

U.S. Deterrence and Influence in the New Era

(including the contributions of U.S. Naval Forces)

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Center for
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Preface

This report is the product of a Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) self-initiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era emerging after the Cold War. It was undertaken upon the initiative of Robin Pirie, then Vice President for Strategy and Forces at CNA, and presently the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and Environment.

The development of this approach to military deterrence and influence has benefited from my discussions with, among others, Ralph Jefferson, Daniel Chiu, Col. Tom Bowditch, USMC (Retired), VADM James Dorsey, USN (Retired), and RADM James Cossey, USN (Retired). The approach also benefited from the CNA Occasional Paper of October 1993 by Linton F. Brooks entitled *Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence* and the discussions during the writing of that paper. Major revisions were made to the paper as the result of a peer review by Floyd (Ken) Kennedy of CNA. Useful comments were also provided by Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Retired), Senior Fellow at CNA. See also my companion piece to this paper, *The U.S. Naval Contribution to Deterrence: What has not happened in the world, and how the presence of Naval forces contributed to those events not happening* (CNA Research Memorandum 95-139, August 1995, by H. H. Gaffney).

Summary

1. **Deterrence and influence defined.** One can get bogged down in definitions, so I have used simple ones:

- “Deterrence” is what the U.S. **doesn’t** want to happen, both as events and over time. If unwanted events do not happen, there is little feedback—the dog that didn’t bark.”
- “Influence” is the exercise of communications with other countries to bring about something the United States wants to happen, in a **positive** sense. It is hard to measure “influence,” but we might at least define “influence” as a matter of positive communication, where there is feedback, unlike in “deterrence.”

2. **Deterrence during the Cold War** was global, focused on the Soviet Union and on nuclear balances and threats. To extend this by analogy to the new world situation may be too narrow and may not apply at all:

- The opponents are different and smaller.
- The United States has the overwhelming force.
- The situations of concern are disconnected, unlike the global connected-ness of the strategy of Containment.

3. **A new perspective on deterrence is needed:** it may lie in “reassurance and stabilization.”

- In the new era, the United States can consider most countries as friends, to be included in looser, larger collective security arrangements.
- However, some of the classic elements of deterrence may remain with regard to the mutual strategic balance with Russia and the four current rogues—Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

4. The world is becoming more an “economic world” than a “security world.” Most countries play by the rules, especially for economic reasons.

- However, the advanced countries sit amidst a sea of troubles in the Third World. Maintaining security is thus on the fringe of the main world activity. The new geography of American strategy is looser, more fragmented.
- Nonetheless, the contingent role of military forces has always been an important one to ensure that the “economic” world doesn’t fall apart.

5. Over the long run, the United States doesn’t want to see new arms races, new blocs, new confrontations, or “peer competitors.”

- Most countries are our friends.
- The few hostile countries, the rogues, who also tend to be the proliferators and supporters of terrorism, can be isolated.

6. The possession as well as the use of military forces—owning, permanently deploying, regularly deploying, and actually fighting from time to time—contributes to ensuring that things don’t happen or to exercising positive influence in maintaining and structuring the new security order. It is very hard to say which of these four functions contributes most, or that one contributes exclusively.

- Maintaining alliances and professional military relations have to be done “over there:” U.S. forces have to travel overseas to deter rogues and exert influence in specific cases.
- But maintaining and modernizing technologically advanced war-fighting forces are done mostly in the Continental United States (CONUS).
- Moreover, *deterrence and influence are only one dimension of why the U.S. has forces*. It has them as well for war-fighting in contingencies and for historical and domestic reasons.
- The way the United States relates to countries varies—it is not like the Cold War, where countries were regarded as being either on our side or on the other. It now runs the spectrum

from old friends, through new friends, to the very few hostile countries. (I have constructed nine categories of countries in this spectrum. They are specified later in this paper.)

7. U.S. naval forces contribute to deterrence and influence in the new situation across the spectrum of the possession and use of military forces. They make a major contribution in deterring the four current trouble-makers and in extending professional relations with friendly countries, as well as in maintaining the strategic nuclear balance with Russia (which means for the two navies maintaining ballistic missiles on missile-launching submarines—SLBMs in SSBNs—within agreed limits).

8. For the future, the evolution of situations to which “deterrence and influence” relate may be almost as important as what I call the vertical dimension (specific current cases).

- The evolutions of deterrence and influence are not yet clear, but it is entirely possible that they can be managed in a positive direction—though the actions are mostly diplomatic, with military strength in the background.
- One must be careful to recognize that “deterrence and influence” are not simply matters of foreign policy, but lie between day-to-day diplomacy and the specific war-fighting purposes for which the United States builds its forces.

9. Where do I come out?

- The task of “military deterrence and influence” in the post-Cold War period is to contribute to a stable world system, that is, to build a protective wall around “the economic world” so that the economic world can function and prosper. That is, the role of military forces is to foster the stability in which economies can thrive.
- U.S. military forces do this by organizing and extending both bilateral relations with key countries and by sustaining and extending broad collective security arrangements, and by walling off the few rogues that aspire to mount aggressions against their neighbors (including with weapons of mass destruction),

and to anticipate and forestall the other, diminishing, prospects for two-state wars.

- I say the United States should preserve the best war-fighting force it can within its resources: this will deter the rogues, and discourage any military competition, whether from Russia, China, or anyone else.

Introduction

During the Cold War, the basic strategy of the United States was to contain the Soviet Union and its allies, under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence.

This strategy enabled perhaps 80% of world activities, i.e., those outside the Soviet bloc, to continue without disruption by the Soviets.

U.S. naval forces contributed to this strategy, especially in strategic nuclear forces, in connection with reinforcement of NATO, and in balancing off the Soviet navy. They also engaged in other activities—interactions with other navies, e.g., in South America, shows of force, or actual interventions (e.g., in protecting Kuwaiti tankers during the tanker war of 1988), not all of which were particularly connected with the Cold War, but that were part of the general U.S. policy to actively engage around the world, to head off competition from the Soviet Union.

In the new era, world connections are mostly economic, and U.S. military forces “contain” disruptions to economic flow, especially in their stabilization and reassurance roles. That is, they deter activities potentially disruptive to the world system.

U.S. naval forces contribute to this new “containment” in many ways, scattered about the world. However, “the scattering” is not so random: the tasks of “deterrence and influence” are focused as follows:

- The United States continues in mutual strategic nuclear deterrence with Russia, and U.S. naval forces (as represented by SSBNs) contribute “half” of the U.S. side.
- Four rogue countries persist in the world—Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. They must be deterred and contained in the classic way until they evolve into more normal countries. U.S. naval forces contribute to this, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

- Most of the rest of the countries in the world are friends and allies of the United States, and relations with them are specific. The understanding of “deterrence and influence” becomes a lot easier when countries are specified.

One specific situation hangs in the balance with regard to understanding deterrence and influence: that is the role of the United States, and in particular the U.S. Navy, in defusing military threats and confrontations by China against Taiwan. It is a problematic situation because (a) the United States and China have a real chance at establishing normal relations over time—China need not be an enemy—and (b) China has not really begun to build a force that could invade Taiwan. Yet China threatens the use of force to deter Taiwan from declaring independence.

The threats in the new era, and to the world system, may tend to be exaggerated

From a security and military point of view, the residual threats after the Cold War can look overwhelming, a view of chaos in the world, to some Americans.

In fact, most of the world is getting along pretty well. Many developments are favorable to peace and prosperity. The military threats or other threats of violence tend to be on the fringe of most world activity and are scattered.

Some might even say that they are in the background, which makes it difficult for publics to be alarmed by them.

And when projected across time, the disruptions and threats look even more widely scattered.

In short, security matters are presently on the fringe, and many of the feared threats have not yet materialized or, like almost all internal conflicts, are outside the main stream of life in the world.

At present (August 1998), there are severe problems in the East Asian and Russian economies, and these problems are rippling into South America and into worldwide stock markets. However, their effect on the countries' security, particularly their internal security, are not yet

clear (aside from the temporary riots that have taken place in Indonesia). One thing is for sure, however: these economic troubles are not conducive to countries increasing their defense budgets or forces. In fact, purchases of new equipment are being cancelled.

The threats must be examined with care

There are three major sources of disruption in the world today:

- Rogues, who tend to accumulate weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, threaten their neighbors, and sponsor and resort to terror.
- Two-state confrontations that could result in classic wars (including confrontations fomented by the rogues).
- Internal conflicts.

The really threatening rogues are few, known, and all have economic troubles or are subject to embargoes. There are only four of these rogues right now: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Syria and Cuba might aspire to be rogues, but are restrained by their circumstances. It would be wrong to consider or treat China as a rogue.

The major two-sided confrontations at present are few and are scattered—Arab-Israeli, Iran-Iraq, India-Pakistan, North Korea-South Korea.¹ A major crisis has been brewing between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus over the acquisition by Greek Cyprus of the most advanced Russian air defense system. The confrontations between Greece and Turkey in the past had been contained by their joint membership in NATO and their aspirations to join the European Community. To the preceding two-state confrontations we might add the confrontation between China and Taiwan. All these situations are at present deterred in one way or another, though all retain the potential to become devastating wars and internationally disruptive if conflict were to break out.

1. Other two-sided confrontations, latent, active, or in truce, include Ecuador-Peru (in truce), Venezuela-Colombia (latent), Morocco-Algeria (latent), Saudi Arabia-Yemen (latent), and Armenia-Azerbaijan (in truce), as of August 1998.

The main sources of conflict in the world today are internal conflicts—the collapse of states. External “deterrence and influence” hardly tempers these internal conflicts. Rather, it takes direct intervention on the ground, which takes us beyond “deterrence and influence” as I have defined them. Note, for instance, the futility of the forces of NATO countries posturing outside and above Bosnia and Kosovo. It is hard to get “messages” through when people are actually engaged on the ground. Once the outside forces have actually been deployed on the ground (e.g., the IFOR and its successor the SFOR), those forces, in their police role, have served as a deterrent to further violence.

I should note that, by my own count, the *numbers* of internal conflicts in the past, at present, and possible for the future are about the same. Many internal conflicts have continued across all three epochs. Individual internal conflicts may be getting more intense, however, with the pressures of increasing populations. Nonetheless, they are not the subject of this paper on “deterrence and influence.”

We can *imagine* changes for the worse in the future

We can imagine major sources of concern blossoming in ways that would intrude into the normal functioning of the world system.

The worst imaginable evolutions would include:

- A division into three separate, mutually exclusive, economic blocs—American (Western Hemisphere), European, and East Asian—with the possible emergence of associated military balances of power within each bloc or between them.
- A big state collapsing internally, with associated chaos and spill-over into adjacent areas. We have feared this of late in the cases of Indonesia and Russia. The Chinese leadership lives in perpetual fear of internal collapse.
- The emergence of some sharp, two-sided local conflicts.
- The emergence of a string of revolutionary Arab or other revolutionary Islamic states—but, given long history, unable to coordinate or unify among themselves.

- And—across the whole background—terrorism, drug traffic, refugees, pirates, international crime, etc.—basically non-state, individual activities.

What is hard to predict for the future—because it is unlikely, if not inconceivable—is the emergence of a new bipolar situation, with a big military power, a peer competitor in military power to the United States.

U.S. military forces have deterrent roles in the new era

From a military security standpoint (as opposed to some broader view of security), there are a number of adverse events or configurations or power that the United States does not want to occur in the future.

I am not talking about the United States exercising diplomacy or taking other active measures to intervene in situations or to prevent proliferation, or conducting actual military interventions in situations. I am talking about bad events not happening, in part because the United States maintains and brandishes its military strength.

More specifically, what is to be *deterred* in the new era are:

- The classic cases for deterrence, that is, on one hand, the maintenance of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence with Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, deterring the four rogues from attacking their neighbors.
- The emergence of enemies or arms races. This “deterrence” is to be achieved through positive bilateral and multilateral engagements with both old friends and allies and with those countries, like China, with whom we have had problematic relations.
- The rise of a “peer competitor” in the future.

The opportunity now exists to make the transition from classic deterrence to reassurance and stabilization through engagement, even though elements of classic deterrence are likely to persist.

“Military influence” (other than in actual interventions or defense) now becomes a mixture of deterrence, relations for reassurance, and stabilization.

- It appeared during the Cold War that U.S. *military* influence was the main backing and driver of *overall* U.S. influence. The military competition with the Soviet Union provided a strong motivation for the United States to engage around the world, rather than to go home as it did after World War I and World War II. But the United States also believed that its strong economy was a source of strength, and it also supported the recovery of the European nations and of Japan. Then, in collaboration with those countries, it maintained the “Bretton Woods” structure of international economic stabilization.
- In the post-Cold War period, one might think that *military* influence would fade in U.S. foreign policy, while *economic* initiatives took a higher priority. However, the United States has the habit of being a strong military power, takes the leadership in situations where military force may be needed, and apparently derives confidence in its other initiatives from its military strength. At the same time, it continues to take economic initiatives, such as leadership in resolving the Asian financial crises of 1997-1998. Perhaps one can say that military and economic initiatives are in closer balance in the post-Cold War period.

A new view of “circles of influence”

The focus of influence (a more active concept, as opposed to the more negative concept of deterrence) is still on individual countries. Their security situations vis-à-vis the United States and within the world can be classified in order to examine “influence for what” in a discriminate way.

We can look at the countries to which we apply policies of deterrence or influence in a series of concentric circles:

- Old friends and new;
- Those countries dependent on the United States (and others) for their defense and even their survival;

- Countries with whom the United States has long had prickly relations;
- Countries that could go either way (i.e., undecided as to whether to join the overall world system or not);
- And the remaining rogues.

These circles of deterrence, reassurance, and stabilization does not apply to internal conflicts and the war on drugs. Those take other measures. Moreover, reduction of global terrorism depends mainly on progress in bringing about peace between Israel, the Palestinians, and the neighboring states.

The main tasks of deterrence and influence—maintaining and expanding associations, assuring countries on their defense, engaging new friends, and maintaining classic deterrence—can be arrayed in their roles with regard to each of these spheres.

Naval forces contribute to deterrence, stabilization, and reassurance in the new era

Naval forces can be applied to this model of concentric spheres. Professional (navy-to-navy) relations play prominently in a number of the spheres.

These contributions can be assessed crudely as major, medium, and minor roles, depending on the cases.

One can then discuss the relevance of the various naval platforms—carriers, surface combatants, amphibious forces, and submarines—within the spheres.

There are some things that U.S. naval forces do *not* deter or prevent, unless by active interventions in situations. These include the aforementioned internal conflicts, terrorism by individuals or small groups not directly associated with a state, piracy, and drug trafficking, and selected potential two-state conflicts not connected with the rogues or in strategic areas (like India-Pakistan or Peru-Ecuador).

Finally, I would note that deterrence–stabilization–reassurance are not all that naval forces do. Their other activities can be related to these categories, though.

As a bottom line, I would assert that the main direction for the future for U.S. naval forces—for the purposes of deterrence, stabilization, and reassurance, at least—should be maintaining a trained, ready, technologically capable force.

- This would be appropriate for the main tasks of immediate deterrence—deterring the four rogues—while hedging against the future, unlikely, emergence of a peer competitor navy.
- This force is likely to be sufficient for engagement purposes.
- It need not go to extremes of technological development since no “peer competitor” looms as yet, and may never.
- But the size of this force is also important, for it enables U.S. naval forces to be in several areas at once and it discourages any country from competing with us in naval strength. For instance, U.S. aircraft carriers have been such an awesome, costly, and technically difficult force to build that we have no competition.

Visions of the future

Early in the 1990’s, we saw the old Soviet threat coming down, estimated that third-world forces would slowly increase, and worried about the re-emergence of Russia, or the emergence of China, as a new global threat.

In this paper, I would add the extra dimension of cooperation. The growth of cooperation is an equal possibility as the emergence of new threats—and is more manageable. That is, the unfolding of constructive relations over time can be envisaged. The main point about “presence” is that naval relations alone cannot guarantee that all the good things the United States wants to happen can happen, but what is done in specific actions must be done well if any of the larger, more general contributions are to be realized.

