Strategy as Story: Judgment, Bias, and the Narrative Behind the Decision to Invade Iraq

Abstract

At least since the end of the Cold War, United States security strategy has not typically evolved rapidly in the face of unexpected environmental shifts. President Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 provides a case study of the difficulties associated with such evolution; the Administration's discourse generated a closed "September Eleventh" narrative that ultimately led to biased judgment. This narrative was a closed story in which thematic connections were made solely between existing elements. Prospect theory, which describes how risk is calculated in questions of gain and loss, offers insight into risk. The availability heuristic, which pulls on the most readily accessible information to determine frequency or likelihood, makes the selection of Saddam Hussein understandable. The anchoring heuristic, and its associated conjunctive bias, explain the improbable linkage of terrorist, weapon and dictator.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 06, 2011
Accession Number
ADA600574

Entities

People

  • John H. Chaffin Iv

Organizations

  • Marine Corps University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Case Studies
  • Cold War
  • Computer Programs
  • Governments
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • Iraqi-War
  • National Security
  • Nonlinear Dynamics
  • Psychology
  • Recreation
  • Security
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • United States Central Command

Readers

  • Computational Linguistics
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies