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14. ABSTRACT This is a study of the Salfist-Jihadist movements appeal to the Islamic Population resulting in their growing popularity and ability to re-seed extremist groups with willing new members. Not all Salafists are terrorists, nor are all terrorists Salafists, however their teachings potentially leave a greater number of their followers open to radicalization than other Islamic movements. The United States must read, study and learn from jihadi writings, counter the Salafi-Jihadist's Offer of perpetual Jihad to the Islamic Community, make the Islamic Community the Center of Gravity in action as well as in speech, and define the military mission within Islamic Lands. Misunderstanding over US intentions in Islamic Lands has fueled radical salafist propaganda which has not been countered by the US, while the US has also not amplified the counters being offered by governments of Islamic Nations. The battle against extremism is a skirmish, while the real battle wages within the minds and perceptions of the Islamic Community.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**The Salifist-Jihadist Movement's Appeal to the Potential
Terrorist & Possible Counter-Measures**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Major Wayne E. Prince, United States Army

AY 2009-2010

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Master of Military Studies**Executive Summary**

Title: The Salafist-Jihadist Movement's Appeal to the Potential Terrorist & Possible Counter-Measures

Author: Major Wayne Prince, United States Army

Thesis: This research is a study of the appeal of the Salafist-Jihadist Movement to muslims and examines its vulnerability to radicalization. The goal of this study is to determine why it appeals to potential terrorists, how it serves to radicalize young Muslims and to begin a discussion of what counter-measures exist. The United States can more effectively counteract terrorism by focusing on societal issues within the Islamic World, rather than focusing entirely on the radical minority within it.

Discussion: Religious extremism has led to violence in all of the world's religions. While the world has eradicated much of this in modern times, fundamental Islam has come to the forefront of American minds through the events of 9/11. Within the Islamic World the Islamists gained a significant following since Arab Nationalism and Pan-Arabism faded away. This has put the Islamic extremists at odds with their state governments. In seeking a grievance to coalesce their following around the Islamists have chose the United States, the 'far enemy' as the source of their troubles. The progression of extremist Islamic movements has given rise to the Salafist Sect of Sunni Islam. The Salafists constitute a very small minority of the world's Sunnis, and the radical extremists among the Salafists are a smaller number still; however, they hold great influence and continue to grow at an alarming rate. The Salafists are literalists in terms of living as Mohammed as taught in the teachings of the Holy Quran and the Hadiths. Moderate Muslims portend that the Hadiths provided the sayings and doings of the Prophet Mohammad from which the religious scholars can extrapolate these teachings to apply to modern times. The Salafists take no count of time or space and insist on returning to the ideal. This makes it extremely difficult for the moderate Muslims or their government to counter the arguments of the Salafists, as the Salafists use the strict, word for word, script from the Holy Quran and the Hadiths in support of their arguments. These teachings follow dangerously close to the *Six Steps to Radicalization* identified in a study by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center for Terrorism Research. While not all jihadis are Salafis, a disproportional number of Salafis actively or passively support the jihadis. The United States' fascination on the jihadis however misses the main target; the Ummah, the center of gravity for the extremists. The United States must continue targeting the terrorists, while providing more assistance and attention to the Ummah.

Conclusion: The Ummah should be the main focus of the United States' counter-extremists approach. The Current trends of diplomacy have not been effective and provide the jihadis with fodder for fueling hate. There are schisms between the jihadis and the Ummah. The jihadis offer the Ummah a state of perpetual war. The United States must support the center of gravity, the Ummah, and can do this through a better understanding of the Salafists.

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Preface

After serving greater than two years in Iraq as an intelligence officer I found that the U.S. military was quite adept at mapping terrorist networks and movement patterns with the result of capturing and killing a substantial number of identified bad actors. Dedicated to the cause and supportive of my commanders I read Mao, Guevara and sought to expand my learning further on countering insurgents militarily. I felt quite confident in my ability to target insurgents, but wanted to know how we could take out the insurgents and ensure there is no one else waiting to take his place. Mao Tse-Tung famously said the guerilla must move among the people like a fish through the sea. We must expose the fish by removing the sea. It was this idea that prompted my assertion to examine how to do this. This paper is the product of that examination.

I am thankful to many who assisted me in this project. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Rebecca Johnson for her guidance, support and keen recommendations throughout the process of research and writing this paper. Her patience to dig through the initial incoherent drafts was of great help and deeply appreciated. I am thankful for the depth of knowledge and breadth of the curriculum provided by the Marine Corps University which provided many different views of the problem and world class lectures which provided fascinating insight. Likewise I am indebted to many Marine Corps University faculty members who contributed greatly to my gaining a larger understanding of this topic. I am grateful for the research team and resources at the Alfred M. Gray Research Center. Their expertise and energetic response as well as their forgiving nature for my overdue books were of great value. Marine Corps University's dynamic student body composed of students from varying backgrounds and inclusive of Soldiers from Muslim countries was of great benefit. Most importantly, I must thank my wife, Andrea, who endured and strongly supported my focused attention to this project for many evenings and weekends.

The Salifist-Jihadist Movement's Appeal to the Potential Terrorist & Possible Counter-Measures

Introduction: The Source of America's Current Threat

If our goal is comprehensive change and if our path, as the Quran and our history have shown us, is a long road of jihad and sacrifices, we must not despair of repeated strikes and recurring calamities. We must never lay down our arms, regardless of the casualties.¹ – Al-Zawahiri, 2001

America, despite all of its war-making powers, has been unable to reduce the threat of Islamic based terrorism in the world and has not developed a coordinated plan for preventing Islamic based terrorism in the first place. The main effort has been against the terrorists, who are the minority, while the majority of the Muslim population has been largely ignored. Ignoring this majority has prevented the United States from determining or acting on the sources of dissatisfaction within Muslim communities, which allows the terrorists to replenish their numbers. The large part of the effort in the war on terror has been to try to answer the questions on how to prevent terrorists from harming America. While part of America's effort must focus on meeting the threat that exists today, greater attention is required to reduce people's motivations to resort to terrorism in the first place.

The first step in shifting our focus from reaction to prevention is correcting a general misunderstanding that overstates the popularity of radical Islam among the wider Islamic community. Due to this misperception of Islam, the United States unfairly touts Islam as synonymous with terrorism, which results in the racial profiling and distrust of Middle Easterners. Violent extremists benefit from the U.S.' misunderstanding. By drawing the attention of the United States directly upon active terrorist groups and personalities, terrorist franchises such as Al Qaeda have not only grown in prominence, but also succeeded in divesting the

attention of the United States from, or skewing its perception of the more populous mainstream Islamic community. Over the past decade America's encounter with elements of radical Islam has focused on countering the outwardly visible symptoms, such as violence or anti-U.S. rhetoric itself instead of seeking to determine and affect the underlying causes for this behavior. This reactionary stance has only served to amplify the voice of those calling for extreme action.

