


Civilian Research Project USAWC Fellow

The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

by

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The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

In the decades to come, the most lethal threat to the United States' safety and security--a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack--are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states, is in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.¹

-Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defense-2010

If there are organizations operating in ungoverned regions of the world that legitimately represent "the most lethal threats to the nation's (US) security and safety"² the question is, how can the US influence the ability of a sovereign foreign nation to reduce those threats? Past attempts by the US over the last two decades include the employment of several military strategies to deny safe haven³ to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, each producing varying levels of success. This included short duration unilateral retribution bombing campaigns, US Special Forces-led air and ground campaigns, and full-scale ground invasions and occupation, followed by far-reaching Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. None of these approaches fully satisfied the intent of preventing al-Qaeda and its affiliates from taking advantage of all failed and failing states and vulnerable spaces from which to plan and operate worldwide.

When the US military showed progress in one region, the al-Qaeda network often followed the path of least resistance and established operations in another location where local governments were unable or unwilling to interdict them. As of 2011, al-Qaeda claimed affiliation with 14 other terrorist groups and an operational capability in over 30 nations.⁴ The response to al-Qaeda's ability to rapidly relocate into safe haven is a US strategy that appears reactive as opposed to pre-emptive, chasing the threat

from one location to the next. Reversing or even slowing that trend would be a major accomplishment for the US military.

This current strategy against al-Qaeda, based heavily on the use of Counterterrorism (CT) techniques and authorities, has been effective at maintaining pressure on the organization's Core leadership. However it is a strategy that equates tactical success--the elimination of al-Qaeda leaders--with long-term sustainable security. The CT strategy needs to be balanced with an attempt to develop foreign nation security forces through an increase of Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations. This vision aims to develop the security structure in partner nations to a level of capability to the point where they are able to deter al-Qaeda from establishing operations within their territorial borders over the long term. In current joint US military doctrine, SFA is described as:

...central to the success of U.S. strategies in the contemporary and future operating environments. Our nation's capacity to conduct SFA supports future strategies through fully integrated capabilities to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Foreign Security Forces (FSF) include not only military forces, but also police, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations at all levels.⁵

SFA extends well beyond military-to-military training and conceptually addresses security as a system of interoperable components to include: civilian command and control, rule of law, internal policing functions, force development, and the capability to sustain operations across the full spectrum of operations. SFA provides a broader approach to addressing the multiple efforts required to defeat the threat presented by al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to reduce the emergence of safe havens.

Research Question and Thesis

The primary aim of this paper is to expand upon the question, “Is Security Force Assistance the ideal operational method to prevent the use of safe haven by al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations in failed and failing states and other ungoverned regions of the world?” Secondary aims are to define the conditions that generally exist prior to al-Qaeda moving into a failed or failing state or other ungoverned regions, as well as to look at the potential future role of US Army Conventional Force⁶ Brigade Combat Teams in supporting SFA operations.

The basic proposition offered is that to effectively deny safe haven over the long term, the US must come to rely less upon tactically focused lethal targeting as part of a CT strategy and more upon building sustainable and effective partner nation security sector capacity. To achieve this, the US must increase the employment of US Army Conventional Forces in SFA missions, to assist in the development of security sector capacity among select partner nations.⁷ This is a long-term and potentially costly method, but it is still in the best interest of the US to develop the entire security sector capacity of partner nations, to facilitate their ability to support civilian authority, protect their population, control their territory and reduce the availability of safe haven to al-Qaeda within their borders. By answering the primary research question, this study hopes to further the discussion regarding the increased employment of US Army Conventional Forces in SFA operations to deny safe haven to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

This paper is organized into three sections. It begins by framing the general operational environment through a description of the current threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the general characteristics of safe haven and failed or failing states

and ungoverned areas. This is followed by a discussion of the recent refinements to strategic guidance, doctrine and authorizations, as well as a discussion on the benefits, challenges and the operational effectiveness of recent SFA operations. The paper then reviews the current US Army Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept and recommends refinements in training and organization for Army Brigades assigned to conduct SFA missions.

Threats

It is generally agreed that the US is willing to intervene abroad when its interests are threatened by terrorist organizations. The continued existence of al-Qaeda and the number of failed and failing states that offer potential safe haven to the organization remains an item of particular interest to the US. Therefore, any discussion about where to execute SFA missions has to be framed within the context of threats, location and US interests. In spite of some recent claims that al-Qaeda no longer represents a significant global menace, the evidence suggests that the organization will still attempt to gain a foothold and establish operations in locations where desirable conditions exist.

These “Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration” include: poverty, social inequalities, ineffective government institutions, and inept security forces. When combined, these pre-conditions will help create segments of a nation’s population that become vulnerable to the rhetoric and influence of radicalized social leaders. By understanding the threat and recognizing the existence of the Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration, the US can focus SFA efforts early to assist partner nations in denying access to safe haven.

Proclamations about the demise of al-Qaeda should be viewed with skepticism in light of the strategic patience and resiliency the group exhibits. In 2010 the Combating

Terrorism Center issued a report that highlighted al-Qaeda's dwindling capability, and its overall ineffectiveness. The report also infers that the organization is strategically adrift. The report included the following statement, as cited in the Congressional Research Service Report, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*:

More than twenty years after its creation, Al Qaeda shows clear signs of decline. The group has lost many of its key operational leaders to arrest or assassination; a number of Al Qaeda franchises—including in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria—have been substantially weakened or defeated; and a host of ideological challenges, including recantations from prominent jihadis themselves, have compelled Al Qaeda to spend valuable time defending its reputation and actions. These setbacks and others suggest that Al Qaeda is not any closer to achieving its long-term goals than it was on 10 September 2001.⁸

While there is agreement that the al-Qaeda Core remains under pressure and the strategic goals of the organization are not yet realized, it is too early to dismiss the danger it represents. The internal strategy debates that occur in any globally-oriented, decentralized organization with a disparate membership base should not be misinterpreted as a sign of its impending demise. Additionally, the status and capability of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operating out of Algeria, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), all mentioned above, is different in 2013 than as described in the December 2010 report. These three groups are considered to possibly be the most capable contemporary al-Qaeda affiliates, and they represent the durability of the al-Qaeda enterprise.

