

U.S. Policy in Pakistan: Colombia Policy as a Way Forward

by

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**U.S. POLICY IN PAKISTAN:
COLOMBIA POLICY AS A WAY FORWARD**

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ABSTRACT

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Tensions between Pakistan and the United States are arguably at the worst since the two countries have partnered together to fight the “War on Terror”. In part, these tensions may stem from the troubled civil-military relationship inside Pakistan. A Historically the military has always been the key driver of Pakistan’s foreign policy foundation in which Pakistani diplomacy. Elected officials have the burden of not only leading the civilian populace but the military as well. They are struggling with both.

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U.S. POLICY IN PAKISTAN: COLOMBIA POLICY AS A WAY FORWARD

Tensions between Pakistan and the United States are arguably at the worst since the two countries have partnered together to fight the “War on Terror”. How did we get to this point, how do we move forward? The larger question is should we continue to engage with a partner that is frustrating at best and at its worst a partner that seems to aid and assist the very enemy we have declared war on. Both profess to want a deep and serious friendship that will stand the test of time and is more than a series of “transactions.”¹ However, the persistent gap between United States and Pakistani objectives raises fundamental questions about the kind of relationship the two countries can sustain.

This research paper will discuss the external factors of India, Afghanistan, China and Iran influencing our relationship with Pakistan. During this discussion the intent is to lay out the dynamics of South Asia and the role that Pakistan plays within it. It is not my intent to go into detail on each country and its role in regards to Pakistan but rather to give the reader a backdrop of all the different influences within the region that make engagement with Pakistan challenging. I will also discuss the internal factors of the Northern Frontier Area, the Pakistani Military and Government relationship and history of Pakistan in South Asia. Again the intent is to provide the reader with the many dynamics internal to Pakistan. As the reader will quickly deduce these internal factors are causes for even bigger challenges when trying to engage with Pakistan. Finally I will discuss why the U.S. should continue to engage with Pakistan even though very

challenging at times, and then compare and contrast our engagement plan with Colombia as a way to move forward with Pakistan.

Why choose Colombia as a possible model from which to derive an engagement strategy with Pakistan? For both countries it is important to the United States to have stable partners that can govern within its own borders. As we began to engage with Colombia our two countries were not the best of partners. Much like Pakistan the two governments did not see eye to eye and there were many internal actions going on within Colombia that are similar to what we are seeing today in Pakistan. Through all the different dynamics and friction that go on in dealing with another country the U.S. should stay focused on the endstate, and this article argues that the endstate of the United States should be striving for, is a stable nation that can govern within its own borders. This is the link from which we can review our Colombia engagement experience and apply the lessons learned to Pakistan.

External Factors

India. Pakistan and India have a long history of conflict with each other. When the two nations became independent from British rule Kashmir was provided the liberty to choose to become a state within India or Pakistan or become their own nation state. When the ruler of Kashmir decided to keep its independence tribal leaders from Pakistan came to persuade him to change his mind. India saw this as an invasion and sent troops to defend Kashmir. Thus the beginning of a very tumultuous relationship between the nations of Pakistan and India.² In my research I have found that this relationship, although, arguably getting better, has been the largest catalyst for instability in the region. Although Kashmir is a large fissure between India and

Pakistan, the rise of India economically and militarily has caused Pakistan concern in India's perceived military threat. Because Pakistan has not been able to keep up with the rapid economic and military growth of India, Pakistan has allowed safe haven for militant groups that have and continue to disrupt India's rise as a regional power. Unfortunately these same groups continue to try and disrupt U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. To complicate matters even more, Pakistan now has to worry about these very same militant groups turning against its own populace, security and governance apparatus.³

The good news is India and Pakistan are talking. They have held two bi-lateral talks as recently as November and December of 2011.⁴ Although arguably these bi-lateral talks have not resulted in substantial results, they are talking and that is a good sign for not only India and Pakistan but the South Asia Region in general.

