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
**TITLE: Army Modularity and Command Relationships:
"Who's my Boss?"**

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
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Executive Summary

Title: Army Modularity and Command Relationships: “Who’s my boss?”

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Thesis: Army Transformation and Modularity have changed the model of the tactical fighting force, while unhinging the logistics command relationship at the Brigade Combat team level. This has resulted in confusion and debates regarding how the Forward Support Company should be task organized.

Discussion: Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for all operations. These relationships prescribe clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. Within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), a command relationship that has been defined in Army doctrinal publications is that of the Forward Support Company (FSC), but the implementation of that doctrine is being circumvented, causing multiple issues with its organic higher headquarters. Defining this relationship is essential because of the wide ranging implications that are affected such as Logistics Command and Control; Training, Readiness, and Oversight (TRO); enforcing the Principles of Sustainment; Resource Allocation; Unity of Command; and Span of Control.

Conclusion: Doctrine should emphatically state that the Forward Support Companies are assigned to the Brigade Support Battalion and should be placed in a direct support relationship with the maneuver battalions. By doing this, a common baseline will be established, limiting the initial debate. This technique was used successfully by the Forward Support Battalion for the Maintenance Support Teams (MST) serving in direct support of the Brigade Task Forces.

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Tables

	Page
Table 1. Brigade Combat Team Task Organization Chart.....	7
Table 2. Command Relationship Chart.....	12

Preface

This project is the result of my personal experience associated with the friction of two battalion level commands providing direction to a subordinate company without clear lines of authority expressed by the brigade headquarters. I have had numerous debates on where the Forward Support Company (FSC) should be task organized as well as the benefits and disadvantages of leaving them underneath their organic headquarters or placing them within their supported battalion. In my experience, most senior commanders are hesitant to make a decision during the initial stages of their command because of the lack of experience with FSC and the dynamics that come with these organizations. This hesitation will end as future leaders currently serving in Brigade Combat Teams grow through operational experiences. I don't anticipate wholesale changes in the mindset of senior commanders from this project, but I am optimistic that the research material provided will give readers a new perspective on the realities of doctrine, the friction that modularity has caused in this area, and a technique to carry away to influence unity of command.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance received by Dr. Charles D. McKenna, Dean of Academics at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Your perspective, insight, and most of all interest in this project were invaluable. Additional thanks go to the FSC Commanders of the 4th BCT, 1AD (2008 – 2010) for the candid conversations and sharing the struggles of their command. Finally, to LTC(P) David Wilson for your encouragement, candor, and most of all your approach in dealing with this command relationship challenge during your battalion command. Your mentorship and influence have been priceless.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	i
LIST OF TABLES	ii
PREFACE	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	1
ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION AND MODULARITY	2
THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (MODULAR DESIGN)	5
LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION ECHELONS BELOW DIVISION.....	7
ARMY COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS	10
MODULAR LOGISTICS FACES CHALLENGING CHANGES	14
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN A GARRISON ENVIRONMENT	15
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.....	21
CONCLUSION.....	25
ENDNOTES.....	28
BIBLIOGRAPHY	31

Characteristics of Army Command Relationships

Command Relationships define an organization's structure from the most senior commander to the lowest noncommissioned officer leading Soldiers on the battlefield. These relationships begin to take form through a unit's task organization, but are further refined by the senior commander. Command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders and organizations. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility.

Command relationships identify the degree of control by the commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identify the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.¹ As the commander further defines these relationships, his intent is simply to enhance the organization's command structure in order to effectively leverage command and control (C2), streamline directives, and facilitate span of control. Since the Army began transforming from an Army of Excellence (AOE) to a Modular force, these relationships have been skewed for sustainment forces at multiple echelons. Numerous publications have defined the Forward Support Company's (FSC) command and support relationship within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), but the implementation of this doctrine is being circumvented, causing multiple issues with the FSC's ability to operate with its organic and supported higher headquarters. Army Transformation and Modularity have changed the model of the tactical fighting force, while unhinging the logistics command relationship at the Brigade Combat team level. This has resulted in confusion and debates regarding how the Forward Support Company should be task organized.

Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for all operations. These relationships prescribe clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. Some forces are given command or support relationships that limit the commander's authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allow commanders to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces.² This paper will analyze how Army Transformation and Modularity affect the command relationships at the tactical level for sustainment units operating within the BCT. Defining this relationship is essential because of the wide ranging implications for areas such as Logistics Command and Control; Training, Readiness, and Oversight (TRO); enforcing the Sustainment Principles; Resource Allocation; Unity of Command; and Span of Control. While examining each of these areas, I will evaluate and provide a recommendation on the proper command relationship while operating in Garrison and during Full Spectrum Operations.

Origins and History of Army Transformation and Modularity

In order to understand the difficulties of today's command relationships, we must review previous logistics force structure, logistics doctrinal relationships, and be able to recognize the differences in order to suggest a solution. Additionally, to build a common operating picture, we will review what Army Transformation is, why the Department of Defense directed the military to transform, how the Army evolved towards modularity, and what effect it had on the logistics structure.

