

U.S. Interests and Future Military Presence in Southeast Asia

by

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PREFACE

As the Cold War draws to an end, U.S. military presence in Asia is being called into question. Opponents of continued presence consider it a vestige of earlier times since there is presently no compelling threat to deter. Also, it is a drain on valuable resources. Furthermore, the issue of burden-sharing is constantly being raised as our Asian allies grow richer off of their exports to the U.S.

Proponents of U.S. military presence argue that potential conflicts still exist, and that the U.S. must be forward-deployed to react to crisis in a timely manner. Moreover, presence is deemed to have a positive political effect on the region, even if it is aimed at deterring no single overriding threat. In fact, throughout Asia the perception is widespread that the U.S. military presence is a stabilizing influence.

In order to examine the issues surrounding the political effects of peacetime presence, CNA undertook a study on *The Political Effects of U.S. Military Presence in Asia*. This paper, which analyzes U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, was written for that project by Sheldon W. Simon, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University. The views expressed in it are the author's own, and not those of CNA or the Department of the Navy.

Jonathan T. Dworken
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U.S. INTERESTS AND FUTURE MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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INTRODUCTION

For security purposes, the United States sees Southeast Asia as a maritime region of vast sea spaces. Its friends in the area--the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) (Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei)--are all trading states. For this reason, Washington has identified one of its major security responsibilities--maintaining open sea lanes for international commerce. This region has not been designated as an area of vital American concern since the Second Indochina War (1963-1975), but it is important, because of its location astride the sea lanes between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and America's Northeast Asian allies, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Unlike U.S. deployments in Japan and Korea, which provide direct deterrence against potential invaders such as the USSR and North Korea, Southeast Asian U.S. military facilities in the Philippines are not configured primarily to defend the host country. Instead, they provide the storage and repair capacities needed to give the U.S. Navy and Air Force a surge capability in the event of international crises, allowing moves west to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf and north to the Sea of Japan. For example, during the Iraq confrontation in 1990, supplies from the Philippines were transferred to U.S. forces in and around Saudi Arabia.

In the four decades since the Korean War, the United States developed a multiple-carrier battle group strategy to protect its friends and deter its adversaries in the western Pacific. This strategy reached its apex during the watch of former Navy Secretary John Lehman, who argued for the creation of sufficient naval strength to attack the

Soviet Pacific Fleet at its point of origin around Vladivostok.¹

Although that strategy may have been feasible in the Brezhnev era, the political setting of the 1990s has changed radically and much of the rationale behind the large carrier battle group concept is now in question.

When the United States viewed the Soviet Union as its most important adversary, the ability to dominate the seas and project power to those areas the USSR might attempt to destabilize provided an effective, though expensive, military configuration. The 1990s, however, may well be an era of Soviet-American security cooperation and constrained U.S. defense budgets, and, thus, continued reliance on large carrier battle groups as the centerpiece of U.S. naval strategy should be reconsidered. Indicative of this new era was the joint news conference held in Moscow on August 2, 1990, by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Both agreed that the adversarial relationship had ended, and each anticipated a new cooperative era in Asia as well as in Europe.²

When regional conflicts occurred during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington automatically aligned on opposite sides, contending with each other to establish system dominance. Today, mutual antagonism is ending. The breakdown of the USSR's command economy means that Moscow can no longer compete with the West for the allegiance of developing states. Soviet retrenchment, in turn, makes obsolete the U.S. policy of lining up an array of disparate supporters for an impending East-West confrontation. The United States no longer has a direct stake in the outcome of every political upheaval occurring in less-developed

countries. The presence of communist insurgents in the Philippines and a communist regime in Cambodia may now seem less important to Washington because linkage to the Soviet Union is less tenuous.

