depth descriptions of each floor, detailing amenities and

¹³² Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 158.

¹³³ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 978.

advantages room-by-room, providing comparison charts displaying how this particular house will turn out to be the best deal in town, etc. The desire is to provide the future homeowner with the information necessary to make the best decision possible (which, they hope, will be none other than selecting the show house).

It is all about “Mr. Strategy,” as everyone sets about measuring how well the blueprints have been drawn, without actually discussing the needs of the homebuyer. Everyone simply assumes that buying this particular house is already a done deal, so they all empress themselves to bedazzle the “ivory tower” managers with their well-oiled processes to “make it all happen.”

The Planning School, like the Design School, thrives in simple, stable (i.e., predictable), and controllable environments. Creativity and choice are almost non-existent. Prediction and anticipation is neither predicted nor anticipated. The end result is not attended to, nor even fully defined.

Strategies, through a rigorous set of steps, are decomposed into sub-strategies and programs. Formal, decomposed, deliberate (i.e., prescriptive) instructions are given, followed by periodic, incremental controls for decision making.

Ostensibly, in such a structured, procedurally acquiescent environment, decisions can quickly become static, even artificial. Group think is also often the result of these large machine-like (i.e., centralized, formalized, stove-piped) approaches to strategic planning.

We are reminded of the all too familiar world of “cascading strategy development,” mandated by the original GPRA of 1993. Long-term (usually five years) comprehensive, “strategic” plans perch at the top, to be implemented through decomposed sub-strategies followed by medium-term plans, giving rise to short-term annual operating plans. Sound familiar?

Leadership’s desires (previously articulated in the Design School) are now captured in the form of programmatic *goals* and *objectives*. Strategy is subsumed, disappearing as an issue that has been resolved once and for all. The ephemeral world of strategy development has been replaced with the formal planning process, uncertain

values and dispositions with the certainty of goals, the fallible qualitative assessment with the infallible quantitative evaluation; *success* becomes synonymous with obsessive-compulsive *control*.

This is federal government “strategic planning” at its best, but unlike the *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, this planning approach has yet to know its sunset. Still in its apogee, it is the “best practices” strategic planning methodology most often employed by public and non-profit sectors today.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

Strategic performance management within the federal government upholds and implements similar dictums. The GPRA-MA institutionalizes its own performance management “innovations” through the OMB Circular A-11, and individual agency-level solutions, such as the DHS PPBE, fully in line with the premises of both the Design and Planning Schools.

However, the idea that strategy can be developed in a structured, formalized process is rejected by the authors of *Strategy Safari*, who believe that much of the information truly important for strategy making and assessment remains tacit, never becoming hard transferrable fact. They prefer the word *programming*, rather than *planning* to describe the GPRA-MA world of frameworks and models, which often adopts explicit data as Gospel truth.¹³⁴

Because authorizations, oversight and appropriations at the department still remain a largely disjointed process, where projects continue to be proposed along departmental or component lines, the true utility of GPRA-MA of 2010 and PPBE frameworks, models, and tools is to provide the necessary structure to synthesize inputs necessary to conduct analysis. Like calculators, such frameworks are able to process but not analyze data; synthesize, but not draw conclusions. They should not be seen as offering or mandating specific policy or strategy solutions, even though they are often

¹³⁴ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 1129.

used to do just that. We need to remind ourselves that we are the humans, and they are the machines, and that information must be accompanied by interactive dialogue in order to become knowledge.

This tendency, which is clearly at odds with collaboration, is linked to the dominance of instrumental rationality—the ideal of goal directed behavior guided by experts and designed to find the “right” policy. As a result, we end up with the Decide, Announce, Defend syndrome (DAD), which wreaks havoc on public engagement with decision making. This syndrome in turn is grounded in a culturally embedded mechanical metaphor for policy making. We tend to see a problem as being like a machine that experts can take apart and fix, reassembling it so it is again in working order.¹³⁵

Indeed, innovators must remain on their guard against these traditional school approaches, which buy into many of the fallacies relative to data analysis and decision making. The GPRA-MA of 2010 itself encourages inflexibility through its goal and target-setting mandate as a formal means to structure the priority of projects and to inform senior management about them. Put simply, it only reinforces strategies already being pursued, without offering a framework for alternatives. It also requires decision making by remote, and therefore can quickly devolve into a strategic planning and decision-making guidebook for dummies.

b. Summary

We must never forget that the GPRA-MA should only be seen as a support for legislative and executive branch management decision making rather than as a means to attend to strategy making or measure success. A fine line exists between enabling and controlling. It remains to be seen whether the execution and implementation of departmental GPRA-MA solutions (whatever they end up being) will make such a distinction.

¹³⁵ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 9.

4. The Positioning School: An Analytical Process

The third (and final) prescriptive school is less concerned with the process of strategy formation than with the actual content of strategies. It is referred to as the positioning school because it focuses on maintaining strategic positions in specific environments.

The Positioning School sees strategic management as the process of selecting the right solution, from among a highly constrained set of generic strategies. Here, the HOME BUILDING INSPECTOR or HOME DEPOT® INTERIOR DESIGNER descends with his/her standard checklist or paint palette seeking standard conditions to satisfy. This is strategic planning as science, or at least as recipe: a little here, a little there, and often. Solutions are selected, rather than designed or formulated, based on in-depth and somewhat aloof analysis. Empirical data and calculation is front and center. Strategy is not complicated. It is not complex. It is simple, stable and seemingly mature, typical of industrial tried-and-true solutions, standard issue ware: mass-produced, globally understood. No-mess, self-cleaning, instant strategy in a box: just add water...

The Positioning School does not take roads less traveled. It stays on paths already traced; focuses on navigating options already well established. This is planning by “Critical Path,” maintaining position (i.e., status quo) versus creating/innovating new ones.

This rational approach to decision making is based on objective data, logical deductive analysis and systematic comparison of alternatives, the guiding philosophy of most public sector budgeting processes. This “powerful normative model [...] grounded in positivist epistemology [where] neutral experts [...] gather, compile and analyze data [and] use [it] to make decisions” remains the most dominant today, despite current challenges to it.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 17–18.

How effective such a strategy can be internally, however, is questionable; especially, if it has been developed by external consultants, using generic or standard ingredients. Its limitations are similar to those of the Planning School, neglecting many of the softer influences involved in strategy building: power, politics, culture and social elements.

The authors suggest that the one redeeming quality of the Positioning School, with its ready-made solutions, is that it indirectly admits to the “dirty little secret of the strategy industry [...] that it doesn’t have any theory of strategy *creation*.”¹³⁷ Indeed, we keep trying, never admitting defeat, expecting to find the real answer/solution, but finally opting for one of two roads: (a) doing nothing and being accused of dereliction of duty; or (b) doing something (easy) and calling it success. The Positioning School resolves this issue by choosing the second option. Basta! Now we can focus our energies on something else. Such as pursuing management’s true gift, *analysis*, while ignoring its deficiencies, *planning*, which we have just determined is not a true science.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

The Positioning School argues, like the OMB GPRA-MA of 2010 policy, that only a few key strategies (i.e., priority goals) are desirable. This approach can be particularly appealing, playing as it does into the dogmatic mindset prevalent in today’s strategic planning and performance management communities. People choose options then defend them to the death, with very little adaptation and/or directional change in the process. Unfortunately, results reflect this lack of flexibility, of going to the extreme, or at least too far, in one’s premises.

Today’s government strategic planners have bought into the rational and prescriptive side of the strategic planning process, or the first three schools of design, planning and positioning, or what is referred to as “the operationalization of planning.” They have once again chosen the HOW over the WHAT, placing emphasis on top-down, hierarchical, command-and-control design processes.

¹³⁷ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 1596.

It is no wonder then that strategies for measuring success also follow along in lock step. The official message from Congress and OMB may be “engagement and collaboration, cultural learning, continual innovation and improvement, and transparency and accountability,” but everybody knows better. Like Pavlov’s dog, we’ve been trained to expect certain desires and behavior from our Congressional and OMB masters. It is the messenger, rather than the message, which still rings the loudest, making us salivate, at just the right time, in all the right places.

“We’re from higher levels of government and we’re here to help” may indeed be true, but will not be believed by the worker bees until verified and validated.

b. Summary

The jury is still listening to evidence in the trial on the GPRA-MA and the DHS PPBE response to it. Will power players at all levels be able to resist the urge to use information to simply justify agenda-motivated (i.e., political) decisions, or will they actually use the information to make objective, evidence-based decisions? Will they even be allowed to? Operators know that those who will not (or cannot) do this, should not be trusted with “real” data, and they will continue to keep the “good stuff” in-house and close-hold.

5. The Entrepreneurial School: A Visionary Process

As we transition from prescriptive to descriptive strategy, we begin to associate strategy with entrepreneurship, describing the process in terms of vision creation by a great, even an inspirational leader who begins to say to us with an exotic accent, “This is what you’re saying it *should* be; this is what it *could* be...if you would just let it.”

The Design School sees a leader, not as the prophesied Messiah, but as the “ho-hum” head(s) of an organization. This is not so with the Entrepreneurial School, which leans much more heavily on its leaders, seeing them as revolutionary geniuses to be vaunted.

In step with our own metaphor, we would now be looking to the personal, creative (i.e., intuitive) even iconic HOME IMPROVEMENT DESIGNER à la the Home and

Garden Network[®], or the world-renowned Chef of the Food Network[®]. The hope is that he/she will bring flexibility into the process through personal charisma and vision, relying heavily on judgment, wisdom, experience and insight.

The Entrepreneurial School says that this type of strategic philosophy would be particularly well suited for new and or existentially threatened organizations, where deliberate, broad-lined strategy can be defined then flexibly implemented based on emergent (sic treacherous) situations.

This is leadership by adventure, the strategic planner as Indiana Jones, looking for the diamond in the rough, the one great gem of an idea that will change everything.

Unfortunately, the way forward is only as good (and as bold) as the leader. Very few leaders have that spark of genius necessary to inspire and evoke the emotional resources of an organization, and appropriately leverage its physical, tangible assets.

Needless to say, such a philosophy is not well adapted to the federal government, whose default reaction is to maintain both balance and status quo. With its occasional, opportunistic and revolutionary, short-term, versus evolutionary, long-term leadership style, the Entrepreneurial School often has the tendency to go too far for government officials. “Me too” strategies, resulting from uncreative or detached management, are much simpler and safer. Thank you very much. Besides, how could the glass houses of government weather such volatility, anyway? Breaking eggs is fine, as long as the end state actually produces an edible omelet.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

The sound philosophical and somewhat inspirational contributions of the GPRA-MA and its subsequent policy have been established. In order to translate these noble premises into actionable and effective strategy at the agency level, true entrepreneurial leadership will be required. The legislation acknowledges the necessity for strong, political leadership and the role of appointees, who with their strong need for control, ability to be independent, built-in drive to leave behind a “legacy,” and accompanying tendency to accept moderate risks, are in the best position to affect

positive “revolutionary” change in the arena of government strategic performance management. But how many have answered the call? More importantly, how many are actually inspired?

It will take such inspired, courageous leadership, operating out of strong conviction(s), to transition public agencies to embrace more collaborative practices, totally currently at odds with today’s bureaucratic norms, seemingly obsessed with simplicity and the instant resolution (i.e., gratification) of problems. Complex and contributive processes are often seen as confusing and a threat to the power of politicians and agency heads, and the control they wield to maintain the existing, more traditional institutional structures and norms.¹³⁸

b. Summary

Superhuman entrepreneurial ship will practically be required to break the symbiotic relationship existing between elected and appointed officials always looking for simple, objective information to justify (versus inform) their decisions and the bureaucratic rationality entrenched to satisfy those needs. Once again, the GPRA-MA model, if appropriately leveraged, can break such a “bunker mentality” and allow DHS leaders to adopt more collaborative decision making based on a multiplicity and diversity of knowledge.¹³⁹

6. The Cognitive School: A Mental Process

If strategy can be a personalized vision, then strategy formation also has to be understood as the process of “concept attainment” in a person’s head.¹⁴⁰ Such is the premise of the Cognitive School.

This school of *thought* crystallizes the strategic management process as an individual mental strain occurring in the mind of the strategist. Strategy is no more than

¹³⁸ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 9.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 18.

¹⁴⁰ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 2344.

the strategic planner's social construction of reality, which has somehow yielded inputs from the environment, initially distorted, but finally emerging as strategic "perspectives - in the form of concepts, maps, schemas, and frames."¹⁴¹ The whole strategy making discipline is reduced to hermeneutics, or how people analyze patterns and process information.

Therefore, a small but important cognitive school has developed using cognitive psychology to enter the strategist's mind and better understand how strategies are mentally conceptualized.

OK, that is nice. But, how can such an ephemeral approach possibly be leveraged to enhance public strategic planning and performance management, in practical terms? Understanding what is psychologically or sociologically happening in the mind of the strategist and how he/she is processing information is all rather theoretical and does not seem very useful in guiding collective strategic planning and/or performance management processes.

Perhaps one can look at it this way: in order to "close the deal" one must understand the deal makers and breakers, which in our home analogy would be the actual HOMEBUYER. Remember him/her? Understanding how he/she thinks in order to better understand his/her particular needs and make proposals to satisfy them, is akin to understanding the end users of strategic planning frameworks in order to determine what decision-making structures best fit into their worlds. The Cognitive School is, in essence, *requirements identification*.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

As previously mentioned, GPRA-MA is a simple solution to a wicked problem. GPRA-MA, as a strategic performance management framework, creates imaginary lines between "events, objects, and situations so that [they] become meaningful for the members of an organizational world,"¹⁴² influencing decision-makers'

¹⁴¹ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 2397.

¹⁴² Ibid., 2486.

beliefs about their internal and external environments. The idea is that, by making the world rational, recognizable, and ultimately, collectively understandable, the framework can be used to effectively impact decision making.

The Cognitive School reminds us that the mind is a very complex place, where accurate decisions require much more than simple and often redundant empirical evidence, much more than clear, single point decision making. It challenges us to beware of the simplistic, reductionist GPRA-MA of 2010 framework, which may only be providing decision-makers with an inaccurate mental representation of reality.

Admittedly one has to start somewhere, because as the authors state, a “wrong mental representation, is better than no representation at all, for at least it gives encouragement, which can stimulate action.”¹⁴³

This author agrees with the legislation’s attempt to influence such shared understanding, by providing similar cognitive maps, schemas, models, etc. As long as this is counterbalanced by the Cognitive School’s warning that groupthink can also result from such an approach and that we should constantly strive to avoid becoming overly dependent on one interpretation of reality to the point of resisting or dismissing all evidence to the contrary.

This School’s philosophy has the potential to act as an antidote against the administrative tendency to reduce everything into a best practices “one-size-fits-all” box in our desire to optimize, or find that one best solution. As previously mentioned, performance improvement is a non-static wicked problem with multiple and often conflicting goals, and institutionalizing performance management processes based on an overly simplified (i.e., optimized) framework in the name of greater effectiveness and efficiency will simply lead to a Kafkaesque-like performance management bureaucracy made up of arbitrary rules and procedures rather than tailored solutions resulting from the input of a multiplicity of contributors, including (gasp) lay people.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 2315.

¹⁴⁴ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*.

Therefore, the GPRA-MA should be constantly interpreted in light of the Cognitive School's special emphasis on reframing perceptions in order to affect thought paradigms. In our present context of strategic performance management, this ushers in greater dialogue toward improved collaboration, learning, and creativity, and away from the current traditional linear model, with its emphasis on the expert knowledge, reasoning and argumentation of government functionaries.

Cognitive frames are so embedded in people's thought processes that they are largely subconscious. It takes persevering reiteration to reframe an issue, situation or practice in ways that would allow for the development and implementation of revised policies and practices. This School encourages this new form of reasoning, or "intellectual bricolage," by drawing on the experience and broader component knowledge of many players.

b. Summary

The idea that the GPRA-MA should only be adopted and applied to vehicle formal, deliberative, argumentation and logical conclusions should be rejected, because it totally neglects other kinds of reasoning and/or premises, based on group dialogue, narratives, even visioning, role playing and storytelling. Such alternative voices can indeed provide valuable knowledge about how partners/stakeholders, including the general public, are experiencing the current situation and how certain options might affect that outcome. Only in this way, can new or alternative options, approaches, and strategies be developed and courses of action taken to adequately address such concerns.¹⁴⁵

7. The Learning School: An Emergent Process

Each of the following four schools opens up the strategy making process to include more than the single (or few) individual(s). For the Learning School, the world is

¹⁴⁵ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 5–6, 124–126, 128.

too complex to allow strategies to be developed all at once as clear plans or visions. Hence strategies must emerge in small steps, incorporating other forces and actors, as the organization adapts, or “lives and learns.”

The Learning School believes that organizations reach end state through a never ending process of small, successive steps as opposed to large quantum jumps. Success is achieved through “logical incrementalism,”¹⁴⁶ through trial and error, by constantly incorporating “lessons learned” into overall action plans.

This School recognizes the limitations of omnipotent leadership in the real world of complexity, diversity, unpredictability, emerging perspectives and continuous change. Therefore, centralized direction is deemphasized in favor of decentralized experimentation, believing that control and direction should be provided by a much more extensive professional cadre involved in strategy making. Top, middle and front-line managers “manage up” through bottom-up descriptive action-learning loops as opposed to top-down prescriptive command-and-control strategy formulation-implementation processes. The goal is to produce more effective, less “clever” strategies that do not separate thought from action, formulation from implementation, theory (i.e., prescriptive) from practice (i.e., descriptive).

Here, we have the free-lance professional PHOTOGRAPHER, roving from floor to floor, going from room to room, taking pictures to share ideas and best practices with everyone involved in our building project.

For a Learning School organization, its “strategy” is the staff’s focus and ideology—how *it* works is how *they* work. Beauty is truly in the eye of the beholder. Strategy is what you see happening, improvement what you see working, and management, what you see being decided.

The Learning School, however, is not the panacea, particularly in situations where conditions are rather stable, or in times of crisis where decisive leadership is called for. Moreover, overly focusing on “incrementalism” alone, with little or no hierarchical

¹⁴⁶ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 2637.

control, could rapidly lead to no strategy at all, only a few stove-piped tactical maneuvers. Without direction, one ends up simply maintaining status quo, or serendipitously making progress.

The Learning School approach must be coupled at some point, preferably initially, with a few prescriptive parameters. Otherwise, the home builders might end up building something other than a house, or no building at all.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

The GPRA-MA acknowledges the utility of such “grassroots” models for strategy formation and strategic learning, because it acknowledges the organization’s capacity to experiment, to fail. The deficiency, however, is improperly or insufficiently defining failure. For homeland security or law enforcement agencies involved in making life and death decisions, where there is zero tolerance for error, would the learning school be appropriate?

In such environments, where failure is acknowledged but not really accepted, logical incrementalism can be used to manage change, to impact culture, rather than to develop strategy. In the words of Ahlstrand, Lampel, and Mintzberg:

The role of leadership thus becomes not to preconceive deliberate strategies, but to manage the process of strategic learning, whereby novel strategies can emerge. Ultimately, then, strategic management involves crafting the subtle relationships between thought and action, control and learning, stability and change.¹⁴⁷

Several of the GPRA-MA formal governance, interaction strategies (e.g., the PIO, PIC, quarterly performance reviews, etc.) encourage such learning environments where agencies “actively seek to move knowledge from one part of the organization to another, to ensure that relevant knowledge finds its way to the organizational unit that needs it most.”¹⁴⁸ This aspect of the law should be more vigorously pursued to assist in

¹⁴⁷ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 3076.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3167.

transitioning from standard, traditional governance structures to what some refer to as “meta-governance” structures with political (i.e., legislative) and organizational (i.e., administrative) frameworks that foster cooperation and learning.

b. Summary

Elected and/or appointed leaders, serving more as neutral facilitators or process mediators, should allow their staff to create and communicate organizational narratives, which can lead to a (re)framing and eventual resolution of issues.¹⁴⁹ Without official legitimacy given to dialogue, the actors may never move beyond simply admiring the pictures, while continually asking for more. Click, click, click...

8. The Power School: A Process of Negotiation

The Power School treats strategy formation as a process of negotiation, of bargaining and compromise among conflicting individuals, groups, and coalitions within an organization grappling with both internal (i.e., micro) and external (i.e., macro) environments.

Such negotiation is carried out by an organization’s legitimate institutions of power, which the authors identify as its “formal authority, established culture, and certified expertise.”¹⁵⁰ Strategy development is not what it should be, but what internal power interests allow it to be, strategies are simply negotiated “truths.” As is typical with politics, where objective truth is most often replaced with something else, “planning” becomes synonymous with “accommodation.”

¹⁴⁹ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 211.

¹⁵⁰ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 3623.

Proponents of this school argue that it is not possible to formulate, let alone implement, optimal strategies: the competing goals of individuals and coalitions ensure that any intended strategy will be disturbed and distorted every step of the way, and the end state will simply reflect the interests of the most powerful groups in the organization—they will, if you like, [only] “map” the existing power structure.¹⁵¹

The homebuyer is no longer the individual looking for a place to make a home and raise his/her family, but rather a FLIPPER, motivated by other, less altruistic, desires and interests.

Evolutionary theory is validated in the Power School, because in these types of organizational jungles, only the strongest survive. Only the loudest voices are heard, only the needs of the most vigorous are satisfied. All the other voices are muffled, muted, perceived intermittently through various strategic alliances, and occasional stakeholder analyses. This is truly regrettable, however, because planning in complex environments requires face-to-face dialogue among the ensemble of all stakeholders. When missing, this translates into deal breakers and/or lethargic implementation because there were no opportunities to ensure and display mutual gain, resulting in lack of buy-in later on.

These purely political planning styles where selling or marketing a strategy is more important than actually implementing it, where quantitative and qualitative data is collected to prove a point rather than (re)solve a problem, and finally, where anecdote through word-of-mouth reigns supreme over independent, objective analysis, can be countered (i.e., balanced out) by small group and diverse task teams. Unfortunately, in the Power School, loyalty to leadership is often more important than actually accomplishing things for the greater good of the organization.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

When hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically resist change, power has become a stagnant and negative force. Here, checks and balances might be useful to overcome skepticism and self-interest. Political pressure, from more

¹⁵¹ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 3568.

objective sources, can be applied to promote the necessary change. Political operatives (i.e., PIOs), working behind the scenes, can stimulate innovation that is being blocked by this type of intransigence. Acting as objective strategists and decision-makers, PIOs can leverage additional alliances and diagnostic tools to make the planning process more democratic, ensure that all sides of an issue are fully debated, and help decrease resistance once a decision has been made.