The US government still maintains that the most dangerous external threat to the security of the nation remains al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The 2012 US National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the basis of the overarching framework being employed against that threat:

The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that...denies al-Qaeda safe haven...and builds positive partnerships...around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power—both military and civilian—as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions.⁹

This NSS guidance builds upon the June, 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which recognizes that, “the preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents.”¹⁰ The CT strategy identifies elimination of safe haven and building partner nation’s CT capacity as major objectives in defeating the threat stating that, “Al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories. In close coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to contest and diminish al-Qaeda’s operating space through mutually reinforcing efforts.”¹¹ These two strategic guidance documents provide the general direction and intent from which operators develop and implement US strategy.

However, the threat of al-Qaeda requires further scrutiny. When deciding where to employ US resources to defeat a threat, it is important to determine the operational reach of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to categorize them by intent, and most importantly, by their capability. When that analysis is combined with the previously mentioned Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration, a clear picture of where to employ US forces in SFA mission roles becomes evident.

al-Qaeda Core

The threat presented by al-Qaeda comes in two distinct forms: al-Qaeda “Core” elements and al-Qaeda affiliated groups. The US intelligence community agrees that al-Qaeda’s Core leadership has been degraded by the persistent pressure applied by

US targeting operations over the last 18 months. This includes the killing of key figures, Atiyah Abd al Raham, Ilyas Kashmiri and Osama Bin Laden in 2011.¹² This pressure has “degraded al-Qaeda to a point that the group is probably unable to carry out a complex, large-scale attack in the West. However, the group has held essentially the same strategic goals since its initial public declaration of war against the United States in 1996, and to the extent that the group endures, its leaders will not abandon the aspiration to attack inside the United States.”¹³ Thus, the overall ideology and strategic goals of the al-Qaeda Core remain consistent. “Its religiously based goals consist of reversing a secularizing wave in the Muslim world, and its geopolitical goals are to liberate Palestine, and unite the Muslim lands into a single state--a Caliphate based on religious laws.”¹⁴ Although in a weakened state and isolated inside of Pakistan¹⁵, the al-Qaeda Core under the leadership of As-Ayman Al-Zawarhiri, is still a potential threat to the US. As long as it continues to exist, the Core provides cohesion and unity of purpose to the larger al-Qaeda enterprise through strategic vision, ideology, and spiritual inspiration.

al-Qaeda Affiliates

There is growing concern among senior US intelligence officials, as they watch the expansion of al-Qaeda ideology through affiliated organizations, often operating in unstable regions.¹⁶ While in 2001, the visible central al-Qaeda command of Osama-bin-Laden posed the greatest threat, now in 2013 these affiliates are arguably the more problematic of the types of al-Qaeda threats discussed. They can be difficult to categorize, as they represent the full spectrum of capabilities, intent, ideologies and geographic spheres of influence. It has been reported that al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations are active and have a presence in over 70 nations around the globe.¹⁷

Some of these groups have global objectives and sufficient capabilities to see them to completion, while others maintain only a regional or sub-regional capability and influence.¹⁸ Understanding those distinctions are important when developing a strategy to combat their activity.¹⁹

These capable and well-organized affiliate groups pose a threat to US interests, as well as to legitimate regional governments. If a link between affiliate groups with demonstrated capability and the al-Qaeda Core is confirmed, then the planning assumption becomes that they represent a dangerous regional threat, with potential to adapt into a broader international threat. It is in the best interests of the US to build the security sector capacity of partner nations opposing these types of affiliate groups.

Loosely Affiliated Groups

There are other affiliates that carry the al-Qaeda label, but have little to no operational reach or capability beyond their local sphere of influence. These groups can be regarded as loosely affiliated organizations and their direct link to al-Qaeda is difficult to confirm. The Tuareg rebels in Northern Mali fall into this category. In a late-2011 bid to gain regional autonomy, the Tuareg made alliances of convenience with al-Qaeda affiliates, Ansar-Dine²⁰ and AQIM. However, it would be difficult to label the Tuareg as al-Qaeda affiliates that presented a grave threat to US interests.²¹ The problem with groups like the Tuareg is that overstating their al-Qaeda affiliation can lead to a response strategy that defaults to CT methods and could potentially limit future engagement options, as well as build momentum towards resentment against the US and partner nation's governments. Therefore, such loosely affiliated groups must be thoroughly analyzed before they are designated as al-Qaeda affiliates with operational reach.

In summary, al-Qaeda Core remains a real threat to the US. The organization still has the intent, capability, structure and enough of a network to plan for attacks against US interests. Amongst affiliate organizations, those with a clear ideological and operational alignment with al-Qaeda and the capability to achieve regional and global objectives continue to represent a threat to the US and its interests. The US should focus the majority of its SFA and foreign aid attention on assisting the nations battling this category of affiliate.

Safe Haven

A centerpiece of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and now an enduring component of the overall US Security Strategy is the necessity to deny al-Qaeda and its affiliates the ability to operate in safe haven. A terrorist safe haven is defined as, “an area of relative security that can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities such as recruiting, training, fundraising, and planning operations.”²² Safe havens are not merely defined by a physical or geographic location. They can also exist in the cyber realm, in urban settings, in free societies and within many existing legal statutes.²³ In addition, safe havens are not limited to failed states and ungoverned spaces, as it is argued by some that the austere and undeveloped conditions of failed states can present severe operational challenges to terrorists.²⁴ However, for the purpose of this paper, safe haven is confined to a geographic location within the borders of an internationally recognized nation-state, with the area of haven falling outside of the control of the state’s security and governance apparatus. It is these types of areas that terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates seek to occupy, to facilitate their ability to plan, prepare, and execute future operations.²⁵ While it is possible for al-Qaeda safe havens to exist in relatively secure nation states such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,

they most often emerge in unstable regions beyond the operational reach of local governance and security forces, or in states that are on the verge of collapse.