If the USSR can no longer be considered the *raison d'etre* for U.S. naval and air deployments in Southeast Asia, are there other reasons for maintaining those deployments? The answer is a qualified yes, especially during this transitional period in world politics when the military capabilities of the United States are perceived to be an element of stability in an increasingly uncertain international setting. If the world is about to enter an era of regional arms reductions, a stabilizing procedure for reaching those ends requires multilateral negotiations rather than unilateral drawdowns. The latter could have the unintended effect of raising the military profiles of those states that had previously been secondary actors. A drastic reduction of U.S. forces, for example, would elevate the navies of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and India to positions of prominence previously unattained in the post-World War II era. The capabilities and intentions of these states could generate so much concern on the part of other regional members that a new arms race would ensue, creating a less stable environment than the superpower rivalry that had preceded it. Thus, some kind of continued American presence in Southeast Asia, could preclude, or at least dampen, a new cycle of arms buildups.

U.S. naval and air deployments from the Indian Ocean to the northwest Pacific will probably continue to be welcomed by ASEAN. Southeast Asia still prefers defense ties to a friendly power that will

ensure the protection of regional sea and air lanes to the creation of an indigenous ASEAN defense pact. Such a pact is infeasible because of territorial disputes among several of the six ASEAN states and because of the general inability of those states to project force significantly beyond their immediate boundaries. The presence of American, Australian, and British ships and aircraft also allow the ASEAN states to spend less on defense and to concentrate on developing their economic competitiveness.

Southeast Asia's general prosperity over the past two decades was a result of combined U.S. and Japanese interests. Japan's investment, combined with America's open market, provided an almost uninterrupted cycle of growth. In the 1990s, however, continued open access to the U.S. market and ASEAN's growing complaints about Japan's unwillingness to transfer the technology Southeast Asia needs to progress up the product cycle are leading to changes in this favorable economic structure. The negative effects of America's declining economic position may be ameliorated if Japan continues to liberalize its markets, although overreliance on Japanese capital can be balanced through growing South Korean and Taiwanese investment. Nevertheless, changing U.S. economic interests may place Washington on a collision course with its Southeast Asian friends. Growing American protectionist sentiment resulting from chronic defects in the balance of payments threatens Southeast Asian access to the U.S. market. Increasingly, the United States perceives itself the victim of an unfair division of labor: Southeast Asia sells raw materials to, and buys capital equipment from, Japan, but it markets manufactured goods to the United

States.³ Over time, this pattern could erode political support in Washington for maintaining armed forces in the region in order to protect a trade arrangement seen to be undermining the U.S. economy. In the 1990s, America appears less and less willing to provide regional security for an international trade regime that appears to be biased against U.S. exports.

Southeast Asia has also been important to the United States because of its relevance to Washington's premier Pacific ally--Japan. A stable and secure Southeast Asia provides Tokyo with raw materials, energy, manufactured goods, and a nearby location for external investment. A Japanese military role in the region commensurate with its economic position, however, would be unacceptable to Southeast Asian states and would probably undermine Japan's commercial position. Thus, Japan hopes that U.S. forces will be able to remain in the region, operating in some manner from Southeast Asian facilities.

CHALLENGES TO U.S. INTERESTS

Challenges to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia during the 1990s may well be a matter of definition as a new security environment takes shape. While global war against the Soviet Union fades as the rationale for an American presence in the Pacific, the new rationale may become regional threats to international commerce and access to natural resources, production facilities, and markets. Is this a credible substitute that will justify maintaining forward-deployed forces? In the abstract, probably not. It is difficult to imagine plausible scenarios in which any regional actor, including Vietnam, China, and the

Soviet Union, would choose to obstruct international commerce or attempt to deny access to important centers of production and resources.

In the absence of specific threats, an active U.S. presence in the Asian-Pacific region would seem to rest on the belief that, without it, other countries with questionable intentions might vie for regional dominance. In Southeast Asia, Japan is the focus of such concern. An extension of Tokyo's naval deployments south of the Bashi channel (Taiwan) would elicit considerable anxiety from countries that had been occupied by Japan in World War II. Moreover, if Japan added a military presence to its already dominant economic position, other states in the region would perceived this as a new hegemony. A political and economic backlash, comparable to the 1974 anti-Japan riots in the region, might well recur. This prospect could have been what U.S. negotiator, Richard Armitage, had in mind when he urged the Philippine delegation to the negotiations on U.S. bases to "give our friends in the region adequate time to adjust a world in which superpower rivalry is being replaced by the proliferation of regional powers...."⁴

Armitage may also have considered the potential volatility of maritime disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Although the United States is not committed to any of the claimants (Malaysia, Taiwan, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam), the presence of U.S. ships and aircraft in the vicinity is believed to have had a stabilizing effect. The probability of any state's resorting to force to

acquire additional islets may be reduced because of American naval dominance. An American withdrawal could increase the prospect for new PRC-Vietnam clashes over the Spratlys, especially if Soviet negotiations to sell China a dozen SU-24 attack aircraft are successfully concluded.⁵

Beijing is developing a combined arms capability in the vicinity of the Spratlys. The navy of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has exercised as far south as the coast of Brunei. In their March 1988 clash with Vietnam in the South China Sea, the Chinese employed destroyers, frigates, supply ships, marines, and their naval air force.⁶ The atolls currently occupied by the PRC are within the Philippine claim areas and just outside those of Malaysia. According to one regional specialist, China now has the amphibious force to effect "multiple landings against Vietnamese, Philippine, and Malaysian garrisons with a sure guarantee of success." PLA ships and naval aircraft have the tactical missile capabilities to destroy artillery and electronic installations on the islands they would attack before marine landings were made.⁷

The Soviet Union has not endorsed any contestant's claim to the Spratlys, including that of Vietnam; however, Moscow has reportedly assisted Hanoi in developing a new scientific station in a remote part of the island chain. China has protested the cooperative venture to set up hydrological and aquatic research stations. ASEAN reaction to this development has been one of low-key concern. An Indonesian official

expressed anxiety over the prospect of the Soviet navy's entering the Spratly dispute,⁸ but, given the general reduction in Russian capabilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet military involvement in the Spratlys appears improbable.

There is at least one encouraging sign with respect to the Spratlys: the claimants have all expressed their desires for a negotiated settlement. Even Beijing, as part of its general effort to restore the PRC's international political stature, has proposed joint development of the Spratlys "while putting aside for the time being the question of sovereignty."⁹ Premier Li Peng also appeared to extend an olive branch to Hanoi by offering for the first time to negotiate the Spratlys' future "after relations are normalized"--in other words, after resolution of the Cambodian conflict, which may be several years away.¹⁰ One possibility would be a joint development regime for the area's seabed and marine resources.

Beijing may be proposing an international development regime while it finesses the issue of political control because it is anticipating future tensions with ASEAN. Resolution of the Cambodian conflict over the next several years could dissolve the glue that has bound the ASEAN-China joint effort in Indochina. Other issues, such as the Spratlys, could then emerge to sour relations. Melioration of the Spratlys' conflict along the lines of China's 1978 compromise with Japan over the Senkakus (joint development and postponement of the sovereignty issue) could defuse China-ASEAN tension before it begins.

ASEAN itself could undergo a metamorphosis if a new Cambodian regime, controlled by neither Hanoi nor Beijing, is created. Without a

common security threat, the ASEAN states might move in separate directions, thus eroding the association's political unity. Thailand may see its future more as a center for Indochinese development than as a cooperative partner with such insular states as Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia and Indonesia could concentrate on developing a new regime regarding the straits. Perhaps anticipating the need for a new external threat to hold ASEAN together, the Indonesian Armed Forces Chief, General Try Sutrisno, has warned that both Hanoi and Beijing still maintain hard-line Leninist governments that could effect a new rapprochement after the Cambodian issue is resolved. A Sino-Vietnam entente could pose a new threat to Southeast Asian security;¹¹ however, given pervasive suspicions occasioned by more than a decade of hostilities, as well as the persistence of disputes in the South China Sea, General Try's concerns seem unduly alarming.

U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THEIR EFFORTS

American forces in the Pacific are configured around carrier battle groups whose strategic mission is to effect both sea control and sea denial. For the past three decades, this strategy was directed against the USSR. U.S. antisubmarine warfare systems (P-3s and SSNs) exercised and deployed to threaten Soviet SSBNs in their Sea of Okhotsk bastion, thereby forcing the Soviet Pacific Fleet to remain close to its home bases to protect those valued strategic assets. By pressing Moscow to

retain its navy in home waters, sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea were relatively free from any Soviet threat. Thus, sea control and sea denial became two sides of the same coin.

U.S. deployments typically featured two carrier groups in the western Pacific, backed by two groups from the Third Fleet operating east of Hawaii. Additionally, two battleship surface action groups rotate every six months to the western Pacific. Most of the U.S. surface vessels and submarines arrayed against the Soviet Pacific Fleet have been tasked with protecting their central firepower platforms: the aircraft carriers and battleships. Five Aegis-class cruisers assigned to the Seventh Fleet use highly automated phased array radars to enhance the protection of these battle groups. These radars are capable of tracking multiple air targets beyond 200 n.mi., directing interceptors, and launching their own missiles to eliminate the targets.¹²

In Southeast Asia specifically, no significant U.S. assets are permanently based at Clark Air Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines. Rather, these facilities furnish storage, training, and repair locations for virtually all U.S. ships and aircraft that patrol the SLOCs from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. The bases also provide a surge capability if one is needed to reinforce U.S. operations in the North Pacific. American naval and air forces in the region regularly exercise on a bilateral basis with the armed forces of the ASEAN states. In one instance, these exercises led to the U.S. Navy's placing underwater

detectors in the Indonesian Lombok and Sunda straits in order to monitor submarine traffic in these sensitive waters.¹³ These capabilities and strategies were designed with Soviet forces as the designated target.

Beginning with the August 1990 Iraq crisis, however, Washington used its Philippine facilities to supply the task force it was assembling in the Persian Gulf. This post-Cold War shift in targets to the Middle East has led to some second thoughts among American allies in Southeast Asia. Thai commentators have noted that any use of Thai facilities as staging points could make Thailand a party to the Gulf conflict, thus jeopardizing the safety of thousands of its workers in Iraq and Kuwait. Similar concerns have been expressed in Manila over the use of Philippine bases.¹⁴ Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has indirectly voiced criticism of U.S. strategy by protesting against the Japanese plan to send elements of its Self-Defense Forces to the Persian Gulf in a behind-the-lines support capacity. Prime Minister Lee argued that any decision to send Japanese forces beyond their home waters would not be welcomed in Southeast Asia, regardless of the rationale.¹⁵ In this case, Tokyo was responding to American pressure to go beyond mere funding for the multinational forces assembled in Saudi Arabia. From a Southeast Asian perspective, however, the Japanese response was seen as potentially disruptive because it would introduce for the first time since World War II, the military forces of a country already perceived to be the dominant economic power in Southeast Asia. The prospect of an overseas Japanese presence would be even more daunting if U.S. forces in Southeast Asia were reduced in line with Secretary of Defense Cheney's plans for the 1990s.

American use of the Philippine bases after the current agreement expires in September 1991 will be considerably more constrained than at present, if the agreement is continued at all. At the time of this writing (December 1990), the emerging Philippine position would require that Clark Air Base be returned to the Philippines and that a new arrangement be agreed on for Subic Bay. The United States could maintain some naval deployments and repair facilities at Subic under a new commercial arrangement.¹⁶ Presumably, these facilities would also be available to the ships of other countries, including the USSR. In a post-Cold War environment, however, previous U.S. objections to a Soviet presence at Subic should disappear. America's future use of facilities in Singapore has not been deterred by the presence of Soviet ships in Singapore's ports.

Continued access of some kind to the Philippine bases still seems essential in order to project force to the Middle East and to support what may be a permanent task force in the western Indian Ocean. Moreover, pilots from the carrier practiced at the Crow Valley instrumentation range, which can simulate the environment they would encounter should they be required to attack Iraq and Kuwait.¹⁷ Generally speaking, Philippine officials have not objected to the use of the bases to back U.S. deployment in the Persian Gulf because these forces are not directly involved in combat. A problem could arise, however, if war broke out. Manila would be very concerned about the safety of its nationals in the Gulf states should the bases continue to serve as an essential supply point for U.S. forces.

If the United States maintains access to Subic Bay while the USSR gradually withdraws from its Vietnamese base at Cam Ranh Bay, Washington will once again have the only dominant naval force in Southeast Asia. U.S. carrier groups would look west to the Persian Gulf, however, and not to the North Pacific as they have in the past. In time, this new orientation could create friction with New Delhi and its plans to make India the dominant power in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the reduction in its Southeast Asian deployments, the USSR hopes to remain a player in regional security. The Soviets are promoting a collective security concept for the Pacific rim as a device to rationalize their own limited presence and to dilute U.S. naval dominance by incorporating it within a regional framework. Thus, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in his September 4, 1990, speech in Vladivostok, offered to host an Asian-Pacific foreign ministers conference in 1993. The purpose would be to create a regional system responsible for "sea and air traffic safety, including terrorism and pirate control."¹⁸ By broadening security arrangements to encompass Asian communist and capitalist states, the USSR would remain a significant actor in regional security decisions.

EFFECTS OF A REDUCED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

There is little doubt that the demise of the Cold War and the need to reduce the U.S. deficit are leading the United States to reduce forward-deployed air and naval forces in Southeast Asia independent of the actual security situation. The number of Navy carriers may be reduced from 14 to 11 by the mid-1990s. If so, the Navy claims it will

no longer be able to keep one carrier permanently in the western Pacific and another in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon's blueprint also calls for cutting Marine Corps forces by 25 percent to about 150,000, which would greatly reduce the U.S. amphibious capability in Third World conflicts.¹⁹ Moreover, challenges by regional powers tend to have a much shorter warning time than that which the United States has trained for in dealing with a potential Soviet attack. Therefore, the necessity for rapid-response forces, including tactical air cover, will be greater than it was in the Cold War era. Nevertheless, because the Soviet Pacific Fleet may no longer be Washington's primary concern, the presence of a single carrier and other combatants may be enough to convey a commitment to protecting the SLOCs. Littoral states would not have the capability of challenging even a reduced U.S. Seventh Fleet, and friendly Southeast Asian navies would presumably cooperate in sustaining the routes of international trade on which their prosperity depends.

The overall ASEAN view was best articulated by Singapore's Trade and Industry Minister, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, who recalled that the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia had not only contributed to overall stability in recent decades but had also permitted ASEAN to concentrate on economic growth. Lee feared that a precipitous decline in American forces would lead to a regional arms race to balance other possible powers including Japan, India, Vietnam, and China.²⁰ The end result would be less security at a higher cost.

If the United States withdraws its forces from the Philippines and relocates them in the Mariana chain on the islands of Saipan and Tinian

and on Palau, some additional advantages would accrue. These new locations, plus Guam, would provide better defense of the sea lanes east of the Philippines and easier access to alternative oil routes through the Indonesian straits.²¹ Nevertheless, in an era of austerity, the construction of these facilities is by no means assured.

By contrast, the United States will be expanding its use of facilities in Singapore. Repair work done at Sembawang shipyard would be more expensive than work done in the Philippines but less expensive than in Japan, Hawaii, and Guam. In Thailand, the United States might be able to arrange the prepositioning of supplies at the former American air bases, Udorn and U Tapao, for use on a contingency basis. A similar understanding might be possible for the deep-water port of Sattahip. Joint Thai-U.S. exercises could be conducted from these facilities. Nevertheless, American deployment from these locations in crisis situations, such as a Persian Gulf conflict, would not be guaranteed because the host countries would fear threats to their oil supplies and to their overseas nationals. Thus, in the event of war, Washington might be forced to operate directly from the mid-Pacific to Diego Garcia, which would strain logistics and extend the time needed to arrive on the scene.