They should not look to the GPRA-MA for assistance, however, as there are currently no levers in the law to mitigate the same challenges occurring at the higher levels, between the executive and legislative branches, that would contribute to the development of deliberate strategy as the collective realization of *shared* intent. The legislation itself is a honed political beast with its own power centers, varying and opposing perceptions and interests, all pitted against each other at the highest levels of national leadership. The hypocritical Act, therefore, practically guarantees that decisions within agencies will be influenced by power politics, rather than purely objective and neutral decision making.

b. Summary

Politics or negotiated compromise, which often inadvertently results in mission slippage and drift, is no way to make a strategy or measure success. Here, strategic planners and performance practitioners really should do as elected officials say, not as they do.

9. The Cultural School: A Collective Process

In the Cultural School, strategy formation is rooted in the culture of the organization where the process is viewed as fundamentally collective and cooperative.

If the Power School spotlights the slightly Machiavellian, aloof flipper, the Cultural School considers the HOME BUYER'S IMMEDIATE AND DISTANT FAMILY, FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES in making decisions, a "social-power school" if you will.

Here, strategic planners try to involve various groups and departments across the organization in its strategy development, in order to reflect organizational culture. This approach takes into account the crucial role social processes, beliefs and values play in strategic planning and decision making, which also provides an explanation as to where and why there might be resistance to change.

Needless to say, this is not often a strategy adopted by federal government players, because it is too vague, can actually feed resistance to change and be used to justify the status quo. Don't ask. Don't tell. Besides, who really cares about touchy-feely "community culture," anyway? When it comes to making and accepting hard decisions, people will just need to "buck up." Such an attitude is regrettable, because the Cultural School approach can provide decision makers with the "pulse" of an organization as they work to develop and implement various change management strategies.

a. GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations

The GPRA-MA acknowledges the importance of creating a performance culture of continuous improvement to affect change, and recommends leveraging community resources by forming independent, specialized "communities of practice" to face some of the challenges posed by stagnant leadership and "dug-in" mentalities. Currently these types of forums, however, are either non-existent, powerless, or too immature to truly bring about the monumental change necessary to shift the strategic performance management philosophy from prescriptive to descriptive, and bring into the fold the much "softer," and hopefully longer lasting, influences of the latter schools.

The GPRA-MA can be leveraged to establish such communities and invest them with authority to tackle the more recalcitrant problems facing government decision makers. These innovative learning forums are replacing the standard formulaic procedure of establishing and implementing goals, then measuring their success based on data collection and analysis, by ushering in more non-traditional, non linear approaches to problem solving, that engage all partners and stakeholders, and are based on common perspectives and concerns and shared understanding of reality. We have already mentioned how additional insight might be gained, by dialoguing with as many players as

possible, particularly lay people, looking for knowledge that reveals general public preferences. This is just as important for analyzing a situation and formulating responsive policy, as officially recognized subject matter expertise or “scientific” knowledge.¹⁵²

Planning and decision making in complex environments requires joint, collaborative fact finding:

The term joint fact finding is in some respects a misnomer as it belies the full implications of this activity. It is far more than fact finding, or perhaps less. This term implies that the practice is built on scientific or positivist principles and that facts are objective things out there. In practice, joint fact finding is built on a social constructivist view of knowledge. The process weeds out dubious findings, uncovers assumptions, identifies biases, and dismisses unsupported claims. In the end truth is what the group decides it is. It is not just about “facts” but about relationships, causes, predictions. It is about “truth” deeply embedded in a context, a time and a place.¹⁵³

b. Summary

In the next chapter of this thesis, Innovative Networked Meta-Governance—The “Next New” Thing in SPM, we will look at ways the Cultural approach can be practically translated into the creation and modification of knowledge in a way that creates real value to end users, literally creating and redefining culture, through CoPs and ICTs, and leveraging them to advance inter- and intra-community learning and collaborative problem solving within the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010.

10. The Environmental School: A Reactive Process

Theorists within the Environmental School believe that strategy formation is a reactive process where initiative is not stimulated by inside players, but by outside pressures.

¹⁵² Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 5.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 160.

Just as a home cannot get built without first obtaining the necessary permits from GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, construction workers and homeowners often find they have to comply with requirements established by others beyond their control.

Called to mind once again, are the three pillars of strategy making, leadership, organization and environment, with the latter being the most overbearing, leaving very little choice to the first two. The environment, as the main actor, rather than simply a factor, becomes the architect of an organization's strategy. Like a boat in the midst of a perfect storm, it is no longer the captain or crew steering the ship, but category five hurricane winds unleashed by an out-of-control mother nature. The captain and crew shift from a state of driving the craft to one of surviving the crest.

What is ultimately produced, say the environmentalists, is a strategy that is no more than a response to the many challenges posed by external factors, which have forced one to evolve or go extinct. Strategy is merely a desperate reaction, rather than a measured selection among many valid options.

a. *GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations*

Very little is being said about the impact of the environment on performance management and improvement processes. As the role of leadership is primordial in the prescriptive schools, privileged by government, there is even denial that strategy is something that happens involuntarily to an organization. If anything, individuals and agencies fight to maintain choice in all matters, often at the expense of reaping benefits from more collaborative, acquiescent approaches. However, when overwhelming external factors, such as extreme fiscal environments and draconian budget cuts, impose certain decisions upon agencies, leadership often borrows from the Environmental School playbook to affect unwanted change by saying: "PPBE is not our fault, the devil is making us do it."

b. *Summary*

Before arriving at this point, GPRA-MA solutions should proactively seek to apply Environmental School principles by striving to understand how strategic

decisions can impact and be impacted by external partners/stakeholders, including them in strategy and decision making, where feasible. Working together in such a collaborative way, seeing reality from a different perspective, will enable us to better “weather the storm” together, anticipating, then mitigating some of the more devastating effects of uncontrollable environments.

11. The Configuration School: A Process of Transformation

In the Configuration School, strategy formation is a process of transforming the organization from one type of decision-making structure to another, by applying various approaches from the nine preceding schools when and where appropriate.

The Configuration School tells us that we should be seeking to find a sense of balance between all nine schools, selecting from a portfolio of possible approaches to manage strategy, considering the nine differing philosophies as no more than different dimensions or perspectives of a single process: strategic planning and decision making.

Perhaps successful strategic performance management is really only, in the end, successful change management, involving the application of appropriate force and control at just the right time, in just the right places. Leveraging the various tools of the Configuration School means applying the concepts and principles of all nine schools in order to ensure that the entire organization moves forward, both formally and informally.

The difficulty is in understanding when and where to adopt the most appropriate configuration(s) in order to (1) choose/change direction, and then (2) stabilize that direction. Ultimately, strategy making should ensure stability, while avoiding stagnation; contribute to improvement and innovation, yet avoid insecurity and disruption.

Here, the skills of an agile CONSTRUCTION SITE MANAGER will be called upon to pull everything together and ensure forward momentum. In the world of performance management, such a role would ideally be filled by the federal government PIO.

a. *GPRA-MA Nexus and Complexity Theory Considerations*

Does GPRA-MA of 2010 have all the elements of the five descriptions and ten schools of thought? If so, what does that mean? If not, how will that affect its success?

We have already determined that performance management and improvement is a “wicked” problem, requiring complex, perhaps multiple solutions and approaches. Could one of those approaches be to ensure multiple layers of structure and process are applied to translate GPRA-MA of 2010 principles into actionable strategy?

Thinking outside the box means moving beyond the simple recording and the vaunting of status quo. It means stimulating true innovation in performance management and improvement processes. One approach would be to consider evaluating specific strategic performance management frameworks against the criteria of the 10 schools of thought to see how they measure up.

Because one size does not fit all, all of the time, in all places, GPRA-MA strategies, in the near term, should begin to supplement its existing approaches by adopting principles from the Configuration, Learning and Cultural schools. Through learning and adaptation, building flexibility and agility into strategic planning and decision-making processes, involving a multiplicity of players, federal government agencies will come closer to finding solutions best adapted to their own unique mission requirements and stakeholder needs.

Collaborative planning and policy may not be appropriate for those decisions that would fall into the Cynefin categories of simple and complicated (ordered), where there is already agreement about capabilities and requirements, where closed system, non-interdependent programs are at play, easily displaying logic model cause and effect. Collective negotiation is not appropriate, either, when split second, life and death decisions need to be made (i.e., putting out fires). Rather, collaborative planning is more likely to generate feasible and legitimate decisions than traditional decision making when more complex, seemingly chaotic (disordered) problems (i.e., preventing the fires) are involved. Adept planners and performance management practitioners would be able to

assist both leadership and managers in appropriately categorizing issues and challenges and apply alternative strategic planning and decision making processes where needed.¹⁵⁴ The principles defining the Configuration School can assist in this transformational process.

b. Summary

We need to stop insisting that the world be simple. We need to stop having zero tolerance for failure. On the contrary, we need to accept failure because there is so much to learn from it. What we need to avoid at all costs is laziness, indifference, hubris and ignorance.

Successful change flows from learning, growth, and development. Change can't be managed. Change can be ignored, resisted, responded to, capitalized upon, and created. But it can't be managed and made to march to some orderly step-by-step process.¹⁵⁵

D. SUMMARY

In the end, GPRA-MA and the DHS strategy to implement it will ultimately involve choices between strategic management or control and strategic planning or innovation, between public administration and public accountability. Will the GPRA-MA of 2010 and/or the DHS PPBE solutions translate into the fully-fledged strategic planning system necessary to improve departmental strategy? Before anyone can actually measure the effectiveness of a model, the model must first be implemented. Before it can be implemented, it must first be developed. We are still in the process of developing these frameworks. So, who knows? But we have high hopes.

The problem with the GPRA-MA and PPBE frameworks is that they are not comprehensive. They only plan, implement and measure what comes into view. We are often told that strategic plans need not be comprehensive, all inclusive, but only concentrate on select focus areas, issues, challenges and/or gaps.

¹⁵⁴ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 7.

¹⁵⁵ Ahlstrand, Mintzberg, and Lampel, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management*, 4914.

What about the rest? Is anybody watching? Does anybody care? What can social complexity theory teach us? Can emergent strategy or patterns really be the most important things we should be looking at, but do not because they fall outside our sphere of control and influence, outside the premises of the first three (3) prescriptive schools?

Because true strategy is not induced, but rather emerges, are not government strategic plans really a lot like artificial national borders drawn on a map by powerful world leaders (i.e., conquerors), but never fully understood or integrated into the human psyches or social structures of the people actually living within these borders? My passport may say that I belong to such and such a country, and I know that I should have it with me when I intend to travel or enter into areas controlled by border guards, but in my heart and mind, I know that I am someone else, something much more.

What can strategic management practitioners do to change the status quo in the arena of strategy planning and assessment? What needs to be done to move away from the control processes of the design, planning and positioning schools, to embrace more creative and innovative processes that will contribute to the detection and leveraging of natural patterns? Experts believe that, in effect, emergent or realized strategy may be more comprehensive and successful, than intended strategy. They are, in any event, less dogmatic.

Government decision-makers must understand that the ultimate goal of the GPRA-MA of 2010 is to create a high-trust environment, as a natural pattern. GPRA-MA and the OMB provide directional philosophy and strategy process recommendations that should be taken into account as contributing in this arena.

Avoiding myopathy, or the inability to see the forest for the trees, of getting lost in the weeds, requires that one continually assess existing strategy or approaches for implementing GPRA-MA. This means doing more than simply complying with its prescriptive instructions, of satisfying the letter of the law. It means embracing its underlying concepts, understanding the spirit behind the law. It means going above and beyond the “call-of-duty.”

This will involve incorporating different strategic planning philosophies or perspectives into existing strategies and processes, based on current practices and lessons learned from other homeland security directorates or components. There are also valuable perspectives to be gleaned from complexity theory and other industry strategic planning and decision-making best practices, such as the five (5) definitions and ten (10) schools of thought outlined in “Strategy Safari.”

In the next chapter, we will demonstrate how applying some of the more salient aspects from these various sources can produce a workable, more innovative alternative to the one-time, one-dimensional (i.e., mechanical) approach to problem solving currently espoused in most government strategic planning and decision-making practices today.

We must begin to broaden our horizons, question existing beliefs, boundaries, barricades and buy-in when it comes to strategic performance management, because, ultimately, it is the performance of the organization that matters the most, not the performance of its bureaucratic processes.

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VI. INNOVATIVE NETWORKED META-GOVERNANCE – THE “NEXT NEW THING” IN STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

In light of the various principles covered in the literature review and our follow up complementary discussion on social complexity theory, this chapter will lay out the *next new thing* with the greatest potential to impact federal government strategic performance management moving forward: innovative networked governance.

Combining best practice principles from all five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas and the various complexity theory epistemologies we covered in the last chapter, we are now able to arrive at our one overarching performance improvement concept and first workable solution.

Building on the idea of resilient, innovative, networked governance, or meta-governance, previously espoused in chapter three, we will now practically demonstrate how agencies might improve inter- and intra-organizational learning and collaboration, combining these principles and related best practices with information technologies. As always, we speak of these solutions within the larger context of fiscal, ethical and democratic responsibility, in our efforts to continually reconcile GPRA-MA organizational performance with the overarching definition(s) of public accountability defined in chapter two. Indeed, totally separating performance results from their broader social, legal, and moral settings and relationships would eliminate any prospect of oversight and/or enforcement, and in essence “de-fang” the concept of true public accountability as an ultimate goal.

A. INNOVATIVE, NETWORKED GOVERNANCE AS A SOLUTION TO ENSURE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY

The DHS Performance Community often quotes the saying “What gets measured, gets done.” But, what if agencies are measuring the wrong things? Won’t GPRA-MA of 2010 and its supporting framework only ensure that these “wrong” things still get done, only more efficiently and effectively? Should not the legislative and executive branches be eliciting participation and commitment from *all* parties along the performance

improvement continuum (i.e., public, political, executive, managerial, operational, front line, end users, etc.) *before* committing to goals and being held accountable for them?

Getting the average citizen, as well as other impartial/independent stakeholders, more involved in government affairs and operations would ensure that neither policy makers nor executors were exercising power in ways that failed to maintain liberty and true political legitimacy.

The public views accountability differently than the public manager does. So, when government institutions opt to implement simple performance-based accountability systems to prove success, as opposed to adopting more interactive approaches to improve performance, they are only demonstrating good management skills in the execution of a political or administrative agenda. Such bureaucratic leadership tends to communicate to the public the information they are currently using to manage, but not necessarily, the information the public needs, expects, or even fully comprehends. Unfortunately, this seems to be the current unspoken philosophy of most public performance accountability systems in existence today.

Strategic performance management models, such as the GPRA, and its modernization in 2010, will require much more descriptive solutions based on learning, collaboration and relational capabilities. In today's increasingly centralized federal government environment, any attempt to move away from the current approach of leadership-driven, top-down, informational command-and-control might be initially seen as heretical, impractical, and counterintuitive, but such a paradigm shift is not unwarranted.

In order to move away from the prescriptive, one-directional (i.e., dictatorial) way of interfacing with the public, government entities might consider forging working relationship(s) with average citizens, creating a more interactive dialogue with them through *technology-based knowledge sharing environments*, affording constituents the opportunity to use their electoral and administrative voices to discuss and address problems directly impacting them.

Cross-organizational CoPs, and their supporting public-facing ICTs, can “soften” the more traditional autocratic systems, combining the best of both prescriptive and descriptive paradigms, *information sharing and relational networking*, leading to the discovery of more creative and/or innovative solutions to problems.

Web-enabled CoPs, due to their focus on interactive inquiry and relational information sharing, are particularly well suited to improve transparency, collaboration and learning. In fact, CoPs are the easiest, quickest and least onerous way to ensure that government agencies are communicating expectations, progress and success both internally and externally. Internally, they stimulate synergistic thinking and best practices sharing, providing valuable platforms for the right people with the necessary expertise and resources to offer and obtain feedback in efforts to attain both near- and long-term organizational goals. Appropriately leveraging these information technologies would allow public administrators to first develop a common understanding of success, in collaboration with all concerned stakeholders, especially the American people, in order to develop a comprehensive framework to measure and report out on progress.

Combining CoPs with interactive, web-enabled ICTs can result in greater transparency and increased public and performance accountability. Through their potential to improve communication and collaboration, these interactive forums are able to bring the inner workings of government into the public arena, and thus contribute to the overarching concept of performance management and improvement as a tool to increase public trust.

We discuss below in further detail how CoPs and web-enabled ICTs are advancing accountability by improving performance outcomes (i.e., what is working and merits replication and what is not working and needs attention). We place particular emphasis on how government institutions can translate improved performance into increased trust through these types of relational information sharing technologies based on innovative-networked governance, or meta-governance.

B. INNOVATION

Government has been noted in the past as being, “insufficiently innovative, inflexible and unresponsive, unable to integrate [...] separate activities [to form a greater whole], and harness and manage private capacities effectively in the service of [common] goals.”¹⁵⁶ As a long-standing institution with a set organizational structure and well-defined rules of engagement, government encounters particular challenges when it tries to adopt creative and innovative solutions to problems. Currently, within the federal government context, accountability does not mean achieving a profit or producing goods, or even providing services to a limited number of stakeholders, but rather, meeting the expectations of political overlords and administrative oversight and management entities. In such an environment, the terms flexibility, creativity, innovation and accountability, all important drivers of performance excellence, carry different meanings.

Because power comes with both responsibilities and constraints, the natural default reaction of most public institutions is to maintain balance and status quo, rather than creatively innovate. The philosophy of occasional, opportunistic and revolutionary remedies, so characteristic in private industry, is not well adapted to serve the evolutionary, long-term needs of the public enterprise, with obligations to respect the rule of law and achieve a myriad of results for a panoply of diverse, often contradictory, interests. Here, one is not “gambling” with private equity, but with the state’s resources, and government officials must always have a higher than usual expectation that what they attempt to do will actually succeed.

The simple fact is that government is designed to perform reliably, not adapt to changing circumstances. Government institutions do not weather any type of volatility well.

Couple such a *raison-d’être* with the myriad of Congressional and management oversight bodies, to include the GAO, Inspector General offices, and a seemingly increasingly critical and pessimistic public, and any potential for risk-taking or “rocking-

¹⁵⁶ Stephen Goldsmith and Donald F. Kettl, ed., *Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High-Performance Government* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 3–4.

of-the-boat” required for innovative change and improvement is effectively nipped in the bud before it even begins.

In such an operating environment, government employees are often forced to harness and apply collaborative or innovative approaches to problem-solving that still allow them to stay within the stringent parameters imposed on public organizations, always under the obligation to achieve social outcomes for the common good.

A recent report produced by the Partnership for Public Service and IDEO, entitled “Innovation in Government,”¹⁵⁷ specifically speaks to the unique barriers that public officials have to confront in dealing with change, as well as their responsibility to change, offering a few “government-proof” (i.e., safe) techniques for change.

Much like performing acrobatics in a straight jacket, almost “tricking” government officials into innovating, they establish a pre-defined, and rather rigid, process along with a government-wide infrastructure to support it. Their primary contribution to innovation is that this rather familiar, traditional six-step process,¹⁵⁸ and its underlying principles, requires relational networking to be successful, characterized by a diverse community of committed, optimistically confident, goal-focused individuals, all possessing inter-disciplinary skills that can be applied within and across a multiplicity of connected, interactive and flexible governance structures: *Innovative Networked Governance*.

C. NETWORKING

The private sector speaks of this type of innovative networking in terms of crowdsourcing and co-creation.

Crowdsourcing literally means outsourcing an activity to a large and undefined group of people, a crowd, to elicit innovative ideas and solutions to problems.¹⁵⁹ It is

¹⁵⁷ *Innovation in Government* (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service and IDEO, February 2011).

¹⁵⁸ Process: Commit to Innovation, Define Agency High-Priority Goals, Identify Opportunities and Brainstorm Solutions, Implement Ideas and Navigate Change, and Achieve Results.

¹⁵⁹ Yannig Roth, “Crowdsourcing and Co-Creation are Complementary,” Innovation Excellence Blog, entry posted May 31, 2012.

ideal for generating new inventive ways of doing business, but has drawbacks when knowledge-intensive answers are required. Intermediaries are required to overcome such hurdles and bridge the gap between the greater “free-thinking” society and the subject matter experts existing within specific disciplines. Such intermediaries ensure a streamlined and controlled transfer of knowledge between the various entities that may lack smooth working or collaborative relationships.

Co-creation goes one step further by allowing analysts to dig even deeper and further plumb the depths of the untapped intellectual resources of these few targeted individuals within the larger group. The original concept of co-creation was *value creation*, which states, “informed, connected, empowered, and active consumers are increasingly learning that they too can extract value at the traditional point of exchange. [...] The aim of co-creation is to enhance organizational knowledge processes by involving the customer in the creation of meaning and value.”¹⁶⁰

Co-creation recognizes the importance of congruence and continuity, emphasizing “active, creative, social collaboration [and long-term commitment and involvement].”¹⁶¹ The idea is to establish *real working relationships through an ongoing and mutually sustained exchange in an environment of ease and trust*.

Crowdsourcing and co-creation are somewhat scary for government, as they often evoke scenes reminiscent of the wild, wild, west where unruly citizens (i.e., hecklers) shout epitaphs at their elected and appointed officials during town hall meetings. Private industry, however, is less intimidated and remains non-pulsed before these types of “messy” interactions, considering them a valid means to innovate.

For crowdsourcing and co-creation to become palatable to government institutions, they must be translated into language and concepts that they can understand, into approaches or solutions that can be better managed and controlled.

¹⁶⁰ Roth, “Crowdsourcing and Co-Creation are Complementary.”

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

Authors Goldsmith and Kettle, in *Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High-Performance Government*, suggest that this idea of networked government might provide an answer to finding the “balance between the values democratic governments are politically and constitutionally required to protect and the adaptability and flexibility that is required to allow [them] to adapt to an environment that is both heterogeneous and dynamic in its demands.”¹⁶² In other words, softening the constraints and expanding the boundaries of Weberian bureaucracy.

This is what *The Starfish and the Spider* refers to as the *sweet spot* between sufficient decentralization, for creativity, and sufficient structure and control to ensure success.¹⁶³ The authors claim that in any industry dependent upon information, there is a tendency toward decentralization, while in areas where security and accountability are important, the preference is for centralization. There appears to be a conundrum here for government, particularly the DHS, which can be defined as information-dependent, requiring safety and security, yet still having to produce proactive and flexible results. Quite logically, therefore, DHS leaders and decision-makers find themselves in constant flux between decentralized (i.e., networked) and centralized (i.e., top-down command-and-control) options/solutions.

