

Multinational Experiment 5



COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING, MANAGEMENT AND EVALUATION OUTLINE CONCEPT

Version 3.0
02 October 2008

This is the final MNE 5 document on Cooperative Implementation Planning,
Management and Evaluation

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 02 OCT 2008		2. REPORT TYPE Final		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Cooperative Implementation Planning, Management and Evaluation - Outline Concept				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lt Col David Couzens, Mr. Graham Kessler, Mr. Charlie Sneed				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) UK Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, UK; US Joint Forces Command, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, Suffolk, VA				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to outline an initial concept for the way in which multinational and inter-agency partners might conduct collaborative analysis (assessment), planning, implementation and evaluation for an intervention. This paper focuses on activities at the in-region level. It will also provide the direction to enable organisations activity and program planning.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS multinational, experimentation, MNE, Cooperative Implementation Planning, (CIP), Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation, (CIME), Multinational Inter-Agency Strategic Planning, (MNISP)					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 45	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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AIM AND INTENT

1. The aim of this paper is to outline an initial concept for the way in which multinational and inter-agency partners might conduct collaborative analysis (assessment), planning, implementation and evaluation for an intervention.¹
2. This concept has been updated based on results of experimentation within the Cooperative Implementation Planning (CIP) and Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation (CIME) focus areas as part of Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE 5). It is intended to stimulate discussion across the wider community of interest for the Comprehensive Approach.
3. This paper focuses on activities at the in-region level. The CIP process will draw from the direction and guidance provided by the Multinational Inter-Agency Strategic Planning (MNISP) focus area, led by France, and will feed and be fed by the CIME focus area led by the USA. It will also provide the direction to enable organisations' activity and program planning.

CIP AND CIME OUTPUT

4. The objectives for the CIP and CIME processes are:
 - To support the development of the higher level overall Coalition strategy² through the provision of specialist advice in response to requests for information.
 - From this Coalition strategy to develop a country-level, multinational and inter-agency 'Framework Plan' that details a set of desired outcomes that are shared across many organisations.
 - To enable the coherent development of organisation-specific activity or program plans that can contribute to the achievement of outcomes in the shared Framework Plan.
 - To enable dialogue and coherence during the implementation of activities and programs related to the shared Framework Plan.
 - To evaluate changes in the conflict environment over time, review progress against the Framework Plan adjusting it as required.
 - To provide a reporting mechanism to the strategic level and national capitals.
 - To act as coordination mechanism between implementation partners, to include relevant international organizations, non-governmental organizations and host nation governments and civil society.

TERMINOLOGY AND PLAN HIERARCHY

5. Different organisations use different terminology; whilst the terms may vary the basic concepts are however common and there is considerable similarity between

¹ The term intervention is not intended to imply a purely military intervention. It is intended to describe interagency activity by a broad range of actors.

² In MNE 5, this strategy is called the Coalition Coordinated Strategy (CCS). For more information, see the MNE 5 Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning Guide (French Joint Center for Concepts Doctrine and Experimentation: Bibliography Reference #15)

civilian ‘results based’ and military ‘effects based’ approaches. To avoid confusion this concept will refer to the following hierarchy of outcomes:




Figure 1 Hierarchy of Outcomes

6. The highest level direction for the inter-agency Coalition will be set by the Multinational Strategic Forum within the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy (CCS). This will establish the Strategic Vision, the Transition State and Strategic Objectives. This will then be developed through CIP into the country-level, multinational and interagency Framework Plan. This Plan will be comprised of a set of desired outcomes for the Coalition, including their relative priority and the intended sequence for achieving them. It will not describe how the outcomes will be achieved or how supporting activities will be conducted – this will remain the responsibility of individual organisations and will be captured in each organisation’s activity or program plans. The intent therefore is for the Coalition to produce a single Coalition Comprehensive Strategy, realised through the implementation of a single outcome-focused Framework Plan that in turn is supported by the successful implementation of a number of individual organisation’s activity or program plans.




Figure 2 Hierarchy of Plans

ASSERTIONS

7. A combination of lessons from operations, interviews with representatives from government departments and a review of academic research has led to a number of assertions that have shaped the CIP and CIME concepts. Further insights have been gained through experimentation within the focus area and these have caused the assertions to be refined slightly. The key assertions are:

a. **Cooperation not Command.** Conflicts are invariably complex and no single organisation is capable of resolving them in isolation. A comprehensive approach is required that brings together the key stakeholders to work collaboratively with each other to address the breadth of the issues. These different organisations are unlikely to fall within a single 'command chain' and therefore such collaborative working is likely to be essentially voluntary based on cooperation and mutual benefit rather than command.

➤ Collaboration will be based on cooperation rather than command.

b. **Embrace Diversity.** In joined-up, multi-organization work, cooperation is dependent on the willingness of individuals to learn about, understand, and embrace the perspectives and cultures of partner organisations. Differences in organisational missions, mandates, and histories will create seemingly large differences in approaches to problem solving, not just between civilian and military organisations, but between different civilian organisations as well. Fundamental differences in organisational approaches to an intervention (i.e. a short versus long term perspective, or a "working on conflict" versus a "working in conflict" point of view) can create rifts between partners that can be significantly lessened through a process of learning, understanding, and ultimately embracing organisational diversity.

➤ Individuals must embrace the impact of different partner organisation's cultures.

c. **Local Ownership.** Sustainable progress in transforming conflict and crisis situations can only be made by local people; experience shows that externally imposed solutions rarely prove sustainable. CIP and CIME must therefore find ways of incorporating local perspectives and priorities. Ultimately the plan will need to focus on rebuilding the social contract between the state and its population. The level and means of achieving this partnership with the host state will depend on the situation; possible approaches are discussed in Annex A. It is asserted that CIP and CIME must draw on local perceptions and priorities.

➤ CIP and CIME must draw on local perceptions and priorities.

d. **Collaborative Analysis.** A study by the World Bank³ has shown that analysing the situation collaboratively is a key precursor to coherent action. Attempts to conduct analysis separately and then combine the results rarely achieve the required 'meeting of minds' between those coming from different

³ World Bank: Bibliography Reference #46

perspectives. Such attempts can lead to situations where differences are simply glossed over and not resolved only to re-emerge later at the tactical level. It is therefore asserted that CIP must begin with a collaborative analysis of the situation. Whilst this will draw upon these higher-level strategic assessments⁴ and from other existing national and organisational assessments it will still be necessary to review these in-region. In addition to enabling planning and implementation processes, the collaborative analysis will form part, or all, of a baseline description of the environment, which will be used during evaluation to help identify trends and progress towards Coalition goals.

➤ CIP and CIME require a collaborative analysis of the situation.

e. **Regional Understanding.** A recurring theme is the complexity of the environment and the length of time that it takes to develop sufficient understanding to enable effective activities. Adversaries have proved adept at managing and manipulating the media enabling them to capitalise on errors and on the lack of rapid and obvious progress gaining an advantage that can be hard to overcome. It is therefore essential that any intervention begins with a higher level of understanding than at present. This demands a proactive approach to analysis that draws on the understanding developed during routine (pre-crisis) engagement with the region across all organisations and departments. Those organisations and departments engaged in conflict prevention and peace building should therefore regularly capture this level of understanding summarising it for subsequent use; as far as possible this should be done collaboratively. It is asserted that CIP and CIME must be based on the understanding developed over time by those routinely engaged in the region and that these individuals should be represented within the CIP process.

