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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

ALLOCATING MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE
RESOURCES FOR PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: ALLOCATING MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES FOR PHASE ZERO OPERATIONS

Author: Major Carl Priechenfried, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Current Marine Corps tables of organization misallocate intelligence resources within the Marine Air Ground Task Force based on an outdated emphasis on conventional operations.

Discussion: The Marine Corps allocates intelligence resources primarily to the higher echelons of deploying forces in accordance with current Marine Corps tables of organization. Operations in complex operating environments such as Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrate the need for adjustment to intelligence resource allocations to satisfy emerging intelligence requirements. While the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan remains the near-term objective for the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps intelligence community must consider increasingly complex future operating environments to assess potential impacts on intelligence resource allocation within and external to the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) organizational construct. This study analyzes engagement and shaping activities to identify allocation requirements and propose courses of action regarding intelligence support concepts of operation.

Conclusion: The Marine Corps should develop an intelligence support concept of operations that institutionalizes the sourcing and reallocation of scalable intelligence support teams from a MAGTF's command element to satisfy future operating environment intelligence requirements.

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Preface

I based this exploration of intelligence support concepts of operation and resource allocation on a profound interest in Marine Expeditionary Unit operations combined with my experiences as an Intelligence Officer at the Battalion Landing Team, Marine Expeditionary Unit, Division, and Marine Expeditionary Force levels. As a staff officer responsible for recommending intelligence resource allocations, I was curious about the history and basis of the existing allocation structure as well as recent allocation modifications utilized ashore in Afghanistan and afloat by a Marine Expeditionary Unit. I began my research with well-recognized secondary sources for background and then focused on primary and secondary sources from some of the men who developed and implemented the intelligence support concept discussed in this paper.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the Command and Staff College faculty who provided the support, mentorship, and patience to assist me in completing this effort. The most important form of support came from my wife, Dr. Amy Poe, who provided encouragement and strength while simultaneously teaching at a community college and running a busy household of three young children in my absence. Without her, none of this would have been possible.

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Introduction

“We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.”

- President George W. Bush¹

National policy demonstrates the intention of the United States (US) to commit heavily in engagement activities in the near-term future. The 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* addressed this role, stating, “Consistent with the President’s vision, the United States will advance these interests by...engaging abroad on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect, and promoting an international order that advances our interests by reinforcing the rights and responsibilities of all nations.”² The 2010 *National Security Strategy* reinforces this point, stating, “The starting point for that collective action [to serve global common interests] will be our engagement with other countries.”³ Successful engagement thus emerges as a critical skill to achieve US national interests. Indeed, such Phase Zero Shaping activities⁴ will not only be important; they will be vital in enabling future international influence in an increasingly resource-constrained environment. An examination of this future operating environment’s characteristics and associated intelligence requirements is therefore necessary.

The allocation of intelligence resources within the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) construct is flexible and subject to change. Marine Corps intelligence resource allocations underwent significant adjustments over the previous decade to satisfy counterinsurgency operations requirements. This operating environment, categorized as Phase Four Stabilization operations,⁵ is considerably more complex than the Cold War, conventional-threat based operating environment on which the preexisting resource allocation structure is based. Similarly, strategic forecasts of future operating environments based on current global trends characterize the future as increasingly complex due to the presence of and overlapping

influence between state and non-state actors. This raises the question of “What next for Marine Corps intelligence?” in the post-Operation Enduring Freedom environment.

This paper investigates the allocation of Marine Corps intelligence resources to satisfy engagement and shaping intelligence requirements. First, a brief literature review of intelligence failures and recommended fixes highlights key issues found within the intelligence community. This section also addresses the current status of Marine Corps MAGTF intelligence resource allocations to serve as a point of departure for the alternate courses of action proposed later in the paper. Second, an analysis of the characteristics of Phase Zero (Shaping) operating environments identifies associated intelligence requirements. Third, courses of action (COAs) regarding adjustments to current intelligence resource allocations are proposed and analyzed. Included in this section is a cost and benefits comparison between these proposed courses of action. Lastly, this study concludes with a recommendation and questions for future research.

Background

There is a large body of published literature addressing “fixing” intelligence within the Defense Department. An analysis of this body of literature makes it apparent that the focus of these critiques rests primarily on strategic or operational intelligence failures. Strategically, such failures included the belief that Iraq was continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction and the underestimation of the threat posed by the al Qaida terrorist organization to the US.⁶ Operational level intelligence failures highlighted in the literature generally focused on inaccurate perceptions of the operating environments in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom that resulted in their prolonged continuation – namely, the failure to

anticipate, or even initially acknowledge, the rise of the Iraqi insurgency and to incorporate and apply past counterinsurgency operations lessons learned.⁷

This does not discount the fact that lessons applicable to the tactical level are extant within this body of literature. On the contrary, it is worthwhile for the military intelligence practitioner to look for all areas in which intelligence lessons learned are applicable across any of the levels of war.⁸ Foremost in the current literature is Lieutenant General Michael Flynn's assessment of the role intelligence is playing in Afghanistan, prominent primarily due to Flynn's role as the senior military intelligence officer in Afghanistan when he published the article. Flynn and his coauthors criticize current tactical and operational-level intelligence practices and procedures that fail to satisfy strategic intelligence requirements. They argue that counterinsurgency campaigns are fought at the tactical level and therefore tactical intelligence can equate to strategic intelligence.⁹ Central to their article is the assertion that analytical capability is absent where it is most needed – at the battalion level and below. Consequently, while friendly units gather intelligence on the enemy to support force protection and kinetic operations, they miss the more important goal of developing intelligence “for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency.”¹⁰ The recommendations contained therein outline tactical intelligence planning, collection, production, and dissemination “fixes” to address the shortfalls of the current system.¹¹

More specific to the Marine Corps intelligence community, reports submitted to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) over the previous decade identify service-specific issues requiring attention. The need for enhanced analysis and collection capabilities at the lowest level is a consistent theme in the large body of reports addressing intelligence. A battalion that deployed to Afghanistan noted in its after action report that “Distributed operations

with limited connectivity require a robust intelligence apparatus at the company level.”¹²

Another battalion landing team attached to a Marine Expeditionary Unit echoed this point by stating, “The rifle company needs a true intelligence cell manned with trained intelligence Marines rather than a ‘company level intel cell’ of infantry Marines.”¹³ The current concept of providing limited intelligence training to infantry Marines within a company is inadequate to meet the intelligence requirements of complex operating environments.

It is noteworthy that the intelligence critiques primarily focus on the recent Iraq and current Afghanistan conflicts. The literature pays considerably less attention to future requirements pertinent to a more benign operating environment. The focus on the current fight is understandable. The “rediscovery” of and focus upon counterinsurgency operations that occurred in the middle of the last decade was critical for a military mired in Iraq and largely absent in Afghanistan. However, rather than repeating the experience of the 1990s when the military “missed” counterinsurgency as a central mission, it is appropriate to look beyond the current campaign to future missions and associated intelligence requirements.

The Marine Corps was responsive to the intelligence lessons learned over the past decade. The service changed both its total force end strength and experimented with innovative programs providing intelligence training to non-intelligence designated Marines at the sub-battalion level. However, these changes only partially addressed the need for increased intelligence capabilities at the lowest levels. Before analyzing the changes and their shortfalls, the next section provides a review of the current USMC organizational structure and associated intelligence resource allocation to set the baseline for current capabilities and gaps.

Current Intelligence Resource Allocation

The Marine Corps employs a MAGTF organizational construct designed to counter military threats based on a presumption of force-on-force conventional military conflicts.¹⁴ Multiple MAGTF sizes exist. At the lower end is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), consisting of approximately 2,200 personnel. Next in size is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), a task-organized force consisting of between 3,000 and 20,000 personnel depending on the assigned mission. The largest MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), a 20,000+ sized force that is equivalent to a US Army Corps. Additionally, the Marine Corps forms Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) of varying sizes to accomplish specific, limited-duration missions. Internally, the MAGTF consists of a Command Element (CE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE). This organizational structure emphasizes centralized planning and decentralized execution. The intelligence architecture associated with the MAGTF reflects this emphasis.

The MAGTF possesses a robust and multidisciplinary intelligence capability. This capability consists of aviation intelligence, ground intelligence, human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), ground reconnaissance, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), geospatial and imagery intelligence (GEOINT), all source analysis, and meteorological analysis (METOC). The majority of intelligence assets associated with this capability is allocated to the MAGTF's CE. This provides the senior commander sufficient capability to satisfy prioritized intelligence requirements, support decision-making, and afford greatest flexibility in the employment of these assets across the unit's assigned area of responsibility (AOR).

In the MEU, the intelligence section is frequently the largest section within the CE, accounting for 57-80 (23-32%) of the total personnel assigned to the approximately 250-person CE¹⁵ and for 45-54% of the total intelligence personnel (148) assigned to the approximately 2,200-person MEU.¹⁶ In the MEF, intelligence resources within the CE comprise several battalions of intelligence personnel and cover the full range of intelligence capabilities.

As noted by Flynn and codified within current US military counterinsurgency doctrine, the nature of localized COIN operations demand a focus at the lowest tactical level.¹⁷ Combat experiences over the previous decade in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced this emphasis on the local level as well as demonstrated the need for a downward reallocation of intelligence assets. The operating environment for COIN operations emphasizes decentralized planning and decision-making. To satisfy these demands, the Marine Corps must assign more intelligence assets to tactical levels. Expanded capabilities to collect, process and exploit, and analyze/produce intelligence are needed at the sub-battalion (i.e. company and platoon) level to generate high operational tempo generation and assist the development of physical, social/cultural, and human terrain knowledge.