Failed and Failing States

Failed and failing states represent a central feature in the campaign against al-Qaeda and trans-national terrorist groups, as they are no longer viewed solely as a humanitarian issue.²⁶ They are now viewed as potential threats to the US and its allies. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* Robert Rothberg stated that, “In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension”²⁷ Failed or failing states are not necessarily fringe entities and their affected populations are significant in numbers, thus posing a substantial challenge when developing strategies to combat the conditions that contribute to their deterioration. Foreign aid and development practitioner, as well as author Stephen Browne offers that, “These states are still numerous; by most definitions, at least one-third of all developing countries. And they harbor up to 1.5 billion people, almost a quarter of the world. Fragile states are of universal concern because they are the source of many of the most challenging global problems.”²⁸ Many of the preconditions that exist in failing states, such as extreme poverty, social inequalities, ineffective government institutions, civil conflict, inept security forces, or the collapse of an existing regime are often the key enablers for the emergence of safe havens. Internal conflict is seen as the single most important factor in keeping those states on the edge of failure. Browne describes the inter-relationship between civil strife and poverty and how one often propels the other in a self-sustaining cycle:

Within the developing world, those states which have made the least progress and have remained mired in low income and high poverty levels have been the most prone to conflict, while those which have done relatively better have reduced the risks of conflict and insecurity....there is a close empirical relationship between civil war and low income. Poverty increases the likelihood of civil war and war is a prime cause of poverty.²⁹

Breaking this cycle is an important step in reducing the likelihood that a state fails and the conditions for safe haven emerge. It cannot be ended by relying solely on the use of CT tactics, attacking al-Qaeda affiliates after they arrive in a region. In part, ending the cycle requires the establishment of a secure environment where state systems of governance have the space to develop effective security capacity. Local security forces are best suited to combat internal conflicts. Through SFA missions in selected nations where local security forces are not highly politicized or corrupt, the US can assist local governments and security forces in building the capacity to extend the reach of security, thus facilitating their ability to extend development to larger sectors of the population.

Security Force Assistance Operations

In a March 2013 *Foreign Policy* sponsored roundtable discussion, LTC (R) John Nagl argued that:

If there is one thing that we failed to do in Iraq and Afghanistan as effectively as we should have, its security forces assistance...we continued to not resource that properly. That is the *raison d'être* for the American Army in this century. It's refusing to accept that. We are continuing to mess that up and will continue to mess it up until somebody grabs the Army by the shoulders and shakes it and says. Security force assistance is your job. Do it.³⁰

LTC Nagl is accurate in his assessment of SFA efforts throughout much of the US military's early experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the situation today is not as bleak as he portrays, as the Conventional US Army is actually well-postured to begin

an increased role in SFA missions. As a result of the lessons learned and applied from Iraq and Afghanistan, which include: refinements to guidance, doctrine, legal authorities, legislative adjustments to the funding of Security Assistance operations, and improved interagency cooperation between the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD), there now exists a window of opportunity to expand Army SFA efforts to train, equip and build the capability of partner nation security forces.

Authorizing Documents and Guidance

There is a prevalent myth within some circles of the DOD and the US government that the Conventional US military is not designed for, or capable of conducting SFA missions; that somehow the tasks associated with SFA fall outside the realm of the military's primary mission, which is to fight and win the nation's wars.³¹ Nothing could be further from the truth. In the last six years, significant refinements to US strategic guidance, directives and doctrine all point to the future importance and operational relevance of SFA operations. The 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance states, "In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations."³² It also states that, "the US [will]...continue to take an active approach ...working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary."³³ In 2009, the DOD mandated that Stability Operations be developed across the joint force as a core competency mission.³⁴ Followed in 2010 by DOD instructions, which mandated the establishment of SFA capabilities within the force to, "assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats" and most significantly, it authorized the use of Conventional

Forces to conduct SFA operations.³⁵ This is a departure from the past, when SFA missions were executed almost exclusively by Special Operations Forces (SOF). Joint and Army Doctrine updates in the last three years also recognize the changing global security environment and provide revised guidance on Stability, Security Cooperation and SFA Operations³⁶ and emphasize the ‘whole of government’ approach to stability operations.³⁷

Most importantly, even though the threat of al-Qaeda still exists, the US interagency process is better poised than ever to meet it. In the last six years, the DOD made extraordinary strides and gained a large array of expanded legal authorities to train partner nations’ security forces, which significantly altered the existing interagency relationship between DOS and DOD.³⁸ Section 1206 to the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a provision of the FY2012 NDAA, section 1207, are seen as watershed events, as related to DOD’s ability to execute SFA operations.³⁹ Section 1206 authorized the US military to expand their role in training, equipping and advising foreign military forces and the GSCF expanded funding authorities for DOD forces to train the internal security elements (police, border police, and rule of law entities) and internal ministry officials of partner nations.⁴⁰ These refinements represent a new era in interagency cooperation and US Security Assistance procedures. Unfortunately, both Section 1206 and the GSCF are temporary provisions and not codified into US Law. This must be rectified. If these provisions are not extended and eventually enacted into law under Title X, US Code, the DOD will be limited in its ability to effectively wage operations against the decentralized and extensive threat posed by al-Qaeda and other transnational threats.

However, the expanded role of DOD in determining where and how to expend SFA resources, especially in the area of training host nation internal security elements and ministries, is not universally accepted. Cindy Williams from *MIT's Security Studies Program* and Gordon Adams, a frequent contributor to *Foreign Policy*, believe that the DOS should retain exclusive control over all security cooperation and assistance authorities and limit DOD to the traditional role of implementing programs only as directed by DOS. In a jointly authored MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, they contend that the DOD and the military in general are ill-suited culturally to be trusted with expanded security cooperation authorities:

...the expansion of DOD non-military programs could erode the effectiveness of delivery of foreign assistance. The planning and implementation of programs for governance, policing, law enforcement, and economic development are not core skills in DOD. U.S. civilian government institutions have longer experience and greater qualifications for such work. Unlike DOD, for these organizations such programs are a core skill. The civilian organizations also have the knowledge to ensure that funded projects are sustainable over the long term, not simply focused on a short-term, combat-related mission....A military face on the broader U.S. global engagement may prove counter-productive to long-term U.S. national security goals.⁴¹

These concerns reveal an outlook that is rooted in ideas of a different era and are not consistent with the current operating and threat environment. At the time of the formulation of such Foreign Military Assistance programs, the US did not have to contend with dozens of vulnerable nation-states and ungoverned regions where the conditions existed for infiltration by al-Qaeda. By having the authority to equip and train the full array of host nation security forces, the US military can assist in the development of a security structure that is linked and integrated across military and civilian elements. Linking the police, border police, investigative services, rule of law

and military elements into a network to defeat threats to the host nation creates an integrated, and in this writer's opinion, a more effective security network. Additionally, the US military has the force structure, internal force protection capacity and logistic capability to establish SFA operations in areas that are remote, austere, and often beyond the reach of civilian DOS resources. The ability to expand the operational reach of local security forces is a distinct advantage for SFA missions aimed at disrupting safe havens.

To alleviate the concerns of those who believe the DOD is not capable of responsibly meeting US foreign policy objectives, the provisions of Sec 1206 and GSCF require that all initiatives and programs go through both department secretaries in what is termed a 'dual key' approval process.⁴² This procedure is echoed throughout every echelon of the system and includes similar dual approvals by regional Combatant Commanders and related US Ambassadors. This joint approval process is a forcing function at every echelon and requires subordinates to coordinate with their interagency counterparts, and it appears to be working. In a 2011 study on Section 1206 by Rand's Jennifer Moroney, she discovered that:

Many [stakeholders] noted that the "dual-key" nature of the 1206 Program authority requires greater interagency cooperation at various levels...several remarked that this was, in fact, the most successful aspect of the program...some stakeholders commented that since the initiation of the 1206 Program, they are "always on the phone" with their counterparts in other agencies and now meet regularly through interagency working groups⁴³

This check and balance system allows DOS to have direct input and oversight on every ongoing and newly initiated SFA program.

The refinements to security assistance-related strategic guidance, doctrine and authorizations over the last six years have been significant. They represent the need

for increased interagency cooperation and development of implementing systems that meet the demands of countering, and eventually pre-empting transnational terrorist threats that adapt and relocate quickly. They also serve as notice to the US Army that the future will see more, not less SFA operations and that Conventional Forces are going to be called upon to execute operational requirements that Special Operations Forces units are unable to meet.

US Army Conventional Forces and SFA

In the era of competing demands and security challenges, a debate in the Army continues surrounding the question of whether or not Conventional Army Brigade Combat Teams are the right units for employment in SFA operations.⁴⁴ Contemporary strategic guidance, current doctrine, the nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda operating in safe havens, and requests for units capable of executing security cooperation tasks from Combatant Commanders, which are often beyond the ability of SOF units to source, all point to the reality that requirements for Conventional Force-sourced SFA operations are unlikely to diminish in the future. The Army's challenge is to ensure it embraces SFA as a primary mission and that if it is not going to establish a standing SFA Advisor formation, then it needs to ensure the Conventional Brigade Combat Teams it selects to conduct security cooperation tasks are properly organized, trained and fully capable of executing SFA missions.

Advantages of SFA Operations

Properly applied, US Army Conventional Forces trained to execute SFA operations provide an effective resource to US Ambassadors and military commanders for combating al-Qaeda and their affiliates attempting to establish or exploit regional safe havens. SFA operations typically do not require the deployment of large troop

formations; they are small footprint, flexible and provide multiple employment options. They can be executed across the full spectrum of military conflict: in low-threat environments, in nations combating internal threats or in the midst of a counterinsurgency, or in support of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) conducting major combat operations against an external threat.⁴⁵

While not an operational requirement, the ideal time to execute SFA is pre-conflict or in a semi-permissive environment, where a state's security and governance capabilities are somewhat functional and there exists a level of stability within the state. SFA operations are not unilateral; this is because, generally speaking, they support the host nation's Internal Defense and Development Plan (IDAD) and missions are executed based on the guidance and parameters established by the host nation, US Ambassadors and the Combatant Commanders. These include efforts in Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).⁴⁶ SFA operations support the interagency campaign plan, which ensures unity of effort by all DOD and DOS contributing agencies.⁴⁷ This guarantees that the US Ambassador retains oversight and positive control of all training and assistance missions occurring within his or her area of responsibility.

An additional advantage of SFA operations is that they require the deployment of US military ground forces to partner with and train host nation security elements. This is important for two reasons. First, when the US employs ground forces, it is a demonstration of US resolve and commitment. Second, US Forces provide a visible example of the attributes and values of a professional military force to the partner nation's security forces. Daily interaction with host nation counterparts develops

confidence, personal and professional relationships, and mutual respect among forces. In many nations, professional conduct and values training is every bit as important as marksmanship and medical training. US Forces can serve as positive role models across an array of activities and functions, such as: the primacy of civilian control of the military, the value of human rights in military operations and the importance of justice and the rule of law. Additionally, partnered operations require the development of trust between forces and that is best achieved by long-term, consistent working relationships. As Admiral William McRaven, Commander of US Special Operation Command, recently stated when discussing his plan to expand the Global Special Forces Network and increase partnerships with foreign nations, "You cannot surge trust."⁴⁸ The thought being, that those personal relationships have the potential to build trust, but they take time to develop. SFA missions require close partnerships and daily human interaction with host nation partner forces; this represents one of the greatest advantages and strengths of SFA.

Concern that SFA missions are inordinately dangerous, due to the likelihood that deploying small training teams to often remote locations puts US forces at increased risk, represents a valid concern, but is not fully supported by the facts. As of April, 2013 more than eleven years after combat operations commenced in Afghanistan, US casualty numbers total 2,072 deaths, with 1,716 killed in action, 356 non-hostile deaths and 18,404 wounded. In all locations associated with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) outside of Afghanistan (this includes fifteen locations where US forces are currently active) total deaths are 119, with 11 killed in action, 108 non-hostile deaths and no reported data on wounded in action.⁴⁹ This is not intended to minimize the effect

of killed or wounded in recent operations, but it does point out that there does not appear to be undue risk to US soldiers conducting operations in small groups around the world.

