

THE RISE OF CHINA IN THE CARIBBEAN: IMPACTS
FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

ROHAN F. JOHNSON, MAJ, JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE
B.S., University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 2004
M.S., University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 2008

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-02

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-12-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2013 – DEC 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Rise of China in the Caribbean: Impacts for Regional Security			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Johnson, Rohan F., Major			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The People's Republic of China (PRC) intensified its relations with Caribbean states in recent years. The Caribbean community is now embracing a growing and purposeful Chinese presence utilizing all the elements of "soft power" and instruments of national power-diplomacy, military assistance, and economic development to strengthen its strategic alliances within the region. The expansion of China may undermine United States (US) geopolitical dominance in the Basin which has the potential to create gaps in the areas of traditional security cooperation such as border security, law enforcement, military affairs and security policy and strategies. In the context of US geopolitical interests and Caribbean security, this study seeks to explore China's motives and ascertain whether any gradual erosion of US geopolitical influence in the region may affect longstanding assistance and cooperation in treating with traditional and current non-traditional threats to Caribbean security; specifically transnational criminal organizations and terrorist networks Does China pose a realistic threat to the U.S. in the region? Will current trends pose a conceptual or realistic challenge to the existing balance of security in the Caribbean Basin?					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Soft Power, Geopolitics, Transnational Organized Crime, Caribbean Security, CARICOM, China, National Security, US					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	98	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Rohan F. Johnson

Thesis Title: The Rise of China in the Caribbean: Impacts for Regional Security

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Peter R. Scheffer, Jr., M.A.

_____, Member
Joseph G. Babb, Ph.D.

_____, Member
David Seigel, M.S., M.M.A.S.

Accepted this 13th day of December 2013 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE RISE OF CHINA IN THE CARIBBEAN: IMPACTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY, by Major Rohan F. Johnson, 98 pages.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) intensified its relations with Caribbean states in recent years. The Caribbean community is now embracing a growing and purposeful Chinese presence utilizing all the elements of "soft power" and instruments of national power-diplomacy, military assistance, and economic development to strengthen its strategic alliances within the region.

The expansion of China may undermine United States (US) geopolitical dominance in the Basin which has the potential to create gaps in the areas of traditional security cooperation such as border security, law enforcement, military affairs and security policy and strategies.

In the context of US geopolitical interests and Caribbean security, this study seeks to explore China's motives and ascertain whether any gradual erosion of US geopolitical influence in the region may affect longstanding assistance and cooperation in treating with traditional and current non-traditional threats to Caribbean security; specifically transnational criminal organizations and terrorist networks.

Does China pose a realistic threat to the US in the region? Will current trends pose a conceptual or realistic challenge to the existing balance of security in the Caribbean Basin?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to the many individuals who motivated, encouraged, supported and challenged me throughout the writing of this Thesis. The journey was an immense learning experience which brought home certain realities regarding the confined space of our international relations. Among those who helped me to span the gap from the Caribbean to the United States and all the way to China, and to whom I give all the credit for my successful completion are my Thesis Committee Chair and advisors; Mr. Peter Scheffer, Mr. David Seigel and Dr. Joseph Babb. I would also like to thank wholeheartedly the extended staff of the Graduate Degree Program; Dr. Robert Baumann, Dr. Constance Lowe and Mrs. Venita Krueger. I received great support and advice from my Thesis Seminar instructor Mr. Nathaniel Stevenson and I thank the librarians and staff at the Combined Arms Research Library; especially Mr. Michael Browne and Mrs. Susan Fowler-the Copyright Coordinator. The task would have been much more difficult if I did not have the motivation and positive attitude of the special group of students in Staff Group 2A of ILE Class 13-02. I thank them for the climate of camaraderie and friendship that they provided. I must single out my Thesis Chair for a special acknowledgement as he is the epitome of selflessness and sagacity. He guided with skillful alacrity, great insight and tremendous understanding, and to him I owe a great debt of gratitude. Finally, I thank my wife, Simone and son, Mathieu for the invaluable support they always gave and the sacrifices they endured as I focused on the project. They were my strength and strongest motivators and I give all thanks to the Heavenly Father for their purposes in my life and His Will to see me through.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	x
TABLES	xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Introduction.....	1
Primary Research Question	3
Secondary Questions.....	3
Significance	4
Assumptions.....	5
Definition of Key Terms.....	5
Limitations and Delimitations	8
Contextual Framework	8
The Caribbean	8
Geopolitics and US Policy in the Caribbean.....	12
China’s Expansion in the Caribbean.....	14
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	18
Literature Focusing on Current Challenges to Caribbean Security	18
Literature Addressing US and Caribbean Relations–Emerging Trends	23
Literature and Research on Chinese and Caribbean Relations–Emerging Trends	31
Literature and Research on the Implications of ‘Soft Power’	37
Literature and Research on the Model of Interest and Identity Formation.....	41
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	45
The Estimate	45
Strategy, Power and Influence	46

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	52
Strategic Direction	52
US Policy towards China	52
US Policy towards the Caribbean	53
China’s Policy Towards the US	55
China’s Policy Towards the Caribbean.....	57
Caribbean Policy Towards the US	60
Caribbean Policy Towards China	64
Summary of Inputs for Strategic Analysis.....	65
Assessment Challenges and Opportunities	66
Major Strategic Challenges	66
Potential Opportunities	69
Summary of Interests and Objectives	71
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	74
Findings	74
End State	76
Summary of Security Environment	76
Strategic Direction	77
Major Challenges	79
Potential Opportunities	80
Recommendation	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY	82

ACRONYMS

AOR	Area of Operations
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CDB	China Development Bank
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
COA	Course of Action
COCOM	Combatant Commander
CRS	Congressional report Service
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic
DOD	Department of Defense
Ex/Im	Export/Import
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FY	Financial Year
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICBC	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Program
JP	Joint Publication
LAC	Latin American and the Caribbean
NADR	Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
NSC	National Security Council

OAS	Organization of American States
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
PRC	People's Republic of China
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
TBI	Third Border Initiative
TCN	Transnational Criminal Network
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. The Caribbean.....	10
Figure 2. Main Global Cocaine Flows 2008	20
Figure 3. US Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, FY 1946-2010	26
Figure 4. Sub-regional Distribution of the FY 2013 Request	29
Figure 5. Regional Distribution of US Assistance, FY 2008 and FY 2012	30
Figure 6. Comparison of Chinese and Western Bank Loans to Latin America	32
Figure 7. Model of Identity and Interest Formation.....	44
Figure 8. Dynamics of Power.....	50

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. US Assistance to the Caribbean.....	28
Table 2. Summary of Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean 2005-2007	34
Table 3. China Bank Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean by sector.....	35
Table 4. Taiwan’s Official Relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean.....	40
Table 5. Input, Questions, Sources	65
Table 6. Table of Interests, Power, and COAs.....	71

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Chronic wrong doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

— The Roosevelt Corollary, “United States Becomes a World Power Policing the Caribbean and Central America”

Introduction

The Caribbean Region has historically been considered the ‘backyard’ of the United States (US) and by extension, a key focus of US strategic geopolitical policy and influence ever since President James Monroe articulated the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This doctrine asserted the right of the US to be the sole foreign power with authority to intervene in the affairs of Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ The Roosevelt Corollary was a modern manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine; reinforcing US geopolitical influence in the Western Hemisphere. One author, David Ronfeldt, remarked that the US “converted the Caribbean Basin into a geopolitical and strategic asset for the projection of American Power in the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as for transportation between our East and West coasts.”² Ronfeldt continued to assert that the Caribbean was the cradle from which the US arose to become a world power.

¹Albert B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1916), 9.

²David Ronfeldt, “Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin” (Research Report, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1983), 19.

The sphere of US control and influence in the region has been affirmed on many occasions and is normally reflected in its foreign policy. In 2001, President George W. Bush endorsed the Caribbean Third Border Initiative which was essentially a re-affirmation of the commitment of the US in treating the region as a major focus for foreign policy and national security. This initiative, among other things, targeted programs designed to enhance diplomatic, economic, health, education, law enforcement cooperation, and collaboration with Caribbean nations. While emphasizing that the Caribbean lies on its southern border, it also recognized that this concept was sometimes overlooked, relegating issues such as regional democracy, trade partnerships, health and education in the region to a low priority status in US foreign policy in times when the US did not need to defend its interests from external incursion. Importantly though, the impact of threats to regional security posed by illegal drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and financial crime has always been of sufficient importance for US policy makers to appreciate that they pose more than a *de minimis* threat to US security and interests in the region.

In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) expanded its economic relations with Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.³ In addition to diplomatic and economic activities, China increased cooperation and assistance programs with the region's militaries and has even conducted several high profile military exchange visits in

³Richard L. Bernal, "The Dragon in the Caribbean: China-CARICOM Economic Relations," *Round Table* 99, no. 408 (June 2010): 281-302.

recent times. In the last decade, for the first time in modern history, China deployed military police to the region as part of a United Nations (UN) mission to Haiti.

The greater part of China's expansion within the Caribbean occurred in a period where some analysts have reported a simultaneous shift in US foreign policy away from the region. Even to the casual observer, it is clear that this represented a shift in focus away from hemispheric affairs to one centered around the war on terror and other activities in the Middle East. Even so, the confluence of these two events has given rise to a broad range of issues signaling a period of uncertainty regarding the extent of US interests in the Caribbean.

In the context of regional hemispheric security implications, how does a real or perceived decline in US interest in the Caribbean, and the simultaneous growth in China's relations with almost all of the island states affect current regional security arrangements? Will the expansion of China and the perceived erosion of US geopolitical influence in the Caribbean Region pose any real threat to the current security landscape?

Primary Research Question

What are the implications to regional security posed by the emergence of China as a strategic influence in Caribbean geopolitics?

Secondary Questions

In order to address the research question, the following secondary questions must be answered:

1. What are the current and emerging security threats in the Caribbean Region?

2. What are the current Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) relations and emerging trends between the US and the Caribbean nations?
3. What are the current DIME relations and emerging trends between the PRC and the Caribbean nations?
4. What are the most likely and most dangerous courses of action for China with respect to Caribbean and US security?
5. What are the most likely and most dangerous US courses of action in response to China's growing influence?

Significance

As the relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Caribbean states intensifies, to include substantial growth in cooperation with the region's militaries over the last decade, the Caribbean Community continues to embrace this new and purposeful China. The PRC has utilized mainly 'soft power' through the instruments of national power—diplomacy, information, military and economic means to strengthen its strategic alliances within the region. China's outreach underscores its leveraging of influence in the hemisphere and the resultant weakening of the sphere of power and influence historically exercised by the US.

This trend may have implications to long-standing security cooperation between Caribbean states and the US in areas such as border security, intelligence sharing, law enforcement, military affairs and joint security policies and strategies. Over the years, the regional security apparatus has matured in many respects and has been able to engage most significant threats to regional security through its national and regional

arrangements, and with significant US cooperation and support. The efforts have been concentrated to fight the growth of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and to deter the potential for the development of terrorist networks and safe havens.

This study seeks to explore the motives for China's surge in interest in the region and to determine whether any gradual erosion or deterioration of US geopolitical influence may impact US and Caribbean relations to the extent that it affects current strategies geared toward dealing with threats to regional security.

Assumptions

The most significant assumption of this study is that a threat to Caribbean security translates directly as a threat to US national security. This relates to the region's close proximity to the Southern border of the US and the potential regional vulnerability to the terrorist networks and transnational criminal activities.

Definition of Key Terms

The following terms will be used throughout the study:

CARICOM: Group of states forming the Caribbean Community.⁴

Foreign Policy: A policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations. It is designed to achieve national objectives.⁵

⁴CARICOM is the regional organization of the group of Caribbean nations that are party to the revised treaty of Chaguaramas. The Treaty established the Caribbean Single Market and Economy.

⁵Dictionary.com, "Foreign Policy," <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/foreign+policy?s=t> (accessed 16 October 2013).

Geopolitics: This will be defined as the study of the influence of factors such as geography, economics, and demography on the politics and foreign policy of a state.⁶

Hirschman's Influence Effect: The influence effect is defined as the level of dependence, power and domination that can arise out of trade relations.⁷

Monroe Doctrine: This doctrine asserted the right of the US to be the sole foreign power with authority to intervene in the affairs of Latin America and the Caribbean.

National Instruments of Power: All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”⁸

National Security: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations, specifically the condition provided by a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; a favorable foreign relations position; or a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, covert or overt.⁹

⁶Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Geopolitics.”

⁷Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), chaps 1, quoted by David Siddhartha Patel, <http://www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/hir1.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2013).

⁸Bernal, “The Dragon in the Caribbean,” 174.

⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 244.