Finally, U.S. naval contributions to deterrence, stabilization, and reassurance can be seen evolving in two major directions over time:

1. In shepherding today's deterrence tasks in favorable directions;
2. In contributing to new dimensions for the maintenance of peace in the world.

Some definitions and basic concepts

DEFINITIONS

A SIMPLE DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE:

- **POSSESSION AND USE OF MILITARY FORCES—**
- **IN THE HOPES THAT SOMETHING WILL NOT HAPPEN**

(The more passive approach)

A SIMPLE DEFINITION OF MILITARY “INFLUENCE”:

- **POSSESSION AND USE OF MILITARY FORCES --**
- **TO PERSUADE SOMEONE ELSE --**
 - **TO DO SOMETHING WE WOULD LIKE THEM TO DO,**
 - **OR TO PARTICIPATE IN SOMETHING,**
 - **OR EVEN JUST TO LISTEN TO US.**

(The more active approach)

INFLUENCE MUST BE **FOR** SOME PURPOSE:

IT IS A TRANSITIVE WORD: IT NEEDS AN OBJECTIVE.

I do not want to dwell on definitions of deterrence and influence in this paper. The new era is one of activism and communication, not of introspective development of theologies to explain a distant and mysterious opponent (the Soviet Union).

My definition of **deterrence** for the new era is one of a double negative: **not** using forces so that something does **not** happen. This is essentially the same definition as applied during the Cold War.

The definition of **influence** becomes more complicated. It is not a negative process, hoping something doesn't happen. *It has to be for a purpose.* Moreover, the connection between the possession of military forces and exerting influence is less straightforward than for deterrence. As I will discuss later, influence depends on what kind of relations the United States has with the country it is attempting to influence. It is perhaps even more dependent on the subject that the

United States is taking up with that other country. I noted above, however, that sometimes our military cooperation and strength simply gets us in the door to talk to the other country. This was the U.S. experience in much of the business of foreign military sales and security assistance.

Some factors to bear in mind

1. Whatever the history of deterrence over the centuries, it took on a special meaning in the Cold War:

- It was bound up with nuclear weapons.
- It was bound up with the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the USSR and their respective allies.
- It was a civilian-developed and articulated concept—militaries on both sides were unhappy with it.
- **First-order** deterrence lay in mutual assured retaliation and destruction.
 - Mutuality meant first-order deterrence lay in the balance between the forces.
 - Assured retaliation required the survivability of the launchers.
 - Balance got bound up in arms control negotiations from 1969 on (in 1967, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey to initiate the SALT talks, but negotiations were put for two years because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968).
 - While balance is essentially a static concept, both sides felt it could be threatened by technological breakthroughs (e.g., through the introduction of MIRVs or the achievement of greater accuracy) or by which side had the greater production expansion potential.
- **Second-order** deterrence lay in “usability”: the weapons could survive; they could be commanded and released; and they

could penetrate to, and cause great damage to, the targets either side said they were aiming at.

- Most refer to this as “credibility,” a word which by its iteration has lost meaning now, but was meant originally as an expression of the evident responsiveness and war-fighting capabilities of the weapons.

- Collateral damage was a red herring:

- It was an inevitable part of using nuclear weapons, and might even be planned.

- It reinforced the civilian nature of nuclear weapons and deterrence and thus of the need for close civilian control.

- The people in the nuclear weapons laboratories and the military wanted the nuclear weapons to be so precise and tailored that the civilians might think they were indistinguishable from conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons remained nuclear weapons, however.

2. None of this applies now, of course, except with regard to the residual U.S.-Russian strategic balance.

3. It is especially difficult to convert all the principles above to something called “conventional deterrence.” I have not used this term in this report for a number of reasons:

- The use of the term “conventional deterrence” sounds like a stepping-down, a reaching for a weak substitute to the robustness of nuclear deterrence. In this sense, the use of the term may betray a nostalgia for the devastating effects of nuclear weapons. It can even lead to a futile search for substitutes for those effects.

- Conventional weapons were never a substitute for nuclear weapons, not even in the 1980s vis-à-vis the Soviets in Europe. Nuclear weapons simply are qualitatively different (see the NATO Nuclear Planning Group study of the “Military Implications of Technology,” published around 1976) and carry political baggage of a qualitatively different sort.

- Moreover, the United States still retains nuclear weapons in its arsenal and has not ruled out their use in certain circumstances (see the vague threats to Saddam Hussein to deter his use of chemical weapons in Desert Storm, or the threat by President Clinton in 1994 to North Korea that they might cease to exist as a society if they were to use nuclear weapons). In a sense, it is the rogues' problem to figure out how to sneak in under our nuclear threshold. And, of course, it is the rogues to which much of this discussion attaches.
- The U.S. deterrent still remains in the totality of U.S. forces. The conventional forces have a lot of power, but they can't cause the utter devastation that nuclear weapons can. That is why the focus in the forces is on devastating blows to opposing forces rather than simply punishment against a society in retaliation.

4. Deterrence during the Cold War was conceived as a strategy of the weak:


- Secretary of State Dulles conceived the strategy of Massive retaliation as compensation for perceived American and other NATO countries' inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the Soviet hordes.
- The NATO Triad (strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces) emerged for the same reason. It represented a strategy of escalation ("going out of control"—even though much thought in the United States was devoted to "escalation control").
- Strategic nuclear retaliation was a way of saying, "I cannot defend myself and escape damage, but I can cause damage to you."

5. Politicians can bluff and say wild things, but the military has to think of the consequences. Military personnel are the ones that could be killed.

6. Do any of these factors continue to operate when you are very strong and have a huge advantage?

- Or will the weak (e.g., North Korea) get to us by threatening to go out of control?
- Or does the United States convey a new kind of “weakness” by its fear of taking casualties?

Perceptions of deterrence



As part of the definition of deterrence, one must take into account the perceptions of deterrence on both sides—that is, those who wish to deter, and those they wish to deter. As this chart shows, the United States developed a theory and posture of deterrence and attempted to communicate it to the Soviet Union. These messages had to cross through two thick cultural filters—indeed, barriers. The first was our own, based on what our perceptions of the Soviet Union were—the “operational code of the Politburo,” the receptivity of its leadership, its intentions, etc. The second was that of the Soviets themselves.

The difficulty was that we could never be sure the messages were getting through. We did not know whether the other side was getting the messages, whether he considered them relevant to what he was up to, and whether he acted upon them. For instance, if he had no intentions relevant to our particular message, we might simply look provocative. On the other hand, deterrees do not like to admit they are being deterred, and can simply look truculent.

The net result of the two cultural filters has been an enormous amount of our own ideas bouncing back at us. Americans used to speculate endlessly about whether deterrence was working. I note, in both the American and Israeli cases, that the longer deterrence worked, the more anxious the government got as to *why* it was working. Periodically, we tore the concepts apart ourselves, and put them back together as a new theory. The other effect is, of course, self-deterrence.

In the event, while the Soviets never liked to admit it, they gradually absorbed our notions of deterrence, and the Russians feed them back to us even today. The cases of the rogues become more difficult: the Soviets knew our message was relevant to them, but it has taken a long time for Saddam Hussein to think that the Americans ought to have anything to do with what he wants to do in his own neighborhood.


Even if we are unsure that our deterrent messages are getting through to their intended target, bystanders—including those countries the United States is defending or reassuring—may well take note of our efforts. This bystander effect may be important to the overall structure of deterrence, worldwide.

The United States positively wallowed in self-deterrence. U.S. Government discussions were marked by hand-wringing all across the Cold War. Some of these characteristics persist to this day. This hand-wringing usually was anxiety as to whether our deterrence was “credible.” It essentially reflected the struggle between the pure military thinkers, who believed that the only deterrent was a complete war-fighting capability, versus the politico-civilian level, which recognized deterrence as a concept of the weak, with due regard to the horrors of nuclear war. The pure military thinkers do not want to take risks—they are the ones, traditionally, who will be killed—while politicians

can bluff, remain ambiguous, and take the risks upon themselves. The pure military thinker wants a plan, for decisive effect. The politician wants options.


Some of this hand-wringing is seen in the concerns about nuclear proliferation today. For instance, some say that North Korea, if it were to possess 12 to 20 weapons, would deter the United States and would force U.S. forces disperse during reinforcement, thus requiring twice the number of forces. Some talk of redeploying “tactical” nuclear weapons to the area. During one discussion at CNA, someone suggested that we might instead just surface a Trident boat in the area when necessary. The reaction in the room was, “Oh, that will upset everybody.” Exactly. We are reminded that in deterring, it is not altogether bad to be provocative and unpredictable, i.e., to sound a bit wild.

A further annotation of the chart on perceptions follows.



Deterrence vs. influence

A further definitional consideration is the difference between deterrence and influence. I have defined influence as positive actions, with the use of forces, but not the use of force (note the distinction), to help create a structure of reassurance and stabilization around the world. As the following chart shows, the influence process is a much more open, two-way process than that of deterrence.




Deterrence involves the difficult task of sending messages across two dense cultural filters to a reluctant receiver, with little feedback. As a consequence, we spend much time talking to ourselves as to whether deterrence is working.

As for the influence process—which may simply be open communications—government-to-government talks may cover only part of the dialogue between two countries, depending on the countries. At the

same time, other international connections and domestic preoccupations raise the noise level on both sides.

Our models of what influences other countries are still not very good. On one hand, some people think a country can be bought with economic aid and security assistance. On the other hand, we found that these programs may simply have delivered access of U.S. officials to the other government, though at the top. Countries still do not like to say that they made decisions under U.S. pressure. Does this surprise anybody? This is why the process of cooperation becomes much more mutual—a country is doing something not because it is a U.S. interest, but because the two countries have found a mutual interest.

Deterrence, influence, and foreign relations



During the Cold War, deterrence, based as it ultimately was on nuclear weapons, had an abstract and stand-alone character to it.

The foreign policy sphere was pursued quite separately, against the background of the nuclear deterrent. Conventional war-fighting capabilities were, in a sense, a hedge against having to use nuclear weapons unless it were necessary. This further separated the nuclear deterrent from day-to-day foreign relations.


In the new era, we see considerable overlaps among the categories of U.S. activities along the spectrum from foreign economic activities to the domestic functions of defense. These overlaps tend to blur the clear identification of the deterrence category, unlike in the days of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, we can still conceptually distinguish the area of “military deterrence and influence,” even if it overlaps with the other areas shown above and its boundaries are blurred. That is, we must distinguish it from day-to-day foreign policy on one hand and actual operations or decisions on the size and configuration of American forces on the other hand. Both of these other areas are practical and purposeful for their own specific goals. The concept of deterrence backs and illuminates both of them, however.

In conducting day-to-day foreign policy, American representatives know they are backed by a strong America, including a strong military, although this strength may be in the deep background to the issue or business at hand.

In operating and building the forces, the U.S. military establishment also has in mind its specific tasks and missions. In fact, wrestling with the details sometimes may obscure for them the overall value of the forces—reflective of the fact that we define credibility for ourselves, and may wallow in self-doubt about it. It is hard to think of the forces as causing things **not** to happen by their being possessed and not used, but the effect is there, however difficult to measure. The United States did this with nuclear forces (and conventional forces) during the Cold War, and will do the same in the post-Cold War period, though their deterrent utility may be more difficult to comprehend.

A quick summary of the role of U.S. military forces



I have been scanning the literature and have attended several conferences and discussion groups over the last several years, following the end of the Cold War. I have found that most of the discussions are concentrated on what I have labeled “the four rogues.” This is natural, considering the surprise of the Iraqi seizure of Kuwait and the continued tensions in Korea. Moreover, these countries pose the major threats to disrupt the world structure of peace and free commerce. They threaten their neighbors, and they are all trying to press ahead with programs to develop, produce, and weaponize weapons of mass destruction, that is, nuclear, chemical, and even biological arms. They all either sponsor terrorism now or have sponsored it in the

past. All of these countries express hostility to the United States. There is no question that any aggression by them must be deterred and thrown back if it were to occur.


Other countries might be included among the rogues, but really don't qualify:

- Castro's Cuba has certainly been one of them. However, with the loss of Soviet support and successful U.S. policies to isolate Cuba in the hemisphere, the Cuban economy has plummeted and the country is extremely weak. Nonetheless, a couple of years ago, during an exit call after a conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro told former Secretary of Defense McNamara and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., that he intended to foment revolution once he got his economy back on its feet again.
- Syria might also have been included in the rogue category, especially because of its covert support of terrorism, but it too has lost Soviet support. Also, President Assad has been cautious, and he sometimes flirts with engaging in the Middle East peace talks. Syrian forces have achieved relative stability in Lebanon without offending the international community. In 1990, Syria joined the Coalition Forces against its long-time enemy and Ba'ath competitor, Iraq.
- Then we come to China. As will be seen in the following pages, China, because of its size and fast-growing economy, looms over Asia. Without going into detail here, I would say that it is a mistake to assume that China is an aggressive country. That assumption was one of the mistakes the United States made as it got embroiled in the Vietnam War. The relations between the United States (and others) and China can be difficult, especially as China makes its transition to a market economy while the leadership tries to preserve Communist rule, but it would be a mistake to label it a rogue country.

The issue for this paper is whether the hostility and threats of the four rogues is sufficient on which to base all U.S. military planning, and whether such a focus suffices to ensure stability into the future. As I will attempt to show, I do not believe it is. To put it another way, the

“deterrence” function remains narrow, while the “stabilization and reassurance function grows, that is, relative to the deterrence function.

Expanding deterrence and influence beyond the four rogues



As this chart implies, U.S. strategies for deterrence and influence could go in any of three directions:


- They could remain concentrated on maintaining and brandishing war-fighting capabilities against the four rogues. This would also provide a capability against any other rogue that may emerge. It would enable the rest of the world not to have to worry about disruptions. Maintaining this capability may also enable the United States to stay ahead of other countries in military capabilities.
- They could emphasize close associations and presence around the world, including the preservation and vitalization of collec-

tive security arrangements, such as NATO, or those with Japan and Korea. This strategy would help to contain and isolate the rogues and would provide a framework for all countries to join the world community.

- They could lay back and guard against a presumptively threatening future represented by some putative “peer competitor,” like the Soviet Union used to be. They would be guarding against the reemergence of a bipolar world.


A main point is that U.S. resources do not permit taking out insurance policies in all directions, i.e., having all kinds of deterrence—but then, as I will attempt to lay out in the following pages, it is not necessary to do so. Choices will have to be made, but the United States has considerable latitude in making those.

In the following chart, I have annotated the previous chart to show some of the strategies and operations entailed at each level.




The next version of this hourglass chart shows a range of force implications. The range goes from keeping lots of forces at the current

state of technology, at the top, to reaching for ultimate technologies (with its implications for reductions in the numbers of the forces) at the bottom.



As I will attempt to demonstrate in the rest of this paper, I believe that the best force contribution for the United States to make in maintaining deterrence and influence around the world may lie in the shaded oval shown in the chart on the next page.

- What I am saying in this next chart is that the best deterrent for the United States is to maintain a war-fighting capability at roughly the technological level of its present forces—which are the most advanced in the world—while adding the precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to current platforms and integrating the forces better with joint command and control. I think this would serve to deter both the four rogues and any country that might contemplate trying to compete with the United States in military capabilities.



The emphases the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps can place within this deterrence scheme are shown here. If I were right about where the emphasis should be put for the best deterrent outcome, then there would be:


- More emphasis on the striking-force navy, i.e., on carriers and TLAMs (i.e., Tomahawk cruise missiles); and
- Less emphasis on the smaller surface combatants (i.e., the FFG-7s) and on amphibious warfare ships; and
- Less emphasis on the higher end of the technological spectrum (submarines or exotic ships like the Arsenal Ship.)

Out of the Cold War

This section covers four topics: (1) the geography of US strategy in the Cold War, (2) Cold War traps, and (3) moving from the old envelope to something new. It also covers (4) the case of China.

The geography of American strategy

During the Cold War, all the elements of American deterrence strategy were connected, as shown in the following chart.




Even the new Southwest Asia (SWA) strategy, developed after the fall of the Shah of Iran (the Carter Doctrine), was associated with the Soviet Union. Later on, in 1989, as Communist rule in Eastern

Europe collapsed and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was becoming less of a threat, CENTCOM (the Central Command) shifted its planning focus to Iraq—just barely in time, for a year later Saddam seized Kuwait.