So, on the surface it appears that smaller contingents of US forces are actually at less risk. This is an area that is beyond the scope of this paper and requires further analysis, but if validated, it would provide additional support for increasing SFA-type missions, as their small footprint nature may actually reduce said risk. There is an element of risk associated with most military operations and SFA is no exception. This risk can often be mitigated through training on rules of engagement, in-extremis evacuation plans and maintaining situational awareness of surroundings. Risk aversion cannot be allowed to lead to paralysis of US geopolitical and military objectives; it must be addressed, mitigated and not permitted to overwhelm decision-making criteria or interfere with operations. SFA operations can work for every agency that understands that some risk must exist in these types of endeavors.

Recent SFA Operations

Iraq and Afghanistan garner a majority of the attention when examining recent US-led military operations that have included a large SFA component. However, it is a mistake to base decisions on the future commitment of US forces to conduct SFA operations, solely upon the lessons learned from those campaigns. Compared to the majority of ongoing SFA operations, Iraq and Afghanistan were in many ways unique. As stated by Brian Burton in the National Defense University's, Center for Complex Operations Journal *Prism*, "In both instances, the United States toppled existing hostile regimes... and is rebuild[ing] institutions of security and governance from the ground

up....these intensive and expensive efforts at state-building are not necessarily the most important from the standpoint of understanding the future direction of US strategy.”⁵⁰

More common SFA operations, like those conducted in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) and similar missions in Colombia and the Horn of Africa, offer better examples of the potential benefits of SFA operations. Although executed primarily with Army SOF units, they represent a case study for Conventional Force units to model when preparing for employment in SFA operations.

In the Philippines, the presence of al-Qaeda affiliate, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Mindanao led the US to increase SFA operations in 2002. US forces operated in-country at the request of the Philippine government in an advisory role and were not authorized to conduct combat operations.⁵¹ They initially provided training to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, advised Filipino units, and participated in civil-military operations. “The core goals were to neutralize ASG and other al-Qaeda-linked militants...while extending the reach of the Philippine government to prevent those militants from exploiting ungoverned territory...”⁵² In 2005, the US provided communications, intelligence collection and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) enabling support to AFP during a direct action mission aimed at ASG leader, Khaddafy Janjalani.⁵³ The overall effect of this SFA mission in the Philippines, “substantially degraded ASG manpower and military capability...it is unlikely that these pose a strategic threat to the Philippine government...ASG strength declined from approximately 1,000 men in 2002 to [approximately] 200 in 2006.”⁵⁴ While the numbers are interesting, the real impact of the SFA mission was the AFP’s

success in defeating the ASG's ability to pose a serious threat to the legitimate regional government.

Success was attained through partnership and assistance, and allowing local security elements to solve local problems, which is a tenet of SFA. This was done with a relatively small, thoroughly trained and capable US SOF ground force. The US Army SOF elements primarily employed twelve-man Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) A-Teams that partnered with AFP company-sized elements and counterterrorism reaction teams. The deployed US SOF personnel numbers (ODAs, Civil Affairs, and support) were rarely above 700.⁵⁵ One of the participants, in summarizing the SFA approach stated, "The heart of the strategy is based on building relationships, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security force capabilities, sharing intelligence, and information and developing focused civil military programs and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance."⁵⁶ Success was gained through a sound application of the principles of SFA, which ultimately enabled partner security forces operations.

Despite some of the recent Security Assistance successes, there are opponents of military SFA operations and the strategy of partnering with and training local security forces to secure their own territory. They claim that the US has overstated the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and that SFA operations are a poor use of defense dollars and ineffective in developing long-term partner capacity.⁵⁷ Former US Ambassador Dennis Jett asserts that US Foreign Military Assistance and SFA missions too often result in the unintended consequence of strengthening repressive regimes that gain much of their power from their security partnerships with the US. He also argues that the expenditure of resources in states that are failed and failing is an indirect path to

supporting repressive regimes that use their well-trained military to retain power. He states that, “Just building up the military is not a solution to a security problem if those forces are more interested in fighting for whatever political or ethnic faction they identify with than defending the nation as a whole.”⁵⁸ Ambassador Jett also claims that current SFA efforts are too military-centric and are not focused on developing the institutions of democracy. He states that, “Money for arms and other security assistance is easy to find, while support for strengthening the courts, legislative branches, civil society and the press never is.”⁵⁹

Ambassador Jett is clearly opposed to the US military expanding SFA operations, which include the development of partner nation internal security forces and institutions. Similar to Williams and Adams, he contends that the military is professionally unsuited to the task of developing non-military institutions stating that, “... the defense establishment, once given the order to charge, tends to go at any task with far more enthusiasm and energy than subtlety and judgment.”⁶⁰ His concerns merit consideration and attention, before employing military forces to conduct SFA missions.

However, his argument is dismissive of the military’s ability to comprehend the complexity associated with SFA operations and paints all military assistance endeavors and personnel in the same negative light. First, the military component of Security Assistance is conducted within the parameters set by the US Ambassador of the host nation and the related Internal Defense and Development Plan. This safeguards against a military only approach to operations and it establishes a framework wherein the military’s efforts are in support of the Ambassador’s vision. Second, as military operators prepare to undertake SFA missions they generally realize that they are doing

something far more subtle than charging a hill. The lessons learned from early SFA efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are well reflected in the previously described refinements to Security Assistance doctrine and planning guidance. These updated guidelines stress the whole of government approach towards SFA operations and address many of Ambassador Jett's concerns.

Additionally, his overall critique discounts the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, repeats the often mentioned, but rarely quantified statement that US involvement abroad, " ... will increase rather than diminish, threats to America's security"⁶¹ and offers that in many cases concerning US engagement within failed or failing states that, "the best course of action is to do nothing at all."⁶² Doing nothing, while always an option, might lead to a loss of initiative in the fight against al-Qaeda and place partner nations, and potentially the US, at greater risk. The key is to apply SFA judiciously as an enabling effort to support the overall host nation security strategy as directed by the US Ambassador. If a SFA effort would further empower a corrupt and repressive local government than it would be unwise to apply it in those conditions.

Foreign engagement often includes the risk of establishing some of the conditions Ambassador Jett identifies in his writings. The current DOS and DOD security assistance legal guidelines mitigate some of these risks through the checks and balances described earlier. There is no desire to challenge the primacy of the DOS in all foreign nation engagement initiatives and strategies. However, when the conditions are favorable and improving the security forces of host nation might lead to greater stability of the government, then SFA conducted by the US military is potentially a very effective tool.