National Security Strategy: A document approved by the appropriate governing authority for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.¹⁰

Security: “The protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from external military attack and coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values.”¹¹

Soft Power: The term ‘soft power’ is defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”¹²

Transnational Organized Crime: This research adopts the United Nation’s implied definition which encompasses virtually all profit-motivated serious criminal activities with international implications.¹³

¹⁰The definition used incorporates aspects of the US DOD definition found in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).

¹¹Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993).

¹²Joseph S Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), XI.

¹³It is important to note that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) does not have a precise definition of Transnational Organized Crime (TCO). This is to allow for a broader application of the Organized Crime Convention to new types of crime that may emerge in the constantly changing global criminal landscape over time.

Limitations and Delimitations

The short time available to conduct the research will pose the most significant limitation. As such, the study will narrow its focus on existing data readily available through the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) and other online sources. Additionally, important information on China's national security strategy and specific aspects of foreign policy may not be easily accessible due to China's 'non-liberal' policy on information.

The study shall limit itself to the Caribbean Region with only limited relevant references to the larger Latin American bloc of countries. That is to say, it will not concern itself with the more widely discussed security challenges intrinsic to South and Central America unless they directly or indirectly impact Caribbean Regional Security. The security of the US and its Homeland Security will be considered to the extent that a threat to the Southern border of the US translates directly as a threat to Caribbean security.

Contextual Framework

The Caribbean

The area termed Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) comprises a number of sub-regional groups, namely: Mexico; Central America (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama); the Caribbean (12 countries); South America, which comprises the Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru), and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) plus Chile

(see figure 1).¹⁴ For the purpose of this study, only those 13 small independent states concentrated in the Caribbean along with 2 from South America will be examined.¹⁵

This group of island states is typically classified as small developing states with characteristics uniquely associated with their small sizes. They are particularly vulnerable to global shocks and natural disasters. Thucydides' account of the Melian debate provides some appreciation of the relative puniness of small states and the vulnerabilities associated with their existence in the international system. Indeed, as many proponents of the Realist perspective would argue, the statement by the Athenians that justice depends on who has the power to compel, has credence not only with respect to geographical outlay but also with the condition of a state's self-sufficiency, industrial and technological advancement and overall influence in the world. The Caribbean states boast neither large land masses nor any major influence in world politics, and thus would easily fall into the category of weak states espoused by the Athenians.

Over the years the governments of the Caribbean have resisted attempts to fully integrate into a regional entity and the effects of globalization have had far greater impacts on their weak social and political systems and infrastructure. To some extent the impact on their fledgling economies has helped to perpetuate a kind of dependency

¹⁴Report of the European Commission on Latin America: Regional Programming Document 2007-2013, http://eeas.europa.eu/la/rsp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2013).

¹⁵In this research the Caribbean includes 12 island nations (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Monsterrat, St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago), 2 geographically located on the north coast of South America (Guyana and Suriname), and 1 from Central America (Belize). Guyana, Suriname and Belize have characteristics more common with Caribbean nations and participate in Caribbean regional organizations.

syndrome, especially with their strongest and nearest ally—the United States. According to one analyst, Dr. Thomas P. Barnett, they fall into a category of states outside of the “Functioning Core”¹⁶ representing repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder and chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. Dr. Barnett refers to these parts of the world as the “Non-Integrating Gap.”¹⁷



Figure 1. The Caribbean

Source: U.S. Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY 2013 Appropriations*, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2013).

Note: Central America is pictured in light green and the Caribbean is pictured in dark green.

¹⁶Thomas P. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004).

¹⁷Ibid.

Notwithstanding, this rather unfavorable and arguably inaccurate classification, the importance of the Caribbean in the modern international system predates the end of the Thirty Years War in Central Europe (1618-1648). The region's importance came to fore after the arrival of Christopher Columbus and the European penetration that followed. This heralded an era of human development described as the birth of capitalism and the rise of the New World. The region's close geographical proximity to the World's most powerful nation has ever since been a cause for some geopolitical interest—protection from further intervention from European powers, deterring international communism or spreading capitalism.

By the 1930s the region was steeped in its colonial capitalist regime with the US influence steadily growing. At the end of the Second World War, and as the contest between the East and West intensified, the balance of power continued to shift in favor of the US. During this era the US became more and more concerned with maintaining the status quo within the region, or as it is sometimes referred to, its “backyard.”

The Caribbean after the end of the Cold War, and especially since the horrific terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, gradually and understandably so, retreated to a back seat on the American agenda. The waning of US interest in the region is, however, not a new phenomenon. At different periods in history, the importance of the Caribbean on the American's foreign policy agenda has fluctuated; depending on other global issues and developments. Notwithstanding, the region still remains critically important in the international system based on a simple, geographical fact- its close proximity to arguably, the most powerful country in the world.

Geopolitics and US Policy in the Caribbean

By virtue of its geopolitical proximity, the Caribbean basin lies within the North American Security Zone. As such, the Caribbean has remained a consistent feature in US foreign policy matters relating to security, but even more importantly, the Caribbean enjoys strong economic and diplomatic ties to the northern, hegemonic super power. History, however, shows a fluctuation in levels of US strategic interests in the region depending on the global security climate. The ebb and flow of its foreign policy dynamics has been typically balanced on an appreciation of any positive incursion by other foreign powers assessed as creating vulnerability threats to US homeland security.

From all indications, and indeed, as was expressed in the original Monroe Doctrine directed at European Colonial powers, the protection of US interests in the region precludes a rationale for the use of military force against perceived threats. By and large, and mainly due to the pre-emptive nature of US directed intervention within the Caribbean, the US foreign policy strategy in the region was always preventive and anticipatory. Prima facie, more demonstrative of a policy is to retain primacy in the region while engaging the interests and cooperation of Caribbean states.

In periods of relative stability, with the primacy of the US unchallenged, policy interests would be manifested in routine security within the Caribbean Basin. This state of affairs has tended to change dramatically and swiftly during periods representing attempts to change the status quo. The early and mid-1960s, during the expansion of Soviet power and the attempts by Russia to establish a foothold in Cuba, the US responded with a concerted military response to deter any potential incursion of a Soviet regime in the Caribbean. Two such examples are: the role of the US in the Bay of Pigs

invasion against the Fidel Castro revolutionary government in 1961, and the US Naval blockade around Cuba in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Interests again deteriorated or returned to routine status in the 1970s when the US was deeply engaged in the Vietnam War, and the emerging power vacuum created new geopolitical dynamics. Ronfeldt posits that it motivated the local elites and counter-elites to seek new allies outside their countries; beckoned regional powers—Cuba, Mexico and Venezuela- to become more assertive; attracted the Socialist Internationals from Europe; and introduced into the Basin a new political rivalry between European-based Social Democracy and Christian Democracy, and; it encouraged the Soviet Union to further strengthen Cuban ties.¹⁸

US interest was stimulated by several issues again in the 1970s—the Panama Canal Treaty negotiation, the Nicaraguan Revolution, Haitian refugee escalation and further development of Cuba’s military capabilities. These issues projected an air of relative complacency by the US in the region which in turn created opportunities for extra-regional powers to further entrench themselves in the hemisphere. Again, these changes reinvigorated US attention to regional affairs.

Other significant events over the decades would prompt increased as well as diminished focus as the region competed with other interests on the world stage. The Grenada intervention, the first Persian Gulf War, and more recently the Global War on Terror, were all considered priorities with respect to other matters of international strategic importance of the day. As different challenges arose, the key principles which traditionally underpin US policy in the Caribbean basin focused on securing US presence, power and passage, deterring hostile foreign powers from acquiring military bases and

¹⁸Ronfeldt, vii.

facilities, preventing regional destabilization and dedicating military resources to protecting its interests and assets in the region.¹⁹ These principles preclude new threats from arising in the Caribbean and in many respects represent a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine which emphasize that the US “protect itself by preventing a condition of affairs in which it would be too late to protect itself.”²⁰

China’s Expansion in the Caribbean

With the exception of six Caribbean Islands that still maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), China has strengthened its relationship with every single other Caribbean state. China spent billions of dollars in aid and soft loans to these countries prior to the 2007 Cricket World Cup and over the past decade has invested heavily in areas such as the tourism, infrastructure development, agriculture, training and trade.²¹ While it is difficult to establish the exact quantity, analysts report that foreign, direct investment in the Caribbean by Chinese firms totaled nearly 7 billion US dollars in 2009 which represented an increase of over 300 percent from that of 2004.²²

The rapid expansion of trade and political relations between China and the Caribbean since the beginning of the 21st century has spurred much debate concerning

¹⁹Ibid., v.

²⁰Ronfeldt, vi.

²¹Ezra Fieser, “Why is China Spending Billions in the Caribbean? *Global Post*, 22 April 2011, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/110325/china-caribbean-investment-tourism> (accessed 13 July 2013).

²²Ibid.

China's motive and whether there is an overarching strategic imperative for the PRC to gain economic and political advantages within the region. Bernal suggests that while China's focus is on economic relationships, this aspect of China's involvement cannot be separated from the political dimension and therefore has to be examined in the wider context of the PRC's shifting world view, its super power status, and the "geopolitics in the current global conjecture."²³

From a foreign policy perspective, China's objectives are not easily discernible as there is no official data available that could be considered reliable. However, in 2008, China highlighted its priority within both Latin America and the Caribbean in a policy paper which stated that it was seeking to develop a comprehensive partnership featuring equality, mutual benefits, and common development with countries within the region. Bilateral cooperation for resources and energy, tourism, trade and investment, agriculture, among other areas, were emphasized as being the most important in its foreign policy.²⁴ The paper also mentioned that the country's broader inter-regional diplomacy is to expand relations with Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the US.

The 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) analyzed that China's primary interest in the region was to gain greater access to needed resources such as oil, copper, and iron through increased trade and investment. The report also recognized that Beijing's additional goal was to isolate Taiwan by seeking to have the twelve Latin

²³Bernal, "The Dragon in the Caribbean."

²⁴Odeen Ismael, "China's Influence Growing in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Share* (2009), <http://www.sharenews.com/opinion/2009/07/01/china%E2%80%99s-influence-growing-latin-america-caribbean> (accessed 22 September 2013).

American and Caribbean nations that still hold ties with Taiwan shift their diplomatic recognition to China.²⁵

In 2004, the government of Dominica broke long-held diplomatic relations with Taiwan in recognition of the 'One China' policy and established diplomatic relations with the PRC. In return, the Chinese promised to undertake infrastructure development projects totaling over 100 million US dollars.²⁶ Grenada also received a token appreciation in the way of a 55 million US dollar stadium when it severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2005.²⁷ On the other hand, St. Lucia, after General Elections in 2006, switched recognition to Taiwan in 2007. Within days of the formal diplomatic change, China withdrew its diplomatic corps from the country.²⁸

As China's influence increases within the region, Caribbean states have seemingly embraced the idea of China as a new partner in trade and diplomatic relations. The PRC's policy on non-interference in the affairs of other countries and its 'no strings attached' loan policy have been welcomed by these small economies which view the relationship more in terms of developmental assistance with much less bureaucracy.

²⁵Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, *China's Growing Interest in Latin America*, CRS Report for Congress, 2005, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22119.pdf> (accessed 1 August 2013).

²⁶Sir Ronald Sanders, "China's Presence in Dominica," *Caribbean News Now*, 29 April 2011, <http://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/opinion/389630.html#axzz1L32altQl>. <http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A--China%27s-presence-in-Dominica-6189.html> (accessed 22 September 2013).

²⁷Fieser.

²⁸Daniel Erikson, "China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother," The Jamestown Foundation, 2009, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35848&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=83aaa0f966 (accessed 11 August 2013).

Although the US and Europe remain the region's largest trading partners, in many ways China offers a more attractive trade and investment regime. It is also widely viewed that China's presence comes at an opportune time when there are perceptions of growing neglect and disinterest on the part of the US government, especially over the last decade.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Caribbean states possess a structural feature that is not common to all states in the international system: they are small states in terms of territory and population, as well as in most and in some cases, all–elements of national power and state capacity. This structural feature accentuates their vulnerability.

— Dr. Ivelaw Griffith,

“Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change”

Literature Focusing on Current Challenges to Caribbean Security

This statement by Dr. Ivelaw Griffith sets the tone for understanding the unique nature of the Caribbean security environment. Small states in general, with a few exceptions, possess certain characteristics that make them more vulnerable to security risks—their size and population being the most crucial. Other factors such as small economies, undeveloped social and physical infrastructure and weak political institutions could be considered off-spring of these two former variables. By virtue of the definition of small states having a population of 1.5 million or less, (Jamaica, Cuba and Haiti have larger populations), the whole region is characterized as a system of small states.