The United States related many of the small interventions it made and its assistance to Israel to the Cold War, even though there may have been no direct connections. The Navy's Maritime Strategy emerged as a kind of global connector of the whole strategy.

The world of Containment



U.S. deterrent strategy during the Cold War can also be shown as in the chart above.

Underneath the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, the United States erected the wall of containment around the Soviet Union and its allies (here shown as the Warsaw Pact and Vietnam). The wall of containment included the alliances the United States formed and the security assurances it provided a number of countries, as well as the


overseas presence of U.S. forces. U.S. economic strength also contributed to the overall umbrella of deterrence.

Outside the wall of containment, the Free World pursued its own economic and social development (the general background in the chart).

The chart shows how the Soviet Union tried to break out of containment and outflank the West—or at least many of us interpreted its actions that way. It tried to support or make connections with many of the newly decolonized countries (“support of wars of national liberation”). Through Cuba and directly, it made incursions into Central America and Africa (Angola and Ethiopia). It also cultivated countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which tried to keep some distance from the West (e.g., India, Indonesia, Algeria). Later on, the United States sought to roll back these outflanking maneuvers, with much success.

The Soviet Union supported, especially with military equipment, a number of rogue countries, shown here in the ovals. It did not control their decisions to go to war (Stalin acquiesced in Kim Il Sung’s attack on South Korea in 1950). These are the rogues that still exist, with the exception of Egypt and perhaps Syria.

U.S. naval forces contributed strongly to the deterrent strategy of containment during the Cold War, as shown on the following chart.




Residues of Cold War thinking

The next chart shows the problem of transferring the Cold War concepts and thinking about deterrence to the new era.

In the American case, I have noted the anxiety about proliferation, which is compounded by the slowness of its realization, despite the apparent (but unacknowledged) efforts of Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Of course, India and Pakistan are now declared possessors of nuclear weapons (whether this makes them “nuclear powers” is another question), and the effect on world security of their steps is still being debated.


The discussions in Washington, most of which take place among rather low-level officials, tend to assume that the United States is self-deterred from using nuclear weapons now that the Soviet Union is out of the picture.



They try mightily to transfer the old concepts to purely conventional responses. This is nothing new; in the early 1970s, the nuclear enthusiasts, disappointed at the lack of political response to their claim that only nuclear weapons could defend (i.e., in Europe), discovered that the Services had been developing PGMs (and without benefit of high-strategic theory) and latched on to them as the new deterrent.

I assert that, as long as the United States possesses nuclear weapons of any kind, no politician will be unaware of them. A recent case in point is the public revelation that the United States sent a strong, yet ambiguous, threat to Saddam Hussein before Desert Storm, delivered by a reliable messenger. The Iraqis have cited this threat as a reason for their not employing chemical or biological weapons.

A particularly egregious transformation is one that treats the new enemies (or rather, the ones the United States is left with) as being as brilliant as the Soviets were, as shown on the next chart.



The United States feared the Soviets because they had a vision for conquering the world, they supposedly had decisive leadership motivated by this vision, they demonstrated technological prowess, and, worst of all, Americans feared that the Soviets had found the way to manipulate minds (see discussions of the U.S. Army experiments with LSD in the 1950s). They seemed to be on their way to creating *homo Sovieticus*, the completely passive and compliant citizen. On the nuclear-deterrent side, some people in the United States believed they were aiming for a disarming first-strike capability and that they believed in nuclear war-fighting.

In any event, the Soviet Union collapsed, despite the assurances of "Team B" that the Soviets could do anything they wanted to do. It becomes ever clearer that the Soviet leaders did not believe in their own vision, that they wallowed in internal arguments and indecisiveness, that they got old and feeble, and that the population was passive, but not compliant. The Soviets' economic system didn't work, and they themselves say that one of the reasons, if not the main reasons, was that they over-militarized the economy and society. They had

some excellent technological achievements, but those were uneven, and it was not clear the forces were organized and trained to exploit them. They certainly put few resources into maintenance. Now that we can converse in pragmatic terms with the Russians, they tell us that the Soviet leadership gradually accepted our notions of deterrence, even though they could not admit it back then and the word “deterrence” was taboo. They knew that a nuclear war could not be fought.

We have to be careful not to make the same kind of mistaken assumptions about enemies in the new era. “Saddam was brilliant before Desert Storm, he was dumb during it, and he will be brilliant next time.” Someone has suggested that we should assume that our enemy will be as smart as we are. I would say that we should temper our thinking by assuming that we could be as dumb as he is.

The case arising beyond the four rogues is China. In the next two pages, I address whether they are “detrable” or “undetrable.”

The case of China

Later on, in this report:

- China will be identified as a wild card, outside the basic trilateral (US-Europe-Japan) framework. That is, China is “only 30% in” in the world system where most already play by “the rules,” rules not set by China.
- US policy is to be one of engagement, rather than containment.
- The US Navy could lead in doing the military part of engagement—though the Navy’s role will be transient; i.e., if relations do improve substantially, the naval contacts will be less crucial.

China is undergoing severe change:

- Surging economic growth, with all the associated dislocations.
- Feeling their oats; finally emerging from Western, Japanese, Marxist domination.
- Leadership succession after the death of Deng seems to have flowed smoothly to Jiang. At one point, it was thought that he

was specially cultivating the military (the PLA, or People's Liberation Army), but military officers have been omitted from the Standing Committee of the Politburo for the first time.

They tried their old brainwashing, psychological warfare against Taiwan in March-April 1996:

- Sending "messages." Sounding "gongs and bells like we always do," as one Chinese official said.
- President Lee Teng Hui won in a landslide, but backed off independence (the effect the Chinese desired).
- China does not have the capability to invade Taiwan and has not begun to build it.

The United States, by deploying two carriers to the area, got in the way of Chinese tactics:

- Counter-noise to "signals." (Though US had nothing particular to shoot at.)
- The Chinese were offended: They said it was "none of your business," and they were distressed that the noise created by the United States' reaction interfered with their "messages."

China's leadership may be more worried about Taiwan's democracy than its independence:

- Though they would "go ballistic" if independence were declared (they already have in the literal sense, in the way we saw—demonstrative firing of ballistic missiles into the sea, bracketing Taiwan).
- They may be more worried enough about managing their own exploding economy and preserving their own leadership and the legitimacy of their Communist system of government control.

China is a weird aggressor:

- China left Hong Kong (and Macao) alone after the 1949 revolution and their driving Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) off the mainland.

- They were poised to pursue Chiang to Taiwan in 1950, but the U.S. 7th Fleet took up its position in the Taiwan Straits after war in Korea broke out, and the invasion did not occur.
- China withdrew fully from North Korea in 1954.
- They shelled Quemoy and Matsu in 1958, shifted to shelling on alternate days, then shifted to shelling the islands with leaflets. They still haven't crossed the narrow channels to seize the islands.
- All India lay at their feet in 1962, but they stopped after seizing some glacial land. They merely sent "a political message."
- They have fooled around with the Spratly Islands for two decades or more; they haven't taken any decisive action there.
- They tried to teach Vietnam "a lesson" in 1979, but got a bloody nose, losing 20,000 troops in two weeks.

China can be deterred:

- They back down, they stop, they step back to just sending "signals" and "messages."
- They have bigger internal problems to take care of.
- They are still "encumbered" by collective leadership, which creates caution.
- They do have boundaries that cannot be crossed—a fact which the United States has to recognize (the Yalu River or Taiwan independence are cases in point).

These points are summarized in the following chart:

CHINA, TAIWAN, AND DETERRENCE DOES IT FIT THE APPROACH IN THIS REPORT?

- We regard China as a wild card, not quite fitting into the world structure yet.
- China is undergoing severe change.
- Aged government tries old-style brainwashing on Taiwan.
- US mounts counter-campaign, creates lots of noise, spoils “deterrent” effect desired.
- Chinese leadership may be more worried about Taiwan’s democracy than its independence (though independence would make them “go ballistic”).
- China is a strange aggressor: it backs off.
- China can be deterred.

Incidental note:

In the March 1996 confrontation, China got very upset with the United States intervention in the Taiwan Straits when the *USS Nimitz* deployment was announced, even though the *Nimitz* was still in the Persian Gulf! This might be regarded as “virtual presence.”


The evolution of deterrence today—toward reassurance

To conclude this section, and to provide a forecast of the forthcoming presentations, the following chart shows that some elements of classic deterrence will remain in the new era:

- The United States will be locked into mutual second-strike retaliatory deterrence with the Russians for some time to come. The chart covers Russia only partially because the Russians have a lot of internal problems on their minds these days and want assistance from the outside world to help them solve those problems.

- The United States will still want to project a policy of deterrence toward the four rogues, or any other rogue that might arise. It will be different from Cold War deterrence because it will not be mutual; U.S. forces are far stronger than any opposition that the rogues can pose. But then the United States is distant and they may not believe we are concerned with their ambitions. Nonetheless, each of the countries shown has been deterred, for various reasons, not least because of the threat of U.S. retaliation. North Korea has not attacked south for 48 years. The Iraqis did not move on Kuwait for 29 years, and then did so in desperation and for limited objectives. Libya has not attacked or supported rebels in neighboring states for some time. Iran wants to spread its Islamic revolution, but has been singularly unsuccessful in the 19 years of the existence of its Islamic regime; it has managed only to bring Sudan and the Hezbollah in Lebanon into its embrace. It has not otherwise shown overtly aggressive military intentions.

As for the rightward movement on the chart, the rest of the countries in the world are not our enemies, and a new regime of “reassurance and stabilization” can be sought, as I will discuss.



The world today

In considering the new deterrence and influence, it is necessary to describe the emerging and evolving world in which any such strategy is to operate. In this section, I present a particular strategic-economic view of the world. This is a world in which most countries play by the rules, though things could fall apart. I also describe the transition from the “security” world to the “economic” world that is taking place. I note the differing perceptions of the world possessed by the economics people on one hand and the security people on the other. Security matters are left on the fringe. However, I also show some of the ways the security situation in this world could go bad.


The strategic-economic view of the world

The next chart is my map of the current world situation: a triangle of advanced countries sitting on a sea of troubles in the rest of the world (or “the Third World”). To this triangle, the advanced nations hope to add the former Communist countries of East Europe and the Soviet Union, though perhaps with the exclusion of the Central Asian countries. I have shown the Asian “tigers” spread between the United States and Japan, and Greece and Turkey hanging on the fringe of Europe.

The advanced countries have much of the wealth and not so many of the people. The Third World has enormous numbers of people, and their populations are still growing. The numbers on this chart are approximate.

Many of the world’s current troubles are to be found outside the main triangle: over-population; most of the world’s oil; the passage of trade; the depletion of resources, especially wood for fuel; and the decline of the environment. The reference to “Kaplan’s dragons” refers to the article by Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1994, in which he describes the collapse of states

in the Third World. (It is also a reference to the ancient cartographers who, when they did not know what to fill in on the map, simply stated, “here be dragons.”) The problem with the collapsing states—such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—is how much difference their collapse makes to the rest of the world, aside from the humanitarian aspect. It makes little difference for a strategy of deterrence and influence.




Over all this looms China, with its immense population and now booming economy. India might follow soon, and already is booming in population. It is not yet possible to draw the map in such a way as to accommodate China.

A caveat about the Third World: it is not so simple to describe it today as it was to describe just after decolonization in the early 1960s. Many countries have graduated (like the Asian tigers) or are in the process of doing so (South America). Are the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf Third World to be considered “Third World”? We are left with much of Africa, Central America, only a few countries in South Amer-


ica, and South Asia as constituting the Third World. Bosnia may have reverted to Third World status, and Albania is still there.

The next chart provides an additional perspective on the North vs. the South. One can almost describe the area in which transactions cross between the four entities shown on this chart as “the cockpit of the world.” The current sources of conflict and other troubles may be found in that cockpit.



Most countries play by the rules

Yet another view of the world is in the “blob” chart that follows. Most of the countries play by the rules, or declare their aspirations to do so. International law, as shown, covers only a small portion of these rules, mostly with regard to sovereignty and diplomacy. The rules are tacit, practical, experiential, not codified (except perhaps in business practices). It is not anarchy, but it is a soft and flexible system.



The rogues are the countries who do not wish to play by the rules or who wish to set their own rules, and who, as a consequence, are isolated.

Other countries are outside because they choose not to notice the world—Myanmar is almost the only case in point—or because they are imploding and do not notice the rest of the world, though they do generate refugees.


I have shown Russia as 90 percent inside because the Russians declare their intentions to be a full part of the world community and are relieved that they now have the chance. Of course, their internal preoccupations as well as the West keeping them at bay may yet turn them inward and isolate them. Then we may not know what rules they may be following, if any.

I have shown China 30 percent inside because the Chinese have joined the world economy and are dependent on it. They are debating among themselves whether they should follow all the other rules.

I would describe Saudi Arabia (and by extension the Gulf emirates) as 50 percent in because they are entirely dependent on the rest of the world to buy their oil and for their continued survival as sovereign countries, while they try to preserve their traditional systems. I describe Israel as 30 percent outside because the Israelis sometimes set their own rules, as when they bombed the Iraqi reactor or invaded Lebanon. These percentages are completely impressionistic.


Shown in the chart on the next page are various ways this world-playing-by-the-rules could fall apart:

1. 1. A China that is only 30 percent in leaves a lot out, and it will take time and some events before we can safely say that it is a full member of the world community, playing by the rules.
2. An imploding country close to the advanced world could engulf that world in a new and destructive struggle, or disrupt economies and civil relations among countries trying to deal with the problem. The situation in the former Yugoslavia raises these kinds of fears. A war in Korea would certainly be destructive. While it could be confined, it would cost the United States an enormous amount and disrupt the South Korea contribution to the world economy
3. The world could divide into new blocs. First, we could see three economic blocs develop: in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and East Asia. Second, these blocs could evolve self-contained security arrangements, to the exclusion of the others. Under these circumstances, we might see Russia strive to make the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into a security bloc as well, within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. However, the other countries of the CIS, especially Ukraine, would resist, and it is not clear whether the Russian economy could grow at all if it were isolated from the rest of the world.
4. Finally, the world could dissolve into 190-odd pieces, as countries' internal preoccupations overcame their international connections, or they broke into even smaller entities, and there were some kind of collapse of the world economy, led by a collapse in the international finance system. Is this happening now (August, 1998)?



Transition from “the security world” to “the economic world”

The world is now in a period of transition from one in which security dominated the agendas of the heads of state of the major nations to one in which economy dominates their agendas.



A major point is that neither the past “security world” nor the prospective “economic world” can be viewed as pure. Economic issues have dominated the agendas of the heads of state of the major Western nations—now institutionalized as the Group of Seven (G-7)—since the oil shocks of 1974 and 1979. The Cold War itself went through an evolution from hard to soft, as strategic nuclear arms control discussions took root, the Soviet Union backed away from confrontation on Berlin, the Helsinki Accords were ratified, and other, tacit, rules for easing the confrontation took root. In the 1980s, the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) was ratified, and Gorbachev took over as leader of the Soviet Union. The more the Soviet Union engaged with the rest of the world—running up an \$80 billion debt, as it turned out—the less it could afford or hold onto its own system, including continuing to provide subsidies for Communist states such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Ethiopia.

Outside the stark dichotomy of security vs. economics, there are whole other worlds of politics and culture (by culture I mean the international trade in ideas, rock-and-roll, etc.). These are not addressed in this presentation, although the more democratic governments there are, the more secure the world is, by general consensus.

The cold war changed over time

Some thought that U.S. foreign policy and security policy during the Cold War was very pure: all was containment and deterrence, and every relationship was driven by these strategies. They thought the U.S. economy could bear any expenditure on defense it wanted for these purposes, and the percentage of U.S. GDP for defense remained high.

The strategy was containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union—and confrontation against them where necessary. Strategic nuclear weapons were at the cornerstone of the strategy, but the direct confrontation was in Europe. There was also competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World, especially upon decolonization. The leadership in the United States concentrated on these security issues.