This paper examines the radical Salafist Movement* and its relationship to modern terrorism in order to try and understand why this movement appeals to people and why its advocates ascribe to terrorism. A minority group of radical Salafists have succeeded in causing the United States to marginalize entire groups of people, thereby further feeding their efforts at recruiting and radicalizing a population. Only through understanding the root causes of radicalization can the United States effectively counter this movement. The United States can only counter the spread of radical Salafism by strengthening its relationship with the moderate Islamic Community. The United States can more effectively counteract terrorism by focusing on societal issues and the Islamic World at large as opposed to a radical minority within it. Just as counterinsurgencies are never won through targeting the enemy alone, neither will the battle against Islamic extremism be won unless the United States focuses its main effort on building a positive relationship with Muslim populations around the world.

Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab is credited as the founder of Wahhabism and drew upon the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya in claiming to be "purifying Islam of innovations."² While estimates show only about 1% of Muslims to profess Salafism, their influence is much more significant

* Salafists: Sunni Muslims drawn largely from the Hanbali school of Islam who believe the true understanding of Islam is based solely upon the words and deeds of Muhammed and are therefore very conservative in their stance. They refuse to accept the rulings of most Muslim authorities unless based upon the words and deeds of the pious forefathers (salaf). Those within Saudi Arabia prefer the term Salafi over the term Wahabi, while these terms are often in reference to the same groups. Salafists originated in Egypt and have since intermixed with Wahabbis in Saudi Arabia. Note that not all Salafis are violent extremists, nor are all terrorists Salafists.

than their numbers.³ The United State's continued broad brush approach of the Islamic World contributes to this wide margin of influence through its painting of large segments of Muslims in the same light.

This research will attempt to propose some measures available to the United States that could help alleviate societal pressures within the Islamic World and thereby deter potential terrorists from the apparent appeal of the Salafi-Jihadist movement. First this research will examine the environment in which radicalization takes place and what factors terrorist groups target. This will include a discussion of societal and religious factors within the Islamic World. Next this study will attempt to identify the factors within the environment that are key vulnerabilities to radicalization. This study will conclude with actions the United States can undertake or influence in order to defeat terrorism at the root.[†]

Background: The Environment of Radicalization

Quite often the media refers to a terrorist as an Islamic extremist or fundamentalist without further clarifying this descriptor. This leads to the conclusions that the attacker was a terrorist because he was a Muslim. While there have certainly been instances of extremism in all of the world's major religions, terrorism is a defining issue of the day and a large preponderance of the terrorist attacks against Western targets are being undertaken by Islamists. Moderates within the Islamic faith cite that theirs is a religion of peace. The question the United States must examine is how charismatic terrorist personalities use Islam to radicalize young Muslims to the extent of carrying out acts of violence? In an effort to answer this question a review of the components of the Muslim faith as well as the role of Islam within Muslim society is required

[†] Root: The author identifies the root of terrorism as the radicalization process to include the environment in which radicalization occurs.

with an eye for what has left youths vulnerable. Currently there exist societal gaps within the Islamic World that radical Islamists such as Al Qaeda target for exploitation. This section reviews the identifiable gaps within Islamic society that allow a young Muslim to be vulnerable to radicalization. Finally, this section examines the roots of the Salafi sect in Islam and highlights the specific ideologies within this sect that may lend it to extremism.

A noteworthy guide to the radicalization process is a study by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center for Terrorism Research; *Six Steps to Terror*.⁴ Although this study seeks to determine the source of radicalization in homegrown terrorism, its steps are still relevant to the overall radicalization process, particularly as radicalization occurred for many such as, Mohammed Atta for example, within Europe.⁵ Of note, five of the study's six steps relate to religion. The six steps to radicalization identified in the study are:⁶

1. *Adopting a legalistic interpretation of Islam*
2. *Trusting only select religious authorities*
3. *Perceived schism between Islam and the West*
4. *Low tolerance for perceived theological deviance*
5. *Attempts to impose religious beliefs on others*
6. *Political radicalization*

In order to put the six steps to radicalization and the problem posed by these steps into context it is necessary to understand the youth bulge. The youth bulge within the Islamic World is one of the world's greatest challenges of the twenty-first century.⁷ Nearly 65% of the population of the Middle East is under the age of 30.⁸ This youth bulge is not lost upon movements within the Islamic World. The inability among youths to land employment or secure a good education leads to their disenchantment with the status quo and their seeking comfort in

religion.⁹ This large youth population results in both a large population of unemployed youths in Islamic lands and a large number of Muslims emigrating into the West in search of employment or education. “Middle Eastern youth face unemployment rates that are nearly twice the world average; 20-40 percent compared to 10-20 percent.”¹⁰ These instances leave them vulnerable to radical elements who actively seek to exploit them along the lines of the steps to radicalization. These cases lead the youth to believe that the West along with apostate Muslims is the cause of their unemployment. Muslim youth who have not acclimated to new cultures after emigrating seek comfort in a return to their roots often found at the mosques.¹¹ Radical elements seize upon those who appear vulnerable or willing to listen with sales pitches of them not being to blame for their current situations and subsequently bringing them to the understanding that the West is to blame.¹² In discussing the six steps to radicalization it is important to maintain sight of the problems posed by the youth bulge.

