Theory, its Impact on Military Doctrinal and Organizational Change during a Time of War
Abstract
This monograph's purpose is to explore theory and its impact on military organizational and doctrinal changes during a time of war. One underlying assumption is that theory drives doctrine, which produces organizational change. Technological or capability improvements (prior to, during, and after change) will influence, but not dictate, the wholesale refinement of either theory or doctrine. The research methodology included historic analysis of warfare theories, case study comparisons of past successes and failures, and scrutiny of lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The study used a dialectic approach to show the impact of change during a time of major war, specifically, during World War II within a conventional warfare framework and during the Vietnam War within an unconventional warfare framework. This is followed by a discussion of contemporary lessons learned during OIF and OEF, to include observations in 2004-2005 from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) on Brigade Combat Team (BCT) transformation. Other topics include the modular transformation of the active component, mobilization and transformation of the reserve component, and changes generated within the Army Aviation community during the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 14, 2007
- Accession Number
- ADA596719
Entities
People
- Richard M. Beckinger
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College