In reality, during the Cold War, the model of containment and deterrence was not pure and did not explain or direct everything:

- The Cold War evolved and softened over time. The United States and the USSR were engaged in strategic arms control negotiations from 1969 on.
- China and the Soviet Union split, and President Nixon made his opening to China.
- Much of what happened in the Third World—decolonization, development, conflict—did not fit the pure model, whatever the rhetoric.
- Arab-Israeli wars and India-Pakistan wars didn't quite fit the mold, though American and Soviet equipment was used in these wars.
- The leaders of the Western world gradually shifted their focus away from security to economics, as their domestic politics and economies settled down, and especially after the oil price shocks of the 1970s meant that economic issues came to the fore. U.S. leadership from the middle 1970s concentrated more on economics than on security.

- Social security nets in the Western world grew and competed with defense for a share of GDP (in fact, it was not an equal competition).
- The United States made a big miscalculation about the nature of the Cold War and got bogged down in Vietnam.

The world in the new era is likely to be messy, not pure, as well:

The world is now in transition to some different kind of world than the one we knew in the Cold War. It is shaping up now as an economics–dominant world. Security recedes into the background.

In a pure model of this better world, defense would not be a drain. The NEC (National Economic Council), not the NSC (National Security Council), would be dominant as the White House policy coordination forum. Foreign policy would focus on trade and economic relations. The free market economies of the former Communist states would take off. The Third World would develop. Debts would be manageable. Populations would not grow as fast. Wars between states would disappear, and even internal wars would diminish.

But we know that this future, economic, world is going to be messy as well. There will be conflicts, there will still be a need for defense, and the possibilities and threats posed by proliferation remain to be dispelled.

Prosperity in the advanced states will not be automatic. Trade conflicts will still exist. The recover of Russia will be slow. Some parts of the Third World will remain in bad shape. Internal conflicts will rage, and there will still be the threat of two-sided wars, e.g., between Israel and the Arabs, or between India and Pakistan. Some countries may still be armed to the teeth or determined to become so. U.S. leadership would still be engaged in trying to resolve the messy little conflicts. Defense will still be necessary, and threats will still be exaggerated.

In the meantime, the world is still going through its transition—or perhaps it is the nature of the international system always to be in transition

The signs are actually good, despite continuing internal conflicts and the persistence of disruptive activities by Libya, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.


In the United States, a number of structural economic initiatives have been and are still being pursued (NAFTA, GATT, APEC, G-7(8), dialogue with Japan). The U.S. economy is strong, though those of Europe and Japan are stagnant at the moment. Russia has not yet turned the corner, though privatization and the free market are firmly established there.

On the military side, most military establishments are downsizing. China has put economic growth first before a military build-up. In any case, military establishments are less affordable than they were before and they are in direct competition with the social safety nets in every country. Even in Africa signs of growth are beginning to appear. Two-sided or two-state wars have almost vanished.

On the downside, however, many internal conflicts continue, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Tajikistan, and elsewhere.

Differing perspectives between economics and security folks

As the world makes this transition to an “economic world,” we can only note that a great gap exists between the perceptions of those people who manage economic matters and those who manage security matters. They are separate communities. They do not talk to each other. In the United States, they may come together at the level of the Cabinet/or NSC, but even at that level there is also an NEC.



The economics folks, for instance, in the United States:

- See a completely different set of activities from the security folks.
- Have a rosy view of the future.
- Engage in non-zero-sum games—there will be benefits for everyone, as in free trade.
- Talk the same language from country-to-country (e.g., Mexico's leadership is mostly educated in the United States). Both Moscow's internal and international dialogues are conducted in language recognizable in Washington.
- Have their own international institutions—G-7 (8), IMF, IDBs (International Development Banks), APEC, etc.
- Do not stand wringing their hands about a lack of strategy or of strategic direction, but simply move out to do what they have to

do and want to do. They do not wait around for the equivalent of the National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy to be written and debated.

- Of course, in the summer of 1998, it may be dawning on the economics people that the global financial system is crumbling, as East Asian financial and economic troubles continue and are not resolved, the Russian economy collapses, stock market values decline worldwide, IMF measures do not stem the decline of economies, and the IMF runs out of funds to loan.


The security folks, for instance in the United States:

- See violence persisting around the world, rogue states, proliferation, potential peer competitors in Russia and China, and the exploitation by others of commercially available technologies for more efficient military means.
- Take a gloomy view of the future—after all, it is their job to anticipate the worst case.
- See military competitions as zero-sum games—you either win or lose.
- Are not able to communicate with potential enemies, who hide behind their own walls of military secrecy.
- Have their own institutions—NATO; treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; the UN Security Council, etc.
- Complain constantly about the lack of strategy, foreign policy, or clear articulation of either.

It is my belief—it requires further study—that the economics folks nonetheless make deep, hidden, perhaps unconscious assumptions about the stability of the world security situation that allows them to pursue their tasks and goals. I asked a businessman from the West Coast of the United States, who does business in Mexico and Asia, what he assumes about security that permits him to continue to operate freely in the international sphere. He said that he had never thought about it.

Security matters are currently on the fringe

The picture shown below is a stark one, perhaps a caricature, and does not necessarily anticipate future changes.



However:

1. With the end of the Cold War, there is no major balance-of-power situation. The United States is the sole superpower. There are no opposing security blocs, though NATO continues and its members debate whether the alliance should be exclusive or all-embracing of new members. There are perhaps mini-balance-of-power situations in Korea and vis-à-vis Iraq, or between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. It is not a multi-polar world, as some say, but a non-polar world.
2. At the other end of the spectrum, I have counted about two dozen countries imploding at any time—in the past, at present, and prospectively in the future. Most of these situations do not

disrupt world peace and stability, though the human effects are appalling, and the situation in Bosnia is too close to the European center for comfort. UN Peacekeeping is consuming more manpower and dollars, though the roughly \$2.2 billion the UN spends annually (including \$1.6 billion in the former Yugoslavia) is less than one percent of the annual U.S. defense budget.

3. There are four active rogue countries, but all four are contained and embargoed in some fashion. Proliferation in all four is extremely slow. Three of them have grievous internal economic troubles. Castro's Cuba would also be a rogue if Castro could manage it, but the Cubans may be the country most devastated by the loss of Soviet subsidies. Syria is laying back. China is not a rogue now, and probably will not be. Some Indians say that they should rule all of British India, but they have backed off in those instances where they had the opportunity to exert hegemony (i.e., in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives).
4. No country has replaced the Soviet Union to exploit advances in technology, either from commercial sources or internally, for military purposes.

In other words, the world security situation is manageable at this time. Military budgets in most of the world are declining. The international arms market shrank from a nominal \$45 billion to \$25 billion from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, not counting inflation and the rising real costs of the sophisticated systems that are now produced (the replacements for the F-5 and MiG-21, for instance, are either far more expensive or are trainer aircraft like the British Hawk). It had recovered somewhat in the mid-1990s, to \$32 billion a year, but the economic troubles in East Asia have reduced it once more.

This post-Cold War picture of manageable security could change, of course, as shown on the following chart. The tasks of deterrence and influence in the new era are to help these things **not** to happen, that is, to keep security matters at the fringe of most of world activity.


I have gone on in the next chart to draw what I think is the most reasonable picture of a **bad** future situation. It is more of an anarchic and fragmented world than a return to a Cold War situation.

It is characterized by:

- A division into three major economic blocs.
- A rather confused confrontation between an enlarged NATO and a Russia trying to corral the other former Soviet republics into a new military alliance, yet getting into confrontations with the individual countries that would supposedly be members of this alliance.
- Perhaps a new balance-of-power confrontation in East Asia, with Russia and the United States anxiously on the side-lines, punctuated by a crisis over Taiwan (not the minor crises that pop up from time-to-time over the Spratly Islands).

- More hostile Islamic states, which take steps backward to medievalism, yet still cannot unite.
- The collapse, economically and socially, of a major state.
- Transnational social problems involving refugees, terrorists, drugs, etc.
- The decline of resources and the natural environment attendant upon rampant population growth.

None of these possible developments create favorable conditions for the emergence of a “peer competitor” to the United States.



Transition of deterrence to the new era

This section covers three main topics:

1. What the US wants NOT to happen in the new era;
2. The transition of deterrence concepts to their application in the new era;
3. Influence and categories of countries.

What does the United States not want to happen?

IN THE NEW ERA, WHAT DO WE WANT <i>NOT TO HAPPEN</i> ?
• NO MORE WORLD WARS (Like World War I in Europe, World War II in Europe and Asia) • NO MORE COLD WARS (Like 1947–1989) • NO MORE ARMS RACES (Like US–USSR, or Arab-Israeli) • NO MORE OPPOSING POWER BLOCS (Like NATO–Warsaw Treaty Organization or, now, CIS) • NO NEW ROGUE NATIONS OR LEADERS (It is hard to envisage who the next bad guy might be) • NO MORE INTER-STATE WARS (Potential now very low, mostly because of economic interdependence) • NO ARMS BUILD-UPS BY A STATE BECAUSE IT FEELS ISOLATED AND THREATENED (Saudis, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Israel are cases in point) • NO NUCLEAR WARS (Some say, “no more nuclear wars,” since there was one in 1945) • NO <i>USE</i> OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (Preventing proliferation is another matter)
UNFORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT KNOW HOW TO DETER INTERNAL CONFLICTS FROM OUTSIDE

“We,” in this case, refers to the United States. The United States is the only country with the kind of global outlook described in this vugraph. Most countries would agree with these goals—they are obvi-

ous—but, unlike the United States, not many countries believe they can do much about any of the goals, much less all of them.

How each of these goals is pursued is another matter, to be discussed further in this presentation.

Note that I say, “no nuclear wars” and “no use of chemical or biological weapons.” Stopping or discouraging proliferation of these kinds of weapons is more a diplomatic task, especially in active pursuit of export controls on the elements needed for such weapons development. Maintaining stability around the world—no blocs, no neighbors threatening neighbors—may keep a country from feeling it needs to develop or otherwise acquire these weapons. It has worked in Europe, in South Africa, and between Brazil and Argentina, but has not worked in the cases of Iraq, Israel, India, or Pakistan, and probably did not work in the case of North Korea.

I also assume that internal conflicts cannot be deterred. That is, they cannot be deterred by the threat of intervention from outside, or by the presence of military forces outside borders. Of course, one can imagine a country’s leadership appealing for solidarity because of a strong military power on its borders, or a Libya or Iran using the American devil to reinforce that feeling of solidarity. But such appeals do not compensate for governments losing their effectiveness or for groups within the country trying to dislodge them. At a certain point, the tensions, clashes, and eventual breakdown of order in a country make the country so introspective that they would not notice that somebody outside was trying to deter the violence. Active intervention is something else, either politically (to urge a government to reform, e.g., the United States urging President Marcos of the Philippines), or militarily (e.g., the United States in Haiti, or the French in Africa), or with aid (Rwanda was considered to be one of the most thorough experiments with aid programs—but it was all for naught).

What does deterrence and influence mean for the United States?

To expand on these objectives, deterrence for the United States in the new era is owning, deploying, and brandishing forces so that conflict doesn't happen.

The Cold War is over; the classic kind of deterrence pertains in only limited spheres:

1. Continuation of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence with Russia, though gradually reduced forces and better relations may change its nature.
2. China is presently the only other country that poses an ICBM threat to the United States—that is, they acknowledge aiming missiles at us, unlike Britain and France, for whom aiming at us is unthinkable. The Chinese threat is, nonetheless, a minimal threat; they call it a minimal deterrent.
3. Deterring the four rogues—Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

In addition, the United States wants the following **not** to happen in the world (whether the United States intervenes or not—in most cases the U.S. Government may take a diplomatic role—or whether or not its military forces are relevant for each and every one of these purposes, or only some of them, is to be discussed later in this paper):

1. No two-state wars.
2. No new blocs, arms races, or balance of power stand-offs.
3. No big military build-ups by any single state.
4. No threatening confrontations that could result in war.
5. No use of weapons of mass destruction.

The United States would also like the following not to happen, but US military forces do not particularly *deter* them. That is, possession of U.S. military forces, their deployments, and threats to use them have not particularly affected their development. Direct measures to discourage them are taken by other agencies, especially by the State

Department (I am not addressing direct interventions or actions in this paper):

1. Terrorism (except in those instances where a definite state sponsorship may have been identified, e.g., by Libya).
2. Internal conflicts, civil wars, breakdowns of states.
3. Traffic in drugs.
4. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In a more positive sense, the United States wants:


1. Democracy throughout the world (which also lessens chances of wars).
2. Observance of human rights.
3. Free markets and free trade around the world.
4. Open communications and diplomacy among states.

US military forces back up these last elements up by their strength and small contributions, but actions to bring them about are not their specific responsibility.

The transition of deterrence to new forms

We are now in a transition from the old deterrence to some new concept, which I call here “reassurance and stabilization.” The old deterrence was based on two opposing blocs, in an ideological confrontation, with nuclear weapons gradually coming into mutual balance, and rather static confrontations on the ground and at sea. Arab-Israeli and Indian-Pakistani wars merely highlighted the eventual mutual desire between the United States and the USSR to keep the status quo.

The ultimate goal of a peaceful world would be characterized by the goals in the chart below. Nuclear weapons would play less of a role. Of course, this world would still conform to the “messy” model: there would still be a few rogues, and the relentless growth of populations guarantees more internal conflicts.



In the transitional stage, the United States and Russia are still locked into mutual strategic second-strike retaliatory deterrence, waiting for the Russian Duma to ratify START II. Both governments are eager to continue reductions under a START III treaty. There are even discussions within both countries, and informally between the two countries, to find ways to reduce the elements that have characterized the mutual assured destruction strategy, including parity and high readiness for launch on warning or under attack. If ameliorating measures were pursued, the two countries would have established a new kind of relation that might not even be one of necessarily deterring each other—the ultimate detargeting, as it were.

**THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA WILL BE LOCKED INTO
MUTUAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
FOR AN INDEFINITE FUTURE**

- Despite improved relations and reduced strategic nuclear forces.
- Parity, high readiness, and target planning will persist on both sides.
- Russia, in its weakened situation, relies more on nuclear deterrence.
- Over time, the two countries may find ways to break this lock.
- In the meantime, mutual strategic nuclear deterrence will persist.

Despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, good and open relations with Russia, the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the reductions agreed upon in START I, II, and in prospect for START III (down to even 2,000–2,500 warheads or even lower), and detargeting, the elements of mutual strategic nuclear deterrence persist:

- Balances, parity—each side must have about the same numbers as the other. Negotiations are necessary to go to lower numbers or to restrict capabilities. The agreements must be verified by mutual inspections.
- High alert rates, that is, high readiness, despite detargeting. These are inherent in the nature of the systems built and deployed by the two countries.
- The United States still plans targets, according to a deterrent strategy, and presumably Russia does, too.
- Even the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons rises again, in the NATO expansion context. Loose talk about the renewed deterrent role of “tacnucs” is heard.

Over time, the two countries could break out of this locked-together posture:

- It seems ridiculous to maintain these postures with the end of the Cold War, except for the “objective reality” of the destructive power of the weapons.
- Russia, especially, may not be able to maintain even a level of 2,000 warheads, given the state of their economy and the lack of funds for the upkeep of their forces. The United States is in much better shape. While it has launched its last Trident boat, it continues to build Trident D-5 missiles. It is not building any more ICBMs or bombers, but its existing strategic nuclear forces are well-maintained and have many more years of service ahead of them.
- Relations and understanding between the two countries could continue to improve. Trust and transparency could replace the need for verification.
- Steps may be taken to relax high alerts, e.g., by separate storage of warheads.

In the meantime, the two countries will continue to sustain mutual strategic nuclear deterrence.

The United States and Russia also want their nuclear forces each to greatly outnumber those of any other countries. This is also an incentive for maintaining the forces, and thus a deterrent posture. The overall convergence of Russian and American views on the strategic situation in the world can be represented as follows:



On the other hand, Russia is preoccupied with its internal troubles right now, starting with an uncertain political system; an economy that has sunk far lower than the U.S. economy did during the Depression; crime and corruption in the capital and elsewhere; and trouble in Chechnya, Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan. As one Russian has said, "Add up all the troubles around Russia's borders—which are about as long as the Soviet Union's borders—and they amount to a series of unconnected regional problems, not a global picture."