Governments are no longer operating in a world where the uniformed masses will simply be satisfied with hierarchical, vertical, one-way communication coming from governmental subject matter experts. True visionaries already see the writing-on-the-wall with regards to the public’s demand for (and right to access and impact) information. Forward leaning officials will proactively seek to adapt their public communication mechanisms in anticipation of the coming tsunami of concerned citizens desirous to meaningfully engage in policy development and evaluation.

¹⁶² Goldsmith and Kettle, ed., *Unlocking the Power of Networks: Keys to High-Performance Government*, 10.

¹⁶³ Brafman and Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider*, 191–195.

CoPs readily offer such innovative-networked solutions, in ways that are still “safe” for government. They “metastasize the cancer” by creating forums for information and idea exchange, “open[ing] dialogues between leaders and the public on how to address and merge [...] differing perspectives.”¹⁶⁴

CoPs can contribute to closing the gap in accountability misconception(s) by establishing an on-going dialogue between average American citizens and their political representatives and/or public appointees.

Interactive, web-enabled CoPs, and their supporting ICTs, can be leveraged to bring civic participation and learning back to the forefront, cultivating more productive relationships between the public and national leadership; one that enhances problem solving, and generates trust and cooperation:

One of the most telling characteristics of high-achieving communities—those where citizens are in the habit of coming together to solve problems—is the way these communities learn collectively from their efforts. This type of learning involves citizens evaluating both outcomes and goals. And it involves assessing the community itself—the way it performs—as well as the results of projects.¹⁶⁵

Most proponents of public accountability assert that true innovation will require more than simply interjecting new ideas, approaches or processes into existing structures and approaches. It will require an entirely new dynamic created through “loosely managed organizations that provide open, collaborative “spaces” that are flexible, loosely coupled, [and] decentralized.”¹⁶⁶

Leveraging such alternative thinking, coming from diverse sectors, including the general public, would allow public leaders to better connect with the people they are serving in ways that could actually help them tackle some of society’s more intransigent

¹⁶⁴ Johnson, Rochkind, and DuPont, *Don’t Count Us Out: How an Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine the Public’s Confidence in Schools, Business, Government, and More*, 7.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 37.

problems. Listening to discern alternative answers from citizens, as opposed to simply communicating a political or administrative official's own predetermined position(s) would indeed be a novel approach to governing.

Government performance and results can advance public accountability, but only when goals and objectives are defined and monitored by an ensemble cast working within a multitude of institutional settings and cultural contexts. This requires fostering operating environments where additional "soft factors," such values, norms, beliefs, attitudes and expectations, are given free expression.¹⁶⁷ Contrast this with the current high-level, and often removed, political and/or bureaucratic leadership dictating according to strict rules of engagement.

Our public institutions should be able to weather questions and challenges coming from lay people, applying more parochial (i.e., local) knowledge to find solutions, if indeed the assumptions of our policy professionals and experts are truly grounded in and supported by solid data-based theory as opposed to purely politically-motivated (i.e., agenda-driven) anecdote.¹⁶⁸

Ultimately, the true dynamic of a legitimate public performance accountability framework, is one that brings us back to our original definition of accountability as being "*social in nature*;" one that is developed in *civitas* and *res publica*, a public entity, belonging to the people.

1. CoPs

The American Heritage Dictionary refers to a community of practice as "a group of people having a common identity and professional interests, [...] that undertake to share, participate and establish a fellowship."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Johnson, Rochkind, and DuPont, *Don't Count Us Out: How an Overreliance on Accountability Could Undermine the Public's Confidence in Schools, Business, Government, and More*, 52.

¹⁶⁸ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 174.

¹⁶⁹ *American Heritage Dictionary*, 1996.

Authors Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, in their *Guide to Management Knowledge: Cultivating Communities of Practice*, provided a most comprehensive discussion of CoPs, defining them in simple terms, as “groups of people who share a concern, set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis.”¹⁷⁰

The term community suggests that these groups are not constrained by typical geographic [...] or functional boundaries, but rather by common tasks, contexts, and interests. The word practice implies knowledge in action — how individuals actually perform their jobs on a day-to-day basis [i.e., descriptive] as opposed to more formal policies and procedures that reflect how work should be performed [i.e., prescriptive].¹⁷¹

This ability to canalize “evolving knowledge” is a primary characteristic of CoPs and particularly compelling within the performance management discipline where much of the knowledge is tacit, or not easily found in searchable databases and libraries, but found in people’s heads, and based on past experience, carefully cultivated subject matter expertise, and the development and maintenance of relationships. CoPs are ideally suited to affect change by combining both types of knowledge, explicit and tacit.

Much like androgogy, where the student takes personal responsibility for learning, versus pedagogy, the more static and formal process of educating “sophomores,” CoPs offer opportunities to better steward information, because they allow the end users to liberally create and/or modify the knowledge themselves, whether tacit or explicit, creating and (re)defining culture. This improves upon the temporary, one-dimensional (i.e., mechanical) approach to problem solving, espoused in most operational working groups, project teams or the centralized, single-directional centers of excellence, un-integrated with actual day-to-day operations.

CoP members may never actually produce tangible deliverables, such as tools, standards, manuals, etc., because the primary benefit of forming and being a part of such a league, or professional guild, is the evolving body of knowledge acquired, shared and

¹⁷⁰ Etienne Wenger, Richard McDermott, and William M. Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), 4.

¹⁷¹ Kimiz Dalkir, *Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 145, 147.

fed back, not only within the immediate group focusing on the topic at hand, but also exponentially, to one's larger organization working to solve the latest "wicked" problem.

There are many different types of CoPs, according to Wenger, based on size (i.e., small or big), duration (i.e., long-term or short-term), location (i.e., collocated or distributed), composition (i.e., homogeneous or heterogeneous), scope (i.e., inter- or intra-agency), origin (i.e., spontaneous or intentional) and formality (i.e., unrecognized or institutionalized).¹⁷²

The one thing CoPs should all have in common, however, is an emphasis on the key components of *collaborative rationality*, or DIAD (i.e., Diversity, Interdependence, and Authentic Dialogue), where participants, as equals, listen to each other and/or to information coming from formally recognized external experts. DIAD goes beyond the typical Western approach of scientific, purely objective, rationality by preferring more interpretive, pragmatic, experiential and dialectical ways of understanding, of engaging in joint understanding, explanation, meaning and learning. The DIAD network's three (3) dynamic, interactive elements keep participants within the realm of rationality by reiteratively framing and reframing the various exchanges, through:¹⁷³

- Diverse and Interdependent Participation;
- Reciprocal, Relational, Educative and Creative Dialogue; and
- System Adaptation For Shared Identities and Meanings

Authors Wenger et al. capture these important components of group effectiveness by defining seven principles necessary for networked government arrangements to flourish: (1) Design CoPs for evolution; (2) Open a dialogue between inside and outside perspectives; (3) Invite different levels of participation; (4) Develop both public and private community spaces; (5) Focus on value; (6) Combine familiarity and excitement; and (7) Create a rhythm for the Community.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷² Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, 24–27.

¹⁷³ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 17.

¹⁷⁴ Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*.

The idea is to cultivate CoPs that create spaces where there is “active participation by all members; clear communication of ideas and feelings; influence based on expertise, ability, and access to information, rather than on the basis of authority or power; flexible decision making procedures responsive to the needs of the situation; use of critical analysis of each other’s conclusions and reasoning to promote creative decision making; and explicit recognition of conflicts, and efforts to resolve them constructively.”¹⁷⁵

In the aggregate, CoPs are seen as an effective and efficient means to create learning environments for organizational transformation or improvement, becoming veritable force multipliers when combined with information technology enabled knowledge management systems and processes.

We continue our discussion below with a brief overview of ICTs and how they can contribute to knowledge management within the context of information-sharing COPs operating in various organizational, cultural and behavioral settings.

2. ICTs

We cannot discuss performance- or results-based management, of which the GPRA of 1993 and its 2010 update are the main legislative drivers, without mentioning the types of open information technology systems preferred by most government performance practitioners at the federal level to communicate performance and results: ICTs, Management Information Systems (MIS) or Knowledge Management Systems (KMS).

Wenger purports that a knowledge management system includes “two highly interdependent processes by which knowledge is produced and applied:”¹⁷⁶ knowledge-development (i.e., production) wherein tacit and explicit knowledge is converted into tangible, visible (i.e., accessible) information, and knowledge-application (i.e., analysis) which applies this information to deliver products or services to customers, partners and/or stakeholders.

¹⁷⁵ Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, 123.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

Knowledge management, therefore, simply means managing the knowledge-production and analysis processes in a way that creates true value to end users and consumers.

Technological approaches and solutions to governmental performance management seek to improve operations by collecting, monitoring and communicating empirical data through web-enabled information technology software applications, such as performance monitoring and reporting systems or performance-based accountability systems (PBAS), Management By Objectives (MBO), and ZBB. These performance-based BI technologies pull inchoate information, existing in diverse databases (e.g., data warehouses, data-marts and enterprise resource planning, programming, budgeting and execution systems, etc.), into one central repository. Their purpose is two-fold, (1) leverage an organization's complete intellectual assets, to include capturing, documenting, and disseminating both collective and individual explicit and tacit knowledge in order to offer one version of "truth;" and (2) provide accurate real-time information (i.e., data plus analysis) to inform decision making.¹⁷⁷

The logic may be simple, in theory, but it is much more complex and challenging to implement, in practice.

In order to leverage the full benefits of web-enabled information technologies to impact organizational performance, people- or interaction-based knowledge management should be preferred over knowledge- or information-based knowledge management. In other words, connecting "knowers" is more important than linking "knowledge."¹⁷⁸

In fact, when it comes to the role and impact of information technology as a learning and knowledge-sharing tool, these technologies can be used by COPs as tools for overcoming geographic and organizational barriers, but they are generally unnecessary

¹⁷⁷ Frank Camm and Brian M. Stecher, *Analyzing the Operation of Performance: Based Accountability Systems for Public Services* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Irma Becerra-Fernandez and Dorothy Leidner, ed., *Knowledge Management: An Evolutionary View* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008); Dalkir, *Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice*.

¹⁷⁸ Dalkir, *Knowledge Management in Theory and Practice*, 145, 147.

for a successful CoP and cannot replace them.¹⁷⁹ The emphasis is on human- (versus computer-) interaction as a means to ensure effective inter- and intra-organizational communication and collaboration. The focus should not be on technology, but on people and end-users, the latter simply being enhanced, rather than established or defined by the former.

The philosophy has shifted from technology being a goal in and of itself to that of being no more than an enabler, allowing information (i.e., raw data) to reach program managers and decision makers who, through *human interaction and discussion*, create the real value, or actual knowledge. Technology is no longer seen by anyone as the magic “silver bullet” where new information technologies are able to capture all the knowledge of an organization into easily accessible databases. This may still be the idea for some knowledge management practitioners as a way to improve situational awareness or accomplish simple, process-oriented tasks (i.e., assembly line production), but it is no longer seen as a way to resolve some of the more complex, intractable problems facing today’s public organizations.

Any technological support solution to advance performance management or improvement within federal institutions will have to walk lock step, in parallel with participative, interactive, learning frameworks and processes based on real-human dynamics and face-to-face interaction.

While ICTs may contribute to improved communication and transparency, the preference within the overall performance community is toward CoPs as the being most viable solution to satisfy GPRA-MA of 2010 requirements. They are in line with the growing trend to leverage the benefits of inter- and intra-community learning and collaborative problem solving, and are, what Wenger, McDermott and Snyder call “living repositories.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ *Excellence in Government Performance Improvement Council Fellows, Advancing Federal Performance Management Through Communities of Practice*, August 9, 2010.

¹⁸⁰ Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, 9.

D. GOVERNANCE

There are several practical examples of private industry firms or even academic institutions applying the principles of CoPs to real world situations with great success. Without overlooking or diminishing these case studies, we prefer to concentrate on ways that ICT-supported CoPs can be integrated within the field of government strategic performance management as part of a leadership decision-making process (i.e., governance).

Agreeing with the myriad of both short- and long-term benefits CoPs offer to organizations and individual members,¹⁸¹ the greatest advantage they provide to powerful government entities pertains to their ability to alleviate the burden on government to operate within strict parameters, constraints and limitations, yet still produce results. Public sector CoPs have the potential to:

- Create long-term intangible outcomes, in a world where emphasis is placed on short-term tangible outputs;
- Nurture relationships, in a world where acceptable behavior between government officials and the citizens they serve is often dictated according to strict rules;
- Foster personal and professional collaboration, in a world where interaction follows a hierarchical, top-down, command-and-control trajectory; and finally,
- Cultivate learning environments where curiosity and innovation can find expression in a risk-adverse culture, constantly seeking to maintain balance and status quo.

The Partnership for Public Service OMB PIC 2009/2010 Fellows Cohort provided four very distinct objectives that drive the formation of public performance CoPs:¹⁸²

- Promote innovation, and the sharing of knowledge, information and resources;
- Enhance active collaboration among internal stakeholders;
- Ensure the organization has consistent business practices; and
- Facilitate resolution of issues and implement change.

¹⁸¹ Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, 16.

¹⁸² *Excellence in Government Performance Improvement Council Fellows, Advancing Federal Performance Management Through Communities of Practice.*

We discuss these potential contributions and objectives of CoPs within our now already familiar GPRA-MA of 2010 framework below.

CoPs can be leveraged to ensure *Leadership Engagement and Collaboration, and Learning and Improvement* (i.e., GPRA-MA of 2010 focus area #1), as they are a unique combination of three fundamental elements: a *domain of knowledge*, which defines a set of issues; a *community of people* who care about this domain; and the *shared practice* they are developing to be effective in their domain.¹⁸³ In the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010, government-wide strategic performance management is the *domain*, the *community* is the PIC and supporting government-wide performance community. Together they create/adjust the *shared practice*, defined as “a set of common approaches and shared standards that create a basis for action, communication, problem solving, performance and accountability: case stories, theories, rules, frameworks, models, principles, tools, experts, articles, lessons learned, best practices, and heuristics.”¹⁸⁴

What is unique about the legislation is its articulation around the concept of developing and evolving CoPs to improve organizational learning and collaboration. By codifying the recommendations of Executive Order 13450, requiring participation in the OMB PIC and its activities, the GPRA-MA, in fact, *institutionalizes* CoPs, requiring that the sharing of explicit and tacit knowledge pertaining to an organization’s performance improvement efforts, should take place within and through the legislation’s officially mandated community of practice, the OMB PIC:

The PIC is envisioned as a hub for the government’s performance management framework/network, charged with improving government-wide performance, achieving priority goals, and identifying and tackling specific problems as they arise. The PIC will serve as a home for federal communities of practice, organized by problems, some by program type,

¹⁸³ *Excellence in Government Performance Improvement Council Fellows, Advancing Federal Performance Management Through Communities of Practice*, 27.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

such as regulatory matters, and some by methods, such as quality management. These communities will be expected to develop tools and provide expert advice and assistance to their colleagues.¹⁸⁵

CoP best practices are also being applied to evolve and improve the role of leadership within the federal government performance community, emphasizing, “all CoPs depend on internal leadership, but healthy communities do not depend entirely on the leadership of one person.”¹⁸⁶ Characteristic of the OMB PIC, as well as innovative-networked governance, is *diffused leadership*, wherein recognized experts from both within and outside of the community are regularly invited to share perspective and suggestions in the form of practical techniques and tools.

Wenger states, “the most successful communities of practice thrive where the goals and needs of an organization intersect with the passions and aspirations of participants. [...] This intersection of personal meaning and strategic relevance is a potent source of energy and value.”¹⁸⁷ In CoPs, everyone benefits and adds value, each individual member being recognized as a legitimate “leader among peers.”

The focus of successful CoPs within the federal government is multiple and calls on its public and private organizational members to supplement the existing capacities of typical Weberian administrative structures through both:

- Formal, top-down mechanisms, where high-level government decision makers are asked to create and lead a network to tackle a specific performance problem; or
- Informal, bottom-up configurations, where government officials, through persuasion, coalition building and supporting cutting-edge technologies form working groups.

¹⁸⁵ Partnership for Public Service and Grant Thornton, *A Critical Role at a Critical Time: A Survey of Performance Improvement Officers*, 2.

¹⁸⁶ Wenger, McDemott, and Snyder, *Cultivating Communities of Practice*, 36.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

In addition to the benefits, structural elements, and leadership of performance-focused CoPs, their main purpose and functionality within GPRA-MA focus areas #2–4 (i.e., *Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment*, *Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation and Performance Reviews*) involves knowledge management pertaining to:

- Using goals, measurement, incentives, analysis feedback and measured experiments to motivate the discovery and promotion of effective action;
- Presenting and disseminating information inside the federal government and to delivery partners in support of priority setting, to stimulate discovery and innovation, and to motivate performance improvement;
- Exchanging lessons from individual agency experiences; and
- Cooperating on pilot projects across agencies to gather new insights.¹⁸⁸

CoPs, as evolving bodies of knowledge, are also increasingly being employed to advance the *Transparency and Accountability* aspect of the federal government performance management discipline as well (i.e., GPRA-MA focus area #5).

As previously stated, the GPRA-MA requires that performance information be streamlined and posted in online formats useful to Congress and relevant to the general public, with high expectations that such an emphasis on creating open and transparent processes will revolutionize the way government does business.

Performance.gov, overseen by the OMB PIC, is one example of a *public-facing ICT*, supported by a myriad of cross-organizational CoPs, both large and small, long-term and short-term, collocated and distributed, homogeneous and heterogeneous, inter- and intra-agency, spontaneous and intentional, unrecognized and institutionalized.

This website serves as the public window communicating federal government goals and performance results in key areas of focus. It is the single, government-wide ICT mandated by the GPRA-MA and includes information on (Cross-) Agency Priority Goals, and Agency Strategic and Performance Plans and Reports in machine-readable formats.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Shelley Metzenbaum, *Performance Management Recommendations for the New Administration* (Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2009), 46.

¹⁸⁹ OMB Circular A-11.

A centralized website makes information about government goals and performance easier for the public, Congress, delivery partners, agency employees, and other stakeholders to find. It is also used by the OMB PIC to support cross-agency coordination and decision making in the advancement of government-wide goals.

A successful example of an *interactive web-enabled CoP*, which combines the concepts of both CoPs and ICTs, is the DHS Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) IdeaFactory, which was launched to provide creative solutions in support of the TSA mission. Named by the White house as a model of open government, the IdeaFactory, through the creation and fostering of a collaborative community of engaged employees committed to initiating effective change, uses social media concepts to connect employees and expand upon the traditional suggestion box.

The IdeaFactory operates with characteristics similar to most COPs by empowering all TSA employees to submit ideas, provide comments on how to improve new concepts, and rate ideas with specific recommendations for implementation. This interactive web-enabled CoP fosters information sharing by providing employees with a voice to:

- Contribute to relevant and important topics aligned with agency priorities;
- Talk, educate, and inform each other through online communities; and
- Provide valuable and impactful feedback regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of TSA programs directly to agency headquarters and staff.

1. Meta-governance: Innovative, Networked Governance

We have reviewed best practices relative to CoPs and ICTs, and seen how they can be leveraged to marry two separate concepts of public accountability within the public administration context: information sharing and relational networking.

Internally, CoPs can be leveraged to transition from current traditional governance structures to more collaborative, networked ones (i.e., meta-governance). The following table demonstrates the differences between these two types of decision-making frameworks and the leadership and management styles that dominate each:¹⁹⁰

<i>Governance Dimension</i>	<i>Traditional Governance</i>	<i>Collaborative Governance</i>
Structure	Top down hierarchy	Interdependent network clusters
Source of Direction	Central control	Distributed control
Boundary Condition	Closed	Open
Organizational Context	Single authority	Divided authority
Leadership Approach	Directive	Generative
Role of Manager	Organization controller	Mediator, process manager
Managerial Tasks	Planning and guiding organizational processes	Guiding interactions, providing opportunity
Managerial Activities	Planning, designing, and leading	Selecting agents and resources, influencing conditions
Goals	Clear with defined problems	Various and changing
Criterion of Success	Attainment of formal policy goals	Realization of collective action and conditions for future collaboration
Nature of Planning	Linear	Nonlinear
Public Participation Objective	Legal conformity, inform and educate, gain support of public for agency policies	Create conditions for social learning and problem-solving capacity
Democratic Legitimacy	Representative democracy	Deliberative democracy
Source of System Behavior	Determined by component participant roles	Determined by interactions of participants

Table 8. Traditional Versus Collaborative Governance

Externally, ICTs and CoPs can contribute to improved public accountability when used as tools to facilitate “the exercise of power or authority—political, economic, administrative or otherwise—to manage a country’s resources and affairs. [CoPs can

¹⁹⁰ Boohar and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 202.

serve as] the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups [can] articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.”¹⁹¹

CoPs and their supporting information technologies enhance leadership engagement, collaboration, learning, transparency and decision making, which together can result in greater accountability. Whether we discuss accountability through the eyes of the general public or the public administrator, the GPRA-MA of 2010 offers a valid framework to ensure a common understanding of and commitment to the goals and objectives of both elected and appointed officials. Leveraging CoPs in order to move beyond the current status quo and identify shared (i.e., collective) goals involving a multiplicity of both public and private stakeholders, all working toward the achievement of a better society, represents an important first step in building public trust, collaboration and cooperation.

Ultimately, interactive web-enabled CoPs are oases in the middle of a dry desert, an orbiting space station in the midst of an almost endless universe, a frontier outpost providing much needed supplies, advice, and encouragement to “emigrants travelling West,” not yet fully decided on whether they will embark on that one additional trip, hesitant before that additional perilous leg of their voyage into uncharted territory.

E. SUMMARY

Due to the post industrial knowledge creation environment we are now operating in, a different value proposition than has been available previously is emerging in our current system of democratic governance: the increasing demand by U.S. citizens to directly participate in the development of the policy and strategy adopted by the executors of legislation, and this, at all levels of public service (i.e., federal, state and local).

