


Civilian Research Project Senior Service College Fellow

The Role of the Reserve Component in the 21st Century

by

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United States Army National Guard



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

I. Introduction

The United States has developed a finely honed and effective military force that includes both active and reserve component units and personnel to fight and win the Nation's wars. How does the United States maintain the magnificent military posture that its active and reserve units have attained? The nation faces rapidly changing challenges; where and how are investments made that allow for relevant cost and benefit? While this paper may not have all the answers, the one that is clear is that the nation's fiscal woes, and its habits of the past, will push it to repeat the mistakes that led to Task Force Smith: a symbol of the price the military pays when not prepared due to being underfunded and stretched beyond capabilities. American soldiers and leaders have the obligation to work towards a smarter solution, a leadership solution, and create a better and more fiscally sustainable model that also is better suited for the future of its military. In March 2011, the US Army Reserve submitted a Posture Statement to the 112th Congress, Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, that indicated "We are now at a point where current and projected demands for Army forces will require continued access to the Army's reserve components, making real what has been in policy for some time. This means that mobilization and operational use of reserve component Soldiers and units will have to continue for the foreseeable future. The Army of the 21st century will require a versatile mix of tailorable and adaptable organizations—both active component and reserve component—interdependently operating on a rotational cycle."¹ This cycle also depends on the type and availability of forces in demand from combatant commanders and/or civil authorities.

The Commission on National Guard and Reserves, published in April 2011, cites that an “uncertain security environment ahead and the challenging fiscal realities faced by our government make obvious the necessity for more flexible sources of manpower that are better able to respond rapidly in the homeland, that can be efficiently increased in times of need, and that can be reduced in a way that economically preserves capability when requirements diminish.”² Proposed in 1817 by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, the peacetime “expansible” Army could rapidly grow in wartime without diminishing its capabilities. During peacetime the Army would maintain a complete organization of companies and regiments with a full complement of unit and staff officers and a small number of enlisted men. In wartime, the Army would quickly recruit and train young soldiers to fill the ranks while the experienced full time military officers would be responsible for leadership, staff planning and training. Although Calhoun’s proposal was not adopted in his own time, today’s Reserve Component support to the Active Duty could be viewed as an updated version of his concept. In December 2002 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs cited “The reserves will continue to make a significant contribution to the nation’s defense. As the Total Force transforms to meet the challenges of the future, it is essential that the Reserve components be part of the transformation.”³ Each Reserve component contributes to the Total Force in different ways, spanning the spectrum from dedicated peacetime roles to wartime support alongside their active-duty counterparts. Today the Guard and Reserve have been integrated into the planning and execution of all military operations and have been an essential element to their success.

II. History

A. Reserve Component Structure

The Reserve components are located in thousands of cities across the United States. While integrated into the total military force, these service members are part-time personnel. They are citizen soldiers who play a dual role as both professional military personnel and responsible citizens in their communities. Thus, Reserve component personnel are a vital link between the military and the American public. A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in 2007 provides the historical data. “Immediately following the end of World War II, Congress enacted two laws that affected the organizational structure and manpower strengths of the reserve components. In July 1947, Congress enacted Pub.L.No. 80–253, the National Security Act of 1947. Section 207 of this law established within the U.S. military a separate Department of the Air Force, defined to include all of its reserve components.”⁴

Late in 1947, the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, chartered a special board to examine the best use of the country’s reserve forces. “The Gray Board recommended the merger of the National Guard and Reserves into a federally controlled force called the ‘National Guard of the United States.’”⁵ A recommendation to merge the Guard and the Reserves was quickly dismissed by Congress, despite claims that it would produce military and fiscal efficiencies. “This conclusion was based on the finding that the National Guard— with its dual state and federal allegiances—was not suitable for the Cold War.”⁶ “In June 1948, Congress enacted Pub.L.No. 80–759, the Selective Service Act of 1948, providing for the call-up of National Guard and other reserve component forces at the discretion of Congress or the president. Section