I have noted that deterrence and influence by U.S. military forces, as addressed in this paper, have little to do with the internal conflicts, whether chronic or newly-breaking out, around the world. Perhaps the riots in Indonesia in May 1998 might have been averted by better IMF policies and actions and earlier radical changes by President Suharto, but those actions go beyond the scope of this paper.

The ultimate goal of a peaceful world would be characterized by the goals in the earlier chart entitled "Transition of Deterrence to the

New Age.” Nuclear weapons would play less of a role. Of course, this world would still conform to the “messy” model: there would still be a few rogues, and the relentless growth of populations guarantees more internal conflicts.

Deterrence, influence, and categories of countries

There are only four countries right now that are indubitably hostile to the United States and maintain military forces that could attack their neighbors—Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Some would add Syria and Cuba to this list, and they must always be watched, but, as i discussed earlier, they are constrained by their circumstances.

The United States wants to engage Russia and China so they won’t evolve “adversarially.” In the case of Russia, the notion of engagement goes well beyond the strategic nuclear relationship.

We want to obviate the necessary of Germany or Japan or any other country thinking they might somehow have to become big military powers. This is hardly a problem right now.

We want to end almost all international terrorism by achieving peace in the Middle East.


All the rest of the countries in the world are:

- Friends and allies; or...
- A few countries with which U.S. relations remain prickly; or...
- Countries which don’t count (e.g., Myanmar/Burma).

No one wants India and Pakistan to go to war.

- The Kashmir situation and its guerrilla warfare drags on without resolution, forever tempting the two sides to a larger war.
- A war would be appalling per se.
- They could use nuclear weapons.
- The situation may be relatively stable because both countries depend on their membership in the world structure for their viability. (At the moment—August, 1998—India defies the world for the internal, national, purposes of the BJP.)

In the earlier section on definitions, I showed the chart below in order to draw the distinction between “deterrence” and “influence.”



- **Deterrence** is a confrontational matter, meant to convey messages as to what is unacceptable action, to which there may be retaliation. With the Soviet Union, it became a mutual stand-off. The feedback is inefficient, if there is any at all. I have also noted the “effect on bystanders”—for U.S. allies, this can be source of reassurance; others might tremble.
- **Influence** is mutual from the start, between countries, and the feedback is almost too great—there are many channels, private and governmental. The situation can be noisy. But the general patterns of communications can also contribute to building a community of nations. In this influence model, countries are participants, not just bystanders.

The strawman usage of the term “influence” can sometimes sound like, “the United States tells other countries what to do,” and the measure of influence is whether they “comply.” If a country does not comply, the United States may be said to have “lost influence.” It can sound like a one-way street, just another version of a zero-sum game. In practice, relations are usually a matter of mutual adjustment.

Thus, as we address the question of influence, the first consideration is that it has to be for something, for a purpose that lies beyond the instrumentalities or relations involved in the matter. For instance, “influence” may be to:

- Promote countries living peacefully with each other.
- Promote democracy and human rights within.
- Promote free trade to the advantage of all.

Instrumentally, this may mean for the United States Government:

- Maintaining connections and communications with as many countries as possible (as an instrumentality to open up the possibilities of doing the above).

On a day-to-day basis, it may mean:

- Keeping countries allied or otherwise friendly with us.
- Keeping or obtaining access to facilities for our forces.
- Persuading countries to play by world community rules.
- Deterring aggression against our friends and allies (or even the United States).
- Persuading countries to vote with us on security issues at the UN.
- Persuading countries to join with us in a military intervention.
- As the background to resolution of trade, democracy, human rights issues.

Over the long term, influence (still in the security sphere) may be directed at:

- Preventing the development of opposing blocs.
- Discouraging the need for countries to undertake military build-ups.
- Discouraging arms races.

The process of influence depends on the country, the history of its relations with the United States, common membership in alliances and other organizations, the country's security dependence on the United States, its geographical location and significance, and so forth.

I have divided countries into nine categories, shown below. The countries shown are illustrative.

INFLUENCE: CATEGORIES OF COUNTRIES
(not all countries listed)

1. **Very Old Friends** (e.g., UK, France, Canada, Netherlands)
2. **Strong Newer Friends** (e.g., Germany, Japan, Israel)
3. **Isolated countries -- US responsibility** (e.g., Taiwan, Israel)
4. **Countries that have been dependent on us for security**
 (e.g., Turkey, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Philippines, Tunisia)
5. **On our side now!** (e.g., Egypt, East Europe, **Russia**, Ukraine)
6. **Difficult relations, from time to time** (e.g. Mexico, France Greece, India)
7. **Countries which could go either way** (e.g., China, Syria)
8. **The openly hostile countries** (Cuba, Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Sudan)
9. **Special drug war countries** (e.g., Colombia, Bolivia, Peru)

Where does Pakistan belong in all this?

1. **With very old friends**, the United States doesn't just walk in and say, "We are here to influence you." Rather, we say, "Together, we have a problem; what do we do together?" We learn from them.

2. **Strong, newer friends** are those that date from the post-World War II period. With Germany and Japan, the United States has had much more of a tutelary relation. While the United States consults fully with them, they may still display a certain deferential reticence. As for Israel, the United States was the first to recognize its new nation, in 1948, and the links have remained strong across the years.

3. At the same time, Israel is also in that category of **isolated countries that depended on the United States for their security and for their recognition in the world community**. Taiwan is the other strong case. These countries may have been treated like pariahs by other countries. Of course, both Israel and Taiwan have built their own strong self-defense capabilities, with support from the United States. These countries may show a fierce independence in dealing with us, sometimes to our discomfort.

4. A number of other countries have also **depended on us for their security in the past** or even in the new era, though their places in the world community are fully recognized. Note, for instance, the vulnerability of Tunisia, squeezed between Algeria and Libya. Together with the French, the United States reassures them.

5. The “**on our side now**” countries might also be labeled “**the prodigals.**” The United States initially encounters a certain eagerness to relate to us, and an openness as to their desire for help. They may become disillusioned if the United States does not deliver as much as they hoped for, and then more mature relations must be developed over time.

6. There is a category of countries with whom the United States always seems to have **prickly relations**, relations that go up and down. This may be because we overwhelm them (Mexico) or tend to better support their competitive neighbors (Greece, India), or because of their own pride of stature (India). France may be the classic case, though on the whole it belongs in the first category—very old friends. None of these prickly relations have actually turned hostile, though these countries may flirt with countries hostile to us (Mexico with Cuba, India with the Soviet Union, France with Iraq).

7. **Countries that could go either way** have been discussed previously. They are also not beyond dialogue, though the United States experiences long disconnections with them.

8. I have already discussed the **openly hostile countries**—the rogues—extensively.

9. Finally, I have put the **drug war countries** in a special category. The United States has generally had good relations with these countries (though relations have often been prickly with Peru), but the countries face enormous internal difficulties in controlling drug traffic.

How the United States deals with countries depends a lot on where they stand in the history of their relations with us.

A digression on the nature of governments

In thinking about deterrence and influence, it is tempting to regard other governments—and especially those of rogue nations—as monolithic, confident, sure in their decision-making, hard-over on their interests to the exclusion of other countries' interests. Decisions appear to be made promptly and consistently. The United States Government, on the other hand, is regarded as incoherent in its foreign policies, indecisive, and torn apart by public arguments, especially those between the Executive Branch and Congress.

But governments are not hard nuts and black boxes. The U.S. Government has always been happiest dealing with the monarchies, e.g., in Morocco and Jordan, where one person makes the decisions and we can just walk in and find out what that decision is. We are always a little puzzled that the Israeli Prime Minister has to go back and consult his cabinet, whereas President Sadat of Egypt made his own decisions on the spot (as at Camp David in 1979). The United States also finds it difficult dealing with what I call "administrative democracies," such as Japan, where the political leadership may be weak and formidable bureaucrats call the tune. We tend to regard China as monolithic now, and we do not know how Russia will turn out. Right now, "Tsar Boris," as the Russians refer to President Yeltsin, seems to rule arbitrarily through decrees. But Russia has a lively press, much of the

debates are open, and Yeltsin has followed constitutional procedure in appointing new prime ministers.


For example, the Soviet Union was hardly as monolithic as many in the United States believed, as shown in the chart below. Their caution and collective leadership had much to do with the effectiveness of our deterrent during the Cold War. Of course, their military literature that we obtained stressed war-fighting and taking the offensive, and otherwise sounded aggressive and hostile. Our military literature stresses war-fighting as well, though under civilian control. We now understand that they accepted our notions of deterrence more than they were willing to publicly admit.



*Brezhnev once said to his brother: "All that stuff about communism is a tall tale for popular consumption. After all, we can't leave the people with no faith. The church was taken away, the czar was shot, and something had to be substituted.? So let the people build communism." (Luba Brezhneva, *The World I Left Behind*.)

Back to influence and countries

We might now sort all these types of countries out and array them into concentric “circles of influence.” I call this “a new formulation,” because I am not talking about classic spheres of influence, as were established at the Yalta Conference, or in the dividing up of colonies in Africa in the 19th century.



Much of deterrence in the Cold War related to deterring Soviet attacks or imperialism against both our strong friends, old and new, as well as the countries dependent on us for their security. These latter countries were often threatened by neighbors who were either supplied by the Soviet Union or were their satellites. The Pakistanis noted to us that, whenever a country signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, that country attacked its neighbor soon thereafter. They were, of course, referring to the Indian-Soviet relation. I checked the list of such treaties and, sure enough, found that the country with which the Soviets had signed the treaty had committed some sort of aggression against its neighbor in all but one case.


In the new era, our strong old and new friends are hardly threatened. The weight of a U.S. strategy of deterrence now falls mostly on deterring attacks by the rogues on those countries that have difficulty defending themselves, such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.

The drug-war countries and the imploding countries fall outside this system.

In the next chart, I have allocated countries illustratively to the circles:

- In the inner circle, I have listed the four rogues, plus Cuba (in light type, because of Cuba's current and likely prolonged weakness and lack of outside support following the collapse of the Soviet Union).
- I have listed Russia in two places. In light and smaller type, I show them in the category of "countries that could go either way." In bolder type, still with a question mark, I show them in the category of "on our side now." This, I believe, is the stronger possibility.
- France can appear in both the outer ring as a strong friend and as a country with whom the United States has prickly relations from time to time. Personally, I believe the weight should be on France as a strong old friend.
- The United States has had some frictions with the countries in Southeast Asia, who declared their wishes to pursue both economic growth and a semi-authoritarian form of government, but who are otherwise not militarily hostile to us in any way and indeed welcome our military presence. One could almost put Saudi Arabia into this category as well. In Southeast Asia, though, the prickliness of some of the government has been moderated by the financial and economic crisis beginning in 1997 and the need for the IMF to help bail them out.
- Israel and South Korea are moving into the outer circle, both because of their military strength and booming economies and because, in the Israeli case, their threatening neighbors have been neutralized. Thailand is no longer threatened by the Viet-

nameless or the Khmer Rouge. The Philippines were never really threatened from the outside, perhaps because of their close relations with us as well as the broad stretch of water that separated them from the rest of Asia, but they have long fought communist rebels throughout the islands and the Moros in the south. Internal collapse is their more likely scenario, though they have achieved stability and their economy is doing better, though also affected by the Asian economic troubles that began in 1997.



There are a number of countries that might not fit on this chart. In particular, the countries of South America and Africa are out of the strategic main stream and do not fit—at least for the purpose of “deterrence and influence” on security matters.

The tasks of deterrence and influence in the new era are to contain the four rogues, plus Cuba, prevent the countries that could go either

way from going the bad way, keep the strong new friends and those “on our side now” still on our side, work carefully with the “prickly relations” countries, and collaborate with our friends to protect the vulnerable countries.

The case of China

Having swept through these formulations, let me return for a moment to the case of China, in the deterrence and influence context. The sweep of this paper is too great to discuss the case of China in any detail, but a few remarks seem necessary.²

There is a struggle in Washington these days (e.g., summer, 1998) as to:

- Whether the United States can engage China in peaceful relations and whether China is truly interested mostly in its economy and joining the world community; or
- Whether China (a) *will be* a “peer military competitor” or (b) whether we in the United States should prudently *assume* it will be a peer military competitor.

To put it bluntly, the second set of propositions tends to be driven in Washington by the fear of some that U.S. forces cannot be justified at their current levels without posing a Chinese threat (threat to what, other than Taiwan, is not clear). The sizing of our forces since World War II, the emergence of nuclear weapons, and the Korean War has always been based on some big competitor, namely the Soviet Union. The size of U.S. forces was further rationalized in war-fighting scenarios against the Soviet Union. Some feel the need for replacements for both enemy and scenarios.

As noted earlier, China is the only country other than Russia that seems to aim ICBMs at the United States. Moreover, China is big—1.3 billion people and growing. It is far larger than any of the other countries in the region, and the United States is far away. Some say that the

2. I have discussed the case of China myself more extensively in *China is not the Soviet Union* (CNA Professional Paper 543, August 1997).


rise of a “peer competitor,” “at least regionally,” is “inevitable” when there is one superpower left. Others say that the world is evolving, becoming more globally interdependent, that the United States is a unique country to be a superpower, both because of its deeply democratic nature and its distance from Eurasia, and that history is not “inevitable.” Aside from its bigness and the growth of its economy (which growth is now slowing down), China has not yet really embarked on some big military build-up.

The need for U.S. “deterrence” at the moment comes down to (a) the confrontation over Taiwan and whether the United States deters China from attacking Taiwan, or, at the other extreme, (b) whether China really intends to go the route of the Soviet Union sometime in the future and turn itself into a military superpower.


“Influence” still has to play out in the case of China, however. As discussed earlier, and further below, “influence” is much more of a two-way street than deterrence. No matter how some might like it, influence is not a matter of telling another country what to do. If “influence” were not to work, and China decides to be hostile (on other than the Taiwan case), and they want to poise their 18 ICBMs against the 3,500 intercontinental warheads the United States would keep under START 2, or they want to increase the 18 (either by adding more missiles or by MIRVing), we can handle *that* deterrent race.

U.S. military forces in deterrence & influence

Recall this chart from the beginning of this presentation. The wall of containment was built around the Soviet Union and its allies. They may have tried to outflank that wall (that's what many thought they were doing). The U.S. nuclear umbrella stabilized the whole system.



In the evolving world that I have described in this presentation, we can search for an analogy for “the World of Containment.” I suggest that it may be as portrayed in the next chart:




The wall of military deterrence and influence—the wall of security—can be drawn around the economic world, where most countries are playing by the rules, and where economic competition is non-zero-sum, with eventual benefits for everyone (providing our economic managers continue to act wisely and the growing world population doesn’t outstrip resources and ruin the environment).

The analog to the nuclear umbrella of the Cold War is the United States’ remaining strong, in its many dimensions, including military. This American strength would both deter attack and keep other countries from thinking they needed to be military superpowers, both because they would be discouraged in trying to compete and because the worldwide security system would be stable enough. The United States would also deter the use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, a lesser task.

This is where my major assumption comes into play—that in the current (1998) political and economic situation of the United States, the floor of the U.S. defense budget is much firmer than many people

had expected upon the end of the Cold War. This floor may erode—just as the defense budgets of practically every other country have been eroding—or it could collapse, in which case I would go back to the drawing board.

I have annotated the previous chart, as shown here.



The elements of U.S. strength are repeated, at the top left.

The basic objective of "influence" is to bring Russia and China inside the wall, and not let Germany or Japan out.

The mutual second-strike retaliatory balance of strategic nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States will be maintained until it is clear that it is no longer necessary to do so.

The rogues that threaten world peace are shown, each with a separate containment wall.

A major internal conflict near the advanced world and threatening to breach the wall is also shown—in this case the Bosnian situation (and more generally, the whole Balkan situation).

The major military functions for U.S. forces in deterrence and influence are shown as composing the wall:

1. Maintain alliances and expand collective security systems.
2. Maintain some permanent deployments, as necessary (i.e., in Europe, Korea, and Japan).
3. Continue to deploy U.S. naval forces. Other U.S. forces may deploy from time-to-time as well, as for exercise *Bright Star* into the Middle East.
4. Intervene as necessary from time to time, mindful of the indirect results this may have for the system of security.