The initiation of Army Transformation began following Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990's. Senior civilian and military leaders identified a critical flaw in the Army's operating structure that derived from a Cold War era fighting force prepared to execute full spectrum

operations in Europe as a heavy fighting force. Following the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 by Iraq, the United States Army realized that it did not have a lethal force package to quickly project into theater to defend Saudi Arabia. Instead of a rapid response force of a heavy armored division, a Light Infantry Brigade from the 82d Airborne Division was the first to establish defensive positions in Saudi Arabia during the early stages of Operation Desert Shield. The entire US force package took nearly six months to generate sufficient combat power to begin Operation Desert Storm.³

The term “transformation” was made popular by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld during his tenure as the Defense Secretary in the George W. Bush administration. The origins of military transformation for US forces have been ongoing since the American Revolution. During the 20th century, the US Army saw transformation actions that included: the Square Divisions in WW I, Triangle Divisions in WW II, reorganization of Army Divisions after the Korean Conflict and during the Vietnam era, the Army of Excellence during the 1980’s through the 1st Gulf War, and Force XXI that evolved following Desert Storm and was the starting point for Army Modularity.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld defined transformation as a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations. It employs the nation’s advantages and protects against asymmetric vulnerabilities. It sustains the United States strategic position, thus promoting peace and stability in the world.⁴ Following the publication of the 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, the Army developed its Campaign Plan in order to implement this transformation throughout the force. The main effort of the campaign plan was the directive to convert all Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) maneuver brigades and activate 15 additional (AC) Brigade Combat Teams.⁵

General Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, testified before Congress on the importance and sweep of Army transformation. In December 2006 he stated, "Following 9/11, our Army began its most significant reorganization since World War II to ensure that the formations of all components are fully manned, equipped, and trained."⁶ This effort includes modernization, modular conversion, rebalancing forces across the active and reserve components, and a force generation model (ARFORGEN) that provides for continuous operations.⁷

General Schoomaker himself was continuing a process that began nearly seven years earlier in which then Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki envisioned a transformation strategy that would result in a force that was more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force.⁸ The Army's transformation process took on the form of a modular force. After gaining an understanding of why we transformed from an Army of Excellence to a Modular force, it is necessary to define modularity and determine its future significance.

Army Modular Force conversion reorganized the operational Army into modular theater armies, theater support structures, Corps and Division headquarters, Brigade Combat Teams, Multifunctional Support Brigades, and Functional Support Brigades based on standardized organizational designs for both the active and reserve components. The Army reorganized from a division-based to a modular brigade-based force to achieve three primary goals: First, to increase the number of available BCTs to meet operational requirements; second, to create Brigade-size Combat Support and Combat service support formations of common organizational designs; third, to redesign organizations to perform as integral parts of the Joint Force, making them more effective across the range of military operations and enhancing their ability to contribute to Joint, interagency, and multinational efforts.⁹

Modularity is a force design method that enabled parent units to detach modules or elements from the parent unit and to tailor those functions and capabilities for deployment in support of rapidly assembled contingency forces or a projected force. Modules or elements are interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet changing missions and requirements. The goal of modularity is to provide the combatant commander a flexible mix of headquarters and tactical forces. As always, the challenge is to be able to deploy the right force, and the right command and control, at the right time and place.¹⁰

Modular transformation affected nearly every organization within the operating force from the corps level down in an effort to produce an agile and lethal fighting force necessary to wage and win wars on the modern battlefield. This transformation moved the focus from a division-centric force focused on the employment of 10 divisions, to a brigade-centric force focused on the employment of 70 plus brigades that are more responsive to regional combatant commanders' needs, better employ joint capabilities, facilitate force packaging and rapid deployment, and fight as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespace.

The Brigade Combat Team (Modular Design)

The Army maintains that by organizing around BCTs and Support Brigades, it will be able to better meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment and, specifically, jointly fight and win the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Accordingly, the Army anticipated that modularization would result in:

- At least a 30 percent increase in the combat power of the Active Component of the force;
- An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50 percent;
- Army operating forces that require less augmentation when deployed – reducing the requirement for ad hoc organizations;


- Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units;
- Force design upon which the future network centric developments [Future Combat System] can be readily applied;
- Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle:
- One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active Component;
- One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force;
- One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and
- Reduced mobilization times for the Reserve Component as a whole.¹¹

Throughout the 1980's and 1990's, brigades were functionally aligned throughout the force underneath a warfighting Division Headquarters. Additionally, they were designed to provide a specific capability, sometimes linked to a specific region. Combat brigades were task organized essentially as either a heavy armor or mechanized infantry and light infantry force. The light infantry force was the strategic output developed in the early 1980's as the centerpiece of the Army of Excellence force structure.