A second concern that arises when examining recent SFA success is whether or not US Conventional Forces can replicate the efforts of SOF elements. In US Army SOF units, a typical ODA is comprised of one Captain, a senior warrant officer, and ten non-commissioned officers. Before acceptance into Special Forces training, every team member must complete a difficult physical and psychological assessment process, followed by duty-specific qualification and language training, which can last up to 36 months, depending upon specific requirements. The average time in the Army for an ODA team member is around 11 years and teams generally remain intact for several years. These conditions create a mature, experienced and cohesive military unit that thrives in complex and adaptive environments.

By comparison, Conventional Unit soldiers do not receive the same amount of specialty training, averaging about six months prior to arrival at their first unit. Their formations are organized as hierarchical structures that lack the organizational depth and experience of an ODA, and the time in service for the majority of the soldiers is around four years. Although a Conventional Force Brigade formation is not organized, manned or trained at the same level as US SOF elements, if given sufficient time to form and prepare, it can execute SFA tasks. And in many cases, a Conventional Brigade has the internal capability to create and source special purpose Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs) that are beyond even the capabilities of SOF units. This is most apparent in the area of logistics, administration and maintenance support; all three which are areas that have been identified as systemic training weaknesses in current SFA operations.

LTC Allen Pepper, who served as the security cooperation officer on the Mali

Embassy Country Team stated that much of the SFA training effort in Mali focused on building proficient tactical level combat units, platoons and companies. And while those elements became proficient, the supporting structures of logistics and maintenance did not receive the same attention. The inability of the Malian Army to resupply and sustain its forward-deployed forces was seen as one of the contributing factors to their defeat by Tuareg rebels and the al-Qaeda affiliated AQIM and Ansar-Dine forces in 2012.⁶³ The same conditions were observed in OEF-P, "...ODAs focus mainly on training smaller units...and substantial US security assistance funding has not addressed problems in AFP supply and logistics capabilities...despite the improvement in individual units' combat capabilities, the overall sustainability of AFP operations is questionable."⁶⁴

Building sustainable capacity requires development of an internal support structure within partner forces. Developing the units that deliver food, water and ammunition, or those that maintain vehicles and weapons, and still others that ensure payroll is met and records are kept are not SFA tasks that most SOF units are prepared to execute. As LTC Pepper stated, "We should not discount the importance of less glamorous missions, strengthening the various institutions that are essential to sustaining the force."⁶⁵

Conventional Brigades, with six subordinate battalions and 3,500 soldiers, have the organic structure to develop Advisor Teams to meet these institutional training requirements. Coupled with current authorizations to train internal security elements and ministries, there is tremendous potential for developing the long-term sustainability capacity within partner units. By establishing partnerships at every echelon within the

sustainment system, from battalion to ministerial level, SFA units can create parallel systems of tracking requisitions, the processing of forms, the delivery of supplies and the management of inventories at each step of the process. The same concept is applicable for maintenance, finance and administration functions. The idea is not for SFA elements to do the work and create a dependency; rather, the parallel arrangement creates transparency within the system and provides visibility on points of friction that are slowing or stopping key processes. These parallel organizations are manpower-intensive and beyond SOF capability. However, in most imaginable scenarios, a Conventional Brigade can create, man, train and employ these Advisor Teams at every node within the system.

The employment of Conventional Force Units to conduct SFA missions is not a new phenomenon in the US Army. Iraq and Afghanistan were both in large part SFA operations, as Conventional Forces provided the majority of the soldiers and units for those tasks. However, with the Iraq war over and the Afghanistan conflict ending, the US Army will almost certainly re-evaluate how it will source SFA missions in the future. This is not a competition between SOF and Conventional Forces, but it is a subject that will help define the relevance of the Conventional Army well into the future.

Regionally Aligned Forces and Conventional Force Brigades

Moving forward, whenever the Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration exist anywhere in the world, the US military must carefully consider its options to meet global security obligations. The most promising initiative is the US Army's new concept to regionally align Army formations against Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility. The Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) program is expected to be fully in place by the end of FY 2016.⁶⁶ Corps and Division Headquarters and Brigade

Combat Teams will be regionally aligned, but not committed until directed by the Secretary of Defense. These regional alignments provide units with a training focus, an opportunity to build professional relationships between staffs and the pre-employment opportunity to develop a ready pool of regionally astute soldiers and formations upon the request of a Combatant Commander.

In the coming year, an Army Brigade will execute the first in a series of deployments in support of US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The entire Brigade is not deploying at once, and the majority of the planned missions are supported by small formations with specialized capabilities.⁶⁷ However, the real promise of the RAF concept is that if properly applied, there is enormous potential to expand the program of SFA partnership into nations where the Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration exist. Once there, SFA partnerships can start to develop entire security structures prior to safe haven exploitation by al-Qaeda.⁶⁸ The challenge for the Army remains to be SFA Conventional Unit composition, as well as approaching SFA operations as a primary training task.

There are multiple concepts in circulation concerning the “right” structure for a SFA unit. In 2011, Colonel Gary Rosenberg’s *Security Force Assistance and the Brigade Combat Team: Recommendations for a Way Ahead* offered recommendations on structure, essential competencies and training requirements for an SFA Brigade. He argues that the current Brigade Combat Team structure can effectively source SFA missions with augmentation and training, primarily due to the experience level of soldiers that have served in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁶⁹ This argument is sufficient for units

going to execute SFA missions in Afghanistan, but does not fully address the expanded role of SFA as a primary US Army task post-2014.

In 2007, LTC (R) John Nagl recommended the establishment of a standing US Army Advisor Corps with the single purpose of conducting Security Assistance and SFA missions.⁷⁰ Nagl's recommendation takes into account the most likely nature of future threats and he correctly identified that, "The need for well-trained, professional combat advisors is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future... and we are likely to need at least as many, if not more, to cope with challenges of the future security environment."⁷¹ Seeing the validity of Nagl's argument, his description of the nature of future conflict, coupled with current defense guidance to employ small footprint and innovative solutions to security challenges, it seems intuitive that the Army would look at establishing a full-time Advisor Formation, as he suggests. However, it remains unlikely that will happen.