The United States would still have the difficulty of sizing and configuring the forces in accordance with these constructs, including the more abstract umbrella function. However, it should be remembered that U.S. forces do more than deter and influence.

Background conditions for U.S. military deterrence and influence

In examining how U.S. military forces contribute to deterrence and influence, I would note the following questions and conditions:


- What is it about the U.S. military effort that may cause things not to happen?
 - People have to notice.
 - They have to be impressed.
 - They have to think the United States relevant to what they're up to, if they're up to anything.
 - They have to think the United States is there or can get there.

- They have to think the United States has both the capability to cause them more than tolerable damage and the will to do so.
- What is it about the U.S. military effort that may vitiate the above?
 - The reverse of any of the above.
 - U.S. self-deterrence: internal debates, lack of interest, running its own reputation down.
 - The reluctance of the United States to take casualties. More arguable is whether people out there see a reluctance by the United States to inflict civilian casualties. The United States talks about keeping them down, and Libya and Iraq have tried to exploit this U.S. tendency.
 - The irrelevance of U.S. military power to most of the conflicts that arise today (that is, lack of opportunity to demonstrate use of force)
 - Incidents that may shed a bad light on U.S. forces or U.S. decision-making—e.g., the situations in Haiti and Somalia. In Haiti, we backed away from landing police advisors from the LST USS Harland County, but later intervened massively. In Somalia, the deaths of 18 Rangers caused us to abandon the country.
- Unlike the dominant impression many of us had in the Cold War, not all the U.S. military may do is for deterrence:
 - A large defense effort is rooted in domestic politics and the domestic economy. It is a source of national identity and pride (i.e., it makes the country feel good about itself).
 - Desert Shield was for defense; Desert Storm was an offensive operation that had to be done.
 - Our interventions in internal conflicts (e.g., Haiti, Somalia) were for the purposes of actively resolving the situations.
- International defense efforts for other purposes may have benefits for deterrence:

- Engagement with other countries—in joint training, strategic dialogues, etc.—are part of the general U.S. effort to maintain its relations and influence with friendly countries and may signal to the rogues that we can mobilize opposition.
- The bystander effect of actual interventions: other countries note that the Americans are tough, willing to fight, and have unequaled military capabilities.
- Actual interventions, especially if done well, create opportunities both for reinforcing solidarity in coalitions and expanding their membership.

These factors are expanded upon in the following pages.

ELEMENTS OF US STRENGTH AND DEFENSE THAT MAY CONTRIBUTE TO MILITARY DETERRENCE AND INFLUENCE



To expand on some of these categories:

- U.S. political leadership keeps the world together:
 - In the G-7, now expanding to G-8 to include Russia.
 - The United States has taken the lead in keeping Russia engaged in world, conducting the initial negotiations to reconcile Russia and expanding NATO in what eventually became “The Founding Act.”
 - The U.S. has taken the lead in negotiating GATT and NAFTA, organizing APEC, and in other economic initiatives.
 - The United States provides continuing and irreplaceable leadership in NATO.
 - The United States has been the driving force for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).


None of these is institutionalized for all time—they all take continuing leadership efforts.

- U.S. military forces are capable, trained, and expeditionary:
 - The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are ready (in war-fighting trim) and professional.
 - Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces are still large and ready. They will be nominally balanced with Russia for an indefinite future. This also means that either force is larger than any others. Of course, the Russians are having trouble maintaining parity as their forces deteriorate and are not replaced.
 - Continued technological improvements are being made in the forces—at a rate faster than those made by any other country in the world.
 - The United States has unique, global technological capabilities, like world-wide communications, surveillance, etc.
 - Not worth (i.e., affordable) anyone else duplicating.

- We can apparently dominate the battlespace—fog of war can be applied unequally, to our advantage.
- The United States has bought airlift and sealift so the forces can get anywhere in the world. The deterrent benefits of these lift capabilities may be ambiguous. We also worry about timeliness so much in our internal debates that we may vitiate the deterrent benefits of physically speedy responses.
- The capabilities of U.S. forces are demonstrated out in the world from time to time:
 - U.S. forces are being maintained on the territories of other countries—in Europe, Korea, and Japan.
 - Regular deployments, particularly of naval forces, are undertaken around the world.
 - U.S. military personnel undertake coalition activities—discussions, exercises, visits, etc.
 - Actual operations are undertaken: some are big, as for Desert Storm; or small, as in peacekeeping.


The drawbacks that might vitiate some of these advantages are shown on the next page.

ELEMENTS OF U.S. SELF-DETERRENCE:
DRAWBACKS VITIATING MILITARY DETERRENCE AND INFLUENCE



*These are the elements of self-deterrence.
 We also communicate this self-deterrence to others.*

How what else the United States does in defense contributes to deterrence and influence




I have noted that the United States Government does not plan, build, deploy, and use its military forces solely for the purpose of deterrence. One can list the four major reasons for U.S. forces, as shown above. To expand on each category:


- Keeping old associations and opening new ones includes:
 - 1. Maintaining old alliances and friendships with countries;
 - 2. Seeking new opportunities to relate to countries (e.g., Poland, Russia);
 - 3. Exercising, training, and dialoguing with all of the above;
 - 3. Planning, organizing and carrying out coalition operations.

- Actually intervening in conflicts and carrying out other operations, and learning and sharing the lessons learned involves:
 - 1. Fighting in two-sided wars (e.g., Desert Storm, North Korea if another war were to occur);
 - 2. Containing wars (e.g., embargoes, the Earnest Wil tank protection operation in the Persian Gulf);
 - 3. Peacekeeping or peacemaking interventions in internal conflicts (e.g., Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia);
 - 4. Pursuing terrorists and drug traffickers;
 - 5. Conducting NEOs (non-combatant evacuation operations).
- Keeping a big defense budget and force is a symbol of national pride and place in the world and entails maintaining:
 - 1. Four Military Services;
 - 2. Force structure;
 - 3. A defense industrial base;
 - 4. A sizable defense budget;
- Preparing for the future entails
 - 1. Staying “ahead” technologically;
 - 2. Having a defense industrial base;
 - 3. Personnel trained, experienced, motivated.


Each of these elements can then be connected to the basic objectives of deterrence and influence in the new era, as shown in the next chart.



The next chart shows that U.S. forces are currently stretched in four major directions, with considerable overlaps. Note that the authorities for these uses of the forces may be different. The natural tendency is for the three day-to-day operations to squeeze the more abstract “warfighting forces for two MRCs,” with a consequent squeeze on modernization of the forces.



How does all this relate to “deterrence and influence in the new era”?
The next charts show the connections.



COMPETING DEMANDS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR THE USE OF US FORCES: Implications for Deterrence---Annotated

For the national level (President and NSC), and in its connection to relations with other countries, this is the essence of reassurance and stabilization:

- It is there.
- It is the core of alliances.
- It is at least a tripwire.
- It provides access and facilities for reinforcement.

But it has its costs:

- Maintaining rotation base may conflict with 2 MTWs.
- Burden-sharing.
- Some inflexibility for MTWs.
- Threat is gone in Europe; Congress may yet question continuation (Korean presence is locked in by American politics)

**PERM-
ANENTLY
DEPLOYED
FORCES**

**WAR-
FIGHTING
FORCES FOR
TWO MTWs**

**REGULAR
DEPLOY-
MENTS**

**CONTINGENT
OPERATIONS**

For the classic defense planners (still in a Cold War mold?), this is the essence of deterrence:

- They have a known force of some bigness.
- It is directed against putative or potential enemies with forces.
- It has a deterrent hedge - in planning for the second MTW.
- "War-fighting" is what military forces do, and the weapons must be provided accordingly.
- Weapons also means a future orientation.
- Its "Usability" (some may refer to it as "credibility") rests in air & sea lift.

For the national level, this also represents engagement and a reminder that the US has big, capable forces. For deterrence:

- In the near term, the rogues are reminded that US can act quickly.
- In the longer term, all are reminded that US has the largest, most capable Navy, and not to mess with it.


You have to do what you have to do: these operations take place when deterrence fails, or was irrelevant in the first place.

But there are effects on bystanders and for deterrence in the future:

- Desert Storm had to have a strong effect on bystanders.
- Unsuccessful operations (Somalia?) could have a different effect.

Relating U.S. military deterrence and influence to specific countries

This chart summarizes the deterrent—that is, non-use-of-force functions—in each of the circles in the “spheres of influence” chart.



- **With strong friends, old and new,** the United States would maintain associations, both bilateral and in alliances, through military staff talks, exercises, exchanges, and so forth. Most of the countries in which the United States is interested are across the oceans, and the United States generally has to go over there to interact. This may mean continuing permanent stationing


(as in Europe, Korea, and Japan) or the periodic presence of naval forces (as in the Mediterranean area and in East Asia).

- **With those countries that tend to depend on the United States for their security and even their survival** within the world structure, the United States would continue to provide assurances as to their defense, as may be appropriate given the proximity and imminence of threats (obviously, if there isn't much threat nowadays, we don't have to make strong and unambiguous commitments). We would also seek to engage them in broader security dialogues in association with their neighbors (e.g., as we have encouraged in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). We would pursue the same kind of interactions as with strong friends, including visits of naval forces. We would also hope through our associations that these countries would not undertake big defense efforts out of a sense of isolation and fear.
- **Regarding the countries that are on our side now, or with whom the United States has prickly relations from time to time, or who could go either way**, we seek to engage them in dialogues that are meant both to reassure them as to our intentions and to remind them of our strength, professionalism, and dedication to democracy. This approach includes visits and exercises. We would encourage transparency of defense efforts and strategies. We would hope that they would find it unnecessary to develop matching or challenging military capabilities.
- **Finally, classic deterrence**—threats, reminders of American strength, reassurances to neighbors and alliance building with neighbors, etc.—apply to the remaining rogues. Presumably, the pressure on the existing rogues would discourage other potential rogues from becoming real ones. The threats and pressures have to be relevant and noticed by the rogues. This would seem to involve showing up in their areas either continuously (as in the Persian Gulf) or from time to time (off Libya).

The geography of U.S. strategy in the new era


As compared to the “geography of American strategy” during the Cold War, shown earlier in this paper, we see that the components

have all drifted apart, are disconnected, and are smaller (i.e., the situations are less threatening). The Middle East situation of itself—the connected spheres of Iran-Iraq on one hand and Arab-Israel on the other—remains threatening. The threat of a North Korean attack remains ever-present, but North Korea can no longer count on support from Russia or China. Around 1995, the Russians told the North Koreans that they would no longer observe the security guarantees in their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.



What this says is that geographically it is not practical to have a single, coherent, worldwide strategy of deterrence and influence. We can speak of strategies of deterrence for discrete regions, but influence unfolds country-by-country, and conflicts would probably tend to be local and highly focused, as in Desert Storm.

We can envisage some larger connections being made, as shown on the following chart:



In Asia, assuming that Korea is reunified in a way the United States approves of, we can at first envisage three feisty competitors: Japan, the reunited Korea, and China. They would respect each other's independence, but would compete economically, and one can imagine their competition turning into an arms race. Russia and the United States might be on the sidelines, feeling some threats—unless all these countries were to get together and explore what stable security arrangements might be made so that each country could continue its economic growth in peace. The United States and Russia both have stakes in seeing this happen. What this arrangement would be is not clear; it would not be some NATO equivalent—unless NATO itself had turned into a broader collective security arrangement.

That is why I show a larger envelope stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” This could embrace Russia, the other republics of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the NATO countries. The alternative of a NATO enlarged only to include the Eastern European countries would leave both Russia and other countries, such as the Baltic states and Ukraine, floating outside a security arrangement—or else Russia would strive to make the CIS a security alliance (not that it would be successful).

U.S. naval forces' contribution to deterrence and influence in the new era

In this section, I will address the contributions of U.S. naval forces to deterrence and influence in the new era in several parts:

- The general contributions to deterrence and influence by U.S. naval forces, per specific situations in the world;
- The way U.S. naval forces relate to the nine categories of U.S. relations with countries that I have laid out earlier;
- How other U.S. naval activities—done for other purposes—contribute to deterrence and influence.
- The contributions of specific naval platforms to deterrence and influence.
- What U.S. naval forces do not deter or influence (aside from their direct interventions in situations).

General contributions of U.S. naval forces

To remind: **deterrence** in the new era for U.S. military policy is:

1. In the near-term, **classic deterrence**, of Russian strategic nuclear forces and of the four rogues.
2. For the mid-term, **maintaining alliances** and **engaging other countries**.
3. In the long-term, **deterring the emergence of a peer competitor** or of hostile blocs

The contributions of U.S. naval forces are summarized in the annotation of the “new containment” chart discussed earlier in this report:

- Participating in naval multinational interception forces (MIFs) in embargoes to deter merchantmen from running blockades.

1a. Defusing confrontations (another form of classic deterrence):

- Offsetting Chinese threats to Taiwan.
- Deterring Iraqi bluffs of another attack on Kuwait (as they did in October 1994: while Iraq assembled 70,000 troops on the border on that occasion, the force did not seem configured and logistically supported for another attack on Kuwait. Rather, they made it clear (later—as picked up by FBIS) that they were making a gesture to encourage France and Russia to support the lifting of the embargo on Iraq in an imminent UN vote. The gesture had the opposite effect—talk about trying to get through cultural barriers to influence Saddam Hussein!)
- Deterring Iran from military actions in the Persian Gulf or across the Gulf.
- The occasional FON (Freedom of Navigation) operations are also a form of deterrence—the United States reaffirms the right of passage.
- Interposing between Greek and Turkish forces so as to defuse any confrontation between those two countries in the Aegean Sea.

2. Engaging with other countries so as to *assist* in precluding their becoming hostile to the United States.

- Engaging with the Russian Navy as part of the general improvement of relations between Russia and the United States. (It is to be noted that the Russian Navy—like other navies—is the most internationally-minded of the Russian military services. However, it is the least influential of the Russian military services, and is in pretty bad shape in 1998.)
- Engaging with the Chinese Navy, with exchanges of visits of CNOs, other high-level officials, and ship visits. (This may be the major role of the U.S. military in the immediate future, for port visits and discussions between the naval officers on both sides is the most benign way to begin to build understanding

and transparency. However, the slow opening of naval relations may pale when compared to events—e.g., confrontations in the Taiwan Straits—and actions in other spheres—e.g., trade and diplomacy).

3. Maintaining alliances and engaging other countries; reassuring:

- Engaging with NATO allies and in the Partnership for Peace) PFP program—e.g., in the Mediterranean area and in BALTOPS (i.e., Baltic Operations, the annual U.S.-sponsored exercise in the Baltic Sea).
- Homeporting a carrier in Japan.
- Sustaining U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific—"The Seventh Fleet," including the CARAT series of exercises with the ASEAN countries.

4. Deterring the rise of a peer competitor navy:

- Keeping the biggest navy in the world.
- Keeping the only capital ships left in the world (the aircraft carriers).
- Continuing to have and develop the most technologically capable navy in world (the U.S. Navy has the only AEGIS capability, or its equivalent, except for the four Japanese AEGIS ships).
- Maintaining and improving the best naval surveillance and communications systems in the world.
- Maintaining a force that is logistically self-sufficient and that can go any place in the oceans.

To summarize the contributions of U.S. naval forces to deterrence and influence in the new era in a somewhat different way, I have divided those contributions into those that are: (1) almost unique, (2) perhaps half of U.S. military influence in a given function, and (3) less dominant (but nonetheless valuable) contributions:

1. Nearly unique contributions by U.S. naval forces:

- Defusing confrontations over Taiwan.

- Deterring Iranian actions against its neighbors (except for Iraq).
- Deterring Libya, through the threat of retaliation.
- Maintaining embargoes at sea, along with allied navies (assuming the bulk of trade by the embargoed country moves by sea—this is the case with Iraq, but not with the former Yugoslavia).

2. “Half” the deterrent or military influence in the following cases:

- Maintaining the strategic nuclear balance with Russia (literally half upon the implementation of START II).
- Deterring another Iraqi attack on Kuwait.
- Maintaining the alliance with Japan.

