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The Hippo Generation and the Vampire State: The Impact of Corruption on Failing Nations

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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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
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
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** The Hippo Generation and the Vampire State: The Impact of Corruption on Failing Nations

**Author:** Major Kate Germano, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** Corruption has the power to destroy the bonds between a nation and its citizens through the bastardization of the social contract and the rule of law. It is the most destabilizing force against good governance, significantly limits human development, and increases a nation's chances of becoming a failed state.

**Discussion:** This research project represents an attempt to gain an understanding of corruption and its impact on failing states. In order to develop a full grasp of the influence of corruption, first, the meaning of corruption as it pertains to society and governance must be fully defined. This also requires us to determine if corruption is endemic to a country due to culture or religion, or if it simply becomes an institutionalized means of survival as a result of sustained turmoil and a high level poverty within a country. In order to ascertain why corruption is such a destabilizing force, we must also assess the influence of corruption on the citizens of a given nation and determine whether the impact on the populace can be quantified in terms of human development. Second, we must ascertain the significance of corruption by determining if there is a correlation between corruption and state failure. Finally, we must assess the implications of corruption in failing states for the international community.

**Conclusion:** Corruption is not endemic to specific cultures or countries, but is instead the result of sustained turmoil and lack of adherence to the rule of law. Further, corruption is a measurable entity and its impact on human development and therefore the health of a state can be quantified. Finally, there is a strong correlation between endemic corruption, low human development, and the likelihood that a nation will fail, with severe implications for the international community.

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For the past decade, the majority of the news coming out of Afghanistan regarding the war has been focused on kinetic operations. Accordingly, when Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated to the press that the coalition would not achieve victory unless it was able to reduce the corruption in the country to a large degree, the admission came like a bolt out of the blue.<sup>1</sup> Suddenly, the press was abuzz with reports of the United States military's efforts to use intelligence assets to combat the "widespread perversion of authority by Afghan power brokers," begging the question, how was it possible almost a decade into a brutal war against the forces of Al Qaida and the Taliban, that suddenly, corruption might doom the coalition to failure?<sup>2</sup>

To fully answer this question, three aspects of corruption must be fully explored. First, in order to understand why corruption is such a powerful force, the meaning of corruption as it pertains to society and governance must be fully defined. This requires a determination as to whether corruption is endemic to a country due to culture or religion, or if it simply becomes an institutionalized means of survival as a result of sustained turmoil and poverty within a country. In order to establish why corruption is such a destabilizing force, the impact of corruption on the citizens of a given nation must also be assessed and quantified in terms of human development. Second, the significance of corruption must be established by determining if there is a quantifiable relationship between corruption and state failure. Finally, the implications of corruption and state failure and their impact on the international community must be addressed.

### **Corruption Defined**

Transparency International, a nonprofit organization that seeks to eradicate corruption throughout the world, defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain."<sup>3</sup> Private gain can pertain to an official requiring payment or preferential treatment for a service the government is required to provide by law, or requiring payment or preferential treatment for

a service the government is prohibited by law from providing. Common forms of corruption include kleptocracy, or the funneling away of public funds and assets; bribery and extortion; the unauthorized sale of public licenses or public office; election tampering; and the abuse of power.<sup>4</sup> According to experts, the most corruption prone government agencies are those responsible for, “public procurement; re-zoning of land; revenue collection; government appointments; and local government.”<sup>5</sup>

Economist George Ayittey characterizes the ruling elites who abuse power as “the hippo generation,” stating that a “they are stuck in their intellectual patch, complaining about colonialism and imperialism. They wouldn’t move one foot. You ask them to reform the economies; they’re not going to reform because they benefit from the rotten status quo.”<sup>6</sup> The corruption of a given country’s political system is typified by such public officials who use their authority to accumulate wealth and power. This abuse of authority has the potential to completely wreck the existing political structure, and significantly reduces the degree of faith the citizens have in the desire and ability of the government to meet their needs and requirements. Further, when government officials are dependent upon bribes and kickbacks, they are more likely to look the other way when it comes to the activities of terror and criminal networks within their borders. As a result, non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and criminal networks are able to take root and thrive.