The idea of a brigade-centric force was not uncommon. Most divisional brigades undergoing a combat training rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, would add additional transport and maintenance assets (from the base division's Main Support Battalion) in conjunction with the Forward Support Battalion (from the division support command), a military intelligence company (from the division's Military Intelligence Battalion), signal assets (from the division's Signal Battalion), and so on, often swelling up from a base strength of 1,700 to 4,000 Soldiers per rotation.¹² The maneuver BCTs are standing combined arms formations, each with combined arms task forces, organic artillery, reconnaissance squadron, logistics, signal, and a headquarters.

Heavy Brigade Combat Team Organizational Table

United States Army



Logistics Transformation Echelons below Division

In looking at logistics transformation at the BCT level a huge undertaking was initiated. The Division Support Commands (DISCOM) throughout the Army divisions were inactivated along with all the Main Support Battalions (MSB). Assets from each of these organizations as well as other inactivating headquarters from across the logistics formation were reorganized. A tailored force was created and assigned to the Brigade Combat Team providing the BCT commander with an assigned logistics force called the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB).

The Modular Force Logistics Concept is a major step forward in achieving required future force operational capabilities sooner to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The design incorporates the six transformation imperatives established by Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) for a modular force capability to improve near-term operational capabilities in a joint operating environment and achieve joint interdependence in logistics. Specifically, this concept enables and supports the following:

- First, a modular “brigade-based” Army that is more responsive to geographic combatant commanders’ (GCC) needs, better employs joint capabilities, facilitates force packaging and rapid deployment, and fights as self-contained units in non-linear, non-contiguous battlespaces.
- Second, an Army logistic structure that is responsive to the needs of a Joint and Expeditionary campaign quality Army.
- Third, eliminates redundancy and streamlines support by reducing unnecessary layers.
- Forth, provides a logistic capability that leverages emerging technologies, links support to supported organizations, and the Army to Joint organizations – from Continental United States (CONUS) to Area of Operations (AO) and within Area of Responsibilities (AOR).
- Fifth, no Reserve Component forces would be deployed within first 30 days.
- Six, this force must be “as capable” as the Army of Excellence force.¹³

The sustainment support structure found within the transformed modular brigade is the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB). One of the single greatest impacts on the transformed brigade size organizations was the placement of both a network support unit within the Brigade’s Special Troops Battalion and a dedicated logistical support structure – the BSB. While remarkable that this capability is now found within these transformed Brigade structures – not all BSBs are alike.¹⁴ The BSBs are tailored to support a specific type of brigade whether it is a Heavy, Light, Stryker, Fires, or a Maneuver Enhanced Brigade. The exact capabilities in each BSB vary based on the type of supported brigade. Essentially they are all structured in the same manner to

support tactical logistics at the BCT level. Subordinate units of the BSB found in all BCTs include a Headquarters Company, Supply and Distribution Company, and a Field Maintenance Company. In a Heavy, Light and Fires BSB, you will also find Forward Support Companies that have a doctrinal mission from the BSB to provide direct support logistics to a maneuver or fires battalion. Finally, you will find a Brigade Support Medical Company within the BSB in a Heavy, Light and Stryker BSB.

The BSB transformed from the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) of the Division Support Command (DISCOM) as part of the modular logistics transformation. The BSB is an organic unit of the BCT and consists of functional and multifunctional companies assigned to provide tactical logistics support to the BCT. Its mission is to plan, prepare, rapidly deploy, and execute the uninterrupted flow of tactical-level logistics and Army Health Service (AHS) support to the particular type of brigade it supports. The BSB is trained and equipped to support the brigade's requirements for full spectrum operations which include offense, defense, stability operations, and civil support.¹⁵ Additionally, it was developed to maintain positive command and control over its eight subordinate companies without exceeding its span of control.

The BCT is a well structured force that contains all the elements of the War Fighting Functions (WFF) consisting of Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, Command and Control (C2), and Force Protection (FP). In looking specifically at C2, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 (*Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*) defines it as the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system. Command and control is an essential element of the art and science of warfare. No single specialized function, either by itself or combined

with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for C2. Through C2, commanders initiate and integrate all military functions and operations toward a common goal – mission accomplishment.¹⁶ Three key areas within the C2 line of effort play an important part in implementing the control which is a fundamental element for operational success. These areas include Chain of Command, Command Relationships, and Unity of Command.

Chain of Command establishes authority and responsibility in an unbroken succession from one command to another. The commander at each level responds to orders from a higher command and, in turn, issues orders to subordinates. In this way, the chain of command fixes responsibility and sources of authority at each level while, at the same time, distributing them broadly throughout the force.¹⁷ In essence, a clean chain of command within the BCT would appear as such: Brigade Commander, Battalion Commander, and Company Commander. This version of a command structure is the norm and any deviation from it would require the senior commander to authorize an official task organization change via a mission type order. Strict adherence to a clearly defined chain of command is the best practice in all but exceptional circumstances; however, commanders remain flexible.¹⁸ Circumstances might require subordinate units to operate temporarily outside their chain of command for different missions. A temporary shift in task organization can alter the clear lines of communication throughout the chain of command, and real friction can occur in this process depending on the Command Relationships (Command and Support) outlined.

