

Recruiting for 2030

Is the US Air Force Getting the Recruits It Needs for the Future?

Col (sel) Steven C. Marsman, USAF*

The Air Force has stated that it seeks not only 31,980 recruits in fiscal year 2009 to meet its needs for sustainment but also the right people with the right skills at the right time.¹ However, our service recruits Airmen, not numbers. The Air Force wants capable Airmen today who will become leaders for tomorrow. Will we meet our goal for 2009? Absolutely. Even though the number 31,980 represents about 4,000 more individuals than we recruited the previous year, more than likely, the Air Force will have little difficulty accessing this figure.² In fact, we will probably book this many into the system by the summer of 2009. Furthermore, the Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) almost certainly not only will get the right *number* of people but also will access recruits who match prerequisite skill levels and aptitudes at precisely the sequence and timing needed for all training pipelines. One question remains, though: will the Air Force attract the *type* of recruits it requires for the future? Obviously, this question is essentially qualitative rather than quantitative. Many individuals in the current ranks fear that the answer is no. They may be correct—but probably for the wrong reasons. A sufficient number of people with the proper cognitive ability or aptitude are available and willing to join. If we fail, we will do so because we lack insight about how to recruit and what we really need for the strongest possible Air Force. Thus, this article first addresses the challenges and

processes that recruiters face in their effort to meet stated mission goals. It then examines how policies, processes, and programs effectively concentrate on certain areas that emphasize diversity but, in so doing, may create new, currently unaddressed problems for future recruiting.³

Recruiting Challenges

Every day, Air Force recruiters work hard to find young men and women who will become leaders 20 years from now. They seek quality applicants who meet the service's stated goals and criteria. When I served as commander of a recruiting squadron for most of the states of the Upper Midwest, I directed a unit that looks for the best and brightest in this nine-state region.⁴ The uninitiated could hardly fathom the challenges associated with this daunting task. For example, few people understand that 73 percent of youth between the ages of 17 and 24 are ineligible to join the US military.⁵ That is, we cannot even consider almost three out of every four individuals in this group. Further, most of them have no interest in serving in the armed forces. Currently, training programs in recruiting teach that in order to get one recruit to basic military training, we must make contact with 100 individuals.⁶ How is it possible for the Air Force to meet all of its numbers *and* satisfy both internal and external quality metrics yet still not get the people it needs for the

*Formerly the commander of the 343d Recruiting Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, the author is now a student at the Air War College.

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future? The answer to this question depends upon a confluence of overlapping factors, including requirements, quality, and eligibility, as well as manning, demographics, and propensity.

Requirements

We're all familiar with the saying, "We get what we ask for." A good staff officer quickly learns that everything flows from stated requirements. What is the mission? Whether personnel, logistics, or operations, we have to know what is required before we can satisfy a need. This article will not labor over the extensive processes originating with Headquarters US Air Force, Manpower and Personnel, that drive requirements for recruits, based on extensive compilations of projected vacancies and known training pipelines as stated by functional communities across the service. Suffice it to say that our goals derive from requirements levied through that command structure down to the individual recruiter in strip malls of small towns across America. Ultimately, *we get what we ask for*—at least within budgetary constraints.

Quality

What do we ask for? The answer varies, depending on the functional community. Nevertheless, in the broadest sense, the Air Force asks for the highest quality candidates America has to offer. The Department of Defense (DOD) levies certain quality metrics on all of the services, but the Air Force has had no problem exceeding them.⁷ For over 25 years, more than 98 percent of our recruits have come from candidates with the highest educational credentials (Tier 1); this is no small feat, considering the fact that independent, nonpartisan research has demonstrated that "nearly one-third of all public high school students—and nearly one half of all African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans—fail to graduate from public high school with their class."⁸

Is simply possessing a high school diploma enough in the Air Force's highly

technical and demanding career fields? It is not. Without exception or waiver, all applicants must also score at least 36 (out of 99) on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test (English only) in order to join. So, does the Air Force bring in thousands of minimally qualified high school graduates with poor ASVAB scores? We do not. "High quality" recruits, those in category levels (quintiles) I, II, and IIIa, have an overall qualifying test score of 50 points or more (top half). Those in category IIIb have a score less than 50 but at least 36. Although the DOD requires that 60 percent of recruits score in the top half of the ASVAB test, the Air Force has far outstripped this goal for decades.⁹ Other branches have not fared as well.¹⁰ Nevertheless, expectations are not uniform within the Air Force. The AFRS charges squadrons with varying high-quality category I–IIIa goals, depending on a market's ability to recruit such applicants. The ASVAB test, however, is more than just an overall qualifying score. It also comprises several other skill-set line scores (e.g., mechanics and electronics, or aptitude areas such as quantitative thinking). It is not surprising, then, to find almost as many qualifying matrices of scores as individual Air Force specialty codes, tracing back to requirements levied by Headquarters Air Force. Again, ultimately, *we get what we ask for*—and Air Force demands are rigorous.

Eligibility

What else constitutes a qualified applicant? Beyond a high school diploma and a good ASVAB score, eligibility requirements range widely. Recruits must satisfy the minimum total quantitative test score of 36, mentioned above, or meet a quality requirement demanding a minimum aptitude score, such as 72 in electronics. They might qualify for an aptitude area with a line score as low as 32 (e.g., administration), but there are few jobs with such standards, and the wait can be long. Physical standards such as body fat index, maximum allowable weight for a given height, color vision, depth percep-

tion, or the ability to lift heavy objects play a role as well. Some of the criteria reflect the physical rigors likely encountered in execution of the mission, such as the ability to swim or run swiftly; others, such as those necessary for intelligence jobs requiring compartmented security clearances, consider such matters as citizenship (native or naturalized), credit history, and violations of the law (e.g., too many speeding tickets). Problems suggesting flaws in character or moral improbity can be disqualifying; these include felonies, any open-law violation (even relatively minor infractions such as excessive parking tickets), drug use, shoplifting, driving under the influence, possession of alcohol as a minor, and other misdemeanors spelled out in excruciating detail in the regulations.

Failure to meet these criteria disqualifies some applicants entirely. Others are eligible for a limited number of jobs—which may not interest them. A few will qualify for all career fields. Nevertheless, rigorous quality checks at every level limit the pool of eligible applicants. It is also important to point out that final eligibility is adjudicated by the impartial, third-party oversight of the United States Military Entrance Processing Command (which owns and administers the ASVAB), a joint organization acting independently of any service influence in nearly every step of the process. Additionally, all applicants must pass rigorous medical

examinations administered by civilian physicians employed by the joint command, not the Air Force. Data collected by the command, going back decades, reveal typical successful processing rates of only 50 percent for all services.¹¹ This quality cross-check ensures that everyone fully adheres to the regulations and that we place only qualified Airmen in the Air Force.

However, do all these stated objectives and quality metrics involving diplomas, testing, and eligibility ensure that the Air Force obtains the people it needs for the future? Not necessarily, due in part to a goaling system driven almost exclusively by stated mission requirements from Headquarters Air Force. This system does not fully consider all aspects of demographics or an individual's propensity for joining the service; neither does it completely incentivize less tangible outcomes such as diversity. Once again, we get what we ask for—no more. For example, when the Air Force tasked the AFRS with an increase of 4,000 new recruits in fiscal year 2009, the command faced two choices: either “pour gas on the fire” or “peanut-butter-spread” the requirements. That is, the AFRS had to choose between working in geographic areas that virtually guaranteed more recruits or evenly distributing the requirements nationwide, holding the recruiting squadrons accountable for their portion of the new goal. The command chose to “pour gas on the fire” by



US Air Force photo

Maj Gen Anthony F. Przybyslawski, vice-commander of Air Education and Training Command and a Chicago native, administered the oath of enlistment to 60 young men and women on 16 August 2008 during the 50th Annual Chicago Air and Water Show.

recruiting in areas that would most easily help it attain the increased goal. Thus, the AFRS added 124 new recruiters in those areas believed most productive for its purposes.¹²

Manning, Demographics, and Propensity

Was such an approach inappropriate? Not at all. The Air Force still received the highest quality recruits in terms of numbers, skills, and timing. It does, however, illustrate the recruiting process writ large. The Air Force bases its recruiting on manning, propensity, and demographics. First, and obviously, we recruit best where a recruiter is present. By way of explanation, many people do not realize that line recruiters volunteer for this temporary special duty away from their career fields. As of this writing, only two active duty Air Force Airmen recruit in the state of South Dakota and its more than 77,000 square miles! Because of their voluntary status, recruiters have the final say about where they work—based on availability. Therefore, many offices remain chronically vacant. Although squadrons assign nearby recruiters to “cover” such empty offices, in truth, those individuals cannot effectively attend to zones located several hours from their home office. Additionally, many of them choose to return to their hometown. Unsurprisingly, a city like sunny San Antonio, Texas, holds more attraction for them than one like Bemidji, Minnesota, which can literally lie fallow for years. A good many will also choose locations close to Air Force installations, where they can avail themselves of the benefits of the base and the instant market of potential recruits who have a higher propensity to join.

Additionally, base realignment and closures continue to transform the Air Force into smaller enclaves with an ever-decreasing footprint. For instance, a circular template with an 800-mile diameter (approximately 500,000 square miles or an eight-hour drive time) having its center on the border intersection of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota would capture portions of 11 different states but only three active duty Air Force bases:

Offutt (Nebraska), Whiteman (Missouri), and Scott (Illinois).¹³ However, moving this same template south to Altus AFB, Oklahoma, would capture 18 Air Force installations, just as moving it to Robbins AFB near Macon, Georgia, would encompass 15 entirely different bases.¹⁴ Similar comparisons adduce evidence that no major active duty Air Force installations exist in 14 states north of 39 degrees latitude—the southern Kentucky border.¹⁵ Therefore, despite US census data showing that the mean center of population of the United States runs on a line along the Kentucky border, the overwhelming majority of Air Force installations lie below this line.¹⁶ It is easy to deduce that exposure to the Air Force and its way of life is not nearly as accessible to half the population of this country, at least to the same degree as those who live south of Kentucky. This situation produces a special-duty system of volunteers with its consequent chronic shortage of manning in certain locations, in conjunction with recruiters' desire to return home; moreover, the proximity of air bases creates a synergy whereby Air Force recruiters continue to draw heavily from increasingly smaller cultures and communities.

But manning and demographics do not drive the recruiting process in isolation. The propensity of potential applicants to join the Air Force also plays a significant role. For example, the state of Alabama yields almost 10 times as many recruits as South Dakota even though both are roughly the same geographic size and both have about 50 percent of their populations in nonmetropolitan areas.¹⁷ Alabama's larger population (5.8 times that of South Dakota's), in and of itself, does not account for this difference.¹⁸ Specifically, a compilation of DOD recruiting data by the Heritage Foundation revealed propensity ratios of 0.9 and 1.31 for South Dakota and Alabama, respectively.¹⁹ That is, for every 90 recruits from South Dakota who join, 131 from Alabama join, despite similarities in geography and rural densities.

Such propensities are common. In fact, most of the South Central states are over-represented, compared to their Upper Midwest counterparts, with Texas among the highest at a 1.31 propensity and North Dakota among the lowest at 0.53.²⁰ This difference suggests that Texans are 40 percent more likely to join than North Dakotans. Good business principles would advise us to “pour gas on the fire” and increase manning in those areas that include people with higher propensities to join. In fact, in an era of fiscal frugality, the Air Force has practiced good husbandry of its resources and increased the number of recruiters in these fertile locations. Implementing such enterprise solutions ensures that the Air Force gets the numbers it needs, just as upholding recruiting standards ensures that quality remains high.

However, the unintended consequence of increasing goals in areas of higher propensity is that we continue to propagate an Air Force that “speaks with a Southern accent.” Many people see nothing wrong with such a demographic shift; indeed, some of them would even complain of a prejudicial bias for pointing out that it exists. Nevertheless, I do not offer this observation as some Mason-Dixon polemic but as a single illustrative example of the significance of propensity in Air Force recruiting. For good or ill, a process based on manning, demographics, and propensity continues to institutionalize differences between those who join the Air Force and the greater American society we protect.

Possible Consequences of Recruiting Policies, Processes, and Programs

America is not uniform. Cultures and demographics vary widely throughout the nation. Political views abound as well. Nearly every reader is familiar with the concept of “red states” and “blue states,” which is reflected in propensities to join. We also see

differences in recruiting based on such factors as use of alcohol, metropolitan densities, and proficiency in the English language—even tattoos. Indeed, far fewer people are eligible to join today because broad sectors of America celebrate their culture with extensive use of tattoos as body art.

Censuring alcohol consumption by minors also varies greatly among locations. Wisconsin is just as famous for its breweries as its cheese. Is it acceptable to disenfranchise more applicants from Wisconsin than from West Virginia because their subculture makes them 2.5 times more likely to drive while under the influence of alcohol than their West Virginia counterparts?²¹ Many readers would immediately, vehemently, and vociferously argue that such discrimination is entirely appropriate and necessary, demanding only the highest quality candidates for defense of the nation. Perhaps, but the point is that distinct cultural differences exist among populations across the federated states. Those in the Upper Midwest, such as Wisconsin, the Dakotas, Minnesota, and Nebraska, have rates of self-admitted DUIs as high as 26 percent, while states like Arkansas, Kentucky, the Carolinas, and West Virginia are at 10 percent.²² In our quest for recruits, is it appropriate to permanently disenfranchise youths from broad swaths of the nation at more than twice the rate of other areas?

Would anyone be surprised if it were demonstrated that members of densely populated metropolitan areas of the East and West coast “blue states” have substantially lower propensities to join the Air Force than residents of suburbs or rural areas? Urban areas are densely populated but produce only 8 percent of military recruits.²³ By way of illustration, the state of Montana has a population of just under 1 million, averaging only six people per square mile. Rhode Island, also with a population of approximately 1 million, has a much greater density—over 1,000 per square mile.²⁴ Yet, the propensity to join is 1.67 in Montana and .53 in Rhode

Island; that is, more than three times as many Montanans as Rhode Islanders are likely to join the service, despite the states' nearly identical populations. However, this article does not seek to interpret such differences in worldviews among population densities or geographies in the United States; rather, it simply points out the fact that significant differences do exist and are reflected in the people who join an all-volunteer Air Force.

So, are we getting the recruits we need? As stated in the beginning of this article, the Air Force is certainly attracting the right *number* of young people to join. Additionally, Headquarters Air Force is continually identifying the right cognitive and aptitude skill sets required for the future to ensure that we have good quality. And the AFRS has effectively executed its mission faithfully for a decade, sending only the best-qualified recruits to basic military training on time. But what about diversity?

Headquarters assures us that the Air Force has made great strides in assuring a diversified force structure in terms of race and gender, and statistics seem to bear this out. A quick look at the Air Force Personnel Center's Web page proclaims it, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness annually confirms such assertions.²⁵ Nevertheless, is it a force structure representative of America? For the most part, it is—if we limit diversity to the traditionally tracked categories. However, Air Force diversity is much broader than simple demographic differences commonly identified by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. It also includes “personal life experiences, geographic background, socioeconomic background, cultural knowledge, educational background, work background, language abilities, physical abilities, philosophical/spiritual perspectives, age, race, ethnicity and gender.”²⁶

Diversity for the sake of appearances has limited value in a meritocracy such as the military. Meritocracies select, reward, and promote, based on performance. The

military concerns itself much more with the tangible successes of combat than with vagaries of political representation. Echoing recent comments by the secretary of the Air Force, the underlying principle of diversity is varied backgrounds, experiences, and mind-sets of diverse groups of people to ensure the widest possible range of outcomes.²⁷ As long as we access people who can conform to our military ethos and inculcate our core values of integrity, service before self, and excellence in all we do, we should be casting the net for the most diverse Air Force we can recruit. If we do not, if we recruit only from our own families and communities, if our applicants come only from around air bases, if we continue to contract further and further into the South, if we disenfranchise major sections of the nation due to culture or politics or behaviors, then we run the risk of becoming detached from the rest of society. Worse, we risk the potential of developing an elite, homogeneous culture disconnected from the values and experiences of the larger population base and the elected civilian leadership. Historically, America's founding fathers greatly feared the possibility of the military's developing its own unique subculture, considering it a dangerous path to take. Such a military may begin to question, albeit benignly at first, the direction and decisions of the civilians it has sworn to protect. Although this notion may be jarring to readers raised on Samuel Huntington's long-cherished ideal of the “soldier and the state,” authors such as Peter Feaver have already raised the warning flag about such changes in oversight and civil-military relations.²⁸

