Operation "STRANGLE" (Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study of Tactical Air Interdiction
Abstract
This case study of tactical air interdiction was done under the Rand Tactical Studies Program, which is part of a USAF-sponsored inquiry into the conceptual, operational, and technical aspects of major Air Force missions. The World War II Allied air campaign in Italy, Operation STRANGLE, was chosen because it was an important milestone in the evolution of interdiction doctrine and therefore might explain the origin of concepts that have been retained as part of current doctrine. The purpose of the study was to yield insights into the validity of those concepts; historical material was included only as needed to provide a concrete setting in which to explore them. It was not the author's intent to write another history of the campaign. The prevailing concepts of the role airpower should play, and of the manner in which it should be employed and controlled, largely governed its effectiveness in World War II, as they will in future conflicts. The tools available to a field commander and the approved concepts for their use are the result of long-range planning for force procurement and employment. The planning reflects official doctrine which, in turn, rests on past experience that must be periodically reexamined to test its validity in a changing environment. The present inquiry into the origin of the concepts for tactical air interdiction may therefore prove useful to force-structure planners in DCS/Plans and Operations, as well as to tactical field commanders and their staffs. A preliminary version of this Report was given limited distribution within the United States Air Force. The present, slightly amended version is the final report on the study.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- ADA596075
Entities
People
- F. M. Sallagar
Organizations
- RAND Corporation