Army Command and Support Relationships

The BCT is assembled as a combined arms force using command and support relationships to effectively execute Full Spectrum Operations. Command and support relationships specify the type and degree of authority one commander has over another and the type and degree of support

one commander provides another. Further defined, command relationships establish command responsibility and authority between unit commanders, and support relationships identify the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.¹⁹ Command relationships can be organic, assigned, attached, under operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON).

- **Organic** assets are assigned to and form an essential part of a military organization. Organic assets are those listed in the unit's Military Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), and are in this command relationship when conducting missions in support of their own unit.
- **Assigned** units remain subordinate to the higher headquarters for extended periods. Assignment is based on the needs of the organization and is formalized by orders rather than organizational documents.
- **Attached** is the placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. The commander of the unit that receives the attachment is responsible for the sustainment and logistics support that is beyond the capability of the attached unit.
- **Operational Control (OPCON)** is a command relationship that provides full authority to organize commands or forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.
- **Tactical Control (TACON)** provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified.

IF RELATIONSHIP IS:		INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:							
		Has Command Relation- ship with:	May Be Task Organized by:	Receives CSS from:	Assigned Position or AO By:	Provides Liaison To:	Establishes/ Maintains Communica- tions with:	Has Priorities Established by:	Gaining Unit Can Impose Further Com- mand or Sup- port Relationship of:
COMMAND	Attached	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	As re- quired by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gain- ing unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ. Note 1	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As re- quired by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
	TACON	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As re- quired by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	GS; GSR; R; DS
	Assigned	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As re- quired by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable
SUPPORT	Direct Support (DS)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Sup- ported unit	Parent unit; Supported unit	Supported unit	Note 2
	Reinforc- ing (R)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Rein- forced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not Applicable
	General Support Reinforc- ing (GSR)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Rein- forced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not Applicable
	General Support (GS)	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As re- quired by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not Applicable

NOTE 1. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task organize a multinational unit (see TACON).

NOTE 2. Commanders of units in DS may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

As stated by General (Ret) Gary Luck, "We have learned in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that the support command relationship is probably the most powerful relationship in terms of gaining access to additional capabilities. This relationship in essence makes the supporting commanders responsible for the success of the supported commander."²⁰

Army support relationships are not a command authority and are more specific than the joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. They assign a support relationship when;

- The support is more effective if a command with the requisite technical and tactical expertise controls the supporting unit rather than the supported commander.
- The echelon of the supporting unit is the same as or higher than that of the supported unit.
- The supporting unit supports several units simultaneously.²¹

Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units' capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not alter administrative control (ADCON).²²

Unity of command is the last of the three Command and Control lines of effort that will be highlighted. As we saw in both command relationships and chain of command, authority and responsibility are the basis for creating synergy within the organization. That synergy begins at the top of the pyramid with the commanding officer. In any command, only one officer commands. This is embodied in the principle of war, unity of command. Unity of command is the Army's preferred method for achieving unity of effort. Commanders always adhere to unity of command when task organizing forces. Under unity of command, any mission falls within the authority and responsibility of a single, responsible commander. Commanders receive orders from only one superior, to whom they are accountable for accomplishing the mission.²³ Through this method, unity of effort is leveraged, authority is clearly defined, and command responsibility is maintained.

Modular Logistics Challenges

Transformation not only changed the physical structure of the divisions and maneuver brigades, but it completely changed the relationships of the logistics community within those organizations. Within the Army of Excellence model, maneuver brigades did not have an organic logistics structure larger than a platoon size element that resided in the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the maneuver battalions. This platoon size element provided that battalion with a minimal logistics capability, primarily of class III(B) & class V (bulk fuel and ammunition). Additionally, the Maintenance Support Team (MST) that was in a direct support roll from the Forward Support Battalion was co-located with this element. Oversight and execution of the sustainment mission was leveraged by the HHC commander.²⁴

The Forward Support Battalion served in a direct support role to the maneuver brigade and was an organic asset of the Division Support Command. All training, resourcing, administrative, and logistical support derived through these command channels. The Forward Support Battalion answered directly to the DISCOM Commander and was only attached or OPCON to the maneuver brigade for large scale training efforts, such as a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation or during contingency operations when the maneuver brigade was supplemented with additional assets from the division, morphing it into a combined arms organization.

The challenges for the Forward Support Battalion Commander of working directly for the DISCOM Commander and supporting the Maneuver Brigade Commander are similar to the challenges that a Forward Support Company (FSC) Commander faces as he supports his Maneuver Battalion Commander, while being assigned to the BSB.

