Culture Clash: Bomber Nuclear Operations in a Post-Cold War World
Abstract
A global power requires a conventional bomber force that is aggressive, creative, and decisive. It also requires a nuclear bomber force that provides flawless, positive control of weapons and follows procedure to the letter. When I joined my first operational unit, after initial qualification training in the B-52, the remnants of Strategic Air Command (SAC) were still prevalent. Older crew members spoke longingly about Mother SAC, hoping that somehow the command would rise again. Air Combat Command (ACC) had just combined the bombers of SAC and the fighters of Tactical Air Command (TAC). At the time, it was doubtful that one could find two more divergent cultures in the Air Force. SAC represented the force built by General Curtis LeMay to deter the Soviet Union. TAC represented the Air Force that would support the Army in a conventional conflict. Each culture's flight crews disdained the other. TAC warriors saw SAC as a regimented organization that could not improvise. SAC warriors saw TAC as a fraternity of cowboys. Neither understood how the other became the way they were -- and probably did not care to understand. Regardless of who was correct, the bomber community generally accepted that TAC had won the philosophical debate. Therefore, we worked diligently to change the culture to correspond to the new ACC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA597559
Entities
People
- Robert Spalding