The unique vulnerability to risks associated with small states presents them with security challenges which are sometimes beyond the capacity of individual states to address. Primarily, these challenges are in the form of sophisticated, international crimes which flow from powerful and well-financed transnational criminal organizations. The reach of these enterprises far surpass that of individual country borders and typically span a network which includes the US and European regions. Dr. Griffith identified some of the most significant traditional threats as drug-trafficking, money laundering, illegal

weapons' trafficking, corruption of public officials and organized crime.²⁹ When considered on a global platform, many of these challenges would have relatively less impact on overall national security in large, developed states due to robust crime fighting institutions and legal systems. Within the region however, large criminal enterprises overwhelm the internal security apparatus of the individual states; creating environments susceptible to narco-trafficking and drug-related violent crimes, gang warfare, and widespread corruption—in essence, weak and ineffective criminal justice systems.

The security landscape is further compounded by the region's geographical proximity to the United States. The character of transnational criminal networks is such that they are not confined by national borders. In one respect, the spill-over effects of transnational crime will find its way into the porous borders of neighboring countries; the US being no exception. Additionally, and paradoxically, it is the Caribbean's proximity to the US, with the US being the major consumer of illicit drugs in the world, that creates much of the challenges associated with drug-trafficking for the Caribbean states.

The Caribbean lies on the direct transshipment zone from South America to North America. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that in 2008, North America accounted for more than 40 percent of global cocaine consumption. According to the UNODC report, for the North American market, cocaine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central America by sea, and then onwards by land to the US and Canada; with Colombia remaining the main source of the illegal drug

²⁹Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean*.

itself (see figure 2).³⁰ Colombian cocaine destined for the US travels through Jamaica, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and the Bahamas; these countries being largely considered then as “transit zone” countries.




Figure 2. Main Global Cocaine Flows 2008

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), “Drug Trafficking,” <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/> (accessed 24 September 2013).

The US National Security Council (NSC) homepage expresses that “TOC poses a significant and growing threat to national and international security, with implications for

³⁰United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), “Drug Trafficking,” <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/> (accessed 24 September 2013).

public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability.”³¹ There is a recognition that the criminal networks are expanding and are able to penetrate even the most secure democracies. The Security Council indicates that TOCs threaten US economic interests with the potential of crippling world financial systems through subversion, exploitation, and distortion of legitimate trade and economic markets. There is also the nexus between TOCs and terrorist networks, which indicates that terrorists and insurgents are relying on TOCs to generate funding in order to facilitate violent activities. The NSC reports that the most significant international drug trafficking organizations which pose threats to US national security are associated with terrorist groups.³² The following quote illustrates the extent to which the US considers the danger of linkages between TOCs and terrorists—even the possibility of access to WMDs warrants grave concern:

Involvement in the drug trade by the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is critical to the ability of these groups to fund terrorist activity. We are concerned about Hezbollah’s drug and criminal activities, as well as indications of links between al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb and the drug trade. Further, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab has engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom and extortion, and may derive limited fees from extortion or protection of pirates to generate funding for its operations. While the crime-terror nexus is still mostly opportunistic, this nexus is critical nonetheless, especially if it were to involve the successful criminal transfer of WMD material to terrorists or their penetration of human smuggling networks as a means for terrorists to enter the United States.³³

³¹US National Security Council, “Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat> (accessed 24 September 2013).

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

Of the traditional threats to Caribbean security, perhaps the most serious and critical is that posed by the infiltration of terrorist networks. The shock waves of the brutal terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 have left the Caribbean, much like the rest of the international community, reeling from the realization that no way of life is safe. The attacks exposed the world to the horrific nature of irregular warfare and a new security paradigm requiring a global effort to counter-terrorism in all forms. The fragility of Caribbean states could translate directly into a weakened US southern border if terrorist networks seek to gain a foothold in the region.

It is no surprise therefore that the Third Border Initiative was introduced by the US with the original intent of having a US-led partnership with Caribbean states in order to facilitate and strengthen the nations' capacities to deal with security issues. The program involves initiatives for combating transnational crime; with special emphasis on illegal drug-trafficking and illicit arms trade, and to promote regional security.³⁴ Curtis Ward writes about regional security, and had indicated that the TBI was expanded to include enhancement of the region's capacity for US and Caribbean cooperation in dealing with potential terrorist threats. He further quotes the following statement issued by the governments of the US, the CARICOM, and the Dominican Republic, which emphasized the issue of security in US and Caribbean relations:

We are further bound by a determination to protect our region..n from terrorists and criminals who would destroy our way of life and by a belief that terrorist acts, such as the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, represent a serious threat to international peace and our hemispheric security and require

³⁴Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, "Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative," U.S. Department of State Archive, 13 January 2004, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28136.htm> (accessed 14 June 2013).

our governments to continue our efforts to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. We recognize our interdependence and the importance of close cooperation to combat new and emerging transnational threats that endanger the very fabric of our societies. By virtue of their small size and geographic configuration and lack of technical and financial resources, Caribbean States are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to these risks and threats, especially those posed by illicit trafficking in persons, drugs, and firearms, terrorism, and other transnational crimes.³⁵

Although terrorism permeates as the most dangerous threat to the Caribbean and US security landscape, Dr. Griffith also elaborates that other criminal trends include genuine security issues such as environmental and food security, health security (HIV) and human security. The extent of the security cooperation necessarily involves the protection from the threat of diseases, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict and political repression.³⁶

Literature Addressing US and Caribbean Relations—Emerging Trends

In a study of US foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean conducted by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) in 2012, it was revealed that since 1946, the US has provided over 148 billion dollars in assistance to the region. According to the report, assistance spiked in the 1960s under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, and then declined in the 1970s. It went up again in the 1980s during the Central American conflicts, and fell during the 1990s. Throughout the latter part of the last century and during the first decade of the 21st century, the level of assistance continued an upward momentum; reaching its peak in 2010 in the aftermath of the

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ivelaw L. Griffith, ed., *Caribbea Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change* (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004), 53.

earthquake that ravaged Haiti (see figure 3).³⁷ This trend is indicative of the inconsistent nature of US foreign policy toward the region, as has been heretofore established.

In support of this observation, Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin,³⁸ drawing evidence from a case study on the relationship between the US and the Caribbean, quoted Robert Pastor, Vice President of International Affairs and Professor of International Relations at the American University, “American interest in the Caribbean has been motivated by the onset of crises, but is dominated by large periods of disinterest as the default position.” Professor Pastor continued to suggest that Caribbean states were too small to present any credible threat to the US and only show up on the radar screen when American interests become the focus of attention due to crisis or instability.³⁹ If there were any doubt as to the veracity of Professor Pastor’s comments, the CRS Report confirmed them by asserting “US policy makers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times.” These statements are pertinent to the issue of this study as it is the seemingly waning or diminishing interest within the region during the first decade of the 21st century that may have opened up opportunities for other foreign powers to gain a foothold. The question is whether the outside relationships have been sufficiently

³⁷Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY 2013 Appropriations*, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2013).

³⁸Jeremy R. Arael and Emil A. Payin, ed. *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996).

³⁹Major Jaime S. Ogilvie, “Exploring the Future of Security in the Caribbean: A Regional Security Partnership” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 30.

developed over time to maintain a position of superior geopolitical influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The diplomatic relationship that has been forged between the US and the Caribbean is mainly due to the geographic proximity of the US mainland to the group of small states within the Caribbean Sea. Different US Administrations have employed varying strategies based on the most critical issues of the day, but in real terms, whether apparent to the region or not, a US strategic foreign policy is always in place that would be sufficient to secure the enduring US interests in the region. Policy priorities are based on the premise that the US has a responsibility as one of the most powerful nations in the world to play a part in building stable, prosperous and democratic institutions.




Figure 3. US Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, FY 1946-2010

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1 July 1945–30 September 2010 (Greenbook, April 2012).

Under the current administration of President Barack Obama, the US policy toward the Caribbean has focused on four priorities. They are: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future.⁴⁰ Of note is that the Obama Administration has taken some of the same policy approaches as that of his predecessor (President George W. Bush), but has focused mainly on partnering with the Caribbean

⁴⁰Mark P. Sullivan, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2013).

States and allowing them to share responsibility. Mutual respect and dialogue has been a recurring theme as the Obama Administration promotes this policy.⁴¹ The US commitment to working with Latin America and Caribbean nations was echoed by Ms. Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, at the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly meeting in Bolivia in 2012. During her address she said that the US and its Caribbean alliance will work “in the spirit of genuine and equal partnership to advance liberty and prosperity for all citizens of the hemisphere.”⁴²

Notwithstanding, the new policy trend is to promote more independence in this group of Small States, however, the Caribbean still remains the second largest recipient of US assistance behind Mexico in the Western Hemisphere (see figure 4). There has been a gradual shift in US aid away from security assistance toward that of humanitarian assistance and development. In FY 2013, the Obama Administration’s request was about 31 million dollars or 5.9 percent less than the previous year; with Haiti continuing to be the dominant recipient and amounting to approximately two thirds of total assistance (see table 1).

When compared with other regions of the world, the assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean has been on the decline while aid to Central Asia and the Middle East

⁴¹Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “US–Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead,” United States Department of State, 6 January 2011, <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/154105.htm> (accessed 12 September 2013).

⁴²Roberta S. Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Remarks to the 42nd OAS General Assembly,” United States Department of State, 4 June 2012, <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2012/191779.htm> (accessed 12 September 2013).

has increased (see figure 5).⁴³ This trend represents the shift in global priorities on the US agenda and indicates the relative importance of the regions and issues as they relate to US interests around the world.

Table 1. US Assistance to the Caribbean

Country/Program	FY2011 (Actual)	FY2012 (Estimate)	FY2013 (Request)
Bahamas	0.2	0.2	0.2
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean	32.3	34.2	35.2
Cuba	20.0	20.0	15.0
Dominican Republic	37.0	30.1	29.8
Guyana	16.9	10.8	7.0
Haiti	380.3	357.2	340.0
Jamaica	7.6	5.7	5.4
Suriname	0.3	0.2	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	0.3	0.2	0.2
CBSI	77.4	64.0	59.0
Total	572.2	522.7	492.0

Source: U.S. Department of State, “FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” 9 March 2012, <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm> (accessed 13 September 2013).

While Caribbean States in general have fragile economies, it is noteworthy that the English-speaking countries in particular, have strong democratic foundations, place a high value on the rule of law and have the institutional mechanisms to promote justice, equality and freedoms. The major problem with these same nations lies in lack of resources and technical capacity to strengthen and to continue to build on these

⁴³Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Sullivan, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2012), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf> (accessed 12 September 2013).

foundations. To this end, there is congressional oversight for providing assistance to help build capacity and bolster respect for political rights and civil liberties.

In terms of legislation specifically affecting the Caribbean, the US Senate of the 113th Congress approved a resolution following Haiti’s 2010 earthquake. There has also been comprehensive reform legislation and a measure to reform the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition, both Houses of the US Congressional Appropriations Committee have included many provisions for US aid to the region in their reports to the US State Department and Foreign Relations Operations.




Figure 4. Sub-regional Distribution of the FY 2013 Request

Source: U.S. Department of State, “FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” 9 March 2012, <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm> (accessed 13 September 2013).

In the area of regional security, the US government has funded a number of programs to address security concerns both through bi-lateral arrangements with individual countries, and with the regional body represented by several organizations managed by the US Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD has legislative authority to

carry-out foreign assistance efforts in the region to assist with humanitarian relief, counter-drug and counter-terrorism programs, and stabilization.⁴⁴ There is funding through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Program which focuses on counter-narcotics and civilian law enforcement, as well as projects to strengthen justice systems.




Figure 5. Regional Distribution of US Assistance, FY 2008 and FY 2012

Source: Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY 2013 Appropriations*, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/row/R42582.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2013).

To help in strengthening the capacity to deal with global threats including terrorism and WMD proliferation, funding is provided through the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs (NADR). The International Military and Education Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are

⁴⁴Ibid., 25.

also channels through which foreign militaries in the region may receive funding and training.⁴⁵

The regional security programs have also targeted the expanding drug trade and drug-trafficking related violence. The new initiatives aim to provide assistance to Central American and the Caribbean governments in efforts to boost their capacities in combating violent crimes and the trafficking of illegal drugs and weapons. Significant emphasis was placed on the recovery efforts in Haiti in 2010, which saw an increase in aid during FY 2010 by over three times that of the previous year.⁴⁶ In addition to this support in 2010, there was also the revitalization of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which supported citizen security, promoted social justice and reduced illicit drug-trafficking.⁴⁷

Literature and Research on Chinese and Caribbean Relations—Emerging Trends

The *Inter-American Dialogue Journal* reported that in 2010, China's loan commitments of 37 billion US dollars to Latin American and Caribbean countries were more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and the United States Export-Import Bank combined (see figure 6).⁴⁸ The report also indicated that not only are Chinese loans to Latin America larger than that of their western counterpart, but

⁴⁵Ibid., 5.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 14.

⁴⁸Kevin, P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, "The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America," *Inter-American Dialogue*, February 2012, <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2013).

they are also growing faster. These large loans offered by the China Development Bank (CDB), China Ex-Im Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) over the last 10 or so years cover a wide range of assistance projects in the wider Latin America region as well as in the Caribbean. Countries such as Jamaica and the Bahamas for example, between 2005 and 2011, have benefitted from over 3 billion US dollars in loans for just infrastructural development (see table 2).




Figure 6. Comparison of Chinese and Western Bank Loans to Latin America

Source: Kevin, P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America,” *Inter-American Dialogue*, February 2012, <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2013).

China’s development model typically favors infrastructure and industrialization over micro-inventions in health and social services (see table 3).⁴⁹ One argument is that

⁴⁹Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski, 17.

the loans represent areas of Chinese interests and provide access to the region's natural resources.⁵⁰ Chinese banks rebut this assertion and explain that they seek to support economic growth rather than social welfare. The Journal also reports that the China Ex-Im Bank states on its website that its projects must create jobs in the borrowing country and therefore the loans typically support technical areas such as infrastructural development, communications, mining and energy, and transportation. It is noteworthy that western loans concentrate mainly on government, social, and environmental purposes, while the Chinese loans focus on energy, mining, infrastructure and transportation. This means that the Chinese are filling a gap left open by the World Bank and IDB loans.⁵¹

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid., 18.

Table 2. Summary of Chinese Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean 2005-2007

Year	Borrowing Country	Borrower	Lender	Amount (\$m)	Purpose
2005	Brazil	Gerdau Acominas	ICBC and BNPP	201	Steel mill equipment
2005	Chile	Codelco	CDB	550	Improve company efficiency and technology
2007	Jamaica	Government	Ex-Im	45	Montego Bay Convention Center
2008	Costa Rica	Government	SAFE	300	Government bonds
2008	Peru	Chinalco Peru	Ex-Im	2,000	Mining Equipment
2008	Venezuela	BANDES and PDVSA	CDB	4,000	Funding infrastructure, other projects
2009	Bolivia	YPFB	Ex-Im Bank	60	Home gas lines, oil drilling rigs
2009	Brazil	Telemar Norte/Oi	CDB	300	Expand telecom network
2009	Brazil	Petrobras	CDB	10,000	Pre-salt business plan
2009	Ecuador	Petroecuador	PetroChina	1,000	Advance payment for Petroecuador oil
2009	Mexico	América Móvil	CDB	1,000	Telecom network infrastructure/equipment
2009	Multiple	BLADEX	CDB	1,000	Regional trade financing
2009	Peru	Cofide	CDB	50	Transportation, infrastructure
2009	Venezuela	BANDES and PDVSA	CDB	4,000	Infrastructure, including satellite
2009	Venezuela	CVG	CDB	1,000	Mining project credit
2010	Argentina	Government	CDB and others	10,000	Train system
2010	Bahamas	Government	Ex-Im Bank	58	Airport infrastructure
2010	Bolivia	Government	CDB	251	Chinese satellite
2010	Bolivia	Government	Ex-Im Bank	67.8	Infrastructure
2010	Brazil	Vale Mining Company	CDB and Ex-Im	1,230	Ships to transport iron ore to China
2010	Ecuador	Government	Ex-Im Bank	1,682.7	Hydroelectric dam Coca-Codo Sinclair
2010	Ecuador	Petroecuador	CDB	1,000	80% discretionary, 20% oil-related
2010	Ecuador	Government	Ex-Im Bank	621.7	Sopladora hydroelectric dam
2010	Jamaica	Government	Ex-Im Bank	340	Road construction
2010	Jamaica	Government	Ex-Im Bank	58.1	Shoreline reconstruction
2010	Venezuela	PDVSA	CDB and BES	1,500	Trade-related credit facility
2010	Venezuela	BANDES and PDVSA	CDB	20,000	Funding infrastructure
2011	Bahamas	Baha Mar Resort	Ex-Im Bank	2,450	Resort Construction
2011	Bolivia	Government	Ex-Im Bank	300	Helicopters, infrastructure
2011	Ecuador	Government	CDB	2,000	70% discretionary, 30% oil-related
2011	Peru	BCP	CDB	150	Finance
2011	Venezuela	PDVSA	CDB	4,000	Infrastructure
2011	Venezuela	PDVSA	ICBC	4,000	Housing
TOTAL				75,215.3	

Source: Kevin, P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America,” *Inter-American Dialogue*, February 2012, <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2013).

Table 3. China Bank Loans to Latin America and the Caribbean by sector

(\$ million)	Total	World Bank	IDB	Chinese
Health	\$17,926	\$8,463	\$9,463	\$—
Education	\$7,008	\$4,389	\$2,619	\$—
Water, Environment	\$16,144	\$7,061	\$9,084	\$—
Public Administration	\$19,105	\$11,013	\$8,092	\$—
Finance, Trade	\$18,328	\$7,170	\$9,858	\$1,300
Housing, Infrastructure	\$38,098	\$—	\$4,397	\$33,701
Transportation	\$27,693	\$7,192	\$8,821	\$11,680
Energy, Mining	\$30,061	\$2,565	\$7,576	\$19,920
Other	\$10,651	\$378	\$2,028	\$8,614
TOTAL	\$185,383	\$48,231	\$61,937	\$75,215

Source: Kevin, P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America,” *Inter-American Dialogue*, February 2012, <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2013).

Outside of banking and finance, there are a number of other assistance projects and programs on which the Chinese government has been embarked in their expansion across the region. Dr. Evan Ellis, Assistant Professor with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) writes on “Chinese Engagement with Nations of the Caribbean,” and makes an argument that the growth of the Chinese influence in the region should be of strategic interest to the US. He highlights that China’s key logistic hub for the region is a large, deep-water port and airport facility in Freeport Bahamas—a mere 65 miles from the continental United States. Dr. Ellis also mentions that, among other things, the largest population of Chinese students studying in the region is in Cuba,

and that there is a growing military relationship between the region's militaries and the PRC.⁵²

Some of the major Chinese projects include a deep sea-harbor and highway port in Suriname which will link the country to resource rich Brazil; a 462 million US dollar cash infusion in a beach front resort on the east coast of Dominica; construction and operation of a 1 billion US dollar container in Freeport, Bahamas; several cricket Stadia across the region in preparation for Cricket World Cup 2007; a 100 million US dollar purchase of a major stake in Omai Bauxite Mining from the government of Guyana, and the construction in Trinidad and Tobago of the Prime Minister's residence and National Academy for the Performing Arts.⁵³

With all of these Chinese investments in the region, the question that arises is: "What are the motivating factors for China?" One may begin to analyze this question by looking at China's expressed foreign policy. This can be traced to their "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." Their mantra was first articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai and later adopted by Chairman Mao Zedong as a feature of the New China foreign policy.⁵⁴ The five principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-toxic interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and

⁵²Evan Ellis, Ph.D., "Chinese Engagement with Nations of the Caribbean," April 2011, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-4/2011_4_06_ellis_s_eng.pdf (accessed 18 May 2013).

⁵³Norman Girvan, Collection of internet articles (2007-2011) on: "China's Growing Presence in the Caribbean," <http://www.normangirvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/china-in-the-caribbean-2007-2011.pdf> (accessed 18 May 2013).

⁵⁴Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existenc," November 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm> (accessed 30 April 2013), 17.

mutual benefit, and; peaceful coexistence.⁵⁵ To these one must ask: “Are these principles truly representative of China’s approach in its expansion into the Caribbean?”

According to research conducted at New York’s Wagner University, and used by the Congressional Research Service, the findings suggest that China’s economic assistance and related investments are driven primarily by the PRC’s need for natural resources, and secondly by diplomatic objectives (such as isolating Taiwan). The CRS Report also claims that Beijing aims to open up foreign markets for Chinese goods and to invest, build manufacturing plants, and to develop markets overseas.⁵⁶

Literature and Research on the Implications of ‘Soft Power’

In his transmittal letter to the 2008 US Committee on Foreign Relations; a report entitled “China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia, and Africa”⁵⁷ former Senator Joseph R. Biden, then chairman of the Committee, wrote: “China’s emergence as a global power has profound implications for the security and economic

⁵⁵Kathleen D. Cole, “The Sleeping Dragon Awakens: Ramifications of Chinese Influence In Latin America” (Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2006). Cole was quoting from “Zheng Ruixiang, “The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Their Proclamation and Application,” *China Institute of International Studies* (March 2005), <http://www.ciis.org.cn/item/2005-03-08/50849.html> (accessed 13 January 2005).

⁵⁶Thomas Lum, *China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40940.pdf> (accessed 23 September 2013).

⁵⁷Congressional Research Service, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and Africa” (A Study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 8 April 2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013).

interests of the United States.” He asserted that China’s rise presented both challenges and opportunities for the US, and that China was attempting to exploit foreign aid and reap soft power advantages.

This is the same soft power to which Harvard Professor, Dr. Joseph S. Nye referred when he articulated that “US policymakers were squandering US power and influence.”⁵⁸ Dr. Nye advocates that soft power is concerned with the “ability to shape the preferences of others and to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” It is about a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.⁵⁹ Expanding on Dr. Nye’s idea, Dr. R.E. Evans provides an alternate and simpler definition for soft power as “a dynamic created by a nation whereby other nations seek to imitate that nation, become closer to that nation, and align its interests accordingly.”⁶⁰

Others have defined the concept following on Dr. Nye’s original work. Dr. Colin Gray’s definition is: “The ability to have influence by co-opting others to share some of one’s values and, as a consequence, to share some key elements on one’s agenda for international order and security.”⁶¹ Dr. Alexander V. Vuving, an Associate Professor at

⁵⁸Nye.

⁵⁹Ibid. x.

⁶⁰R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” *JFQ*, no. 60 (1st Quarter 2011): 85-91. Quoting Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990) and *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁶¹Colin S. Gray, “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century” (Monograph, U.S. War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2011), v.

the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies puts it succinctly as: “Soft power is the ability to affect the behavior of others by influencing their preferences.”⁶²

The dynamics of soft power therefore, when viewed in relation to the US government’s traditional relationship with the Caribbean, and China’s expansion into the region, must be a cause of concern to US policy makers. Dr. Evans, in a case study on Chinese Soft Power in Latin America,⁶³ has already posited that the economic, cultural and institutional battles which the PRC has used to advance its position, have both leveraged and contributed to an erosion of the US global, strategic position. Dr. Evans makes the compelling argument that the “core of Chinese soft power in Latin American, as in the rest of the world, is the perception that China will present significant business opportunities in the future due to its high rate of growth and advancements in technology.”⁶⁴ This perception is further categorized as representative of hope for future access to Chinese markets and investments; Chinese influence and infrastructure; culture and work ethic; developmental models; China as a counterweight to US and Western institutions, and China as the ‘wave of the future.’”⁶⁵

⁶²Alexander Vuving, “How Soft Power Works” (Paper presented at a panel “Soft Power and Smart Power,” American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, September 3, 2009), quoting Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Vuving%20How%20soft%20power%20works%20APSA%202009.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2013), 6.

⁶³Ellis, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,” 85-91.

⁶⁴Ibid., 86.

⁶⁵Ibid.

In its political, bi-lateral and multi-lateral connections to Caribbean and Latin American member states, Dr. Evans’ studies have observed that China is careful not to align itself with any anti-US sentiments. He notes that the PRC is also expanding its reach to regional and multinational organizations in order to broaden its influence on non-state actors. Dr. Evans’ research also shows that the major avenues utilized by the PRC are trade and investment, development assistance, diplomacy, culture, education, tourism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; operating through political leadership, business communities, students, youth groups, and the general population.⁶⁶

So what are China’s main objectives? Are there ultimate intentions unbeknownst to the wider international community? For now, there are probably two which may be assessed with any certainty; those being economic development as its primary objective, as well as the further isolation of Taiwan (see table 4).

Table 4. Taiwan’s Official Relationships in Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean (12)	Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Africa (4)	Burkina Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland
The Pacific (6)	Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu
Europe (1)	The Vatican

* As of February 2008

Source: Congressional Research Service, “China’s Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and Africa” (A Study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 8 April 2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013).

⁶⁶Ibid.

Literature and Research on the Model of Interest and Identity Formation

Central to the understanding of how actors perceive the contemporary operating environment and what conditions influence their behavior is first an understanding of their perspectives of world politics and how they develop coherent approaches to achieve their interests in the international strategic environment. The system of international states operates by a set of rules premised on the idea that states are the central actors. This is the perspective traditionally dictated by the realist theory which offers that states pursue self-determined interests as a pragmatic response to the risks and dangers of a potentially anarchical world.⁶⁷ A liberalist view of world politics focuses more on people, institutions and interdependent relationships. This perspective accounts for the role of international organizations and other non-state actors in the international political arena. Liberals also believe that the rule of law and the transparent democratic process facilitates international cooperation.⁶⁸

For the purpose of this study, the constructivist approach to understanding world politics is used as a model to ascertain what may be the US and China's perceptions of threats in the international system, and more specifically, in the Caribbean. It is considered a fundamental principle of the constructivist social theory that "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings that the objects have for

⁶⁷United States Army Command and General Staff College, "C200 Strategic Environment: Advance Sheets and Readings," ILE Common Core, August 2012, 51.

⁶⁸Ibid., 76.

them.”⁶⁹ In other words, the actions of states towards other states depend on how they are viewed, that is to say, if they are considered adversaries or not. Small states in the Caribbean for example do not view the power and might of the US military as a threat notwithstanding the overwhelming disparity in strength and capabilities; however, an impending influx of refugees from the neighboring island of Haiti might pose a significant perception of threat from that country to the effect that foreign policies towards that country may be adjusted to reinforce security measures to prevent illegal entry.

What of the relationship between US and China? How are each perceived by the other? Would this perception determine their policies towards each other and their balance in the international system of states? In the constructivist thought meanings and actions are organized and arise out of interaction.⁷⁰ It is from these interactions that states develop self-regarding ideas about security which predisposes them to act in a certain direction towards the other.

At the risk of oversimplifying the construct, consider the inference or attribution made by one state about the other’s intention. Alexander Wendt⁷¹ argues that this depends on two factors. The first is the gesture of the physical qualities, which in this

⁶⁹Ibid., 97. Note: C200 Readings extracted from Thomas Hobbes’, “Leviathan, 1651” (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1886), 63-65; Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: ‘A Philosophical Essay,’” 1975 in William Hastie’s “Principles of Politics” including his “Essay on Perpetual Peace, A Contribution to Political Science” (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1891), 94-100; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of It: The Social Construction of Politics,” *International Organization* (Spring 1992): 396-407.

⁷⁰Ibid., 100.

⁷¹Ibid., 84.

case may be a state's military strength or economic power. The second gesture would be the intent of a state where it makes a gesture with its physical qualities. This scenario presents an interesting analysis. The US may make an error of attribution by inferring the wrong Chinese intent based on the China's rapid economic and cultural expansion in the Caribbean region, however, in a system of anarchical states where it is understood that states act in their self-interest and preservation, it may be unwise to assume, before the fact, that China's actions are not intended to be threatening. The conundrum is thus, that there exists a situation where a social threat is perceived and constructed but it is not necessarily natural or real.⁷²

The principle presented by the model of identity in figure 7 shows that security systems evolve through interaction in which each party acts in a way which imparts a sense of threat to the other and eventually creates expectations of distrust. The thrust of the argument is that "competitive systems of interaction are prone to security dilemmas."⁷³ Threats are perceived based on states' own conceptions of their relationship to the other, regardless of the actual intent or motives for their actions.

⁷²Ibid., 100.

⁷³Ibid., 101.




Figure 7. Model of Identity and Interest Formation

Source: CGSC IL Common Core C200, "Strategic Environment Advance Sheet and Reading," August 2013, 102.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the process of using a strategic estimate as the methodology to assess possible threat implications within the Caribbean. The method will also incorporate an assessment of the use of power and influence through the instruments of national power. The final analysis entails an examination of the national interests of the US and of China, juxtaposed against the interests of the Caribbean bloc of countries under the auspices of CARICOM; specifically relating to the threats to regional security. The overall strategic estimate process will therefore incorporate critical thinking and problem-solving processes, and seek to identify what actions may constitute the most likely and most dangerous courses of action by the US and China.

The aim of the Strategic Estimate will be to ascertain whether there is any perception of threat leading to a traditional military confrontation, or; whether there is any perception of vulnerability to current non-traditional threats such as TCO's or acts of terrorism which may be due to China's expanding influence and the possible decline of US geopolitical dominance in the region. By ascertaining China's possible strategic motivation, determining the perceptions of threats to and from the US, and analyzing the actual threat environment, this methodology hopes to provide a clear indication of the security implications of China's rise in the Caribbean.

The Estimate

The strategic estimate provides a comprehensive assessment of the operating environment. It is a problem-solving process which looks at a set of inputs and subjects

them to analysis and synthesis in order to arrive at critically thought out conclusions. The systematic approach integrates joint force strategic estimate doctrine spelled out in JP 5-0⁷⁴ and the Army problem-solving process in Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 5-0-1,⁷⁵ (Chapter 11) which provides the intellectual framework upon which military commanders and their staffs develop strategies and conduct planning.⁷⁶

The systematic approach has been adjusted to reflect a wholesome assessment rather than a military operational estimate of the Caribbean region. Inputs will incorporate information already covered in the previous chapters on the strategic setting, current events, national and regional policies and peacetime planning. The process will consider the context and definition of the problem question, sources of strategic direction for all stakeholders in the region, describing the strategic geopolitical environment, considering courses of action, and finally, some challenges and risks involved. The approach will culminate with products providing a summary of the findings in the estimate process.

Strategy, Power and Influence

Strategy is a term used to describe a plan of action or the military art of planning operations in battle. US Armed Forces Joint Publication (JP-1) defines strategy as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a

⁷⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), B-1.

⁷⁵Department of the Army, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0-1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 11-1.

⁷⁶ILE C200 Student Text Book, “Strategic Environment,” 296.

synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and-or multinational objectives.”⁷⁷ From this definition it is clear that strategy is not confined to military operations even from a US military, doctrinal perspective. It involves the combined national policy, economic, political and psychological activities designed to achieve stated national objectives. From the national perspective, there is the assumption that all states and non-state actors pursue interests intrinsic to self-preservation. National strategic objectives are derived from these broad interests towards a desired end-state. The elements of power are used to promote, facilitate and advance national interests using all available resources.

Consequently, the role of strategy is to ensure that the pursuit, protection, or advancement of these interests - which are achieved through the application of the instruments of national power—is accomplished in a coherent and optimal manner.”⁷⁸

“National security depends on the complementary application of the instruments of national power.”⁷⁹ The Armed forces of the US are guided by the national security policy in the employment of the military instrument of national power in conjunction with the diplomatic, economic and informational means carried out by other organs of the state. These are the instruments which allow the US the ability to exercise influence on

⁷⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), B-1.

⁷⁸Harry, R. Yarger, “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 5-16. Quoted in ILE Common Core, C200, “Strategic Environment: Advance Sheet and Readings,” August 2012, 89.

⁷⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, v.

the world stage and apply its power in human potential, economy, industry, science and technology, geography and national will.⁸⁰

In the application of military power, the military constantly assesses the international security environment to determine possible threats to the US while appreciating that challenges which may be posed from states or groups of states, other non-state actors such as terrorists, criminal networks, and special-interest organizations. The diplomatic instrument is the principal instrument for forging and nurturing relationships with other states and foreign groups towards the achievement and advancement of US values, interests and objectives. The economic instrument is used to facilitate economic and trade relations while promoting US objectives such as general welfare through global markets and resources and economic development and expansion of international partners. Information access and security is fundamental to the overall security of the US and forms a vital part of military operations. The integration of information and denial of essential information to adversaries form a critical part of defensive and offensive security operations.

If it is accepted that a state's power may be defined in terms of its diplomatic, informational, military and economic influences, the question must then be asked, how much power and influence do these instruments of national power create in the international arena? To answer this question, it is useful to understand the mechanisms which soft power and influence affect.

Some argue that a state's power is relative and therefore must be considered in relation to other actors in the international realm. The projection of a state's military

⁸⁰Ibid., 1-6.

power is then only effective if, when compared to other actors, allows that state to exercise its free will and dominance without fear of defeat in a battle against an adversary's military. The same principle applies to economic, informational and diplomatic power-all of which may be exercised in the advancement of states' individual interests.

As has already been discussed in chapter 2, power in and of itself is a concept which denotes an ability to project influence. In the analysis of power, it may be applied directly as hard power such as in the might of a nation's military, wherein the direct effect (or threat) of destruction is enough to persuade others to abide by a state's will or be deterred from acting against a state's will. The other dimension of power is however more subtle and applies influence more in the form of shaping the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Thus, the gradual injection of a state's culture and political ideals across borders through agenda setting, attraction and co-opting may achieve the same effect of projecting influence through coercion and inducement (see figure 8).




Figure 8. Dynamics of Power

Source: CGSC IL Common Core C200, “Strategic Environment Advance Sheet and Reading,” August 2013, 82.

Nye argues that this indirect way to achieve influence is the “second face of power” and that it is possible to achieve stated objectives by virtue of just being attractive to others on the world stage without using the threat of military force or sanctions. Instead, he advocates that setting an agenda which expresses values, being an example to emulate, and showing prosperity and openness will greatly influence others.⁸¹

Hirschman’s influence effect compliments this view of soft power by stressing the importance of using trade as a means of exerting power and influence. Hirschman argued that “conscious cultivation of asymmetric interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their

⁸¹CGSC ILE Common Core, “Strategic Environment Advance Sheet and Readings,” August 2012, in Dr. Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5-18.

economics, but also their foreign policies to the preferences of the stronger state.”⁸² In fact, it is also a reasoned view that threats and coercion normally inspire resentment and resistance in a target state while rewards and inducements are more likely to prompt a willingness to bargain.⁸³

Hirschman outlines two aspects of using trade as an instrument of national power, the supply effect and the influence effect.⁸⁴ The supply effect is concerned with the exchange of goods which creates a natural supply and demand relationship, usually a positive effect, wherein the supply of more desired goods replace the less desired goods in a state. The more desired goods improve the war-making machinery of a state. Thus, the supply effect seeks to amplify the military strength of a state and is considered as an indirect source of power.⁸⁵ The main principle of the influence effect however, is one of dependency, which may be achieved through the actual dependence of one state on another state’s trade. Alternatively, dependency may be so ingrained that it is difficult to adjust trade conditions from one state to another.⁸⁶ In this sense both of these dependency conditions may be deliberately induced by a state in furtherance of its interests over another state.

⁸²Michael Mastanduno, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice” (Paper prepared for *Interdependence and Conflict*, ed. Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, for submission to University of Michigan Press, June 2001), <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2013).

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Hirschman, 172.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Strategic Direction

US Policy towards China

The National Defense Strategy of the US is clear in its assessment of the PRC in terms of the PRC being a military threat. It expressly states that China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the US in the foreseeable future.⁸⁷ The strategy is therefore hedged against the growth and modernization of China's military and the potential impact of any strategic advantage the PRC may gain in the international community. Military leaders have planned for the continued expansion of China in traditional military capabilities, but have not excluded the idea that US and Chinese interaction will be long-term and multi-dimensional; incorporating peacetime relationships in order to mitigate short term challenges and enhance long term national interests.

The strategy goes on to advance the US government's approval of the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China emphasizing that there is also a responsibility for China to take a "greater share of the burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system."⁸⁸ Of profound importance is the appreciation that a critical aspect of the strategy is the pursuit of the establishment of a dialogue with China to in order to

⁸⁷Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), 3.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 10.

ensure a better understanding, improved communication and a reduced risk of miscalculation.⁸⁹

US Policy towards the Caribbean

The US policy toward the Caribbean has focused on four priorities. They are: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. The Obama Administration has focused mainly on partnering with the Caribbean States and allowing them to share responsibility.

The new policy trend is to promote more independence, shift US aid away from security assistance toward that of humanitarian assistance and development, and provide assistance to help build capacity and bolster respect for political rights and civil liberties.

Legislation has been implemented to provide humanitarian assistance to Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. There has also been comprehensive reform legislation and a measure to reform the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition, both Houses of the US Congressional Appropriations Committee have included many provisions for US aid to the region in their reports to the US State Department and Foreign Relations Operations.

In the area of regional security, the US government has funded a number of programs to address security concerns both through bi-lateral arrangements with individual countries, and with the regional body represented by several organizations. The DOD has legislative authority to carry-out foreign assistance efforts in the region to

⁸⁹Ibid.

assist with humanitarian relief, counter-drug and counter-terrorism programs, and stabilization. There is funding through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Program which focuses on counter-narcotics and civilian law enforcement, as well as projects to strengthen justice systems.

In strengthening the capacity to deal with global threats including terrorism and WMD proliferation, funding is provided through the Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs (NADR). The International Military and Education Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are also channels through which foreign militaries in the region may receive funding and training.

The regional security programs have also targeted the expanding drug trade and drug-trafficking related violence. The new initiatives aim to provide assistance to Central American and the Caribbean governments in efforts to boost their capacities in combating violent crimes and the trafficking of illegal drugs and weapons. In 2010, there was also the revitalization of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which supported citizen security, promoted social justice and reduced illicit drug-trafficking.

Military responsibility in the regions falls under the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). This Combatant Command's (COCOM) mission is to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations within the area of responsibility (AOR) in order to support US national security objectives and interagency efforts that promote regional security and cooperation.⁹⁰ This mission is carried through detection, monitoring, interdiction, combined exercises and operations, building partner

⁹⁰This mission was extracted from the USSOUTHCOM Brief, "Theater Engagement Strategy 2022."

capability, security force assistance theater security cooperation, key leader engagement, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, among other ways.

USSOUTHCOM supports other non-military efforts through the joint interagency effort in areas such as countering illicit trafficking, combating terrorism and information sharing. The end states of the military policy toward the region are:

1. Threat approaches to the US homeland and vital US interests are monitored and if necessary defended.
2. Partner Nations militaries and security forces have the capability and capacity to protect their sovereign territory from Transnational Organized Crime threats.
3. Partner Nation military and security forces have the capability and capacity to prevent terrorist organizations from threatening stability in the region.
4. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the AOR is prevented and the use of WMD is deterred.
5. Partner Nations have the capability and capacity to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to mitigate the effects of natural and man-made disasters.
6. The US and international community has freedom of movement and strategic access through the Panama Canal and the global commons (international maritime, air, and cyberspace domains) throughout the AOR.
7. The US Southern Command is the military partner of choice for AOR states.

China's Policy Towards the US

China considers its relationship with the US as the most important as well the most sensitive; the most comprehensive yet the most complex, and; the most promising

but the most challenging. The model is based on the principle of mutual respect and win-win cooperation.

The policy begins with the term respect. There is recognition that both countries are different in many ways. There are differences in language, culture, cuisine, natural resources, government and they are at different stages of development. Due to these differences, there is a need to understand that these are the products of history which cannot be changed at will. Both countries must therefore show respect to history and appreciate the differences. This will lay the foundations for constructive and productive relations.

The policy speaks to Cooperation. China recognizes that despite the many differences, the common interests far outweigh them and are still growing. The US is China's second largest trading partner with bilateral trade amounting to approximately US\$ 500 billion in 2012.

There is recognition that both countries share important international responsibilities as permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. They therefore have a primary responsibility for international peace and security.

There is need for joint efforts and cooperation in the areas of global concern such as climate change, food security, energy security, disease prevention, poverty alleviation, combating transnational crimes, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation. Additionally, the policy promotes rallying around areas of differences and having economic complements; having cultural and educational exchanges to promote mutual learning; and converting areas of diversity to areas of opportunity.

The policy recognizes that the relationship between the two countries affects the future of the two peoples but also has a major impact on the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. This relationship has to be managed with a strong sense of responsibility. This means being prudent and cautious on all issues that affect the other and not allowing either to be taken advantage of. Responsibility means acting positively and constructively, resisting the temptation to focus too much on short-term gains but instead working towards long-term interests.⁹¹

China's Policy Towards the Caribbean

China's official policy towards the Caribbean articulates an intention to pursue peaceful development in a "win-win" strategy. It affirms that China, being the largest developing country in the world, is ready to carry out friendly cooperation with all countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence⁹² and that the end state is to build a peaceful and prosperous world.⁹³ It has had long established friendly

⁹¹As there is no officially published policy on the US, these policy goals were extracted from Ambassador Cui Tiankai, Chinese Ambassador to the US, "China's Foreign Policy and China-U.S. Relations" (China Forum, SAIS, 8 October 2013), <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/sghds/t1086428.htm> (accessed 1 November 2013).

⁹²China's Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were first articulated by Premier Zhou Enlai and later adopted by Chairman Mao Zedong as a feature of the New China foreign policy. These are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-toxic interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit, and; peaceful coexistence. Information may be found at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence," November 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm> (accessed 30 April 2013), 17.

⁹³Chinese Government Official Web Portal, "China S Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean," November 2008, http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm (accessed 20 October 2013).

cooperation and diplomatic ties with Caribbean countries in various fields since the 1970s. Over the last decade, there have been increased high level exchanges, stronger political mutual trust and closer cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, culture and education, and mutual support and close coordination in international affairs.

The goals of China's policy on Latin America and the Caribbean may be summarized as follows:

1. To promote mutual respect and trust: By strengthening dialogue and communication; enhancing political mutual trust; expanding strategic common ground, and; continuing to show understanding and support on issues involving each other's interests and concerns.
2. To deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results: By leveraging respective strengths and seeking to become partners in economic cooperation and trade for mutual benefit.
3. To draw on each other's strengths to boost progress: By carrying out more cultural and people to people exchanges, learn from each other and jointly promote development and progress.
4. To advance the One China principle as the basis for establishment and development of relations: By seeking to get countries in the region committed to the one China policy and supporting China's reunification and not having official ties with Taiwan.

In furtherance of these broad areas of official policy, China will continue to have high profile government exchanges and dialogue to improve bilateral and multilateral arrangements and to promote economic investments and trade. China continues to

provide professional consultation and cooperate in building macro-economic and financial policies while working to conclude banking regulatory cooperation agreements to jointly combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The PRC is promoting exchanges in agricultural science and technology to promote development of agricultural techniques and training programs in the region. China is cooperating in flora and fauna inspection and intensifying agricultural trade to jointly uphold food security. China is working actively to support cultural cooperation agreements to strengthen cultural interaction and exchange between cultural art institutions and professionals. It is encouraging direct contact between sports authorities and national Olympic committees through bilateral sports exchanges in various forms.

Infrastructure and construction is a major focus of development as the Chinese work with the Caribbean countries to strengthen transport, information and communications industries. China is also working on expanding mutually beneficial cooperation with Caribbean countries in resources and energy within bilateral cooperation frameworks. Expansion is ongoing in the fields of medicine and health care and China is ready to enhance scientific and technological exchanges to strengthen cooperation in bio-fuel resources, environment technology, marine technology and other areas of mutual interest.

On security matters, China has increased its level of military exchanges and cooperation utilizing defense dialogue, mutual visits by defense officials and professional training and exercises to improve professional relationships. The PRC has deepened its peacekeeping participation and cooperation in non-traditional security matters. China has also expanded its cooperation in judicial affairs and judicial assistance in criminal and

civil matters, and extraditions in particular. There are planned efforts to increase sharing of information, penalty enforcement and legal services. China has intentions to make concerted efforts in law enforcement and work jointly to combat transnational organized crimes including drug and economic crimes. Strengthening of intelligence and technological assistance under bilateral and multilateral exchange mechanisms are also on the agenda.

In appreciation of the role and importance of regional and sub-regional organizations in the Caribbean, in safeguarding peace and stability, promoting regional stability, development and integration, China supports, encourages and will continue to strengthen consultation and cooperation with relevant organizations in various fields.

Caribbean Policy Towards the US

The CARICOM has no official policy towards the US, although they share many common traditions and goals of peace, democracy and prosperity.⁹⁴ There is, however, a longstanding relationship between the governments in the region (individually and through CARICOM) and the US. The US has been the major economic partner of CARICOM in areas of trade, investment, tourism and migration.

It is recognized that US foreign policy has a significant impact on the economic progress of the CARICOM countries and that this economic development is an essential

⁹⁴In the absence of an official policy, excerpts in whole or part were taken from a testimony given by Richard L. Bernal, Ambassador of Jamaica to the US (1991-2001) to the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the US House of Representatives Hearings on US Policy towards the Americas in 2010 and Beyond, March 30 2013, "US Foreign Policy towards the Caribbean Community (CARICOM): Economic Aspects."

foundation for peace and democracy. It is the driving force in the region's fight against transnational crimes.

The rationale for the focus of the region's policy is primarily due to the characteristics of "small states" or small middle-income developing economies (SMIDEs) which make them acutely vulnerable to exogenous external events. This vulnerability is pronounced because of a high degree of openness, narrow range of economic activities, concentration of exports, limitations of economies of scale, and constrained competitiveness of small markets. Sustainable economic growth must be accomplished in the context of global economic recession and great care exercised in the application of macro-economic policy. Efforts should focus on building long-term capacity for international competitiveness through investment and improvement in human resources and modern infrastructure.

Achieving sustainable economic growth will be more likely if developed countries and large developing countries of the G20 refrain from policies, in particular, protectionism, that inhibit access in their markets. The US, given its unique role in the world economy and as the main economic partner of CARICOM, must continue to play a leadership role in shaping and nurturing an international economic environment that is sensitive and supportive to the economic requirements of SMIDEs.

The main areas of focus for a CARICOM policy towards the US should include: (1) sustaining and promoting opportunities; (2) alleviation or elimination of constraints and impediments, and; (3) facilitating the attraction, mobilization, creation, allocation and utilization of resources.

As the largest trading partner of CARICOM, the US should expand trade and extend the duration on the Caribbean Basin Trade Promotion Act which allows imports from CARICOM to enter the US free of cost. The US business community may also help to reinforce market-driven and private enterprises in CARICOM economies.

With the exception of Haiti, US developmental assistance to CARICOM countries has declined from the mid-1980s. Many interpret this as a sign that the US does not regard CARICOM as a priority. Of note is that the decline in US aid has been accompanied by the rise in economic aid from other countries such as China. The US should increase its development assistance to CARICOM countries in order to boost their fledgling economies.

The World Bank's current portfolio to CARICOM countries focus, inter alia, on economic policy, urban development, education, catastrophe risk insurance, disaster risk management, HIV/AIDS prevention and control, biodiversity conservation, management of climate change impact, public sector modernization and telecommunications. The World Bank should increase the amount of resources provided to CARICOM countries.

The Inter-Development Bank (IADB) has provided vital development funding to CARICOM countries. World Bank should increase the amount of resources provided to CARICOM countries. The Caribbean constituency has had 53 loans amounting to \$1.2 billion. During 2009 the Caribbean constituency (the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) received \$495 million in loans following on \$404 million in 2008. To date (in 2010) a further \$235 million has been approved. These projects include policy-based lending and investment loans for infrastructure, education, water, agriculture, sanitation, energy and coastal protection. The IADB must be endowed

with additional resources to enable it to continue its policy-based lending and counter-cyclical financing, and to expand its conduit of resources to the SMIDEs of CARICOM.

The militaries in the region have enjoyed strong ties to the US over the years both from a bilateral perspective and through regional security agreements. Examples include the recent strengthening of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and commitment by USSOUTHCOM to strengthen regional capacity through CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)⁹⁵ in the joint planning of a strategic framework for countering illicit trafficking.⁹⁶ USSOUTHCOM has employed many peacetime initiatives in the region through training, conferences and joint-exercises with Caribbean states. While other US Executive agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the US Coast Guard have cooperated at the operational level in the fight against drug trafficking through Caribbean waters.

⁹⁵The Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) was established by the Twenty Seventh Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government in July 2006, as the implementation arm of a new Regional Architecture to manage CARICOM's action agenda on crime and security. Caribbean Information Society Portal, "The Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)," <http://carib-is.net/stakeholders/caribbean-community%E2%80%99s-caricom-implementation-agency-crime-and-security-impacs> (accessed 22 November 2013).

⁹⁶Reported on the CARICOM IMPACS website, http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1&format=feed&type=rss (accessed 22 November 2013).

Caribbean Policy Towards China

Most Caribbean states engage with China because of the Prospect of economic and social development in the region.⁹⁷ As shown in chapter 2, China is able to provide a substantial amount of economic assistance towards development of infrastructure, investment and trade, banking and finance, agriculture and culture, among other areas. The Caribbean bloc of countries, therefore on a whole, regard China as an important source of development aid, Foreign Direct Investment, and trade for generating long-term growth and development in the region. The region will look to China for deeper economic and financial cooperation and China's membership in the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank is an important feature of this economic relationship.

China is also seen as an intermediary between the Caribbean and developed countries as the largest and fastest growing developing state. In this respect the Caribbean would benefit from aligning itself with China because of the potential China holds for transforming the global economic order.⁹⁸

As long as there is a perception of a decline in US interest in the region, China will present itself as a viable alternative for aid and development assistance. During the period of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan spanning the last 10 years especially, the US aid and assistance declined in real terms. Chinese policy of non-interference and

⁹⁷Annita Montoute, "Caribbean-China Economic Relations: What are the Implications?," *Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy* 1, no. 1 (February 2013): 110-126.

⁹⁸Ibid.

neutrality provides easy access to Chinese loans and therefore China presents itself as a strong counterbalance to the economic and financial decline from the US.⁹⁹

Summary of Inputs for Strategic Analysis

Table 5 summarizes the inputs of the relationships between the US, China and the Caribbean. A critical assessment of these facts provides the foundation for determining the nature of the strategic environment.