The lines of authority and responsibility for this relationship are skewed throughout the modular brigade community. Published doctrine clearly states that the FSC is assigned to the

BSB and habitually supports the maneuver element within the BCT. Culturally in the military, leaders have a desire to have all the assets they want under their direct control which, in this case, causes a misinterpretation of the supported / supporting relationship. Maneuver battalion commanders are hesitant to work under a support relationship for fear of shortfalls in support and span of control, therefore creating a scenario where a command relationship is the desired end state versus the doctrinal solution.

Command Relationship in a Garrison Environment

How should the FSC be task organized? Is it really practical to place the FSC in a supporting role or should they be assigned, attached, or under the operational control (OPCON) of the maneuver battalion command? In order to distinguish the best course of action, we must first identify if maneuver battalions within the BCT are equipped to train, resource, and employ sustainment companies if placed underneath their direct command and control and what the possible implications might be.

Training for any organization begins with the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL). The METL is a compilation of mission-essential tasks that an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission. There are three different METL's:

- Joint METL (JMETL) is a list of tasks that a joint force must be able to perform to accomplish a mission.
- Core METL (CMETL) is a list of a unit's core capability mission-essential tasks and general mission-essential tasks. Units train on CMETL tasks until the unit commander and next higher commander mutually decide to focus on training for a directed mission.
- Directed METL (DMETL) is a list of the mission-essential tasks a unit must perform to accomplish a directed mission.²⁵

Commanders are responsible for training their subordinate units. For example, Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) is responsible for training its Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

two Armor Companies, and two Mechanized Infantry Companies. These are the units organic to the Combined Arms Battalion in a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). What's more, commanders in accordance with (IAW) FM 7-0 (*Training for Full Spectrum Operations*) are also required to guide and evaluate two echelons down.²⁶ For example, brigade commanders train battalions and evaluate companies; battalion commanders train companies and evaluate platoons. In this scenario, the Combined Arms Battalion Commander would be required to train the FSC and evaluate the distribution and maintenance platoons within the FSC. This is not an impossible task for a seasoned commander who has advanced through the tactical ranks and understands tactical ground logistics within his battle space. Conversely, the CAB commander is placed at a disadvantage with regard to the technical aspect of employing the assets of the FSC. Unless the CAB commander is familiar with the principles of sustainment, Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS), petroleum functions, distribution operations, supply management, and the full realm of maintenance management just to name a few, he and his staff may be faced with difficulties that could unhinge the training effort of the FSC and develop shortcomings that would surely affect the overall success of the Combined Arms Battalion and the Brigade Combat Team as a whole. Although the senior trainer for the FSC is the company commander, he or she must receive the proper influence, guidance, direction, and mentorship that come from years of experience in the logistics field.

It should be noted that officers in the Army are being promoted to the rank of Captain at approximately 36 months time in service (TIS) and once they complete the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course (CLC3) for logistics officers, they will likely assume a Company Command. If the officer finds himself in a situation where he has no experience in a FSC or a BCT, that transition will be challenging at best as he experiences a steep learning curve in the

midst of a myriad of training, maintenance, supply, budget, and administrative requirements. This is not unlikely. In June 2008, the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division had five of eight logistic company commands filled with either First Lieutenants or Captains who had not completed the Captains Career Course. In this case, three of the four FSC Commanders were advising a maneuver battalion commander on logistics within their organization with less than 36 months of experience in the military and the fourth had never served in a BCT prior to that assignment.²⁷

Training is the cornerstone of military operations. Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders need to exercise mission command in order to achieve unity of effort. Training prepares forces and soldiers to conduct operations according to doctrine.²⁸ Executing a high quality training regimen begins with evaluating a unit's current training readiness. This evaluation normally occurs quarterly as the unit reviews its Mission Essential Task List (METL) collective and individual tasks that are prioritized for that training period. Subordinate unit METL tasks are derived from their higher headquarters and the training plan is nested within the priorities of that higher headquarters. For example, an Armor Company's collective tasks are nested with its METL tasks that are prioritized by the Maneuver Battalion Headquarters in order to synchronize training efforts across the battalion and ultimately influence a specific METL task of the higher headquarters. As we look at a Combined Arms Battalion, the supporting Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) is: Conduct an attack/Movement to Contact, Conduct a Defense/Delay, Conduct Security Operations (Screen, Guard, Area Security), Conduct Stability Operations, Conduct Command and Control (C2), Protect the Force, and Provide Sustainment. Of the 287 tasks that accompany these seven CMETL tasks, none align directly with the Forward Support Company's core mission essential

task. While there are tasks that relate to the core mission, such as conduct company operations, deploy/redeploy the company, and maintain assigned vehicle, the training effort in the FSC does not synchronize with the maneuver battalion like that of the BSB. Moreover, it is not uncommon for the FSC to solely provide support to the maneuver task force during training events, but fail to accomplish their own training objectives.