Reflecting this need, from fiscal year 2006 (FY06) to 2009 (FY09) the Marine Corps total force structure expanded from approximately 180,000 personnel to just over 204,000, an almost 14% increase.¹⁸ The Marine Corps intelligence community benefitted disproportionately from this expansion, with its overall total structure growing from 4,376 to 6,891 Marines, an almost 56% increase.¹⁹ The largest growths were in the following fields: MAGTF Intelligence Officer (from 482 to 642); Ground Intelligence Officer (94 to 277); Aviation Intelligence Officer (63 to 125); Counterintelligence / Human Intelligence Specialist (533 to 740); Intelligence Specialist (1,298 to 1,840); Geospatial Intelligence Specialist (161 to 244); Cryptologic Digital

Network Technician/Analyst (44 to 226); and Special Communications Signal Intelligence Operator/Analyst (503 to 622). Appendix A provides the Marine Corps structure growth from FY06 to FY09 for all intelligence primary military occupational specialties (PMOS) as well as the service's total end strength.

Current operational requirements largely drove this growth. The intelligence officer population expanded almost 70%, reflecting a much greater need for intelligence community leadership. The significant growths in the CI/HUMINT Specialist (over 50%) and Intelligence Specialist (almost 42%) demonstrate the greatly increased requirements for tactical HUMINT collection and intelligence analysis at the lowest echelons to support operations in complex environments. The other primary area of expansion was in signals intelligence, specifically the fields of digital network analysis and special communications signals collection. This growth reflects the increasingly technical component of communications in today's battlefields.

In addition to expansions in overall USMC intelligence resources, emergent intelligence-specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) demonstrated downward resource allocations. One TTP that is now a formal program of record is the Company Level Intelligence Cell (CLIC). This program provides a two-week training package to selected Marines within infantry companies to provide rudimentary intelligence planning and analysis skills. Another increasingly widespread TTP is the formation and employment of intelligence "direct support teams" (DSTs). The DSTs were stand-alone, multi-disciplinary intelligence collection and analysis teams that differed from previous resource allocation methods organized on functional lines. The DST concept emerged as a favored method to push intelligence resources downward to provide added capabilities to lower echelons. Although briefly mentioned as a support concept in 2003 Marine Corps intelligence doctrine,²⁰ DST use was nonexistent prior to the

outbreak of the Iraq insurgency and subsequent conduct of counterinsurgency operations that highlighted the need for robust intelligence capabilities at the lowest echelons.²¹ Demonstrating the widespread adoption of this concept, the DST construct was an integral component of both the II MEF and 2nd Marine Division intelligence sections' concepts of support during initial II MEF staff planning for the 2011 deployment to Afghanistan.²²

This support concept has expanded outside of units scheduled for Afghanistan deployments. During the 24th MEU's 2008 deployment to Afghanistan and subsequent 2009-2010 deployment cycle aboard ship, the intelligence section experimented with the creation of Operational Support Teams (OSTs). Mirroring the DSTs in capability but on a smaller scale, the OSTs pushed all-source intelligence collection and analysis capabilities downward in order to support more proactive, robust engagement and shaping activities as well as satisfy combat and counterinsurgency intelligence requirements.²³ The Marine Corps Special Operations Command also uses the DST concept, where they source DSTs to deploying Marine Special Operations Companies to provide robust intelligence capabilities below the battalion level.²⁴ Elements of this concept are even emerging in the Marine Corps Supporting Establishment. The service-level intelligence organization, the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), is currently reorganizing from a functional to a regional orientation.²⁵ In effect, this reorganization will create multi-discipline DSTs aligned to the three MEFs that recently have assumed a regional focus.²⁶ Although not named as such, MCIA expects the DST concept to efficiently direct downward intelligence (by product support if not by resource allocation).

While use of the DST has expanded, it is not an institutionalized concept across the Marine Corps. Consequently, the manner in which it is manned, trained, and equipped varies from unit to unit. This lack of consistency means that units do not build institutional knowledge

on either the theory or the practice of employing DSTs, which leads to “reinventing the wheel.” In an already overburdened pre-deployment training program (PTP), time is the most precious commodity available. While lessons learned and after action reports from previous DST experiences exist, they are neither standardized nor collated to provide a sum of knowledge by which future units can benefit.

Future Operating Environment

This study now shifts forward to a description and analysis of future operating environments. Forecasting the future is inherently problematic. Strategist Colin Gray acknowledged the difficulty in writing on the future and “saying worthwhile things...all the while accepting the inescapable limits of our knowledge.”²⁷ However, he went on to assert that given warfare’s unchanging nature, “historical experience is a goldmine for the understanding of future war and warfare.”²⁸ Thus, a close examination of recent historical trends serves as a basis for future conditions.