➤ CIP and CIME must be based on the understanding developed over time by those routinely engaged in the region; these organisations and their representatives should be represented within the CIP process.

f. **Open Dialogue.** Experiences from real-world coordination efforts, reinforced by the findings from CIP experimentation, suggest that it is the dialogue between individuals with different perspectives that matters more than adherence to any particular process. Whilst improved connectivity and software tools are enabling a far richer discussion between people in different locations, this generally works best between those who already share a common perspective and those who have developed a mutual trust through personal interaction. Where dialogue is required between those holding different cultural backgrounds, face-to-face dialogue is preferred. Those taking part in the dialogue also need to be empowered to speak on behalf of their organisations. It is therefore asserted that a forum should be provided to enable face-to-face discussion between empowered representatives of participating organisations (military, development, foreign affairs etc). These representatives must be collocated.

➤ A forum should be provided to enable face-to-face discussion between

⁴ In MNE 5, the Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning focus area developed an approach for the delivery of a shared “Coalition Strategic Assessment.”

empowered representatives of the participating organisations; these representatives must be colocated.

g. **Right People.** The output of any planning process depends on who takes part in it. Each situation will differ and different individuals and organisations will become more or less significant in each case. The membership of any planning group will therefore need to adapt to ensure that key individuals or organisations are included. It is therefore asserted that before the CIP process starts a stakeholder analysis will need to be conducted to identify who should form part of the planning process and that membership should be reviewed regularly as the situation develops.

- Before the CIP process starts a stakeholder analysis should be conducted to identify who should be part of the planning process; membership should be reviewed as the situation develops.

h. **Flexible Processes.** Different organisations have developed different approaches to meet their specific needs. Development of a single common approach is likely to end up being the lowest common denominator and will lack the richness that exists within individual approaches. The approach used should reflect the nuances of the situation under consideration and draw from the breadth of techniques available within each organisation. It is therefore asserted that the process and techniques adopted will be unique to that situation but will usually be an amalgam of existing processes and techniques.

- The process and techniques adopted will be situation-specific but will usually be a combination of existing processes and techniques.

i. **Informed Facilitation.** Significant differences exist in the resources that each participating organisation can commit to planning, implementation and evaluation processes. There is a danger that those with the largest resources, or the greatest power, will dominate and hamper open and honest dialogue. The dialogue should therefore be facilitated by an organisation that is not one of the major stakeholders. The facilitators will need to have a good understanding of the various approaches, tools and techniques used by the participating organisations. The facilitators should draw on this knowledge and previous experience to identify the most appropriate mix or approaches for the situation thus forming a tailored planning and evaluation process. Further, they must be skilled in wide range of facilitation techniques, including visualisation techniques, and be seen as legitimate by the organisations represented. It is asserted that planning and evaluation processes should be enabled by an informed and legitimate facilitation capability.

- Multi-organisation planning and evaluation processes should be enabled by an informed and legitimate facilitation capability.

j. **Single Leader.** The complexity of crises and the resultant uncertainty associated with Coalition interventions means that consensus is not always possible. There will be times when the participating organisations will not be able to agree on a common way forward. Experience has shown that a 'casting vote' is

required; the forum therefore needs a single ‘leader’. Leadership of the forum will require a light touch – the casting vote should be used sparingly. The leader may be the head of one of the participating organisations or may be appointed by the strategic level forum as their special representative. The option chosen will depend on the situation and the nature of the task. Whichever option is chosen, the participating organisations must appreciate that the leader has been given the authority to lead the development of the implementation plan. Leadership is discussed in more detail in Annex B.

- The forum will require a single leader.

k. **Learn and Improve.** Plans, activities and the assumptions behind them must be assessed periodically with a view toward determining the overall progress of the intervention, learning lessons and improving policy and practice. Two forms of assessment are envisaged; firstly, ongoing monitoring during the course of the intervention to enable fine corrections or adjustments to be made where required. Secondly, mid-term or post-intervention evaluation to identify changes in the conflict environment over time and to evaluate whether these changes have occurred because of, in spite of, or in complete isolation from, the intervention. Whilst those conducting the intervention activities carry out the former it is asserted that, in order to ensure that the evaluation team and results are seen by stakeholders as credible, objective, and competent, a mix of personnel both internal and external to the Coalition should be considered to make up the evaluation team.

- Monitoring and evaluation of overall mission progress should be undertaken to learn lessons and improve policy and practice.

l. **Remain Engaged.** The planning process is iterative; engagement does not end once the plan has been delivered, and it is critical that there be a commitment to revisit, review and adjust the plan as the intervention is happening. The situation will change, initial assumptions may prove unfounded and spoilers and those opposed to the plan will also have a voice. The forum must therefore remain in being in order to monitor and enable the implementation phase. As new information becomes available, the forum must assess implications for the framework plan and decide if and how the plan should be adjusted. It is asserted that the interagency implementation forum will be required for the duration of the intervention although its makeup and leadership is likely to evolve during the course of the intervention.

- The interagency implementation forum will remain in being throughout the duration of the intervention.

8. These assertions suggest that interagency fora be established through which dialogue can take place leading to the development of a country-level, outcome-focused Framework Plan and increased coherence across the activities of various organisations in the field. The possible structure and role of such fora are discussed in the next sections.

STRUCTURE

9. One of the characteristics of modern conflict and conflict transformation is the multitude of actors that are present. Due to the capabilities, expertise, access and understanding that they possess, some of these actors, state and non-state, will be fundamental to achieving the Coalition's strategic objectives, others will not. The former will need, as far as possible, to be brought in to the 'inner core' of participants with whom a Coalition will wish to conduct collaborative analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation in order to develop shared, coherent outcomes and conduct mutually supporting activities. An approach to identifying key actors and the desired level of interaction with those actors is shown in the stakeholder analysis diagram below:

	Low Impact	High Impact
Supportive	Coordinate With	Collaborate With
Unsupportive	Deconflict	Modify Behaviour

Figure 3 Desired Interactions Based on Stakeholder Analysis

10. While some organisations will be able to work in a fully collaborative manner with a Coalition planning group and commit to supporting Coalition outcomes by implementing activities and programs under the auspices of the Coalition, there will likely be a number of high impact organisations working in the conflict region who will need to interact with the Coalition at a lower level of "interaction maturity"⁵. The appropriate level of interaction maturity between these organisations and a Coalition planning group may be at a coordinated or deconflicted level, as opposed to a fully collaborative level. Interaction maturity between the Coalition planning group and other organisations should be considered on a case-by-case basis and will be

⁵ Levels of interaction maturity referenced below are derived from Moffatt and Alberts, "Maturity Levels for NATO NEC Command." For more information see bibliography reference #27.

influenced by each organisation's authorities, responsibilities, chains of accountability, information sharing policies and other factors. Additionally, the level of interaction maturity between the Coalition planning group and a partner organisation may change over time due to political or practical factors. For some organisations, such as humanitarian actors, any direct interaction with a Coalition of nations may be inappropriate. Humanitarian organisations will usually not be included in an overall political and/or military strategy, to ensure the independence and impartiality of humanitarian activities. Humanitarian agencies will usually have a separate coordination structure facilitated by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by UNOCHA. Liaison structures should be established with the humanitarian coordination structures, mainly through the coordinating agency, but also with individual agencies when appropriate and called for. A first task could be to produce common guidelines for how interaction with humanitarian agencies should take place.