Resourcing a subordinate element is the requirement of its higher headquarters. Through their organic command relationship, the FSC will continue to receive resource allocations from the BSB. Mission command requires commanders to have authority over or access to all resources required to accomplish the mission. Significant resource requirements include, but are not limited to personnel replacement, Military Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and funding (Operational and Maintenance Army (OMA), Other Procurement Army (OPA), Government Purchase Cards (GPC)). Resourcing an organization or subordinate force must not violate unity of command and should support unity of effort. Further, allocations of resources should have minimum restrictions on their use, permitting subordinates to further reallocate or to employ them as the tactical situation requires.²⁹

Personnel replacement happens through the Electronic Military Personnel Office (eMILPO) system that manages strictly by Unit Identification Codes (UIC). The UICs are aligned based on a unit's organic command structure and are uploaded at echelons beyond the BCT. The BSB has and will retain administrative rights to receive, in-process, and direct the assignments of the forty plus Military Occupational Skills (MOS) that reside within the organization. The requirement to manage this action is also relative to the Unit Status Report (USR) and the Personnel Rating (P-Rating). The USR looks at the BSB holistically, processing all of the personnel assets by MOS, Grade, and their deployable status. It is imperative that the BSB retain control over the

personnel distribution process to ensure that the right Soldier is placed in the right position in the right organization. With the large number of military occupational skills within the battalion, a need for a specific skill set, grade, and experience could be found wanting in several companies, and it is imperative that the BSB Commander leverage these assets to fill critical shortfalls in accordance with his priority of fill and pending mission requirements.

Administrative oversight for Forward Support Companies is a sensitive and delicate area. There are a multitude of tasks that are accomplished daily in the Human Resource arena that would be difficult to transition from the BSB to the maneuver battalion headquarters; personnel actions within eMilpo, chapter and elimination actions, flags, reenlistment bars, finance transactions, promotions, and personnel placement are only a few of the many areas affected.

Equipping and managing the Military Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for the Forward Support Companies can not be transferred to the maneuver battalion for reasons similar to the Human Resource Management actions. First, all unit equipment is controlled through the Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (PBUSE) system managed at the company level, but supervised and accounted for by the Brigade Property Book Officer (PBO) located in the Brigade S4. The PBO is accountable for maintaining proper accountability of all equipment throughout the Brigade, but he/she does not prioritize equipment distribution within a subordinate battalion unless directed by the Brigade Commander. The prioritization of equipment at the battalion level is the responsibility of the Battalion Commander. With similar equipment spread across the BSB, it is necessary to manage the distribution efficiently; just as with the personnel rating, the Unit Status Report (USR) totals the shortages of equipment across the BSB based on the Equipment Readiness Codes (ERC) to calculate the Supply Rating (S-Level).³⁰

Funding of Forward Support Companies is an area that can be conducted easily for a maneuver element. The same constraints, requirements, and assets to accomplish this mission are found in all the battalion headquarters within the BCT. Funds can be transitioned to different accounts; government purchase cards do not have to be aligned through organic headquarters; moral, welfare, and recreation (MWR) funds are normally managed at the company level; OMA and OPA funds are tracked at the battalion and brigade level so visibility is nearly transparent.³¹

While the previous topics have been administrative in nature, mission support is an area that is most important not only to the BSB Commander, but to the Maneuver Battalion Commander as well. How a unit is supported, how effective and efficient is the support, and what a battalion commander can do with the forces task organized underneath his headquarters are all questions and concerns for the leadership within the BCT.

In all cases, mission support is generally if not always considered an essential task to accomplish. Exceptional focus is placed to ensure success is achieved. With Forward Support Companies in a doctrinal direct support role, the habitual relationship is fixed enabling the maneuver commander to prioritize their effort in order to leverage mission accomplishment. The maneuver battalion is not staffed to track and evaluate many of the technical aspects of the FSC; they are manned to ensure time sensitive delivery of supplies are synchronized with combat trains, establishing and effecting maintenance policy and priority within the organization, and to ensure that the FSC's are fully integrated in the planning process for all operations.

Assessing how a unit will conduct a mission prior to the actual operation is a tough task. In viewing a maneuver battalion's assets, experience, span of control, and technical skills along the lines of training, resourcing, and employing a FSC in a garrison environment, the evidence suggests that the maneuver task force's ability to do so on an even moderate level would be

marred by complications that could unhinge the battalion's overall effort to influence the FSC's mission success. With the myriad logistical requirements of the FSC, the technical experience, skill, and proficiency are not inherent to the maneuver task force headquarters creating unwelcomed shortfalls in the FSC's training and support mission. The FSC's training efforts would be stalled and this would introduce and facilitate the possibility of an undertrained and ill-prepared force deploying in support of contingency operations.