Policy makers routinely grapple with the future as they implement current actions to create future outcomes. To assist their efforts, numerous government organizations produce strategic forecasts to identify future operating conditions and characteristics. These forecasts employ different methodologies, time scales and scopes. However, a critical read of these documents reveals commonalities regarding the predicted future environment. These commonalities serve as a baseline for this analysis of future intelligence requirements.

These “relatively certain” key characteristics include the emergence of a multi-polar global political system, increasing population growth disproportionately in lesser developed areas (predominantly Asia, Africa, and Latin America), continued population migration to urban

and littoral regions, and increasing global resource demands and regional shortages²⁹. These key characteristics, plus the possible inclusion of the less certain factors such as climate change and increased spread of extremist ideologies create a greater conflict potential. While mitigating factors are possible, their emergence is uncertain at best. These factors include resource innovations such as alternate energy, food, and water technological advances; growth of actors capable of providing regional “clusters” of stability; and adaptations of multilateral and international organizations such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization to meet the challenges of the new century. In recognition of these characteristics, the US response is to increase global engagement to shape and influence friends, allies and potential adversaries towards a more stable future. A discussion of these shaping and engagement activities, identified as Phase Zero operations in joint US military doctrine, follows.

Phase Zero Operations and Intelligence Requirements

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, identifies phasing as a key aspect of the element of operational design, intended “to logically organize a campaign’s diverse, extended, and dispersed activities.”³⁰ Phasing serves several important purposes. It allows commanders and staffs to “define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose” to enable “systematically achieving objectives that cannot be achieved concurrently by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence.”³¹ Military campaigns at the operational level of war are categorized into six phases, comprised of the following activities: shaping (Phase Zero); deterring (Phase One); seizing the initiative (Phase Two); dominating (Phase Three); stabilizing (Phase Four); and transitioning to civil control (Phase Five).³²

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) plan Phase Zero operations in detail. The GCCs are responsible for producing theater Security Cooperation Plans (SCPs) in accordance with guidance from the National Command Authority and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff³³ to synchronize engagement and shaping activities within their respective areas of responsibility with other government agencies responsible for overseas engagement, primarily the US State Department.³⁴ These operations are “performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies” to:

shap[e] perceptions and influenc[e] the behavior of both adversaries and allies, develop[e] allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improve[e] information exchange and intelligence sharing, and provid[e] US forces with peacetime and contingency access.³⁵

Shaping activities include:

- operational activities such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, sanctions enforcement, counterdrug operations;
- combined exercises;
- security assistance;
- combined training;
- combined education;
- military contacts;
- humanitarian assistance; and,
- other engagement activities such as engagements resulting from arms control treaties, obligations, ongoing negotiations, information exchanges, et al.³⁶

An examination of Phase Zero operations reveals requirements that drive the intelligence process. A detailed understanding of the political, military, social, and informational environments is required for the US to successfully influence perceptions and shape behavior. Specifically, the military must understand what potential areas of tension exist to manage the consequences of its actions and avoid potential pitfalls. For example, a US military force that is conducting a military-to-military exchange with an Arab nation should take into consideration the differing Muslim weekly calendar when planning schedules. Tension can also exist between

long-standing allies. The US and an allied nation may have differing political views regarding a potential adversary. Using this adversary for the scenario in a combined exercise can cause unnecessary disagreement.

Another goal of Phase Zero operations is developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, for which there are robust intelligence requirements. To support developing realistic, sustainable self-defense capabilities, the US must understand the domestic political, economic, and cultural context in which the host nation's military resides. A mature understanding of the host nation's threat perception is also required to ensure that both countries share a common appreciation of the provided capabilities. Detailed information of the existing capabilities of the host nation's military, including level of technological development, underlying doctrine, training capabilities, and cultural information of the population are required for US forces to maximize the effectiveness of interactions and training programs.

A third goal of Phase Zero operations is to improve information exchange and intelligence sharing. While standing agreements exist between the US and many countries to enable formal intelligence sharing at the national level, interactions at the lower levels can often yield valuable intelligence. One of the largest barriers is cultural information and context to support routine interactions. At the individual level, developing relationships through formal exchanges, shared training and other interactions can assist the US in advancing its interests. Arrangements such as the International Military Education and Training program support this type of individual-level relationship building by including foreign military officers within the US military's professional military education programs, and it is not uncommon for participating

international military personnel to achieve high ranks in their militaries. Both long- and short-term shared experiences allow participants to develop a deeper understanding of each other.