In order to adequately respond to these demands, DHS may be required to step away from current standard performance management and improvement processes based

¹⁹¹ *E-Governance* (Mumbai, IND: Global Media, 2009), 208.

on traditional iterative strategic planning and incremental progress, focused internally, and embrace more innovative-networked solutions to governance and decision making.¹⁹²

To ignore these demands and continue on with the same types of one-way dictatorial top-down command and control communications with each other and the American public on the “progress” the government is making, would be to ignore potential threats on the horizon (i.e., public indifference, civic unrest, civil disobedience, etc.). In order to appropriately prepare for and respond to the anticipated coming changes in the cultural and political environment, homeland security strategies will require more than simple, reductionist rules-based methodologies. They will require innovative-networked solutions, such as the one we’ve just covered involving web-enabled CoPs and supporting ICTs, which “recombine [...] technology and human social and cultural behavior.”¹⁹³

How, then, can DHS move away from its current “false sense of linear order and predictability” and respond to “what is in reality an interactive, complex, and evolving web of forces, constraints, incentives, and conditions?”¹⁹⁴

To begin with, DHS leaders, management partners and stakeholders should recognize and acknowledge “the power of the [powerless] few,” and in the face of an increasingly complex, and decentralized cultural and professional landscape, be willing to adopt more innovative leadership and management styles that showcase collaboration, participation and networking. More specifically, the DHS can establish a solid foundation for more innovative performance management and improvement practices by better leveraging the epistemologies and best practices reviewed in this thesis, refreshing and (re)modeling its current GPRA-MA strategies and solutions.

¹⁹² Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, “The Power of “the Few”: A Key Strategic Challenge for the Permanently Disrupted High-Tech Homeland Security Environment,” *Homeland Security Affairs* 7, art. 19 (December 2011): 14.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

Chapters I through VI of this thesis have attempted to answer the following questions in our effort to establish a solid theoretical foundation for the development of innovative yet practical strategic performance management practices:

- What is DHS (currently) doing (in the arena of strategic performance management)?
- What is DHS not doing?
- What does DHS have to do?
- What are others doing?

The next two (2) chapters will be dedicated to answering the two remaining questions from our research design: “What should DHS be doing?” and “How should DHS do it?”

Culling from our synthesis of external best practices, complexity theory and the concept of innovative, networked meta-governance solutions, we have made specific improvement recommendations within the context of the GPRA-MA framework that are intended to increase public and organizational performance accountability in answer to the question: *What should DHS be doing (differently) to improve its performance management strategies and solutions with the intent of increasing accountability within and across the department and vis-à-vis the American public?*

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are meant to instill a culture of greater public and organizational accountability leveraging the GPRA-MA framework and incorporating best practices into DHS performance management and improvement solutions, pulling from the research results of our literature review and subsequent discussion on social complexity theory. The recommendations focus on both the philosophical/theoretical, as well as the practical applications of strategic performance management as it pertains to the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA, and the five (5) conditions identified as hindering the legislation's effectiveness. Which of the general overarching "perceptions of reality" within the best practices merit replication in the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010 mandate? How can they be institutionalized to enhance federal government SPM?

Even though the recommendations may indirectly result in improving the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA, as well as impact the cultural conditions contributing to the lack of success, the proposed suggestions do not represent a comprehensive, all inclusive, solution to the department's overall performance management policies and practices, nor are they meant to improve specific DHS programs and/or activities.

Rather, they are intended to display ways DHS can better leverage public and private best practices, in the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010, to cultivate greater accountability within and across the department and vis-à-vis the American public. Included, therefore, are only those actions that contribute to bridging the gap between traditional definitions of public accountability (i.e., organizational performance or improved government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-traditional interpretations of improved public and organizational trust.

A. TRUST AS ACCOUNTABILITY

All power is a trust; and we are accountable for its exercise.

—Benjamin Disraeli

In Chapter II, public and organizational accountability was defined in detail. Here, in order to propose straightforward answers and solutions, accountability will only be equated with *trust*, along with an equally straightforward definition: *giving and getting the benefit of the doubt*.

In their book, “The Speed of Trust,” authors Stephen Covey and Rebecca Merrill present a model that distills trust down to a function of two essential elements: CHARACTER (i.e., integrity, motive, and intent) and COMPETENCE (i.e., capabilities, skills, results, and track record), expressed in five (5) distinct waves (and interdependent principles).¹⁹⁵

- Self-Trust (Credibility)
- Relationship Trust (Consistent Behavior)
- Organizational Trust (Alignment)
- Market Trust (Reputation)
- Societal Trust (Contribution)

The authors believe that “once you create trust, [a function of] genuine character and competence [...], almost everything else falls into place.”¹⁹⁶

They continue by detailing the characteristics of both organizational trust and mistrust.

Low-trust organizations are filled with internal departmental rivalries and stove-piping, people bad-mouthing other departments and staff behind each other’s back, chronic complaining and staff not feeling like they can make a change. Organizational communication is driven by gossip rather than leadership interaction and messaging. There is limited innovation, lack of staff development and career progression, and a culture dictated by urgency rather than impact or importance.

Less trust results in less information being shared, naturally resulting in increased suspicion, ultimately culminating in less trust.

¹⁹⁵ Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, *The SPEED of Trust* (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006), 32, Kindle edition.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 10.

In the “The Speed of Trust,” authors Stephen Covey and Rebecca Merrill distinguish the difference between low- and high-trust organizations.

Organizational Mistrust

1. People manipulate or distort facts;
2. People withhold and hoard information;
3. Getting the credit is very important;
4. People spin the truth to their advantage;
5. New ideas are openly resisted and stifled;
6. Mistakes are covered up or covered over;
7. Most people are involved in a blame game, bad-mouthing others;
8. There is an abundance of water cooler talk;
9. There are numerous “meetings after the meetings”;
10. There are many “undiscussables”;
11. People tend to overpromise and under deliver;
12. There are a lot of violated expectations, for which people try to make excuses;
13. People pretend bad things aren’t happening or are in denial;
14. The energy level is low; and
15. People often feel unproductive tension—sometimes even fear.

Organizational Trust

Information is shared openly;
Mistakes are tolerated and encouraged as a way of learning;
The culture is innovative and creative;
People are loyal to those who are absent;
People talk straight and confront real issues;
There is real communication and real collaboration;
People share credit abundantly;
There are few “meetings after the meetings”;
Transparency is a practiced value;
People are candid and authentic;
There is a high degree of accountability;
There is palpable vitality and energy—people can feel the positive momentum.

Table 9. Organizational Mistrust and Trust

In the world of SPM and the GPRA-MA of 2010, mistrust would translate as follows:

- *Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement:* Less trust means that individuals will not be empowered to make decisions, much less create or innovate, which, in turn, would contribute to maintaining status quo within the existing hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces of the various DHS organizations. Less trust would perpetuate management and staff resistance toward more innovative, non-traditional, outside-of-the box solutions, necessary to solve “wicked” problems. Such a lack of leadership investment and engagement in driving continuous performance improvement, as an underlying philosophy, would result in common, simplistic solutions being

proposed to resolve complex situations. There would be missed opportunities to decentralize information sharing and cross-organizational networking contributing to the creation of a positive learning and performance management culture leading to greater trust. Leaving in place centralized control would engender inflexible group think and continued Resistance to change, resulting in Stagnation.

- *Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment:* Less trust would mean less communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, resulting in stove-piped strategic planning and decision making, culminating in competing, and often contradictory priorities, unintentional gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. This lack of alignment and connectivity between individual, program, and agency behavior and action would sow Confusion and Doubt concerning leadership motive and intent, further diminishing trust.
- *Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation:* Less trust in this arena would pertain to credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity. Inaccurate information or analysis would mean less understanding and the absence of sound decision making. As a result, Inconsistency and Indecision would come to characterize agency performance measurement and evaluation functions, which require valid data and trusted empirical evidence to establish confidence in perceived progress and results.
- *Performance Reviews:* Less trust would translate into the lack of the free flow of information, resulting in inadequate knowledge management and lack of situational awareness. Transparency, required for knowing where one stands within the greater whole, is a prerequisite for trust and appreciative inquiry. Fear of punitive rather than inquisitive performance reviews would result, discouraging any initiative to share information or know more, culminating in Indifference and Passivity.
- *Transparency and Accountability:* Less trust would result in disengaged public servants preferring compliance reporting over more democratic governance structures, systems and processes, necessary for true transparency and public accountability (trust). Lack of (Public) understanding of how government works, would allow political hubris to dictate options, culminating in fewer real, longer lasting solutions. (Public) Criticism and Conflict would dominate.

Organizational high-trust, on the other hand, fosters cross-functional team building to solve problems together. Behavioral issues and low morale are the exception instead of the norm. Innovation is encouraged and rewarded. Leadership, management,

and staff communication is open, consistent, and constant. Career paths are established with staff, empowered to develop themselves, and, finally, outcomes and impact drive decisions.

The world would look much better, as well, in SPM/GPRA-MA terms:

- *Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement:* Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the general arena of overarching strategic performance management, would lead to greater Engagement from agency leadership, management and staff, committed to the creation and maintenance of an overarching performance culture focused positively on continuous improvement through transparency, open information sharing and the ability to discuss performance in non-punitive ways. Innovative leadership from the agency PIO, garnishing the respect and trust of the entire organization, would oversee the selection and testing of more creative and resilient strategic vision and decision-making methodologies, based on value creation and mutual benefit, all culminating in the production of real, long-term solutions. Agency PICs, espousing meta-governance principles and collaborative, interactive learning environments, would have become veritable “living laboratories,” creating real Momentum for progress to be made in the remaining GPRA-MA focus areas.
- *Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment:* Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the annual DHS planning and goal setting process would mean that there was no difference, or light of day, between what internal Tier 1 senior leadership and Tier 2 management and front-line personnel understood as contributing to individual, program, and agency priorities, and what external partners and stakeholders, both public and private, elected and non-elected officials, understood as success and the means to achieve it. Uncertainty and unpredictability, due to complexity, would not automatically translate into confusion and doubt regarding leadership motive and intent, or fear of the loss of command and control, but rather would be seen as an opportunity to entertain more complex, non-linear, participative solutions to achieving strategic Clarity and reaching consensus, ultimately leading to greater organizational and public Confidence.
- *Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation:* Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the development and application of empirical data and analysis would mean greater Credibility and trust vis-à-vis agency analytical and decision-making processes. Such legitimacy would translate into a willingness to invest more in the organization’s measurement and evaluation capacities and capabilities, stimulating

improved intra- and inter-agency Collaboration, necessary to identify and incorporate relevant and meaningful data and analytical products, tailored to the needs of end users, especially the public.

- *Performance Reviews:* Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt in the context of agency data-driven performance review models would mean that these informal discussions and/or formal meetings, convened to reduce costs and improve outcomes, would finally become true value added to agency leadership and management. Characterized by diversity, interdependence and authentic dialogue (i.e., collaborative rationality), these forums would create the Motivation and Initiative necessary to overcome inconsistent DHS processes and disjointed mission coordination, leading to the discovery of true cross-cutting goals and solutions facilitated by greater intra- and inter-agency interaction and collaboration. Performance data and analytical results would no longer be communicated simply to prove success to a rather limited audience of official government management and oversight bodies, but integrated into daily operations as a standard operating procedure to better inform agency decision making and results.
- *Transparency and Accountability:* Giving and getting the benefit of the doubt when communicating and reporting performance information means that there would be reconciliation between the way the public understands the current departmental mission to secure the homeland, and the way DHS leaders understand it, as expressed in their actual goals and priorities. This would allow citizens to judge for themselves whether their taxpayer dollars are really delivering the results they expect. Simple compliance reporting would have given way to true public accountability thanks to innovative meta-governance structures, systems and processes, linking the GPRA-MA of 2010 with the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability. Internally, these robust closed-loop strategic performance management frameworks would mitigate and/or resolve the deficiencies in the department's performance management and improvement practices, while at the same time, positively impact the prevailing cultural conditions contributing to these deficiencies. Externally, these frameworks would be bridging the gap between improved government efficiency and effectiveness and public trust, reconciling the political/administrative definition and understanding of organizational performance accountability with the concerns of the general public. Greater (Public) Optimism and Contribution to the DHS mission would be the benefit.

Creating a climate or culture of accountability and trust entails getting organizations to move from requirements-based to integrity-based actions, from compliance (i.e., pressure from without) to congruence (i.e., motivation from within), from minimum to optimum performance.

Prescribing actions to instill a high-trust culture within the DHS, both intra- and inter-agency and vis-à-vis the general public, should be done in a straightforward, “spinless” manner, and expressed in dichotomous terms of success or failure. Do DHS performance management/improvement processes involve valid and specific recommendations (i.e., programs, projects, activities, initiatives, etc.) that increase/improve trust or limit/diminish it? Yes or no. If not, then what can be done about it?

B. THE COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK

The following recommendations to establish a solid theoretical foundation for the development of effective strategic performance management frameworks and practices, based on trust, have been articulated around the Competing Values Framework (CVF).

The CVF, developed by University of Michigan faculty members, identifies four cultural archetypes to diagnose and make proper changes to organizational culture and improve the execution of new strategic direction: (1) collaborate; (2) control; (3) compete; and (4) create, each of which differ in the degree to which the organization is internally or externally focused or more flexible or rigid in nature.



Figure 3. The Competing Values Framework (CVF)

The upper left quadrant identifies values that emphasize an internal, organic focus, whereas the lower right quadrant identifies values that emphasize external, control focus. Similarly, the upper right quadrant identifies values that emphasize external, organic focus whereas the lower left quadrant emphasizes internal, control values. These competing or opposite values in each quadrant give rise to the name for the model, the CVF.

As an integrated and consistent approach to individual and organizational development and progress, the framework can be used to organize change management recommendations in the field of performance management and improvement.

Each CVF archetype displayed below will contain specific courses of action to increase both public and organizational accountability associated with each major hub or GPRA-MA/cultural condition category and/or theme. These recommendations are addressed to both higher and lower level officials, and are intended to be equally feasible whether current guidance and solutions are prescriptive (top-down) or descriptive (bottom-up), or whether current accountability mechanisms are primarily vertical or horizontal.

The recommendations have been loosely placed, independent of any particular order of importance, within one of the four (4) CVF quadrants below in order to avoid running the risk of committing the same error attributed to current strategic planning and performance management practices, that of simplifying complex problems into simple formulas. The following recommendations, therefore, are not meant to solve specific problems at specific moments in time and/or within specific timeframes, but rather, contribute to the changing of mindset(s), behavior(s) and ultimately culture(s), over time, and independently of any predetermined process or set schedule.

1. Collaborate

One (1)			
CVF Archetype	Emphasis	Organizational Focus	Social Complexity
COLLABORATE	Human Relations	Internal/Flexible	Organic/Descriptive

Any performance management improvement tools and techniques to increase accountability primarily involving *teamwork, collaboration, talent management, empowerment, or inter-personal relationships* (i.e., long-term development, doing things together) have been listed under the upper left quadrant.




Figure 4. CVF Archetype: Collaborate

The main contribution of social complexity theory to this archetype is the idea that one leader, one perspective, one solution is not enough. This is where problem solving morphs into action learning, where strategic planners and decision makers realize that the world is too complex and evolving for them to be able to single handedly “fix” problems simply by finding the “right” formula. Entertaining more holistic, interactive approaches to issue resolution, based on “self-organization, system-wide learning and [adaptation],”¹⁹⁷ policy makers discover that true COLLABORATION means power distribution, ushering in new styles of (collaborative) leadership, new forms of

¹⁹⁷ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 32.

(networked) governance and more (leveling) management practices. Isolated, hierarchical top-down, command-and-control epistemologies are displaced by methods emphasizing multiple perspectives, mutual dialogue, shared meaning, contextual understanding, and joint action.

a. Collaborate Recommendations

(1) COLLABORATE #1. Require an Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Factor and Indicator of Success in SES performance plans—With the intent of cultivating public service motivation among employees, the OPM, can further link performance management and strategy achievement with overall public good by adding an additional (public) engagement factor to one of the five (5) critical elements within federal SES performance plans. In line with the current duties and functions of SES members, there would be a measure of success encouraging outreach to external constituencies (i.e., Congress, state and local governments, interest groups, the media, etc.) through participation in collective networks experimenting and/or innovating in the design, alignment, use, and communication of public performance information. The factor would be added to the existing elements (i.e., leading change, leading people, business acumen, building coalitions, and results driven), and be fulfilled in collaboration with all appropriate internal agency offices (i.e., Congressional affairs, public affairs, etc.) in compliance with current OMB policy governing the engagement of unelected government officials with external public partners and stakeholders.

(2) COLLABORATE #2. Encourage Internal Agency Communication, Collaboration, Outreach between PIOs, and Congressional and Public Affairs Liaisons—The federal PIO and staff should establish, long-term, collaborative working relationships with the agency’s internal Legislative and Public Affairs Offices in order to better embrace the power of politics and public messaging as positive rather than negative forces impacting the performance management discipline. Rapprochement between these networks would assist performance practitioners in two ways: (1) better understanding and reconciling the different interpretations of success defined by elected and non-elected public officials, public and private partners and stakeholders, including

average citizens; and (2) communicating departmental performance progress in terms that can be easily understood and embraced by these various groups, particularly Congressional leaders and the general public.

Through such collaboration, performance management practitioners would also be in a better position to adopt plain language that non-performance staff can better relate to. Agency progress and success against goals and objectives would be communicated in a standard performance or business nomenclature that minimized government jargon, yet still respected the overarching policy and priorities of both the legislative and executive branches. The common standardized language could then be used to communicate with Congress and the public through various mandatory and optional forums, such as the OMB public website, Performance.gov, Congressional reports, annual performance and accountability reports/updates, and/or additional two-way, interactive means of communicating with government officials at the state, local, and tribal levels.

(3) COLLABORATE #3. Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Crowd-Sourcing at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission—Performance management, or measuring progress toward strategy achievement, is based on established frameworks and processes (such as the GPRA-MA of 2010 and the OMB Circular A-11). As such, it is not a “wicked problem.” Actual performance improvement, however, is, and will require much more innovative, outside of the box solutions, involving the free flow of information and creative ideas. In partnership and close collaboration with national Congressional representatives and State and local/tribal leaders, PIO, Congressional and public affairs staff should establish DHS information campaigns meant to educate and mentor local communities, both individuals and groups (i.e., businesses and non-profits), regarding the DHS mission set, its current programs, projects and activities. In line with the principles of true democratic governance, these “DHS 101 Seminars” would contribute to maintaining the federal government’s covenant with citizens and communities by going beyond the current one-way public communication initiatives that simply “market” the DHS brand. In addition to communicating how DHS programs contribute to securing the homeland, at a much more

granular and interactive level than the current public-facing ICTs we are using today, this new type of two-way, interactive means of communicating with officials at the state, local, and tribal levels, would provide specific suggestions, according to a pre-established democratic governance framework explaining how individuals and organizations within local communities can contribute to the DHS mission. This framework would be comprised of several outreach efforts or events, such as attending town hall or neighborhood council meetings, participating in public surveys and focus groups, serving on boards, commissions, and oversight committees, sponsoring initiatives, and/or volunteering, all representing opportunities for the public to directly participate in the affairs of government. This public socialization of the DHS mission would include step-by-step instructions along with supporting material/references on how individuals and organizations within local communities can get more involved in DHS strategic planning and decision making. See also recommendation [Create #1]: *Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Co-Creation at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission.*

2. Compete

Two (2)			
CVF Archetype	Emphasis	Organizational Focus	Social Complexity
COMPETE	Rational Goals	External/Focused	Control/Prescriptive

Tools or techniques, such as *competitiveness, fast response, decisiveness, driving through barriers, or goal achievement* (i.e., short-term performance, doing things fast), have been placed under the lower right quadrant.




Figure 5. CVF Archetype: Compete

COMPETITION in the world of social complexity theory means winning, but only as co-members, or equal partners on a team, where everyone has been granted equal access to information in an attempt to collectively mold policy. Opinions are swayed and decision-makers persuaded through open communication and sound argumentation, based on widely accepted assumptions built and interpreted through inclusive dialogue. The terms typically associated with competition, such as “autocratic leadership and culture,” “personal ambition,” “Machiavellian cunning and duplicity/manipulation,” and “political savvy,” are shunned to the preference of other more egalitarian concepts, such as “interactive empowerment,” “personal responsibility,” “mutual contribution,” “authenticity and legitimacy,” and “openness and shared control.” Moving up is synonymous with doing good work (together).

a. Compete Recommendations

(1) COMPETE #1: Select the PIO/Deputy PIO Based on Factors of Trust—The Act stipulates that the federal PIO can either be a career or non-career (i.e., political) member of the SES. However, because of the importance the GPRA-MA places on the contributions of this particular leader to create a positive learning and performance improvement culture, overseeing all agency performance-related activities, it is extremely important that the PIO and/or Deputy PIO be known by those within his/her existing organization, and already enjoy high-trust from peers,

colleagues and those hierarchically above and below. If people do not know and/or trust the PIO/Deputy PIO, based on a combination of previously demonstrated character and competence, then their attitude toward the GPRA-MA and the overarching discipline of strategic performance management will be affected as well. Their positive or negative disposition toward the mandate's principle change management agent, can either impede implementation of the Act, or cause it to be seen as a force multiplier within the agency.

In addition, these trusted administrators would need to be placed in positions that are sufficiently hierarchically influential to affect real change, such as through the establishment of a centralized office of strategic performance management reporting directly to the CEO or his/her equivalent. Power influences implementation and execution, setting the tone, and can be positive (i.e., encouraging bottom-up congruence), or negative (i.e., forcing top-down compliance). The personality and approach of the PIO/Deputy PIO should display an understanding and respect of internal culture. Trust is equally important, and when combined with power, can prove invaluable to leaders of organizations, both external political appointees and internal career executives, possessing only one, but not the other characteristic. Trust allows others to lead and manage based on subject matter expertise, not hierarchical position, helping organizations find that elusive "sweet spot" between centralization and decentralization, control and the free flow of information, thus minimizing the unnecessary territoriality and stove-piping that often impedes true innovation and change.

(2) COMPETE #2: Develop Innovative Networked (Meta-) Governance Leadership Training for Federal PIOs and Staff—The OPM and OMB should work with agencies to develop and deliver strategic and innovative leadership training for federal PIOs and their staffs. Emphasizing the "soft" (i.e., culture, beliefs, relationships, etc.) components of strategic leadership and management, this training would supplement and build on the "hard" performance management and improvement training requirements associated with the five (5) focus areas outlined in the GPRA-MA, and articulated around the formal structure and hierarchy of the OMB PMF, its governance structures, control systems, and processes.

Because traditional leaders tend to contribute to status quo, whereas more collaborative leaders can change mindsets and paradigms, it is important to select and develop “innovative” leaders capable of focusing on the unique nature of strategic vision and system-wide decision making, as opposed to only the short-term, stove-piped, day-to-day operations. Such an innovative performance manager/practitioner educational framework, therefore, would impart and nurture executive-leadership styles at the strategic, tactical and operational levels, and include topics, such as conceptual and behavioral complexity, strategic management, visionary/inspirational leadership practices, and meta-governance tactics. Up and coming leaders should increasingly demonstrate a preference for meta-governance, abandoning the traditional top-down, closed loop, governance structures prevalent in today’s public sector.

This training, specifically targeting PIOs and their staff, could then be supplemented by additional, similarly focused training for senior staff and program managers, emphasizing parallel skill sets at the tactical and operational levels, also conducive to more innovative and creative leadership. OMB and the PIC could work together to outline minimum requirements for the training, along with standard tools and templates, that agencies could customize, tailoring the approaches to fulfill their individual requirements. Minimum requirements would focus on communicating the true face of leadership, which is no longer hierarchical, but vertical, no longer one-directional, but a reflection of “relational webs” of “network power” where complex problems are resolved through interdependent and interactive dialogue.

The main purpose of the PIO/Deputy PIO leadership training would be to develop “next generation” leaders that recognize the importance and utility of transitioning from the current centralized top-down, command-and-control management model, primarily rational and directive, where power is mostly concentrated at the top and unhealthy for organizations, to one that prefers decentralized “leaders among peers,” trusted, inspirational, emotionally intelligent, and capable of adeptly applying collaborative skill sets to ambiguous, complex adaptive systems.

(3) COMPETE #3: Develop and Communicate Government Performance Information Tailored to the People—If true knowledge management means producing, analyzing and communicating information in ways that create true value to end users and consumers, then public-facing performance data should provide context and meaning to average citizens and/or their representatives. If government performance management practitioners are unable to package the public information mandated by the GPRA-MA in ways that satisfy the expectations and needs of the American people, then it has failed in its purpose to ensure transparency of government operations in the spirit of true fiscal and performance accountability.

We have developed several recommendations, articulated around six (6) key attributes of performance reporting,¹⁹⁸ to ensure that the federal government’s performance measure development and reporting processes are serving and satisfying the taxpayer, transparently communicating public policy and its effects as a means to gain and maintain public trust.

- Attribute #1: Consistency and comparability in performance reporting structures

The United States’ federalist system of checks and balances makes it particularly difficult to reconcile national decision making with the strategic direction of state and local administrations.

We should focus on finding that hybrid “sweet spot” between federal government centralization and state and local decentralization, working to establish a clearer line of sight between investments in national goals and objectives and the assessment of the impact of those investments at more local levels. Effort should be made to reflect results in annual performance reports by displaying logical relationships between a federal agency’s inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes, at the higher level, and the actual benefit to local communities and municipalities, at the second and tertiary levels. Even though logic models are currently being used by public administrators to align agency resources, programs, and activities to achieve national strategic goals, there is very little effort to demonstrate how the achievement of such strategy is actually impacting

¹⁹⁸ Boyle, *Performance Reporting: Insights from International Practice*.

American lives at the state and local levels. We should concentrate on reconciling executive and legislative branch goals and decision making, with the needs and desires of the American public, which are most often expressed locally.

Government officials should work to ensure greater linkages and collaboration between those who shape policy (i.e., legislative branch) and those who execute it (i.e., executive branch), while establishing the necessary mechanisms for a clearer articulation and understanding of federal intent at both the state and local levels. Tangible, measurable results from these national-level investments should also appear in the annual performance reports of state and local governments, demonstrating how federal programs are specifically enhancing individual communities throughout the nation.

- Attribute #2: Inclusion of qualitative narrative to accompany quantitative performance indicators

There is a preponderance of ways to improve decision making through detailed program explanations and supporting data in government financial and performance reports. Narratives should be much more granular, display the immediate benefit of government programs, and be written in language and terms easily understandable by the general populace. In other words, the information should be more educational in nature, as opposed to the simple information sharing formula predominant in the majority of the government's current public-facing performance and accountability reports.

Even more important is providing information on ways citizens can get more involved with their local representatives and/or public officials, reaching out to those who are actually responsible for the government program results contained in the performance plans and reports, in order to perhaps proactively influence better outcomes. Getting average citizens, and other impartial/independent stakeholders, more involved in government affairs and operations would create an environment conducive to greater political and administrative accountability, for both policy makers and executors.

Officials can borrow some of the suggested mechanisms, provided in the current literature and captured in several of these recommendations, to continually and proactively strengthen and sustain a more open, transparent, and participative relationship between public administrators and average citizens, by involving the latter in

performance measure goal development and evaluation of success. Indeed, offering more information of an educational nature on government public websites, as well as working to elicit and communicate public expectations regarding specific government programs to legislative and executive branch officials would ensure greater accountability from nationally elected and appointed representatives.

- Attribute #3: Existence of clearly identified outcome measures

Provide public-facing outcome narratives and supporting performance indicators communicating the results and contributions of government programs at a more granular level, by disaggregating data according to demographic, geographic, or other relevant characteristics, highlighting significant variations to pinpoint problems and identify possible solutions.

Greater effort should be made to ensure that Americans understand how success is being achieved and/or what specific challenges are preventing success, so that they can evaluate for themselves the efficacy of the strategic direction adopted by their leaders, as well as the strategies government officials are adopting to improve success.

Agencies should be encouraged to articulate at least three (3) types of public-oriented objectives and associated performance indicators in their annual performance plans and reports:

- Outcome objectives, reflecting citizen expectations;
- Service quality objectives, reflecting the expectations of the end users of public services; and
- Management efficiency (i.e., cost saving) objectives, addressing taxpayer concerns.

Including objectives and associated performance indicators, related to the (re)allocation of inputs or activities within programs, and linking them with the achievement of overarching priorities should be included in annual performance plans and reports.

This detailed data at the national level should be reproduced by state and municipal governments in order to display connectivity with local-level strategic plans, priorities, budgets and performance results.

- Attribute #4: Availability of both target and baseline data to guide assessment(s) over time

Everyone agrees that U.S. performance reports do rather well when it comes to presenting established targets and baseline data, displaying up to five years of previous performance, and stressing the importance of communicating trends and not simply target achievement.

However, and perhaps due to the greater volatility of the American political landscape, the United States is less adept at displaying the potential and actual impact of new legislation on performance results.

The United States should develop more sophisticated continuity of operations planning and implementation guidelines, based on established protocol and processes, capable of weathering the frequent changes in elected and bureaucratic leadership and the resulting shift in strategic direction, without impeding the logical continuity of public performance reporting. Without such continuity, continuous improvement becomes an impossible fallacy.

- Attribute #5: Good formatting/presentation and effective use of technology platforms

The most focus and progress made in the recent past pertains to use of technology to support the consumers of performance information. In particular, Performance.gov, the federal government's centralized web portal, which provides results of government programs in a structured and consistent format, is helpful to sift through the mass of data currently available. Performance.gov is also increasingly providing hot links to other websites that contain additional information on the outcome area under scrutiny.

Next steps could include providing easy access to relevant databases and systems-generated analysis and reports, effectively presented and formatted, without having to rely on government information technology or other subject matter experts, thus further streamlining these types of one-way information flows to the American public.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Toby Hatch, Raef Lawson, and Denis DesRoches, *Scorecard Best Practices: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008), xi, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=10295892&ppg=13>.

Likewise, developing more refined administrative processes that produce improved inter- and intra-agency collaboration, communication and coordination would contribute to reconciling the disparate performance monitoring and reporting systems. The goal is to provide the American public with a common operating picture of overall government performance, as opposed to the stove-piped performance reporting processes coming from individual agencies, currently in place.

Most importantly, performance information should be placed in context and tailored to the needs of each particular audience, by constantly asking the “so what” question: What does the indicator, measure, number etc. really signify in terms of specific actions that can be taken within that particular sphere of influence? The principle is simple: if no action/decision is required, then performance information is not required. If performance information is not used to make decisions or take action, then it is neither important, nor necessary. Providing information for action/decision can be facilitated by formatting data in ways that allow it to be quickly and easily understood. In 1986, the NASA engineers of the space shuttle Challenger knew that the shuttle was not ready to be launched. Prior to countdown, they had produced several analyses containing copious and detailed performance data. Yet, this supporting documentation had not been presented in a clear, concise way that allowed decision-makers to fully and immediately understand the danger. Data needs to be presented in a way that draws attention to what is really important, what specifically requires action and/or decision, and this, within the attention span of the targeted audience, and in language that is meaningful to them.

- Attribute #6: Inclusion of output and activity indicators

The U.S. approach to performance reports in recent times has been to focus almost exclusively on outcomes, whereas the majority of actual indicators still appear to be output measures. This is because these reports are often being used as accountability mechanisms for individual program performance as opposed to providing perspective on overarching mission achievement. Nevertheless, good indicators of outputs and activities

are helpful in painting a richer description of success, because they allow for a better understanding of exactly what went into achieving the overall performance result.²⁰⁰

Public managers are constantly looking for the appropriate balance between the end state and the granular data used to develop and/or inform specific outcome-based performance measures. Leadership often hedges outcome targets, due to a lack of a clear line of sight between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Because they do not understand what actually contributed to success, they are unable to influence the results. Because they feel they really cannot impact results, they become less interested in participating in strategic performance management exercises in general. With a better understanding of causal effect, officials would be more willing to allow higher-level cross-cutting strategic measures to collectively reflect their own individual contributions. Likewise, if they know exactly how their efforts contributed, they would be more willing to hold themselves accountable for achieving results.

In order to minimize the fear of the loss of control, which prevents collaboration, there needs to be greater cross-organizational dialogue and buy-in, necessary for the production of true outcome-based measures, and this, from the beginning of the performance measure development process.

To summarize, transparency with external partners/stakeholders is beneficial as there is a risk to not being transparent. More information is better. Otherwise, people will fill in the blanks with misinformation. Everyone along the performance management spectrum has an obligation to ensure the transparency of performance data. In a free democratic nation, the public has the right to see full-unclassified data sets pertaining to the programs they are funding, whatever they might do with it, either positive or negative.

²⁰⁰ Marelize Goergens and Jody Zall Kusek, *Making Monitoring and Evaluation Systems Work: A Capacity Development Tool Kit* (Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications, 2010), 4, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=10373405&ppg=33>.

3. Create

Three (3)			
CVF Archetype	Emphasis	Organizational Focus	Social Complexity
CREATE	Open Systems	External/Flexible	Organic/Descriptive

This upper right quadrant suggests tools and techniques focused on *innovation, creativity, articulating future vision, transformational change, or entrepreneurship* (i.e., breakthrough, doing things first).



Figure 6. CVF Archetype: Create

Social complexity theory would encourage individuals working within this archetype to embrace the true meaning of CREATIVITY as “making or bringing into existence something new,” rather than the bureaucratic definition of simply adjusting existing structures and/or tweaking standard operating procedures and calling them new. Creation, seen through the prism of Weberian administration which does not allow for uncertainty, is limited to what is already known, tethered to definitive conclusions and specific recommendations leading to clear outputs, rather than to what is still undefined and evolving, based on contingent conclusions and experimentation, and contributing to

greater outcome success.²⁰¹ True creation first requires that one be flexible, resilient, and open to change. “Resilient [innovative, networked] governance, therefore, means not only responding to change, but also creating and shaping it.”²⁰²

a. Create Recommendations

(1) CREATE #1: Apply the Innovative (Democratic) Networked Governance Principle of Co-Creation at the State and Local/Tribal Levels to Advance the DHS Mission—Building on the information and momentum gained through the “DHS 101 Seminars” public outreach and crowd-sourcing campaigns, develop a co-creative approach to further tap into the valuable perspective that a more limited and targeted number of average citizens, business and non-profit leaders, and state and local homeland security officials can bring to defining and refining the DHS mission, its continually evolving strategy and program solutions. This approach would involve an iterative, declassified, public-facing strategic performance management framework, mirroring the formal DHS PPBE structure. Based on the concept of value creation through open, mutual dialogue, voluntary collaboration, horizontal (versus vertical) communication, and sustained long-term working relationships, the framework is meant to elicit citizen and other public partner and stakeholder input to better inform and communicate the articulation of DHS goals and priorities; the alignment of DHS resources to accomplish those goals; and the assessment of progress and results. Borrowing from the *collaborative rationality* approach to negotiation, outlined in the book “Getting to Yes,”²⁰³ the process would apply the following principles to build consensus and reach agreement: separate the people from the problem; focus on interests not positions; invent options for mutual gain; insist on using objective criteria; and develop a BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).²⁰⁴ This will entail

²⁰¹ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 175.

²⁰² Ibid., 206.

²⁰³ William L. Ury and Roger Fisher, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 1st ed. (New York: Penguin, 1981).

²⁰⁴ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 28.

“[d]ialogue among professionals and other knowledgeable players, [...] problem framing, selecting information, developing a robust and integrated picture of the issues from multiple perspectives, and choosing [a long-term] strategy [best tailored to meet the needs of each individual].²⁰⁵

For such a framework to work in practice, involving stakeholders at all levels, current DHS goals and objectives should be developed/revised using an achieving end-state, rather than incremental, mind-set. Strategy should be developed, not through a single, one-time or even multiple-time discussion(s) with the public, but rather as setting the stage for a successful long-term exchange toward the attainment of long-term success. The overriding goal here would be to establish real working relationships through ongoing and mutually sustained dialogue in environments of ease and trust where external stakeholders are afforded the opportunity to use their electoral and administrative voices to better understand and contribute to the resolution of homeland security-related problems.

Revising strategic planning processes in such a way would ensure buy-in and support from multiple sources, and contribute to communicating a consistent message about the strategy’s expected and actual outcomes in a language that is meaningful to all stakeholders. In turn, such a dynamic would create a revised and acceptable/accepted public message that could actually influence the day-to-day negotiations and legislative/executive decision making of national leadership. In other words, it would completely change the tone and focus of today’s government performance and results dialogue. The American people and not only unaccountable public administrators could directly influence the framing of political considerations, perhaps mitigating accusations of partisanship and self-interest levied by, and against, strategic performance management practitioners within the federal system.

Most DHS officials are mission focused, often oblivious to self-seeking political considerations, desiring to do the right thing on a day-to-day basis, rather than waiting to be forced to do it eventually through some external compliance

²⁰⁵ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 171.

process. Such congruence, when coupled with a higher public service calling based on a public/private partnership that involved the engagement and collaboration of all stakeholders, would make punitive bureaucratic oversight all but unnecessary. When you are working directly with people who are counting on you, you will strive to be successful, independent of any formal governance structure and/or administrative process. The law is for lawbreakers; formal audits and management controls for those who do not feel compelled to hold themselves accountable. For those who are intent on serving people they personally know and interact with on a daily basis, a more mature, interactive systems approach to instilling a culture of accountability would be the most appropriate.

(2) CREATE #2: Create an Innovative (Web-Enabled) Networked Community of Practice to Inform DHS Strategy and Performance Measure Development—DHS organizational performance management can be reconciled with the various definitions of transparency and public accountability through interactive, web-enabled CoPs, and their supporting ICTs.

The DHS PIC, in collaboration with OMB, and component agencies, should develop interactive web-enabled CoPs that are capable of interfacing with all partners and stakeholders along the performance improvement continuum, particularly the general public. Building upon the success of the TSA's IdeaFactory, and based on its social media concept expanding the traditional suggestion box, these innovative CoPs would create and maintain virtual communities/teams, performance-based networks and learning forums that go beyond the simple, one-directional, information communication technology tool in place today, Performance.gov. This next generation ICT-enabled CoP would forge working relationship(s) with average citizens, creating an interactive dialogue with them through technology-based knowledge sharing environments, all with the express purpose of enhancing the development and measurement of DHS strategy. Working with departmental strategic planners and public affairs specialists, these collaborative communities would be comprised of a limited and

targeted number of state and local homeland security leaders, average citizens and business and non-profit leaders from across the nation, as a follow up to the “DHS 101 Seminars” Crowd-Sourcing and Co-Creation efforts.

These interactive web-enabled CoPs would foster innovative (democratic) networked governance by providing average citizens with a voice to:

- Talk, educate, and inform each other about the homeland security environment and the DHS mission through online communities;
- Contribute to relevant and important departmental programs and state and local homeland security-related priorities; and
- Provide valuable and impactful public feedback regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS strategic goals and measures directly to agency headquarters and staff.

Such an approach would bring civic participation and learning back to the forefront, through the cultivation of more productive relationships with the general public based on trust and collaboration. Translating crowd-sourcing and co-creation into networked solutions, creating forums for information and idea exchange, these departmental public-facing, web-enabled CoPs would contribute to closing the gap in the misconception(s) regarding the DHS mission and its contributions to the safety and security of the American people by establishing an on-going dialogue between average citizens and public officials.

Leveraging cross-jurisdictional (i.e., federal, state and local) CoPs, and their supporting public-facing ICTs, would allow us to move beyond the current status quo of one-directional information sharing, to two-directional knowledge management and the communication of shared (i.e., collective) goals involving a multiplicity of both public and private stakeholders. It would represent an important first step in building public trust, collaboration and cooperation.

(3) CREATE #3: Leverage Web 2.0 Technologies in Policy Development and Decision Making—In ongoing efforts to institutionalize processes that establish safe spaces for government officials to create and innovate, agencies should work with their internal public affairs and information technology shops, to identify any current ongoing efforts to leverage advanced internet technologies and applications

including blogs, wikis, RSS, and social bookmarking to better engage constituencies and improve the presentation and implementation of specific agency programs.

The DHS PIO, in partnership with the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and appropriate public affairs specialists should identify ways that social media can help facilitate crowd-sourcing and co-creative dialogue between “citizens” and “public managers,” advancing this specific type of networked democratic governance within the department. The White House Office of New Media Technologies has already been working with various federal leaders government-wide, figuring out which social technologies work best in different circumstances to promote citizen engagement and to analyze the feedback they receive directly from the people relative to executive branch policy and priorities. Teams can be formed to pilot tailored social media projects capable of analyzing data gathered from hundreds of thousands of tweets and/or from other next generation communications tools in response to DHS public messaging. Analyses, identifying recurring themes, issues, and/or solutions within these communications, could then be developed into reports and provided to DHS components charged with developing or interpreting policy in specific arenas, for further follow up. Actions could include the possible revision of internal agency policy and/or the development of pilot initiatives and programs to implement the suggestions, in full compliance with current legislation and/or rules and regulations. An Executive Order to federal CIOs, advancing Web 2.0 technologies in agency policy development and execution, should be issued to ensure that agencies feel empowered to communicate directly with the American people in such a way.

4. Control

Four (4)			
CVF Archetype	Emphasis	Organizational Focus	Social Complexity
CONTROL	Internal Processes	Internal/Focused	Control/Prescriptive

Finally, tools or techniques, focused on *assessing and measuring, controlling processes, structuring, efficiency improvement, or quality enhancement* (i.e., incremental, doing things right), have been highlighted in the lower left quadrant.




Figure 7. CVF Archetype: Control

Social complexity theory is what allows visionaries to use the structured environment of the GPRA-MA of 2010 to safely shatter the strict parameters of CONTROL, and move away from official government subject matter experts and expertise as representing the only road to legitimacy, in order to embrace a more inclusive definition of knowledge management involving a multiplicity of stakeholders with a wide variety of experience and perspectives. Collaborative planning and decision-making processes, wherein many kinds of knowledge, including input from lay people, should be considered as essential in understanding problems and developing policy solutions to them.²⁰⁶ Control, in the context of innovative networked governance, what we posit as being the “next new thing” in performance management and improvement, does not mean the preparation, monitoring and assessment of detailed policies and programs, but rather the establishment and shepherding of flexible governing frameworks that mobilize resources and unleash talent. Organizational effectiveness and efficiency are merely by-products, not goals in and of themselves, of this new genre of “control.”

²⁰⁶ Booher and Innes, *Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy*, 5.

a. Control Recommendations

(1) CONTROL #1: Consider A Multiplicity of Program Theory Models to Develop Strategy and Measure Performance—Whether an agency opts to use the logic model, balanced scorecard, strategy mapping, or a different, uniquely tailored alignment methodology to create a clear line of sight between high-level strategic goals and individual program and personal contributions, the emphasis should not (only) be placed on the linear, step-by-step process of displaying the various simplistic input-output relationships that exist among the diverse elements contributing to goal and measure achievement. Other, less rational, purely Newtonian-based planning concepts should come into play as well, allowing for more than the simple and rather limited compilation of detailed program action plans. Alternate options would include the development of counterintuitive governance frameworks that mobilize a diversity of players and remove all obstacles to greater collaboration. In order to determine whether we are doing the right things, and not simply doing things the right way, program decision-making models should allow for a multiplicity of perspectives that challenge the status quo, not simply regurgitate quantitative, “objective” data to sell strategy that has already been decided upon, or justify the allocation of resources that have already been applied. Ultimately, program theory models and empirically based problem-solving methodologies should be able to translate past knowledge into future action, not only past action into current knowledge.

(2) CONTROL #2: Develop Innovative (Collaborative) Networked Performance Measurement and Evaluation Methodologies—In order to minimize distrust in executive branch analytical products, and ensure that they are making credible, unbiased representations about how well agencies and programs are performing, include a cross-representation of analysts in working groups (i.e., action learning forums) dedicated to developing acceptable methodologies and tools that improve the overall analytical capability and capacity of the department and appropriately define, measure, achieve and communicate what truly constitutes success. Genuine independent and objective oversight should be the guiding philosophy in the formation of these performance measurement and program evaluation teams, and

therefore should be comprised of external subject matter experts from both the public and private sectors, such as public/private think tanks, research centers of excellence, government management and oversight bodies, external consultants, and/or academia. Moreover, whether these measurement and evaluation tools and techniques support agency strategic planning processes, resource allocation processes, risk analyses, net assessments, modeling capabilities, statistical analyses, and/or data collection and verification, they should involve Congressional perspective and expectations *up front*, at the beginning of both the development and analytical processes, as opposed to the approach currently in place, which primarily involves simple information gathering and/or after-the-fact inquiry.

(3) CONTROL #3: Reform the Congressional Authorization and Appropriations Processes and Budget-Performance Frameworks—The current DHS appropriations accounting structure still reflects a patchwork collection of legacy, pre-9/11 appropriation accounts associated with individual components formerly organized as independent agencies or components of other departments. This means that resources still continue to flow to separate organizational elements, with their own unique cultures and stove-piped mission sets, as opposed to a single department, the chimerical “One-DHS,” possessing the “power of the purse” to develop plans, apply taxpayer dollars and understand performance results from longer term, strategic, cross-cutting perspectives. Without further consolidation in this arena to better communicate legislative performance expectations, DHS will continue to be hobbled in its ability to establish integrated strategic planning, resource allocation, execution oversight, and reporting processes, all of which are necessary to mature the homeland security enterprise in the most transparent, accountable, efficient and effective way possible.

As the legislative and executive branches work to reconcile their competing and often contradictory agendas and priorities, Congress should consider consolidating the DHS appropriations structure in order to facilitate departmental comparisons of impact based on like costs across components and offices. This would

increase the department's cross-organizational analytic capability and capacity and help DHS leadership better understand the implications of its strategic planning and resource allocation decisions.

First, greater emphasis needs to be placed on cross-cutting strategy at both the Congressional and OMB levels to encourage more inter- and intra-organizational alignment and collaborative performance planning. The GPRA-MA can be used to develop broad national goals and objectives along with associated accountability mechanisms to eliminate duplication, fragmentation, and/or redundancy of government programs. Congress would, therefore, be acting more like a board of directors, telling agencies what to do, but not necessarily how to do it. More efforts to ensure government-wide strategic clarity and organizational alignment could then be made at the OMB level, where there is sufficient authority to canalize the "messiness" of such collaboration.

Next, Congress, OMB Resource Management Offices (RMOs) and the PIC, and agencies could work together to develop pilot projects involving multi-year budget periods to allow programs to focus on long-term investments and adjust spending over time to improve short-term performance. This may require working with Congress to develop legislation and ensure continuity that allows for longer term budgeting.

Currently, there is a disconnect between the GPRA-MA and DHS' solution to implement it: PPBE. GPRA performance goals and measures tend to be shorter term (1-1/2 to 2 years) and politically driven to coincide with annual Congressional and administrative priorities. This has resulted in a bi-furcated performance planning and reporting structure within DHS and its Components, where GPRA-mandated measures are often considered to be no more than simplistic statements of what DHS is or wants to be in the eyes of the public, but not fully representative of the complexity of the DHS mission space nor sufficiently granular to measure and manage its discrete responsibilities. As a result, there are, in practice, two sets of measures within the department and its various components:

- Public-facing GPRA measures, meant to "prove success," that are short-term, aligned with a Congressional budget framework and political appointees trying to make their mark within a limited 2–4 year timeframe; and

- Internal agency measures, meant to “improve performance,” that are longer-term, aligned with agency 4–6 year strategic, tactic and operational planning and program/front-line managers looking for data to inform specific policy and resource allocation decisions.

Both Congress and OMB in acknowledging this less-than-ideal situation should work to better leverage the GPRA-MA to find the right balance between these macro- and micro-levels of strategic performance management. Purposeful effort will need to be made to link the development of higher, national level goals and their associated GPRA performance measures, with the more granular, prescriptive data, developed by the operators within each individual agency, based on the SMART objectives associated with their internal strategic planning and budgeting processes. This would also ensure that agency GPRA performance measures are not divorced from their longer-term strategic plans and simply aligned to individual short-term public-facing programs, solely based on Congressional/OMB interest. Improved collaboration between Congress and OMB would also allow for agencies to modify/adapt the goals and measures that they are actually using to manage and that accurately reflect real progress on the ground, to better inform the public in terms that are relevant to them.

This would go a long way in eliminating the disjoint between the nation’s political leadership, being held directly accountable to the people, and its unelected administrative officials, interpreting legislation through their day-to-day operations and discrete, opaque decision making.

It is time to make better progress in this arena. The 9/11 Commission Report stated it succinctly: *“Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.”*²⁰⁷

C. CONCLUSION

We have linked the theoretical conceptualization of public and organizational accountability with the GPRA-MA of 2010, in order to allow DHS leaders and performance management and improvement practitioners to experience a paradigm shift

²⁰⁷ Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, *The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Authorized Edition* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 399.

in the way they consider and apply strategic performance management within the DHS. Such a rapprochement, however, is still not sufficient to instill a culture of accountability at the department.

Absence trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, government officials, both elected and unelected, will continue to default to the traditional governance styles they already know and depend upon.

This thesis has provided a public accountability, or public trust, framework based on innovative (democratic) networked governance, or meta-governance.

We have reviewed the reasons for, as well as the benefits of, such an approach. We have answered our over-arching fundamental research question. Namely, how has the lack of true public and organizational accountability rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective and what can the DHS do to instill a culture of greater accountability, or increased trust, by better leveraging the Act toward such a goal?

We have discussed the current condition of strategic performance management within the department and how the five (5) cultural conditions, primarily the lack of trust, have rendered the GPRA-MA ineffective.

We have seen the cost of this situation, how it is preventing the improvement and communication of DHS performance and results, as well as the negative consequence these inadequate performance management practices are having on DHS mission effectiveness and efficiency.

Finally, we've proposed remedies within the framework of the GPRA-MA of 2010, applying strategic performance management best practices and social complexity theory to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) both intra- and inter-agency, and vis-à-vis the public at large.

Our “next-generation” solution proposed in these recommendations, spotlighting innovative-networked governance, will ameliorate all five (5) of the cultural conditions affecting performance management and improvement, alleviating deficiencies in all five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, by:

- Focusing on collaboration as a means to diffuse and redistribute power and leverage the almost limitless capabilities of an almost equally limitless pool of talent;
- Redefining competition to ensure that inclusive dialogue and teamwork are indeed force multipliers and that two (or three, or four, etc.) minds are truly better than one when it comes to finding solutions;
- Unleashing true creativity by freeing it from the limits of Weberian and Newtonian paradigms; and
- Shattering the myth that machine-like control automatically results in greater effectiveness and efficiency.

We have seen how these social complexity theory epistemologies and principles can be practically applied to:

- Overcome *resistance* to change and *stagnation* through greater leadership and management *engagement*, committed to transforming standard working groups into performance-focused action learning forums creating *momentum* toward continuous improvement;
- Eliminate *confusion* and *doubt* concerning leadership motive and intent, by seeing complexity and unpredictability, not as overwhelming challenges, but as opportunities to discover more participative ways of achieving strategic *clarity* and organizational alignment, of reaching consensus, and gaining external stakeholder *confidence* in the homeland security enterprise;
- Translate the *inconsistency* and *indecision* which currently characterizes agency performance measurement and evaluation functions into analytical products that enjoy greater *credibility* and legitimacy, leading to improved intra- and inter-agency *collaboration*;
- Replace the current *indifference* and *passivity* toward performance reviews with *motivation* for and *initiative* toward more innovative management dialogue and cross-organizational interaction and collaboration; and finally,
- Reconcile organizational performance accountability with public trust by applying transparent and democratic meta-governance structures, systems and processes, turning current public *criticism* and *conflict* into greater *optimism* and *contribution* to the homeland security mission overall.

Moving toward trust, or giving and getting the benefit of the doubt, should be the one overriding factor determining success or failure. In a world increasingly characterized by uncertainty, diversity and interdependence, traditional institutional

sources of trust can no longer be taken for granted. They are being displaced by the requirement to earn respect and confidence through genuine dialogue and mutually responsive and beneficial relationships.

Innovative-networked governance offers a way to confront the declining trust in government institutions and practices, by ensuring that public accountability is truly based on a social relationship between two parties that expect promises to be kept. In other words, innovative-networked governance can bring us back to our original definition of accountability as the single most important driving factor of any legitimate government performance and results framework, one that belongs to the people and is social in nature.

The GPRA-MA performance accountability framework and federal government strategic performance management, will either be of the people, for the people, and by the people, or it will have failed in its premise to ensure true accountability within public administration. It will remain directionless, confusing, vague, unaffected and disregarded.

As career civil servants, currently being held accountable to other government elites, rather than directly to the American people, it is easy to ignore this evolving government-citizen interaction dynamic, the one defining philosophy of true public service, that of being held accountable to our fellow citizens and their increasing vociferous demand to be heard in the halls of national power.

No taxation without representation...

As unelected government officials, who do not like change, neither anticipating nor preparing for it, we appreciate being insulated from directly experiencing cultural shifts and changes in public mindset in the daily execution of our duties.

Change, nevertheless, is coming. Indeed, it is already here.

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VIII. IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP

In their bestselling book entitled *Switch: How to Change Things When Change is Hard*, authors Chip and Dan Heath argue that the primary obstacle to making lasting change in our lives and communities issues from a conflict built into our brains, into our very nature. Pulling from research in psychology, sociology, biology, and other fields, they maintain that our minds are ruled by two different systems: the rational and the emotional. The rational mind (i.e., the “rider”) understands and accepts the utility, necessity and often times the inevitability of change, whereas the emotional will (i.e., the “elephant”) seeks comfort in the routine and the familiar. This dichotomy produces a natural tension in people’s hearts and minds. This tension can be overcome by applying pressure at various “stress” points. New “patterns” or “habits” can then be created, transforming the *old* emotional into the *new* rational (i.e., the elephant becomes the rider), with change following rather quickly.²⁰⁸

The GPRA-MA of 2010 is currently being used to apply pressure at various stress points to affect change in government effectiveness and efficiency (i.e., performance).

As the focus of a research topic, the GPRA-MA of 2010 can be studied to demonstrate how the federal government is working to ensure that today’s government programs are helping us to achieve long-term results in the greater public interest. The GPRA-MA of 2010, in fact, proposes a way to do this through the development and implementation of a five-prong approach or strategy. Our “SWITCH” authors call this “*Pointing to the Destination.*”

The vision of the GPRA-MA of 2010 is not complicated. It is quite simple. The government should be able to clearly, consistently and correctly demonstrate its challenges and success to internal and external stakeholders, particularly the American public.

²⁰⁸ Chip Heath and Dan Heath, *Switch: How to Change Things When Change is Hard* (New York: Broadway Books, 2010).

In today's fiscally constrained environment, the need to deliver the same quality of services with less money (i.e., work more efficiently) is widely acknowledged. There is no longer a need to establish these Values, describing why this matters to create a sense of urgency. *We have found the 'Feeling' (i.e., SWITCH).* GPRA-MA is, in fact, proof of that. Rather than yesterday's "Why," the question being asked today is "How."

"Why" can be defined in terms of results or "measurable deliverables" that can be achieved through the implementation of the GPRA-MA: Better informed policy, strategic planning, resource allocation, investment and human resource management decisions. Indeed, by improving our analytical capability to make better-informed decisions, we will improve operations, and ultimately, results.

"How" can include specific actions, such as (1) socializing GPRA-MA of 2010, OMB and department requirements and frameworks, constantly communicating for buy-in; (2) empowering action that enables good performance management practices at all levels (i.e., strategic-, tactical-, operational); (3) scheduling discussions/demonstrations of other agencies best practices; and (4) creating quick wins through effective change management teams.

All of this has been done already, and even rather well. We have just drawn attention to existing literature, volume upon volume, discussing the GPRA-MA and the overarching subject of strategic performance management, both in terms of official government policy, as well as private industry best practices, and how to practically apply them to improve government organizational performance.

Defining and achieving true public accountability, defined as public trust, on the other hand, is still largely uncharted territory.

Making sure elected and appointed officials keep their word and deliver on their promises is a much better focus for a research topic. Here, there is no clearly defined vision. There are conflicting, often contradictory values. There is no real urgency. And with regards to results, few have told us what specific actions to perform to get there, or how to know it when we do.

A. CURRENT STATE, GAP ANALYSIS AND END STATE

Placing the GPRA-MA of 2010 with its agenda to improve mission and program outcomes, or performance results, within the greater context of public accountability, we have made practical suggestions on how to apply the various aspects of the GPRA-MA to instill a culture of accountability at the DHS in answer our original research questions.

Our goal was to move beyond the status quo, to go beyond the current practice of adopting simple solutions to tackle the complex problems relating to strategic planning and decision making, and instead identify alternative approaches more meaningful to end users at all levels of the performance improvement continuum.

Our approach/solution was to adopt an emerging philosophy/strategy based on innovative networked governance to creatively implement the GPRA-MA of 2010, by asking public servants to associate what they do in their daily professional lives with public accountability, and this, always with the implicit, unspoken desire of the American public to be heard, to be active participants in the decisions of their government. This thesis project was meant to proactively respond to the changing attitude relative to public accountability, determine how these changes to the existing cultural climate of government-citizen interaction is influencing the current field of federal government strategic performance management and make recommendations on how to best navigate in this quickly evolving landscape.

We have attempted to explain and validate the premise that the GPRA-MA of 2010, similar to most traditional strategic performance management frameworks, is failing to impact DHS performance and results. We demonstrated this current lack of success by highlighting deficiencies signaled by federal government performance practitioners in all five (5) of the legislation's major focus areas.

We have shown that without sufficient leadership engagement/commitment to instill a performance improvement culture through positive learning and interactive cross-organizational collaboration, the various hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces

within the DHS organizations will continue to accept inadequate performance management frameworks limited by group think, preferring common practices over best practices.

Even though language within the GPRA-MA mandate has attempted to alleviate challenges associated with the lack of connectivity among agency plans and performance results, DHS programs and initiatives continue to be plagued by competing, and often contradictory priorities, unintentional gaps and duplicative or redundant efforts. We have outlined a few measures that would ensure that the current top-down, prescriptive, and stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting are being counter-balanced by efforts to embrace more descriptive, bottom-up solutions based on a better understanding of the complexities of the homeland security environment.

Closing the gap in this area will require moving beyond the current practice of simply producing performance information, but not using it in any management and operational decision making. Effectively, decision making should be influenced by how emerging strategy is actually impacting program performance as opposed to basing decisions on purely political considerations and/or negotiated compromise. This can only be accomplished when sound program evaluation methodologies, undergirded by valid and verified performance measurement analytics, are applied and communicated through relevant, engaging, adaptive and inquisitive learning forums (i.e., successful data-driven performance review sessions).

Finally, communicating and reporting transparent performance information will require replacing current compliance reporting frameworks hampered by unnecessary DHS bureaucratic complexity with true accountability structures supported by sound governance processes that ensure sufficient input, feedback and follow-up, involving a variety of stakeholders, including the general public.

Addressing these various competency and capability gaps in the performance management discipline will entail gaining and sustaining leadership engagement and commitment, creating a results-oriented performance management culture, fostering

collaboration and alignment, gaining timely access to accurate qualitative and quantitative data, obtaining organizational buy-in, and most importantly, working to ensure a better public understanding of how DHS works.

The GPRA-MA of 2010, as a typical government PMF, may satisfy the needs of public administrators responsible for implementing government programs through a rather mechanistic “operationalization” of performance management, but more innovative, less traditional approaches to strategic planning and implementation will need to be considered if a high-trust culture, necessary to achieve lasting results, is to be instilled.

Today, because the GPRA-MA framework primarily associates accountability with improved organizational outcomes, or performance results, the overarching cultural climate or conditions contributing to true public and organizational accountability still remain largely unaffected. In addition to the main accountability factor, other conditions are undermining strategic performance management as well, such as the particular challenges/difficulties encountered when attempting to resolve performance management/improvement issues, the administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control, undue political influence, and insufficient administrative and management governance and oversight.

We have, therefore, made several recommendations on how to leverage the legislation in a way that affects change in both attitude and behavior, alleviating not only the identified deficiencies in its major focus areas, but also mitigating the negative effects of the current environmental conditions that contribute to the lack of the creation and sustainment of a high-trust culture.

The crosswalk on the following page vertically displays where each of the twelve (12) recommendations would positively impact these five (5) focus areas and cultural conditions, horizontally demonstrating interdependencies between the various CVF categories and activities that can lead us from the current state to the desired end state.

GPRA-MA Focus Areas/ Cultural Conditions	CVF Quadrants											
	Collaborate			Compete			Create			Control		
	#1	#2	#3	#1	#2	#3	#1	#2	#3	#1	#2	#3
	SES Performance Plan Meta-Governance Factor	PIO/Congressional/Public Affairs Collaboration	State/Local/Tribal Crowd-Sourcing	PIO Selection Based on Trust Factor	Meta-Governance PIO Leadership Training	Public Communication of Government Performance	State/Local/Tribal Co-Creation	Innovative (Web-Enabled) Networked CoPs	Web 2.0 Technologies	Multiplicity of Program Theory Models	Performance Measurement Evaluation Methodologies	DHS Congressional Authoriz./Approp. Reform
GPRA-MA #1: Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement	X			X	X			X				
GPRA-MA #2: Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment		X	X				X	X		X		X
GPRA-MA #3: Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation							X	X		X	X	
GPRA-MA #4: Performance Reviews		X				X				X		
GPRA-MA #5: Transparency and Accountability	X		X			X	X	X	X		X	
Cultural Condition #1: Accountability/High-Trust	X		X			X	X	X	X		X	
Cultural Condition #2: Complexity of Performance Management Challenges			X				X	X	X	X		
Cultural Condition #3: Political Considerations		X					X	X	X			X
Cultural Condition #4: Administrative Tendency to Direct and Control			X		X		X	X				X
Cultural Condition #5: Insufficient Management Oversight					X					X		X

Table 10. CVF Cross-Walk with the Five (5) GPRA-MA Focus Areas and Cultural Conditions

B. FUTURE RESEARCH

In order to develop and implement a deployment roadmap to implement the recommendations contained within this thesis, change managers should first conduct a gap analysis based on an accurate baseline of capabilities, determining how successful each individual agency/component has been in implementing the GPRA-MA to date, what the limitations of their current practices might be; and which cultural conditions/trends existing within their own agencies need to be affected in order to instill a culture of public and organizational accountability.

Establishing such a capability baseline would assist individual agencies in better understanding deficiencies and/or gaps in their existing performance management frameworks and practices within the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, as well as the general cultural climate contributing to such deficiencies, and how the ensemble of these challenges are practically affecting their current performance management and improvement efforts.

The additional research methodology referenced Appendix C can be modified and applied to establish such a performance management/improvement capability baseline in view of determining which of the twelve (12) Recommendations might apply, and how they can best be tailored to assist agencies transition from current state to end state.

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APPENDIX A. EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Systematic measurement of performance has been evolving within the Federal Government since the early 1990s. Beginning with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, meant to improve overall financial and management processes, followed by the OMB Bulletin 91-15, Form and Content of Agency Financial Statements, each agency was required to produce an audited financial statement, including an overview of its mission linked with organizational measures displaying its most significant performance results.

The 1993 GPRA, in line with the underlying Reinventing Government (RIGO) philosophy of President Clinton and Vice-President Gore, emphasized the importance of clearly defining an end state to promote greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in federal spending, by requiring for the first time that agencies prepare strategic plans, annual performance plans and annual performance reports with measurable performance indicators to address the policy, budgeting and (managerial) oversight needs of both Congress and agency program managers.

Before the Act was updated in 2010, the Administration of President George W. Bush issued interim policy and guidance, which continued to associate strategy with results. Initiated in 2002 and articulated around the four broad themes of program purpose and design, strategic planning, program management and program results, the PART was a diagnostic tool with a standardized methodology to evaluate every federal program at least once every five years. President Bush built upon this analytical foundation in his Executive Order (EO) 13450, Improving Government Program Performance, dated November 13, 2007, requiring that each agency establish measurable goals for each program, identify individuals responsible for achieving these goals, and establish the means to measure progress against those goals. The EO also established the position of PIO supported by a PIC to oversee agency performance management activities.

In 1997, the GAO, assessing the effects of the GPRA, noted that “GPRA’s requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government,”²⁰⁹ with “significantly more federal managers [...] having performance measures for the programs they manage.”²¹⁰ However, even though federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA, there were not significant gains in the use of performance information for decision-making.

Hoping to close this gap, and falling in line with the Bush Administration’s focus on program effectiveness and public accountability, the Obama Administration outlined its own performance improvement philosophy; first in OMB Memorandum M-09-20, Planning for the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 Budget and Performance Plan, dated June 11, 2009, then in OMB Memorandum M-10-24, Performance Improvement Guidance: Management Responsibilities and Government Performance and Results Act Documents, dated June 25, 2010.

Transitioning from a planning and compliance reporting approach, focused primarily on the production of performance information, to one that would apply such information to assess overall results, the President’s performance improvement strategies placed a much greater emphasis on:

²⁰⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Results-Oriented Government GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results* (GAO 04–38), Washington, DC: GAO, March 2004.

²¹⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Lessons Learned for the Next Administration on Using Performance Information to Improve Results*.

- Using performance information to lead, learn and improve outcomes;²¹¹
- Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency;²¹² and
- Strengthening problem-solving networks, inside and outside the government, to improve outcomes and performance management practices.²¹³

Emphasizing quality rather than quantity in government performance data, the memoranda required that each department and agency identify a limited number of high-priority performance goals that were quantifiable and measurable. Progress toward these goals was to be monitored by senior agency leaders through constructive performance review processes.

²¹¹ In addition to pursuing High-Priority Goals (HPPGs) at the agency level, the Administration said it would ask agency leaders to carry out a similar goal-setting exercise at the bureau level in the coming year. Both agency leaders and OMB would put in place quarterly feedback and review sessions that are modeled after so-called “Stat” efforts in state and local governments. Office of Management and Budget, OMB, *Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2011*, 73–75.

²¹² Office of Management and Budget, OMB, *Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2011*. The Administration said it would “eliminate performance measurements and documents that are not useful” and convey information about agency-, cross-agency-, and program-level measures. In combined performance plans and reports, the Administration would explain, “why goals were chosen, the size and characteristics of problems Government is tackling, factors affecting outcomes that Government hopes to influence, lessons learned from experience, and future actions planned.” In an effort to make performance data useful to “all audiences—congressional, public, and agency leaders,” a new federal performance portal would provide “a clear, concise picture of Federal goals and measures by theme, by agency, by program, and by program type.” The portal also would link to “mission-support management dashboards.” The dashboards would include the IT Dashboard and “similar dashboards planned for other functions including procurement, improper payments, and hiring.” Information about all federal impact evaluations would be available through the portal as well.

²¹³ Office of Management and Budget, OMB, *Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2011*. The Administration planned to use “existing and new practitioner networks,” both inside and outside government. To address shared problems, the Administration would create cross-agency teams. The PIC, established by Executive Order 13450, would “function as the hub” of the overall network. OMB would work with the PIC to “advance a new set of federal performance management principles, refine a Government-wide performance management implementation plan, and identify and tackle specific problems as they arise.” The PIC, in turn, would establish communities of practice organized by program type, problem, and methods.

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APPENDIX B. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2010 SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW

#	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Focus Area	Strategic Planning	Performance Planning	Performance Reporting	Priority Goals	Progress Reviews	Performance Improvement	Transparency and Accountability	Leadership and Collaboration
GPRA-MA Section	306, Agency strategic plans	1115, Federal Government and agency performance plans Section 10, Format of performance plans and reports	1116, Agency performance reporting Section 10, Format of performance plans and reports	1120, Federal Government and agency priority goals	1121, Quarterly priority progress reviews and use of performance information	1116, Agency performance reporting 1121, Quarterly priority progress reviews and use of performance information	1122, Transparency of programs, priority goals, and results 1125, Elimination of unnecessary agency reporting Section 10, Format of performance plans and reports	1123, Chief Operating Officers 1124, Performance Improvement Officers and the Performance Improvement Council 12, Performance Management Skills and Competencies
Purpose/ Goal	Strategy is well-linked to mission, vision and values	There is full integration of organizational performance through to individual performance	Data is organized and formatted for decision-makers	Agencies have cultivated consumers of perf. information	Program offices and program managers understand and utilize performance management principles in their regular work	Understanding and routine communication of strategic Intent	Availability of Performance Information Contributing to Organization-Wide Learning	Establishment of clear roles and ownership Human capital strategy is linked to organizational goals
Federal (OMB) Requirement	<u>Government-wide Strategic Plan</u> See II and IV	<u>Federal Government Performance Plan (FGPP)</u> Sec. 1115(a) Level of performance to be achieved in current and Budget FY Includes FedGov Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(a) Includes cross-cutting outcome	<u>Performance Report</u> Results in most recent quarter Comparison to Plan Includes FedGov Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(a) Quarterly results posted online-Sec. 1122(c)(5)	<u>Federal Government Priority Goals (FGPGs)</u> Sec. 1120(a) Updated every 4 years Includes cross-cutting and mgmt.	<u>OMB Quarterly Priority Progress Reviews</u> Sec. 1121(a) Categorize by risk of not achieving targets For at risk goals, identify	<u>OMB Low Performing Goals Report</u> Sec. 1116(f) Each fiscal year To Agency, Congress, and GAO Includes all Agency low performing goals <u>OMB Recommendations to Congress</u> Sec. 1116(i)	<u>Performance.gov Website</u> Sec. 1122: FedGov Website <u>Sec. 10</u> No expenses for printing, except to Congress Searchable, machine-readable format Federal Government Performance Goals (FGPGs)	<u>Performance Mgmt. Skills and Competencies</u> Sec. 12 Performance Mgmt. Position Classifications Training

#	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Focus Area	Strategic Planning	Performance Planning	Performance Reporting	Priority Goals	Progress Reviews	Performance Improvement	Transparency and Accountability	Leadership and Collaboration
		goals and mgmt. improvements Posted online-Sec. 1122(c)		goals Limited in quantity Long-term Posted online-Sec. 1122(c)	improvement actions Includes FedGov Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(a) Posted online-Sec. 1122(c)(7-9)	To Congress Reauthorization proposals, statutory changes, planned Executive Actions, or identification for termination Low performing goals for 3 years		
Agency Requirement	<u>Agency Strategic Plan (ASP)</u> Sec. 306 Updated every 4 years Describe how goals or objectives contribute to FGPGs, incorporate congressional views and suggestions, and how performance goals in APP contribute to general goals and objectives Posted online	<u>Agency Performance Plan (APP)</u> Sec. 1115(b) 1 st Monday in Feb. Includes all Agency Goals-Sec. 1115(b) Includes Agency Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(b) Low priority programs identified-Sec. 1115b10 Describe how performance goals contribute to general goals and objectives (in ASP) and federal government performance goals (in FGPP) Posted online-Sec. 1115(b) & 1122(b)	<u>Performance Report</u> Sec. 1116 150 days after end of fiscal year; more frequent updates for some data Includes all Agency goals-Sec. 1115(b) Includes Agency Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(b) Quarterly results of Agency Priority Goals posted on Agency Website and OMB Website-Sec. 1122(b)(5)	<u>Agency Priority Goals (APGs)</u> Sec. 1120(b) Updated every 2 years Identified from among the agency perf. goals Total # set by OMB Informed by FedGov goals Posted online-Sec. 1122(b)	<u>Agency Quarterly Priority Progress Reviews</u> Sec. 1121(b) Head of agency and COO, with support of PIO Review most recent quarter's progress with goal leader Coordinate with personnel within and outside agency who contributes to goal Categorize by risk of not achieving targets For those at risk, identify performance improvement actions Includes	<u>Performance Improvement Plan</u> Sec. 1116(g) To OMB Measurable milestones Designation of senior official Includes low performance goals for 1 year <u>Performance Improvement Actions Report</u> Sec. 1116(h) To Congress Proposed actions, including statutory changes Funding changes, including reprogramming requests Includes low performance goals for 2 years	<u>Agency Programs</u> Agency Strategic Plans Agency Performance Plans Agency Performance Updates List of Agency Programs-Sec. 1122(a)	<u>Other Executive Branch Requirements</u> Sec. 1123: Designation of COOs Sec. 1124: Establishment of (a) PIOs and (b) PIC Sec. 1125: Reducing duplicative and outdated agency reporting

#	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Focus Area	Strategic Planning	Performance Planning	Performance Reporting	Priority Goals	Progress Reviews	Performance Improvement	Transparency and Accountability	Leadership and Collaboration
					Agency Priority Goals-Sec. 1120(b) Posted online-Sec. 1122(b)(7-9)			
OMB Performance Management Improvement Strategies	Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency (OMB M-10-24) Open and transparent government that engages the public (OMB M-11-31)	Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency (OMB M-10-24) Open and transparent government that engages the public (OMB M-11-31)	Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency (OMB M-10-24) Open and transparent government that engages the public (OMB M-11-31)	Effective, efficient, productive government (OMB M-11-31) Open and transparent government that engages the public (OMB M-11-31)	Using performance information to lead, learn and improve outcomes (OMB M-10-24) Effective, efficient, productive government (OMB M-11-31) Strengthening problem-solving networks (M-10-24)	Using performance information to lead, learn and improve outcomes (OMB M-10-24) Effective, efficient, productive government (OMB M-11-31)	Communicating performance coherently and concisely for better results and transparency (OMB M-10-24) Open and transparent government that engages the public (OMB M-11-31)	Using performance information to lead, learn and improve outcomes (OMB M-10-24) Fair, equitable and honest government (OMB M-11-31)

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APPENDIX C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

A. RESEARCH METHOD

The following suggested research method to establish a performance management baseline capability within individual DHS organizations and to assist in developing a tailored action plan to implement the twelve (12) recommendations contained in this thesis, follows the *hypothesis-driven multiple, collective case study* approach. It consists of face-to-face interviews with federal government leaders and subject matter experts who have examined accountability issues in the context of strategic performance management. The interview process, articulated around the GPRA-MA framework, involves various types²¹⁴ of qualitative research methodologies²¹⁵.

B. SAMPLE PARTICIPANTS/SELECTION

1. Sample Participants

The researcher can begin by interviewing DHS high-level officials (i.e., GS-14, GS-15 and/or SES), subject matter experts in performance management/improvement, associated with and/or members of the OMB and/or DHS performance community (i.e., OMB/DHS Performance Improvement Council), tasked with implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within and across the federal government, particularly the Department of Homeland Security, in order to gain a representative sampling of DHS performance relative to the GPRA-MA of 2010.

2. Sample Selection

The above non-random sampling procedure is based on purposive or judgment sampling.²¹⁶ This type of non-probability sampling serves as the basis for selecting

²¹⁴ Types of Research: exploratory, descriptive (i.e., inspectional, syntopical), analytical, explanatory, and predictive (i.e., basic, both deductive and inductive).

²¹⁵ Research methodologies: multiple, collective case studies, semi-structured interview, judgment sampling.

²¹⁶ Judgment sampling is a non-probability data collection technique in which the interviewees are selected based on their knowledge or experience. It is used to ensure researchers interview interviewees with the specific expertise or experience that is under study.

interviewees, due to the limited number of people that have expertise in the area being researched, and the need to acquire meaningful interview data. The following three (3) selection criteria can be used:

- Initial interviewees can be selected from among the DHS performance community (see section 5 below). Because this community is comprised of the performance measurement experts representing the components and headquarters offices in DHS tasked with the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010, it represents the best forum currently available within DHS to elicit diverse perspectives on performance management principles, best practices, policy, guidance, and initiatives.
- The researcher may also seek to interview additional subject matter experts within individual DHS agencies and/or other organizations, either known to have contributed to the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010 or who routinely develop, use, and rely on performance information to increase public and organizational accountability, trust, greater awareness, participation, cooperation and collaboration both inter- and intra-agency and vis-à-vis the general public; and
- The researcher should attempt to select experts representing a wide range of responsibilities and organizational levels (i.e., staff professionals, first-line supervisors, office directors, and agency senior management) including:
 - Parent organization (i.e., cabinet level departments): Deputy Secretary, Office of the Chief of Staff, Offices of Policy, Strategic Planning and Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and the Office of the Performance Improvement Officer;
 - Sub-Parent organization (i.e., bureaus, offices, components, sub-agencies): Offices of Policy, Strategic Planning, Program Development, and Analysis and Evaluation, Chief of Operational Divisions, Office of the Performance Improvement Officer, and Director of National Programs;
 - Programmatic Level: Officials responsible for implementing programs, programmatic and policy experts, and budget and performance analysts.

C. DATA SOURCES/DATA COLLECTION/PROCEDURES

1. Data Sources

Interviews of these federal officials, or government subject matter experts, will consist of:

- **Completion of A Survey Questionnaire:** Participants are asked to complete a two-part survey questionnaire, articulated around various Causes and/or Evidence (CE) (i.e., practices/factors/elements) contributing to SPM challenges within the DHS, and five (5) overarching conditions (C) also believed to impact GPRA-MA implementation. Duration of Task: Approximately 15–30 minutes.
- **Follow-Up Interview:** The follow up face-to-face interview would ask respondents to clarify and/or elaborate on the responses given in the survey questionnaire. The purpose of the interview is two-fold: (a) determine the outcome or how successful the interviewees have been in implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) focus areas of the legislation, and (b) calculate the corresponding accountability variable or how efforts are affecting or being affected by (the lack of) public and organizational accountability. Duration of Task: Not to exceed 60 minutes.

2. Data Collection

The subjects can opt to complete the survey questionnaire either by e-mail or face-to-face. If the subject opts to complete the survey face-to-face, both task one (1) and two (2) can be completed at the same time within the one-hour time frame allotted for the interview.

3. Procedures

Both the two-part survey questionnaire and subsequent semi-structured interview are meant to generate insightful information, by delving into the challenges and successes of the department's strategic performance management practices, impacting the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010.

The suggested interview questions, found below in section 6, have been articulated around the Act's five (5) focus areas and conditions affecting implementation, and crafted based on an inspectional review of official government policy directly relating to the GPRA-MA of 2010, and a syntopical research of external strategic performance management best practices. The questions have been grouped into 6 broad categories: Category I: Questions Relating to GPRA-MA focus area #1: leadership engagement, collaboration, learning; Category II: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #2: strategic planning, strategic clarity, organizational alignment; Category III: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #3: program evaluation, performance

measurement; Category IV: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #4: performance reviews, improvement; Category V: Questions relating to GPRA-MA focus area #5: transparency, decision making, accountability; and Category VI: Questions relating to overall conditions impacting GPRA-MA implementation.

The survey questionnaire, also found below in section 7, asks the following two (2) questions meant to validate and/or refute this thesis' original propositions/hypotheses:

- *Causes and/or Evidence of GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency:* How do the following variables in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA Focus Areas impede implementation of the Act within your organization?
- *Conditions Contributing to and/or Impacting SPM/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/ Inefficiency:* How do each of the five Conditions impede successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your organization?

The ultimate goal of the survey questionnaire and follow-up interview is to better understand the DHS performance management culture, how successful DHS has been in its implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010, and how its success and/or failure is affecting or being affected by the overall climate of accountability. By culling information pertaining to the various GPRA-MA themes and sub-themes (i.e., causes and/or evidence and conditions), and drawing valid conclusions from these findings, the researcher would be in a better position to begin to determine whether the lack of true public and organizational accountability has rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective at improving and communicating performance and results and what the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can do to remedy this situation. In other words, the researcher would be able to answer the overarching, fundamental research question from the perspective of his/her own DHS organization, unit or sub-unit; namely, how can the GPRA-MA of 2010 best be leveraged to instill a culture of accountability within the department and vis-à-vis the American public by adopting and/or tailoring the twelve (12) recommendations listed in Chapter VII.

D. TYPE AND MODE OF DATA ANALYSIS

1. Type and Mode of Analysis

Closing the gap between the two worlds of federal government SPM/GPRA-MA and organizational and public trust within individual organizations, will involve conducting in-depth research into the problem and/or issue, and making recommendations based on findings.

- Inventorying current performance management and improvement practices within the DHS, highlighting some of the department's more successful strategies and solutions to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010;
- Further assessing these approaches against the underlying principles of the GPRA-MA of 2010 and relevant best practices contained in this thesis; and
- Selecting/tailoring the specific improvement recommendations, contained in Chapter VII, based on actual performance management and/or cultural climate deficiencies, in order to best leverage the Act to increase accountability and improve public and organizational trust.

To accomplish this, the researcher can adopt the process of a *hypothesis-driven multiple, collective case study*.

a. Step 1: Identify the Number of Cases

The researcher can inventory some of the current (more successful) DHS strategies and solutions to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010, including a review of existing practices at the headquarters level and/or within its seven (7) major components (i.e., CBP, CIS, USCG, FEMA, ICE, TSA, USSS), organizations, units, sub-units, etc..

b. Step 2: Discuss the Relevance and/or Importance of these Cases

Each performance practitioner or subject matter expert interviewed can be asked to describe and assess their current efforts to implement the GPRA-MA of 2010 in the context of public and organizational accountability. In addition, they can be asked to qualitatively evaluate their approaches, strategies and solutions against the underlying principles of the GPRA-MA of 2010 and/or relevant best practices.

c. Step 3: Conduct Analysis

The Researcher can then adopt *thematic qualitative analysis* to analyze the results of these face-to-face interviews, summarizing findings according to themes, patterns, variables, causes, and correlative factors. Particular emphasis should be placed on determining both (a) the *outcome* or how successful the interviewees have been in implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) focus areas of the legislation, and (b) the corresponding *accountability variable* or how these efforts are affecting or being affected by (the lack of) public and organizational accountability.

Open-ended, focused questions can be asked in order to glean information from subject matter experts based on their experience, perceptions, opinions, feelings, and knowledge of strategic performance management in the context of the GPRA-MA of 2010 and public/organizational accountability. These data can then be recorded, transcribed into single-spaced pages, and then coded/interpreted according to initial themes and sub-themes based on the following criteria:

- Five (5) GPRA-MA focus area(s);
- Overarching research questions (i.e., condition, cost, consequence, application) specifically relating to public and organizational accountability;
- Additional ad-hoc themes contained in the literature review; and
- Five (5) conditions contributing to strategic performance management and/or GPRA-MA ineffectiveness/inefficiency.

In coding/interpreting the interview results, the researcher can adopt the *constant comparison method*, a reiterative process of category refinement, consisting of breaking down the data into color-coded data bits, identifying preliminary category names and rules of inclusion, creating a tentative list of all categories and sub-categories, adding to, subtracting from and/or revising the original themes and sub-themes, in order to “group answers according to [the] common questions [and themes], analyz[ing] different perspectives on central issues,”²¹⁷ draw conclusions and recommend ways to

²¹⁷ Jane F. Dye, Irene M. Schatz, Brian A. Rosenberg, and Susanne T. Coleman, “Constant Comparison Method: A Kaleidoscope of Data,” *The Qualitative Report* 4, nos. 1/2 (January 2000), <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR4-1/dye.html>.

improve. In understanding the research results relative to both the GPRA-MA implementation and the conditions impacting its success, various processes such as categorization, comparison, inductive analysis, and refinement of data bits and categories can be utilized (see Step 4 below).

The goal is to (1) cull information from the interviews based on the various themes and sub-themes, looking for internal homogeneity—coherence within a theme and external heterogeneity—distinct themes that represent the data set with clear relationships and a connection to any of the above-mentioned themes and sub-themes, (2) draw valid conclusions from these findings (see Step 4 below), and finally (3) make recommendations for improvement based on the developing trends, desirable system characteristics and successful case studies identified (see Step 5 below).

Discussion of the results of the analysis from each of these individual case studies can be comprised of the following four (4) components, present in most research designs:

- A rationale for studying each case;
- A detailed description of the facts related to the specific individual(s), program(s), or event(s) studied;
- A description of the data collected:
 - Responses as they relate to *outcome* (i.e., success or failure) in implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 within all five (5) focus areas of the legislation;
 - Responses as they relate to (i.e., support or refute) the study's propositions/hypotheses (i.e., conditions);
- A discussion of the major themes and patterns indicating similarities and/or differences, articulated around the following criteria:
 - Responses as they relate to the study's problem statement and interview questions (i.e., two-part survey questionnaire);
 - Responses as they relate to the *accountability variable* (i.e., the cause and/or consequence of the outcome) or how their efforts are affecting or being affected by public and organizational accountability or the lack thereof.

d. Step 4: Interpret Research Results

The interpretation of the results of the research conducted using the interview questions and survey questionnaire should be two-fold:

- **Research Results/Findings (Current State):**²¹⁸ Exploratory and descriptive (qualitative) data discussing current DHS strategic performance management programs and processes using the multiple, collective case study approach, in answer to the question: *What is DHS already doing?:* (a) DHS Headquarters; (b) CBP; (c) CIS; (d) FEMA; (e) ICE; (f) TSA; (g) USCG; (h) USSS or other DHS organization, unit, sub-unit, etc.
- **Research Results/Interpretation (Gap Analysis):**²¹⁹ Analytical and explanatory convergence (i.e., triangulation) of the (qualitative) data, summarizing findings according to themes, patterns, variables, causes, and correlative factors. Current DHS strategic performance management programs and processes can be connected to the larger theme of public and organizational accountability, weighing current DHS practices against best practices in order to determine any gaps, in answer to the question: *What is DHS not doing?*

In addition to the above analysis and commentary focusing on individual organizations, there should be a summary discussion of responses as they relate to the *Accountability variable* (i.e., the cause and/or consequence of the outcome) or how DHS efforts are affecting or being affected by (the lack of) public and organizational accountability, in answer to the thesis' problem statement and research questions:

2. Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s)

How has the lack of true public and organizational accountability rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective at improving and communicating performance and results and what can the DHS do to remedy this situation?

- **Condition (Pure Research):** The lack of accountability has rendered the GPRA-MA of 2010 ineffective, which in turn impedes organizational trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration, both intra- and inter-agency, and vis-à-vis the public at large, perpetuating a vicious circle. Why? How?
- **Cost (Pure Research):** This situation prevents the improvement and communication of performance and results. How?

²¹⁸ See Step 3.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

- **Consequence (Pure Research):** How are these inadequate performance management practices negatively impacting DHS mission effectiveness and efficiency?
- **Application (Practical Research):** How can DHS leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) within the Department, and vis-à-vis the general public?

Finally, the Blue Ocean Strategy's Four Actions Framework can be used to articulate discussion of the results of the findings/interpretation from each of these individual case studies in answer to the questions, "What is [DHS] already doing?" (Current State), "What is [DHS] not doing?" (Gap Analysis) and "What should [DHS] be doing?" (End State).

E. THE BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY[©]

The researcher can adopt the Blue Ocean Strategy[©] approach innovated by authors W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne to better organize and interpret the current state and gap analysis findings, relative to both the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010 and the various climatic conditions and deficiencies (i.e., causes and/or evidence) impacting its success.

Diverging from most traditional strategic planning methodologies, Blue Ocean Strategy[©] seeks to create true value by providing decision-makers with various frameworks and analytical tools that allow them to break free from existing environmental constraints, both internal and external. *Value Innovation*, the cornerstone to Kim and Mauborgne's philosophy, is created when strategy favorably affects both effectiveness (i.e., value) and efficiency (i.e., cost). Cost savings are made by *eliminating* and *reducing* the factors that cause competition. Value is attained by *raising* and *creating* elements that are new and/or unique, setting organizations apart in uncontested market space.²²⁰

Articulated around six (6) principles necessary to ensure such value innovation, such as reconstructing market boundaries, focusing on the big picture, reaching beyond

²²⁰ W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, *The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2005), 16.

existing demand, getting the strategic sequence right, overcoming key organizational hurdles, and building execution into strategy, Blue Ocean Strategy[©] ensures differentiation from standard operating procedure and common results.

This researcher has already applied the Blue Ocean Strategy's Four Actions Framework²²¹ to identify ways to *eliminate* and/or *reduce* causes of SPM/GPRA-MA ineffectiveness and inefficiency, while highlighting actions that would either *raise/increase* and/or *create* conditions conducive to improving public and organizational accountability. Using this analytical tool, the researcher asked four key questions to challenge the various DHS organizations' strategic logic and performance-related business models:

- Which practices within the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas, taken for granted, should be *eliminated* in order to increase public trust and organizational accountability?
- Which factors should be *reduced* well below standard expectations?
- Which elements should be *raised* well above standard practices?
- Which practices should be *created* to revolutionize the way current DHS leaders and performance management and improvement practitioners, partners and stakeholders consider and apply strategic performance management?

Impacting the causes of ineffectiveness and/or inefficiency in GPRA-MA focus areas 1, 4 and 5, or leadership engagement/collaboration/learning/improvement (1), performance reviews (4), and transparency/accountability (5) respectively, were identified as being crucial to impacting culture, and therefore deficiencies within these areas were slated to be completely eliminated, and replaced with the creation of new dynamics. Regarding focus areas 2 and 3, or performance measurement and program evaluation (2) and strategic clarity and organizational alignment (3), considered less important to cultural change, efforts would focus on reducing the causes contributing to the lack of current success, while raising standards that would lead to greater effectiveness.

²²¹ Kim and Mauborgne, *The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*, 29.

The following scale of 1 to 5 was used to establish a *best practices baseline*, relating to GPRA-MA ineffectiveness/inefficiency, in answer to the question, “How do deficiencies in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas impede implementation of the Act within your organization?”

- 1 – Does not Impact Success
- 2 – Slightly Hinders Success
- 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success
- 4 – Hinders Success
- 5 – Greatly Hinders Success

Through our initial analysis, detailed in Chapter V, section 2 (i.e., GPRA-MA deficiencies and strategic performance management culture within the DHS), we have already demonstrated that improving performance within the Department will “counter-intuitively” require paying particular attention to certain GPRA-MA focus areas and conditions that have been minimized and/or neglected to date. That means identifying GPRA-MA focus areas 1, 4 and 5, and conditions 1, 2 and 4 as leverage points, which is contrary to and contradicts the legislation’s primary emphasis on performance measurement in support of strategic clarity and organizational alignment, and political/administrative governance and oversight, as being the key factors affecting change.

Because our best practices baseline is counterintuitive, it has not been tried or proven yet. “Counterintuitive” is often the most appropriate word to use when describing complex systems, however, because as systems become complex, their behavior can become surprising, having leverage points that are frequently not intuitive, and when they are, often used “backward” to maintain status quo, as opposed to improving or innovating, systematically worsening whatever problems one is attempting to solve.²²²

We have chosen to push through such knee-jerk resistance, by applying the four actions framework, which causes us to think more broadly about systems change, making every effort to mitigate deficiencies in focus areas 1, 4 and 5, to the point that they are no longer impacting success. Implementing best practices in these areas means achieving

²²² Meadows, *Thinking in Systems: A Primer*, 2734–2736.

number one (1) on the scale. For focus areas 2 and 3, success is expressed in terms of ensuring that any ineffectiveness and inefficiency is only slightly hindering success, or achieving number two (2) on the scale.

So, even though we are stuck with working within the strict parameters of the Act to affect federal government performance, we can at least attempt to move its “levers” in a more radical fashion than has been attempted before.

It is not that parameters are not important— they can be, especially in the short term and to the individual who’s standing directly in the flow. People care deeply about [...] variables [...]. But changing these variables rarely changes the behavior of [...] system[s]. If the system is chronically stagnant, parameter changes rarely kick-start it. If it is wildly variable, they usually do not stabilize it. If it is growing out of control, they do not slow it down.²²³

See Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #1, depicting these elements within the five (5) focus areas that would either need to be created/raised or eliminated/reduced to instill a culture of accountability.

²²³ Meadows, *Thinking in Systems: A Primer*, 2774–2778.

Blue Ocean Strategy: Four (4) Actions Framework	
ELIMINATE	RAISE
5 – Lack of Transparency and Accountability <i>5a – Eliminate Lack of Transparency in Communicating/Reporting Results</i> <i>5b – Eliminate Stove-Piped Strategic Performance Planning and Reporting</i> <i>5c – Eliminate Political Hubris</i> <i>5d – Eliminate Lack of Public Understanding of Government Operations</i> <i>5e – Eliminate Compliance-Only Reporting</i> <i>5f – Eliminate Ad-Hoc Congressional Engagement</i> <i>5g – Eliminate Unnecessary, Outdated, Duplicative Strategic Plans/Reports</i> <i>5h – Eliminate Multiplicity of Congressional Committees</i> <i>5i – Eliminate Inadequate Performance Monitoring and Reporting Systems (i.e., COPS)</i>	3- Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation <i>3a – Raise Performance Management and Measurement Analytics</i> <i>3b – Raise Objectivity</i> <i>3c – Raise Data Quality, Accuracy and Timeliness</i> <i>3d – Raise Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures</i> <i>3e – Raise Stretch Targets</i>
REDUCE	CREATE
2 – Lack of Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment <i>2a – Reduce Non-Connectivity Among Plans, Programs, Results</i> <i>2b – Reduce Competing and Contradictory Priorities</i> <i>2c – Reduce Unintentional Gaps and Duplicative/Redundant Efforts</i> <i>2d – Reduce Top-Down Goal Setting</i> <i>2e – Reduce Prescriptive, Centralized, Stove-Piped SPM</i> <i>2f – Reduce Politics and/or Negotiated Compromise</i> <i>2g – Reduce Inconsistent and Non-Integrated SPM Systems and Tools</i> <i>2h – Reduce Stove-Piped Organizational and Strategic Planning</i>	1 - Leadership Engagement/Collaboration/Learning/Improvement <i>1a – Create Leadership Engagement/Commitment</i> <i>1b – Create Cross-Organizational Collaboration</i> <i>1c – Create Independent Thought</i> <i>1d – Create Best Practices</i> <i>1e – Create Flexibility, Creativity, Innovation</i> 4 – Performance Reviews <i>4a – Create Periodic Progress Reviews</i> <i>4b – Create Inquisitive Performance Reviews</i> <i>4c – Create Data-Informed Decision-Making</i> <i>4d – Create Feedback and/or Follow Through (i.e., Improvement Plans)</i> <i>4e – Create Streamlined Reviews</i>

Table 11. Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #1: Instilling a Culture of Accountability through Successful GPRA-MA Implementation—Five (5) Focus Areas

A similar process was applied to establish a best practices baseline for the Conditions as well, in answer to the question, ““How are each of the five Conditions impeding successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your organization?””

Conditions 1 and 4 were to be completely eliminated, with best practices topping out at number one (1) on the scale. Efforts should be made to ensure that the second condition was only slightly hindering success, or number two (2) on the scale, while conditions 3 and 5 would be allowed to “somewhat hinder success” (i.e., number three), without having any great impact on public and organizational trust.

See Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #2, depicting which of these cultural conditions would either need to be created/raised or eliminated/reduced to instill a culture of accountability.

Blue Ocean Strategy: Four (4) Action Framework	
ELIMINATE	RAISE
(C4) Administrative Top-Down Command-and-Control	(C2) Best Practices and/or Non-Traditional Performance Management Solutions
REDUCE	CREATE
(C3) Influence of Politics (C5) Bureaucratic Governance/Oversight	(C1) Public and Organizational Accountability/High-Trust Culture

Table 12. Blue Ocean Strategy Four Actions Framework #2: Instilling a Culture of Accountability by Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to Strategic Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency

1. The Blue Ocean Strategy Canvasses

Strategy canvasses are both diagnostic and action tools, demonstrating an organization’s current constrained performance, based on various factors or criteria along the horizontal axes, when compared with unconstrained desired end state, or best practices benchmarking.

The basic principle is that true change can only be accomplished through dramatic transformation that sets organizations apart from standards, by placing them in

uncontested “market space”, as opposed to simply through incremental progress, which leaves these same organizations stuck in the morass of competitive mediocrity.²²⁴

The initial result findings using the above-mentioned research methodology can be presented using Blue Ocean Strategy Canvasses, visually/graphically depicting the current state of SPM/GPRA-MA within the major DHS components, organizations, units, sub-units, etc. in answer to the question: *What is DHS already doing?*


As indicated, the four actions framework was used to establish best practices baselines.

Weighing current DHS strategic performance management practices, programs and processes, against these best practices, expressed in terms of the current state of DHS GPRA-MA implementation and the conditions affecting its implementation, will allow the researcher to conduct a gap analysis in answer to the question: *What is DHS not doing (but should be doing)?*

Strategy Canvass #1 can be used to depict DHS progress in implementing the GPRA-MA of 2010 across its five (5) focus areas, as well as its current status with regards to the five (5) cultural conditions contributing to successful strategic performance management and, ultimately, accountability (i.e., Strategy Canvass #2).

Following these initial result findings and identification of any gaps, specific tailored actions to achieve any of the thesis’ recommendations, deemed relevant to one’s organization, can then be considered to *raise* and/or *create* conditions more conducive to improving public and organizational accountability, *eliminating* and/or *reducing* the causes of GPRA-MA ineffectiveness and inefficiency.

²²⁴ Kim and Mauborgne. *The Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant*, 25–28.




Key

How do deficiencies in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas impede implementation of the Act within your organization?:

- 0 – Not Applicable (i.e., Cause and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency Non-Existent)
- 1 – Doesn't Impact Success
- 2 – Slightly Hinders Success
- 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success
- 4 – Hinders Success
- 5 – Greatly Hinders Success

Figure 8. Blue Ocean Strategy Canvass #1: Instilling a Culture of Accountability through Successful GPRA-MA Implementation —Five (5) Focus Areas



Key

How do each of the five conditions impede successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your organization?:

- 0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Condition Non-Existent and/or Not Necessary)
- 1 – Doesn't Impact Success
- 2 – Slightly Hinders Success
- 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success
- 4 – Hinders Success
- 5 – Greatly Hinders Success

Figure 9. Blue Ocean Strategy Canvass #2: Instilling a Culture of Accountability by Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to Strategic Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency

a. Step 5: Outcome/Recommendations (End State)

The major outcome of the supplementary research is to make specific improvement recommendations to increase accountability by improving performance management strategies and solutions within the context of the GPRA-MA framework.

Providing these end state outcome recommendations will require predictive (qualitative) research and problem statement *resolution*, in answer to the question: *What should DHS be doing (differently) to improve its performance management strategies and solutions with the intent of increasing accountability within*

and across the Department and vis-à-vis the American public? This will first entail summarizing and interpreting the findings, then making recommendations on what DHS should be doing and how it should be doing it to close any identified gaps in performance.

The recommendations contained in Chapter VII of this thesis, can then be selected and tailored, based on an actual capability baseline, in light of the results of the survey questionnaire and subsequent interviews, focusing on both the philosophical/theoretical as well as the practical applications of strategic performance management within the five (5) major focus areas of the GPRA-MA, and the five (5) conditions impacting the legislation's effectiveness.

In order to move beyond the status quo, and ensure that the Act is improving performance results within the DHS, focus has been placed on actions that create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e. high-trust). This involves improving the noted deficiencies in the five (5) pillars of the GPRA-MA, by impacting conditions contributing to those inefficiencies, and selecting more flexible, creative and innovative solutions to increase public engagement, collaboration, and cooperation within the discipline of strategic performance management.

It means focusing on how the DHS can better leverage the GPRA-MA, as well as public and private best practices, to bridge the gap between traditional definitions of public accountability (i.e., government effectiveness and efficiency) and its more non-traditional interpretations of improved organizational and public trust.

2. DHS Performance Community

The DHS Performance Community, led by the COO and the PIO, is operationally supported by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) located under the CFO within the DHS Under-Secretary for Management (US/M). The DHS performance community, also known as the DHS performance team, has been an enduring structure since DHS was formed and is comprised of the performance measurement experts representing the components and headquarters offices in DHS. The performance team meets monthly, and serves as a forum to share best practices, review policy, guidance,

timelines, and discuss initiatives related to performance management. This community's structure may vary depending on leadership direction. See the following figure for a diagram of this structure.




Figure 10. DHS Performance Community²²⁵

3. Interview Questions

a. Background Questions

- What type of work do you do? Who do you work with? How would you characterize your level within your organization (i.e., front-line manager, SES and/or top-level officials (COO, PIO, political appointee, etc.)?)
- Are you directly/indirectly involved in the implementation of the GPRA-MA of 2010 within your organization?

²²⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *CFO Policy Manual: Chapter 5.0 "DHS Performance Guidance"* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, October 2012).

b. *Overarching/Fundamental Research Question(s)*

- What is the prevailing attitude within your organization (among leadership, management and the performance community) toward the GPRA-MA of 2010?
- How have you been implementing its requirements within all five (5) focus areas? In which areas have you excelled (i.e., been pioneers), made some progress (i.e., been migratory), and/or stagnated (i.e., settled)? Would you be willing to share a brief explanation about those programs and/or processes where you have been successful?
- Of the five (5) conditions (i.e., (C1) public and organizational accountability/high-trust culture; (C2) best practices and/or non-traditional performance management solutions; (C3) influence of politics; (C4) administrative top-down command-and-control; (C5) bureaucratic governance/ oversight) identified as potentially impacting GPRA-MA implementation, which one(s) have impeded success in your organization the most? Why?
- How would you describe a low-trust organization? How would you describe a high-trust organization?
- Do you believe that your organization has a culture of public and organizational accountability (i.e., high-trust culture, participation, cooperation and collaboration) both internally within your organization and DHS, and externally within OMB/GAO and the general public? Why? Why not?
- Do you feel that the GPRA-MA implementation has been hindered by this lack of accountability? If so, in what ways? In terms of performance management? Mission effectiveness/efficiency?
- Have your current performance management approaches, strategies, solutions improved outcomes and/or increased accountability? If not, what can your organization do to alleviate/remedy this situation?
- How can DHS better leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to create, then cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) within your organization, DHS, and vis-à-vis the general public?

(1) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #1:

Leadership Engagement, Collaboration, Learning.

- What do you believe are the greatest contributors to leadership's commitment to creating a positive learning and performance improvement culture? What are the greatest challenges?

- Do you believe that there has been a lack of agency leadership commitment and engagement to elevate the importance of the performance management and improvement discipline and create a performance culture inspiring continual learning and improvement within your organization? Why? Why not?
- Has this lack of leadership commitment and engagement adversely affected organizational trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration both intra- and inter-agency, and vis-à-vis the public at large. In what ways?
- Does your organization prefer top-down command-and-control hierarchies versus collaborative networks and interpersonal relationships to manage transformation and affect lasting cultural change? More specifically, does your organization tend to focus on short-term, stove-piped, day-to-day obligations and operational expediencies, rather than long-term, system-wide, vision and desired end-state decision-making? If so, what have been the costs of this preference? What are we missing out on, in terms of mission efficiency and effectiveness?
- How can leadership, collaborative networks/partnerships/organizational learning, that involves all stakeholders and emphasizes innovation, adaptability and the utilization of new (i.e., innovative) knowledge, be leveraged to create and cultivate a culture of accountability (i.e., a high-trust culture) within your organization, the Department of Homeland Security, and vis-à-vis the general public?

(2) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #2: Strategic Planning, Strategic Clarity, Organizational Alignment.

- What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to ensuring organizational alignment and strategic clarity within your agency?
- Have your strategic performance management frameworks struggled with creating a clear line of sight between high-level strategic goals and individual program and personnel contributions and associated outcome measures. If so, why?
- Has this lack of strategic alignment adversely affected your mission efficiency and effectiveness? If so, how?
- Have your strategic performance management frameworks preferred the rational or prescriptive versus descriptive side of strategy, development, implementation and assessment? How successful have your approaches to strategic planning, tactical planning, financial planning, management reporting, and human

resource allocation been in increasing public accountability and/or organizational trust?

- How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to develop strategy, translate it into operational actions, and monitor and improve the effectiveness of both?

(3) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #3: Program

Evaluation, Performance Measurement.

- What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to improving the quality of your organization's performance measures and building analytic capacity to produce and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision-making?
- Have your strategic performance management frameworks integrated program analysis and evaluation, and/or business process transformation processes into its efforts to understand and improve results? If so, how effective have these processes been?
- Has this lack of robust analytics adversely affected mission efficiency and effectiveness? If so, in what ways?
- Have your strategic performance management frameworks preferred to relegate analysis and evaluation to the programmatic level versus the cross-cutting strategic level. What have been the costs of this preference? What are we missing out on, in terms of mission efficiency and effectiveness? How have such stove-piped approaches affected public accountability and/or organizational trust?
- How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to improve its program auditing, program evaluation and data analytics, performance measurements, and business process transformation policies, practices and processes in a way that enhances both public and organizational accountability?

(4) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #4:

Performance Reviews, Improvement.

- What have been the greatest contributors and hindrances to conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to improve performance results (i.e., effectiveness and efficiency)?
- Do your strategic performance management frameworks utilize public and/or internal scorecards/dashboards (i.e., web-enabled performance monitoring and evaluation (M&A) or reporting systems or databases) to monitor and report on results? If so, how effective have these systems been?

- Has a lack of transparency adversely affected mission efficiency and effectiveness within your organization? How?
- Have your government strategic performance management frameworks preferred top-down command-and-control compliance reporting to prove success rather than regularly scheduled (i.e., routine) performance reviews to improve performance? If so, what have been the costs of this preference? What are we missing out on, in terms of mission efficiency and effectiveness? How have such traditional, reductionist, Newtonian approaches affected public accountability and/or organizational trust?
- How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to enhance its internal and external performance monitoring, reporting and review systems and processes in a way that enhances both public and organizational accountability?

(5) Questions Relating to GPRA-MA Focus Area #5:

Transparency, Decision-Making, Accountability.

- Have your strategic performance management frameworks and governance structures increased the transparency and improved the decision-making of your operations both internally with leadership, DHS, and/or management and oversight bodies and externally with the general public. If so, how? If not, why not?
- Has this increased transparency and improved decision-making resulted in accountability? If so, how? If not, why not?
- Has placing the emphasis on public organizational performance, through improved transparency and decision-making, for example, hindered your organization's ability to achieve greater public and/or organizational accountability (i.e., trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration)? If so, how? What have been the consequences?
- How can your organization leverage the GPRA-MA of 2010 to bridge the gap between public organizational performance and public accountability, to translate improved government effectiveness and efficiency into improved public trust, participation, cooperation and collaboration?

(6) Summary Question.

- Is there anything else you think is important for the researcher to know? Do you have any additional comments/ideas for what works (i.e., what you have been using) or suggestions for what could work better in the arena of strategic performance management, the GPRA-MA, and public and organizational accountability?

4. Two-Part Survey Questionnaire

**Survey Questionnaire #1:
Instilling a Culture of Accountability through Successful GPRA-MA
Implementation
Five (5) Focus Areas²²⁶**

Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire in answer to the question “How do the following variables in each of the five (5) GPRA-MA focus areas impede implementation of the Act within your organization?”

²²⁶ GPRA-MA focus areas: (1) *Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement*: demonstrating leadership commitment to creating a positive learning and performance improvement culture; (2) *Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment*: aligning individual, program, and agency priorities through annual planning and goal-setting; (3) *Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation*: improving the quality of performance measures, by building analytic capacity to produce and analyze timely, actionable performance information for decision-making; (4) *Performance Reviews*: conducting frequent, data-driven reviews to improve performance outcomes and reduce costs; and (5) *Transparency and Accountability*: communicating and reporting transparent performance information frequently and effectively to increase accountability and results.

Causes and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency	Scale 1–5 ²²⁷					
GPRA-MA Focus Areas	5-Greatly hinders success	4-Hinders success	3-Somewhat hinders success	2-Slightly hinders success	1-Doesn't impact success	0 – Not Applicable (Cause and/or Evidence Non-Existent)
#1 - <i>Leadership Engagement and Collaboration and Learning and Improvement</i>	5	4	3	2	1	0
(1a) Insufficient leadership engagement/commitment to drive performance improvement (i.e., limited, minimally compliant leadership engagement)						
(1b) Insufficient cross-organizational collaboration						
(1c) Organizational group think						
(1d) Common (vs. Best) Practices						
(1e) Lack of flexibility, creativity, innovation						
(1f) Hierarchical, cultural and traditional forces systematically resisting change						
#2 - <i>Strategic Clarity and Organizational Alignment</i>	5	4	3	2	1	0
(2a) Lack of connectivity among agency plans, programs and performance results (i.e., disjointed goal setting and misaligned performance measures)						
(2b) Competing and often contradictory priorities						
(2c) Unintentional gaps and duplicative, or redundant efforts						
(2d) Top-down (vs. bottom-up) goal (and/or priority) setting						
(2e) Prescriptive vs. descriptive strategic performance management (i.e., centralized, formalized, stove-piped approaches to strategic planning and reporting)						
(2f) Politics or negotiated compromise, inadvertently resulting in mission slippage and drift						
(2g) Lack of consistent/integrated frameworks, processes, sub-processes and tools to develop strategy, translate it into operational actions, and monitor progress and improve performance						

²²⁷ 0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Cause and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency Non-Existent); 1 – Doesn't Impact Success; 2 – Slightly Hinders Success; 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success; 4 – Hinders Success; 5 – Greatly Hinders Success.

Causes and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency	Scale 1–5 ²²⁷					
GPRA-MA Focus Areas	5-Greatly hinders success	4-Hinders success	3-Somewhat hinders success	2-Slightly hinders success	1-Doesn't impact success	0 – Not Applicable (Cause and/or Evidence Non-Existent)
#3 - <i>Performance Measurement and Program Evaluation</i>	5	4	3	2	1	0
(3a) Inadequate application of performance management/measurement analytics						
(3b) Credibility issues, involving bias or lack of objectivity (i.e., subjective vs. objective judgments)						
(3c) Insufficient quality, accuracy, and timeliness of data						
(3d) Output- vs. outcome-oriented performance measures						
(3e) “Gaming the system” by establishing easily achievable measures and targets						
#4 - <i>Performance Reviews</i>	5	4	3	2	1	0
(4a) Absence of periodic progress reviews						
(4b) Punitive (vs. inquisitive) performance reviews						
(4c) Information/data is produced, but not used (i.e., in management and operational decision-making)						
(4d) Insufficient feedback and/or follow through (i.e., improvement plans)						
(4e) Bureaucratic complexity (i.e., multiple layers of review and lack of cohesive and consistent management processes and operational coordination)						
#5 - <i>Transparency and Accountability</i>	5	4	3	2	1	0
(5a) Lack of transparency in communicating and/or reporting performance results						
(5b) Stove-piped strategic performance planning and reporting						
(5c) Political hubris (i.e., decisions influenced by power politics, rather than purely objective and neutral decision-making)						
(5d) Lack of public understanding of how government works (i.e., lack of public access to agency planning and performance information)						
(5e) Proving success (i.e., compliance reporting) vs. improving performance and results (i.e., accountability)						
(5f) Ad-hoc Congressional engagement						
(5g) Unnecessary (i.e., outdated, duplicative) strategic and performance plans and reports						

Causes and/or Evidence of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency	Scale 1–5 ²²⁷					
GPRA-MA Focus Areas	5-Greatly hinders success	4-Hinders success	3-Somewhat hinders success	2-Slightly hinders success	1-Doesn't impact success	0 – Not Applicable (Cause and/or Evidence Non-Existent)
(5h) Multiplicity of congressional authorizing and appropriations committees						
(5i) Inadequate performance monitoring and reporting systems integrating large amounts of relevant quantitative and qualitative data from diverse sources to provide situational awareness (i.e., common operating picture)						

Survey Questionnaire #2:
Instilling a Culture of Accountability by Impacting Conditions (C) Contributing to
Strategic Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency

Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire in answer to the question “How do each of the five Conditions impede successful SPM and GPRA-MA implementation within your organization?”

Conditions of Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency	Scale 1–5 ²²⁸					
Conditions (C) Impacting Strategic Performance Management/GPRA-MA Ineffectiveness/Inefficiency	5-Greatly hinders success	4-Hinders success	3-Somewhat hinders success	2-Slightly hinders success	1-Doesn't impact success	0 – Not Applicable (Condition Non-Existent and/or Not Necessary)
	5	4	3	2	1	0
(C1) There is a lack of the creation and sustainment of a “High-Trust Culture” (i.e., Public Accountability)						
(C2) Performance improvement is a “Wicked Problem,” particularly difficult to resolve, requiring non-traditional solutions, uncommon/unfamiliar to most government institutions						
(C3) Political considerations, wherein management decisions are sometimes being made based on political issues or hot topics instead of based on evidence that points to a particular alternative that would actually improve performance, rather than, simply prove success						
(C4) There is an administrative/bureaucratic tendency to direct and control, which produces stagnation						
(C5) There is inadequate administrative governance (i.e., bureaucratic oversight)						

²²⁸ 0 – Not Applicable (i.e. Condition Non-Existent and/or Not Necessary); 1 – Doesn't Impact Success; 2 – Slightly Hinders Success; 3 – Somewhat Hinders Success; 4 – Hinders Success; 5 – Greatly Hinders Success.

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