China. Pakistan's relationship with China serves as counterweight to Indian influence in South Asia. China also serves as a counterweight to US influence within the country and the region as well. For China, Pakistan is also a counterweight to Indian Influence as well as a possible outlet into the Straights of Hormuz as China and Pakistan develop a deep sea port near the small fishing village of Gwadar. For Pakistan this port provides strategic depth to the southwest from its major naval port in Karachi. For China the village of Gwadar provides a port in which launch naval forces to protect its energy supply line from the middle east. Gwadar is a concern for the US in that it provides China a possible launching point to exert its own influence into the Indian Ocean.⁵ Although China and Pakistan have enjoyed their relationship as regional partners, China is also concerned with extremist safe havens just outside their

south western border and has asked Pakistan to allow them to set up camps near these extremist sites. These concerns may have led to their most recent Joint Exercise in late November focused on counter-terrorism.⁶ China has not only provided equipment to Pakistan but has begun several joint military equipment programs like the JF-17 “Thunder”, a multi- purpose fighter aircraft, that will not only built in Pakistan for the Pakistanis but for other countries looking for a low cost fighter aircraft as part of the military arms inventory.

Afghanistan. In Pakistan’s view, Afghanistan provides strategic depth from India. To understand the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) relationship we have to understand the history of how and why Afghanistan came to become a nation state. In the late 1800s Afghanistan came in to being to serve as a buffer between Russia and British empires. At the time Pakistan was part of British India and the British decided the borders between Afghanistan and British India. This border known as the “Durand Line” has been a point of contention for the two countries since its inception.⁷ The Durand line not only cut across the largest tribe (Pashtun) of Afghanistan and Pakistan but ensured Afghanistan would remain a landlocked country.

If Afghanistan is to provide strategic depth for Pakistan it is in the best interest of Pakistan to have a weak and unstable Afghanistan. Therefore the safe haven and support to extremists that was pointed out by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen in September 2011 to the press has some validity from a Pakistani point of view.⁸ The root of the issue of safe haven and support of extremists groups in Afghanistan partly stems from the Durand Line Agreement.

Iran. While the two neighbors were staunch Cold War allies, the Islamic revolution, Afghanistan's civil war, and Pakistan's nuclear development have transformed the relationship into one of tense rivalry.⁹ This tense rivalry has implication for the stability of Afghanistan as these two adversaries try and gain dominance within the region. The concern is that the Sunni dominated Pakistan and the Shia dominated Iran have been fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan to gain this dominance. With that said the two nations continue to be economic partners. One highlight that may change the dynamics of the South Asia region is the "Peace Pipeline".¹⁰ This natural gas pipeline is to run from Iran through major cities of Pakistan (Karachi, Khudar, Multan) to India. With a scheduled completion date of 2015 this is a perfect example of how economics can help to improve political relations between opposing countries.

Internal Factors

In this section the intent is to lay out the internal dynamics of Pakistan in regards to the Military and Political branches of government and the implications of the extremists groups located along the Southwestern border of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan.

Military and Political Branches of Pakistan. The largest question of these two branches is can the civilian leadership take control of the Military. In Christine Fair Article "Why the Pakistan Army is here to stay" she posits that given the army's massive economic interests, the compulsion to stage future coups is likely to persist. It would appear that untying these various Gordian knots will remain well beyond the capabilities of Pakistan's civilian leaders and institutions for the foreseeable future.¹¹

The history of the Pakistan Army and Civilian Governance has been tumultuous throughout the inception of the Pakistani State. However, most recently when General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani former head of the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISI) took over the post of Army Chief of Staff in November 2007, from then President and Army Chief of Staff Musharraf, Kayani has masterfully restored the people's confidence in the army and convinced international actors that he was a 'dedicated democrat'.¹² Under Musharraf, Pakistan's army became increasingly demoralized through being forced to fight a war against the country's own citizens in support of Washington's war on terror. As Pakistan's own citizenry turned against the army, the army turned on Musharraf.¹³ General Kayani artfully brought the reputation of the Army up not only domestically but internationally as well. Although the partnership of General Kayani and the Pakistani military with the U.S. Military has been relatively solid throughout his tenure as Army Chief of Staff there are times when he can frustrate not only U.S. Military relations, but because the military is still so intertwined with civilian governance, he and his policies can frustrate the U.S. attempts in supporting the civilian government as well. A very important item to bring out at this point is that although President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani administration are relatively weak in the eyes of domestic and international community they look to serve out their entire term as leaders of the Pakistani government. Which in Pakistan is almost unheard of as most administrations are taken over by a coup or voted out of office prior to the next round of elections. Although this may be only a glimmer of hope, it is still a big step in providing the civilian government the opportunity to take control of its military at some point in the near future.

Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate and extremists groups in Pakistan. At the time of 9/11 there were more than forty extremist groups in the country who all had links with the ISI and the mainstream Islamic parties.¹⁴ Just from this knowledge alone we can begin to understand the uphill battle the U.S. had in dealing with Pakistan and the war on terrorism. Pakistan had enjoyed relative calm and stability as long as it continued to support these extremist groups prior to 9/11. Now that the spotlight was turned on Pakistan and its leadership, the ISI began a dual strategy of publicly denouncing these groups while supporting them with a clandestine organization outside of the Pakistani military and government apparatus. In this duality the ISI could show support for the war on terrorism by conducting raids and even capturing some high level al Qaeda targets like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the planner of 9/11, and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawasawi, al Qaeda's chief financial officer and fund raiser, who had set up thirty-five bank accounts in the United States for the 9/11 hijackers.¹⁵ However this strategy has caused the ISI to lose its grip on controlling these groups as they have become wary of being supported on one hand and raided on another. This has caused turmoil internally within Pakistan and brought terrorist activities within its own borders and against its own citizenry as well as its leadership. There are many extremist groups inside of Pakistan. Some are worse than others, some are disrupting operations in Afghanistan while others are conducting terrorist operations against India. Other extremist groups have even caused China to take steps in preventing leakage of terrorist activities along their border. For Pakistan and its citizenry even worse are some of these very same extremists groups that were so connected to the government

apparatuses of Pakistan have now turned on them and caused over 13,000 casualties as well as 3,000 killed in action.¹⁶

The intent behind this portion of this research paper to this point has been to show the many layers of Pakistan's domestic, regional and international politics. These layers or as has been laid out in this paper, Internal and External Factors, although different geographically and with different players are some of the same factors that the U.S. Government and the U.S. Military had to deal with in Colombia and fighting the "War on Drugs".

In this next section I will compare and contrast the U.S. engagement strategy with Colombia and Pakistan.

Upfront I posited that what the U.S. policy objectives from Pakistan is a stable nation that can govern within it's own borders. We wanted the very same policy objectives from Colombia although the U.S. strategy initially was very specific towards stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. As with Pakistan our strategy has been very specific in stopping the flow of manpower (extremist groups and even more to the point al Qaeda) from disrupting operations in Afghanistan. The point here is that it is time that the United States take the long view and ensure that Pakistan understands that the United States not only wants to be their partner now but into the future as well. Although in the immediate time frame the U.S. objective for Pakistan is their support in stopping the flow of extremist manpower across the border into Afghanistan, the United States has to put emphasis on the long term commitment as well. This broadening strategy with Pakistan may help to instill confidence that the United States is in it for the long term. In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, Moeed Yusuf, Asia Adviser, Center for Conflict Management, U.S. Institute of Peace, pointed out that Pakistan's number one complaint vis-à-vis the U.S. has always been and is that Washington has proven to be an undependable partner.¹⁷ So how does the U.S. change this perception? Should we change this perception? The obvious answer to the second question is yes the U.S. must change the perception of only being a part time partner. The harder question to answer is the first question, especially when Pakistan hasn't been the best of partners. Taking a look at the Colombia experience and the successes and frustrations we had there may help.

The success of Colombia and the disruption of the flow of drugs into the U.S. was thirty years in the making.¹⁸ It was only when the U.S. strategy changed in 2002 and broadened the aperture of engagement that success of the "War on Drugs" began to occur from a U.S. perspective as well as a stabilized nation that could govern within its own borders.¹⁹ Although there are arguably many reasons why the Colombia experience was a success, there were many frustrations along the way. However, supporting our partners and slowly developing mutually beneficial strategies helped to pave the way to a successful partnership.