1 (d) of this law states as policy that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, both Ground and Air, as an integral part of the first line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured. To this end, it is the intent of the Congress that whenever Congress shall determine that units and organizations are needed for the national security in excess of those of the Regular components of the Ground Forces and the Air Forces, and those in active service, the National Guard of the United States, both Ground and Air ... together with such units of the Reserve components as are necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active Federal service and continued therein so long as such necessity exists.”⁷ A number of factors, to include spending cut and mission requirements, have increased today’s reliance on the Reserve Components as part of the Total Force policy to include the Abrams doctrine (named after the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1970's, General Creighton Abrams, who encouraged the concept of a seamless merging of the active and reserve components in order to ensure a commitment of support by the American public).

“In response to some of the deficiencies with the Korean mobilization, Pub.L.No. 66–476, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, set out new policies for reserve forces. Section 201 (a) of this act established as general policy that the reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States are maintained for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to meet the requirements of the Armed forces of the United States in excess of those of the Regular components thereof, during and after the period needed for procurement and training of additional trained units and qualified individuals to achieve the planned mobilization. Sections 202 and 204 of the act established seven reserve components (the National Guard of the United

States, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, and the Coast Guard Reserve) and three levels of reserves (ready, standby, and retired), of which the Ready Reserve had the highest priority.”⁸

The Ready Reserve was liable for active duty activation in a time of war or a time of national emergency called by either the President or the Congress. The Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserves could only be activated in times of war or congressionally declared emergencies, which included various levels and limitations. The National Guard was placed entirely in the Ready Reserve. Throughout the Cold War, defense planning was primarily based on the threat of a global war with the Soviet Union.

B. Transformation

Transformation is necessary to ensure that the American military continues to be prepared for current, emerging, and future challenges. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted a variety of efforts to reorganize reserve forces during his tenure from 1961-1968. “From April to July 1962, at the request of the full committee chairman, a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee conducted a ‘comprehensive inquiry into the defense posture of the Reserve components of our Armed Forces.’”⁹ “The rationale behind the restructuring was to increase combat readiness, achieve cost savings, and eliminate all units for which there was no military requirement. In 1964, using essentially the same rationale as proposed in 1817 by John C. Calhoun, Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed merging all reserve components of the army; the difference was they would be under the management of the National Guard. Another significant difference was that with the implementation of his plan, the Army Reserve technically would continue to exist, but it would consist of individuals, not units. These individuals would participate in summer training and serve as trainees who could be called up in

the event of a national emergency. Of course, this proposal was again an attempt to produce military and fiscal efficiencies by reducing administrative overhead and eliminating a duplicative administrative structure. However, legislators upset by the proposal to merge reserve components under National Guard control held hearings and ultimately a sub-committee opposed the merger of the reserve components as not in the national interest.

“In 1965 the Department of Defense and the nation’s leadership were at odds regarding the role of reserve forces in Vietnam, with the Department of Defense in favor of deployment, and the politicians opposed. McNamara, following his setback in Congress, announced the creation of a Select Reserve Force, a 150,000-member joint Guard and Reserve force that trained diligently for service in Vietnam, but ultimately was never sent there. In fact, the Select Reserve Force was abolished in 1969.”¹⁰

C. The Total Force

A turnaround for reserve forces came when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1969-1973) introduced the Total Force Concept, which advocated the integration of active-duty and reserve forces into a “total force,” with reserve forces responsible for augmenting their active counterparts. Half of the military’s combat forces were assigned to the active component, and two-thirds of the combat support/combat service support forces were placed in the reserve components. This concept also identified reserve component round out battalions and brigades to train and fight as part of parent active duty units. The Total Force Concept was motivated by a combination of Congressional cuts in defense spending and the pending abolition of the draft. In 1973, the year the draft was abolished, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced that the Total Force Concept had become the Total Force Policy, “which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole.”¹¹

During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff (1972-1974), General Creighton Abrams made structural changes that limited the President's ability to commit the Army during conflict. "In addition to using National Guard brigades to round out active-duty Army divisions, shifting of most of the Army's combat service support function to the reserve component meant that even the smallest commitment of Army units during a contingency would require a call up of reserves."¹²

