Counterinsurgency: A Forgotten U.S. Strategy

Abstract

The United States has a history of conducting large, conventional, firepower centric wars to achieve victory. This tactic hindered the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency since Vietnam. The U.S. consistently failed to recognize it was fighting an insurgency and instead tried to fight the American Way of War. The inability of the military to recognize an insurgency and provide a consolidated, comprehensive, and coherent COIN strategy began in the 1960s and continued through today. This inability has proven to be a significant failure for U.S. strategic interests around the world. From Vietnam until today, the U.S. has failed to learn the essential lesson: large, conventional units cannot do nation building or COrN operations due to their size, their inability to conduct decentralized operations, and their reliance on heavy firepower.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 13, 2014
Accession Number
ADA600200

Entities

People

  • Vincent S. King

Organizations

  • National Defense University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Cyber
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Afghanistan Conflict
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Insurgency
  • International Organizations
  • Iraqi-War
  • Marine Corps
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • Second World War
  • Special Operations Forces
  • Terrorism
  • Unconventional Warfare
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Systems Analysis and Design