11. With regard to figure 3 above, it is likely that the number of actors falling within the 'Collaborate With' box will be larger than is easily manageable. However it is suggested that many of these will naturally form functional groupings amongst themselves during planning and implementation of their own activities and programs. In fact, many of these organisations may have been operating in the conflict region before the Coalition forms up, and may have already organised themselves into communities of interest, referred to here as functional groups. These functional groupings are likely to be multinational groupings of likeminded agencies that will work together on sectoral issues (Development, Security, Governance, etc)⁶. It is proposed that representatives from these functional groupings should be brought together with a small central support team to form an Interagency Implementation Forum (IIF) through which the required dialogue can take place and the resultant Framework Plan be constructed. Although it may not be possible initially, the IIF is envisaged as a group formed in the conflict or intervention region.

12. The IIF structure (Figure 4 below) is intended to facilitate joint work amongst organisations. The internal planning and operating constructs of each contributing organisation may remain largely unchanged as a result of the organisation's participation in this forum. National and organisational perspectives, agendas and redlines will need to be considered during IIF work, and it will be necessary for participants to provide feedback to their nations and organisations regarding decisions made in the IIF.

⁶ At the operational or in-region level the majority of these actors are likely to be from government agencies or International Organisations. For the government agencies, the formation of multinational groupings will be less 'optional' than is perhaps suggested. For those non-state actors that need to be included, their ability and willingness to form groupings will affect whether or not they can join the group and therefore influence the activities.




Figure 4 IIF Structure

13. Continuity of personnel will be important if trust is to be forged between members of the IIF and to ensure that a depth of knowledge and understanding of the context, the relevant actors and the issues is developed and maintained.

14. Whilst the precise makeup of the IIF will depend on the situation and the scale of the intervention, the intention is that it remains 'light', with the central support team, or 'core staff' being comparable in size to the number of representatives from the functional groups. It should not develop into a substantial headquarters with large numbers of staff; the majority of personnel and detailed work to develop and implement organisation-specific activity and program plans will remain within individual organisations. The functional group representatives will be responsible to coordinating with and speaking on behalf of organisations in the IIF. Ensuring that the IIF remains small will ensure that it focuses at the correct level of detail and is not dragged down into very specific areas of discussion that should remain the responsibility of the functional groups. Keeping the forum small also removes a degree of inertial constraints which plague large organizations. The key components of this forum are:

- **Forum Chair / Coalition Special Representative:** This is the person that 'owns' the problem at the country-level on behalf of the Coalition. The Forum Chair will be empowered by the Strategic Forum to represent the Coalition in the region and as such will normally be referred to as the Coalition Special Representative (CSR). In order to ensure that the intent of Strategic Planning Group flows down into the implementation planning forum, the CSR should be present during the development of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy.

- **Deputy Forum Chair:** Working directly for the Forum Chair the Deputy will tend to look inwards and downwards within the Forum allowing the Forum Chair to focus upwards and outwards.
- **Representatives from the functional groups:** Accepted by groups of like-minded key stakeholders in-region as able to reflect their views within the planning process. Representatives from host nations or other key organizations from the conflict region may also be present in the IIF as appropriate.
- **Core Staff:**
 - **Facilitation Team:** Acts in support of the Forum Chair and Deputy to run the planning process on their behalf ensuring, as far as is possible, that the process constructs a plan on time that is fit for purpose and that enjoys a broad level of buy-in from the key stakeholders. The Facilitation Experts are not completely neutral, despite the standard usage and implication of the term ‘facilitator’, but are experts in the use of facilitation techniques who assist in the creation of appropriate dialogue by managing debate between participants, in particular drawing out views from all members of the forum. Facilitation experts should be familiar with a wide range of planning approaches and facilitation techniques including visualisation techniques. Facilitation experts must have strong communication skills, the ability to see issues from a non-expert perspective, an ability to identify with others’ point of view and to speak on behalf of others. Empathy is a key attribute of a strong facilitator. As the leads for the development of the IIF’s planning process, the facilitation experts may be called upon to teach aspects of the chosen planning approaches to the rest of the IIF.
 - **Executive Secretary:** The Executive Secretary supports the Facilitation Team by maintaining an audit trail of decisions and by identifying and capturing the key issues from the wide ranging discussions of the forum. This position requires a highly-qualified person with an understanding of the planning process adopted, competence with IT tools (including visualisation tools) and a reasonable level of understanding of the conflict region and the issues associated with the conflict.
 - **Secretariat:** The Secretariat is a group of support personnel led by the Executive Secretary and working for the Forum Chair and Deputy. The role of the Secretariat is to focus on the development of key elements of the forum’s discussions into visualisations, planning documents and other output. The Secretariat may also be called on to support and manage the development of reports, messages and communications that the CSR and Information Advisor will deliver to external organisations and individuals.
 - **Information Management Team:** Supports the Forum Chair by ensuring that IT tools and capabilities are used effectively through the provision of Knowledge Management procedures and technical assistance.
- **Core Staff Advisors:**
 - **Evaluation Advisor:** Provides the Forum Chair with advice on the design and implementation of monitoring and evaluation efforts ensuring that it is possible to assess progress and success with respect to the intervention.

- **Information Advisor:** Provides the Forum Chair with advice on issues concerning the information environment, co-ordinates the development of the Information Strategy, and provides the spokesperson of the Coalition, including media advice to the Forum Chair and to the IIF⁷.
- **Knowledge Development (KD) Advisor:** Provides the Forum Chair with advice related to the use of systems analysis as a tool to support IIF decision-making. This advisor interprets the discussions and conclusions of the Forum to the Knowledge Development support cell and provides the IIF with access to the knowledge base and KD⁸ products.
- **Logistics Coordinator:** Provides the Forum Chair with advice related to regional logistics infrastructure and capabilities and facilitates co-ordination with relevant stakeholders.
- **Subject Matter Experts:** Whilst expertise will be resident within the Functional Groups and can therefore be drawn on by the representatives, it may also be necessary to include individuals with specific expertise (i.e. Security Sector Reform, Humanitarian Relief, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation, etc.) within the forum itself.
- **‘Risk Management Team’:** The forum may benefit from inclusion of a ‘Risk Management Team’, responsible for assessing potential risks and mitigation strategies while also challenging any external bias and cultural norms within the forum. This team may be formed using members of the forum.

⁷ In MNE 5, the Coalition Information Strategy and Information Adviser concepts are examined as part of the Coalition Information Strategy/Information Operations Focus Area.

⁸ In MNE 5, the Knowledge Development (KD) and KD adviser concepts are examined as part of the Knowledge Development Focus Area.

FUNCTIONS

15. The IIF will be responsible for the following 6 functions:

- a. Assist and Understand.
- b. Receive and Review.
- c. Develop and Enable.
- d. Coordinate and Engage.
- e. Evaluate.
- f. Report, Review and Refine.

