Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned from Investigations, 2004-2012
Abstract
Th e Iraq reconstruction experience produced a plethora of lessons about what happens when a stabilization and reconstruction operation (SRO) commences without sufficient systemic support in place. Among the most salient is the need to provide a robust on-the-ground team of investigators and auditors from the outset of such an operation. The presence of strong oversight early on in an SRO would deter the kind of fraud, waste, and abuse that occurred all too often during the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq. Waste is the product of poor planning and weak controls. Abuse is bad management caused by insufficient systemic order. But fraud is the intentional wrongdoing by persons seeking to enrich themselves amid a chaotic and often kinetic environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA591641
Entities
Organizations
- Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction