Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors
Abstract
The role of landpower "at war" is as integral to U.S. defense needs as landpower "short of war"? But what about the role of landpower between these two in environments in which violent nonstate actors dominate? Far less obvious is the role of landpower in irregular warfare, intrastate war waged by belligerents who are not states -- along with its attendant organized criminal, illicit economic, and governmental corruption components. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that, while operational successes in such campaigns may be won at a high cost in U.S. treasure, they are not economically sustainable. Further, the strategic goals of those campaigns -- the desired results which would fulfill the multinational security objectives -- could only be partially met. While the Ba'athist and Taliban governments have been removed from power -- and more importantly al Qaeda forces decimated -- both states are fragile, suffer from tribal and sectarian violence, and are beset with dysfunctional governments. At best, the campaigns waged in Iraq and Afghanistan can be considered only partial victories, at worst, partial failures. In such cases, it is best to devolve opposing violent nonstate actors as quickly as possible so policing forces can implement follow-on strategies. Landpower can help provide security conditions under which these strategies can be facilitated. With these perceptions in mind, this article will look at the relationship of landpower to violent nonstate actors.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA594673
Entities
People
- Robert J. Bunker
Organizations
- United States Army War College