3. Less dominant, though still valuable, contributions:

- Deterring North Korean attack on South Korea.
- Keeping Greece and Turkey apart.
- Engaging Russia and China in the new openings to those countries.
- Maintaining the NATO alliance (where the main action right now is in the absorption of new members into the alliance, the conduct of PFP exercises on the ground, and activating the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council under the Founding Act).


The visibility of U.S. naval forces

The deterrent value of U.S. naval forces does not rest entirely on their being right out on the scene, visible to those on shore. All of the elements shown on the next chart contribute to the deterrent value and influential nature of naval forces.

U.S. naval forces are known because of:

- Their history of deploying and fighting around the world.

- The media attention given to them, both at home and upon deployments.
- Their port visits and exercises with other navies.



Countries around the world, or at least their governments, are well aware of U.S. naval forces. People do not need to see them physically all the time, if ever. The news that the United States had sent two carrier to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 traveled all around the world, via CNN and other news reports.

We can summarize the contributions of U.S. naval forces to deterrence and influence in the following chart:

DEGREES OF DETERRENCE BY NAVAL FORCES				
SITUATIONS	NEARLY UNIQUE	CONTRIBUTING	MINOR CONTRIBUTION	DO NOT DETER
	ANY HOSTILE IRANIAN ACTIONS IN GULF ITSELF	SSBNS DETERRING ANOTHER IRAQI ATTACK ON KUWAIT NORTH KOREAN ATTACK		PROLIFERATION TERRORISM (except Libya) COUPS D'ETAT
	LIBYA CHINESE THREATS TO TAIWAN	MAINTAINING ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN	ENGAGING NATO ALLIES	INTERNAL WARS WAR IN BOSNIA
	MIFs FON OPS		KEEPING GREECE AND TURKEY APART	INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR
SYSTEMS	BIGGEST NAVY IN WORLD			ARGs
	ONLY CAPITAL SHIPS IN WORLD			
	MOST TECHNOLOGICALLY CAPABLE & ADVANCED NAVY			SSNs (maybe major for Iranian Kilos and Chinese subs)
	MOST SELF-SUFFICIENT NAVY			

U.S. naval forces and specific countries

Referring back to the categories of countries with whom the United States communicates, and the nature of those communications, we can array the roles in influence that U.S. naval forces may play, as shown on the chart on the next page.

For the critical categories, 5 and 7—"on our side now," and "countries that could go either way"—the opening of professional relations, as with Russia and China, would seem to contribute to better relations with those countries. The most important aspects of these relations include professional discussions around the table, and ship visits and exercises. Of course, the building of professional relations with these other navies is subject to political wipe-out at any time, especially considering that naval forces are the least influential of the military services in these countries. At the same time, the marginal influence of navies may make it easier to establish professional relations with them


as an opening wedge in relations, unless the usually army-dominant ministries of defense were to obstruct the process. That is, in the current state of Chinese-US relations (in 1998), it is easier for the navies to exchange port visits than for exchanges of army units to take place. From 1972 on, the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy have conducted their annual Incidents at Sea talks. These talks persisted during the years of ups and downs in Soviet-American relations. They continue with Russia, and Russian naval officers declare today that this history proves how navies can get along even if overall relations between the two countries are not good.

INFLUENCE AND DETERRENCE: ROLES OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES	
1. Very Old Friends	Close historic & professional relations
2. Strong New Friends	Great influence with regard to Japan
3. Isolated countries -- US responsibility	Protect against invasion; protect resupply
4. Countries that have been dependent on us for security	NATO and other treaty cooperation; bases; offshore operations
5. On our side now!	New professional relations
6. Difficult relations, from time to time	Possibly negative; possibly positive
7. Countries which could go either way	Seek professional contacts within policy
8. The openly hostile countries	Strong deterrent role
9. Special drug war countries	A minor role
IN ALMOST ALL CASES, US NAVAL FORCES MUST GO <i>THERE</i> TO INTERACT (but not necessarily be there all the time)	

It may be the same with the countries (or their military services) with whom the United States has difficult relations from time to time. Take, for instance, the Indian Navy. Now that the Cold War is over, its officers seek better professional relations, for they admire the U.S. Navy. At the same time, they may maintain an edge of resentment about the superpower status of the United States, our continued operations at Diego Garcia (British sovereign territory), and our tra-

ditionally closer relations with Pakistan. U.S. naval forces' relations with the Greek Navy have always been professional and within the NATO context. While Singapore may have some political differences with the United States from time-to-time, the U.S. naval presence there is firmly established.

In gauging the effectiveness of U.S. naval forces in relating to other navies, and thus to other countries, see the following chart.



The message of this chart is that naval interactions themselves do not bring about all these great goals. Indeed, there are many other programs and events which have impact, and discontinuities can occur at any time. Naval interactions can be lost in the noise. However, they can have no impact at all if they are not done well at their level.

One thing to bear in mind, as demonstrated by this chart, is that the presence of U.S. naval forces around the world does not bring about

Using the roles of naval forces in deterrence and influence for sizing and configuring naval forces

Extrapolating from the previous discussion, I will now run through the impact I think particular naval platforms have in each of the specific categories of deterrence and influence. This is an admittedly superficial discussion. It should also be kept in mind that these are not the only functions these platforms carry out.

1. Strategic nuclear deterrence:

- The SSBN deterrent will eventually constitute half the US strategic nuclear deterrent, under START II limitations.
- SSBNs may also contribute to deterring North Korean attack. In this respect, during the time it was thought that North Korea was definitely going nuclear, some said that the US Navy should consider putting “tactical” nuclear weapons back on ships. Someone else said, “We could just surface a Trident boat off North Korea.” The others said, “Oh, that would upset everybody.” Exactly. That’s what deterrence is about.
- China also has to be sensitive to the U.S. SSBN fleet. It may well discourage the Chinese from competing; they have stuck to a minimal deterrent and have not pursued their own SSBN option seriously (their one SSBN seems to be a testbed and rarely operates)—though we shall see in the future.

2. Deterring the four rogues:

- With regard to Iraq: aircraft carriers and TLAMs on surface combatants contribute heavily to deterring another Iraqi attack on Kuwait, on a nearly continuous basis.
- With regard to Iran, carriers, surface combatants (with TLAM), and SSNs have to discourage any action Iran might take in the Gulf or in the Strait of Hormuz. The last time the Iranian navy took on the US Navy, it lost nearly all its fleet.

- With regard to North Korea, aircraft carriers would make a major contribution to U.S. air attacks. North Korean submariners must also fear US Navy SSNs.
- With regard to Libya, carriers and TLAMs, again, constitute the likely retaliatory force if they were to try something again. Only occasional reminders to the Libyans are necessary.

3. Deterring non-war confrontations (i.e., those unlikely to turn into pitched battles):

- Carriers are the main deterrent and signal to China when it threatens Taiwan, as it did in March-April 1996.
- Surface combatants can interpose between Greek and Turkish navies in the Aegean Sea, if necessary.

4. Engaging Russia and China

- Surface combatants are useful for port visits and exercises. They do not overwhelm and Russia and China can offer complementary exchanges.
- Amphibious ships are good for joint exercises onto the land near the shore. These exercises may be less sensitive than army exercises in the interior of either country. In the case of Russia, both army and marine exercises have stimulated protests, though.

5. Play an active role in alliance and in other navy-to-navy relations:

- Surface combatants and amphibious forces make good connections with other nations for they are on a technological scale closer to those of the host nation.
- USN battle force C² architecture provides for other countries' platforms to plug in.
- Carriers can sometimes overwhelm exercises—they are the queen bees on whom everyone else must focus—but they are a useful symbol of reassurance. They provide the protective

shield for many countries that the United States feels it must protect—e.g., Saudi Arabia, Taiwan.

6. Deter the emergence of a peer competitor navy (distant future)

- As an extension of (5), engage those countries that might otherwise aspire to be competitors (i.e., Russia and China).
- Keep the biggest navy in the world, discouraging other countries from thinking they might match the U.S. Navy in numbers.
- Keep the only capital ships in the world—the aircraft carriers. They are the only real carriers, with the exception of France’s new *Charles de Gaulle* and Russia’s nearly-moribund *Admiral Kuznetsov*. No one can duplicate our carrier force in size, quality, or the capabilities of the aircraft they carry.
- Few (perhaps just Russia and the UK) can duplicate our SSNs.
- Keep a lead in naval weapons, other systems, communications, and their integration. No country now can duplicate AEGIS or expand to TBMD—unless they buy it from us (as Japan has and Spain may).
- It would be hard for any country (except Russia) to duplicate the surveillance, intelligence, or communications US naval forces have.
- Keep the U.S. Navy’s resupply system, which allows it to operate anywhere in the world.
- Keep a full spectrum of training and readiness—thus to stay more ready and professional than any other navy (with exception of UK, NL, France, Japan).

I have noted above that “keeping the biggest Navy in the world” (at least in terms of major ocean-going combatants) is discouraging to any country that might consider buying an equally-sized navy. It is also reassuring to our allies (indeed, it may let them off the hook in pursuing their own naval programs). With the disappearance of the Soviet Navy (many of their hulls remain, but they are mostly inoperative and probably not restorable), the United States’ keeping the biggest navy is easy.

Summarizing these observations on the possible consideration of deterrence and influence in sizing U.S. naval forces, the following chart is offered. These are gross observations, and it may be that there are shades of gray to be considered.

SIZING AND CONFIGURING NAVAL FORCES FOR DETERRENCE, STABILIZATION, AND REASSURANCE							
	Forces						
	CV/CVN	Surf. Cbts.	Amphibs.	SSBNs	SSNs	Size	Technology
1. Nuclear deterrence				X			
2. Deterring the four rogues	X	X	X		x*		X
3. Deterring non-war confrontations	X	X					
4. Deter other potential two-state conflicts		X					
5. Keep relations with countries		X	X			X	X
6. Deter emergence of a peer competitor	X	X		X		X	X


* SSNs are a particular deterrent to North Korea and Iran

Of note, it appears that surface combatants have a wider spread of contributions than other platforms. On the other hand, the carriers cover what might be asserted as the most important deterrent functions—deterring the four rogues, deterring non-war confrontations (of which we have only one case at present in which the United States is directly involved—the Taiwan situation), and deterring the emergence of a peer competitor.

None of these observations is meant to belittle the role of SSBNs in maintaining the strategic nuclear balance with Russia. This is a benign situation right now because of the relatively good relations between the two countries. However, as noted, the U.S. possession of

SSBNs also contributes to deterring any other country from competing in this area.

As shown in the earlier “quick summary of the role of U.S. military forces” in this report, the outcome of deterrence and influence considerations for the sizing and configuring of U.S. naval forces might be visualized as follows:



The emphases the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps can place within this deterrence scheme are shown here. If I were right about where the emphasis should be put for the best deterrent outcome, then there would be:

- More emphasis on the striking-force navy, i.e., on carriers and TLAMs; and
- Less emphasis on the smaller surface combatants (i.e., the FFG-7s) and on amphibious warfare ships; and
- Less emphasis on the higher end of the technological spectrum (submarines or exotic ships like the Arsenal Ship

What the Navy and Marine corps do not deter

U.S. naval forces do not deter, control, or exert influence on all situations in the world. The list below of those activities or situations not deterred is offered. Bear in mind, though, that the possession, strength, and deployments of U.S. naval forces contribute in the general context of U.S. diplomacy around the world.

- **Proliferation.** I assert that U.S. naval forces, either through their existence or deployments, have not deterred *the acquisition* of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by those countries inclined to do so. Of course, one might assert that the nuclear umbrella and other general defense commitments by the United States, manifested by the presence and deployments of its naval forces, have “obviated the necessity” of allied and other friendly countries considering such weapons for their defense. U.S. naval forces may contribute to deterring *the use* of weapons of mass destruction through their capabilities to retaliate.
- **War between India and Pakistan.** This constant possibility has taken on a new poignancy with India’s and Pakistan’s testing of nuclear weapons in mid-1998. However, I have noted earlier that India and Pakistan have not gone to war with one another since 1971, except for skirmishes on the borders of Kashmir. U.S. relations with Pakistan overall may be a deterrent to India attacking Pakistan, if India were so inclined, but it is not clear that that’s the case, given the frequent fallings-out between the United States and Pakistan.
- **Internal conflicts.** We’re not sure anything deters them, except democracy and prosperity on one hand, or strong dictatorship on the other. Countries collapse for a variety of reasons. For those cases of country collapse I have examined, I cannot imagine that U.S. naval forces offshore would have prevented the triggering circumstances.
- **Terrorism.** International terrorists—almost all of whom that aim at the United States are generated by the Israeli-Palestinian situation—are deterred mostly by airport and other border

controls. From time to time, these Palestinian-related terrorists are hosted and trained in Libya, Syria, and Iran. The presence of U.S. naval forces probably deters Libya from generating terrorists, because U.S. naval and air forces retaliated against them in 1986 after the Berlin disco bombing. We can only speculate as to whether this strike had an exemplary effect on Syria and Iran. The major deterrent of future international terrorism directed against the United States is our pursuit of the Middle East peace process.

- **Drug-trafficking.** The best that can be said about the deterrent effect of U.S. naval patrols in the Caribbean is that they, along with other measures, force drug traffickers to take other, more difficult and thus possibly more costly routes. But these changes in routes have brought about no visible change in the volume of drugs transported or the street price.
- **Piracy.** There is not too much to deter. The main problem has been in the South China Sea, and I understand that the number of incidents there have dropped in half over the last year or two. This may not have occurred as much because of stepped up patrols by the local nation (and there have not been U.S. naval patrols, only transits) as by the Chinese government cracking down on the local police who allowed pirates sanctuary in southern Chinese ports (at one point a few years ago, overhead photography showed 11 hijacked yachts in these ports). It is worth noting that pirates have tended not to attack ships in the South China Sea identified with U.S. shippers.
- **It is not clear to me that U.S. naval forces' ARGs (Amphibious Ready Groups) serve a deterrent purpose per se, except as they generally advertise U.S. presence and responsiveness.** I have turned up only one case where they were useful in a threatening way. That was in Burma, in 1988. The government there wouldn't let Americans leave the country during a period of civil unrest. The ARG was offshore. The US Naval Attache pointed this out to the government. They let the Americans leave.
- **The United States has little feedback yet as to what Tomahawk deters.** Given the experience of the Gulf War and the two sub-


sequent Tomahawk strikes, Saddam Hussein recognizes Tomahawk as a retaliatory weapon. He is presently deterred from seizing Kuwait again. The Russian military worries a lot about Tomahawk, but it is not clear at this stage what the Russians would otherwise be deterred from doing.

As I have said, deterrence and influence are all about contributing to things **not** happening, not active intervention to resolve things that have happened. However, the experience of active interventions signals both to those attacked and those who have witnessed those attacks that U.S. naval forces have those capabilities—which, as I say, contributes to the general atmosphere of deterrence, reassurance, and stabilization.

Deterrence and influence into the future

General considerations

In the post-Cold War period, without the timeless nature of the Soviet threat and its attendant scenarios, the United States Government has tended to focus on specific crises and whether they can be deterred from occurring. The perspective can be broader than that. We can divide deterrence into three time dimensions, as shown below on the three-dimensional chart, and as elaborated below.



I. The vertical component: These are the specific cases in which the United States knows it has to continue to maintain a deterrent posture:

- Maintain mutual assured retaliation with Russia
- Deter actions/invasions by Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea
- Deter small actions, e.g, deter shipping from entering embargoed countries

II. Deterrence of the specific (known) cases over time:


- Do we think deterrence is still working in the above cases?
- Why do we think it's working?
- Is there something we should do to refresh it?
- What would a breakdown be in these cases?
- Are the conditions holding, changing, or breaking down?

III. The horizontal component: how the world in general unfolds:

- Who is emerging as a threat to be deterred?
 - New rogues?
 - Development of a “peer competitor?”
- What is happening to the structure of the world and the place of the United States in it?
 - US relative strength and influence?
 - Emergence of security blocs (some of which the United States is not a part)?
- Technological evolution: what is happening with technology and its exploitation?