In 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger continued to support the Total Force Policy. Weinberger added the "First to Fight" principle for resource allocation, according to which "units that fight first shall be equipped first, regardless of component".¹³

When actual combat commenced for Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991, 23,000 Army National Guard troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia. On the next day, President George H.W. Bush mobilized almost one million reservists for two years.¹⁴

On December 31, 1990, the Pentagon's Total Force Policy Report to Congress, which was mandated by Public Law No. 101-510, the Fiscal Year 1991 Defense Authorization Act, recommended that active-duty forces "be able to deploy rapidly to trouble spots and to sustain themselves for the first thirty days with virtually no support from the reserve components," according to the U.S. Army's official historical summary for 1990-91.¹⁵

However, a smaller Army vision faced challenges; a smaller Army meant continued reliance on the reserve component to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency, and to be prepared for large scale threats. The evolution of the Total Force Policy had to play a greater role in meeting this country's future security needs.

The recommendations of the Total Force Policy Report and the decision not to deploy Round out Brigades to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm led the Pentagon to phase out

the Round out Strategy after Operation Desert Storm. Instead, the Army adopted a ‘Roundup Strategy,’ which established a new contingency corps prepared for immediate deployment to a war zone. This corps consisted entirely of five active-duty divisions, with an Army Reserve brigade assigned to each division for backup and subsequent deployment.¹⁶

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2001-2006) was a strong advocate to a policy of military transformation: a policy aimed at transforming the military into a more agile force prepared to counter asymmetric threats from terrorist groups.¹⁷ This capabilities-based approach focused on the how vs. whom the adversary might be or where a conflict might occur.

Each of the Reserve Components proposed initiatives in attempts to transform their service capabilities that aimed at integration and cost savings.

Army Secretary Thomas E. White announced in September 2002, the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ARNGRI), stating that this initiative would “improve the structure and training of the Army National Guard in order to better align it with other ongoing Army Transformation programs and the latest defense strategy.”¹⁸

In 2004 the Marine Corps conducted a Total Force Structure Review. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 10, 2005, General Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps described the impact of initiatives based on this review by stating: “In the reserve component these structure initiatives will increase the capability of Marine Forces Reserve Command to better respond to the Global War on Terror.”¹⁹

In 2004 a policy was pursued by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs William A. Navas, Jr. to transform and integrate the active and reserve Navy. He linked the Active Reserve Integration (ARI) policy to the “Naval Reserve Redesign” study completed in 2002 by Admiral William Fallon and Harvey Barnum.²⁰

In 2005 Ms. Janet St. Laurent, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, submitted a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that developed a total force structure plan for the Air Force, including a reorganization of the Air National Guard, over the next 20 years.²¹ In 2007 the transformation of the Air Force Reserve had begun. Three elements were involved in this transformation: the Total Force Initiative, the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and Program Budget Directive 720.²²

III. Roles and Responsibility

A. Homeland Defense / Civil Support

“The Reserve Component is an integral element of the Total Force and plays a key role in DoD responsibilities associated with homeland defense, civil support, and emergency preparedness. The specialized low density/high demand skill sets in the National Guard – coupled with their unique relationship with civil authorities at the local and state level – often translates into deployment locally within the first 24 hours of an event. Additionally, some Reserve Component forces possess specialized homeland defense and/or civil support skills that are limited in the Active Component. This provides the capability to execute a synchronized military response. Whether built into operational and contingency plans as friendly forces available for coalition-style, cooperative operations, or addressed directly as assigned forces under specified command arrangements such as Joint Task Force (JTF) augmentation, the use of National Guard and Reserve Component forces, as an integral part of the Total Force package, helps bridge the gap and ensures that those forces remain an essential partner in the defense of the Homeland.”²³

Homeland defense and civil support are Total Force responsibilities. In June 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. The document addressed DoD’s roles in the homeland defense mission and support to civil authorities.

