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CIVILIAN RESISTANCE IN CRETE:
20 MAY 1941 – 15 MAY 1945

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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Executive Summary

Title: Civilian Resistance in Crete: 20 May 1941 – 15 May 1945

Author: Major George L. Soubassis, United States Army Reserve

Thesis: Direct civilian participation in the battle of Crete was unusual, unexpected, and contributed significantly to brutal German occupation and counterinsurgency policies.

Discussion: Military historians have examined and analyzed the battle of Crete from almost every angle and have explained why the Allies lost the battle, how the Allies could have won it, and who was to blame and why the Germans never conducted another airborne operation again. However, there has been very little examination, especially in the Western literature, about the heroic participation of the Cretan civilian population in the battle, the Cretan resistance, and the German occupation and counterinsurgency.

The purpose of this paper is to study the participation of the Cretan population in the Battle of Crete, how it affected the German forces during the battle, how it baffled and enraged the Germans, and the effect it had on the German occupation and counterinsurgency. This paper will first provide a brief historical background on why Germany invaded Greece and subsequently Crete. Second, it will discuss the civilian participation during the battle and the affect on the German forces. Third, it will analyze the Cretan culture, history, and psyche and what led them to participate in the battle and the failure of the German intelligence and leadership to understand why the civilian population took arms against them. Fourth, it will examine the German occupation policies, such as the concepts of total war, subsistence of the land, and total solution, their application in Crete and the effect on the population. Fifth, we will discuss the German counterinsurgency methods and their effects on the occupation. Finally, we will conclude with the lessons learned from the German occupation.

Conclusion: The Cretan civilian participation in the Battle of Crete had a major impact on the route of the battle and in the contact of the following German occupation. During the battle, the Germans did not expect the Cretan civilian participation. Up to that point, the German soldier fought against a regular Army and saw the civilian population flee as the German Army approached. In Crete, that changed. The Cretan population took an active and decisive part in the fighting and caused approximately one third of all German losses. This participation led to indiscriminant reprisals and unnecessary violence that fueled the resistance. The German Army failed to understand the enemy and to control the population.

The inability of the German High Command to understand the Cretan culture and why the Cretans took arms against them during the battle led to a brutal occupation. As an estimate, over 20,000 Cretans lost their lives during the occupation because of hunger, reprisals and executions. At the beginning of the occupation, the Cretans offered an opportunity for reconciliation the Germans however rejected it and continued to conduct indiscriminate reprisal operations against the population. As a result, the Cretan population continued to resist the Germans for the four years of occupation and tied down significant German forces in Crete that could had been used elsewhere. The German strategy to subdue the Cretan resistance by military means had failed.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

I would like to dedicate this paper to my wife, Nadege , for all her patience and encouragement she gave me to complete this project and to my kids, Damien and Daphne, for their patience and understanding while Dad was gone at the library most of the time. It could not been done without their unconditional love and support.

I would also like to thank Dr. Erickson for his mentorship during this process and for keeping me on track. Gathering material for this paper was a trial of will and organization. Even though there are many books that analyze the Battle of Crete, there are not too many sources, at least in the United States, that refers to the civilian participation during the battle. It is almost as the civilians did not exist on Crete.

However, in Greece, there are few books written about the battle and the civilian participation and the assistance I received from my father, Leonidas Soubassis, to gather the information was immeasurable and I thank him. This project would not have been completed without his help.

Introduction

On May 20, 1941, the German Army conducted Operation Mercury, the largest airborne operation at that time, in order to invade Crete. From the beginning of the ten-day battle, the civilian population in Crete participated in the fight against the German Army and inflicted heavy losses to the German paratroopers. For the first time, the German Army faced civilian resistance during operations. Direct civilian participation in the battle of Crete was unusual, unexpected, and contributed significantly to brutal German occupation and counterinsurgency policies.

There are many books written about the battle of Crete that explain how the German paratroopers defeated the Allied Army, comprised by the Greeks and the British Commonwealth, defending Crete. Military historians have examined and analyzed the battle of Crete from almost every angle and have explained why the Allies lost the battle, how the Allies could have won it, and who was to blame and why the Germans never conducted another airborne operation again. However, there has been very little examination, especially in the Western literature, about the heroic participation of the Cretan civilian population in the battle, the Cretan resistance, and the German occupation and counterinsurgency.

The purpose of this paper is to study the participation of the Cretan population in the Battle of Crete, how it affected the German forces during the battle, how it baffled and enraged the Germans, and the effect it had on the German occupation and counterinsurgency. This paper will first provide a brief historical background on why Germany invaded Greece and subsequently Crete. Second, it will discuss the civilian participation during the battle and the affect on the German forces. Third, it will analyze the Cretan culture, history, and psyche and what led them to participate in the battle and the failure of the German intelligence and

leadership to understand why the civilian population took arms against them. Fourth, it will examine the German occupation policies, such as the concepts of total war, subsistence of the land, and total solution, their application in Crete and the effect on the population. Fifth, we will discuss the German counterinsurgency methods and their effects on the occupation. Finally, we will conclude with the lessons learned from the German occupation.

Historical Background

By June 1940, after France fell to the Germans, England was the only country left in Europe fighting the Axis powers. With no forces engaged in the European Continent, England was prepared to defend its own existence. In a sense, this gave England a “strategic advantage,”¹ because England was free from Continental land warfare or obligations to alliances and solely dependent its defense during the Battle of Britain on a well-trained Royal Air Force (RAF) and the domination of the British Navy.

In the mean time, in Germany, Hitler tried, diplomatically, to establish his position in the Balkans, to pacify that region, to gain control of the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania, and to secure his southern flank for the upcoming attack on Russia. Hitler, for all intensive purposes considered England at the fringes of defeat as Ribbentrop told Molotov “England is beaten, and it is only a question of time before she finally admits defeat.”² On December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive 21, Operation *Barbarossa*, which authorized the attack on Russia. Hitler’s plan was successful until the Italians were involved in the Balkans.

The Italians were anxious to display their military might before the end of the war. Italy felt like a bystander in the Axis alliance, finding out from the newspapers what their allies were doing. The opportunity for the Italians came up in October 4, 1940, with the termination of

Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Britain. Thus, on October 28, 1940 the Second World War began in Greece.

The Italian attack “invoked the British guarantee of support to Greece given by the British Prime Minister Chamberlain on April 13, 1939.”³ It also brought the strategic value of Crete to the surface. Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, was aware of the strategic importance of Crete and strongly communicated his intent to hold the island on October 29 and November 7, 1940:

The Italians must not have it. We must get it first – and at once. Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [would be a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterranean difficulties. So great a prize is worth the risk and almost equal to [a] successful offensive in Libya. Do not hesitate to make proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors. To lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime.⁴

Unfortunately, for the Italian Army, the outnumbered and under equipped Greek Army was ready for the attack. The Greek Army “had started its mobilization well before the attack, and as part of Operations Plan Ib, it withdrew at the beginning in order to complete its mobilization and to prepare for a counterattack.”⁵ In Crete, in particular, “the V Cretan Division mobilized by November 6, 1940, and by November 25, 1940, shipped to mainland Greece.”⁶ On 9-10 November 1940, the Greek Army counterattacked and subsequently drove the Italian Army about forty miles into Albania.

With the transfer of the V Cretan Division to mainland Greece, the British assumed complete responsibility for the defense of the island of Crete. From November 1-7, 1940, the British landed the 14th Brigade at Crete and started the construction of an airfield at the coastal area west of the village of Maleme, immediately east of Tauronites River.⁷

The Germans noticed the success of the Greek Army against the Italians. The British force in Crete threatened the oilfields at Ploesti, Rumania, and put the Southern flank of

Operation *Barbarossa* in danger. Hitler decided to rescue his Italian Ally, attack Greece and secure his Southern flank prior to executing the attack on Russia. On November 4, 1940, Hitler ordered Operation *Marita*, the attack on Greece. In the mean time, on Crete, “in a period of six months the British managed to appoint six different commanders and accomplish very little in preparations for the defense of Crete.”⁸

On April 6, 1941, Germany attacked Greece through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Because of the quick collapse of Yugoslavia, the German Army enveloped the First Greek Army in Central Macedonia and at the Albanian Front. The Greek First Army under General Tsolakoglou capitulated to the Germans on April 23, 1941. In the mean time, on April 25, 1941, Hitler issued Directive No. 28, Operation Mercury, to occupy Crete “in order to use the island as an air base against England in the East Mediterranean.”⁹ By April 27, 1941, the Germans captured Athens, and by April 30, 1941, the British evacuated about 50,000 troops out of Greece, of “which 25,000 troops evacuated to Crete,”¹⁰ bringing the total number of British forces in Crete at about 28,600.¹¹ A German attack on the island was imminent.

On May 20, 1941, the German XI *Fliegerkorps* (Air Corps) conducted *Unternehmen Merkur* (Operation Mercury), against an Allied Force comprised of Greek and British Commonwealth Forces. After eleven days of heavy fighting and heavy casualties, Crete fell to the German paratroopers and the Allies evacuated the island. For the Germans, Crete was a Pyrrhic victory. (See Annex A, Map 1)

The civilian participation during the battle of Crete and its effect on the German forces.

The Battle of Crete was a battle of many firsts. It was the first battle completely designed and executed by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) to attack and occupy a heavily defended

island using airborne forces as the main effort, and to reinforce it with ground forces transported via air.¹² It was also, the first time during the war, “to the horror of the Germans”¹³ that the civilian population actively participated in the fighting instead of “cowering in fear in view of the German forces.”¹⁴ The “Cretan resistance, unlike other underground movements in Europe that started a year or so after the German occupation, it began literally in the first hour of the invasion.”¹⁵

The German forces did not expect that the civilian population will take an active part during the battle. The German Intelligence briefed the German leadership “that most of the Cretan population was sympathetic towards Germany and would receive them as allies.”¹⁶ As this paper will show, the Cretan civilian participation in the battle caused many German casualties and “so greatly offended the Prussian sense of military order that brutal reprisals were taken against the local population.”¹⁷

The Battle of Crete started at 0600 on May 20, 1941, with a massive aerial bombardment. At 0800, the first wave of the transport aircraft arrived and dropped over 2,500 paratroopers in the Maleme-Chania area. After the initial shock of the airborne assault, the defenders started the “turkey shooting.”¹⁸ The German paratroopers “were in trouble from the beginning.”¹⁹

At the village of Modhion, between Maleme airfield and Chania, Cretan civilians, old men, women and children, using rudimentary weapons such as rocks, shovels, pitchforks, scythes and old shotguns, attacked a company of German paratroopers as they were landing. As the civilians attacked, the New Zealand defenders around the village of Mohdion had to lift or shift their fire so not to hit the attacking civilians. By the end of the fight, the 10th Company sustained sixty percent losses due to the ferocious civilian attack.²⁰

At Gerani, a village north of Modhion, a German company comprised of 126 troops landed between the Cretan defenders and the New Zealanders. By the end of the day, only fourteen paratroopers survived.²¹ By nightfall, the losses of the German paratroopers at the Maleme sector were staggering. The Third Assault Battalion lost over 400 killed or wounded out of 600 troops and the Second Assault Battalion had similar losses.²²

At Kastelli, a village on the coast west of Maleme, a detachment of 72 Germans under the command of Lieutenant Muerbe, landed near the A Battalion of the First Greek Regiment. Within an hour, the Greek Battalion supported by Cretan irregulars killed Lieutenant Muerbe and fifty-three of his men and their "English advisors had to protect the German captives from the Greeks fury."²³

At the Tenth NZ BDE sector, around the Galatas-Alikianos-Aghya area, the situation developed similarly as at Maleme. At Galatas, elements of the Second Battalion landed "within the town square and met their destruction at the hands of the Cretan population and the New Zealanders."²⁴ At the same time, the "ill-trained and ill-equipped"²⁵ Eight Greek Regiment, about 800 raw recruits, supported with bands of armed peasants, defended the Alikianos area and after they exhausted their ammunition, they contacted a bayonet charge and repulsed the attack from the Engineer Battalion of the Seventh Parachute Division.²⁶ The engineer battalion commander, Major Liebach, reported that Alikianos "was strongly held by at least 4,000 Greeks, partisans and British."²⁷ The Eight Greek Regiment and the groups of armed Cretan civilians held the Alikianos – Vatolakkos line until May 25, 1941 when they withdrew and subsequently surrendered on May 29. For "five days, they blocked the German advance towards Chania, and caused them heavy casualties with almost no means other than their superb morale".²⁸

At the city of Chania, the Cretan population participated in the defense of their city with the same ferocity as at the area around Maleme. The following is an example of the attitude the Cretan population demonstrated during the battle towards the German paratroopers as Oberleutnant Toschka and the remaining of his unit trying to stay alive at Venizelos Plaza in Chania, found out.