After the Cold War ended, and after Desert Storm, one model of the future, used in the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Exercise (NFCPE) in 1992, was as shown in the chart on the next page. Some people were still having a little trouble recognizing that not only had the Soviet Union collapsed, but its military had as well. They were concerned about that transition. Thus, we have labeled those concerned as the “transitioners” who were concerned to let everything

down easy, while maintaining the deterrent against the Russians in the meantime.¹



Desert Storm, however, led us to concentrate on the Third World threat, and specifically the four rogues. Their threat was described then as “slowly growing.” One route of U.S. military strategy was to concentrate our “big sticks” against these specific threats—hence the 2MRC, now 2MTW, emphasis in U.S. national military strategy. Detering the rogues has been the focus of this strategy.


Others looked beyond the old Soviet threat and beyond the threat posed by the four rogues to some ill-defined future threat, possibly global—the new peer competitor. Those who are most concerned with this might be labeled “the Cold Worriers.” Some tend to put China in this role, some see it as a more diffuse threat—terrorists, drug traffickers, organized crime, and multi-national corporations all

1. For further explanation of these descriptions, see Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, “It’s Going to be a Bumpy Ride,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January, 1993), pp. 23-26.

in league, with enough money to buy military forces. Some can even envisage a resurgent Russia.

In addressing the task of U.S. deterrence and influence as the future unfolds, these models are not sufficient.

Below is an expansion of the previous chart. If the top half represents classic deterrence, including the deterrence of the rise of a peer competitor, the bottom half represents the development of an influence approach, with an emphasis on mutuality and cooperation.




Some would do this by preserving and extending the older institutions of cooperation. Thus, a limited expansion of NATO and the redefinition of cooperative roles in the U.S.–Japan Mutual Security Treaty have been undertaken.

Others would “leave it to America,” going it alone against the rogues, for instance. Indeed, the first descriptions of the U.S. 2MRC strategy assured the public that the United States would be able to carry out any action unilaterally. This assertion looked rather strange in the

case of Korea, where the contribution of 650,000 ROK soldiers to their own defense can hardly be overlooked, but sometimes is. Similarly, the United States is not the sole defender of Taiwan—Taiwan has strong defenses of its own.

The future could as well see the development of expanded cooperative security arrangements and dialogues—including with Russia and China. These arrangements would go beyond classic defensive alliances to something called “collective security”—a vaguer and more difficult-to-manage concept.

The complex chart below is a detailed representation of the previous chart. It represents the world of confrontations coming down across time from the confrontations of the Cold War.




The seriousness of the task of deterrence is presently in a trough because of the reduction of major confrontations, but presumably it could get more serious in the future. The dimension of “influence” —or better, cooperation—is shown on the lower level of the chart. This lower set of curves shows that things could get better and not just worse. For instance:

- We can envisage the mutual assured retaliatory balance between the United States and Russia declining to a low level and then to continue indefinitely at that low level. On the other hand, it could dip below the line if relations between the two countries were to evolve so favorably that their strategic nuclear relations were like that between the United Kingdom and France, who do not target each other.
- The deterrence of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact goes to zero, and, correspondingly, the level of NATO cooperation declines toward the zero axis. On the other hand, if Russia were to increase its military power—and this could happen only far in the future—the NATO deterrent might be strengthened by its members again. Confrontational blocs could reappear. Further, though, the Russians could join in both cooperative peacekeeping and a broader collective security arrangement. They want to.
- The need to deter Iraq and Iran is likely to continue indefinitely, with surges from time to time as one or the other tries something aggressive. On the other hand, Saddam can’t live forever, Iraq can’t stand the embargo forever, and Iran has severe internal problems and some favorable political evolution. Therefore, the need for deterrence in the Gulf could decline eventually (though probably not to zero—Iraqis may never be peaceful, not belligerent, people).
- The need to deter North Korea could also continue indefinitely. Moreover, the future of Chinese foreign policy remains to be revealed. On the other hand, the starvation of the North Korean populace may reach its limits, the regime could collapse, and Korea could reunite—as many assume. Moreover, it

may be possible to find a new system of security cooperation and reassurance in East Asia.

The main point here is that the United States is in a deterrent-need trough right now, and the future could bring a great variety of circumstances, both good and bad.

Perhaps the complexities of the future can be viewed in the chart below, in which the spaces in which the United States and China could interact are laid out.



What this chart shows that each country can reach out into the future in widely divergent ways.


- At one extreme, if the United States were to turn isolationist and China were to be preoccupied with its population of 1.3 billion and growing, the two countries would be in a pacific live-and-let-live mode.

- If, at the other extreme, they were both interventionist and internationalist, they could clash.

Neither of these extremes must necessarily eventuate. The ground for dialogue and engagement and mutual adjustment is wide. Neither side is unreceptive to the other (unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, which appeared to be driven only by its inner ideological, i.e., Marxist-historical calculations, though we know better now that they were not so sure that history was on their side once their economic growth stagnated). But we will not know where we are on this chart except as events and contacts reveal across time.

Contributions of U.S. naval forces across time

The contribution of U.S. naval forces in the time dimensions discussed above can be laid out as shown below:



Another way of looking at the tasks of U.S. naval forces in deterrence and influence over time is shown in the chart on the next page.

NAVAL DETERRENCE & CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION **OVER TIME**

EVOLUTION OF TODAY'S DETERRENCE:

- Gradually phase down strategic nuclear, as relations with Russia evolve.
- Outlast Qaddafi, Saddam, Iranians, and North Koreans
- Interpose between Greece and Turkey as necessary

EVOLUTION OF WORLD PEACE

- Contribute to maintaining alliances
 - Engage Russia, China
- Maintain other friendships
- Maintain unequalled Navy
- Stay ahead in technology

TODAY:

- Maintain strategic **Nuclear** balance
- Contribute to deterring **IRAQ**
- Scare the **IRANIAN** navy
- Spoil Chinese "messages" to **TAIWAN**
- Contribute to deterring **NORTH KOREA**
- Threaten **LIBYA**

Incomplete work: the failure of deterrence, and deterrence in crises

In this report, I have concentrated on the *evolution* of U.S. military deterrence and influence as it may be applied in the new era.

This has been a paper on the operation of deterrence and influence between the United States and other countries. I have not tried to analyze *the failure* of deterrence (or the failure of influence—which might simply be the breaking off of relations). Some say that deterrence must inevitably fail. I have noted that the longer deterrence works, the more anxious are those who are maintaining it as to why it works.

Deterrence has been working rather well in the areas I have been discussing in this paper: North Korea has not invaded South Korea for the past 48 years; the Arab states and Israel have not gone to war since 1973, that is, for 25 years (discounting the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the Scud attacks by Iraq on Israel in 1991); India and Pakistan have not gone to war since 1971. Mainland China has not invaded Taiwan.

The case of the failure of deterrence that is brought up nowadays is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It is asked, “Why didn’t we (the United States) deter Saddam Hussein?” In the first place, I would note that Iraq had been deterred for the previous 29 years, following its threat to newly independent Kuwait in 1961. In 1990, Saddam was desperate, being \$85 billion in debt. He could not service that debt following the eight-year war with Iran, in part because oil prices were sinking, sinking caused in part by a stubborn Kuwait that kept pumping oil. Moreover, it did not occur to him that the United States would intervene, or even care. He also assumed, from the American experiences in Lebanon and Vietnam, that the United States could not suffer casualties. It is a curious case: deterrence certainly failed, but

no one had sent any convincing messages to Saddam that he was supposed to be deterred. He is deterred today, by the active measures of Southern Watch and Northern Watch, and by the economic and technological restraints of the embargo and UN inspections. No one doubts that he would attack something again if the international community were to let its guard down.

Where else could deterrence fail? North Korea could attack out of the blue, but has had this capability and its intentions have been opaque since at least 1954. We now imagine that their desperation could lead to the failure of deterrence. But this has not happened yet.


Going back to the definitions at the beginning of this paper, if deterrence is supposed to be operative, it has to be explicit. It has to be signalled. This may have been what was lacking in the case of Iraq. It is not simply a pious hope that countries not go to war or not attack their neighbors. Notwithstanding, it is hard to know whether even an explicit message gets through, because those supposedly to be deterred do not like to acknowledge they are being deterred.

U.S. expressions of deterrence are now operating in very specific cases right now—in mutual strategic nuclear deterrence with Russia, with regard to the four rogues, and with regard to Chinese threats to Taiwan.

China also maintains its minimal nuclear deterrence and no one is threatening to attack them. Wars between the Arabs and the Israelis, and between India and Pakistan, are not happening, although the ongoing guerrilla warfare in Kashmir seems to have taken on new meaning now that both countries are declared nuclear weapons possessors and India has become more nationalistically assertive.

It is interesting to examine a model of growing crisis, in order to understand the events and actions that might signal the breakdown of a deterrence that had been established. I show this in the chart on the following page. The concern would be about the breakdown of deterrence in a crisis—as when China decides once more to threaten Taiwan, or Iraq decides to threaten Kuwait again. Such situations become immediately dynamic. The questions arise whether (a) deterrence can be reinforced, (b) whether it can be restored despite inci-

dents of violence, (c) whether it breaks down and turns into actual war, and, (d) assuming war does break out, whether resolution might be achieved, at least for the time being, creating a new kind of situation of deterrence.



The chart above is an example of an evolution from a peaceful situation through crisis, and out the other side to one kind of resolution or the other. I will not analyze it further here.

Conclusions

Where I come out

DETERRENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE NEW ERA: SUMMARY OF THE BRIEFING

- **DETERRENCE IS A DIFFICULT CONCEPT: MAINTAINING A POSTURE SO THAT WAR DOES *NOT* HAPPEN.** Little feedback is received.
- **TRANSPORTING IT INTO THE NEW ERA IS ALSO DIFFICULT.**
 - A simple translation may lead us into traps.
 - Residual deterrence remains with regard to Russia and the four rogue states.
- **IN THE NEW ERA, THE WORLD STRUCTURE IS MOSTLY AN ECONOMIC ONE.**
 - Security is on the fringe.
- **BUT BROAD DETERRENT TASKS REMAIN: NO WORLD WARS, NO INTERSTATE WARS, NO BLOCS, NO ARMS RACES.**
 - Internal conflicts can't be deterred (not by outside military forces).
 - Stopping proliferation is a more active diplomatic task.
- **US MILITARY FORCES CONTRIBUTE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM, AND NAVAL FORCES CONTRIBUTE IN A MAJOR WAY.**
 - Though deterrence is not all they are *for* or *do*.
- **DETERRENCE IN THE NEW ERA WILL EVOLVE.**
 - Not vertically, but horizontally, across time, still with little feedback.

1. The world is running itself pretty well these days with only a little help from the military (whatever the news from Bosnia).

- Most countries are friendly.
- There are lots of ways to solve economic problems and create non-zero-sum economic structures.
- Of course, there are overpopulation and internal conflicts in the remaining Third World, but there is little the US military can do to deter these situations from outside.

2. Classic deterrence tasks remain, and US forces must attend to them:

- US strategic nuclear forces must remain in balance with Russian strategic nuclear forces (until our relations have become so good that parity is no longer necessary).
- The United States must continue to deter Iraq and North Korea (and maintain a strong defense in South Korea). Detering Iran and Libya are lesser problems.

3. At the two extremes:

- It doesn't take too much in the way of forces to maintain and expand collective security arrangements (a new European security system, an Asian security system, security relations with Russia and China, continuing to keep in touch with Egypt, Israel, and the GCC countries). This takes mostly diplomacy, travel costs, and exercise costs.
- It is also easy to deter the rise of any "peer competitor." It would take a long time for any country to catch up to the United States, and, in the meantime, we can preserve and expand relations.

The outcome for U.S. forces

Therefore, the United States can probably maintain the best deterrent and be most influential in security matters by:


- Maintaining and improving the best possible war-fighting force within resources—the "Joint, Littoral Force."
- While nominally directed against Iraq and, to a lesser extent, North Korea, the mobility, striking power, command of the battlespace, etc., of U.S. forces can scare anybody and cannot be duplicated.
- The United States also hedges on the future by developing new and improved capabilities and staying ahead of any country.

- The United States has fairly broad latitude to trade off this technological competence against the sheer size of its force structures.
- U.S. forces demonstrate these capabilities in presence, exercises with friends, and actual operations from time to time.

This is for “deterrence and influence”—not using forces. US forces will also be engaged in other operations, for direct defense or other operational purposes—Bosnia, Haiti, etc.—and even in war, in the Gulf, or in Korea.

- These actual operations will have a feedback to deterrence and influence—affecting the US reputation in the world.

With regard to the U.S. forces that would be most appropriate for maintaining deterrence and influence, I believe that the best force may lie in the shaded oval shown below—a chart I used previously, on page 32.



- What I am saying in this chart is that the best deterrent for the United States is to maintain a war-fighting capability at roughly the technological level of its present forces—which are the most advanced in the world—while adding the precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to current platforms and integrating the forces better with joint command and control. I think this would serve to deter both the four rogues and any country that might contemplate trying to compete with the United States in military capabilities.
- At the top, and in between the top and the four rogues—the operations other than war (OOTW) zone—I do not believe it serves the broader notion of deterrence to reduce U.S. capabilities to the level of the rest of the world in order to maintain numbers and “presence.” Nor is it much of a contribution to deterrence and future world security structures to be able to intervene in all or many of the internal conflicts around the world.

Some injunctions

In addressing U.S. military deterrence and influence in the new era, I offer the following injunctions:

- Avoid the old Cold War clichés—do not try to make a simple transference of old concepts to the new era.
 - Don’t put the whole load of US defense planning on the four rogues.
 - Nor turn Russia or China into replacements for the old Soviet Union.
- The clichés lead to a simple extension of the Cold War. That won’t work:
 - The whole load of the strategy is placed on the four rogues—Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
 - Alternatively, we fall into inventing a resurgent Soviet Union or aggressive China.

- US engagement in the world is much more complex. We have mutual interests with many countries—not just our own selfish interests.
- A broader approach is needed: US keeps a big role in stabilizing world security by:
 - 1. Keeping a strong economy and society
 - 2. Keeping a big military
 - 3. Keeping a technological edge
 - 4. Continuing to relate to other countries—the ones that count
 - 5. Deterring the four rogues
 - 6. Demonstrating our military prowess from time to time in actual military operations that are successful in carrying out their missions.
- For U.S. military forces, their consequent deterrent roles are as follows:
 - US military forces contribute to tidying up world structure at the edges...
 - While guarding (deterring, if you will) against emergence of something bad.
 - This means both engagement around the world (presence, etc.)...
 - While staying ahead of the future.
 - This takes a delicate balancing act in force planning.
 - And must also be balanced with maintaining the strength of the American economy and society.
- Within all this, a simple trade-off from nuclear to conventional deterrence is irrelevant—like the concept of the ether.

Postscript: some personal reflections on this report

Note that I never used the words “credible” or “interests,” much less “vital interests” anywhere in this report. In particular, the word “credible” is part of that reflexive self-critique in the absence of information from those who are supposed to be deterred—that is, our guess as to what “he” may be thinking.

I also avoided any implication of separating nuclear and conventional deterrence. For the foreseeable future, the US will own both. Conventional deterrence or capabilities have never been some kind of “substitute” for nuclear deterrence or capabilities.

The report is country/state-oriented. But states these days are not hard Kissingerian nodes. Their foreign policies are either personality-driven or driven by domestic politics. Any approach to this subject these days must be much more sensitive to the complexities of governments’ decision-making—whether:

- Russia in its current chaos,
- The peculiar and evolving political process of Iran,
- China sorting out its leadership approach and policies following the death of Deng, or
- The exasperation the United States Government often feels with the Israeli cabinet process.

A number of states are in fact collapsing.

This report takes a peculiarly American perspective. No other country, and certainly not Russia now, has such a comprehensive global interest. It is worth conducting another study to compare the Ameri-

can strategic outlook with those of other major countries or of the trouble-makers, and then to analyze the interactions.

This report only briefly addressed deterrence or influence within an actual contingency operation, what some call “restoring deterrence.” This is worth further study.

Deep within me, I have made the assumption that the United States maintains a defense budget roughly comparable to that of the present, and that a defense budget of this size is a major component of our looking and feeling stronger than any other country. That is, I have not examined the effect on deterrence and influence of smaller budgets and smaller forces.

It is difficult to size the forces (and the defense budget) from the nebulosities of deterrence and influence, particularly since the United States is not balancing a major opponent like the Soviet Union.