The nature of Islamic culture’s interconnection with a sense of a legal system makes addressing the *adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam*, the first step in the radicalization process, a difficult challenge to understand and more difficult still to counter.¹³ Sharia offers a complete account of life – the relegation of religion does not exist in Islam and Islamic law exerts strong authority over many Muslims. As Mohammed served as both religious and political leader in his time and upon his passing the caliph sought “to ensure the faithful following of God’s will as embodied in Islamic Law.”¹⁴ The Holy Quran and the Sunna[‡] provide the source for Islamic Law and establish a code of life for Islamic society which also strengthens the Islamic scholars as they serve as “the advisors to governments.”¹⁵ Historically Islamic scholars “ran the schools and universities, developed, applied and interpreted the law and administered the social welfare system.”¹⁶ As such, it is readily apparent that society holds greater importance

[‡] Sunna refers to custom sanctioned by tradition, that of the example or model behavior of the Prophet

than the individual does, and that Islam, interpreted by Islamic Scholars, holds great influence over society. The traditional Islamic worldview was of a “life that was intimately and organically related to politics, law and society.”¹⁷ It is important to note there are differences in the degree to which individual Muslims submit to Islamic law. In Iran, submission is enforced by the state. In Pakistan, Turkey, India and elsewhere submission to Islamic jurisprudence is a personal, not public choice. For Salafists, Sharia is true Islam and the Ummah not living by Sharia were living in a state of Jahiliyya.^{§:18} The Salafists pursuit of the establishment of Sharia would serve as the vehicle to realize Islam reestablished as the decisive factors in all elements of Muslim life.¹⁹

The second step in the six steps to radicalization is the decision to *trust only selected religious authorities*.²⁰ Given the authority of selected religious scholar(s) as the sole interpreters of the Holy Quran, scholars manipulate their reading of the Holy Quran and how individuals understand their faith and place in the world. Radical religious scholars will take full advantage of this and consider those with opposing views apostate making it very difficult to argue.²¹ For Salafists, the literal interpretation of the Quran is the only true interpretation of Islam and any variance of this is apostate in their perception. Illiteracy lends itself to radicalization by causing the populace to be more accepting or even dependent upon others interpretations of what the Holy writings say as they cannot read them for themselves.²² In fact, 80 percent of Muslims have no access to the sacred texts in Arabic.²³ Islam has not had its own version of a Martin Luther to spread the teachings of the Quran in all languages and dialects.

“If Arabic is the key to this culture, the Holy Quran is the key to Arabic.”²⁴ Recognizing there exist non-Arabic Muslims; Islam remains rooted in Arabic scripture. The Holy Quran is the word of God as received by Mohammed and therefore not subject to question; however, the Prophet’s secretary, Zaid Ibn Thabit, compiled the final collections of the Holy Quran’s

[§] Jahiliyya: A state of ignorance of divine guidance

teachings after the death of the Prophet.²⁵ Ibn Thabit completed this during the Caliphate of 'Uthman who is thought to have ordered an authorized version copied, and all variants destroyed.²⁶ The protection of the Holy Quran, exhibited by protective measures regarding its translation, served to defend its integrity resulting in protecting the Muslim Identity from potentially merging with other cultures during early Muslim conquests.²⁷ Preventing the diffusion of the Holy Quran served to protect the word of God, to protect the Islamic (primarily Arab Islamic) culture and also served to be the impetus for the creation of a class of religious scholars who would become the only accepted interpreters of Islam.²⁸

Islam has played an integral role in societal life and within state politics since its beginnings. "The Ummah^{**} serves as the dynamic vehicle for realization of the divine mandate in society."²⁹ Within Islam, the Ummah is a central, underlying and all important concept which arguably then defines one central cultural difference with the West's individualism.³⁰ Further the submission required of the Muslim is not passive, but rather "to strive to actively realize God's will in space-time."³¹ This explains why the Islamic scholars have great influence over the Ummah as they hold a unique access to the Holy Quran similar to that of Catholic Priests prior to Martin Luther's Protestant Reformation. When radical teachings are pronounced in Islamic societies where the state reinforces a legalistic interpretation of the faith these two steps to radicalization magnify each other.

The third step to radicalization is the *perception of irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West*.³² World events and the interpretation of them by media of the Islamic world have contributed to this step. During the twentieth century the world has observed Muslims treated unfairly in Algeria, Bosnia, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The differences in western and

^{**} The Ummah refers to the Islamic Community; a community of believers

Islamic society was apparent to several terrorists of the 9/11 attacks who were living and studying abroad during their radicalization process.³³ American dialogue after the events of 9/11 only served to contribute to the delineation of 'us and them' as American leaders struggled to define and name their enemy. Radical Salafists attempt to further expand this divide or the perception of it and can only profit through the belief in an incompatibility between the West and Islam. Usama Bin Laden used Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory in an attempt to unify Muslims in a common defense against the West by raising attention to what he portrayed as an inevitable conflict between the West and the Islamic World.³⁴ Radicals attempt to use any such studies as divisive members in an effort to isolate their targets for radicalization. Radical Salafists attempt to portray only those aspects of Western culture that paint it in a morally decayed light while labeling the West as the primary source of the Islamic World's societal grievances.

Irreconcilable differences between the West and Islam are illustrated in the more radical rhetoric surrounding the perceived unjust occupation of Islamic lands by non-believers and the persecution of Muslims worldwide. Today it is noted that 75% of the world's refugees are Muslim and that no Muslim country has a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations.³⁵ At one time the Islamic world was the largest empire yet known, yet during the nineteenth century the western powers overwhelmed them militarily, economically and politically.³⁶ The threat of colonialism brought with it the establishment of secularist governments and educational systems.³⁷ Some among the Ummah interpreted this as a threat to Muslim identity as well as Islam; the latter due to their belief that the height of the Islamic empire was validation of God's approval for their society.³⁸ The perceived threat to Muslim identity inspired reform movements throughout the Ummah, some of which were the beginnings

of radicalization based in Islam.³⁹ While some movements advocate peaceful change others, such as the radical ideology of Al Qaeda, advocate a need for violence.

Step four in the radicalization process is *low tolerance for deviance*.⁴⁰ This is seen generally in the literal interpretation of the Holy Quran. The Salafists claim to be the only Muslims capable of providing a literal interpretation.⁴¹ This provides an angle to radical religious scholars who may pick and choose verses of the Holy Quran that serve their cause in radicalization, but avoiding discussion of those verses that counter their cause. This is similar to a biased news agency playing a sound bite without putting it into context and without playing the full message. This allows only that specific targeted message to get out to the target audience which is the desired effect; amplify the messages that serve the purpose of radicalization and attempt to mute or ignore those that do not. A progressive example of *low tolerance for deviance* is in the Taliban's establishment of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This organization established punishments for deviance in public settings.