A fourth goal of Phase Zero operations, providing US forces with peacetime and contingency access, also has associated intelligence requirements. One requirement is a comprehensive strategic and tactical understanding of those areas' situations. Strategically, the political climate and stability factors are relevant collection requirements. At the tactical level, the geographic and infrastructural capabilities and limitations of the area in which US forces would operate are valid intelligence requirements. The perception of Americans in general and US military forces in particular by leading politicians and the general population are intelligence requirements that span all three levels of war.

Historically, the Marine Corps uses MAGTFs to conduct Phase Zero activities. The forward deployed MEUs are the primary vehicle by which the Marine Corps contributes to theater engagement and shaping activities. MEUs frequently provide humanitarian relief and assistance. For example, the 22nd and 24th MEUs provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti following the devastating earthquake in January 2010 and the 26th MEU delivered humanitarian relief supplies to Pakistan following widespread flooding in August 2010.³⁷ In addition, MEUs regularly conduct bi- and multi-lateral combined training and exercises. During its 2008-2009 deployment, for example, the 26th MEU conducted bilateral training with Italy, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates.³⁸ Additionally, the Marine Corps started forming and deploying Security Cooperation SPMAGTFs in 2010 to support the Southern Command GCC's engagement strategy.

Within the MAGTF, the CE has primary responsibility for planning and supervising operations. However, the CE frequently has minimal direct exposure to the environment in

which these operations occur. The GCE, and to a lesser extent the LCE, have significantly greater direct contact with the host nation and ashore environment as they conduct the actual training and exercises as well as supporting logistical activities. As a result, the intelligence collection opportunities and analytical requirements to support Phase Zero operations reside within subordinate components of the MAGTF rather than within the CE.

COA Analysis

With an understanding of both the projected environment and Phase Zero intelligence requirements, the question of where to allocate intelligence resources in the MAGTF structure to satisfy these requirements emerges. This section proposes two alternate COAs for allocating intelligence resources within the MAGTF. In addition, this section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, both independently and relative to the each other. Appendix A provides a diagram of the two COAs.

The first COA is to institute a standard operating practice for the intelligence DST concept. This COA standardizes the practice demonstrated over the previous several years of creating DSTs or OSTs to source intelligence assets and capabilities downward within the MAGTF structure. The DST should consist of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors as well as all-source analysts in teams scaled to the size of the MAGTF to which they attach.

This COA confers several advantages. First, by building multidisciplinary intelligence teams, it retains ultimate flexibility for resource distribution with the senior MAGTF commander. The commander retains the capability to weight his main effort in his area of responsibility with additional assets while at the same time ensuring his ability to recall those

capabilities if the situation changes. Second, this COA standardizes the manning, equipping, and training of these teams. It would also institutionalize the process of capturing and applying lessons learned to prevent each team from having to reinvent the wheel prior to deployment. Third, this COA flattens the intelligence organizational structure to facilitate information flow.

This COA also presents some disadvantages. First, by creating a new organizational construct, this COA adds to the already burdensome training requirements for both the intelligence practitioners as well as the leaders to whom the assets attach. Additionally, this COA will likely require additional equipment beyond current allotments. This additional equipment requirement would likely arise for both intelligence and communications systems because of the increased capability directed to lower echelons where no such capability previously existed. This COA also carries potential risks of causing information overload at the higher echelon as well as creating the potential for information leakage. Lastly, information security constraints may limit the full analytic potential of the DST

These disadvantages are clear at the MEU level. In order to function effectively, a DST attached to a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) requires simultaneous multi-domain access to unclassified and classified communications networks, to include a Top Secret / Sensitive Compartment Information communications capability that does not exist within a BLT. Furthermore, BLTs may lack the capability of establishing the Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities required for conducting communications at the TS/SCI level due to their relatively light logistics footprint. Therefore, not only would the DST require additional communications equipment, it would also necessitate some changes in the functioning of the unit to which it would attach.

The second COA is to redistribute intelligence resources downward within the MAGTF construct from the CE to the ACE, GCE, and LCE at the start of the MAGTF's PTP. When not in a pre-deployment status,³⁹ the intelligence capabilities remain in its current location within the CE, which optimizes the training opportunities for the intelligence Marines while not interfering with their ability to develop habitual support relationships similar to those enjoyed between the artillery battalions and infantry regiments. Within a MEU, this COA calls for the CE to source an additional intelligence capability to the subordinate echelons (likely both the GCE and the LCE) at the start of the PTP through the completion of the deployment. The CE retains some intelligence capability in this COA, for the CE retains the missions of shaping the battle space and setting the conditions for the main effort. However, the CE's intelligence capability is more limited in this COA than the status quo.

