Training the Neglected Core of Army Leadership- Troop-Leading Procedures
Abstract
Anyone who has served at a mobilization training center (MTC) has probably observed something similar to the following scenario when working with highly cross-leveled Army National Guard or United States Army Reserve units led by inexperienced commanders and/or key leaders: 1) About 48 hours ago, First Lieutenant Smith looked at his training schedule to confirm that his detachment would conduct a combat patrol convoy and improvised explosive device (IED) defeat training, but failed to clarify the intent, standards of training, and exact start time. 2) Two hours prior to commencement of the combat patrol convoy, confusion reigns in the unit, because 20 Soldiers did not receive advance notification of required equipment. Four Soldiers suddenly announce that they have dental appointments. 3) Due to an unannounced state dignitary visit, the commander cancelled yesterday s training meeting that was to finalize the unit tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) and determine the best unit crew configuration options. 4) A platoon sergeant suddenly reports two HMMWVs and an M2 non-mission capable, and the supply sergeant has no crew-served weapon (CSW) blank adaptors for the training. 5) The unit arrives on time on Range 29, but at the wrong entrance. 6) The executive officer (XO) worked until 0200 to complete 80 percent of an operations order (OPORD) by herself. 7) The same XO answers at least 20 What's going on? questions that morning. 8) Instead of rehearsing crew drills, a squad leader tells his Soldiers, You'll find out everything when you get to the lane.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA596621
Entities
People
- Charles J. Olsen
- David R. Sierakowski
- John Laudonio
- Ronald Holden
Organizations
- United States Army Engineer School