The fifth step in the radicalization process is *attempts to impose religious beliefs on others*.⁴² This "step is often a natural extension of individual's low tolerance for perceived theological deviance."⁴³ In his description of the radicalization of 9/11 terrorists, Marc Sageman describes this process as some of the terrorists become argumentative with friends, family and other Muslims concerning their view of the plight of the world's Muslims.⁴⁴

The sixth step of radicalization is political radicalization.⁴⁵

*The contemporary jihadist political narrative can be broadly outlined: Western powers have conspired against Islam to subjugate it, both physically and morally. At the same time, Muslims worldwide have lost their faith, and lack the strength that they possessed during Muhammad's time. The only proper response to the present situation is military action.*⁴⁶

Political radicalization often develops as individual learns of injustices or perceived inflicted upon Muslims.⁴⁷ This could be the case of an Iraqi child witnessing his father's

mistreatment at the hands of a U.S. soldier or it could be something the individual is taught at a madrassa, heard from a friend or is discussed in the mosque making it highly susceptible if the individual has already been radicalized to unquestioningly trust a specific religious authority. The realization of political radicalization is the claim that current leaders in the Islamic world are corrupt, unjust or puppets of the West.⁴⁸ This is a common theme among Islamic groups and the common denominator between the Arab Nationalism movements and the Islamic Movements.

While the Salafi movement is not inherently radical simply by acceptance of Salafist teachings, it is evident that their presupposed beliefs lend to their vulnerability to the radicalization process. When further aggravations such as difficulty in finding employment or education or a perception of the West's exploitation of Muslims of the world the path to radicalization can begin or escalate. An understanding of the Salafi Sect can help to understand how their basic tenants may allow for significant numbers among them to be susceptible to radicalization.

Roots of the Salafi Sect:

The Salafi movement was one of three major twentieth century movements whose focus was to meet the challenges to the Islamic identity posed by the West. The origins of Wahhabism are traced to Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab who followed upon the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and "claimed to be purifying Islam of innovations."⁴⁹ These teachings took root in Saudi Arabia when the Wahabbi movement of Saudi Arabia merged with Salafi teachings, which originated in Egypt in the 19th century and benefited from the growth of the prestige of Saudi Arabia within the Arab world.⁵⁰ Wahabbism sought to reject modernity while Salafism developed as a movement to meet it, provided it was strictly grounded within the teachings of Islam.⁵¹ As

Salafists entered Saudi Arabia from Egypt due to Egyptian pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood the group combined with the Wahhabi.⁵² The death of Egyptian President Nasser and the ideology of Pan-Arabism in the 1970's as well as the rise of Shi'a Fundamentalism in Iran and the 1980's Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan all served to further radicalize the Islamist movements.⁵³ "Today it is estimated that whilst less than 1 percent of Muslims are deliberately and consciously Wahhabi in their outlook, the Wahhabis nevertheless influence or reach with their ideas about ten percent of all Sunnis."⁵⁴ This figure is expected to grow throughout the twenty-first century without the governments of Muslim states acting to stem its growth; however, the movement has already found its way into important positions within Saudi Arabia.⁵⁵

The Arabic term *salaf*, meaning past, is the root of the term Salafi and is indicative of their pitch for bringing back their vision of the world at the height of Islamic conquest and empire.⁵⁶ The original Salafists were not a fundamentalist group, but a modernist group seeking reform.⁵⁷ This explains some confusion within the understanding of one of the movement's apparent differences of meaning as while it claims a goal of returning to the roots of Islam, their actual beliefs appear new, not ancient.⁵⁸ An example of this is that the Salafists reject the traditional Principles of Jurisprudence through which the foundations of the Shari'a^{††} are found.⁵⁹ As the Quran and the Hadiths^{‡‡} were not written in current times it is often difficult to apply their teachings to modern problems; yet, it is also difficult to counter the argument of the

^{††} Shari'a: Islamic Holy Law based upon in sequence: 1. Holy Quran, 2. Hadiths, (the sayings of the Prophet), and the Sunna, (recording of the Prophet's actions), 3. Qiyas (logical analogy of teachings) and 4. Ijma, (unanimous consensus among scholars). SOURCE: Oliveti, V. (2002). "Terror's Source"

^{‡‡} Hadiths: The recorded sayings and actions of the Prophet Mohammed as recorded by his followers

radical Salafi seeking to adhere to a literal reading of the text and apply this to the modern problem.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of Salafism is their choosing particular Hadiths that best support what they want to say and lend them to a politically charged form of Islam.⁶⁰ In one aspect the Salafi do rightly refer to past, traditional Islam and this is in the rejection of the Qiyas^{§§}.⁶¹ This is on the grounds of the Qiyas being subjective and suggesting it can be directly countered by the Holy Quran or within the Hadiths.⁶² In this manner, the Holy Quran and the Hadiths are taken literally and without question too include a lack of critical thought involving the time of the writing and its meaning in modern times. Further, there are two types of verses within the Holy Quran, literal verses from which the Shari'a are derived and "verses which are allegorical or inherently open to reasonable interpretation, these being the ones from which Islamic wisdom and culture are derived."⁶³ Despite this, the Salafists hold that there are no allegories, but only literal meanings within the Quran.⁶⁴ The Salafi form of Islam is literalist and anti-philosophy in description.⁶⁵

A subset of the Salafi group is the Takfiris, who are the more dangerous aspect of the overall movement as they believe in all the things the Salafi do, but have additional beliefs specific to them to include: they believe in the right to declare and justification to kill all non-believers including those Muslims they deem to be apostate, a clear indication of the fifth step to radicalization. Likewise they deny the legitimacy of any government not adhering to their beliefs. Finally, they reject traditional Islamic restraints for the traditional rules of declaring or practicing jihad and accept suicide as a legitimate tactic in jihad.⁶⁶ These additional beliefs

^{§§} Qiyas: An analogy made by religious scholars; Principle in jurisprudence used to make determinations on new situational matters not specifically mentioned in the Quran or the Sunna. SOURCE: Ruthven, M. (2006). "Islam in the World, 3rd Ed."

readily provide for the acceptance and support of acts of terrorism and assassination.⁶⁷ Not all jihadists are Takfiris, nor are all Takfiris jihadists. Yet their belief in the right to declare other Muslims as apostate provides an avenue used by jihadists such as al-Zarqawi in order to justify the killing of other Muslims. Zarqawi is an example of a jihadist borrowing from the Takfiri beliefs in order to justify and support his actions and is evidence that the Jihadists will pick and choose from other Islamic fundamentals as seen fit in the prosecution of Jihad.