16. Assist and Understand. In the initial stages of any crisis the IIF may not have been deployed and is unlikely to be fully formed. However, the nucleus of the IIF (to include the CSR, at a minimum) should attend or participate in the Strategic Forum's⁹ planning in order to support it and gain an in-depth understanding of the higher-level intent and concerns, which they will then be able to bring to the in-region level. Once formed, the IIF will assist the evolution of the higher level strategy through the provision of in-region knowledge and functional expertise. Much of this will come from the functional groups but be coordinated by the IIF. In order to ensure purposeful dialogue in the IIF it will be important for the Forum Chair/CSR, Deputy Forum Chair and Core Team to prepare a thorough "game plan" for the work of the IIF before the forum comes together for the implementation planning functions that follow.

17. Receive and Review. The IIF will receive direction and guidance from the Coalition Strategic Forum. The precise depth and format of this direction will be refined by the MNISP focus area within MNE 5. At present the intention is that it will be encapsulated within the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy¹⁰. This will include:

- Summary of key findings within the Coalition Strategic Assessment
- The Strategic Vision
- The Transition-State
- The Strategic Objectives
- The Strategic Road Map including a description and visualization of the Strategic Forum's prioritization and sequencing of the Strategic Objectives
- Risk Assessment
- The estimated timescale and time constraints for the intervention
- A broad indication of the resources allocated for the intervention
- Authority for the establishment of the IIF and its leadership and other such coordination mechanisms as required
- The Coalition Information Objectives¹¹

⁹ Described within the MNE 5 Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning Guide (French Joint Center for Concepts Doctrine and Experimentation: 15)

¹⁰ See MNE 5 Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning Guide for detail (French Joint Center for Concepts Doctrine and Experimentation: 15)

¹¹ Information Objectives are decisive conditions in the information environment. They should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and/or effects.

- Initial assessment guidelines to guide IIF evaluation of progress towards the strategic objectives and transition state.

Once received, the IIF will review the direction and strategic assessment of the situation, add greater levels of detail from within the region and review the validity of the Strategic Forum's assumptions based on the reality on the ground. It is likely that this review will cause some iteration of the strategy, of resource allocation and of expectations to ensure that the strategic objectives are clear and achievable. In addition to enabling the implementation planning process, the strategic assessment of the situation will form part of the baseline for subsequent evaluation as it describes the situation before the beginning of the intervention. The final agreed Coalition Comprehensive Strategy may then be formally re-issued by the Strategic Forum.

18. Develop and Enable. Having received the final agreed Coalition Comprehensive Strategy, the IIF will conduct its primary function, that of developing the strategic direction into an in-region multinational, interagency Framework Plan.

- a. **Focus.** The primary focus within the Strategic Forum is on the identification, prioritisation, resourcing and delivery of the strategic objectives; the IIF on the Coalition's desired outcomes. The Strategic Forum and IIF structures are both designed to facilitate multi-organisation planning for the development of a shared plan at the Strategic or Implementation levels, respectively. During the more detailed planning of activities and programs, it is envisioned that planning takes place within individual organisations that will each develop and manage their own plans. At this stage, the IIF will become a coordination and integration forum with two primary functions. The first of those functions is to enable coherent planning and connectedness across the various organisations within the functional groups through information sharing and dialogue. The second function is to ensure that activities planned and implemented by Coalition and partner organisations in the field are, as much as possible, aligned with or linked to Coalition outcomes and can contribute to the achievement of the Coalition's Strategic Objectives and Transition State.
- b. **Development of the Framework Plan.** The Framework Plan is an outcome-focused plan that is jointly developed and owned by various Coalition and partner organisations. Developing the multinational interagency framework plan will demand that the IIF refine the strategic assessment into a more detailed analysis of the situation and of its implications, including logistic issues and constraints, in order to confirm or create a "theory of conflict" that describes how the various key issues within the conflict influence each other leading to and sustaining the current crisis¹². Once an understanding of the conflict is developed, the IIF will develop a set of outcomes that need to be achieved in order to achieve the strategic objectives, as described in the CCS. In doing this, it is expected that there will be a constant (and two-way) flow of information between the IIF and the Strategic Forum, and that the outcomes for the Coalition intervention will need to be approved by the Strategic Forum before planning proceeds further. The IIF will need to maintain constant dialogue with the organisations within the functional groups through their representatives in the IIF to ensure that the expertise within

¹² Examples of theories of conflict can be found in Annex C.

the functional groups informs the IIF planning process. Organisations within the functional groups are likely to be conducting planning in parallel and this cross-flow of information will inform both the IIF and organisational planning processes. Inter-dependencies, relative priority and intended sequencing between outcomes must be agreed by the IIF within the constraints identified in the CCS. The outcomes developed should explicitly address how Coalition efforts will eventually transition to the host nation and other actors; the Transition State in the CCS should be consulted for this work. To facilitate later implementation and evaluation, the Framework Plan should clearly describe two levels of “theories of change”¹³. Firstly, an “intervention theory of change”¹⁴, that will describe the overarching logic behind how and why the intervention as a whole is expected to change the conflict environment over time. The intervention theory of change should be developed by, or in close coordination with the Strategic Forum. Secondly, an “approach theory of change”¹⁵, that will explain how and why the proposed approach, in terms of sequenced outcomes is expected to achieve the strategic objectives in the CCS. The approach theory of change should be developed by the IIF. It will also be critical to prepare for monitoring and evaluation through the identification of outcome-oriented indicators¹⁶ of progress. Indicators should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely. In addition, resources will need to be identified to carry out data collection, monitoring, management and evaluation tasks during the intervention; it is envisaged that the evaluation adviser resident within the forum will assist in these efforts. The Framework Plan should include:

- An explanation of the intervention theory of change
- A set of prioritised and sequenced outcomes including explicit consideration of how Coalition efforts will be transitioned to host nations or other actors
- A description of the interdependencies between outcomes
- An indication of the organisations that will likely implement activities and programs that will be aligned with or linked to Coalition outcomes and can contribute to the achievement of the Coalition’s Strategic Objectives and Transition State
- An explanation of the approach theory (or theories) of change
- A set of outcome-oriented indicators to help determine progress toward, or achievement of, outcomes
- Feasible data collection methodology for outcome-oriented indicators

¹³ Theory of change: an articulation of the assumptions that link a program’s [in this case, an intervention’s] inputs and activities to the attainment of the desired ends. A set of beliefs about how and why an initiative will work to change the conflict. (OECD/DAC: 9). As such it draws not only on the assumptions made within the planning process but will also draw on the underlying theory of conflict held by the planners. These ideas are rarely articulated yet often exert a hidden influence on the planning process.

¹⁴ Examples of intervention theories of change can be found in Annex D.

¹⁵ Examples of approach theories of change can be found in Annex D.

¹⁶ Indicator: Signal that reveals progress (or lack thereof) towards objectives; means of measuring what actually happens against what has been planned in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. An indicator is a quantitative or qualitative variable that provides a simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. (UNDP: 43)

- The Coalition Information Strategy¹⁷ including an explanation of how it is to be implemented
- An estimate of the logistics feasibility of the plan.

c. Endorsement. Once complete, the draft Framework Plan will be copied to the Strategic Forum for their endorsement. As the Strategic Forum should have been engaged iteratively throughout the implementation planning process, this is not intended to be a detailed staffing and authorisation process but a simple check to confirm that the strategic intent has not been changed during implementation planning.

d. Activity and Program Planning. The Framework Plan as developed by the IIF and approved by the Strategic Forum provides a common point of departure and coordination for Coalition and partner organisations that will plan and implement activities in the conflict region. At this stage, the focus of planning is on how individual organisations will conduct activities, transforming their organisations inputs into desired outputs. Although activity and program planning will be conducted within individual organisations, this planning will normally require information from across a number of organisations and hence close liaison will continue to be required in order to ensure coherence and connectedness across organisations and activities.

