Thinking About CAS without Thinking about CAS Doctrine: Selected Interactions of Institutional Processes within the Close Air Support Mission
Abstract
How should the joint force optimize the planning and execution of close air support (CAS)? Previous studies have examined CAS from the perspective of service- and platform-specific procedures. This thesis examines how the joint force, as a cohesive whole, can more optimally deliver lethal firepower against any adversary. Using institutional analysis, three clusters of perverse incentives that hinder joint cohesion are examined. These clusters include the following: (1) the perverse incentives arising from rules of engagement intended to address the conduct of "operations amongst the population," (2) the lack of interoperability arising from the multiplicity of service-specific platforms, and (3) the significant difference between training and real-world execution of CAS. This study reasons that institutions (which include rules, doctrine, practices, standard operating procedures, etc.) within each cluster generate unintended, path-dependent effects deleterious to cohesive joint air support. The thesis then proposes a new approach to CAS that mitigates these threats and fosters joint cohesion.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 13, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA598983
Entities
People
- Aaron J. Carlson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College