In the jihadists' argument there is a close war; (against local and state governments) and a far war against the West.⁶⁸ Terrorists such as Usama Bin Laden are proponents of the far war as argued that they cannot hope to win the close war while outside influences, such as the United States, prop up state governments.⁶⁹ Two significant and telling issues come of this close-far war argument: One is that whether close or far, the Salafists intend to continue their war. Second, the very argument breaches the gap between religion and politics. As put forth earlier, religion permeates every aspect of Islamic culture, to include government; however this portends that Salafist groups such as Al Qaeda have a political goal as much as they have a religious goal. The overall end state is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Taken directly from al-Zawahiri's 2002 book, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, is the following goals:⁷⁰

1. *First stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq*
2. *Second stage: Establish and Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a Caliphate - over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq.*
3. *Third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq*
4. *Fourth Stage: Clash with Israel...because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity*

Al-Zawahiri follows in the guidance of Abu Bakr Naji that luring a superpower, the United States, to invade the Middle East directly is only the beginnings of a larger plan to establish an Islamic Caliphate through violence, thereby restoring their ideal of the heights of Islamic civilization. Spreading their own brand of Islam is a means to this end. To succeed, they must convince Muslims to employ violence.⁷¹ The Quran does provide for violence in the defense of aggression against Muslims.⁷² The act of inciting Muslims to violence becomes far easier for a vastly greater number of Muslims if the jihadis can heed Abu Bakr's recommendation and bring the United States into Muslim lands as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Al Qaeda was certainly growing in prominence as a terrorist organization before the attacks of 9/11 and America's response, it was not yet on par with such organizations as Hamas. However, the 9/11 attacks and America's response resulted in the Al Qaeda franchise to grow rapidly.

The Salafi threat is growing as their influence expands over Sunni Muslims. The actions of the West have not slowed, but arguably have fueled this growth by providing a Western force within Islamic lands thereby resulting in the drawing of many Muslims recruited as mujahedeen. The Salafi propagandists say that Western forces have been oppressing the world's Muslims and provide the American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan as support for this position. "If the jihadis are right in their assessment of geopolitics and the situation in the Middle East, overt U.S. military action or diplomacy can often be more harmful than helpful in the fight against jihadi-inspired terrorism."⁷³ The key to defeating this threat is in the population that is not yet radicalized. This weakness has been recognized by the Jihadists as evidenced by Abu Bakr Naji's concern for public opinion within his writings.⁷⁴ Further evidence and exploitation, although possibly incidental, of this weakness can be seen through a study of the "Anbar

Awakening” in Iraq. In this case, brutal and indifferent attacks upon the population advocated by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi resulted in the population turning against the jihadists. This weakness was recognized in advance by the Al Qaeda leadership as evidenced by Ayman al-Zawahiri’s attempts to reign in the actions of al-Zarqawi, an issue brought to light by the well publicized letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi.⁷⁵

The Threat is Recognized: How Can the United States Defeat it?

America must remain prepared for maneuver warfare, while it is increasingly clear that the threat posed by non-state actors who are transcontinental in character and ambiguous in design is going to be a challenge for the foreseeable future. The United States has identified radical Salafi-Jihad as one threat for the twenty-first century and has struggled to meet it. Year after year the press lauds the success of the U.S. military in capturing and killing terrorists. This must continue, but the United States must determine how to counteract the core grievances that allow these groups to continue to replenish their numbers. This section will lay out six ways in which the United States can mitigate the threat of the radical Salafists. The United States continues to label the Muslim population as the center of gravity, but has not effectively weighted this as the main effort. In a force on force fight, the military would expend much effort in attacking the enemy’s center of gravity; yet, in the battle with terrorists, the population has been largely on the sidelines. The United States must undertake coordinated actions to engage the center of gravity – the population, thereby separating it from the terrorists.

The radical Salafists have distorted the traditional sense of jihad and have used their influence within mainstream Salafism to spread their influence.⁷⁶ The radical Salafist movement is an identified threat to the United States as evidenced by the common use of the term Salafi-

Jihadi, but it is also a threat to non-Salafist Muslim governments, the near-enemy. As discussed, non-Salafists are at a disadvantage in the battle for public opinion of Muslims because both sides draw their arguments from the Quran and the Hadiths. In the Salafists' case, they take the literal verbiage, while moderates attempt to understand the writings wrapped in the framework of time.⁷⁷ This is always arguable, whereas the Quran is not, which explains the dilemma that moderates face. Attempts to counter the Salafists' teachings can easily be portrayed as heresy. A bedrock of Islamic faith and in fact of jurisprudence developed as early as 656CE and remains a bedrock today: the statement, "let the Quran decide."⁷⁸

Read, Study and Learn from Jihadi Writings:

*Al Qaeda has historically told us what they were going to do, and then proceeded to do it*⁷⁹. –Mansfield, L., 2006

The United States must read the primary source materials of jihadist groups and personalities in order to gain clearer understanding of their ends, ways and means. The act of reading and learning from jihadi writings has proven challenging for primarily two reasons: 1. There is an overwhelming quantity of materials making the text selection a highly subjective matter and 2. Many useful texts as well as useful information within texts are overlooked as it is not known exactly what the researcher is to look for or what it will look like.⁸⁰ Abu Bakr Naji has put forth that the failure of past jihadi efforts was the support of proxy governments by the super-power nations and the use of media to portray an aura of invincibility such as the connotation of the very term, 'superpower'.⁸¹ Bakr's proposed solution to this was to provoke a superpower to invade the Middle East resulting in a great propaganda victory for jihadis on the following basis:⁸²

1. *Muslim People will be impressed that jihadis are in direct conflict with a superpower*
2. *Muslim People will be outraged that a foreign power has invaded the Middle East*
3. *Muslim People will be disabused of the notion of the superpower's invincibility the longer the conflict is drawn out*
4. *Muslim People will be angry at Proxy governments allied (or installed by, ie in Iraq or Afghanistan) with the invading superpower*

Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, AKA "the pen jihadist" has authored a handbook on global insurgency within which he discusses reasons for the failures of past jihadist efforts as:⁸³

1. *Local regimes worked together against the jihadis.*
2. *Jihadis failed by ignoring ethnic minorities and tribes.*
3. *Jihadi leaders did not establish a personal connection reciprocated by their low ranking fighters*
4. *Past jihads failed because those fighting failed to win popular support. The fighters failed to sell themselves or their movement to the populace.*
5. *Past jihadi movements lacked religious legitimacy due to alienating the local religious leaders*

Still jihadi groups are not hiding their intent; it is plainly written in many documents and plastered on open jihadi websites such as the above examples demonstrate. The United States should do more to capitalize on the operational planning capital that Jihadi groups have placed in open source mediums with the intent garner widespread attention quickly and proliferate their message. It is clear that more effort and resources must go into understanding the extremists through the writers who guide their ideologies. Currently they benefit from obscurity without the need for technological security measures. Other than determining their intent, these writings

could help identify additional schisms to exploit within their movements as well as possible new links to locations or persons involved in jihadi activities.