(1) IIF Role. During the development of the Framework Plan, it is expected that Functional Group representatives will be able to identify (through coordination within their functional groups) which organisations will likely conduct activities and implement programs that are aligned with or linked to outcomes in the Coalition Framework Plan. During the activity and program planning phase, the IIF, through the Functional Group representatives, will sponsor and facilitate multi-organisation focus groups to encourage dialogue and coordination across organisations that plan to implement programs in the conflict region. This dialogue should assist organisations to identify areas where programs may be interdependent with or conflict with other organisations programs based on common program goals, audiences, customers, resources, etc. The organisations invited to participate in these focus groups will include Coalition and partner organisations, but will also include other key organisations in the region to include host nation and regional organisations, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and private companies, as appropriate. The IIF will not play an authoritative role in these focus groups, but will work to increase coherence, connectedness and information sharing across implementing organisations. As mentioned earlier, in cases where direct dialogue is not possible or appropriate, the IIF representatives may need to conduct careful appropriate liaison with implementing organisations.

(2) Focus Group Approach. Early focus group meetings will likely aim to assist in the shaping and deconfliction of activity and program plans across various organisations. These early sessions may address fundamental questions that will aid organisations in determining what programs and activities they should

¹⁷ The Information Strategy states the interagency (and multinational) approach across all levers of power to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It provides mission-specific strategic and political guidance for civil and military information activities in support of mission objectives.

pursue and what other organisations intend to do in the conflict region. Some relevant questions for these early sessions may include:

- What problems need to be solved within our common areas of expertise/interest?
- What needs to be done to positively influence the conflict situation?
- What are our organisation's comparative strengths and weaknesses?
- What activities and programs are already being implemented?
- Who is best suited to take on what activities and programs?
- Can we identify some common criteria for prioritising activities and programs?

As activity and program plans are developed by individual organisations, the IIF may sponsor and facilitate focus group meetings that aim to help various organisations to share information, intentions and create synergies, as appropriate. In these meetings the IIF core staff can assist in the facilitation of dialogue to help organisations appreciate dependencies and potential conflicts across their goals and plans.

In addition to enabling coherence across implementing organisations, the IIF will benefit from these focus group meetings as they attempt to identify those planned activities that are well aligned with or linked to Coalition outcomes and can contribute to the achievement of the Strategic Objectives and Transition State. The IIF will also gain an appreciation of areas where various organisation's activities and programs might conflict or interfere with each other, thereby necessitating a review of the Coalition's desired outcomes.

19. Coordinate and Engage. During implementation, the IIF will remain intact, with a primary function of enabling continuous dialogue between implementing organisations in the field. The CSR will be the Coalition's in-region lead for coordination between Coalition, partner and other key organisations and will be supported by the IIF core staff, functional group representatives, advisors and subject matter experts. The CSR will retain a reporting responsibility to the Strategic Forum regarding progress of the Coalition intervention.

a. **Coherence.** The entire Coalition process depends on agreements between individuals and organizations to cooperate and coordinate. A major role of the CSR is to maintain coherence through coordination, consensus-building and continuous awareness of what motivates individuals and organisations to stay engaged in the intervention. Representatives of the functional groups will also have a major role here and must continuously engage with the organisations they represent and the CSR to maintain an appropriate level of coherence and to prevent conflicts or duplication of effort across activities and programs. Focus group meetings, as described above, will continue to be sponsored and facilitated by the IIF during the implementation phase in order to enable dialogue and cooperation in program implementation.

b. **Monitoring**¹⁸. Progress toward the attainment of desired output should be monitored throughout the implementation phase by implementing organisations. The IIF will periodically sponsor and facilitate focus group meetings to discuss progress and shortfalls in program implementation in order to enable information sharing and awareness across various organisations. These focus group discussions will enable the IIF to maintain visibility on developments on the ground, especially from the point of view of non-Coalition organisations.

c. **Update the Framework Plan**. Working together, the IIF in coordination with the functional groups will consider the monitoring feedback from organisations in the field in order to make changes to the framework plan as appropriate at the outcome level. These changes should aim to optimise effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance of the plan and its implementation. The sustainability and impact of implementation efforts should be considered at all stages. A strong role for the host nation is critical in this endeavour. In order to preserve a record of the intervention for future lesson learning and evaluation, it is important that monitoring feedback, as well as decisions regarding changes to the plan, be documented. As in the planning phase, flexibility will be a key to success, as every organisation involved in the intervention will have their own priorities and mandates in mind.

20. Evaluate. During and after the intervention, the IIF should commission a joint¹⁹ evaluation²⁰ of the outcomes and impact of the intervention.

a. **Focus**. The evaluation should have mission-wide focus, rather than a program/project, organization, or sector-specific focus. While the conduct and success of individual programs and projects is important, the real impact of the intervention as a whole cannot be determined by “adding up” the results of several separate efforts. This effort should assess both the policy and practice of the intervention against internationally recognized evaluation criteria and will require a robust metrics framework. The evaluation should be linked to pre-planning conflict analysis work through the theory of conflict and theories of change. Guidance for this evaluation should be provided as part of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy from the Strategic Forum.

b. **The Evaluation Team**. The team chosen to conduct the evaluation must be seen by stakeholders as credible, objective, and competent in order to ensure that evaluation results and recommendations are considered and implemented. Therefore, a mix of personnel both internal and external to the Coalition should be considered to make up the evaluation team. Ensuring that both internal and

¹⁸ **Monitoring**: A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing [development] intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds

(OECD/DAC: 8)

¹⁹ **Joint Evaluation**: An evaluation to which different donor agencies and/or partners participate.

(OECD/DAC: 8)

²⁰ **Evaluation**: The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, [development] efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. (OECD/DAC: 8)

external stakeholders play an oversight role in the evaluation may also help in getting the evaluation results to be thoroughly considered and implemented.

c. **Evaluation Approach.** The evaluation team will consider the overall crisis situation with an eye toward identifying changes in the conflict environment over time, as compared to the conflict analysis baseline that was established before planning began. The team will also consider if and how the desired outcomes of the intervention were achieved. Further, this team will strive to identify whether changes in the environment have occurred because of, in spite of, or in complete isolation from, the Coalition intervention. The team will use this analysis to make judgements about whether the underlying assumptions, or theories of change (at the intervention and approach level), on which the framework plan is based are valid.

d. **Coalition vs. Organization Requirements.** Every organization participating in the Coalition intervention may have its own domestic requirements for evaluation, in addition to shared Coalition requirements. These obligations should be kept in mind when planning and conducting the joint evaluation. Different stakeholders in the evaluation, including the host nation, will have varied interests and agenda with respect to the findings and recommendations of the evaluation which may cause friction within the evaluation team. Both of these considerations necessitate detailed pre-planning and coordination amongst the evaluation partners and participants.

e. **The Evaluation Report.** The evaluation report should articulate findings, draw conclusions and make recommendations for the Coalition leadership. The output of the evaluation process should be documented and/or published to provide a record of the intervention.