Our reputation, right or wrong in the South Asia region, of a short-term partner has some precedence as when we worked with Pakistan and Afghanistan to develop a strategy to expel the U.S.S.R out of Afghanistan. Once that task was accomplished in 1989 the U.S. could no longer certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and the Pressler Amendment of 1986 was enacted in 1990 and Pakistan stopped receiving U.S. military assistance and economic aid.²⁰

In 1985, Congress adopted the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This amendment bans most economic and military assistance to

Pakistan unless the President can certify on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device and that U.S. aid would reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such a device. Although Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, and revealed in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device, the U.S. would continue to certify Pakistan's non-nuclear status until 1990.²¹

So how do we change our reputation of a short term partner to a long term partner that is not only looking for short term support but looking to develop a solid bond to help Pakistan become a positive influence within the region? Unfortunately time is probably the real answer but in today's environment and ongoing operations in Operation Enduring Freedom we have to be very clear in our objectives, however, as in Colombia, Pakistan gets a vote as well and we have to acknowledge and focus on those objectives as well. As pointed out by the author Howard B. Schaffer in *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States*. The United States and Pakistan can still work together in support of the objectives they share, though these may need to be more carefully defined than in the past.²² In Colombia the United States primary objective was to fight narco-trafficking, not to assist Colombia in other endeavors. However, in 2002, the United States modified its policy and agreed to support Colombia's fight against its long-term internal security threat—narco-terrorists.²³ Once the United States policy towards Colombia changed, the two nations began to have success in stabilizing Colombia and disrupting drug traffic to the United States, which was its primary concern. In effect the United States received a “two for one”: Success in disrupting drug trafficking and a stable Colombian government capable of securing and governing within their own borders. In Pakistan although our short term goal is, and should be, preventing safe haven to terrorists, and blocking these terrorists from entering into Afghanistan and disrupting NATO operations, the United States should

also take the long view in our partnership and help Pakistan stabilize itself within its own borders and with its neighbors, namely India. As I pointed out in external factors Pakistan almost defines itself with its perception of an impending attack from India although India has no inclination to do anything like that. If Pakistan believes that there main threat is India then it is incumbent on the U.S. to help the peace process between the two nations along. They have met as recently as November and December of 2011, so discussions are taking place, however, the United States should continue to push both sides to move forward. For decades Pakistan has made “deals with the devil” to allow militant proxies safe haven in Pakistan, to disrupt India’s internal security and still provide plausible deniability. If the U.S. can continue to be a catalyst for negotiations between India and Pakistan, the Pakistani leadership will have no excuse but to deal with these militants inside their borders. This would not only be a win for India but a win for China and more importantly from a U.S. and NATO perspective a win for Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan has a win in that it is meeting head on, one of its most lethal internal threats as well as being an active member in stabilizing the South Asia region.

This shift will not occur overnight, but as in Colombia, the momentum of a strong Pakistan with the United States in support will shift from focusing on external threats and begin to focus on internal threats which in turn will allow the U.S. Military to Military engagement to become stronger. The strengthening partnership will in turn, continue to show our resolve that the United States will stand with Pakistan if neighboring nations begin to encroach on their sovereignty. There is no doubt that there will still be much frustration as our cultures are very different, but as we learned in working with the

Colombians, working with a host nation towards a common problem is more effective and less frustrating in the long run.

As Ramsey points out, teamwork takes a team.²⁴ The U.S. has to work with the host nation and not “on” the host nation. Pakistan may feel as if we are working “on” more than “with” their military. An example is the mission to take down Usama bin Laden which has had serious ramifications for military and civilian personnel still in Pakistan. This operation and the lack of communication really points to the distrust of the two governments. This was a very important mission and the U.S. did what was best for the mission in regards to operational security but the Pakistan government directed that the U.S. make its military footprint smaller. In May the U.S. military had more than 200 military personnel in Pakistan, all assigned to the Office of the Defense Representative – Pakistan (ODRP) – a liaison office to the Pakistani military. Also included in that number are about 100 military trainers whose job it is to “train the trainers” within the Pakistani Frontier Corps, the paramilitary group that serves within the tribal areas that border Afghanistan.²⁵ The bin Laden mission and the most recent engagement of Pakistani troops in new outposts along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border in late November continues to strain relations between the U.S. and Pakistan. Most recently, Pakistan retaliated by closing down U.S. and NATO supply routes into Afghanistan. However, there is an opportunity now for the U.S. to take a step back, look at how we were successful in Colombia and apply it to Pakistan in future engagements.