In order to achieve increased understanding Washington should seek out the assistance of host nation governments in identifying the writings, broadcasting and internet based portals used by terrorists and associated groups. The State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs would best conduct this facet of a comprehensive approach, unless efforts were made to create a stand alone agency similar to the United States Information Agency. A second is to embrace its domestic media outlets and seek to discontinue the perception that U.S. media is the enemy of U.S. government and national security. Nearly every major media network maintains overseas affiliates. Through these affiliates the media could provide a summary of broadcasts and publications by region tailored to the purpose of identifying radical writings. Lastly, all collectors should provide identified jihadi websites and e-mail chains to the U.S. Cyber Command. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will need full access, particularly for leads that return to a U.S. based target. Once jihadi writings are recognized, read and understood United States officials will be better able to separate the Islamic population from the influence of the jihadis. This separation can be done through countering the errors where possible. Further, through learning not only what the jihadis publish for U.S. consumption, but also those messages intended for the Islamic Community, the United States will be in a better position to counter the jihadists offer to the Islamic community.

Counter the Salafi-Jihadists' Offer to the Islamic Community:

"It is a fact that Al Qaeda and associated groups offer no vision for Muslims other than perennial jihad – hardly an appealing prospect."⁸⁴ The jihadists recognize the power inherent

within the populace as identified in al-Zawahiri's book entitled, *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, in which he writes; "The jihad movement must come closer to the masses, defend their honor, fend off injustice, and lead them to the path of guidance and victory."⁸⁵ He continues, "We must win the people's confidence, respect and affection."⁸⁶ Within these writings it is clear that through an offer to lead people to the path of guidance, he is referring to recruiting new members and supporters. Zawahiri argues that the battle is for every Muslim and that the conflict must be global, not regional, for if it is regional the powers of the West will be able to concentrate their powers upon it.⁸⁷

Zawahiri called for an element to devote itself to issues of the people, with a stated task being to share people's concern through education.⁸⁸ The Salafists utilize two primary vehicles in support of this aim - madrassas and mosques. Madrassas serve a key role in grooming young Muslims in the ideologies, while the mosques provide a call for education and recruiting. In her testimony before Congress, Jessica Stern stated that some madrassas function as orphanages as well as schools and that the Taliban were borne from extremist madrassas within Pakistan where she reports Pakistani officials estimate 10-15 percent of its religious schools are extremist.⁸⁹ In many Islamic countries the Islamic madrassas are fulfilling the states gap in providing education, and in the cases of some, orphanages for its population. These schools are self regulated and in large part able to act freely. The U.S. aid to Pakistan has benefitted state ran schools, not the independently ran madrassas.⁹⁰ The fact is that "efforts to turn madrassas away from radicalism are succeeding and need U.S. support."⁹¹ The non-governmental agency, the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy has had marked success in reforming madrassas within Pakistan over the past five years with the result of madrassa leaders becoming advocates of peace.⁹² This reform has focused on teaching critical thinking, religious tolerance and human rights and "all

suggested changes in the curricula are grounded in Islamic principles, enabling participants to feel they are becoming better Muslims in the process.”⁹³ Within the Swat Valley area of Pakistan, an area known to be a hotbed of Taliban fighters, a madrassa conducted a workshop attended by a terrorist commander who had intended to discredit the teachings and instead found himself in agreement with the teachings of the peacefulness of the Holy Quran.⁹⁴ The United States should finance and expand projects such as this. While it can never truly be measured it is probable that this method has deterred more terrorists than were killed or captured in a year.

The mosques permeate life and their callers have long been used not only for the call to prayer, but as a means of transmitting information – or recruiting. As has been shown in the recent cases of Nidal Malik Hasan who opened fire on soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas the ability and powers of the mosques to recruit and transmit an ideology transcends regional boundaries. As Marc Sageman points out, several of the 9/11 hijackers became radicalized while living outside of Islamic nations.⁹⁵ Work undertaken within the madrassas as discussed above will influence the Ummah within the mosque as well. Through teaching the Ummah critical thinking skills the project is effectively draining the sea and exposing the fish.

The Battleground of the Ummah

The Ummah is the center of gravity for radical Islamic based terrorist organizations. Mao Tse-Tung wrote that the guerilla must move among the people like a fish moves through the sea. The counter to this would be that if the United States needs to remove the sea in order to expose the fish. The population truly is the key to success and removing it takes away not only the terrorists freedom of movement but also their support and recruiting base as well. The recommendations which follow hinge around some basic tenants:

1. Too much attention is given the extremists and too little to the Islamic Community
2. Not enough effort has been taken to understand either the Islamic Community or the jihadis
3. This is a battle of Muslim Identity that American weapons cannot win, can only temporarily suspend, but that must be fought and won in the hearts and minds of the Ummah and must assuage the core grievances of the Ummah.

America and the West can invade any Muslim country and expect to win a quick and decisive military victory. The battle for the Ummah requires a different kind of battle. U.S. troops should kill or capture terrorists when positively identified; however, the large scale invasion of a nation in order to attack a small jihadi force is counterproductive and feeds into their propaganda machine. In the end, even if successful in destroying the enemy jihadis, a military force could only hope to defeat the jihadis themselves, not the ideas they fought for, which will live on. Imagine if during the American Revolution the British would have destroyed the Continental Army. While this was certainly possible, it is not likely that the idea of freedom and independence would have been squelched. In order to defeat the ideas, the West must support governments in vulnerable lands, such as Afghanistan, and enable them to defend themselves from coercive threats of extremists and help these governments to overcome or meet the core grievances of their people.

In focusing on the population the West must make a genuine effort to identify their core grievances. Higher commanders must provide commanders on the ground the latitude to determine and rectify the grievances found in their sectors. Higher commanders must understand that cookie-cutter measures of effectiveness are only a fraction of the real story and may not give any indication of whether the grievance has been met thus eliminating the threat, or if for reasons unknown the threat is acting along a different line of operations.