From an economic vantage point, corruption robs a nation of its ability to prosper and grow as money and resources are siphoned off for the benefit of the few. As resources disappear, the ability of the state to provide basic services and complete critical infrastructure projects is destroyed. Additionally, corruption understandably scares off international investors and allows for the funneling off of the country’s natural resources. According to scholars Ashraf

Ghani and Clare Lockhart, “Government failure to establish uniform and trusted practices across state territory allows large swathes of the country to fall into the hands of local militias and warlords or global commercial interests that function with impunity.”<sup>7</sup>

### **The Culture of Corruption**

In 2010, Transparency International published the Global Corruption Barometer, which encompassed the survey of 91,500 people from 86 countries to assess the pervasiveness of corruption at various echelons of the government throughout the world and determine which agencies were most likely to be responsible. Sadly, the survey reveals that bribery is perhaps the most pervasive form of corruption in the world. Of all of the bribes reported to be paid by the respondents, 29 percent were paid to the police, while 20 percent were paid to officials from various registry and permit agencies. Of those who reported paying at least one bribe in the past 12 months, 14 percent stated that they attempted to pay off members of the judiciary for various services.<sup>8</sup> Those respondents who admitted to paying the bribes did so for three basic reasons: to avoid problems with the authorities, to quicken the pace of administrative or judicial proceedings, and to receive services to which they were by all rights entitled.

Both the government officials who abuse their power by demanding bribes and kickbacks and the citizens who pay them create a culture of corruption. Rather than being endemic to a specific ethnic group or being a cultural phenomenon, according to George Ayittey, “What began as occasional acts of public misconduct spreads like a cancer and gives rise to a state in which wrong-doing becomes the norm, whereas the notion of public responsibility becomes the exception, not the rule.”<sup>9</sup> Two independent studies lend credence to Mr. Ayittey’s theory regarding the institutionalism and learned behavior of corruption.

## **The Oxford Study**

In 2006, Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, from the University of Oxford, conducted a study to determine if the prevalence of corruption in the students' countries of origin would influence the willingness of the test subjects to offer bribes even if they were aware of the derogatory effects on society as a result of the bribes. To determine if the students would offer a bribe to a public official in exchange for a payback service such as, "a reduction in tax, preferential treatment in a court hearing or a speedier admission to the hospital," the 195 participants from 43 different countries were required participate in a game in which the participants played the roles of private citizens, public servants, and other members of society.

Those participants assigned the role of private citizen were given the option to either decline to offer a bribe or offer a bribe of an amount to be decided by the private citizen. Those who were assigned the role of public servant were given the option of accepting or denying the bribe offered. The participants were warned in advance that both the bribe payer and the recipient would benefit if a bribe was offered, just as they were advised of the ill consequences for the other game members and the game society as a result of bribery.<sup>10</sup> Prior to exiting the game, each participant was asked to complete a survey regarding their perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption in their parent countries. The data was then compared to the findings from Transparency International regarding worldwide corruption.

The results of the study indicated that there was a positive correlation between the data from Transparency International and the "participants' perceptions of how common bribery and nepotism are in health service provision, public appointments, and in the police of their own country."<sup>11</sup> There was also a "statistically significant positive relationship between the level of corruption prevailing in their home country and the likelihood of [the participants] engaging in

corruption, within the context of the experiment.”<sup>12</sup> This was particularly true for the younger participants. According to the authors, the experiment suggests that there is a connection between social norms and the perpetuation of corruption. In other words, the more corrupt a citizen’s government is perceived to be, the more likely the individual is to view paying a bribe to be an acceptable way of doing business. This does not imply that it would be the most desirable way to achieve a given objective, but is instead in many countries simply considered the cost of doing business to get things done.

### **“The best parking pass in town”**

The relationship between social norms and the cycle of corruption is further illustrated by a study conducted by Ray Fisman and Edward Miguel in 2006. In order to assess whether social norms play a dominant role corruption, the two economists reviewed the number of parking tickets issued in Manhattan from 1997 through 2005 to diplomats from 146 countries and compared the data to international corruption rankings. According to the authors, “The act of parking illegally fits remarkably well with a standard definition of corruption, i.e. ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,’ suggesting that the comparison of parking violations by diplomats from different societies serves as a credible measure of the extent of corruption cultural norms.”<sup>13</sup>

Although their vehicles were ticketed, the diplomats cited were not required to pay the fines due to diplomatic immunity. As the authors state, “The original intent of these laws [diplomatic immunity] was to protect diplomats from mistreatment in other countries.”<sup>14</sup> By the time the authors conducted their study, the bounds of diplomatic immunity had been stretched to the breaking point, resulting in 150,000 parking tickets totaling over \$18,000,000.00 in unpaid fines.<sup>15</sup> The British Broadcast Corporation referred to this abuse as “the best parking pass in

town.” After examining the data, the authors concluded that there was a strong positive correlation between a diplomat’s country corruption ranking and his propensity to violate parking laws. In other words, diplomats from more corrupt nations were more likely to park illegally than diplomats from countries perceived to be less corrupt.