Table 5. Input, Questions, Sources

Input	Questions	Sources (Caribbean Region)
Strategic Setting	What are the geopolitical characteristics of the Caribbean region?	Close proximity to US Southern Border
	What is the history of the Caribbean region?	Discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1400s. Former colonies of Europe. Protectorate of US under Monroe Doctrine
	What actors can influence the situation in the Caribbean?	Neighboring states (US, Mexico, Central and South America), Non-state actors (IGOs, TNCs, TCNs)
	Why does the US care about the Caribbean Basin?	Third Border, Geographical proximity. Geopolitical landscape, Access.
	Why does China care about the area?	Resources, Influence
	What are the actors' sources of power?	Economic, Military, Diplomacy
Current Events	What is the US domestic situation	Stable
	What is occurring that concerns the US?	Chinese economic and diplomatic expansion in the Caribbean
	What is occurring that concerns China?	-
	What has changed or is changing?	US no longer distracted by War
	What is the significance of the change?	US may now re-focus attention in the Caribbean
National Guidance	What actions have relevant actors taken?	Observing
	What US national Interests are involved?	Security, International Order
	What Chinese national interests are involved?	Access to resources, Isolating Taiwan, Solidarity with Developing nations
	What is the US Policy towards the area?	Security Cooperation, non-interference of foreign powers in domestic affairs of region
Peacetime Planning	What is China's Policy towards the area?	Economic development and sharing of resources
	What plans already exist to deal with security in the region?	US/Caribbean security apparatus/ Regional security organizations
	What resources and capabilities—military and non-military- are available?	Limited military and non-military

Source: Created by author.

⁹⁹Ibid.

Assessment Challenges and Opportunities

Major Strategic Challenges

From an assessment of the strategic environment, the major challenges surround answers to the following two questions:

1. Are there emerging threats to Caribbean or US security due to China's expansion?
2. Does the US perceive China's growth in the region as a threat to its interests?

The major challenges to Caribbean security remain the threat posed by transnational organized crime-illegal narcotic and arms trafficking, human trafficking, criminal gang violence, extortion, and corruption. The potential for the growth of terrorist networks and the influx of violent extremists will increase if the security apparatus weakens by virtue of lack of capacity or capability within national borders or the strength of alliances in the region, and especially with the US. The region's ability to deal with the problems posed by these security threats is a direct function of their economic standing and its unique vulnerability to external shocks. Failing economies such as that which exists in the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti, coupled with the ever threatening impact of natural disasters, create conditions that invite criminal exploitation. The best remedy for any government and by extension, the region, is economic development which leads to capacity building.

The researcher's close examination of all the activities conducted by China within the region reveal efforts to improve economic relations, trade and investment and diplomatic cooperation with Caribbean nations. The prima facie implications are therefore, without evidence to the contrary, that these activities will serve to build

economic and infrastructural capacity and serve to strengthen national and regional capabilities. While there remains a question of motive, capacity building will serve to strengthen the region's security apparatus rather than increase the potential for the growth of transnational criminal or terrorist networks. With aid and development support from the US to the region declining in real terms since the 1990s, having an alternative to US aid may serve to decrease vulnerability to external shocks and the penetration of criminality.

Still, the region's vulnerability may also be threatened by diminished capacity in the regional security arrangements. Will China's economic development impact longstanding regional cooperation and support from the US? Any examination of the historical trends of the US when it is perceived that the region may be threatened by any foreign power will reveal that the more likely reaction of the US would be to deepen and strengthen current security arrangements. Successive US Administrations have bolstered and augmented the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine and have not strayed from a foreign policy which reinforces the US' commitment to a 'protectorate-like' figure over the Americas. The geostrategic importance of the region underscores the US' need to ensure that both the security of the Caribbean island states and the US itself is not threatened, and therefore the region's most powerful ally will exert all influence and project whatever instrument of national power required to maintain stability.

If there is no obvious emerging security threat posed by the predominantly economic activities of the Chinese in the region, should the US perceive a threat to its sphere of influence and power in the geostrategic lands space? And if so, what are the implications for US and Caribbean security? The answer to the former must be in the

affirmative. If the Chinese are employing strategies in the pursuit and protection of their interest in the long-term, it is quite likely that economic influence used as an instrument of national power, will have the effect of inducing CARICOM states towards a more pro-Chinese relationship. There is the possibility, which cannot be ignored, that this expansion is very much a part of a long-term agenda to attract alliances and co-opt support for China's policies. Based on the principles of soft power projection already discussed, this may be achieved through institutions and policies as is the current modus operandi of China and Caribbean relationship.

To reiterate Hirschman's argument on influence, it should also be noted that the cultivation of interdependence, when conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, may lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies in alignment with the stronger state. In this view, economic persuasion by the Chinese may have the double effect of attracting positive alignment towards China at the expense of dis-alignment with the US, and so doing also cultural resentment towards the dis-aligned state.

The long-term effects of a growing economic relationship between China and the Caribbean arguably mean a diminishing of the relationship between the US and the Caribbean, in effect, a zero sum game. It is still not, however, a military or physical threat to US or regional security. It is merely perceived as an indicator a possible deterioration in the relationships that currently exist based on economic influence. Of importance to note is that the studies have indicated that China's increased trade and investment in the region still lag behind that of the US. The US remains and will continue to be for a very

long time in the future, the region's largest trading partner along with the European Union.

It is also worthwhile to point out that it is not an all positive relationship between China and the region. First, China does not engage CARICOM in a manner that promotes regional integration. Most of its agreements are bilateral in nature. This poses the danger of hindering cohesion which is the foundation of CARICOM itself. Second is that the trade relations are such that encourage cheaper Chinese imports replacing local products which boost exports from China but reduces local development and export. The agreements, which, contrary to the expressed "no strings attached" policy, normally impose the employment of Chinese labor for major infrastructural development projects. Third, China does not insist on development of values such as good governance, democracy and human rights in their developmental strategy of non-interference. Some studies argue that the lack of emphasis on such important issues will be detrimental for the long-term and economic development of the region.¹⁰⁰

Potential Opportunities

While there is the possibility of a deterioration in the sphere of strategic influence exerted by the US in the region over the long-term if the Chinese continue on this path unhindered, there is also the potential for opportunities to be grasped by all stakeholders based on common interests and objectives.

Economic development within the region is in all stakeholders' interests. It is the cornerstone of stability and the driving force in cutting dependence on external aid and

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

foreign influence. Economic stability reduces the vulnerability of small states to external shocks and possible penetration by criminal entities. Whether this economic development is driven mostly by the US or China, is immaterial at this time as it would serve to improve security rather than improve risks to security. It would be in the best interest of the US and the Caribbean to therefore, leverage opportunities for economic development that are being provided by the Chinese for two main reasons.

The first is that in terms of global concerns and the current US Administration's policy, the traditional security concerns of the region pale in comparison to the security issues in other parts of the world, such as in the Middle East. They pale compared to concerns about weapons of mass destruction and the rise of violent extremist groups. This means that the relatively peaceful economic development of the Chinese in the region, although important, will not receive the level of attention in US foreign policy as the more immediate and present danger posed by the other issues. Second, the current Administration has stressed a more cooperative and interdependent relationship in its policy towards the Caribbean, and in general. This means it is discouraging what is normally perceived as dependency syndrome associated with its international relationships and encouraging mutual cooperation and independence. Loosely translated- the region must adjust to the fact that it will receive less and less in aid assistance compared to other times in the history of the relationship.

This may also provide the opportune time for the US and China to establish multilateral security arrangements to assist CARICOM in maintaining a secure environment within the region. It would be in the interests of all concerned to invest in security cooperation to create a climate conducive to economic development and less

prone to vulnerabilities to traditional threats such large TCNs or the infiltration of terrorist networks. It would be a win-win arrangement.

Summary of Interests and Objectives

Based on the analysis conducted on the strategic environment and given the nature of the relationships that exists among the US, China, and the Caribbean, the information in Table 6 portrays the assessed interests, objectives and possible Courses of Action (COA) for each stakeholder.

Table 6. Table of Interests, Power, and COAs

Actor	Interests	Power Available	Strengths	Weaknesses	Likely COAs
US	-Security -Prosperity -Values -International Order	Diplomatic Informational Military Economy	All	None	Most Likely: Diplomacy and Economic activity Most Dangerous: Military offensive posture
CHINA	-Access to Resources -Solidarity -Isolation of Taiwan	Diplomatic Informational Military Economy	All except military	Military	Most Likely: Economic activity Most Dangerous: Military defensive posture
CARICOM	-Peace -Democracy -Prosperity	Diplomatic Informational	Diplomatic	-Military -Economic	Most Likely: Diplomacy and economic opportunity Most Dangerous: Military and political alignment with China

Source: Created by author.

The US continues to promote and protect its national interests of security, prosperity, values and international order within the Caribbean through all of its instruments of national power. The foreign policy is reflective of a continuation of the original precepts of the Monroe Doctrine and more recent arrangements such as the Third Border Initiative which guarantees US cooperation and protection against threats within the region. Its military is operationally engaged in programs providing capacity building, humanitarian assistance, and security cooperation through USSOUTHCOM. It remains the Caribbean's largest trading partner and benefactor of aid for developmental assistance. The US most likely course of action based on the strategic assessment is a continuation of its current policy utilizing economic assistance and diplomacy to further its interests. The most dangerous course of action which may be adopted by the US would be to perceive a direct threat posed by China's expansion and move towards a military offensive posture.

China is focused on mainly utilizing its economic power, with help from diplomacy and strategic communications, to further its interests of solidarity, access to resources and isolation of Taiwan. From all indications, this strategy does not appear to pose any immediate implications to regional security and on the surface, may provide a complementary approach to current US policy towards the region. The emphasis on economic development, while benefitting from the returns of access to resources, does not conflict with the interest of the US nor of the Caribbean community. The advancement of the 'One China' policy is being pursued through the power of economic inducement and does not present a security concern. The Chinese most likely course of action would be to continue its strategy of deepening cooperation and promoting

economic development while its most dangerous course of action would be to adopt any form of military posturing.

The CARICOM's goals are prosperity, democracy and peace. The region will grasp at economic development opportunities in furtherance of these goals. The region's main source of power is diplomacy and it depends on the assistance of strong allies and a foundation of regional integration in order to ensure the region remains one of the most peaceful and secure in the world. CARICOM's most likely course of action would be to continue diplomatic and economic outreach to both US and China. The most dangerous course of action would be to adopt a political and military alignment towards China.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings

This study attempted to ascertain the implications to regional security posed by the emergence of China as a strategic influence in Caribbean geopolitics. It found, *inter alia*, that Caribbean states are too small to present any credible challenge to the international security climate and therefore only appear on the radar screen when American interests are at stake due to crisis or instability. Thus, US policy makers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, and it would appear that attention to the Caribbean is largely motivated by the onset of crises. By default, in periods of relative stability, the US reverts to a position of commensurate disinterest.

This position sets the tone for understanding the region's security climate and the rationale for attempting to discern security implications from a largely economic relationship between China and the Caribbean in a comparatively stable geographical space. It is a fact that the island states in the Caribbean, collectively organized as CARICOM, have unique challenges based on their sizes which make them unusually vulnerable to risks-whether from global financial shocks or natural disasters. Historically, the region has enjoyed the distinction of falling under the protective umbrella of the US due to its geographical proximity to the hegemonic power.

The US has always discouraged any incursion by external powers into the hemisphere beginning with the Monroe Doctrine articulated by President James Monroe in the early 19th century, and subsequent affirmations in the Roosevelt Corollary and the

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative as recent as 2001. The nature of such incursions, however, would be of such that would be perceived as threats to US interests, typically of a security nature, but not necessarily confined to a military threat. The Monroe Doctrine for instance, was originally aimed at discouraging any further colonization by European powers of countries within the Western Hemisphere. It is no secret however, that the doctrine sought to stamp the US' authority as the only power that may interfere in the affairs of these states as they were located within the "backyard" so to speak, of the great power.

Over the centuries, when the primacy of the US was unchallenged, its policy would reflect routine security cooperation with the Caribbean. This would however change in periods where there appeared to be challenges to the status quo. Major flashpoints of increased US attention in the region in the last century include: after Haitian revolts (1914-1934), Cuba (1917-1933), Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), Panama Canal Treaty negotiations (1958, 1964), Grenada invasion (1983), Haiti Presidential Coup (1994, 2004), and Haiti after the earthquake devastation (2010). Outside of these periods the Caribbean would experience a diminished level of interest as the US focused attention to other priorities on the world stage.

Here enters China, the largest developing nation in the modern world and one that is considered by many as the greatest threat to the US as a world power. The PRC over the last 10 to 15 years has rapidly expanded its economic ties to countries with the Caribbean. The only states excluded are those six that have maintained diplomatic relationships with Taiwan. China has spent billions of dollars in aid and soft loans to these small island states with which it has ties and has invested heavily in areas such as

infrastructural development, agriculture, finance and trade, and tourism. This expansion in trade and political relations has spurred much debate concerning China's motives and the seeming incursion into the hemisphere traditionally under the power and influence of the US. Many suspiciously view China's reach and growing economic and diplomatic influence as either a direct threat to the interests of the US or as a strategic long-term goal in furtherance of a future super power status in the global architecture.

End State

The primary concern of the researcher was the impact which the competing interests of the US and China would have on the current security apparatus within the region, given its unique security challenges. The end state is to critically analyze the strategic environment in order to determine interests, objectives, and possible courses of action of each stakeholder, and to recommend a way forward.