Their only chance of survival was to slip through the lines and get out of the city. Their biggest concern was water. A young paratrooper volunteered to get some canteens filled at a well. A sniper hit him, a second soldier tried again with the same result. By that time they spotted the sniper, the sniper was a woman. At the end, a Sergeant tried again to get water, he ran in the open picked up the canteens and made it to the house and run through the door and was captured. A group of women captured him. The leader of the group, Mrs. Georgalakis, after a small debate with her armed band, decided to send him back, without his rifle or his pistol – and no water! Let him tell his leader that unless they surrender to us – the women of Chania - we are going to kill all of them!²⁹

The civilian uprising spread everywhere in the sector and as the battle progressed in the rest of the island. Approximately 1,500 paratroopers landed at Rethymno divided in three battle groups. At the city of Rethymno, the Gendarmerie companies with assistance from the “citizens of Rethymno and surrounding villages”³⁰ defended the city. By the end of the first day of the battle at Rethymno, the German force sustained 70 killed, 300 wounded and 200 prisoners, among which the commander of German forces in the Rethymno sector, Colonel Sturm.³¹ In another action, Captain Wiedemann’s group “came up against the Cretan gendarmerie and Cretan civilians and being unable to advance established a defense around the village of Perivolia.”³² The Gendarmerie and groups of armed civilians besieged this force.³³

Approximately 2,000 paratroopers landed at Herakleion. Major Schulz’s battalion “dropped round the west and south side of Herakleion and met resistance by the Greek soldiers and the Cretan civilians.”³⁴ The civilian participation at Herakleion was as great as at Chania-Maleme area. German reports stated “considerable fighting against *francs-tireurs* took place:

these fought in groups of 7 to 8 men, one of which was led by a Pope (priest) who was subsequently shot.”³⁵ Many German paratroopers lost their lives by “Cretan irregulars who then armed themselves with their weapons.”³⁶ One of the German battalion commanders, Major Walther, reported that he lost “some 200 men from Cretan irregulars around the village of Gournes where his battalion dropped.”³⁷

At Herakleion, the civilian armed groups belonged to two armed bands. The first armed band, under Manolis Badouvas, took action around the area of Atsalenio – Mesampelies - Ai Yiannis - Pateles. The other armed band, under Antonis Grigorakis, also known as Satanás (Satan), operated in the area of Mastampa – Therisso - Giofyro. These armed bands, caused heavy casualties to German paratroopers and provided great services to the allies both during the battle and afterwards during the occupation.³⁸

Even individual Cretans took part in their own war against the German paratroopers. Manolis Paterakis, a Gendarme, left his family at the White Mountains and headed down to the plains to go fight the Germans. At the beginning of the battle, he killed five paratroopers and later joined a band of ten irregulars and spent the next days shooting at German paratroopers. He was not alone; thousands of others set out that morning to attack the invaders of their homeland.³⁹

Another example of an individual war raised by the Cretans is the story of Nicholas Manolakakis. He lived on his family’s farm between the villages of Spilia and Voukoulies. On May 20, as Manolakakis had his breakfast watching his younger son working in the field in front of the house, a transport airplane passed over the house. In a very short time, Manolakakis witnessed the descending paratroopers killing his son and wife. Manolakakis, in a fury, rushed at the paratroopers with the only weapon available, his sickle. Not long after, Manolakakis

managed to kill thirteen paratroopers that landed at his farm.⁴⁰ By the end of the ten-day battle, Manolakakis had “personally killed forty paratroopers and turned himself in to the Germans and was executed.”⁴¹

The Germans captured Crete after ten days of fighting. It was a costly victory. The stubborn resistance by the Allies and the Cretan population had a devastating effect on the German Forces. The Germans lost over 6,580⁴² elite paratroopers, higher than the losses during the fighting in Yugoslavia and mainland Greece, and never again conducted airborne operations during the war. The exact number of German troops lost due to the civilian participation is unknown but the research indicates that of “the 1,955 missing (all but seventeen of these presumed dead by the New Zealand War History)”⁴³ most “are attributed by the German Command to the activity of Cretan *francs-tireurs*.”⁴⁴ This is over thirty percent of all losses during the battle. The military effect of the Cretan civilian participation in the battle was significant and decisive. As Alan Clark in his book, *The Fall of Crete* said:

In this way a picked detachment of the Hitler youth, trained and measured to the last ounce; carrying every weapon that technology could provide, indoctrinated since childhood, - these men were in a space of few hours, defeated by the valour of those whose soil they had attacked. How different might the course of history have been if, a year before, the inhabitants of the West had shown the same fierce courage when their villages were invaded!⁴⁵

The viciousness of the civilian participation had a psychological effect on the German troops. For the first time in the war, they faced civilian resistance during the battle. The people they attacked did not run away, instead, they stood their ground. Not only did they fight, they fought with their bare hands, with rocks, old weapons, scythes and any other form of weaponry available. For example, at Chersonissos, the women emerged carrying sickles, sticks and anything else they could find. The German paratroopers suffered extensive losses from these women.⁴⁶ As the fight progressed in an unfavorable manner, it affected the German morale at all

levels. For example, “for the survivors of Major Scherber’s assault battalion, the end of the first day was like a terrible dream!”⁴⁷ Even General Meindl, the German commander at the Maleme area, “watched helplessly as his units were being decimated. It seemed to him like a nightmare. He had never conceived the possibility that German troops could be so quickly destroyed.”⁴⁸ In Crete, the hunters from the sky had become the hunted.