Comparison

Common Problem. In Colombia the United States eventually took the long view at the common problem and began to apply resources with a small military footprint and worked with host nation to help them solve the common problem. In Pakistan the United States needs to ensure that we are taking the long view, which is stability in South Asia mainly between Pakistan and India but more specifically preventing safe haven for militant factions and terrorists (common problem) inside Pakistan that disrupt day to day activities within their own borders but also allows these militant groups to develop trans-national terrorists that disrupt day to day activities regionally and throughout the international community. As with Colombia, the U.S. Congress, which has been very vocal about cutting all support to Pakistan should stay focused on continuing to shape negotiations around the common problem and apply appropriate military resources (manpower, material) specifically to preventing safe haven in Pakistan while the Executive Branch continues to develop discourse between Pakistan and India and tie monetary, material and training incentives, to continued progress towards peace negotiations.

Develop and focus on the common problem. In the case of Pakistan, the United States must work hard to promote the reputation of being a long-term partner, focused on a stable environment to allow the nation of Pakistan to govern within its own borders as well as becoming a leader in developing stability in South Asia region. Although in the short-term the United States wants the support of the Pakistani Military in denying safe haven to extremist groups and prevent cross border incursions of these elements, the salient point is that the U.S. objective should to be long term partners and support

the Pakistan government in securing their borders and effectively governing within them. One of the key points to attaining this goal is to face the ever growing extremist threat within their own borders. This is the United States' biggest objective because of military operations within Afghanistan but this shouldn't be the only objective when engaging with Pakistan.

Take the long view. Working “with” the host nation and not “on” the host nation.²⁶ From a military perspective this is a tough pill to swallow in regards to Pakistan, even more so with allegations of the ISI and the military being at a minimum, complicit with militant groups inside their borders. However, changing the culture of an organization takes time and ultimately the Pakistani military and security forces will have to do it their way. As in Colombia, when our small units had the time to work and train with their counterparts the Colombian forces, overtime became more professional and they took the fight to the enemy in their own way and were successful, while the U.S. military worked in a supporting role. As in Colombia the Pakistan Military is in most regards the most capable branch of the government apparatus. Although the Pakistani military is arguably one of the most corrupt organizations within the government apparatus. Especially when looking into ISI activities and the duality of openly supporting the attacks and raids on extremists groups but clandestinely supporting them at the same time. Colombia's military had a reputation of being corrupt as well, in the beginning. The Colombian Military had a poor human rights record and had been uncooperative---unable, if not unwilling, to maintain a strict distinction between counterdrug and counterinsurgency operations.²⁷ However, in regards to Pakistan's military, although frustrating at times, especially with the urgency of the war in Afghanistan, continuing to

work at the small unit level, will eventually grow their military into a more professional force. A force like Colombia that will be different from our own but will have the capability to secure its own borders and prevent safe haven for militant groups currently operating within their borders.

Contrast

Civilian Leadership. The largest contrast is the Civilian Governments of Colombia and Pakistan. Although Colombia had a weak civilian government early on in our engagement strategy, eventually a charismatic leader (Alvaro Uribe Velez) was elected in 2002 and President Uribe set about a new and fresh approach in his *Democratic Security and Defense Policy*, which radically reoriented the state's posture from negotiating with to confronting its principal security challenge, an insurgency inextricably linked to the narcotics trade and other criminal activity.²⁸ He took charge of his country's security apparatus and gave it a mission and the resources to achieve that mission. We supported that mission through small unit training and advising. The eventual outcome was a nation that could secure its own borders and disrupt the trafficking of narcotics to the U.S.