Marginalize Radical Salafists:

Al-Zarqawi's indiscriminate killing of Muslims alarmed al-Zawahiri and others within the jihadi movement because their acts not only turned the population against them resulting in the loss of freedom of movement, but also would result in the loss of a large pool of potential recruits. Their extreme ideology causes them to rely heavily on coercive actions which in turns make them a burden upon their communities.⁹⁶ Further rifts can be seen within the writings of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, one of Al Qaeda's leading writers which depict a schism in thought between Al Qaeda ideologues and its more practical military leaders.⁹⁷ Al-Suri is a hardline jihadi whose arguments to "introduce self criticism as an accepted genre and method in jihadist thinking and his attempts to critically analyze the jihadist current objectively" led to conflicts with the Salafist core of Al Qaeda.⁹⁸ This difference is described in a December 2007 article by Brynjar Lia published by the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point:⁹⁹

On the one extreme are the hard line Salafist purists for whom doctrinal purity is of quintessential importance, even if it means fighting side battles, alienating allies and shattering any semblance of a common front against the "Zionest-Crusader" enemy. At the other extreme are primarily military strategists, and whose main preoccupation is political outcome, not doctrinal purity.

Abu Mus'ab al-Suri favors the military strategy and sought to integrate the tenants of Marxist Guerilla Warfare into the jihadist movement.^{***,100} According to al-Suri the jihadist draw their ideology from a variety of sources to include Qutbism^{†††} and Salafism.¹⁰¹ Abu Mus'ab al-Suri wrote of the conflicts within Salafi lines of thought: "It causes internal strife

*** Abu Mus'ab al-Suri defined the jihadist current as: "It comprises organizations, groups, assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, symbolic figures and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed jihad against the existing regimes in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling not by what Allah said, by legislating without Allah, and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of the Islamic nation. The jihadist current has adopted the program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims" As written in The Global Islamic Resistance Call and translated by Brynjar Lia.

††† Qutbism: Islamist ideology based upon the teachings of Sayyid Qutb.

among Muslims and within the resistance movement at a time when are being invaded by the American and Zionist Mongols and their war machines, and at a time when their satellites are eavesdropping on our ideological murmurs and monitoring our daily movements.”¹⁰²

Abu Mus’ab al-Suri recognizes that “the resistance has to be popular, meaning complete participation of all sects of the population, inclusive of all of its multiple diverse groups,” yet he recognizes the hard line taking by the Salafi purists will make this inclusiveness impossible and put at risk alliances with other militant groups as well.¹⁰³ In his book, *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*, Al-Suri relates being told by a Salafi purist that jihad must be fought as Salafists and that any non-Salafists allowed to help should not be granted any leadership roles, but should be lead in their duties as a herd of cows. His written response was; “I couldn’t really understand how we are going to participate in jihad with our brethren in religion and faith if we should deal with them as a herd of cows.”¹⁰⁴

Abu Mus’ab al-Suri has identified a schism within the Salafi-Jihadist threat. By becoming hard line purists, the military strategic theorists who sought inter-group political solutions and alliances against a common enemy had been diminished.¹⁰⁵ Al-Suri’s approach would be inclusive of a greater number of Muslims and thereby more dangerous. The descriptors used by radical Salafists in describing mainstream Muslims could potentially be exploited. By placing themselves and their cause above that of non-radical Salafists they marginalize themselves. This manner of thinking by hard-line Salafists should be presented to mainstream Muslims in their own words in order to display the fact that these hard-liners are quite literally seeking only to use them. This has the potential to show the Muslim community that the Salafist hard liners see them merely as fodder in their battle and are certainly not there for the majority Muslim population.

Using al-Suri's own words could be very powerful in this regard, although we must be careful not amplify the voice of al-Suri in place of that of the hard-liner Salafists, as al-Suri's more inclusive approach to Jihad would potentially be more dangerous. Still, dialogue al-Suri identifies, which portrays Muslims as pawns should be highlighted in order to show that these teachings and these leaders are not looking out for their best interests. In keeping this risk in mind as well as the literacy rates of Muslim nations in mind it may be beneficial to make audio recordings of specific selections of al-Suri's work which then could be broadcast into the Muslim nations. The political leaders of these nations could possibly be convinced that their hold to political power is endangered by the Salafist movement and could assist with this effort. Getting their assistance is instrumental to ensure this broadcast is not seen as further Western interference, as well as to help get the correct Arabic dialects for the recordings in specific areas.

Win Over the Center of Gravity: The Moderate Islamic Population:

One who could possibly fill the role of an Islamic Martin Luther according to John Donahue, and whom in fact various press has labeled as such is the Syrian Muhammad Shahrur who has written on contemporary Islam with mixed acceptance.¹⁰⁶ Shahrur states that:

No official Islamic Institute has dared to delve seriously into the impulses behind all those who practice violence. Because in such a case it would have to consider the basis of Islamic Jurisprudence and the way of interacting with the Book of God and this is something for which they are absolutely not prepared.¹⁰⁷

Perhaps more telling and certainly more ominous is his statement that "[The] official Islamic institution is incapable of entering into ideological confrontation with the theorists of the Qa'ida organization because the latter would defeat them because they both come out of the same ideological school."¹⁰⁸

Again, Abu Bakr Naji has identified another weakness, this being that moderate religious scholars may challenge the teachings and thereby reduce their potential pool of recruits.¹⁰⁹ Bakr argues for violence and criticizes Salafists as well as non-Salafists who advocate peaceful means such as taking part in elections.¹¹⁰ If the purist-Salafists themselves identify moderate religious leaders and Muslims taking an active part in government as a threat then this indicates that more study should be put into how can we exploit these threats as discussed above.

One method of countering this is through building stronger relationships with Islamic nations on the notion that if the Salafists are not open to moderate Muslims then the West is. In order to do this Americans must work hard both within our borders as well as abroad to eliminate anti-Muslim discrimination. Muslims must understand that America is not a threat to them and only seeks to defend itself, and them, from those bent on violence. This is a difficult task at hand and encompasses changing many aspects of how the United States presents itself as well as how America describes its enemy both abroad and domestically. Changing language in key dialogues is instrumental in this. U.S. officials should avoid terms that define Muslims or Islam in general manners. Describing Muslims in generalized terms that relate to language, culture or race does not serve to marginalize the radicals and in fact may push moderates towards the radical camp. Radicals easily manipulate the use of such descriptors in Western discourse in order to broaden their definition of 'us' and 'them.' This measure of changing descriptors has already begun at the time of this writing as evidenced by the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review which within its 108 pages does not use the words Islam, Islamic or Islamist.¹¹¹ The United States needs to take the same consideration when addressing an Islamic radical and actively address the situation in such a way to isolate the radical as opposed to including him within a subsection of the Ummah.