Summary of Security Environment

The nature of security challenges in the region has long been considered a feature of the small size of Caribbean states. This smallness presents an unusual vulnerability to risks especially those associated with sophisticated international crime and well-financed transnational criminal organizations. Some of the most significant traditional threats include drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms trafficking, corruption of public officials and organized crime. These types of security threats may have less impact on larger and more developed states with strong crime fighting institutions and infrastructure, but on small states with fledgling economies, many large criminal organizations could overwhelm the security apparatus.

The Caribbean also lies in the direct trans-shipment zone between South America and North America which represent the major supplier and consumer of illegal drugs respectively. The close proximity of islands such as Jamaica and Haiti to the Southern border of the US is a major factor contributing to the flow of drugs and illegal arms in the region. The situation is compounded by the fact that TOC and criminal networks have been expanding and are able to penetrate even secure developed nations. TOC threatens the region's economies and by extension US economic interests with the potential to cripple financial systems through exploitation, subversion and distortion, or trade and economic markets. There is also a direct link between terrorist networks and TCNs, indicating that terrorist financing is being generated through TOC.

These threats are beyond the capacity and capabilities of Caribbean small states to deal with on their own. Over the years there has been much assistance and cooperation with the US to counter transnational criminal activities. The partnership has focused on strengthening the individual nation's capacity to combat organized crime with emphasis on the drug trade in order to promote regional security. One of the major initiatives of the US in its security assistance program is the building of independent capacities to fight crime with complementing efforts to promote sustainable economic development within the region.

Strategic Direction

The expanding influence of China throughout the region is due mainly to its economic investments. The PRC has pursued an aggressive campaign to establish strong financial ties with almost every Caribbean state. Those that still have ties with Taiwan would benefit from massive financial aid if they break ties and those who establish ties

with Taiwan would lose financial aid. Without having an expressed motive for the increased interest in the region, it may be concluded, based on the observed trends, that China's main goals are to advance its 'One China' policy and to broaden its global geostrategic interests in furtherance of sustainable economic growth. China has expressed in its policy towards the region that it is pursuing peaceful development and friendly cooperation with an end state to build a peaceful and prosperous world. The PRC's enduring interests were assessed to be solidarity, access to resources and furthering a 'One China' policy. In its outreach China recognizes that it has many differences with the US, but also common goals. It stresses mutual respect for these differences and seeks to deepen cooperation between the two countries. The PRC is also showing signs of intent to have a greater share in the responsibility for international peace and security as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The US strategy is hedged in preparation for a modernized Chinese military, but acknowledges that their current relationship is one that is long-term and multidimensional. Importantly, in the strategic analysis of the competing interests, the US approves the rise of China as a peaceful and prosperous China. The analysis revealed that the US would like to see China, as the largest developing nation and the second largest economy in the world, take on more responsibility and share more of the international burden of ensuring stability and growth in the international system. This aligns with the US strategy towards the Caribbean where it seeks to promote economic and social opportunity, ensure citizen security, and strengthen effective democratic institutions. Of even more significance is that the current US Administration's policy stresses the promotion of independence and a shift in US aid away from security assistance and

towards building capacity, humanitarian assistance and bolstering respect for civil and political rights. It has strengthened assistance that build capabilities and capacities which counter terrorism and target the drug trade while its COCOM (USSOUTHCOM) stands by to support US national interests in its efforts to promote regional security and cooperation.

The CARICOM needs sustainable economic development. It relishes the opportunity to take advantage of China's investments primarily as an alternative to diminishing aid and assistance from the US. It needs security assistance which is predominantly supplied by the US, but that will eventually shift towards developing capacity in specific areas. In essence, China will fill a need in supplementing US assistance in areas where China is willing to assist, and where the US is shifting focus. If the US is interested in promoting sustainable development and supports the rise of a peaceful China that is able to assist in providing additional developmental aid to the region, then there should be no conflict of interests in China's expanding economic relationship.

Major Challenges

Security is the main concern of this analysis. The current threats to regional and US security form the basis of the implications of China's growing relationship with CARICOM states. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the increased economic developments between China and Caribbean nations will create added traditional security concerns.

The lack of capacity to counter transnational organized crime and terrorist networks is another major challenge. Any assistance that will serve to improve the ability

of these small states to deal with national and regional criminality, and bolster their infrastructure to withstand risks and external shocks would be welcomed in the region.

The growth of Chinese influence may amount to be a security concern, but not an immediate threat. Based on the current US and Chinese relationship, there is no overt activity suggesting any direct military confrontation anytime in the near future.

Potential Opportunities

When considered in its totality, the growing influence of China does not indicate any diminished influence over and by the US in the region. In fact, the US still remains CARICOM's largest trading partner, closest and most powerful ally, and the largest contributor to regional development and security assistance. The growing economic relationship, combined with the US interests and policies at this time, seem to favor an opportunity to cooperate in the promotion of economic investments within the region. It also provides an opportunity for the US to allow China to share in the responsibility of developing the international system and also to establishing regional security cooperation agreements to fight against terrorism and TOC.

Recommendation

The researcher recommends that the way forward would be for the US to encourage China to take on more responsibility in the areas of security and economic development of the region. China should continue with its most likely COA to advance its interest through the economic means. The US should continue with its most likely COA to advance its interests through diplomacy, economics, military and informational means, and CARICOM should continue to take advantage of opportunities for economic

development by advancing its interests in the best way possible through the employment of strong diplomacy initiatives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Arael, Jeremy R., and Emil A. Payin, ed. *U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996.
- Barnett, Thomas P. *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004.
- Ellis, R. Evan. *China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.
- Griffith, Ivelaw Lloyd. *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993.
- . ed. *Caribbea Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*. Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004.
- Hart, Albert B. *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation*. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1916.
- Hirschman, Albert O. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Nye Jr, Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
- Rosales, Osvaldo, and Mikio Kuwayama. *China and Latin America and the Caribbean*. Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2012.

Periodicals

- Bernal, Richard L. "The Dragon in the Caribbean: China-CARICOM Economic Relations." *Round Table* 99, no. 408 (June 2010): 281-302.
- Ellis, R. Evan. "Chinese Military Activities in Latin America: Panda or Dragon." *Perpestiva*, no. 28 (April 2012): 74-76.
- . "Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study." *JFQ*, no. 60 (1st Quarter 2011): 85-91.
- Montoute. Annita. "Caribbean-China Economic Relations: What are the Implications?" *Caribbean Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy* 1, no. 1 (February 2013): 110-126.

Thorburn, Diana. "Remapping Caribbean Geopolitics." *NACLA Report on the Americas* 39, no. 6 (May 2006): 26-31, 37, 39.

Government Documents

Chinese Government Official Web Portal. "China S Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbbean." November 2008. http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm (accessed 20 October 2013).

Congressional Research Service. "China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa." A Study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 8 April 2008. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/crs-china.pdf (accessed 20 May 2013).

Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008.

Department of the Army. Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0-1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011.

Dumbaugh, Kerry, and Mark P. Sullivan. *China's Growing Interest in Latin America*. CRS Report for Congress, 2005. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22119.pdf> (accessed 1 August 2013).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000.

———. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010.

———. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011.

Lum, Thomas. *China's Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40940.pdf> (accessed 23 September 2013).

Meyer, Peter J., and Mark P. Sullivan. *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2012. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf> (accessed 12 September 2013).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence." November 2000. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18053.htm> (accessed 30 April 2013).

- Report of the European Commission on Latin America: Regional Programming Document 2007-2013. http://eeas.europa.eu/la/rsp/07_13_en.pdf (accessed 13 June 2013).
- Sullivan, Mark P. *Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2013.
- U.S. Department of State. "FY 2013 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations." 9 March 2012. <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/index.htm> (accessed 13 September 2013).
- US National Security Council. "Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security." <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/threat> (accessed 24 September 2013).
- Valenzuela, Arturo, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. "US-Latin American Relations: A Look Ahead." United States Department of State, 6 January 2011. <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2011/154105.htm> (accessed 12 September 2013).

Research Projects

- Balcavage, Colonel Robert M. "Exercising The Monroe Doctrine in Chinese-Influenced Panama." Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2011.
- Cole, Kathleen D. "Sleeping Dragons Awakens: Ramifications of Chinese Influence in Latin America." Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2006.
- Ellis, R. Evan. "U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America." Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2005.
- Gray, Colin S. "Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century." Monograph, U.S. War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2011.
- Hoey, James H. "The Global Reach of Chinese Soft Power: China's Rise and America's Decline?" Thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, 2007.
- Hwang, Edward F. "China's Soft Power and Growing Influence in South East Asia." Thesis, Naval War College, Monterey, CA. 2008.
- Marcella, Gabriel. "Dimensions of U.S.-Latin American Military Relations." Research Memo, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 1978.

- Ogilvie, Major Jaime S. "Exploring the Future of Security in the Caribbean: A Regional Security Partnership." Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007.
- Ronfeldt, David. "Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin." Research Report, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1983.
- Rose, Lieutenant Colonel James K. "Si, Se Habla Mandarin: China's Growing Influence in Latin America." Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2011.
- Taylor, Paul D. ed. "Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North to South." Strategic Research, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2004.
- Tiankai, Ambassador Cui, Chinese Ambassador to the US. "China's Foreign Policy and China-U.S. Relations." China Forum, SAIS, 8 October 2013. <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/sghds/t1086428.htm> (accessed 1 November 2013).
- Vereen, Kevin. "China, The Regional Hegemon with Global Reach." Strategic Research Project, U.S. War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2011.
- Yarger, Harry R. "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy." Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006.

Other Sources

- Bernal, Richard L. "Growing Economic Presence of China in the Caribbean." Paper presented at the International Monetary Fund/University of the West Indies, Conference on "The Caribbean Challenges after Global Crisis," Barbados, 27-28 January 2011. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/carib/pdf/bernal2.pdf> (accessed 25 July 2013).
- Caribbean Information Society Portal. "The Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS)." <http://carib-is.net/stakeholders/caribbean-community%E2%80%99s-caricom-implementation-agency-crime-and-security-impacs> (accessed 22 November 2013).
- CARICOM IMPACS website. http://caricomimpacs.org/impacs/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1&format=feed&type=rss (accessed 22 November 2013).
- Digital History. "United States Becomes a World Power Policing the Caribbean and Central America." http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid+3162 (accessed 12 September 2013).

- Ellis, Evans Ph.D. "Chinese Engagement with Nations of the Caribbean." April 2011. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2011/2011-4/2011_4_06_ellis_s_eng.pdf (accessed 18 May 2013).
- Ereli, Adam, Deputy Spokesman. "Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic on the Third Border Initiative." U.S. Department of State Archive. 13 January 2004. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28136.htm> (accessed 14 June 2013).
- Erikson, Daniel. "China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother." The Jamestown Foundation, 2009. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35848&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=83aaa0f966 (accessed 11 August 2013).
- Fieser, Ezra. "Why is China Spending Billions in the Caribbean?" *Global Post*, 22 April 2011. <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/110325/china-caribbean-investment-tourism> (accessed 13 July 2013).
- Gallagher, Kevin, P., Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski. "The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America." *Inter-American Dialogue*, February 2012. <http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf> (accessed 17 May 2013).
- Girvan, Norman, ed. "China's Growing Presence in the Caribbean." <http://www.norman.girvan.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/china-in-the-caribbean-2007-2011.pdf> (accessed. 18 May 2013).
- Ismael, Odeen. "China's Influence Growing in Latin America and the Caribbean." *Share*, (2009). <http://www.sharenews.com/opinion/2009/07/01/china%E2%80%99s-influence-growing-latin-america-caribbean> (accessed 22 September 2013).
- Jacobson, Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. "Remarks to the 42nd OAS General Assembly." United States Department of State. 4 June 2012. <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2012/191779.htm> (accessed 12 September 2013).
- Mastanduno, Michael. "Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice." Paper prepared for *Interdependence and Conflict*, edited by Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, for submission to University of Michigan Press, June 2001. <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2013).
- Phillips, Nicola. "Consequences of an Emerging China: Is Development Space Disappearing for Latin America and the Caribbean?". The Centre for International Governance Innovation. Working Paper, 2007. http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Paper14_Nicola_Phillips.pdf.

Sanders, Sir Ronald. "China's Presence in Dominica." *Caribbean News Now*, 29 April 2011. <http://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/opinion/389630.html#axzz1L32altQl>. <http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A--China%27s-presence-in-Dominica-6189.html> (accessed 22 September 2013).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC). "Drug Trafficking." <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/> (accessed 24 September 2013).

Vuving, Alexander L. "How Soft Power Works." Paper presented at the panel "Soft Power and Smart Power," American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, 3 September 2009. <http://www.apcss.org/Publications/Vuving%20How%20soft%20power%20works%20APSA%202009.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2013).