Pakistan unfortunately has a Civilian Government administration headed by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and President Asif Ali Zardari that continues to be weak due to infighting among its own party and inability to truly take charge of the security apparatus that supposedly serves his administration. Although in Pakistani terms this administration has been fairly successful as it may be the one of the few administrations to serve out its full term without being overthrown or voted out since the start of the democratic movement. The silver lining is that elections are due in 2013 and

there is opportunity for a charismatic leader to step forward and face the regional and domestic issues that are facing South Asia and Pakistan today.

The Nuclear Equation. Another contrast between these two countries is Pakistan is a Nuclear state. Pakistan has nuclear military capability that has been built up over time to defend against their perceived threat of India. The larger concern is that if Pakistan remains unstable or worse falls to one of the radical Islamic parties that this nuclear capability may fall into the wrong hands. Although there are a myriad of scenarios that could happen if this were to occur, an unstable Pakistan is not in the best interest of the region and the international community. If anything this may be the most important reason to continue to engage with Pakistan and help its government apparatuses to become stable and capable of governing within its own borders.

Operation Enduring Freedom. The glaring contrast between Colombia and Pakistan is there are military operations going on in Afghanistan. Although there were tensions between governments within Central and South America, the “War on Drugs” in Colombia was not being influenced or influencing other countries bordering the country. In Pakistan, however, OEF not only began a renewed partnership with the United States but continues to influence that partnership to this day. The largest influence from a NATO perspective is the safe haven that extremist groups have enjoyed within the borders of Pakistan long before the renewed partnership. Frustrating as it may be the long view and common problem needs to be emphasized when negotiating with Pakistan.

Conclusion

The Pakistan and United States relationship has been a rocky one but it has also been a relationship that can bring about successful outcomes. Especially when the goals we want to attain can be clearly articulated into short term goals but focused on the long term for both countries. Examples of success are expelling U.S.S.R out of Afghanistan or more recently the concerted effort by our two countries to help the Pakistani populace during the floods of 2008. Although they seem worlds apart there is much the United States can glean from its engagement strategy with Colombia and apply it to our current situation in Pakistan. Ultimately the United States wants, as with Colombia, a Pakistan that can secure its own borders and govern in between them. We want Pakistan to not only be an ally in the region but a stabilizing force in South Asia, just as we wanted for Colombia. The Pakistani Military is one of the more professional militaries in the world but lacks civilian leadership as in Colombia. However, given the right mission and supported by the United States working “with” not “on” the Pakistani military can be a powerful and stabilizing force within South Asia.

There is no doubt that negotiating with Pakistan is a tall order for the United States and one that will continue to frustrate both countries as an engagement strategy moves forward. Rather than assume that a long-term relationship is out of reach, U.S. policymakers and negotiators should accept that some important areas will remain outside the ambit of the larger U.S.-Pakistan understanding.²⁹ It is however, necessary, to not only the NATO mission in Afghanistan but to the stability of South Asia and the international community. Our engagement strategy with Colombia worked and produced an outcome beneficial to both countries. In truth, there was no great model or

elaborate plan. Rather, a long-term trial-and-error process that included major policy changes, misunderstandings, frustrations, and mistakes by Americans and Colombians alike eventually produced the improvements in Colombian security that have led to progress in governance and counter-narcotics efforts.³⁰ A detailed look at how the U.S. strategy in Colombia came about and how it was executed may be a way forward in our partnership with Pakistan.

Endnotes

¹ Howard B. Schaffer, *How Pakistan negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* (Washington D.C. United States Institute for Peace, 2011), 180.

² Barry Bearak, "Kashmir a Crushed Jewel Caught in the Vise of Hatred" *The New York Times*, August 12, 1999. This article is one of the best I have found that encapsulates the history of Jammu-Kashmir from the beginning of the conflict to present day.

³ Christine Fair, "Why the Pakistan Army is here to stay: Prospects for civilian Governance" *International Affairs*, 2011, p573. Many Pakistanis continue to believe that India does not accept Pakistan as a separate state and seeks to reabsorb it despite the fact that India has long recognized Pakistan and would probably have no interest in the state at all were it not for the fact that groups based in and backed by Pakistan continue to assault India and its citizenry.