21. Report, Review & Refine. The IIF will be responsible for providing reports back to the Strategic Forum and for ensuring that a consistent view is portrayed back to national capitals. The IIF will also review and refine the framework plan as required drawing on the dynamics of the situation, reports from the organisations implementing activities in the field, advice from the evaluation team, and direction from the Strategic Forum.

Annexes:

- A. Local Ownership
- B. Leadership
- C. Example Theories of Conflict
- D. Example Theories of Change
- E. Key Findings from Experimentation
- F. Bibliography
- G. Glossary of Key Terms
- H. Acronym List
- I. Contributing Authors

Annex A – Local Ownership

1. As has been suggested, sustainable solutions can only be generated within the host country. The social contract between the state and the population needs to be regenerated; the role of the intervener therefore is to support the restoration of this contract assisting efforts to generate, or regenerate, the state's legitimacy and competence. The challenge is how to enable this local input and who should provide it.

2. In some cases the state may have failed or be part of the problem, existing power brokers may be benefiting from the conflict and have little interest in its transformation. Similarly civil society may be weak or non-existent and the population divided. In such a fractured situation, whilst the need for local perceptions and priorities remains necessary, there is a very real danger that poorly considered consultation can simply reinforce existing tensions, strengthen existing power balances and undermine attempts to find a sustainable solution.

3. It is therefore impossible to lay down any prescribed process other than reiterating the need for thorough conflict analysis and the importance of constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the approach selected. However the following three models may form the starting point for discussions on the format of engagement between interveners and state.

4. **Weak State.** Where a state is weak and the social contract largely non-existent the IIF and functional groups may need to act as intermediaries between population and state, or elements of the population and the state, enabling the required dialogue to take place through the external interveners as 'objective' third parties.²¹ It is envisaged that each functional group would interact with those elements of society that it was most able to interact with – for example, a security-focused functional group with elements of the host nation military and police forces. The CSR or, where appropriate the representative of an International Organization (e.g. UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, EU Special Representative), would then provide the interaction with the organs of the state.

²¹ The external interveners are of course far from objective, they will come with their own perspectives and interests and any conflict analysis should take these into account.




Figure 5 IIF Interactions in Weak States

5. Recovering State. As the state gains in both legitimacy and competence the IIF becomes less of an intermediary and more of a partner. The functional groups work with representatives of the departments of state to deliver what becomes increasingly the state's strategy for stabilisation and development rather than the externally developed plan. The Coalition Special Representative continues to provide the liaison with the higher echelons of the state. At the same time, the capacity of civil society is developed and the dialogue shifts from taking place through the functional groups to the state's representatives working with the functional groups.




Figure 6 IIF Interactions in Recovering States

6. **Stabilised State.** This process continues until the balance of effort and decision-making moves away from the IIF to the organs of the state; interaction is now principally between state and population. The social contract has been rebuilt but will remain fragile and in need of support. The forum and functional groups take on the role of mentor to the regenerated government.




Figure 7 IIF Interactions in Stabilised States

Annex B – Leadership

INTRODUCTION

1. Conflicts are invariably complex and no single organisation is capable of resolving them in isolation. Potential solutions require the engagement of a broad range of organisations, military and civilian, working coherently together as part of a comprehensive approach. However, these organisations will have different understandings of the problem and different views of what an acceptable solution may look like and how it should be achieved. They will also have different organisational positions and interests. In addition, many of them will not sit within any single hierarchical management structure and would be unwilling to be co-opted into one. The challenge therefore is to harness the efforts of these different organisations into a coherent overall effort that together is capable of addressing the situation.

2. The CIP approach is based upon the idea that organisations choose to take part in the Interagency Implementation Forum (IIF). Whilst some members may be tasked to take part by their hierarchy, the forum is likely to retain a largely voluntary atmosphere. It is unlikely that the IIF will reach consensus on all issues. Disagreements will occur both during the analysis and planning phases and during implementation. These may be exacerbated by the different levels of security clearance that individuals will hold and the differing access to information that this will lead to. Stakeholders may play institutional 'red cards' and some may even withdraw altogether. If unresolved these conflicts may cause the process to stall and fail or to break apart into distinct and probably incoherent activities, which, while they might be individually successful, will also fail to resolve the overall problem. The issue is how to resolve these disagreements and enable the CIP approach to continue. Lessons suggest that an individual needs to be put 'in charge' who can resolve these disagreements, maintain progress and momentum and deliver a coherent and comprehensive approach. There is however a lack of clarity over what 'in charge' means and of the leadership styles and characteristics that this individual will require.

3. This annex outlines a possible model for articulating the authority of those placed 'in charge' of an intervention and suggests ways in which that leader may optimize their authority in order to ensure a coherent overall approach.

RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

4. Being in charge implies a combination of responsibility and authority. In terms of responsibility the person 'in charge' is the one who 'owns' the problem at that level and is responsible for ensuring that all aspects of it are addressed; they are the individual that is, ultimately, responsible for ensuring that the objectives are delivered. In terms of authority it implies the ability to make decisions (and have them carried out) about the problem, the solution or plan, the priorities and the application of resources and capabilities. However not all organisations are willing to cede this level of authority and the reality is that each will devolve different levels of authority in each of these areas to the individual 'in charge'. This leads to a gap between responsibility and authority; the leader is charged with resolving the

problem but without being able to control the means of doing so. Leadership within the CIP concept is therefore about how to close this gap, how to get disparate organisations to work together to solve the problem and how to solve the differences when they arise.

5. It is suggested that there is an inverse relationship between the level of control that the leader retains over decision-making and the level of consensus towards the decision amongst the organisations; where strong centralised control over decision-making is retained by the leader the sense of buy-in and ownership towards that decision decreases. As the complexity of the environment increases there is a tendency for leaders to try to increase their level of control over decision-making. However as complexity increases so does the need for a comprehensive approach and therefore the importance of maintaining cohesion also increases. A tension therefore exists between the desire for control and the need to retain cohesion and buy-in. The manner by which the leader exercises authority will affect this relationship between consensus and control. Some styles will enable a leader to enjoy greater consensus whilst maintaining a higher level of control over decision-making than others and leadership therefore remains pivotal to the effectiveness of any intervention. It is suggested therefore that certain styles of leadership are more effective in achieving this balance between control and cohesion than others and that there are certain leadership characteristics that can help and others that can hinder. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of these styles and characteristics can enhance the effectiveness of the leader and enable the development of a coherent and comprehensive approach.




Figure 8 Control versus Consensus

Annex C -- Example Theories of Conflict

Source: 'Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action' by Fisher, S. Ludin, J. Williams, S Abdi, D. Smith R and Williams S.

Several generic examples of 'theories of conflict' are listed below. More than one of these may apply to any conflict and the theory for a particular conflict should describe how the various key issues within the conflict influence each other leading to and sustaining the current crisis. In doing this aspects of these, and other, generic theories of conflict may drawn on.