In October 2007, they released Version 2.0 of Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (JOC). These documents provided strategic goals, objectives and guidance to the relevant Homeland Defense activities including deterring and preventing attacks and protecting critical defense/civilian infrastructures, while simultaneously preparing for and responding to incidents.

Currently the Army provides support to civil authorities as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is defined in Field Manual (FM) 3-28 “Civil Support Operation” and aligns with the National Response Framework published by the Department of Homeland Security. DSCA includes activities of all DoD components providing military support to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories and possessions. It does not apply to foreign disasters or foreign humanitarian assistance. The focus of DoD support and response is assignment and allocation of DoD resources to support civil authorities during civil emergencies arising during peace, war, or transition to war. These incidents include terrorist threats or attacks, major natural or manmade disasters, other emergencies, and National Security Special Events. In general, Federal law prohibits direct, active use of Army and Air Force federal military personnel in civilian law enforcement, except under circumstances authorized by the constitution or act of congress. The DoD provides federal military forces, DoD civilians, and contract personnel in response to an approved request for assistance from civil authorities.²⁴

In September 2004, a research report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense based on directives in the QDR dated September 30, 2001. “Efforts to enhance civil support capabilities that could be made available quickly on a short-term basis generally have sought to improve the capabilities of local first responders (e.g., through federally funded training and equipping programs, assistance in planning, and exercises). This focus has

recognized that local first responders are likely to be more responsive than other (e.g., federal) capabilities, and that embracing an all-hazards philosophy by adding capabilities to existing civilian first responders (firefighters, hazardous materials [HAZMAT], emergency medical technicians) can result in a more efficient allocation of resources than would otherwise be the case. These efforts should continue if they will improve the responsiveness and capacity of the overall response and if doing so is cost-effective. That said, there may be situations (e.g., when the costs of proliferating expensive technologies or other capabilities to the local level are prohibitive) that make it attractive to develop and field AC or RC capabilities whose responsiveness, capacity, and cost-effectiveness justify such action.”²⁵

One approach to facilitate the transition to civil support operations at home would to regionalize Reserve Component forces in terms of planning, training, and exercise, congruent with FEMA regions.

B. Overseas Partnership Missions

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. “The National Guard’s 65-nation, 20-year-old State Partnership Program (SPP) provides unique partnership capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors through partnerships between U.S. states, territories and the District of Columbia and foreign countries.”²⁶

As changes occurred within the Soviet Union, between 1989 and 1991, U.S. government officials explored options to minimize instability and encourage democratic governments. One effort to address these goals was to expand military-to-military contacts with the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. “The SPP supports U.S. national interests and

security cooperation goals by engaging partner nations via military, socio-political and economic conduits at the local, state and national level. The SPP evolved from a 1991 U.S. European Command decision to set up the Joint Contact Team Program in the Baltic Region with Reserve component Soldiers and Airmen. A subsequent National Guard Bureau proposal paired U.S. states with three nations emerging from the former Soviet Bloc and the SPP was born, becoming a key U.S. security cooperation tool, facilitating cooperation across all aspects of international civil-military affairs and encouraging people-to-people ties at the state level.”²⁷

Expansion of this program to further help partner countries understand and expand their knowledge base in emergency preparedness, disaster response, consequence management, military education and the necessity for civilian control of the military lends itself well in meeting strategic goals while taking advantage of those primary skill sets. America’s partnership alliances should not be limited to just training and equipping non-US forces, which may or may not be part of a coalition, but to improving collective capabilities within and across the military, both Active and Reserve Component.

The Department of Defense in 2005 indicated that to implement these strategies, it will continue to adapt to changes in the strategic environment, incorporate lessons learned from operational experience, and capitalize on emerging technology and operational concepts.”²⁸

C. Stability / Combat Operations

“Conventional military conflict may no longer be the most useful way to win wars, and it could even be a liability if not used with precision.”²⁹ Today the organizing principle with which America’s rapidly changing challenges are faced leans toward stability or post-conflict operations. The reserve component can be an important contributor to the success of longer term stability operation -- if they have the right people. According to Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, issued on November 28, 2005,

“Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”³⁰ “This premise has two types of implications for the U.S. military. One concerns the training of the main combat forces, the other concerns the specialized roles of units devoted principally to counterinsurgency, stabilization missions, and peace operations.”³¹ The Reserve Components are easily adapted for stabilization and peace operation missions; they should serve a primary role as these missions are foreseeable, predictable and consistent.

