U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine (1980-2003)
Abstract
The U.S. Army focus on conventional warfare during the period 1980-2003 resulted in a lack of counterinsurgency' doctrinal development during that period, leaving the regular Army forces without a basis to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq after the initial invasion in 2003. Further, because of the lack of doctrinal, educational, and training focus on counterinsurgency during the previous two decades, the majority of senior military leaders such as General Sanchez, the V Corps commander in Iraq in 2003, were not adequately prepared to address the strategic and operational level concerns related to a counterinsurgency. This left military leaders and troops throughout Iraq in a situation where disparate operational and tactical approaches were taken against the insurgency, with mixed results. The Army simply had no adequate doctrinal basis that prepared its general-purpose forces to deal with the insurgency that emerged during the summer of 2003.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 04, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA600359
Entities
People
- Matthew R. Simmons
Organizations
- Marine Corps University