

Strategy Research Project

Joint Force Interdependence For A Fiscally Constrained Future

by

Colonel Daniel P. Ray
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Joint Force Interdependence For A Fiscally Constrained Future				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Daniel P. Ray United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. Richard Meinhart Department of Command Leadership, and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6733					
14. ABSTRACT As defense budget reductions become more likely, DoD leadership must remain focused on maintaining and developing joint force capabilities to ensure national security. Opportunities exist to make significant improvements through reforming DoD to better focus capability and readiness on priority efforts. A significant improvement would be increasing joint interdependence. This paper assesses recent strategic guidance and concepts regarding joint interdependence and examines the obstacles and opportunities regarding the changes required across the joint force. It offers recommendations to maintain and strengthen the culture of joint interdependence in the areas of joint training, interagency integration, acquisition reform and reducing organizational overhead. These four opportunities for embedding deeper joint and interagency interdependence must be accompanied by adaptations to existing resource processes, more realistic system acquisition decisions and streamlined organizational structures. Joint force development that deliberately achieves and maintains interdependence during the impending fiscal pressures will be critical to ensuring national security priorities are preserved.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS DoD, Interagency, Acquisition, Training, Culture					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 38	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Joint Force Interdependence For A Fiscally Constrained Future

by

Colonel Daniel P. Ray
United States Army

Dr. Richard Meinhart
Department of Command Leadership, and Management
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Joint Force Interdependence For A Fiscally Constrained Future

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 38

Word Count: 6733

Key Terms: DoD, Interagency, Acquisition, Training, Culture

Classification: Unclassified

As defense budget reductions become more likely, DoD leadership must remain focused on maintaining and developing joint force capabilities to ensure national security. Opportunities exist to make significant improvements through reforming DoD to better focus capability and readiness on priority efforts. A significant improvement would be increasing joint interdependence. This paper assesses recent strategic guidance and concepts regarding joint interdependence and examines the obstacles and opportunities regarding the changes required across the joint force. It offers recommendations to maintain and strengthen the culture of joint interdependence in the areas of joint training, interagency integration, acquisition reform and reducing organizational overhead. These four opportunities for embedding deeper joint and interagency interdependence must be accompanied by adaptations to existing resource processes, more realistic system acquisition decisions and streamlined organizational structures. Joint force development that deliberately achieves and maintains interdependence during the impending fiscal pressures will be critical to ensuring national security priorities are preserved.

Joint Force Interdependence For A Fiscally Constrained Future

Our work must result in a joint force that is responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent and affordable.

—General Martin E. Dempsey¹

As defense budget reductions become more likely,² Department of Defense (DoD) leadership must remain focused on maintaining and developing Joint Force capabilities to ensure national security. Reduced budgets do not necessarily mean a reduced ability to achieve national security and military objectives if wise but difficult decisions are made within an integrated plan. In fact, there are opportunities, given positive and aggressive leadership, to make significant improvements through reforming DoD to better focus capability and readiness on priority efforts. A significant and far-reaching improvement would be increasing joint interdependence between the military services and among other government agencies by eliminating redundant systems and organizations, while balancing some similar capabilities to avoid single points of failure during operations.

DoD leaders must immediately capitalize on their fiscal constraints to create opportunities for more efficiency and complementary effectiveness while prioritizing efforts that focus on vital national security and military objectives. Despite the negative political environment that engenders an atmosphere of crisis regarding the defense budget, as well as the federal budget as a whole, opportunities exist to influence changes that will improve capability through joint interdependence. This involves better aligning ways and means across the military services to achieve strategic ends, which are clearly focused on key national interests. Arguably, these opportunities may be

fleeting while the ongoing and seemingly frantic struggle to balance the federal budget demands immediate and tangible results with feasible solutions for the future.

This economic challenge is not new. In his 1953 State of the Union Address President Dwight Eisenhower warned:

Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy. To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another.³

Today as in 1953, the fiscal challenge issue remains relevant. The 2011 National Military Strategy signed by former Chairman Admiral Mullen states, “The United States will remain the foremost economic and military power for the foreseeable future, though national debt poses a significant national security risk.”⁴ Unfortunately, overcoming the cultural, political and organizational obstacles to achieving a sound fiscal defense policy will require a profound effort by strategic leaders to embed and reinforce change.

The art of interpreting strategic concepts into planning of viable ways with limited means remains a historic challenge for strategic leaders. This paper will assess recent strategic guidance and concepts for intent and meaning while focusing on key terms used by leaders in these documents. It will then describe organizational and cultural implications along with obstacles to the changes required across the joint force to implement guidance without greatly degrading military capability. This paper will offer recommendations to maintain and strengthen the culture of joint interdependence through cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms, while aligning ends, ways and means within a fiscally constrained environment.

This analysis will not attempt to achieve a scientific result that provides absolute answers by predicting specific budgetary outcomes, addressing statistical trends

involved in future cuts compared to historic events, or identifying funding requirements to achieve every strategic goal by military service for the joint force overall. The current economic and political situation is far too complex to achieve such an endeavor. The primary assumption underlying this analysis is that the Defense budget will continue to decline in the next decade based on national domestic priorities and the federal budget situation. Furthermore, while identifying areas for significant changes and using examples, the reader should not infer that any particular program, system or organization described is more vulnerable to reduction or elimination than another. The primary focus should remain on the deliberate alignment of joint force capability and readiness with vital national security interests under specific strategic goals or missions.

Strategic Guidance

Recent strategic guidance and concept documents provide a broad array of direction and intent from strategic leaders for the upcoming decade. In some instances, different uses of terms such as interdependence, integration and synergy for what seem to be very similar ideas may cause confusion. Only by reviewing the sum of these documents can one garner a clear future picture for joint force development and better understand the intent behind some of the language. These documents are reinforced by other articles and statements from senior leaders that coalesce into a clearer, if not completely concise, meaning and therefore provide an understanding of the various ideas' interrelated nature.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and President of the United States (POTUS) have provided specific strategic guidance that help shape and prioritize the future development of DoD capabilities. This guidance helps form the basis for a new approach to joint force development with

limited resources and a clearer understanding of where to assume risk. Other useful concepts such as the CJCS's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) can be overlaid upon the broad strategic guidance to more precisely identify significant changes that will avoid negative outcomes when advancing the nation's security interests.

The defense strategic guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, signed in January 2012 by the Secretary of Defense with an opening letter by the President is valuable in several ways. First, it provides very specific direction that is emphasized later by the CJCS's guidance regarding how the joint force will be smaller and leaner, which global regions will receive more emphasis and why, and where innovative and creative solutions are required.⁵ Second, this guidance clearly states up-front the integrated national approach required to achieve success as illustrated by the following: "The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied." Third, this document makes candid statements about specific reductions that are required such as: "U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations" and "It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force."⁶ Finally, a key tenet espoused in the guidance is to "resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure."⁷ Interestingly, the term interdependence is used only once regarding "advancements in networked warfare in which joint forces have finally become truly interdependent."⁸ This lack of articulating an interdependence focus

across other warfighting functions seems to indicate that there is more work to be done to achieve a broader joint interdependence focus.

The CJCS's *Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* uses several key terms and phrases, such as "fiscal constraint," "troubled political economy," "valuation of risk," and "interdependence" that require expansion and definition to understand their intent and identify objectives for action.⁹ The document's overall tone and emphasis on these particular factors and concepts make clear that the fiscal environment facing the U.S. military creates pressure and warrants an overall evaluation of military priorities, missions, and capability requirements. The CJCS has no command authority to enforce his ideas without SECDEF and, if needed, POTUS support, according to U.S. Code,¹⁰ and the military services' institutional inertia to achieve results can be enormous. Hence, close collaboration with the Service Chiefs is an absolute necessity.

When CJCS General Dempsey discusses "fiscal constraint" and "today's troubled political economy" in his *Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, it is clear that he recognizes the significance of impending budget cuts within a larger United States strategic and political context.¹¹ He also states unambiguously, "we will need to get smaller to stay strong."¹² The Chairman obviously envisions reduced force structure as a key method of saving money while maintaining readiness. The real challenge is how to become smaller while maintaining the capability to execute all the current and future missions.

The CJCS' anticipation of "a new valuation of risk" is much more ambiguous.¹³ This term is often used in discussions about academic economic models regarding assets and credit variables.¹⁴ As the words imply, his guidance seems to be discussing

economic cost versus benefit assessments, but in reality the parameters of risk can actually be defined within the balance of threats, capabilities and affordability. One interpretation of the new risk valuation may be drawing the line of affordability between vital U.S. interests versus other, less important interests for military capabilities that could be achieved through other forms of national power.¹⁵ One can draw distinct linkages between balancing threats, capabilities and affordability in concert with the concept of joint interdependence.

Joint Interdependence

Joint interdependence is defined in Army Field Manual (FM) 1 as “the purposeful combination of Service capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities.”¹⁶ This term deserves more analysis to understand the meaning and intent of the Chairman’s usage and resultant implications for a smaller, affordable and more versatile joint force. The truly contentious aspect of the joint interdependence concept in military terms lies in how far reliance and elimination of redundancy should be implemented among the military services. In the last decade of relative fiscal plenitude, the term has been removed from most guidance and military discussions entirely. When we look at redundancy in particular, several major service systems and capabilities could potentially be targeted for elimination such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and service-specific intelligence platforms. This issue, which was at the forefront of military reductions in the mid-1990s under an interoperable focus,¹⁷ has been resisted since 2001 as military budgets increased to support combat in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as address other terrorist threats. The time has arrived for joint interdependence to trump service autonomy. Further, if military leaders expand the interdependence concept to interagency partners

to reduce military capabilities in lieu of civilian capability, the target list for eliminating capabilities expands even further.

In 2004, COL Paparone and Dr. Crupi wrote a useful critique of the joint interdependence concept that helps define and bound its meaning and different modalities. They state that generals say interdependence is “no service operating independently and all relying on each other’s capability to be successful.”¹⁸ But Paparone and Crupi assert there are varying degrees of interdependence, citing Thompson’s *Organizations in Action*, which describes three types of interdependence: pooled, in which one organization’s failure may impact others; sequential, a linear dependency such as supply-chain logistics; and reciprocal, in which outputs of each become inputs for others.¹⁹ DoD organizations routinely exhibit all three of these interdependence types depending on the capability or mission requirement.

Paparone and Crupi’s conclusions about the real meaning of joint interdependence are significant. They state, “A more strategic recognition is necessary. . . . [This] interdependency brings with it a need to suppress the doctrine of old habits of hierarchical command and control because such doctrine and habits lead to flawed conclusions about how to design and organize U.S. forces.”²⁰ They also briefly touch on the past balance between efficiency and effectiveness where this issue strikes “at the redundancy we have always enjoyed in developing and applying military capability.”²¹

Joint interdependence is not really new. One can find numerous contemporary examples of joint interdependence that have been in place for quite some time. For example, DoD has tasked the Army as the executive agent for various support responsibilities for other services such as veterinary support,²² the defense detainee

program,²³ and postal services.²⁴ These support services, while routine, are critical to daily functionality and point to the fact that interdependence can exist if directed and resourced.

Opinions abound regarding the true success of institutionalized “jointness.” This involves a collective mindset for unity of effort in the U.S. military, and therefore reduction in rivalry and even friction among the Services. Some, such as Kozloski in a 2012 Naval War College Review article, argue that jointness has done little to increase the effectiveness of the military and actually imposed significant organizational burdens that decrease efficiency. His argument centers on the fact that the numerous joint organizations such as Combatant Commands and Combat Support Agencies were created in a relatively unconstrained fiscal era and layered upon existing service structures with no commensurate reduction in overhead.²⁵ The term interdependence, however, goes beyond mere jointness and describes reliance between services for critical functionality.

The Chairman maintains we can restore versatility at an affordable cost.²⁶ The numbers trap can be a seductive and pervasive tool in political rhetoric, especially during arguments regarding the U.S. military’s size. Examples of this could be seen in the recent political debates when the size of a particular service, such as the Navy, was directly calculated on the number of ships, which was then directly conflated with capability.²⁷ Numbers are often used to politicize the challenge of DoD budget decisions. Achieving the correct, balanced capability to meet national security goals articulated in strategic guidance is the actual challenge, not strictly the numbers of platforms, systems or people. In truth, technology advancements may offset the need

for larger forces in terms of platforms and people, but only if they do so in a manner consistent with the capabilities required to accomplish national security objectives. When General Dempsey repeatedly describes the need to advance interdependence for “versatility at an affordable cost” in which the “Services rely on each other to achieve objectives and create capabilities that do not exist except when combined,”²⁸ he is clearly emphasizing the need for trust. Leaders are the only people who can foster organizational trust through positively influencing climate, good communications and constructive decision making.

Interestingly, the Chairman’s CCJO²⁹ and JOAC³⁰ documents do not specifically use the term interdependence. Instead, both documents use very similar concepts that are, upon closer examination, very closely related if not precisely describing the exact same idea. The CCJO focuses on “globally integrated operations” which requires, “a globally postured joint force to quickly combine capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries and organizational affiliations.”³¹ Likewise, the JOAC relies heavily on the concept of “cross-domain synergy – the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others...”³² Without a doubt, these similar and interrelated concepts are critical to developing the joint force in an interdependent manner for the challenging environments of the future within a fiscally constrained budget.

The fundamental obstacles and challenges to joint interdependence are largely cultural and therefore can only be met and overcome through focused leadership. While leaders need to focus on building trust, there are embedding and reinforcing

mechanisms they can use that are described by Shein in his book, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*.³³ Such mechanisms include resource decisions and organizational structure changes that can change the way people think and behave. Before focusing on these mechanisms to change an organization's culture, the service cultural obstacles and challenges require further examination.

Obstacles and Challenges

There are numerous obstacles to ensuring DoD's continuing capability to achieve national interests and objectives despite significantly increased fiscal constraints in the coming years. Cultural and political issues will weigh heavily on finding a proper balance of affordable capability within a reasonable mission set. While the Services' cultures tend to resist significant change overall, they can be adaptive given sufficient incentive. Most of the obstacles to organizational change can be overcome by focused leadership using cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms. Further, since Congress plays a key constitutional role in establishing the budget and overseeing how the money is spent, political considerations are a fact of life for strategic leaders. Hence, they need to be addressed. These political factors can cause significant hindrance or advantage depending on how successful leaders are at convincing key political players in the decision-making process to support needed joint interdependence decisions.

To adapt to the future strategic environment in a time of increasing fiscal constraint,³⁴ successful strategic leaders must understand the cultural obstacles to progress, while fostering the beneficial cultural characteristics that advance the organization toward specific strategic goals while maintaining institutional values. This cultural challenge was articulated by former Secretary of Defense Gates in 2008 when he stated, "The really tough part is preserving those [cultural] elements... that

strengthen the institution and motivate the people in it, while shedding those elements...that are barriers to progress...”³⁵

Builder’s 1989 book, *The Masks of War*, provides useful insights into the origins and character of the different Service cultures within DoD which can be impediments to a joint perspective.³⁶ However, this analysis is over 20 years old, and it is likely that the last decade of war has shaped these cultures toward a more positive, joint perspective. General Dempsey reinforces this assumption in his White Paper titled, *America’s Military – a Profession of Arms*, when he states that the military is “anchored in our shared values and joint effectiveness born from years of fighting together, and the strength of our Service competencies and cultures.”³⁷ If the Services have indeed become more unified in their perspectives of jointness and even embraced joint culture to some extent, this evolution has taken place during a decade or more of common operational purpose and remarkable budget prosperity. The real leadership challenge for the coming years lies in keeping the Services unified and constructively interdependent rather than reverting to the past parochialism of the 1990s when budgets become significantly smaller.

One need go no further than the recent media attention about the way the Services developed combat uniforms in the last decade to see divergence in Service attitudes and efforts, which can erode joint interdependence. Uniforms and insignia are visible and highly valued cultural military artifacts, as defined by Schein.³⁸ As much as uniforms and unit insignia are considered to be a unique and fundamental indicator of service members’ group identity, sometimes the trend toward uniqueness can be costly and counterproductive. Beginning in 2000, when the Marine Corps developed its own

unique camouflage uniform, all the Services have developed a unique combat or utility uniform, each with its own costly research, development and acquisition program.³⁹ Furthermore, the casual observer on the ground will notice that Navy and Air Force personnel integrated into Army units in actual combat usually wear the Army uniform to blend into the organization.⁴⁰ This relatively mundane uniform example is an outward indicator to the American taxpayers, elected officials, and civilian leadership that the military is not very serious about jointness. A more joint approach would have driven a defense-wide vice individual service research and development effort for combat uniforms. It is incumbent upon strategic leaders to find a solution to this type of issue and other divisive situations by finding common approaches that save money and convince the American people that the military is a trustworthy steward of their tax dollars.

Today's strategic leaders must understand all stakeholders' perspectives to design common approaches, especially in a period of fiscal constraint. As Service cultures are deeply embedded, it would be unrealistic and unhealthy to attempt to strip the Services of their unique organizational cultures. As General Dempsey states, "Service cultures provide a source of strength for honing their unique expertise and competencies."⁴¹ However, to foster future success with fewer resources, leaders must understand to what extent the services are capable of planning, programming and operating in a closer, more integrated fashion and take direct action to mitigate obstacles created by unique Service cultures and increase joint interdependence. Resolving this tension between service and joint cultures is a key senior leadership responsibility.

Schein's definition of culture is valuable to understand service cultures, their historical depth, and future impact. "Culture (is): a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to new problems."⁴² Builder's analysis of service cultures and Hoffman's "Marine Mask of War"⁴³ provide worthwhile insights for the strategic leader, especially when viewed holistically in relation to the challenges associated with change. It is absolutely critical for the leader to understand his and other cultures to objectively and effectively collaborate and make effective decisions.

In truth, the different military service cultures are not inherently opposed to joint interdependence. The U.S. military has a distinct advantage over other organizations as they share common oaths of office, goals, and experiences. But Service cultures are different enough to cause friction when their basic assumptions⁴⁴ seem threatened by another culture. When strategic leaders analyze the Services' cultural proclivities to maintain their separation and independence, if not dominant positions, they must understand the tribal traditions and perspective of each organization, not to mention the sub-cultures that prevail underneath.

Even without the military's multicultural nature, the challenge of leading change at the strategic level is complex. Overall, DoD is a very hierarchical and bureaucratic organization bound by not only its own rules, but Federal laws that limit just how creative it can be in adapting to new conditions. Kotter's book, *Leading Change*, provides numerous useful axioms for strategic leaders when implementing

organizational change. To clarify and distill such a complex undertaking into fundamental steps, such as his eight-stage process to create major change, provides a powerful model for leaders to use.

Kotter's eight steps to create major change are summarized as: 1) establish a sense of urgency, 2) create a guiding coalition; 3) develop a vision and strategy; 4) communicate the change vision; 5) empower broad-based action; 6) create short-term wins; 7) consolidate gains; and 8) anchor new approaches in the culture.⁴⁵ Arguably, DoD's leadership has clearly implemented steps one, three and four associated with joint interdependence. Through their guidance they established urgency, developed a vision and strategy, and communicated a change vision. Step two was somewhat addressed by the various CJCS and Defense boards and senior forums. The other four steps require additional action and reinforcement to increase joint interdependence. The pressure of impending budget cuts creates an opportunity to begin, influence and reinforce the need to fully implement these additional steps.

Opportunities Moving Forward

While the obstacles to achieving successful development of an interdependent and capable joint force are significant, they are not insurmountable. As stated, focused leadership will be a critical factor in overcoming cultural inertia against joint interdependence and the required changes that are internal and external to DoD. The size, frequency and duration of budget cuts will largely drive the level and urgency of the changes. This situation, in turn, drives the need to identify opportunities early and often before the failure to act becomes a crisis.

Schein asserts that certain embedding and reinforcement mechanisms are very important to leaders' ability to affect an organization's culture. To embed joint

interdependence, the following mechanisms, implemented consistently, will be critical in the near future: What leaders pay attention to, measure and control on a regular basis; how they allocate scarce resources; and criteria by which they allocate rewards and status. Cultural reinforcing mechanisms such as organizational design, structure, systems and processes as well as formal statements of philosophy, values and creed will also prove vital to instilling and maintaining a culture of joint interdependence.⁴⁶

To implement greater joint interdependence, senior defense leaders must create a more motivated coalition to guide implementation, empower their action, create some short-term wins, consolidate those gains and then anchor and embed those gains into the Services' culture. The concept areas associated with joint exercises and training, greater integration with the State Department, acquisition processes and finally systems and force structure assessment represent some key opportunities for changing DoD and enabling future success in accomplishing national security objectives through increased joint interdependence. These key concept areas are now further examined.

Joint Exercises and Training

To embed and reinforce more joint interdependence, DoD must emphasize joint force development, especially in the area of exercises and training. As Lieutenant General Flynn stated in a recent article, "Jointness is not automatic; it must be nurtured and continually updated through integrated joint force development activities to provide relevant capabilities that are responsive to the security environment."⁴⁷ Joint exercises and training are a lynchpin for maintaining a successfully interdependent joint force. There is simply no substitute for Combatant Commanders assembling all the potential capabilities and forces to function as closely as possible to actual operations, and therefore maintain critical operational readiness requirements. Unfortunately, the

budgets for joint exercises are often the first to be cut before funding for operational requirements, effectively trading joint readiness for a specific service capability.⁴⁸ Recently, a research project composed of retired and active military, congressional staffers and academics proposed accepting risk through lower near-term readiness, despite the strategic guidance to the contrary.⁴⁹ The experts, “wanted to use that money to expand several specific capabilities such as special operations, cyber war capabilities, long-range surveillance and strike capabilities and unmanned, undersea systems.”⁵⁰ While these are laudable efforts, this approach creates a false choice between the need for further development of these capabilities and the actual, current requirement to conduct joint operations now.

Joint training offers a critical mechanism for instilling and maintaining joint interdependence as part of the “joint training imperative” described in CJCS Instruction 3500.01G, *Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States*:

Preparing to operate in a joint, interagency, multinational, and intergovernmental environment is what the Department of Defense and its interagency partners must do. The challenge for joint training is to be responsive to the needs of the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) for all operations.⁵¹

To achieve the imperative for responsiveness, joint exercises are resourced and executed primarily through the planning and coordination of the Service Component Commands. However, the level of interaction and integration between these component commands often leaves something to be desired.⁵²

When resources for joint exercises come under pressure as the study above suggests, strategic leaders must defend them within the strategic guidance to avoid sacrificing current operational readiness in today’s uncertain global environment. This

environment, identified as having persistent tension,⁵³ has lead to regional events that are now occurring in Mali and Syria. Consequently, leaders must decide how to direct the interaction of their component commands toward interdependent operations by shaping the scenarios and planning methodologies of joint exercises and possibly even modifying service-specific training events into joint events.

Only rigorous, well-planned joint exercises will maintain the ability of disparate and dispersed forces to come together and achieve success in actual operations when the time arrives. Likewise, professional military officers operating in a joint force must maintain a depth of understanding and critical thinking skills that only frequent and relevant educational opportunities in robust learning environments can provide. Such opportunities could include continued education with other government agencies such as the State Department. Not only could this be implemented fairly quickly to create a short-term win, but incorporating joint interdependence into the education of future leaders will better anchor the approach in the culture.

State Department Integration

Deeper, more institutional integration between DoD and its interagency partners, particularly the Department of State (DoS) remains fertile ground for improving foreign policy capability for the overall achievement of national security objectives.

Consequently, opportunities to further deepen and improve the impact of interdependence could also be expanded to other national security elements of power rather than limited to the joint force. President Obama emphasized this perspective when he stated, “Meeting these challenges cannot be the work of our military alone...”⁵⁴ Favorable conditions may exist to find efficiencies to better integrate civilian agencies with military capabilities to achieve “whole of government” interdependence to fully

empower the diplomatic, information and economic elements of national power. If the task of adapting the joint force with its myriad of cultures was not challenging enough, the idea of incorporating “whole of government” efforts into any future change effort is truly daunting. Within DoD there is a common mission reflected in CJCS guidance.⁵⁵ While the differences in culture between DoD and DoS can seem stark, they must be understood by strategic leaders to develop a more comprehensive and complementary relationship.

In her book espousing an increased role for DoS through dynamic changes in culture, Schake describes the Foreign Service’s culture as “deficient in three crucial elements in which [DoD] excels: mission focus, education, and programming [of resources].”⁵⁶ These three elements are inextricably linked to the organizational culture and provide valuable insights for strategic leaders outside DoS. Understanding why DoS personnel behave in certain ways may help strategic leaders identify specific solutions to these challenges as an interdependent group. Another significant challenge for DoS, while not specifically one of culture, is the lack of funding. As stated in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, “something’s amiss when the Secretary of Defense has to request money for the (DoS).”⁵⁷ This situation causes friction between DoS and DoD, especially as DoD demands more participation from members of DoS in operations and training. Hence, DoD leaders need to improve the situation by first understanding the State Department’s culture and then developing common effort and mutual understanding in how to nurture organizational climates, communications, and decisions.

Building on the above, one concept for achieving more synergy and interdependence with the DoS is the creation of a Whole of Government National Academy into the existing Joint Professional Military Education institutions. Education institutions already exist within DoD and DoS, which could be leveraged and integrated, to achieve better unity of understanding as well as efficiencies. Increased military officers' educational opportunities for interagency professional development would provide better integration and mutual understanding during planning and operations. While examining changes to military and interagency education opportunities, leaders should drive a review of military specialties such as foreign area officers, military trainers and civil affairs to adjust their force structure and future development. Furthermore, identifying existing military missions and roles that are better suited to another department or agency could embed and reinforce the effects of interdependence among interagency organizations. Instilling increased interagency understanding and cooperation reflects Kotter's last change step of anchoring new approaches into an organization's culture.

Acquisition Process and Focus

Years of attempts to reform DoD's acquisition processes have resulted in some incremental improvements, but they have not achieved significant overall gains in joint system efficiencies. Furthermore, there have been significant cost overruns and unrealized expectations. For example, a 2008 report by the Government Accounting Office outlined \$290 Billion in cost growth in DoD acquisition programs.⁵⁸ In his article, *"Towards a Balanced and Sustainable Defense,"* Hoffman opines after summarizing numerous fiscally-challenged programs, "The end result of these cost overruns is a serious strategic challenge for DoD and future commanders who end up paying to

maintain legacy systems longer and gain systems belatedly that do not deliver as promised.”⁵⁹

Probably the most influential forum for influencing joint interdependence through resource and acquisition decisions, processed within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is the Joint Requirements Overview Council (JROC). According to its charter, which is reflective in U.S. Code Title 10, the JROC is responsible for assisting the Chairman and acquisition officials in, “identifying, assessing, and validating military requirements; establishing and assigning priority levels for joint military requirements; reviewing the level of resourcing required in the fulfillment of each joint military requirement; identifying alternatives for Major Defense Acquisition Programs; and establishing an objective for the overall period of time within which an initial operational capability should be delivered.”⁶⁰ The Vice Chairman chairs the JROC. A major improvement to the JROC in recent years was the inclusion of Deputy Combatant Commanders as involved participants, “unless otherwise directed by the JROC chairman.”⁶¹ This is designed to ensure that the JROC is truly taking joint requirements into account as it deliberates over essentially service-sponsored programs. Obviously, the JROC could be the most important guiding coalition for actually enforcing the strategic guidance of interdependence through key program decisions, but only if the Services are forced to act on its recommendations and if it is empowered to cancel failing or redundant programs if necessary. Currently, only the Secretary of Defense can truly enforce such measures and decisions made within the JROC can be revised.

Another key aspect of the JCIDS in need of review through the lens of joint interdependence, particularly in regard to the Chairman's direction for a new valuation of risk, is the development of, adherence to, and use of Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). KPPs are "performance attributes of a system considered critical to the development of an effective military capability."⁶² KPPs represent critical metrics for achievement of program goals, but it is very likely that many are overly ambitious or extremely difficult or costly to achieve. A more thorough analysis of every program's KPPs is needed with a view toward whether or not some programs could assume risk in a more holistic, interdependent system of military capabilities.

Is it time to "buy Fords not Ferraris?"⁶³ One rather sweeping opportunity for action is espoused by Henry J. Hendrix wherein he argues that the Navy's Carrier Strike Group (CSG) structure and increasingly complex platforms need a complete revision. Hendrix proposes replacing some of the CSGs with "influence squadrons" more suited to today's operational environment and maritime missions. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates alluded to the problem of increasing cost and complexity in an insightful 2009 essay, "In recent years, these platforms have grown...ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is perhaps reaching a point of diminishing returns."⁶⁴ Kozloski suggests expanding the idea across the entire joint force or "Building a Purple Ford" but first with a focus on trimming the organizational overhead that jointness has created.⁶⁵ This idea deserves a closer examination and implementation through the lens of joint interdependence and how some headquarters may be realigned and consolidated.

Numerous concepts regarding reorganizing for a new national security policy merit review in a fiscally constrained environment. Some basic and obvious steps are already underway, such as the reduction in personnel within the Services commensurate with changes to organizational structures. For example, the Army plans to reduce 80,000 from its ranks over the next six years⁶⁶ and the Marine Corps will gradually cut 20,000.⁶⁷ The reality of the military both culturally and procedurally virtually guarantees the success of evolutionary vice revolutionary approaches. Given the changes and trajectory of national security strategy, a more viable approach would be to balance the force as manpower and units are reduced between multi-functional, jointly interdependent forces, often referred to as General Purpose Forces, with an increase in specialized forces for irregular warfare, counterterrorism and security force assistance missions.

Another area of opportunity resides in the continued effort to achieve efficiencies through additional consolidation and elimination of redundant headquarters. The disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in 2010 saved DoD \$2 billion⁶⁸ without any significant side-effects to joint readiness.⁶⁹ It is very possible that other major commands and headquarters organizations, to include those inside the Pentagon, are ripe for elimination or consolidation to not just reduce cost, but improve joint and whole-of-government effectiveness and unity of action. This idea is espoused in Thomas' 2011 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee titled, *The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11*.⁷⁰

Recommendations in Four Key Areas

Joint interdependence must be further developed and maintained through embedding and reinforcing cultural change across the military that involves deciding

which programs are resourced or changed along with adapting and restructuring processes and organizations. The following four specific recommendations, associated with joint interdependence issues examined earlier, represent deliberate actions that strategic leaders should take to address the need for greater joint interdependence in an era of fiscally constrained budgets. These actions will help embed a reinvigorated culture of joint interdependence by ensuring some “quick wins” and implementing some enduring institutional processes and solutions into the Services as articulated in Kotter’s change management steps and Schein’s cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms.