IV. Mission Capabilities

A. Two War Doctrine

Today’s military no longer requires yesterday’s large and heavy forces. There is no longer an “enemy” that warrants the classic formations or equipment. As identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), “in the mid- to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors, but we must take seriously the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in multiple and unpredictable combinations.”³² Stability, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations will continue to be a part of the future security environment, and the possibility of a multiple military crisis will always be a course of action that we should be prepared for, as the number of nuclear-armed powers continues to increase and threats from failed states and rogue actors will continue.

B. Overseas Contingency Operations

The National Defense Research Institute analyzed the potential to employ US Reserve Components in overseas peacetime contingency operations. “The difficulty in assessing reserve force roles, even in the more narrowly defined area of peacetime contingency missions, is that no two operations are exactly alike, and missions change over time in response to operational and environmental changes.”³³ However, if planning takes place based on a force generation cycle, units can be identified as being “ready” and allow for necessary expansion if needed as well as a predictable deployment schedule.

C. Security Force Assistance

The military has become increasingly dependent on contractors in military operations. “The role of defense contractors is directly relevant to the future shape of the Reserve Component because many of the functions that contractors perform, such as base support operations, maintenance, and security, are also performed by members of the National Guard and federal reserves.”³⁴ “When a combatant commander and his staff plan the forces and support needed in a new contingency, they make many specific sourcing decisions. In effect, the combatant commander is the final gatekeeper who must assess the relative residual risks of using contractor and military sources in a specific setting and make the decisions that determine where and how the Army actually uses contractors on the battlefield.”³⁵ Use of the Reserve Components offers training and experience that can rapidly respond to expand the active duty with seamless integration that includes a common cultural understanding that can be lacking with contractors.

V. What Best Ensures the Effectiveness of the Reserve Component?

A. Rebalancing

As the military continues to alter its force structure and its strategies in order to become the flexible and combat ready force required in the 21st century, it must recognize that the Reserve Component has grown from a strategic force to a strategic and operational force that is relied upon for its capabilities and capacity expansion. Consideration should be given to alignment of reserve forces to active duty units in order to allow for integration and relationship building. This should include the sharing of facilities and equipment and the consolidation of training in order to provide a more effective force with greater operational capabilities and status of readiness.

“Our military must move away from the conventional structure and doctrine toward an organization that can be tailored for maximum flexibility”³⁶. Professor William Flavin expressed his views in March 2011 in a PKSOI publication that examined the U.S. Military’s struggle to find the correct balance between conventional and counterinsurgency/stability approaches. Professor Flavin uses Frank Hoffman’s four schools of thought (counterinsurgents, traditionalists, utility infielders and division of labor) and shows where the U.S. has been and may be headed in the future. The counterinsurgents believe that the irregular adversary that is fought today is the face of conflict for the foreseeable future; therefore, the military must not repeat the mistakes of the post-Vietnam era. Instead, they believe that the American military must fully incorporate counterinsurgency (COIN) into doctrine and make the appropriate adjustments in education, training, force structure and resources while accepting risk in a conventional war fighting focus.

B. Training and Readiness

The Army defines ARFORGEN as “the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive

units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commander requirements.”³⁷

Historically for the Reserve Component, budget constraints dictated that they were manned, equipped and trained based on those units that were expected to deploy first. This resource allocation strategy prohibits some Reserve Components from maintaining a force posture that allows for a force that is ready when called. “There was a time when ‘readiness’ of the Reserve Component was considered an issue, as we re-structure the military ‘access’ to RC units is anything but assured in today’s environment. This may have been acceptable years ago in a peacetime environment, but assured access is an unavoidable necessity now during a protracted war. Currently, adequate policy guidance is not in place during the early planning and sourcing phases. Much later, during operational execution, the previously approved mobilization authority is overly managed and scrutinized at both DA and DoD during the staffing for approval of each RC unit alert and mobilization order.”³⁸

