The United States and the British Commonwealth in Korea, 1950-53: A Critical Study of the Origins of Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations
Abstract
Future American military operations, be they high-intensity combat, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, or otherwise, are likely to require multinational contributions. This requirement is due to several possible considerations, to include limited American military resources or the need to demonstrate legitimacy for an operation through international participation. America's first opportunity to lead a coalition as a superpower occurred during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Its coalition faced a war it did not want. Additionally, the coalition included multinational components that were not necessarily familiar with each other's operational practices and tactics. Finally, the coalition made war by employing limited means to achieve limited ends. These criteria are likely to exist at the outset of future coalition operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations is the United States military's doctrinal foundation for the conduct of coalition operations. The Harry S. Truman administration did not have doctrine in 1950 to guide its conduct as a coalition leader. Therefore, this thesis seeks to identify the influence of the American experience in building and leading a coalition in Korea on current doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 13, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA599146
Entities
People
- Matthew D. Marfongelli
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College