Route-Clearance Operations
Abstract
Current Army doctrine is too limited in its coverage of route-clearance operations. Since World War II, a steady increase in casualties from mine warfare suggests that our doctrine lacks the necessary scope and that we need training to successfully conduct combined arms route-clearance operations. Casualties from landmines increased from 4.4 percent in World War II to 33 percent in the Vietnam War. Twenty percent of the U.S. casualties during Desert Storm and 26 percent during Operation Restore Hope were caused by mines. While mine technology has surged, countermine capability is 30 to 50 years old. Mine warfare is an important part of the opposing force (OPFOR) tactics, and much of it is concentrated along friendly lines of communication (LOC). For battlefield success, Army units must clear their LOC of any obstacles and enemy activity that disrupts circulation of forces and material. Shortfalls in technology, doctrine, and training have all contributed to the limited success of route clearance operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Most units training here fail to recognize route clearance as a combined arms operation, and they routinely attempt to clear their LOC without conducting preliminary planning, task organizing, rehearsing, and battle-tracking procedures. The "Thunder Run" is the most common route clearance technique observed at the JRTC. Units roam the roads at 15 or more miles per hour looking for mines-and detect them when a vehicle explodes. U.S. forces cannot accept this approach. As a fighting force, we must develop ways to retain our mobility. This article identifies some of the problems in route-clearance operations and provides options to help ensure successful passage of the force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA599416
Entities
People
- John K. Leighow
Organizations
- United States Army Engineer School