The decision not to create separate Advisor units⁷² in the Army is based upon competing security demands, fiscal and force structure constraints, and the choice to maintain a Conventional Force that is focused primarily on core war-fighting tasks. Advisor centric formations require large numbers of senior non-commissioned officers and officers, which deplete the available pool, and can potentially negatively affect readiness in other combat formations. In this era of competing demands, senior Army leaders acknowledge the requirement to conduct partner nation SFA operations, but ultimately have placed the highest priority of Army training and readiness efforts on preparing for major combat operations on land. As the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ray Odierno remarked in *Foreign Policy*:

The successful conclusion of operations in Iraq and our pending transition in Afghanistan give us an opportunity to reorient the Army towards conflict prevention -- working through engagement with partners and allies across the globe. *However, the ability to win wars on land remains our reason for being.* Potential adversaries must never question whether this nation has the ability to spoil aggressive aims or ultimately reverse illicit gains. We do not seek war, but others must never doubt our ability to win decisively when it occurs.⁷³

So for the foreseeable future, the Brigade Combat Team will continue to serve as the building block for Conventional Force SFA missions. Based on personal experience over six tours of duty between Iraq and Afghanistan, it is my opinion that this approach is not completely insufficient and can work if the units tasked to execute the SFA mission have sufficient time to organize, and more importantly the correct pre-deployment training focus.

Organizing

Mission requirements determine the personnel and equipment composition of SFA units. As part of the RAF program, the Army must demand detailed mission requirements from the joint force Combatant Commanders early in the alignment process, to allow time to organize the Brigade. The Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) provides a three-year cycle for a Brigade to reset, train and then deploy, with each of the three phases lasting for about a year. A Brigade must receive its mission requirements and deployment information early in the first year, or reset phase, of the cycle. This provides the focus for every subsequent organization and manning conference and the development of a SFA mission-specific training plan.

The personnel manning challenge in a Brigade is that many Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams often require senior leaders with unique skill sets that are not organic to the unit. For instance, a rule of law training team requires Army lawyers

and senior paralegal non-commissioned officers; in most Army Brigades there is only one of each. To fill these types of shortages, the Army assigns individual personnel directly to the SFA unit for the duration of the training and deployment period. The assignment cycle requires a minimum of 180 days from request to arrival of personnel to a unit. If the requests are late, then the arrival of personnel starts to overlap into the training phase of the ARFORGEN cycle. To mitigate late personnel additions, the requests for mission-specific personnel must be coordinated and executed within the first 60-90 days of the reset phase. This equates to almost 21 months before the unit is ready to deploy. This kind of long-range planning requires early coordination among the deploying unit, the Combatant Command planning staff, the Country Teams of the nations employing the regionally aligned forces and the US Army Human Resources Command (HRC). The Country Team participation is critical because they best represent the vision and goals of the US Ambassador and can ensure that the unit conducting the SFA mission receives clear guidance on their future role. This establishment of mission requirements early in the ARFORGEN reset phase enables the assignment of advisors with the right qualifications and is a key component to building the SFA organization.

Conventional Force units will likely never reach the level of cohesion seen in a SOF ODA. However, receiving the personnel required for the SFA mission early in the process and given sufficient time to train and develop, Conventional Force units have demonstrated the ability to attain an acceptable level of proficiency.

Training Focus

When the Army aligns a unit to a Regional Combatant Command for employment in a SFA role, the unit must arrive in theater fully trained. This is will be especially

important in the first iterations of RAF deployments. If Combatant Commanders and US Ambassadors do not immediately see the value added of Army SFA formations, it could jeopardize the entire RAF concept. To avoid this, the Army has to ensure SFA missions receive the mission-specific training required, even at the risk of core competency war-fighting task proficiency.

The current US Army training path for RAF units, as they progress towards availability for deployment, emphasizes that Brigades gain proficiency in their core competency tasks, which focus heavily on combined arms maneuver and wide-area security.⁷⁴ Currently, a RAF Brigade must complete a Decisive Action, Culminating Training Event (CTE) at one of the Army's maneuver training centers before the unit is deployed on its assigned mission.⁷⁵ The risk associated with this methodology is that if the Brigade is deploying to conduct a security cooperation mission, then SFA-specific tasks, such as intense culture, language, and host nation security forces familiarization training might not receive the attention preferred by those who favor SFA units. Therefore, once an Army Brigade is designated as a RAF, and receives its SFA mission requirements from the Combatant Commander, those tasks must then become the primary training focus for the unit. Commanders cannot approach SFA tasks as an afterthought to core competency and Decisive Action training.

Continuity

Finally, the Army must avoid episodic engagements with partner nation security forces. To build continuity and lasting relationships with partner nations, SFA units must remain available for deployments into Combatant Command areas of responsibility for a period of up to nine months. SFA missions, with their high premium on partnerships and human relationships demand a commitment to long-term engagements between

partner units. Once a unit reaches the deployment phase in the ARGORGEN model, it is by design available for a year-long deployment. To achieve the full benefit of SFA operations, the duration of deployments must allow sufficient time for the building of relationships and the development of organizational competence.

Conclusion

al-Qaeda and its affiliates still represent a threat to the US and US interests abroad and the number of nations that exhibit many of the Preconditions for al-Qaeda Infiltration remains substantial. Therefore, the US must continue to develop and employ SFA strategies to combat these threats. With the lessons learned over the last ten years in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is clear that the idea of large deployments to disrupt safe haven and foster nation-building are unlikely to be undertaken by the US in the near future. In recent years the US has relied heavily on CT operations, through the use lethal targeting, to disrupt threat networks across the globe. This strategy can be effective against leadership and individuals, but it does not adequately address the requirement to develop sustainable security sector capacity among partner nation security forces. SFA operations develop and build enduring capacity among partners and represent one aspect of the overall campaign plan for a particular nation. Balanced with CT operations, they have demonstrated the ability to effectively reduce the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates from operating in safe havens.

US Army Conventional Forces, employed under the new Regionally Aligned concept, have the potential to become the force of choice for future SFA missions. The ability to develop partner nation security forces, enabling them to secure their state, represents the first and most enduring line of defense against the threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates attempting to operate in safe haven. The US Army must seize the

opportunity to further develop Conventional Force SFA capabilities to ensure it remains a relevant contributor to the fight against al-Qaeda and other transnational terror organizations now and well into the future.