First, joint training and exercises must be fully resourced and in some cases enhanced. As discussed, exercises are the lynchpin for reinforcing and maintaining a joint mindset and joint interdependence among the various service elements that make up the joint force. In some cases, service training funds may need to be transferred to the Combatant Commanders Exercise and Engagement fund⁷¹ to enforce joint training over service-specific training and incentivize innovative joint training venues, even at the tactical level, where the services would otherwise train alone. Achieving this would create a major short-term win in accordance with Kotter’s framework and provide cultural embedding opportunities as leaders decide how to allocate scarce resources.

Second, the SECDEF should shift resources from the Services to incorporate a Whole of Government National Academy into the existing Joint Professional Military Development institutions. Further emphasis should be placed on increased educational opportunities for interagency professional development of military officers. Further examination of the joint force in terms of functionality and specialties is also warranted.

The Chairman should conduct a review of military specialties and functions such as Foreign Area Officers, Trainers or Civil Affairs to adjust or potentially increase their responsibilities, while also identifying missions and roles that are better suited to another department or agency in order to expand the effects of interdependence beyond DoD. These three specialties are identified as they are more involved with increasing an interagency interdependent focus and these adaptations would provide a positive anchor for a new cultural approach as described in Kotter's eighth step for leading change.

Third, the Chairman and SECDEF can improve DoD's acquisition process by empowering the JROC to make it more powerful, less service-centric and more joint-oriented through deliberate SECDEF involvement and enforcement of program recommendations. Incorporating the Combatant Commander's Deputies, as required additional members at all meetings or even supplanting the Service Vice Chiefs entirely, will ensure the JROC process and resultant decisions truly reflect joint interdependence priorities for capability development. Further, all recommendations, especially program cancellations, must be ruthlessly enforced on the Service sponsors by the Secretary of Defense. The JROC should prioritize joint interdependence over substantial service systems according to the responsibilities listed in its charter, especially those programs that overlap or are becoming too costly. The CJCS should implement a Joint Planning Team to present a complete systems review to the JROC that identifies overly complex and costly KPPs for revision or deletion. Likewise, the Chairman should incorporate a capability redundancy review into the JROC to identify capability overlap between

Services and require justification of redundant systems approved by the Combatant Commanders.

Fourth, DoD must continue its efficiencies efforts aimed at reducing overhead through continued disestablishment and consolidation of headquarters and staff elements. As mentioned, the disestablishment of USJFCOM saved DoD at least \$2 billion⁷² and had no significant negative impact on joint readiness. A primary example for review would be consolidation of USTRANSCOM and Defense Logistics Agency into a Global Logistics Command, as proposed by LTG Christianson and espoused by Kozloski.⁷³ Numerous other commands and agencies are potentially ripe for consolidation and elimination such as various intelligence organizations, research facilities and analysis centers. The Secretary should consolidate the gains of the recommendations above according to Kotter's seventh change step, by producing more change in the overall balance and purpose of various forces to better fit future national security objectives.

Conclusion

Joint interdependence will become a necessity as defense budgets are cut. Clearly, joint force development that deliberately achieves and maintains interdependence during the impending fiscal pressures will be critical to ensuring national security priorities are preserved. Ultimately, these four main opportunities for embedding deeper joint and interagency interdependence must be accompanied by adaptations to existing resource processes, more realistic system acquisition decisions and streamlining organizational structures where appropriate. The cross-domain synergy to successfully conduct globally integrated operations in the near future will only function well if joint interdependence is thoroughly embedded in the culture and

reflected in procurement, organizational structures, training, and exercises. DoD leaders can embed and reinforce joint interdependence by routinely and consistently checking the implementation of change, allocating resources accordingly, rewarding and promoting good behavior and making statements regarding the nature and purpose of the change. If strategic leaders can achieve even evolutionary progress in joint processes, procurement and structures together with cultural embedding techniques, training and interagency cooperation, the entire defense enterprise will be vastly improved while better shepherding constrained resources. Failure to take these steps will likely produce negative outcomes as future capability diminishes through neglect rather than purpose-driven, cooperative planning and action.

Endnotes

¹ Martin E. Dempsey, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 26, 2011, <http://www.army.mil/article/62348/> (accessed December 19, 2012).

² David Berteau and Clark Murdock, *Defense Department Must Prepare for Deeper Budget Cuts*, National Defense (May 2012), 24.

³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "State of the Union 1953," February 2, 1953, *American History from Revolution to Reconstruction*, <http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/dwight-david-eisenhower/state-of-the-union-1953.php>, (accessed December 15, 2012).

⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (February 8, 2011), 2.

⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁶ Ibid., 5-6.

⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁸ Ibid., 7-8.

⁹ Martin E. Dempsey, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-02/021312101535_CJCS_Strategic_Direction_to_the_Joint_Force_-_13_Feb_2012.pdf (accessed October 14, 2012), 5, 6.

¹⁰ Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=29#151>, (accessed December 10, 2012).

¹¹ Dempsey, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, 5, 6.

¹² Ibid., 5.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴ Econmodel.com, *Utility Based Valuation of Risk*, <http://www.econmodel.com/classic/risk.htm> (assessed 13 December 2012).

¹⁵ Barack Obama and Leon Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁶ Department of the Army, *FM 1*, (June 2005), <http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter3.html> para. 3-1 (assessed December 13, 2012).

¹⁷ Richard Meinhart, "Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Leadership of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 56.1 (2010), 146.

¹⁸ Christopher Paparone and James Crupi, *What is joint Interdependence Anyway?*, *Military Review*, (July-August 2004), 39.