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen (2007-2011) wrote: “The Reserve component... is essential as it provides strategic and operational depth to the Joint Force We have made significant progress in the readiness of our reserve component, and this will remain a key focus area To capitalize on the progress made, we must continue to utilize the Reserve Component and National Guard in an operational capacity as a trained, equipped, ready, and available force for routine, predictable deployments.”³⁹

When Armed Forces are trained and ready to transition to operational roles as needed, **they** have the ability to expand and contract the total force for predictable deployments as well as be prepared for those unexpected domestic requirements.

C. Flexibility

From the beginning Reserve Component soldiers have demonstrated a flexibility to change that has kept a large standing force of citizen soldiers. The Reserve Components' role and ability to rapidly transition will provide the necessary flexibility to meet mission requirements as an operational force, while preserving strategic capability. The Reserve Components are America's security against unexpected events. They also provide a necessary connection between the military and the civilian community. Recruiting and Retention

The Reserve Components are an essential element of the active duty military forces and provide an unparalleled relationship with local communities. This alliance contributes to the awareness of and commitment to the military. "In March 2006, President George W. Bush signed a new National Security Strategy that he refers to as a 'wartime national security strategy' and states that to follow the path the United States has chosen; we must 'maintain and expand our national strength'. The benefits above and beyond the discussed state and federal mission capabilities are the ability to enhance skills of the individual soldiers so that, upon their return and demobilization, they can get higher paying jobs within their communities. Recruiting and retention for the Guard could stabilize or gradually increase by having a more predictable force deployment schedule....some level of predictability, resulting in the following impacts for the individual Army Guard units: First, providing some level of deployment time frame predictability could lessen adverse stress in a soldier's family resulting in improved retention and recruiting. The support of soldiers families is important not only during deployments but in their possible consideration of reenlistment as well. Second, predictability or unpredictability gives a positive or negative message to the soldier's community. Finally, and almost as important is the positive support the citizen-soldier receives from his or her employer."⁴⁰ Reserve Component

personnel are challenged by their ability to balance their commitment to the military and the impact on their employers and family. A simplification of the ability to transition between part-time reservist and active duty member would provide service members an opportunity to change status based upon their wants and needs and upon where they are in their military career and family lives. This level of accommodation would allow the continuation of a service member's commitment and keep the military from losing their investment and experience unnecessarily.

VI. Summary / Conclusion

Use of the Reserve Components in the 21st Century should build on the achievements that have been made in the growth and capabilities that have contributed to the military during the past decade. Future situations or level of involvement cannot be predicted with certainty. However, large sustained military action is not likely, and serious financial constraints on operations are virtually certain. Therefore, as the military alters its force structure and strategies in order to become the flexible and ready force required, the rebalancing of capabilities and structure must include changes to the roles and missions of the Reserve Components. Utilization of the Reserve Components offers capability and capacity advantages with cost effective savings.

Establishment of a predictable force generation cycle for the Reserve Components will allow a trained, equipped, ready and available force for operational, strategic and Homeland Security missions. The National Guard and Reserve add considerable value to the United States national defense capabilities. The National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) is a security cooperation program that began in 1992; it has expanded to the point where nearly every state National Guard participates, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Expansions of this program to further help partner

countries understand and expand their knowledge base providing for regional stability and civil-military relationships. While military-to-military engagement is the primary focus of the partnership program, goals should include partnership alliances that foster democracy, encourage economic development, and promote regional cooperation and stability, that support combatant commanders' theatre and ambassadors' mission plans improving collective capabilities, both military and civilian, within and across the military, both Active and Reserve Component.

The Reserve Components provide strategic depth, capacity for the unexpected, and sustainment to operational force rotations. The use of the Reserve Components in the 21st Century involves the changing efforts of the active military services to integrate unit associations and a utilization of complementary and mirroring capabilities.

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