During the first hours of the battle, the German paratroopers lost more than half of their strength. British and Greek military units and ragtagged civilians attacked them. As Antony Beevor, in his book *Crete, the Battle and the Resistance* describes:

By the end of the first day alone over 2000 paratroopers had been killed. To assess how many the Cretans had killed is impossible, but the shock to the Germans was unmistakable. They had come to expect their chosen enemy to cave in at the approach of what they liked to call *der Furor Teutonicus* in the imitation of the Spanish infantry’s *furia espaniola* in the fifteenth century. Civilian resistance, while an ancient tradition in Crete, so deeply offended the Prussian sense of military order that brutal reprisals were taken against the local population.⁴⁹

The civilians in particular were ruthless and used any weapon available to them. The ferocity of the civilians shocked the paratroopers. Boys, old men and women “displayed a breath-taking bravery in defense of their island. German soldiers were doubly scandalized of the idea of women fighting them, and executed them if they had bruises from rifle recoil or held knives.”⁵⁰ The paratroopers thought that “for the defenders to shoot at them when helpless stuck many of them as an outrageous violation of the rules of war.”⁵¹

The large amount of casualties and their inability to achieve their objectives frustrated the Germans. The Germans took their frustration out to the civilian population. Since the Greek and British authorities had not issued any uniforms or armbands to the civilians and “thus afford them an official status to protect them from being shot on capture as *francs-tireurs*”⁵² the

Germans started killing anyone on site regardless of if they were civilian combatants or non-combatants.

For example, during the battle at Kastelli on May 20, 1941, the survivors from the German detachment under Oberleutnant Peter Muerbe took refuge in a group of buildings. Inside one of the rooms, they found four civilians, the family of Spiro Vlahakis, him his wife and two grandchildren. One of the paratroopers fired at them and killed them. When his NCO reprimanded the paratrooper, he simply shrugged and said, "Anyway they would have been killed in the crossfire."⁵³ On another example, on May 24, the Germans gathered forty-two civilians from the villages around Herakleion. They executed them in reprisal for resisting them during the battle at Herakleion. These civilians were the first ones to face the firing squads. They would not be the last.⁵⁴

History, Culture and Psyche of Crete

Crete has a rich history that dates back to the antiquity. It is the birthplace of the Minoan Civilization, the predecessor of the Greek Civilization, and through the years, many other peoples, to include the Romans, Venetians, and the Turks, have occupied it. Throughout its history, the people in Crete have conducted numerous rebellions against their occupiers. For example, during the Venetian occupation that lasted about 450 years, the Cretans revolted twenty five times. During the Turkish Occupation, about 243 years, they revolted nine different times. Through wars and revolutions, the Cretans continued to fight for their freedom and to unify with mainland Greece.⁵⁵

During the revolution of 1897, the Greek Army landed at Crete and took over the island. Even though Greece lost that war with Turkey, Crete maintained its autonomy. Finally, under

the guidance of the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos, a son of Crete, Crete unified with Greece on October 12, 1912.⁵⁶

On August 4, 1936, General Ioannis Metaxas, established a dictatorship in Greece. Metaxas ideologically was a nationalist, fascist, and a monarchist. Even though his movement on the surface had many commonalities with the fascist movements of Germany and Italy, in its core it had many ideological differences.

On July 17, 1938, the Cretans revolted against the dictatorship. The revolt collapsed after twelve days and a climate of terror was established. Because of the revolt, the Cretan population was disarmed, and many republican politicians went on exile. The disarmament policy of 1938 and the departure of the V Cretan Division from Crete to the Albanian Front in 1940 had a negative effect on the defense capability of Crete. The Cretan civilian population did not have any weapons to protect itself in case of an invasion.

Before the war, the Metaxas Government tried to balance between Britain, a commanding naval power in the Mediterranean, and Germany, the strongest economic partner of Greece. In Greece, the Greek population was divided between Anglophiles and Germanophiles. Most monarchist were Anglophiles and most nationalist were Germanophiles. In Crete, however, the political sentiment was not as divided as in the rest of Greece. The Cretans, in majority, were republicans, (*Venizelikoi*) and antimonarchist, but also had a high sense of nationalism towards Crete and Greece. They had demonstrated their passion for freedom and for their island many times over.

The people of Crete are very proud of their culture, traditions, their family, and their roots. They are a league of their own. The Greeks call them *leventes*, which means the young, the chivalrous, and the brave. They are very protective of their family and their honor. This is

because during centuries of occupation, the Cretans did not assimilate in the occupier's culture and the Cretan culture stayed intact and strengthened.⁵⁷ Their family and honor were the only things they truly had and were able to control. Because of their high sense of honor, they get involved in *vendettas* that can last for generations. Honor killings were common in Crete as well as family feuds.⁵⁸

The Cretan society is a closed society, centered on the family and the village. The Cretans created relations within the villages either through commerce or through marriages. The world of a Cretan revolved around his family, his property, his village and maybe as far as the next village. Cretans lived in an agrarian society where they depended on their hard work and the little foodstuff their land will provide. The Cretans are "a hardy lot who lived a primitive day-to-day life."⁵⁹

Even though the Cretans are wary of strangers, they are very hospitable and they value friendship to a fault. A visitor to a Cretan house will receive the best meal and if necessary will sleep in the owners bed, even if that meant that the hosts will go hungry or slept on the floor. For the Cretans it is a matter of taking care of their guests and offering their hospitality. They have a social code and adhere to it so they do not create misunderstandings and feuds. As Patrick Leigh Fermor describes in the introduction in the book *The Cretan Runner*:

The warlike habit of these centuries had left a burning nationalism, a free spirit and the determination to resist foreign occupation at any sacrifice. They are virtually weaned on powder and shot. Every shepherd goes armed; the worship of guns and a devastating skill in their use is a dominant characteristic of the Cretan highlands. Marriages are often accomplished by the abduction of the bride by her suitor and a pose of armed bravos, and blood feuds, sometime initiated by one of these two causes, can decimate opposing families over a space of decades and seal up neighboring villages in hostile deadlock. The wild nature of the country puts these things beyond the nature of the law and fills the mountains with scattered population of outlaws. So in spite of the breathtaking surrounding beauty and the idyllic ritual of the year no leaf-fringed legend haunts the shape of the Cretan mountain life. But a foreign traveler will only see the kind hospitality of these mountain people, their devotion to their friends, their humor and high

spirits and a sweetness of character which is the invariable corollary of the hard conditions of their life.⁶⁰

In an extent, the British were visitors at the island; the Greek government during a time of need, the Greek-Italian War, invited the British to protect the island since the V Cretan Division had to go fight in mainland Greece. Through our Western eyes, the British were there to defend Crete. However, through the Cretans' eyes the Cretans had the obligation to protect the British, and later on to "hide and feed them."⁶¹

From the long history of the island and the numerous rebellions against any occupier, it is evident to realize that the Cretan people were not going to stand idle and wait for the German paratroopers to occupy their island regardless of their motive. The Cretan people were honor bound to protect their families, property and to defend their freedom from any invader.

This is evident from the following dialogue that took place in a meeting between General Alexander Andre, the German Commander of Fortress Crete, and a committee of prominent Cretans from Chania that requested audience in hopes to stop the reprisal killings that followed the end of the battle:

I have read the history of Crete, and I must say I admired your heroic opposition to the Turks. Perhaps this commander was appreciative of the Cretan lore and history, and might understand why the Cretan people had resisted the parachute invasion of their island so stubbornly.

Bishop Xiroudakis, was the first to respond. He stated that the Cretan people wanted nothing more but to be left alone, to rebuild their shattered homes, and then go on with their daily life; they wanted only these mass executions to cease, and that hereafter let each person be responsible for his own actions.

General Andre replied: I must repeat that I admired the way the Cretan people opposed the foreigners who came to conquer you in the past, but *why* did you oppose us? Why did you not oppose the Englishmen who came here before us? You knew they are our enemy!

The youngest member of the committee spat the words out. What did you expect us to do-cross our hands and surrender? The British are our friends, while you came to drive us out of our homes, dishonor us, and kill us with your planes and cannon. Our spirit forbade us to surrender, you read our history!"⁶²

The German Intelligence failed to understand the history and culture of Crete and the reaction of the Cretan population to the German occupation. A quick study of the recent Cretan history could reveal the inherent hatred of the Cretans against any occupier, their love of freedom and the Cretan perceptions towards honor and hospitality.

Thus, the Cretan civilian participation in the battle of Crete was an unexpected surprise to the German Army. The German Intelligence grossly miscalculated the amount of troops defending the island and the disposition of the population towards the Germans. The German Intelligence estimated the strength of the defenders at 10,000 British troops supported by the remnants of two Greek divisions. In addition, it assured the paratroopers leadership that the people of Crete were sympathetic to the Germans and would receive them as allies. Both estimates were wrong.⁶³

At the same time, the German leadership failed to understand their enemy. The German leadership focused only on the British forces. They disregarded the value of the Greek forces and completely neglected to consider the local population. The victories over the British and the Greeks during the German campaign in Greece blinded their judgment. The forces they faced in Crete were the evacuated British forces they had defeated in Greece. For the German leadership, it was another battle that would lead to victory over a beaten enemy. What could possibly go wrong?

However, the British and Greek forces on Crete, fought with great gallantry, as they had done in Greece against the Germans. In addition, the unforeseen player, the Cretan population, caused death and destruction to the German paratroopers. From the first day, everything went wrong. The Germans won the battle because of indecision at the Brigade and Division level of the British leadership and because of the fog of war at the Battalion level with the capture of

Maleme. General Student predicted it would take three days to capture the island, Hitler gave him five, and it took ten.

German Occupation Policies

With the fall of Crete, Germany completely occupied Greece. To minimize the effort to control the country, Germany split Greece into three zones of Occupation. The Germans maintained control of the capital, Athens and the port of Piraeus and the surrounding area, the fertile area of Western and Central Macedonia with the port city of Thessalonica, key islands on the Aegean Sea, a zone at the border of Greece and Turkey and most of Crete. Italy assumed control of most of mainland Greece, the Ionian Islands, the Cyclades, the Dodecanese and eastern Crete. The Bulgarians occupied Eastern Macedonia, Thrace and the islands of Samothrace and Imvros in North Aegean Sea.⁶⁴ (See Annex B, Map 2)

In Crete as in Greece, the Germans introduced occupation policies as they had done in other occupied countries. The German attitude towards the civilian population reflected the attitudes of the higher Nazi leadership as it evolved from the racial hierarchy theory regardless of the fact that General Lohr, General Student, General Andrae and General Brauer were not Nazis themselves. The German's high appreciation for the Classical Greek civilization faded in the Nazi hierarchy's subscription to Fallmerayer's thesis "that racial continuity with the ancients had been interrupted in the seventh-century Slavic invasions. At least the Greeks ranked higher than the Slavs."⁶⁵

The influence of the racial hierarchy theory was evident in the training and guidance the German soldiers received to deal with the Greek population during the occupation and counterinsurgency operations with devastating results to the population.

All civilians were to be regarded as potential enemies. Any contact with the Greeks is forbidden. Any Greek, even, when he gets on with a German, wants something from him. For each favour he wants something in return. German good will towards the Greeks is always misplaced. Better shoot once too often than once too seldom.⁶⁶

In addition to a racist attitude towards the Greeks, the German Army followed a policy of plunder and exploitation. The occupying German Army acted like the locust. The German Army lived off the land. The soldiers were “undernourished, tired and even half-starved. They brought no food for the troops with them and no soldiers’ messes; the troops simply ate in restaurants and slept in houses. Many were thoroughly looted.”⁶⁷ This situation had a devastating effect in Crete. For one, Crete itself is not a self-sustaining island. During peacetime, food imported from mainland Greece was enough to support the island with its 400,000 inhabitants.⁶⁸ However, with the destruction of infrastructure and the prohibition of sea commerce and fishing, sustaining the Cretan population and the 20,000 – 30,000 strong German garrisons became impossible.

Even though the famine in Crete did not reach the catastrophic extend as it had in Athens, it was nevertheless felt in the cities. People who had families in the countryside moved out of the cities. The ones without family ties at the villages suffered, especially during 1941 because of the wartime disruptions and an unusually cold winter the harvest was 15 to 30 per cent lower than the year before.⁶⁹

In addition to looting and famine, the Germans implemented levies to the Greek Government in order to pay for the German occupation costs. In other words, the Greeks were paying the cost the Germans incurred while the Germans were occupying Greece. This had a catastrophic effect in the Greek economy, since the government was unable to increase income through taxation; it published more money and created hyperinflation. In the mean time, Hitler’s

attitude was that the Greeks were not paying occupation costs, but rather constructions costs since the German Army was rebuilding the Greek infrastructure.⁷⁰

With the establishment of the German Army in Crete the *Geheime Staatspolizei*-the security state police- known as the Gestapo arrived in Crete. The mission of the Gestapo was to identify and destroy clandestine activities and to find and destroy the Jews living on the island.⁷¹ With the Gestapo, the “Final Solution” arrived in Crete. However, there were not too many Jews in Crete and most of them lived in the cities mainly at Herakleion. In addition, the Jews in Crete were an integral part of the Cretan society and it was very difficult to distinguish the Orthodox Cretans from the Jewish Cretans since the Jews had Cretan names. The attitude of the Orthodox Cretans was very positive towards the Jews and therefore it was unthinkable for the Cretans to hate the Jews. During the occupation, the Germans captured and killed approximately 300 Jews. Many more survived because their Cretan friends and neighbors hid them in defiance to the German reprisals.⁷²

Reprisals and Counterinsurgency Operations

Germany occupied Crete from June 1, 1941 until May 15, 1945. During the four-year occupation, the German Army conducted counterinsurgency operations against the Cretan Resistance movements. The core of the counterinsurgency policies were reprisals, in the form of indiscriminant executions and village burnings and hostage taking. Both techniques were brutal because they did not focus on directly attacking the insurgents; rather they indiscriminately attacked the civilian population. Both techniques failed to reduce the resistance and to gain popular support.

The civilian participation in the Battle of Crete came with a high price. During the ten-day battle, “over 8,575 Cretans died in the battle fields or were captured and shot.”⁷³ (See Annex C, Table 1.) The number of “destroyed houses in Crete amounted to 12,913 residences and the number of orphans to 12,515.”⁷⁴ (See Annex C, Table 2 and 3.) However, this heavy toll of destruction did not satisfy the German occupiers.

With the end of fighting, the German paratroopers were full of hatred and anger with the amount of losses suffered in the hands of the Cretan civilians. Based on General Student’s “Ten Commandments of the Parachute Division”⁷⁵ they were “against a regular enemy to fight with chivalry, but give no quarter to guerillas.”⁷⁶ This reflected the “German attitude towards the rules of war; no one but professional warriors should be allowed to fight. And in Crete paratroopers had encountered a popular resistance unprecedented in the Wehrmacht’s experience.”⁷⁷ By the end of the battle in Crete, the German Army “had suffered the largest losses than anywhere else during the war.”⁷⁸

During the battle, rumors of atrocities and mutilations of German paratroopers in the hands of Cretan civilians surfaced. When these accounts reached Berlin, Goering ordered General Student to initiate an immediate judicial enquiry and to carry out reprisals. However, in a typical Nazi fashion, the reprisals took place before twelve military judges had had time to report their findings.⁷⁹ On May 31, 1941, General Student issued an order “allowing reprisals to include total destruction of villages and extermination of the male population in the territory in question.”⁸⁰

Therefore, under General Student, the German forces conducted reprisals against the Cretan population. In the 20 days, General Student commanded Crete; the German paratroopers “killed approximately 2,000 civilians in a series of revenge killings.”⁸¹ The “first “German mass

execution”⁸² of the war in Europe took place on June 2, 1941, at the village of Kontomari. A German paratrooper unit under the command of First Lieutenant Trebes, entered the village, assembled all the inhabitants and separated all men between the age of eighteen and fifty-five, about sixty civilians, and executed them.⁸³ (See Annex D.) At Kastelli Kissamou, where the A Battalion First Greek Regiment fought, the Germans executed 200 male civilians, and about 145 men and 2 women at Alikianos, Fournes, and Skenes.⁸⁴ The villages of Ayia, Vrysses, Kyrtomado, Sternes, Perivolia and Kandanos followed.⁸⁵

The German practice of hostage taking started during the Battle of Crete. On May 23, 1941, General Ringel, commander of the Fifth Mountain Division, issued an order declaring that:

The Greek population in civilian or German uniforms is taking part in the fighting. They are mutilating and robbing the corpses of our German Soldiers. Any Greek civilian taken with a firearm in his hand is to be shot immediately. Hostages (men between 18 and 55) are to be taken from their villages and if acts of hostility take place against the German Army will be shot. Ten Greeks will die for every German!⁸⁶

It is evident from this order that the German High Command did not consider it prudent to investigate into resistance attacks and to determine the innocence or guilt of the arrested civilians. The German Army killed hostages as a reaction to every attack. This was contradictory to the Cretan sense of justice. As illustrated earlier, in the meeting with General Andre, Bishop Xiroudakis, had requested for the end of the indiscriminate reprisals and for each person to be responsible for his own actions. Unfortunately, the German view towards reprisals was from a position of power, because “Germany had the means to impose its will.”⁸⁷

The indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians did not decrease the Cretan resistance; on the contrary, it fueled it. The Cretan population went up to the mountains, started to create armed bands, and started harassing the Germans. Based on the Cretan culture of honor fighting,

banditry and feuds the Cretan population continued to take arms against the Germans and to demand revenge. The policy of reprisals failed to diminish the Cretan resistance.