While an argument can certainly be made that education within Islamic lands needs to be improved upon, the same can be said for America. Each time a person of Middle East decent is mistreated at an airport this is surely played over and over in Arabic media. While safety is paramount, the Transportation Security Administration needs to ensure it is training its members in culture and that discretion is used when possible. Currently the Salafists, and in particular the hard-line Salafists represent a fraction of Muslims, yet their hard-line stance and violence has garnered them the greatest amount of the United States' collective attention effectively leaving the majority of Muslims on the sidelines.

The Salafist-jihadis are successful only where they succeed in drawing 100% of U.S. attention upon them, while ignoring the rest of the Muslim population. As argued in the recent study, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, the majority of the Coalition's intelligence apparatus has been insurgent focused and remains ignorant of the people, economics and general human environment in which they're operating.¹¹² In taking the example of this statement it can be said that American forces have not been as successful as they could have been in Afghanistan because they failed to pay attention to the population or address their concerns.

As Major General (MG) Flynn's paper discusses the failure of intelligence in accounting for the human environment within Afghanistan, it can be argued that the same has happened at the strategic level in terms of the Islamic World.¹¹³ It is imperative that the United States begin to focus on root problems of the strife existent within the Islamic World. Multiple Islamic thinkers have identified the problems as failing to adapt to the modernity of the twentieth century and more than a handful has credited the fault of this to colonialism and economic dominance of the West. There might never be a cause-effect agreement of the present situation between the West

and the Islamic World and if there were, there are still those within the Islamic World who do not want their world modeled off of the West. In this instance the West should be open and willing to help, but not be of the belief that the West knows best.

Define the Mission and Endstate of Military Actions in Islamic Lands:

O people! The viciousness of the Russian soldier is twice that of the American soldier. If the Americans suffer one tenth of the casualties the Russians suffered in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will flee and never look back. That is because the current structure of the American and Western armies is not the same as their structure during the colonial era. They have reached a state of effeminacy that makes them unable to sustain battles for a long period of time, a weakness they compensate for with a deceptive media halo¹¹⁴. –Abu Bakr Naji, 2004.

Abu Bakr Naji discusses luring a superpower to invade the Middle East directly. Now that this has come to fruition in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is a leading source of recruitment for jihadis. The American military presence in these countries has been a draw for a jihadis of varying ideologies, to include Salafists leading non-Salafists like cows' in jihad as written by al-Suri. Current U.S. government and military thought has corrected course and realized that the key to success in Afghanistan is through the people of Afghanistan. Unfortunately this was not the case previously when the focus on solely on the killing and capturing of terrorists.

America has allowed itself to become an exporter of democracy; however as with all exports, it must realize that the product as it is preferred in one region may need to be tweaked before it will be desired in other regions. Any government established by the West within Islamic lands is vulnerable to anti-government propaganda by mainstream jihadists who may be willing to support the Salafi-jihadists in order to attack it. The United States must allow a government to form that is acceptable to the populace even if it is not the most favorable to U.S. interestes. The support of the populace is the only thing that will give it true legitimacy and thereby a first line

of defense against radical Salafists. Simultaneously Washington must help to amplify the calls of Saudi Officials against terrorism and thereby display that there is nothing inherently wrong with Islam, nor with the non-radical Salafist movement. Often the American press calls for Saudi Officials to speak out against Al Qaeda, yet this is happening and simply not serving as front page news in America.¹¹⁵ An example is on February 21, 2010 as reported on the front page of the *Saudi Gazette*, the Advisor to the Saudi Royal Court, Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Bin Nasser Al-Obeikan stated that belonging to Al Qaeda is prohibited in Islam.¹¹⁶ Instances such as these are not getting press within American news and thereby Americans continue to believe that since they are not hearing anything to the contrary, Muslims must be condoning the acts of Al Qaeda. This is not the case, and it is apparent that Al Qaeda is a threat to Saudi Arabia as well as to the United States. Statements such as this should be amplified by American media to ensure broadcasting to all Americans as well throughout the Islamic World.

Conclusion

This research has demonstrated that there are schisms within the Salafists and more political oriented jihadis who prefer alliances among jihadis for a common cause. Further, the lack of understanding of jihadi intent as well as intergroup conflicts can be corrected through applying time and resources in reading the text written by the jihadis themselves. Lastly, this has shown that the threat of the Salafi-jihadists cannot be killed on a battlefield but must be defeated in a battle of ideas within the Ummah. The fact that the Salafi purists are literalists who take literal meaning from the Holy Quran makes them especially difficult to counter by moderate Muslims. This is because to counter the Salafi movement could easily be made to appear as heresy as they profess to live exactly as the Prophet had lived.

Salafism is merely one of several competing ideologies voiced by the jihadists. Yet, while it may be the fastest growing it may serve to weaken them all.¹¹⁷ The weakness with this brand of extremism is inherent in its actions that result in isolating the Ummah. While some jihadis are willing to form alliances, the Salafists are not open to full participation with non-Salafists which may result in making themselves vulnerable to non-acceptance by the Ummah. Further, the more open they become to alliances with other jihadis, the larger the group becomes, which makes it more difficult to control. Some, like al-Zarqawi may press too hard while non-Salafists may not enforce the same ideology.

What did not develop within this research was a silver bullet capable of defeating the Salafi-jihad movement at the root. The conclusion of this study is that this is not possible by direct action of the United States. This is because it is an attack on an ideology, not a physical target. Further, as the case of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border displays, terrorism is difficult to pin down to a place. In large part this is because the concept of nation-states does not fit neatly in the framework of Islamic nations in which the citizens see the nation more in religious terms than territorial terms.¹¹⁸

Most importantly the United States must understand the battle against terror is a skirmish, while the real battle wages within the minds of the Ummah. Salafism is a new progression of a continuing threat of extreme Islam that has shifted in nature and grown more dangerous since colonial times. The United States must continue to quietly support moderate governments, but must help them to find a solution to the righteous argument of the Salafist. This can be done by helping the governments of Islamic nations realize that they are also a threat to the Salafists; however will not be acted upon until the far war has been won. There are schisms to be exploited within the jihadi groups and the very extreme nature of the Salafists makes them

inherently vulnerable. Islamic writers such as Pasha Mohamed Ali Taeharah, who has an inclusive and accepting approach to other religions, should be supported and their successes and standing touted within Muslim nations.¹¹⁹ The threat of the Salafists will remain, however, until the Ummah no longer accepts it.

End Notes:

¹ Laura Mansfield. *His Own Words: Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri*. (TLG Publications, c2006.)

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