The future use of Subic Bay is essential if the United States is to retain a permanent Southeast Asian presence. By the fall of 1990, it appeared that Washington was prepared to return Clark Air Field to the Philippines after the current agreement expires in September 1991. In exchange, the Philippine Senate may agree to negotiate a new agreement for Subic Bay, which would include an extended reversion period of

perhaps ten years. The United States might continue to use facilities at Clark, such as the Crow Valley air gunnery range, under a commercial arrangement. Similar lease agreements at Subic Bay could include joint Philippine-American use.²² U.S. planes would be given landing rights for a fee, U.S. ships would be charged per berthing, and repairs would be contracted on a commercial basis.

The abortive Japanese plan to dispatch a peace support group to the Persian Gulf as part of the multinational contingent there may have had the unintended effect of raising Southeast Asian consciousness about the desirability of a continued U.S. presence during this period of unpredictable transition. Although the Japanese proposal would only have sent essentially unarmed personnel through Southeast Asia to Saudi Arabia, it would have been the first time since World War II that Japanese government personnel had been deployed overseas. Southeast Asia reacted with anxiety, if not alarm, consistent with its earlier expression of dismay when Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhavan proposed joint Thai-Japanese military exercises. Japan's polite rejection of the latter and its insistence that its Gulf presence would be entirely noncombatant have not alleviated the fear that any overseas deployment by Japan constitutes a dangerous and destabilizing precedent.²³

PROSPECTS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COLLABORATION

From a security perspective, Southeast Asia in the 1990s is a fundamentally different region from what it was only a few years ago. Formerly, the global Cold War imposed its division: ASEAN aligning with

the West, and the Indochina states aligning with the USSR. The major security threat was Vietnam, which led ASEAN to close ranks behind its most threatened front-line member, Thailand. In the 1990s, however, the global basis for these regional assignments is disappearing. Moscow's decision to stop subsidizing Vietnam's empire and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Vietnam led to a retraction in Hanoi's position as well. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam's (SRV's) reorientation toward domestic affairs has, in turn, raised doubts about the continued unity of ASEAN as member states appear to be no longer bound by a common regional threat.

Moreover, the American role of benign mentor may also be reduced. In searching to replace the Soviet-American confrontation as the rationale for forward-deployed forces in the Pacific, the Defense Department now emphasizes the U.S. role as regional balancer, honest broker, and security guarantor. But, whether these concepts will be acceptable either to the U.S. public during an era of tight budgets or to the countries of the region at a time of rising nationalism remains to be seen.²⁴

It is useful to recall that ASEAN was formed in 1967 so that its members could avoid being drawn into the Cold War division that had severed relations among its Indochina neighbors. The transition from a security order dominated by a superpower to one in which Southeast Asia's future peace is provided by its own members means that previously repressed local conflicts may rise to the surface. The future roles of China and Vietnam in the region are cases in point. Both believe they should rightfully be major participants in a Southeast Asian order.

Each still sees the other as a primary adversary, as is reflected in their continued inability to reach consensus over Cambodia. Both may also find themselves opposed to some ASEAN members in disputed claims to the Spratly Islands.

Southeast Asia, then, remains a conflict zone. Disagreements over the security problems mentioned above are openly discussed at ASEAN conclaves, and no consensus emerges on security arrangements or on a strategy for the 1990s. Therefore, ASEAN is reluctant to respond favorably to proposals from Australia, Canada, and the Soviet Union to convene an Asian-Pacific forum on regional security.²⁵ Until the six ASEAN states have agreed on their own security priorities, and on ways of cooperating to achieve them, the prospect of a larger gathering that could bring additional external powers into Southeast Asia is not welcome.

Moreover, despite regular appeals for standardization and joint purchasing of ASEAN defense equipment, little has actually been achieved. For example, despite the fact that several ASEAN air forces employ both F-5s and F-16s, no joint purchasing and no central inventory and repair centers exist. The priorities of individual countries in military engineering, weapons systems, and doctrines are different enough to make standardization impractical. Contrast Singapore's emphasis on forward defense with Indonesia's defense-in-depth; Thailand's concern with land-based threats from the north and east with Malaysia's focus on maritime security; and, finally, the Philippines' focus on counterinsurgency with the rest of ASEAN's orientation toward conventional warfare.