⁴ Tom Hussain, India, "Pakistan renew talks to avert nuclear clash"; *The Miami Herald*, December 27, 2011

⁵ Sanjeev Miglani, "In Pakistan's Gwadar port, Chinese whispers grow", *Reuters Afghan Journal*, May 29, 2011, <http://blogs.reuters.com/afghanistan/2011/05/26/in-pakistans-gwadar-port-chinese-whispers-grow/> (accessed January 12, 2012)

⁶ Pakistan and China hold Joint Military Exercises; *Associated Press*, November 25, 2011, <http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/pakistan-and-china-hold-joint-military-exercises-152953> (accessed January 10, 2012)

⁷ Sultan I. Rome, "The Durand Line Agreement (1893)-- pros and cons", *Valleyswat.net* http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/The_Durand_Line_Agreement.pdf, 12. (accessed January 10, 2011) An excellent interpretation of the this agreement (although still in dispute) that lays out where the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan

⁸ Eyder Peralta, "ADM Mullen Sticks by his assertion that Pakistan supports extremist Network", *NPR.org*, September 28, 2011 <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/09/29/140898616/adm-mullen-sticks-by-his-assertion-that-pakistan-supports-extremist-network> (accessed September 29, 2011)

⁹ Harsh V. Pant, "Pakistan and Iran's dysfunctional relationship", *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2009, pg 43-55 <http://www.meforum.org/2119/pakistan-and-irans-dysfunctional-relationship> (accessed on January 11, 2012)

¹⁰ Shamila N. Chaudhary, "Iran to India Natural Gas Pipeline: Implications for conflict resolution & regionalism in India, Iran, and Pakistan"; *Ted Case Studies* (<http://www1.american.edu/ted/iranpipeline.htm> (accessed on January 12, 2012))

¹¹ Christine Fair, "Why the Pakistan Army is here to stay: Prospects for civilian Governance", 588.

¹² Ibid, pg 579.

¹³ Ibid, pg 578.

¹⁴ Ahmed Rashid, "*Descent into Chaos, The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia*" (New York, NY: Penguin Books Group 2009), 220 The author and this book specifically in Chapter 11 "Double-Dealing with Islamic Extremism, Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan" do a superb job of depicting the inter-relationship and the support provided by ISI and its own internal clandestine organization to the extremists groups not only affecting U.S. NATO operations in Afghanistan but its ongoing war by proxy with India.

¹⁵ Ibid, pg 225.

¹⁶ Ayaz Gul, "Pakistan's Military Pays High Price in War on terrorism" Voice of America, September 08, 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/south/Pakistan-Military-Pays-High-Price-in-War-on-Terrorism-129444778.html> (accessed April 10, 2012)

¹⁷ Moeed Yusuf, *U.S Policy and its Limits in Pakistan*, Senate Foreign Relations, (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 1.

¹⁸ Robert D. Ramsey, "From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience 1998-2009.", *Combat Studies Institute*. December 2009, 155.

¹⁹ Ibid, 156.

²⁰ Howard B. Schaffer, *How Pakistan negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 8.

²¹ Steve LaMontagne, "India-Pakistan Sanctions Legislation Fact Sheet" *The center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*, http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nonproliferation/articles/india_pakistan_sanctions/ (accessed February 6, 2012)

²² Ibid, 182.

²³ Robert D. Ramsey, "From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience 1998-2009.", 156.

²⁴ Ibid, 157.

²⁵ Luis Martinez, "Pakistan asked U.S. to reduce Military numbers in Pakistan", *ABC News*, May 25, 2011 <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/pakistan-asked-us-to-reduce-us-military-numbers-in-pakistan/> (accessed September 20, 2011)

²⁶ Robert D. Ramsey, "From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience 1998-2009.", 157.

²⁷ Ibid, 20.

²⁸ Marks Thomas A Ph.D. "A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC", Stability Operations in the Western Hemisphere, CALL NEWSLETTER 11-15, FEB 11, 47 <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-15/11-15.pdf#page=47> (Accessed January 30, 2012)

²⁹ Howard B. Schaffer, *How Pakistan negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster*, 180.

³⁰ Robert D. Ramsey, "From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience 1998-2009.", 151.