One advantage of this COA is that it consistently enables increased intelligence resources at the lower echelons where a majority of the collection requirements exists. Contacts at the lowest echelons are often more substantial and longer in duration than those of the commanders and staffs. This COA also best facilitates training of the intelligence team due to its fixed location and unit to which it attaches. Not only can the DST best prepare itself for this method of employment; it can also best integrate with its assigned unit and the receiving unit will gain the most opportunity to familiarize itself with the added capabilities.

There are also disadvantages associated with this COA. One is the lack of asset allocation flexibility this COA imparts to the MAGTF commander. A permanent restructuring of intelligence resources down to subordinate echelons reduces the Commander's ability to assign assets as operating conditions change. Another disadvantage is the reduced ability for the Commander to accomplish one of the CE's primary missions of tactically shaping the unit's

environment, which is a primary reason that the Marine Corps disproportionately weights the CE with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and communications assets. The MAGTF command element synchronizes all of its components to yield effects disproportionate to the MAGTF's size, but a reallocation of ISR assets to subordinate echelons will degrade the Commander's ability to achieve this synchronization across the MAGTF's entirety and shape the operating environment. A third disadvantage is that it spreads the intelligence resources thin. Already a high demand/low density asset, any effort to source resources down to the lowest level invariably means that not all units will receive equal support. While the Marine Corps currently experiences this lack of support parity, this issue adds to the lack of flexibility in the MAGTF's battle space mentioned above.

Recommendation

The Marine Corps should adopt COA 1, institutionalizing and further developing the MAGTF Intelligence Support Team concept. This COA confers the greatest benefit and incurs the least cost to the service. The emergence of this TTP across the both the Operating Forces and the Supporting Establishment demonstrates its utility for supporting operations in complex environments. The following recommendations across the Doctrine-Organization-Training-Manpower-Leadership & Education-Personnel-Facilities spectrum support the adoption of this COA.

- Doctrine: This support concept already exists within Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 2-1, Intelligence Operations. However, the current description of the support concept is limited to a single paragraph and does little more than introduce the concept as one among several methods for task organizing intelligence support

units.⁴⁰ The Marine Corps intelligence community must expand this section of the MCWP considerably to address a standardized structure to serve as a baseline for DST planning and offer employment considerations to both the MAGTF Intelligence Officer and the supported Commander.

- Organization: This COA does not call for additional organizational changes. Instead, it utilizes the structure already resident with the Operating Forces to allocate enhanced intelligence capabilities within the MAGTF.
- Training: The current PTPs for deploying MAGTFs provide sufficient training opportunities for the DST to integrate with a supported unit. However, training within the DST must occur prior to the commencement of the PTP to bring the team together as an independent multi-disciplinary collection and analysis team. The MEU PTP offers a existing model for training intelligence teams that DSTs and their parent organizations can readily implement as a baseline training package. The MEFs' Special Operations Training Groups, who supervise the MEU PTP, have a long training history from which DSTs can benefit.
- Material: The only additive material requirements for DSTs are additional communications equipment to enable connectivity across all classification spectrums pertinent to the MAGTF operations. At a minimum, this includes unclassified, secret, and top secret communications capabilities.
- Leadership & Education: Commanders at all levels must be educated on the DST concept and employment considerations. This leadership education should take the form of a standard briefing that addresses the DST mission, organization, structure, capabilities, limitations, requirements, and employment considerations. Because the DST

is an inherently flexible and independent capability, commanders should understand that this capability is a force multiplier that they can allocate for a full operation or only parts of an operation in the same fashion by which they reinforce main effort of an operation with other operational capabilities.

- Personnel: There are no changes to personnel associated with this COA.
- Facilities: There are no facilities requirements associated with this COA.

Further Research

An area for further research is a closer examination of the evolution of intelligence resource allocation within the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community to provide a comparative examination with current Marine Corps intelligence community architecture. Elements within the SOF community, particularly units such as the Army Special Operations Groups, have a long history of conducting shaping activities, dating back to their origins in the early 1960s. Their experiences in identifying operating environment requirements and determining intelligence resource allocations are pertinent to this study. While the amount of resources at the disposal of SOF differs in scale to those of conventional Marine Corps forces, the characteristics of the operating environment and impacts on resource allocation may be similar.

Conclusion

The DST offers the most flexible concept of intelligence support to a MAGTF commander. The Marine Corps intelligence community should codify and further develop the DST support concept as it provides enhanced intelligence collection, analysis, and information

synchronization capabilities. By institutionalizing the DST concept, a MAGTF commander will receive a trained, scalable, limited footprint, stand-alone multidisciplinary intelligence capability that the commander can allocate rapidly across the assigned battle space to satisfy complex operating environment intelligence requirements. While this concept has several disadvantages, the relative benefits outweigh the costs. The initial DSTs will experience the steepest learning curve, as subsequent DSTs would benefit from the maturation of training and employment procedures.