All this being said, however, it is not necessary to lower our standards to obtain greater diversity. Potential solutions lie far beyond the scope of this article, but the first step is to acknowledge the problem and then develop the political will to make changes. If we do not, if we continue to go back to the well, if we continue to travel the easy route, how much more disconnected will Air Force culture become from the rest

of society by 2030? I am confident that in that year we will have a highly competent, highly qualified force structure, motivated to serve and excel. However, unless we modify our recruiting policies, processes, and programs to accommodate vast and ongoing cultural and demographic differences, I am not as confident that those forces will reflect the diversity of America. The next step could take the form of better guidance

and vision from our political and senior leaders, which Headquarters Air Force can state in terms of requirements and which the AFRS can translate into the current goaling system. But if we do nothing, then we might not have leaders in 2030 who will vary as much in viewpoints, backgrounds, and cultural experiences as the rest of the nation we swear to protect. ★

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes

1. This number is revised from the original estimate of 31,800. See Brig Gen Alfred J. Stewart, "Recruiting: Crucial to National Defense," Commander's Commentary, Air Force Recruiting Service EXTRA-net, Randolph AFB, TX, 7 September 2008, <https://xtranet.rs.af.mil/pages/?id=87>. For the Air Force Recruiting Service's mission statement, see the Air Force Recruiting Service Mission Brief, Randolph AFB, TX, September 2008, slide 2.

2. Stewart, "Recruiting: Crucial to National Defense."

3. For the purposes of this article, all references to recruiting mean only active duty, non-prior-service enlisted accessions. Different organizations and systems recruit officer trainees, health professionals, people with prior service, and those in the Guard/Reserve, but they are not considered in this article.

4. Lt Col Steve Marsman served as commander, 343d Recruiting Squadron, AFRS, Air Education and Training Command, Offutt AFB, NE, from June 2007 to June 2009. This squadron's recruiting region is an area of responsibility twice the size of Iraq.

5. Their ineligibility stems from a host of disqualifying factors including overweight, moral improbity, violations of the law, medical conditions, dependents, low test scores, and so forth. Another 10 percent will not join because they are in college, and an additional 10 percent (although technically eligible to join) have limited value to the Air Force as low-quality candidates—leaving a total market of 1.4 million or only 5 percent of the youth! See House, *Prepared Statement of the Honorable David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), before the House Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee on "Overview of Recruiting, Retention, and Compensation,"* 110th Cong., 2d sess., 26 February 2008, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/MilPers022608/Chu_Testimony022608.pdf.

6. "Signing an Applicant," Air Force Recruiting Service Mission Brief, slide 10.

7. "Mission Success," Air Force Recruiting Service Mission Brief, slide 7.

8. "Population Representation in the Military Services," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, fiscal year 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/PopRep2007/index.html>. In recent years, more than 99 percent of Air Force recruits have earned traditional diplomas. However, this underestimates their quality since most of the remaining fraction represents either typically home-schooled children or those with a difficult-to-earn General Educational Development diploma, who score in the highest Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery categories. See also Christopher B. Swanson, *Who Graduates? Who Doesn't? A Statistical Portrait of Public High School Graduation, Class of 2001* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 25 February 2004), <http://www.urban.org/publications/410934.html>; and Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, *Public High School Graduation and College-Readiness Rates: 1991–2002*, Education Working Paper no. 8 (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, February 2005), 1, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ewp_08.htm.

9. Cited in "Population Representation in the Military Services," table D-9. Service programs are required to ensure that a minimum of 90 percent of non-prior-service recruits graduate from high school with diplomas. At least 60 percent of recruits must be "high-quality," defined as graduates with scores drawn from categories I–IIIA; no more than 4 percent of the recruits can come from category IV. The last time the Air Force fell below 60 percent was in 1982.

10. For the past several years, the US Army has struggled with reaching the benchmark, with a low of 44 percent in the high-quality category in 2007. Cited in "Population Representation in the Military Services," table D-9.

11. These data are actually understated if one considers that failing the ASVAB test (less than 36

points) by students taking it at a high school is not considered a "processor" since the test is not proctored at a Military Entrance Processing Station. From "Population Representation in the Military Services."