If ASEAN-wide defense cooperation remains unlikely and the potential presence of other regional maritime states (India, China, Vietnam, Japan) increases, a regional preference for sustained U.S. deployments--however managed--is still a priority. Security links with external powers remain the only acceptable guarantees despite doubts about their credibility. This is why Singapore has offered expanded naval and air facilities to the United States, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations on the Philippine bases. At the same time, Malaysia and Singapore have reinvigorated the Five-Power Defense Arrangement. Even Japan hopes to see the United States remain the dominant military actor in Southeast Asia. After all, it was the American order that suppressed Asia's antagonism toward, and suspicions of, Japan. Japan's Philippine aid program was a direct response to American requests despite Tokyo's grave doubts about the future of the Philippine economy. Similarly, Japan's reluctance to invest in Vietnam, despite good commercial opportunities, is also a sign of its willingness to follow Washington's political leadership.

Bilateral and trilateral security cooperation among the ASEAN states will undoubtedly continue and will perhaps expand. Admiral Sudomo of the National Defense Institute in Jakarta has called for cooperation to secure the regional SLOCs, implying the necessity of a three-way arrangement with Malaysia and Singapore. Similarly, Singapore Second Defense Minister, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong, has stated that use of the joint Singapore-Indonesia air gunnery range in Sumatra could be extended to Malaysia.²⁶

Nonetheless, Southeast Asia faces a dilemma. A regional security community has not yet developed because Southeast Asian nations still believe that conflicts among themselves could lead to war. At the same time, however, the imperatives of nationalism militate against the indefinite reliance on outsiders for national security. This the reason for the rhetoric of moving the region toward a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). In the interim, however, the problems posed by China, Vietnam, and the potential naval power of Japan and India all point to the acceptability of a continued U.S. role in the region. Moreover, if the United States could negotiate an agreement to ban nuclear-tipped, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), the U.S. Navy would be welcomed throughout the Pacific on a long-term basis from Japan through New Zealand. (As the threat of Soviet-U.S. confrontation is reduced, the need for nuclear warheads on surface ships should also disappear.)

A strong residual U.S. naval and air presence in the western Pacific is favored by virtually all littoral states. ASEAN clearly prefers continued American, British, Australian, and New Zealand defense arrangements to the proposals made by Canada and Australia in July 1990 for the creation of an Asian-style, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) regime in the Pacific.²⁷ For the ASEAN states, a combination of enhanced bilateral and trilateral military cooperation and the existence of friendly external powers provides the best assurance of regional stability for the 1990s. Neither the complete exit of outsiders nor the creation of an ASEAN defense community seems to be on the horizon.

MAJOR SHIPS - U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Strategic Missile Submarines

USS Ohio	SSBN-726
USS Michigan	SSBN-727
USS Florida	SSBN-728
USS Georgia	SSBN-729
USS Henry M. Jackson	SSBN-730
USS Alabama	SSBN-731
USS Alaska	SSBN-732
USS Nevada	SSBN-733

Attack Submarines

Los Angeles class:

USS Los Angeles	SSN-688
USS Omaha	SSN-692
USS New York City	SSN-696
USS Indianapolis	SSN-697
USS La Jolla	SSN-701
USS Chicago	SSN-721
USS Pasadena	SSN-752
USS San Francisco	SSN-711
USS Houston	SSN-713
USS Buffalo	SSN-715
USS Olympia	SSN-717
USS Honolulu	SSN 718
USS Helena	SSN-725

Sturgeon class:

USS Tautog	SSN-639
USS Aspro	SSN-648
USS Puffer	SSN-652
USS Guitarro	SSN-665
USS Pintado	SSN-672
USS William H. Bates	SSN-680
USS Parche	SSN-683
USS Richard B. Russell	SSN-687
USS Pogy	SSN-647
USS Queenfish	SSN-651
USS Gurnard	SSN-662
USS Hawkbill	SSN-666
USS Drum	SSN-677
USS Tunny	SSN-682
USS Cavalla	SSN-684