The Cretan Resistance “movement was one of the most successful in Europe”⁸⁸ and one of the first. The resistance started from the beginning of the battle and continued until the German surrender on May 15, 1945. There were many resistance groups in Crete. Some were organized by Greek Army officers others by Cretan *Kapetanios* (Chieftains). These groups conducted acts of sabotage; ambushes, provided shelter to British troops and helped them escape to Egypt, and collected intelligence regarding enemy movements and supplies to North Africa.

Some of the most important actions during the occupation were the attacks on the Herakleion, Kastelli and Tympaki airfields on June 1942 that caused the destruction of 25 German airplanes. In reprisal the Germans killed fifty hostages at Herakleion following these attacks.⁸⁹ The abduction of Major General Karl Kreipe, Commanding General of 22nd Sevastopol Division, by Major Patrick Leigh Fermor, Captain William Stanley Moss, Manolis Paterakis, Giorgos Tyrakis and Stratis Saviolis “was one of the most spectacular and successful co-operation between the Cretan and British forces against the Germans on the island of Crete.”⁹⁰

The significance of the Cretan resistance is that it forced the Germans to maintain a large garrison in Crete instead of using these forces in other theaters during the war. During the occupation, Germany maintained a garrison of 20,000 to 30,000 in Crete for the next four years.⁹¹ At times, based on actions at the Mediterranean Theater this number swell to over 75,000 men in order to defend Crete from an Allied invasion that never came.⁹² This strong presence brought the “ratio of German and Italian forces in respect to the local population to 1 to 5”⁹³ making the presence of enemy forces on the island far greater than in other European

countries. In the end, the German Army was not successful to impose its will on the Cretan resistance and the resistance continued until the end of the occupation.

However, the greater threat to the Germans, as the German soldier perceived, it was not the approaching Allied Force but the Cretans. The Germans knew the “Cretans hate them and were ready to dig up their rifles and say it with bullets. Yet the Germans are hurt and puzzled at not being loved, and are constantly asking why.”⁹⁴ The answer to that question was the hecatomb of six thousand Cretans killed in reprisals by the Germans during the occupation.⁹⁵ Up to liberation day in Crete on May 15, 1945, the Cretans were fighting the encircled German Army at Chania.


Conclusion

The Cretan civilian participation in the Battle of Crete had a major impact on the route of the battle and in the conduct of the following German occupation. During the battle, the Germans did not expect the Cretan civilian participation. Up to that point, the German soldier fought against a regular Army and saw the civilian population flee as the German Army approached. In Crete, that changed. The Cretan population took an active and decisive part in the fighting and caused approximately one third of all German losses. This participation led to indiscriminate reprisals and unnecessary violence that fueled the resistance. The German Army failed to understand the enemy and to control the population.

The inability of the German High Command to understand the Cretan culture and why the Cretans took arms against them during the battle led to a brutal occupation. As an estimate, over 20,000 Cretans lost their lives during the occupation because of hunger, reprisals and executions. At the beginning of the occupation, the Cretans offered an opportunity for

reconciliation the Germans however rejected it and continued to conduct indiscriminate reprisal operations against the population. As a result, the Cretan population continued to resist the Germans for the four years of occupation and tied down significant German forces in Crete that could have been used elsewhere. The German strategy to subdue the Cretan resistance by military means had failed.


Annex 1, Map 1



Map 1, German Assault Plan

Annex B, Map 2

Triple Occupation Of Greece By the Axis Powers (1941 - 1944)



Map 2: Occupation Zones of Responsibility

Annex C

Nome	Men	Women	Children
Chania	2,220	480	418
Rethymno	1,897	405	403
Herakleion	2,045	185	129
Lasithi	431	50	20
Total in all categories	8,575		

Table 1: Cretan Civilians Fallen in Battle or Executed

Nome	Fatherless	Motherless	Both Parents
Chania	3,338	1,098	380
Rethymno	3,320	848	528
Herakleion	3,840	1,772	484
Lasithi	2,017	739	549
Total per category	12,515	4,457	1,941

Table 2: Number of Orphans by Nome

Nome	Total	Partial Destruction
Chania	2,669	4,562
Rethymno	2,338	1,300
Herakleion	6,968	4,942
Lasithi	938	714
Total in all categories	12,913	11,518

Table 3: Destruction of Residences by Nome

Annex D

Massacre at Kondomari



Bundesarchiv, Bild 3011-108-0535-09
Foto: Weixler, Franz Peter | 2. Juni 1941

LT Trebes gives the order for the execution of the villagers at Kondomari.



Bundesarchiv, BAd 1011-108-0527-00A
Foto: Weixler, Franz Peter 12. Juni 1941



Bundesarchiv, BAd 1011-108-0527-00A
Foto: Weixler, Franz Peter 12. Juni 1941

Destruction of Kandanos



Für die brutale Ermordung Deutscher
Fallschirmjäger, Gebirgsjäger und Pio-
nierer von männlichen Frauen, Kindern, wie
auch mit dem Pfarrer, sowie mit ein-
igen der hundertfünfzig Reichs- und
Land-geistes haben, wurde am
3.6.41 KANDANOS
vom Grunde zerstört um niemals
wieder aufgebaut werden.

Διὰ τὴν ἀνεναντίαν βροχόφονον
Γερμανὸν ἀνδροφονίαν, ἀποκρίαν,
καὶ τοῦ Μηχανικοῦ, ἀπὸ ἄνδρας, γυν-
αῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ πρεσβύτερος καὶ
ἐκκλ. ἐργάτης καὶ τοῦ ἀρχιερέως
κατὰ τοῦ Μυράτου Παύλ. Μουτράφ
τῆς 3ης 6-1941 ὁ Κάνδανος ἐκ θεμε-
λίων διὰ τὴν ἐξοικονομικὴν
ἐργασίαν ποτὲ —



Because off the brutal murder of German Paratroopers, Alpinist and Engineers by men, women and children and priest, and because they dared to resist against the Great Reich. We destroyed Kandanos on 3 June 1941, from the foundations so it will never be rebuilt ever again. (Literal translation by MAJ Soubassis)

Notes

- ¹ Clark, Alan, *The Fall of Crete*, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1962, page 7.
- ² Clark, page 7.
- ³ Churchill, S. Winston, *The Second World War, Their Finest Hour*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949, page 533.
- ⁴ Churchill, *The Second World War, Their Finest Hour*, page 534-540.
- ⁵ Hellenic Army General Staff, *Army History Directorate, The Battle of Crete*, Athens 2000, page 3.
- ⁶ HAGS, AHD, page 6.
- ⁷ HAGS, AHD, page 6-7.
- ⁸ Palazzo, Albert. *Battle of Crete*. Canberra: Army History Unit, 2007, page 13-14.
- ⁹ HAGS, AHD, page 38.
- ¹⁰ HAGS, AHD, page 21.
- ¹¹ Churchill, S. Winston, *The Second World War, The Grand Alliance*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950, page 279.
- ¹² Kiriakopoulos, G. C. *Ten days to destiny: The Battle for Crete 1941*. New York: Watt, 1985, page 35-39.
- ¹³ Beevor, Antony. *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (History and Warfare)*. London: John Murray, 2005, page 116.
- ¹⁴ Kiriakopoulos, G. C. *The Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1995, page 17.
- ¹⁵ Beevor, Antony. *Crete: The Battle and the Resistance (History and Warfare)*. London: John Murray, 2005, page 116..
- ¹⁶ Kiriakopoulos, G. C. *Ten days to destiny*, page 102.
- ¹⁷ Beevor, page 118.
- ¹⁸ Kiriakopoulos, *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 149.
- ¹⁹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*, page 5.
- ²⁰ Kiriakopoulos, *The Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*, page 6, also *Ten days to destiny* page 149.
- ²¹ Kiriakopoulos, *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 151.
- ²² Kiriakopoulos, *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 151.
- ²³ Palazzo, page 45-46, also Kiriakopoulos, *The Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*, page 6, also Beevor, page 117.
- ²⁴ Kiriakopoulos, *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 169.
- ²⁵ Kiriakopoulos, *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 76.
- ²⁶ HAGS, AHD, page 63.
- ²⁷ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 176.
- ²⁸ HAGS, AHD, page 127, also Davin, *Crete*, page 323.
- ²⁹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 185-186.
- ³⁰ HAGS, AHD, page 151.
- ³¹ HAGS, AHD, page 153.
- ³² Beevor, page 134.
- ³³ HAGS, AHD, page 156.
- ³⁴ Beevor, page 139.
- ³⁵ Beevor, page 140.
- ³⁶ Beevor, page 176.
- ³⁷ Beevor, page 177.
- ³⁸ Manolikakis, Ioannis .G. *The Golgotha of Crete*. Athens 1951, page 46 Translated from original Greek text by MAJ George Soubassis
- ³⁹ Kiriakopoulos, *The Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*, page 6, also Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 188.
- ⁴⁰ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Ten Days to Destiny*, page 177-181.
- ⁴¹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. *Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945*, page 25.
- ⁴² Davin, D.M. *Crete*. Wellington: War History Branch, 1953 page 488.
- ⁴³ Stewart, I. McD. G. *The Struggle for Crete, a Story of Lost Opportunity*, 20 May – 1 June 1941. London: Oxford University Press, 1966, page 476.
- ⁴⁴ Beevor, page 230.
- ⁴⁵ Clark, *The Fall of Crete*, page 83-84.

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- ⁴⁶ Hadjipateras Costas, Maria Fafalios. *Crete 1941 Eyewitnessed*. Athens, Efstathiadis Group, 1995, page 107.
- ⁴⁷ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 151.
- ⁴⁸ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 176.
- ⁴⁹ Beevor, 117-118.
- ⁵⁰ Beevor, page 116.
- ⁵¹ Beevor, page 109.
- ⁵² Beevor, page 96.
- ⁵³ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 160.
- ⁵⁴ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 11.
- ⁵⁵ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 17-18.
- ⁵⁶ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 17-18.
- ⁵⁷ Psychoundakis, George. *The Cretan Runner*. London: Penguin Books, 2009, page 25.
- ⁵⁸ Psychoundakis, page 25.
- ⁵⁹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 159.
- ⁶⁰ Psychoundakis, page 25.
- ⁶¹ Psychoundakis, page 11.
- ⁶² Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 32-33.
- ⁶³ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 102.
- ⁶⁴ Condit, D.M. *Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II*. Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1961, page 36.
- ⁶⁵ Mazower, page 158.
- ⁶⁶ Mazower, page 157.
- ⁶⁷ Mazower, page 23.
- ⁶⁸ Palazzo, Albert. *Battle of Crete*. Canberra: Army History Unit, 2007, page 27.
- ⁶⁹ Mazower, page 26.
- ⁷⁰ Mazower, page 66-67.
- ⁷¹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 35.
- ⁷² Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 336-37.
- ⁷³ Panagiotakis, George. *Documents From The Battle And The Resistance of Crete, 1941-45*. Herakleion: G. Detorakis, 2007, page 23.
- ⁷⁴ Panagiotakis, page 25.
- ⁷⁵ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 127 and Beevor, page 235.
- ⁷⁶ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Ten Days to Destiny, page 127 and Beevor, page 235.
- ⁷⁷ Beevor, page 235.
- ⁷⁸ Panagiotakis, page 23.
- ⁷⁹ Beevor, page 236.
- ⁸⁰ Beevor, page 236.
- ⁸¹ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 32.
- ⁸² Panagiotakis, page 183.
- ⁸³ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 21 and Beevor, page 237.
- ⁸⁴ Beevor, page 237.
- ⁸⁵ Panagiotakis, page 183, see also Beevor page 237.
- ⁸⁶ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 19-20.
- ⁸⁷ Kiriakopoulos, G.C. Nazi Occupation of Crete, 1941-1945, page 32-33.
- ⁸⁸ Psychoundakis, page 11.
- ⁸⁹ Panagiotakis, page 261.
- ⁹⁰ Panagiotakis, page 335.
- ⁹¹ Davin, page 487.
- ⁹² Beevor, page 271.
- ⁹³ Panagiotakis, page 259.
- ⁹⁴ Beevor, page 271.
- ⁹⁵ Manolikakis, page 168.

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