- The conflict is caused by genuine problems of inequality and injustice whereby sections of the population are excluded and without mechanisms to address these grievances non-violently resort to violence as the only way to improve their situation.
- The conflict is caused by the presence of easily exploitable assets and is essentially a battle between elites over who controls and is therefore able to exploit these assets.
- The conflict is caused by competition for basic resources. As these shortages begin to bite, individuals group together along, family, clan, religious or ethnic lines to support each other leading increased competition, fear and mistrust between groups that then flares up into violent conflict. This can be exacerbated by a tendency to demonise the other groups.
- The conflict is caused by powerful individuals seeking to gain or maintain their position. These individuals may exploit underlying grievances building up fear and mistrust of 'the others' in order to further their power. This may be accompanied by a deliberate policy of targeted attacks, rape and torture in order to eliminate any voices of reason and force people to choose between extremes.

Annex D -- Example Theories of Change

Source: OECD/DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities, 2007

Intervention Theory of Change Examples:

The left column of the following table contains examples of “intervention theories of change”. The right column contains examples of methods that might be used to realize the theories of change in the left column. Following this table, examples of “approach theories of change” are listed.

Common theories of change

Theory of change	Examples of methods
<i>Individual change:</i> If we transform the consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills of many individuals, we will create a critical mass of people who will advocate peace effectively.	Individual change through training, personal transformation or consciousness-raising workshops or processes; dialogues and encounter groups; trauma healing.
<i>Healthy relationships and connections:</i> Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peacebuilding. If we can break down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups, we will enable progress on key issues.	Processes of intergroup dialogue; networking; relationship-building processes; joint efforts and practical programmes on substantive problems.
<i>Withdrawal of the resources for war:</i> Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will become possible.	Campaigns aimed at cutting off funds/national budgets for war; conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.
<i>Reduction of violence:</i> If we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants and/or their representatives, we will increase the chances of bringing security and peace.	Cease-fires; creation of zones of peace; withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement; introduction of peacekeeping forces/interposition; observation missions; accompaniment efforts; promotion of nonviolent methods for achieving political/social/economic ends; reform of security sector institutions (military, police, justice system/courts, prisons).
<i>Social justice:</i> If we address the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity and security, and peoples’ sense of injury/victimisation, it will reduce the drivers of conflict and open up space for peace.	Long-term campaigns for social and structural change; truth and reconciliation processes; changes in social institutions, laws, regulations, and economic systems.

Theory of change	Examples of methods
<i>Good governance:</i> Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources.	New constitutional and governance arrangements/entities; power-sharing structures; development of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable economic structures; economic development; democratisation; elections and election monitoring; increased participation and access to decision making.
<i>Political elites:</i> If we change the political calculus and perception of interests of key political (and other) leaders, they will take the necessary steps to bring peace.	Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war and increase the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favour of peace; withdraw international support/funding for warring parties.
<i>Grassroots mobilisation:</i> "When the people lead, the leaders will follow." If we mobilise enough opposition to war, political leaders will be forced to bring peace.	Mobilise grassroots groups to either oppose war or to advocate positive action; use of the media; nonviolent direct action campaigns; education/mobilisation effort; organising advocacy groups; dramatic/public events to raise consciousness.
<i>Peace agreements/accords:</i> Some form of political settlement is a prerequisite to peace – we must support a negotiation process among key parties to the conflict and violence.	Official negotiations among representatives of key parties; "track 1½" and "track 2" dialogues among influential persons; civil society dialogues in support of negotiations.
<i>Economic action:</i> People make personal decisions, and decision makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards/incentives and punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war-making, we can bring peace.	Use of government or financial institutions to change supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and reward systems; boycotts and embargoes.
<i>Public attitudes:</i> War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.	TV and radio programmes that promote tolerance; modelling tolerant behaviour; symbolic acts of solidarity/unity; dialogue among groups in conflict, with subsequent publicity.
<i>Transitional justice:</i> Societies that have experienced deep trauma and social dislocation need a process for handling grievances, identifying what happened, and holding perpetrators accountable. Addressing these issues will enable people to move on to reconstruct a peaceful and prosperous society.	Truth and reconciliation commissions; criminal prosecutions and war crimes tribunals; reparations; community reconciliation processes; traditional rites and ceremonies; institutional reforms.
<i>Community reintegration:</i> If we enable displaced people (IDPs/refugees) to return to their homes and live in relative harmony with their neighbours, we will contribute to security and economic recovery.	Negotiation and problem solving to enable returns; intergroup dialogue; ex-combatant-community engagement; processes for handling land claims; trauma healing.

Figure 9 Theory of Change Examples

Approach Theory of Change Examples:

- By establishing a new community-level mechanism for handling a range of dispute types, we will contribute to keeping the peace and avoiding incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious violence.
- By creating inclusive structures for community problem solving, we can improve communication, respect, and productive interactions among subgroups in the community, and improve the access of disenfranchised groups to decision making.
- By involving Group A and Group B in mutual discussions, we can develop the conditions for the safe, successful and peaceful return of IDPs to their homes. This, in turn, will promote reintegration, stabilization of the environment and will reverse one of the negative consequences of the conflict.
- If we provide people with better skills for conflict resolution, this will increase the ability of communities to settle disputes non-violently and reduce the likelihood of violence.
- If we develop activities that provide economic benefits to both ethnic communities (economic interdependence), people will have incentives to resist efforts to incite violence.
- If we can improve administration and service delivery and establish non-discriminatory policies, this will reduce inter-ethnic tensions and demonstrate the viability of a multi-ethnic country.

Annex E – Key Findings from Experimentation

Key findings from experimentation in MNE 5 on the CIP/CIME concept are listed below. Descriptions of the experiment venues and detailed analysis of the key findings can be found in the full analysis reports from the experiments listed. Copies of analysis reports can be obtained by contacting any of the primary authors listed on page 'i' of this document.

MNE 5 UK CIP Limited Objective Experiment (LOE), July 2007

- The CIP concept offers strengths that no current planning process possesses.
- A suitable facilitation capability is essential for CIP to succeed.
- Groups require a separate leader and facilitator.
- All groups produced an adequate plan within the time constraints, however the development group was judged to have produced the most complete plan; the diplomatic group the least complete.
- The approaches adopted by the development and diplomatic groups produced a richer analysis of the situation than the military approach.
- Existing planning approaches should be used for guidance to develop a bespoke approach rather than being applied prescriptively.
- Language difficulties can hamper inclusive dialogue; breaking into smaller groups can mitigate this to a certain extent.
- The non-verbal cues used by facilitators are as important as verbal cues.
- Perceptions matter and it is important that members of planning groups feel that they have had a genuine opportunity to influence both the approach taken and the outputs themselves if buy-in is to be achieved.
- The CIP concept offers strengths that no current planning process possesses.

MNE 5 UK/US CIP/CIME Limited Objective Experiment (LOE), October 2007

- The benefits of participating in a CIP forum were judged to outweigh the costs.
- Chair and Facilitation are separate and necessary roles; the inclusion of a Scribe to assist the Facilitator is strongly supported.
- Key attributes of the Chair include intelligence, inclusiveness, openness and the ability to listen.
- The Facilitation role enhanced group cohesion and acceptance of the resulting plan.
- Facilitators should have suitable experience of the tools and techniques required for stabilisation planning in addition to standard facilitation skills.