To ensure smooth implementation, MEUs should first employ the DST concept. The MEUs are the appropriate echelon to serve as a test for the DST concept for several reasons. First, MEUs have been routinely deploying to the European, African, Middle Eastern, and Pacific theaters to serve as the GCC's strategic reserve and contingency response force since the 1980s. In this capacity, MEUs conduct the lion's share of engagement and shaping activities within the Marine Corps and consequently are most familiar with Phase Zero operations. Second, MEUs have a culture of innovation and experimentation. Due to their nature as an amphibious force, their small size, and their consistent operational tempo, MEUs regularly serve as the test bed for new concepts and equipment. Third, as at least one MEU has already tested an initial version of this concept, it has laid the initial groundwork for further development and integration into the MEU PTP and deployment.

This analysis does not suggest that the Marine Corps prioritize Phase Zero operations higher than conventional or irregular warfare operations. Instead, this paper recognizes the merit of Phase Zero operations for building a base of regional knowledge and experience that complements the service's established skills in other areas. For the Marine Corps, who serves as the nation's first-response force, experiential foundations and relationships established through

Phase Zero operations may set the conditions for successful follow-on activities and interactions elsewhere in the operational spectrum. Additionally, such operations do much to promote winning the “battle of the narrative” which is identified as a priority guiding principle to counter irregular threats in current US doctrine.⁴¹

The Marine Corps has optimized intelligence support concepts and resource allocations for counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. While this posture is appropriate given the Marine Corps’ expectation of remaining in Afghanistan through 2014, the service must also consider intelligence requirements for other operating environments. The use of intelligence support teams has emerged as an ad hoc method to satisfy counterinsurgency requirements. However, this support concept is applicable beyond just Phase Four operations. The concept offers a robust, flexible intelligence capability for employment across the battle space to support all components within the MAGTF. The Marine Corps intelligence community should institutionalize this intelligence support method by developing a formal concept of operations to standardize the training and employment of intelligence support teams. By doing so, the Marine Corps intelligence community will enhance its ability to provide support in both current and future operating environments.

Appendix A: FY06-FY09 USMC Intelligence Structure Growth


BILLET DESCRIPTION	PMOS	FY06	FY09	NET CHANGE
MAGTF Intelligence Officer	0202	482	642	160
Ground Intelligence Officer	0203	94	277	183
Human Source Intelligence Officer	0204	27	68	41
Senior All-Source Intelligence Analysis Officer	0205	0	38	38
Signals Intelligence Officer	0206	49	101	52
Aviation Intelligence Officer	0207	63	125	62
Counter-Intelligence Officer	0210	76	102	26
CI/HUMINT Specialist	0211	533	740	207
Intelligence Specialist	0231	1298	1840	542
Imagery Analysis Specialist	0241	265	362	97
Geographic Intelligence Specialist	0261	161	244	83
Intelligence Chief	0291	22	23	1
Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Officer	2602	31	44	13
Cryptologic Digital Network Technician/Analyst	2611	44	226	182
Special Communications Signals Collection Operator/Analyst	2621	503	622	119
Signals Intelligence Analyst	2629	51	80	29
Electronic Intelligence Intercept Operator/Analyst	2631	153	179	26
Special Intelligence System Administrator/Communicator	2651	435	523	88
Cryptologic Linguist (Middle East) *	2671	1	253	252
Cryptologic Linguist (Asia-Pacific) *	2673	1	126	125
Cryptologic Linguist (European I) *	2674	2	51	49
Cryptologic Linguist (European II) *	2676	1	79	78
Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Chief	2691	55	61	6
TOTAL INTEL GROWTH		4,376	6,819	2,443
USMC END STRENGTH		179,793	204,242	24,449

* Note: For Cryptologic Linguists (MOS 267X), the FY06-FY09 structural increase (5 to 504) does not reflect actual manning figures for the same period (500 to 541).⁴²


Source: Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters Marine Corps

Appendix B: Course of Action Notional Organizational Structures

Course of Action 1: The DST



Course of Action 2: Permanent Resource Reallocation



Glossary

DST—Direct Support Team

GCC—Geographic Combatant Command

MAGTF—Marine Air Ground Task Force

MARSOC—Marine Special Operations Command

MCIA—Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MEB—Marine Expeditionary Force

MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU—Marine Expeditionary Unit

DST—MAGTF Intelligence Support Team

OST—Operational Support Team

PTP—Pre-deployment Training Program

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² U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010, iii.

³ Barak Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 3.

⁴ To see the six campaign phases of operations in joint doctrine, see figure IV-8 on page IV-34 and figure IV-9 on page IV-36 in U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 26 Dec 2006).

⁵ JP 5-0, IV-37.

⁶ For example, Richard K. Betts provides an analysis of the pending creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in response to the perceived strategic intelligence failure of not anticipating the 11 September 2001 attacks in Richard K. Betts, "The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63237/paul-r-pillar/intelligent-design>. Writing in 2006, the Director of National Intelligence discussed strategic intelligence reform in his article, Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62643/mike-mcconnell/overhauling-intelligence>.

⁷ Implicit in author Robert Blackwill's essay outlining alternative courses of action in Afghanistan is his criticism of U.S. forces who fail to understand the social fabric of the culture in which is fights. See Robert Blackwill, "Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67026/robert-d-blackwill/plan-b-in-afghanistan?page=show>. James Fearon maintains that the U.S. in 2007 continues its failure in understanding the operational environment in Iraq. See James Fearon, "Iraq's Civil War," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62443/james-d-fearon/iraqs-civil-war?page=show>.

⁸ This paper uses the three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) that underpins joint U.S. military doctrine. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 Sep 2006, incorporating Change 2, 22 March 2010), II-1.

⁹ While I agree with the assertion that in a COIN environment tactical intelligence can equate to strategic intelligence, I disagree with the framework by which the authors make this assertion, in which they equate specific geographic areas to the levels of war. Such a specific definition disagrees with joint doctrine that states "There are no finite limits or boundaries between [the three levels of war]." For the discussion regarding intelligence in COIN, see Paul D. Batchelor, Michael T. Flynn, and Matt Pottinger, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," (Jan 2010), Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 11. For an explanation of the levels of war, see JP 3-0, II-1.

¹⁰ Batchelor et al, 7.

¹¹ Batchelor et al, 9.

¹² First Battalion, Sixth Marine Regiment, "'The Last 100 Days' AAR, Operation Enduring Freedom" (Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, July 2010), 2.

¹³ 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, “Marine Expeditionary Unit Operations in Afghanistan: 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Lessons and Observations From Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)” (Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, February 19, 2009), 2.

¹⁴ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Operations*, MCDP1-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 27 September 2001), 1-4.

¹⁵ The typical deployed MEU command element consists of approximately 250 personnel, of which anywhere from 57 to 80 are assigned to the intelligence section, based on the author’s first-hand experience as the 26th MEU senior intelligence officer from 2007 to 2010.

¹⁶ This number includes all intelligence personnel by military occupational specialty codes 02XX and 26XX as well as the Force Reconnaissance Platoon, the Reconnaissance Platoon, and the Battalion Landing Team’s Scout Sniper Platoon.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, FM3-24 or MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-26.

¹⁸ USMC end strength in FY06 was 179,793; in FY10, the end strength was 204,242. End strength growth over this period was 13.59%. All USMC structure growth data is based on an information request response provided by Manpower Information Management, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters USMC. Gunnery Sergeant Kenneth Emery, email message to author, March 8, 2011.

¹⁹ Emery, email message to author, March 8, 2011.

²⁰ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Intelligence Operations*, MCWP 2-2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, September 10, 2003), 4-13.

²¹ No references to Direct Support Teams were found through a literature search and research in the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned archives prior to the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

²² Based on my first-hand experience participating in the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Operational Planning Team effort in Jun-Jul 2010 as a staff officer within the II MEF G-2 section.

²³ David Westin, “Intelligence Support to the Next Generation of Marine Expeditionary Units,” (manuscript, July 2, 2010).

²⁴ Based on my first-hand experience as the 26th MEU senior intelligence officer interacting with the attached Marine Special Operations Company and its associated DST during the MEU’s 2008 pre-deployment training program.

²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Moffatt, interview with author, March 11, 2011.

²⁶ Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *United States Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2009-2015*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, December 9, 2009), 16-17.

²⁷ Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Phoenix, 2006), 14.

²⁸ Gray, 31-33. Gray’s description mirrors master theorist Carl von Clausewitz description of war as having two “natures,” one “subjective” or changing and one “objective” or unchanging. This was later translated as war’s “nature” which is unchanging and war’s “character” which is changing. For the translated version used in this paper, see Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 85.

²⁹ National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, November 2008), iv.

³⁰ JP 5-0, IV-32.

³¹ JP 5-0, IV-32 – IV-33.

³² JP 5-0, IV-35 to IV-38.

³³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Theater Engagement Planning*, CJCSM 3113.01A, 31 May 2000, GL-7.

³⁴ JP 5-0, II-2.

³⁵ JP 5-0, IV-35.

³⁶ CJCSM 3113.01A, A-12 to A-14.

³⁷ Based on the author's first-hand knowledge as a staff officer with the II MEF Intelligence (G-2) Section during this period.

³⁸ Based on the author's first-hand experience with the 26th MEU during this period.

³⁹ For example, a MEU deployment cycle consists of a seven-month pre-deployment training period (PTP), a seven month deployment period, and a seven month "stand-down" period in which the MEU does not have an attached ACE, GCE, or LCE.

⁴⁰ MCWP 2-1, 4-13.

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