Command Relationship during Contingency Operations

Can the Brigade Support Battalion maintain Logistics Command and Control (LC2) and leverage sustainment assets during contingency operations if they do not maintain task organization of all the sustainment elements in the BCT? The importance of this question leads us back to a unity of command issue and how assigning, attaching, or placing the Forward Support Companies in an operational control (OPCON) status to their supported maneuver battalion during contingency operations would work. The following areas will be considered in order to draw a conclusion: logistics common operations picture (LCOP), mission support evaluated by the tactical logistics functions (fix, fuel, arm, move, sustain), and lines of communication.

Organization is an important Command and Control (C2) tool. How the commander organizes the C2 system can complicate or simplify execution. Organizing effectively requires commanders to know and apply the fundamentals and principles of organization for C2, how to organize the staff, and how to organize for continuous C2.³² A situational awareness tool used on the battlefield and in peacetime operations to assist logistics commanders with C2 has come to be known as the Logistical Common Operating Picture (LCOP). LCOP is a single, identical accounting of the logistics capabilities, requirements, and shortfalls in an area of operations

shared between the supporting and supported elements. The LCOP allows the supporting elements to determine unit capabilities, forecast logistics requirements, synchronize logistics movements, and publish information that improves situational awareness at multiple echelons of support.³³ An effective commander leverages this common operating picture in order to anticipate future requirements, makes current assessments on supply commodities, and enables freedom of action by increasing the number and quality of options available to the commander. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative.³⁴

Assets that the BSB commander leverages to provide LCOP are increasingly present on the battlefield through innovations in the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) such as BCS3, VSATs, and MTS:

- Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) is the Army's Battle Command Logistics C2 system employed at multiple echelons to fuse sustainment, in-transit, and force data to aid commanders in making critical decisions. This system provides LCOP to commanders in a map-centric display.
- Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is a portable satellite used to transmit STAMIS or other unclassified but sensitive, non-secured communications from one entity to the next. VSATs are fielded to the FSCs and authorized within the BSB Field Maintenance Company in order to transmit and receive maintenance and supply transmissions and requisitions.
- Maneuver Tracking System (MTS) enables in-transit visibility on the battlefield tracking Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFID).

Each of these applications is crucial to provide anticipatory logistics on the battlefield and not mismanage commodities and abuse tactical logistics movements on the battlefield. The anxiety that many logisticians deal with daily is not having the data necessary to make accurate assessments and decisions. Tracking commodities is done through the BCS3 system or the LOGSTAT. As previously stated, this data flowed from the maneuver units through the BCT S4 to the Support Operations Officer (senior logistical planner in the BCT assigned to the BSB) in order to calculate the data and allow the SPO to plan replenishment operations and submit

requests to the Sustainment Brigade for future support. Unfortunately, maneuver units often overlook the logistics status report (LOGSTAT). However, with the FSCs, the BSB has a fallback organization that can provide the BSB Commander with real-time logistics updates and can push that data through the Sustainment Targeting Meeting conducted with all the FSC commanders and the SPO. Daily operational summaries (OPSUM) can influence the maneuver battalion S4 that is co-located with the FSC Commander in the Combat Train Command Post (CT/CP) to update the LOGSTAT in the BCS3 and transmit the data to the BCT S4 and the BSB SPO.

Mission Support Activities have to be synchronized throughout the BCT's battlespace to positively shape operations. As the senior logistics integrator for the BCT, the BSB Commander directs all units organic or attached to the BSB.³⁵ In order to achieve success, the BSB commander must be able to visualize, describe, and direct logistics support. The BSB commander visualizes the nature and design of operations through estimates and input from subordinates. He describes support operations in terms of time, space, resources, purpose, and action, employing intent, commander's critical information requirements, and mission orders for planning, preparation, and mission execution.³⁶ Through this process he can anticipate support in all the tactical logistics functions (fix, fuel, arm, move, sustain).

Another challenge and concern for the BSB are the extended lines of communication (LOC) between the BSB and the FSC that support the maneuver units. Doctrinally, while the BSB is within the Brigade Support Area (BSA) with the BCT Tactical Operations Cell (TOC) and the Brigade Special Troop Battalion (BSTB), the FSCs are forward with their supported maneuver and fires battalion. In a planned effort, the BSB commander will build his command and control system to minimize the distance and reduce uncertainty to manageable levels through the use of

information systems such as BCS3, MTS, FBCB2, and electronic mail when available. The BSB commander must understand that some uncertainty can never be eliminated and will be inherent to the extended LOCs. Therefore, he must leverage his C2 systems in order to be able to function effectively when uncertainty is at its height. The best method of managing this is through decentralized execution of operations. Decentralized execution, based on a common understanding of the commander's intent, mission orders, and sharing available information, allows the FSC commanders to cope with uncertainty by exercising subordinates' initiative.

Contingency operations are tough, unpredictable, undetermined in length, and require commanders to assume risk. Personal preference, experience, the tactical situation, and the time distance factor all feed into the decision making process on how to establish the command relationship for the Forward Support Companies. Most importantly, the enemy will have a vote and if C2 is too difficult to maintain unity of command, all actions must push towards accomplishing the mission through a unity of effort.