12. "FY09 EA Manning Projections," staff meeting, Headquarters Air Force Recruiting Service, 11 February 2009, slide 12. This slide reflects a 95 percent target of 1,260 by the end of September 2009 (start of fiscal year 2010).

13. Due to higher speeds on major expressways and slower speeds on other roads, Grand Forks AFB (ND) technically falls barely within an eight-hour drive time. But Whiteman AFB falls out for the same reason, so the count of three remains consistent.

14. Bases in the Altus AFB area include Altus itself, Tinker (OK), Vance (OK), McConnell (KS), Barksdale (LA), Randolph (TX), Lackland (TX, including Brooks City Center and the Kelley and Medina Annexes), Laughlin (TX), Goodfellow (TX), Dyess (TX), Sheppard (TX), Cannon (NM), Holloman (NM), Kirtland (NM), Schriever (CO), Cheyenne (CO), Peterson (CO), and the United States Air Force Academy (CO). Bases in the Robbins area include Robbins itself, Moody (GA), Patrick (FL), MacDill (FL), Tyndall (FL), Eglin (FL), Hurlburt (FL), Keesler (MS), Columbus (MS), Maxwell (AL, including Gunter Annex), Arnold (TN), Charleston (SC), Shaw (SC), Pope (NC), and Seymour Johnson (NC).

15. The adduced states include Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Oregon. Derived from the annual demographic database printed in *Airman Magazine*, January 2004.

16. This means that just as many people reside north of this line as south of it, with a geographic terminus near Saint Louis at Steelville, MO. See "Population and Geographic Centers," <http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/files/popctr.pdf>. Inclusion of all branches of the military makes the distinction even more pronounced.

17. The portion of the enlisted goal in 2008 for flights located in Alabama was 640 compared to only 67 in South Dakota. See "Flight Production_EOY," Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, Market and Analysis Branch, AFRS, Randolph AFB, TX, fiscal year 2008, [https://xtranet.rs.af.mil/library/HQ%20AFRS/RSO/RSOA/RSOAM/Flight%](https://xtranet.rs.af.mil/library/HQ%20AFRS/RSO/RSOA/RSOAM/Flight%20). South Dakota has about 25,000 more square miles than does Alabama. See US Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts (Population Estimates, Census of Population and Housing, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, State and County Housing Unit Estimates, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits, and Consolidated

Federal Funds Report). For definitions of metropolitan areas, see US Census Bureau and Office of Management and Budget. See also US Census Bureau, Census 2000 Redistricting Data (PL 94-171) summary file for state populations, and Cartography: Population Division, <http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/atlas/pdf/censr01-102.pdf>.

18. US Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts.

19. See map 2, "Enlisted Representation Ratios for 2007," in Shanea Watkins and James Sherk, Report no. 08-05, *Who Serves in the U.S. Military? The Demographics of Enlisted Troops and Officers*, Heritage Foundation, 21 August 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/nationalSecurity/cda08-05.cfm>. Calculations are based on data from the DOD, Defense Manpower Data Center, Non-Prior-Service Accessions, 2007; and Steven Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, version 4.0 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, Minnesota Population Center, 2008), <http://usa.ipums.org/usa> (accessed 21 July 2008).

20. Watkins, *Who Serves in the U.S. Military?* See map 1, "Military Enlisted Recruit-to-Population Ratios, by Region in 2007."

21. The rate is 26 percent in Wisconsin, compared to 10 percent in West Virginia. See National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2004-6, Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, <http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm#content>.

22. Ibid.

23. The total is 7.93 percent of applicants with all forms of educational credentials from urban areas. See "Population Representation in the Military Services," table B-42; and FY 2007 Non-Prior-Service NPS Active Duty Enlisted Accessions by Education, Component, and Urbanicity.

24. See US Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts.

25. "Air Force Demographics," Air Force Personnel Center, 31 March 2009, <http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/library/airforcepersonnelstatistics.asp>.

26. "Diversity," *Airman's Roll Call*, 12-18 November 2008, <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-081113-064.pdf>.

27. Hon. Michael B. Donley, secretary of the Air Force, "Diversity," Letter to Airmen, 17 February 2009, <http://www.af.mil/information/viewpoints/secap.asp?id=449>.

28. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); and Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).