Aircraft Carriers

Nimitz class:

USS Nimitz	CVN-68
USS Carl Vinson	CVN-70

Enterprise class:

USS Enterprise	CVN-65
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Kitty Hawk class:

USS Constellation	CV-64
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Forrestal class:

USS Ranger	CV-61
USS Independence	CV-62

Midway class:

USS Midway	CV-41
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Battleships

(All Iowa class):

USS New Jersey	BB-62
USS Missouri	BB-63

Cruisers

Virginia class:

USS Texas	CGN-39
USS Arkansas	CGN-41

California class:

USS California	CGN-36
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Truxton class:

USS Truxton	CGN-35
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Long Beach class:

USS Long Beach	CGN-9
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Ticonderoga Class:

USS Vincennes	CG-49
USS Bunker Hill	CG-52
USS Antietam	CG-54
USS Princeton	CG-59
USS Thomas S. Gates	CG-51
USS Mobile Bay	CG-53
USS Lake Champlain	CG-57

MAJOR SHIPS - U.S. PACIFIC FLEET (Continued)

<i>Ethan Allen</i> class: (ex SSBN type)		Belknap class:	
USS <i>Sam Houston</i>	SSN-609	USS <i>Jouett</i>	CG-29
		USS <i>Sterett</i>	CG-31
<i>Permit</i> class:		USS <i>Fox</i>	CG-33
USS <i>Permit</i>	SSN-594	USS <i>Horne</i>	CG-30
USS <i>Barb</i>	SSN-596	USS <i>William H. Standley</i>	CG-32
USS <i>Jack</i>	SSN-605		
USS <i>Greenling</i>	SSN-614	Leahy class:	
USS <i>Plunger</i>	SSN-595	USS <i>Leahy</i>	CG-16
USS <i>Haddo</i>	SSN-604	USS <i>Gridley</i>	CG-21
USS <i>Flasher</i>	SSN-613	USS <i>Halsey</i>	CG-23
USS <i>Haddock</i>	SSN-621	USS <i>Worden</i>	CG-18
		USS <i>England</i>	CG-22
<i>Barbel</i> class: (Diesel Attack)		USS <i>Reeves</i>	CG-24
USS <i>Barbel</i>	SS-580		
USS <i>Blueback</i>	SS-581	Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)	
		Destroyers	
<i>Darter</i> class: (Diesel Attack)		<i>Spruance</i> class:	
USS <i>Darter</i>	SS-576	USS <i>Paul F. Foster</i>	DD-964
		USS <i>Hewitt</i>	DD-966
Missile Destroyers		USS <i>David R. Ray</i>	DD-971
<i>Kidd</i> class:		USS <i>John Young</i>	DD-973
USS <i>Callaghan</i>	DDG-994	USS <i>Merrill</i>	DD-976
USS <i>Chandler</i>	DDG-996	USS <i>Cushing</i>	DD-985
		USS <i>Ingersoll</i>	DD-990
<i>Charles F. Adams</i> class:		USS <i>Fletcher</i>	DD-992
USS <i>Henry B. Wilson</i>	DDG-7	USS <i>Kinkaid</i>	DD-965
USS <i>Towers</i>	DDG-9	USS <i>Elliott</i>	DD-967
USS <i>Buchanan</i>	DDG-14	USS <i>Oldendorf</i>	DD-972
USS <i>Joseph Strauss</i>	DDG-16	USS <i>O'Brien</i>	DD-975
USS <i>Cochrane</i>	DDG-21	USS <i>Leftwich</i>	DD-984
USS <i>Waddell</i>	DDG-24	USS <i>Harry W. Hill</i>	DD-986
USS <i>Lynde McCormick</i>	DDG-8	USS <i>Fife</i>	DD-991
USS <i>Robison</i>	DDG-12		
USS <i>Berkeley</i>	DDG-15		
USS <i>Goldsborough</i>	DDG-20		
USS <i>Benjamin Stoddert</i>	DDG-22		

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