Can the BSB maintain logistics command and control during contingency operations? Yes, and this was proven during Operation Iraqi Freedom 09-11 by the 121st BSB, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division. This organization retained command and control of all the FSCs in a battlespace the size of South Carolina. It must be noted that the theater of operation was mature, VSATs were readily available and used, LOGSTATs were a priority throughout the brigade, and when inaccuracies were noted, the FSC commanders engaged swiftly. Sustainment Targeting efforts were priceless and enabled the BSB to leverage replenishment operations appropriately via ground and air.

Is this the preferred method that all units should adopt? No, every command will weigh risk, mission accomplishment, resource allocation, command authority, and responsibility differently.

Finally, is this the best command relationship model for success? One size does not fit all; organizational structure, personalities, skills, and experience, as well as training efforts will dictate the best practice for a BCT's task organization structure in any theater of war.

Conclusion

In the SEP/OCT 2001 edition of the *Army Logistician*, LTC Kevin Poling, an Armor Officer and trainer at the National Training Center, stated his concern about how the Army's doctrinal literature would address the relationship between the FSC and the maneuver battalion. He went on to recommend in his article entitled, "Making the Forward Support Company Work", that a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities should be codified in straightforward doctrinal language to guide the building of the new, comprehensive direct-support relationship, nurture the extremely important human dimensions of this relationship, and fully maximize the potential of digital C2 system.³⁷ LTC Poling's recommendations were only partially heeded as the Army failed to address the relationship in great detail in FM 3-90.6 (*The Brigade Combat Team*) or FM 4-90 (*The Brigade Support Battalion*). FM 3-90.6 simply states that the FSC had a habitual relationship with the supported maneuver or fires battalion. Field Manual 4-90 gives a slightly more robust definition stating that the FSC is normally under the command of the BSB and may be placed in either a command or support relationship with its supported battalion.³⁸

In leaving the doctrine vague, the Army is allowing the decision on how the command relationship should be addressed to the BCT Commander and his subordinate Battalion Commanders. My recommendation is to clearly state in doctrine that the Forward Support Companies are assigned to the Brigade Support Battalion and should be placed in a direct support relationship with the maneuver battalions. By doing this, a common baseline will be established, limiting the initial debate. This technique was used successfully by the Forward

Support Battalion for the Maintenance Support Teams (MST) serving in direct support of the Brigade Task Forces.

Direct Support is defined as a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. Additionally, commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

FM 3-0	RELATIONSHIP	Has Command Relationship With:	May be Task Organized by:	Receives CSS from:	Assigned position or AO by:	Provides Liason To:	Establishes/ Maintains Communications with:	Has Priorities Established by:	Impose Further Command or Support Relationship of:
COMMAND	ASSIGNED	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Gaining Unit	As required by Parent Unit	As required by Parent Unit	Parent Unit	GS; GSR; R; DS
SUPPORT	DIRECT SUPPORT (DS)	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Supported Unit	Supported Unit	Parent Unit; Supported Unit	Supported Unit	

Benefits that can come from this relationship are as follows:

- Allows the BSB Commander the flexibility to leverage, surge, and reallocate resources in response to the BCT mission and commander's priorities without requiring a mission type order from the BCT Operations Cell.
- Provides the SPO with maximum flexibility to plan and execute logistic operations within the scope of the BCT Commander's intent whether in garrison or on the battlefield.
- The Maneuver Battalion Commander's (supported commander) scheme of maneuver will prioritize the requirements and plan for the FSC.
- The Maneuver Commander will establish the priority for support within his battalion. Additionally, all security aspects and internal taskings will be designated by the maneuver commander during contingency operations to be executed by the FSC.
- Task organization can be tailored by the BSB Commander to provide additional specialty skills as necessary for mission support.
- Administrative actions and personnel assignments will continue to flow through the organic headquarters limiting friction or reporting.

- Training and readiness will have clear lines of command and control.³⁹

Challenges that will have to be addressed:

- Maintenance assets all belong to the BSB, but the responsibility for unit readiness still resides with the maneuver commanders. A memorandum of understanding or agreement will have to be developed for further direct support allocation of the Combat Repair Teams to the maneuver companies for habitual support.
- Training will have to be closely monitored. The FSC's will report and follow the training requirements directed by the BSB Commander, but have a requirement to support the training efforts of the maneuver battalion. This is a training synchronization issue that will be ongoing throughout the relationship.
- Contingency operations task organization changes throughout the BCT. As subordinate Task Forces are constructed, will the command or support relationship of the FSC change and will there be a requirement for a tailored FSC to support that Task Force?⁴⁰

Authority and responsibility are the two reoccurring themes that come from my research.

Who has the authority to command, control, and direct assets and what level of responsibility is the BCT commander willing to take away from one commander and provide to another?

Doctrine is unlikely to change how the command and support relationship should be accomplished, but there are multiple methods and times to implement the right mix for the mission at hand.

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