- The use of a metrics framework enhances understanding of evaluation terms and enables a fuller and richer set of measures to be developed.
- The OECD-DAC evaluation criteria form a useful checklist of principles during the planning process.
- The early introduction of MPICE into the planning process inhibited creativity.
- The utility of MPICE was misunderstood by participants and the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria experimental treatment did not have the effect that it intended.
- The participants overwhelmingly felt they needed to be collocated for the forum to work effectively during the initial planning phase.
- A member of the group should have specific skills in visualisation techniques; and may require the use of additional visualisation tools.

CIP/CIME Major Integrating Event, Sweden, April 2008

- An iterative process allowing dynamic and frequent interactions between planning and decision-making levels could be an effective way of conveying and adapting the strategic intent to the realities of the field.
- Strategic guidance that is too detailed may hamper subsequent planning efforts.
- It was inconclusive whether the intent from the strategic forum ran clearly through the planning process.
- The intra-forum dialogue enabled participants to express their organization's needs, understand the issues concerning other participating organizations in their forums and to feel they were a part of the decision making process.
- Well prepared core forum staff greatly assisted the development of purposeful dialogue.
- Inter-forum dialogue was judged to be insufficient for the purpose of activity planning and coordination.
- The CIP concept did not identify a mechanism for including the views and influence of high impact actors who are unwilling to be seen as being involved in the forums.
- The movement of participants between groups, in particular the movement of Coalition Special Representative (CSR) from strategic to implementation forums and the transfer of staff from IIF to AP&C Groups, allows for essential knowledge transfer between groups.
- The contents of the products specified in the concept were seen to be too cumbersome and detailed.
- Each level of planning tended to involve details more appropriately considered by the level below.

- The concept of “end state” was a source of confusion and discussions rather than a means to clearly convey the Strategic Forum’s intent.
- The term ‘End State’ was considered inappropriate by many non-military participants.
- The linkages between conflict analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation are made stronger if the assumptions and logic behind the strategic and implementation plans are explicitly documented.
- Generic metrics frameworks assist planners in the identification of appropriate indicators of progress.
- Planning for monitoring and evaluation is enabled by inclusion of an evaluation adviser in the planning group.
- A series of key competencies for core staff were identified that should be used when selecting and training personnel for CIP-type forums.
- The Core Leadership Team drives and shapes the interactions of the IIF. This team was involved in a high proportion of the interactions.
- The role of ‘facilitator’ is not neutral, as defined by professional facilitators.
- The term “scribe” does not encompass the skills and responsibilities of the role.
- The requirement for general administrative assistance should not be overlooked and it is essential that these administrative functions are provided to support forum members.
- Coordination between AP&C Groups as envisaged in the concept is not scalable beyond 2 AP&C Groups.
- Subgroups often form around functional areas. Frequency of interaction is driven by functional task.
- Cultural differences were observed among participants who represented organizations with missions that have different time horizons (i.e. short term humanitarian relief priorities versus long term development priorities).
- Participants indicated that differences in language, national and organizational cultures were not important barriers to information sharing in this event.
- The main barrier when using the Information Exchange Architecture and Technology is attitudes and willingness to share information rather than technical limitations.
- A Coalition Information Strategy is considered essential for coalition crisis management activities within a Comprehensive Approach.
- Knowledge Development is generally suited to support the cooperative implementation planning processes of the IIF and AP&C Groups.
- Knowledge Development was able to enhance the operational understanding of the IIF and AP&C Group members.

- The Shared Information Framework and Technology (SHIFT) solution showed the potential for its users to operate on at least the deconflicted level of interaction maturity.
- The technical support developed and provided using the Service Oriented Architecture supported the basic needs of the IIF and AP&C Groups.
- The experiment construct was judged to be suitable to explore the CIP construct and most of the enabling focus area study issues. The experiment was not designed to conduct a complete examination of all of the CIME study issues.
- The experiment did not permit a conclusive examination of EBAO conceptual linkages with the CIP/CIME concept other than the transfer of the supporting effects and activity elements of the Implementation Framework Plan.

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Annex G -- Glossary of Key Terms

Activity: Actions taken or work performed that translates inputs into outputs. Set within organisations' activity or program planning processes.

Evaluation: The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, [development] efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. (OECD/DAC: 8)

Indicator: Signal that reveals progress (or lack thereof) towards objectives; means of measuring what actually happens against what has been planned in terms of quantity, quality and timeliness. An indicator is a quantitative or qualitative variable that provides a simple and reliable basis for assessing achievement, change or performance. (UNDP: 43)

Information Strategy: The Information Strategy states the interagency (and multinational) approach across all levers of power to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It provides mission-specific strategic and political guidance for civil and military information activities in support of mission objectives.

Input: The financial, human and material resources used for the activity or intervention. Set within organisations' activity or program planning processes.

Joint Evaluation: An evaluation to which different donor agencies and/or partners participate. (OECD/DAC: 8)

Knowledge Development (KD): A process that facilitates the acquisition, exchange, and integration of knowledge from various sources in an effort to enable more effective conduct of operations. It is a continuous, adaptive, and networked activity that helps civilian decision-makers / military commanders and their staffs gain Situational Awareness/Situational Understanding of the operational environment by describing and modelling the composition, context, and functionality of that environment. Systems Analysis is the centrepiece and core process of KD

Monitoring: A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing [development] intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds (OECD/DAC: 8)

Outcome: An outcome is the intended or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs, usually requiring the collective effort of partners. Outcomes represent changes in conditions which occur between the completion of outputs and the achievement of impact.

Output: The intended immediate result, product, goods or services that result from an activity. The output may be physical or more cognitive affecting attitudes and behaviour. The actual outcome of the activity may however not be as intended due to inaccurate information, false assumptions and the impact of external influences. Set within organisations' activity or program planning processes.

Strategic Objectives: Descriptions of the situation as key obstacles in the achievement of the transition state are overcome. The realisation of the strategic objectives indicates the achievement of the transition state and will usually require the involvement of several arms of government. Set within the strategic planning process.

Strategic Vision: A description of the situation in broad terms once "success" in terms of the Coalition's political objectives has been achieved. While it provides the long-term perspective for the Coalition effort, it is usually too far-reaching to enable multinational interagency planning processes. Set within the strategic planning process.

Theory of change: an articulation of the assumptions that link a program's [or an intervention's] inputs and activities to the attainment of the desired ends. A set of beliefs about how and why an initiative will work to change the conflict. (OECD/DAC: 9). As such it draws not only on the assumptions made within the planning process but will also draw on the underlying theory of conflict held by the planners. These ideas are rarely articulated yet often exert a hidden influence on the planning process.

Transition State: Threshold where the situation is sustainable enough to autonomously evolve toward the strategic vision. The description of the transition state should be rich in context and content and must take into account the specificities of the situation and address the causes of the conflict. Whilst coalition engagement may continue beyond the transition state, it marks a fundamental shift in the nature of coalition's engagement. It is expected that the transition state will be attained by the achievement of the Strategic Objectives.

Annex H – Acronyms

AP&C	Activity Planning and Coordination
CCS	Coalition Comprehensive Strategy
CIME	Cooperative Implementation Management and Evaluation
CIP	Cooperative Implementation Planning
CSR	Coalition Special Representative
EU	European Union
IIF	Interagency Implementation Forum
KD	Knowledge Development
LOE	Limited Objective Experiment
MNE 5	Multinational Experiment 5
MNISP	Multinational Interagency Strategic Planning
OECD/DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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