¹⁹ James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003).

²⁰ Paparone and Crupi, *What is joint Interdependence Anyway?*, 41.

²¹ Ibid., 41.

²² U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Veterinary Services Program*, DoD Directive 6400.04 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 22, 2003), 2.

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *The DoD Detainee Program*, DoD Directive 2310.01E (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 5, 2006), 5.

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Program (MPS) and Official Mail Program (OMP)*, DoD Directive 5101.11E (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2, 2011), 1.

²⁵ Robert P. Kozloski, *Building The Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness*, *Naval War College Review* 65.4 (Autumn 2012) 41-63.

²⁶ Dempsey, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, 5.

²⁷ Becky Bowers and Angie Holan, Tampa Bay Times, Politifact.com, "Fact Checkin the Third Presidential Debate", <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2012/oct/22/fact-checking-third-presidential-debate/>, (accessed January 29, 2013).

²⁸ Ibid., 5, 7.

²⁹ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, <https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/347752/file/48933/CCJO%20Joint%20Force%202020%2010%20Sept%2012.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2012).

³⁰ Joint Operational Access Concept, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf, (accessed December 19, 2012).

³¹ Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 4.

³² Joint Operational Access Concept, 1.

³³ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 17.

³⁴ Dempsey, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, 5.

³⁵ Robert Gates, *On Culture...*, April 2008, (Strategic Leadership, Lesson 6, slide 2).

³⁶ Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

³⁷ Martin E. Dempsey, *America's Military – A Profession of Arms*, http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2012-02/022312120752_Americas_Military_POA.pdf (accessed October 14, 2012), 3.

³⁸ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 17.

³⁹ Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, "Armed Forces Spend Billions on Camouflage Uniforms", <http://www.heralddnet.com/article/20121005/NEWS02/710059916> (accessed January 23, 2013).

⁴⁰ The author personally witnessed this behavior in the US Central Command Area of Operations while assigned to U.S. Army Central as a training and exercises officer.

⁴¹ Dempsey, *America's Military – A Profession of Arms*, 5.

⁴² Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 12.

⁴³ Frank G. Hoffman, "The Marine Mask of War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 96, no. 1 (January 2012): 64-67.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 12.

⁴⁵ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press), 21.

⁴⁶ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 231.

⁴⁷ George J. Flynn, "Joint Force Development Vision: Adapting to New and Future Realities," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 64.1 (2012), 148.

⁴⁸ The author has personally witnessed such decision-making over more than a decade as a training and simulations officer in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army Staff and the Joint Staff J7.

⁴⁹ Andrew Tilghman, "Experts Mull Lower Readiness as budget tradeoff", <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/11/military-hollow-force-budget-exercise-readiness-112812w/> (accessed December 19, 2012).

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1.

⁵¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States*, CJCS Instruction 3500.01G (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (15 March 2012), A-1.

⁵² The author personally experienced this problem as an exercise planner with U.S. Army Central.

⁵³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (February 8, 2011), 5.

⁵⁴ Obama and Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 1.

⁵⁵ Dempsey, *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, 4-8.

⁵⁶ Kori N. Schake, *State of Disrepair*, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2012), 8.

⁵⁷ Gabriel Marcella, ed., *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008), 39.

⁵⁸ "Pentagon's Acquisition Chief Taking Steps To Improve Program Execution," *Defense Daily* 238.1 (April 22, 2008).

⁵⁹ F.G. Hoffman, "Towards a Balanced and Sustainable Defense," *Orbis* vol. 53, Issue 3 (summer 2009) 394.

⁶⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, CJCS Instruction 5123.01F (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (January 10, 2012), A-2 - A-3.

⁶¹ Ibid., A-2, A-3.

⁶² Defense Acquisition University, *Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms*, <https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/2127.aspx>, (July 2011).

⁶³ Henry J. Hendrix, "Buy Fords, Not Ferraris," *Proceedings Magazine* vol.135/4/1,274 (April 2009).

⁶⁴ Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age", *Foreign Affairs* vol. 88.1 (January-February 2009), 28-40.

⁶⁵ Kozloski, "Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness," 41-63.

⁶⁶ C. Todd Lopez, "Odierno: Force Reductions will be Responsible, Controlled," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2012/01/mil-120127-arnews02.htm> (accessed December 17, 2012).

⁶⁷ Leon Panetta, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/02%20February/12-02%20-%202-14-12.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2013), 11.

⁶⁸ Lisa Daniel, "Budget Slows Defense Growth, Comptroller Says," *U.S. Department of Defense Information/FIND* (March 30, 2011).

⁶⁹ Pete Hegseth, "Trimming Fat without Sacrificing Muscle," *Military.com* <http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,249575,00.html> (accessed December 15, 2012).

⁷⁰ Jim Thomas, *The Future of national Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years After 9/11, Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., September 13, 2011, http://www.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=5f1a60f4-dc11-4663-9987-96472f5dc4ed (accessed February 20, 2013), 8.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Training*, DoDD 1322.18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, (January 13, 2009), 5,8.

⁷² Lisa Daniel, "Budget Slows Defense Growth, Comptroller Says," *U.S. Department of Defense Information/FIND* (March 30, 2011).

⁷³ Kozloski, "Building the Purple Ford: An Affordable Approach to Jointness," 41-63.