Endnotes

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³ The term *Safe Haven* is often used interchangeably with the word *Sanctuary* throughout much of the literature on the topic. For clarity, *Safe Haven* is used throughout this paper.

⁴ Map of Countries where al-Qaeda and its Affiliates Operate, *The New York Times*, (May 12, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/12/world/12aqmap.html?_r=0 (accessed February 23, 2013)

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¹⁷ Ibid., i.

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³⁹ Nina Serafino, *Security Force Assistance Reform: "Section 1206"-Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2012), 1. ["Section 1206 is the first major authority granted to the Department of Defense expressly for the purpose of training and equipping the national military forces of foreign countries. For almost the past half-century, Department of Defense generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs."], 1.

⁴⁰ Nina Serafino, *Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Overview* (Washington DC, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2013), 4.

⁴¹ Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, "Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming US Planning and Resource Allocation", *MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper*, (June, 2008), 71. <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/WilliamsAdamsOccasionalPaper6-08.pdf>

⁴² Serafino, *Security Force Assistance Reform: "Section 1206"-Background and Issues for Congress*, 6-8.

⁴³ Jennifer D.P. Moroney [et al], "How Successful Are US Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing Countries?: A Framework to Assess the Global Train and Equip "1206" Program" *Rand National Defense Research Institute*, 2011, 23.

⁴⁴ Michele Flournoy and Tammy Schultz, "Shaping U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion Right", *Center for New American Security*, (Washington, DC), 44-45.

⁴⁵ US Department of the Army, *Security Force Assistance*, Army Field Manual 3-07.1(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October, 2009), 1-2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* ,1-3.

⁴⁸ David Ignatius, "Drawing Down but Still Projecting Power" *The Washington Post Opinions*, (March 29, 2013) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-29/opinions/38124062_1_small-wars-usaid-global-network (accessed 3 April 2013).

⁴⁹ DOD Casualty Report as of 15 April 2013, Outside of Afghanistan OEF areas of operation include: Guantanamo Bay, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan,

Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
<http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf> (accessed 15 April 2013).

⁵⁰ Brian M. Burton, "The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach" *National Defense University, Prism* 3, 1 (December 2011): 51. http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/prism3-1/prism_47-62_burton.pdf (accessed 26 February 2013).

⁵¹ Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia*, (Washington DC, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2005), 15.

⁵² Burton, *The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach*, 51.

⁵³ Feickert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism*, 15.

⁵⁴ Burton, *The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach*, 52.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 51

⁵⁷ Dennis Jett, "U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?", *Middle East Policy Council Journal Essay*, (Spring 2010), 1-2.
<http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/us-security-assistance-middle-east> (accessed March 2, 2013).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁹ Dennis Jett, "Losing the War on Terror: Who We Help is Hurting" *Middle East Policy Journal Essay*, 19, no. 3, (Fall 2012): 141, in EBSCO (accessed April 22, 2013).

⁶⁰ Dennis Jett, *U.S. Security Assistance in the Middle East: Helping Friends or Creating Enemies?*, 4.

⁶¹ Dennis Jett, "US Military Support for Troubled States: A Dangerous Doctrine Returns", *Christian Science Monitor*, (August 20, 2010), in EBSCO (accessed April 20, 2013).

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ LTC Allen Pepper, International Military Affairs Chief, USARAF Security Cooperation Division, telephone interview by author, March 5, 2013.

⁶⁴ Burton, *The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach*, 53.

⁶⁵ LTC Allan Pepper, International Military Affairs Chief, USARAF Security Cooperation Division, telephone interview by author, March 5, 2013.

⁶⁶ The implementation of the full Regionally Aligned Force concept will take several years to complete. The initial priority is to begin alignment of Corps and Divisions in Fiscal Year 2013. The Army will formally establish the alignment of I Corps to U.S. Pacific Command, III Corps to U.S. Central Command, and XVIII Corps to the Global Response Force. In addition, in

fiscal year 2013, Army will align divisions to U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa Command. For fiscal year 2014, the Army will align brigades to support theater requirements. Planning is currently underway to align brigades to PACOM, EUCOM and AFRICOM. The projected date for completion of regional alignment is 2016. <http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-12-20>

⁶⁷ Ibid Beginning in March 2013, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division (2/1ID), stationed at Fort Riley, Kan., will support U.S. Africa Command's security cooperation and partnering requirements. 2/1ID will undergo training at the Combat Training Center before embarking on specialized Language, Regional Expertise and Cultural training. Once training is complete, over the course of the next year, teams of Soldiers from the brigade will deploy to multiple African countries to engage in partnering and training events, and to support bilateral and multinational military exercises. <http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-12-20>

⁶⁸For background on building partner military capacity, see LTG(r) James M. Dubik, "Partner Capacity and US Enabling Capabilities," *Army Magazine* (May 2012). http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2012/05/Documents/FC_Dubik_0512.pdf

⁶⁹ Gary Rosenberg, *Security Force Assistance and the Brigade Combat Team: Recommendations for the Way Ahead*. Civilian Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, October 2011), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a565248.pdf>

⁷⁰ Nagl, John A. 2007. "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps," *Future of the U.S. Military Series*, Center for a New American Security, (June 2007). http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf

⁷¹ Ibid., 5

⁷² For background on permanent Advisory Units, see Michele Flournoy and Tammy Schultz, "Shaping U.S. Ground Forces for the Future: Getting Expansion Right", *Center for New American Security*, (Washington, DC), 44.

⁷³ General Ray Odierno, "The Force of Tomorrow", *Foreign Policy*, (February 4, 2013). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/04/the_force_of_tomorrow?page=full (accessed March 1, 2013)

⁷⁴ US Department of the Army, *Unified Land Operations*, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3.0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October, 2011), 6. Army Core Competencies: Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security provide the means for balancing the application of the elements of combat power within tactical actions and tasks associated with offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. It exposes enemies to friendly combat power from unexpected directions and prevents an effective enemy response. Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.

⁷⁵ “Michael J. Knippel, Transformation Integrator, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) G-3/5/7 SPT, telephone interview by author, March, 6, 2013.