The study also demonstrated that the less the police enforced parking laws the more likely the diplomats from corrupt countries were to park illegally. Significantly, in October 2002, the Clinton-Schumer Amendment was implemented, allowing city parking officials to “tow diplomat vehicles, revoke their official parking permits,” and most significantly, to exact payment for 110 percent of the parking ticket fines from the aid allocated by the United States to the nations in question.<sup>16</sup> According to Fisman and Miguel, the number of diplomat parking violations fell substantially following the implementation of the law, indicating that rather than being endemic to certain countries or cultures, corruption is a consequence of opportunity, and can be curbed when proper checks on power are in place and enforced. Conversely, the less public officials are held accountable for adhering to the law, the more likely those indoctrinated by corrupt practices will continue to demonstrate such behavior.

### **The Social Contract and the Rule of Law**

In 1689, philosopher John Locke wrote, “Were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.”<sup>17</sup> In other words, even over three hundred years ago, corruption was recognized as a destructive force on society. According to Locke, a legitimate government was one that provided those services and functions necessary to the life and liberty of its citizens. Locke further believed that a legitimate government was obligated to protect the property of its citizens

and act as the mediator regarding alleged violations of the law in exchange for the citizens giving up their right to adjudicate such offenses on their own. From a modern perspective, good governance is characterized by the ability of the state to deliver public goods and services, manage the political process and maintain accountability, and provide security for the populace.<sup>18</sup>

Locke argued that an incorruptible judicial system and police force and a series of checks and balances between the branches of government were essential in order for the citizens to have faith in the government's ability to protect them. The umbrella over all government actors and actions is the rule of law, which sets "legally defined limits on the state's ability to exercise power arbitrarily."<sup>19</sup> Without an unimpeachable government system, Locke believed that anarchy would reign supreme and basic government objectives would be unachievable. As George Ayittey explains, the rule of law "ensures that the laws of the land are obeyed by all, with no exceptions. Individuals cannot do what they please outside their homes. In their interactions with others, they must follow the law. In other words, the law 'rules,' taking precedence over the whims or caprices of individuals."<sup>20</sup>

The tenets of Locke's philosophy still hold true today. According to scholars Ghani and Lockhart, "Only the state can organize power so as to harness flows of information, people, money, force, and decisions necessary to regulate human behavior."<sup>21</sup> Note that the term legitimate does not specifically apply only to the democratic form of government, since as Brinkerhoff, Johnson, and Hill point out, "In much of the non-Western world, authority and legitimacy flow from indigenous sources grounded in religion, ethnicity, tribal or kinship affiliation, and/or territorial identity."<sup>22</sup> Regardless of origin, it is the rule of law that lends

legitimacy to a governing body, and a legitimate government is one that acts as the agent for its people.

### **“PhD: Pilfering of High Degree?”**

The results from Transparency International’s 2010 Global Corruption Barometer report indicate that the vast majority of those polled believe that corruption is on the rise in the world. The results of the survey are startling. Of the 91,500 citizens polled, 79 percent reported that they believed their respective nation’s political parties were corrupt or extremely corrupt. Additionally, 62 percent of those surveyed reported that they believe public officials are corrupt or extremely corrupt, while 58 percent of those who participated in the survey indicated that the police are corrupt or extremely corrupt.<sup>23</sup> The trends regarding the corruption of the judicial system and police are especially worrisome, since they represent the face of the government to the people. Since the perception of corruption by a country’s citizens generally coincides with reality, the fact that the vast majority of those polled believe that the world’s police and judiciary structures have been compromised by corruption indicates that the rule of law, the underpinning of the social contract, is in great peril worldwide.

When the rule of law is not enforced by the state, disaster quickly ensues. George Ayittey christened such governments as vampire states, “because they suck the economic vitality out of their people.” He further explained, “A vampire state is a government which has been hijacked by a phalanx of bandits and crooks, who use the instruments of state power to enrich themselves, their cronies and tribesmen, and exclude everybody else.”<sup>24</sup> Although his comments pertained specifically to the nature of the problems faced by Africans due to officials bleeding their states dry, his analogy aptly captures the nature of corrupt public officials throughout the world and the impact of their actions on their citizens.

Interestingly, the diplomats who incurred the most parking citations between 1997 and 2005 as noted in the study by Fisman and Miguel were from the same countries that top Transparency International's 2010 Corruption Perception Index, indicating that little has changed in these countries in terms of either the checks and balances on the power of the government officials or the social norms. In the Fisman and Miguel study, each diplomat from Chad incurred an average of 124.3 parking citations between 1997 and 2005.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, each diplomat from Sudan racked up an average of 119.10 tickets during the same time period.<sup>26</sup> As George Ayittey explains, in vampire states, "The chief bandit is the head of state himself. Their water taps run all the time; the people can collect rain water. There are inexhaustible supplies of food and gasoline for them, but not for the people. And there are no buses for the people. Period. Those shiny buses that ply the road are for vampire elites."<sup>27</sup> The gulf of disparity between the citizens and power brokers of corrupt states is most poignantly illustrated by global human development statistics.

### **Corruption and Human Development**

The degree of inequality between sectors of society in a given nation is aptly demonstrated by the access its citizens have to government services. In Chad, which ranks as one of the most corrupt and least developed nations in the world, only 11.8 percent of all of the roads in the country are paved and less than one quarter of the population has access to clean drinking water.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, another highly corrupt and unstable country, just 1.82 percent of the country's roads are paved.<sup>29</sup> In fact, as Appendix A demonstrates, the majority of citizens living in those states considered to be the most corrupt and least stable lack access to roads and transportation.

According to The World Bank, this is significant since, “Rural road investments are found to reduce poverty significantly through higher agricultural production, higher wages, lower input and transportation costs, and higher output prices.”<sup>30</sup> In a study conducted in 2006, The World Bank also determined that paving roads led to a significant increase in the number of children who attended school. Because illiteracy perpetuates the cycles of poverty and corruption, the government’s ability and willingness to devote the resources required to build critical infrastructure like roads is key to its future potential. Most significantly, “Road investments are pro-poor, meaning the gains are proportionately higher for the poor than for the non-poor.”<sup>31</sup>

In fact, the extent to which a nation acts as a legitimate force by providing goods, infrastructure, and services for the development of its citizens is quantifiable, and the statistics demonstrate a clear link between the corruption and low human development capacity. The United Nations human development index ranks 169 nations in terms of average life span, health, education, and standards of living. For the 42 nations assigned very high human development ratings, the average life span is 80.1 years, while the mean length of schooling for a citizen living in one of these countries is 10.8 years. For the 41 countries ranked as low on the human development index, however, the average life span is only 55.1 years of age, and the average length of schooling for the citizens living in these countries is just 3.8 years.<sup>32</sup>

So what is the impact of corruption on human development? By comparing the data from several reputable sources, the impact of corruption on a given nation can be quantified. Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the extent to which country experts and businessmen from 178 countries throughout the world perceive that corruption is a problem. To gather the data required for the report, the non-profit group conducts

annual surveys relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. Low scores (less than five) indicate that public institutions are heavily compromised, with a score of less than three signifying that the country is highly corrupt.

While Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore figure prominently as the countries perceived as the least corrupt in the world with scores of 9.1 respectively, Somalia was perceived as the most corrupt country in the world with a score of 1.1, closely followed by Afghanistan in second place with a score of 1.4, and Iraq in third place with a score of 1.5. In sixth place, Sudan was not far behind with a score of 1.6, while Chad achieved seventh place on the survey with a score of 1.7. Yemen was ranked as the 32<sup>nd</sup> most corrupt country in the world with a score of 2.2, while Pakistan achieved a score of 2.3, earning the country 35<sup>th</sup> place in the survey.<sup>33</sup>

As Appendix A illustrates, countries that scored poorly on the human development index were also those that received the lowest scores on Transparency International's corruption perception index. The 41 countries assigned low ratings on the human development index received corruption perception index ratings between 1.40 and 4.10, indicating significant corruption levels persist in those states. In comparison, the 17 countries assigned rankings of 7.0 to 9.3 (very clean) on the corruption perception index were all assigned very high human development index ratings.

This demonstrates that the majority of those individuals who live in highly corrupt countries live on average 25 years less than those citizens who live in very clean, or less corrupt countries, and few are provided the opportunity to pursue an education past the elementary school level. In essence, the gap between life expectancy and mean years of schooling in corrupt and clean or very clean states is the direct result of the corruption and misrule of the government.

As George Ayittey explains, “for the vampire elites, using the state machinery for self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment is the main preoccupation. They care less about reliable supply of electricity, clean water and medical care for the people as long as they [the politicians] have access to them. When they need medical care, they go abroad. Their food is imported. They send their children abroad for education. As for the people, they can eat grass.”<sup>34</sup>

### **Corruption and the State**

When the rule of law no longer applies to the government and the citizens perceive the judicial system as the most corrupt agency in the country, such as in Afghanistan, the people are faced with the prospect of either taking matters into their own hands in an attempt to protect their lives and property or rely on the services of a pseudo-local government.<sup>35</sup> As Andrew Garfield, Senior Fellow for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, wrote, “The Taliban has sought to establish shadow governments in many districts and to provide welfare programs and incomes for unemployed young men. Bored, disaffected, and angry unemployed young men offer ripe pickings for the AGE [antigovernment element] recruiters, who offer hope, honor and income to those without any.”<sup>36</sup>

In these “vampire states,” the underpinnings of Locke’s social contract are flipped on their head and the people become agents for the state. As the Army Field Manual for Stability Operations states, “In societies where state-society relations are dominated by patronage and where favoritism and nepotism are ingrained, basic public administration principles such as competitive procurement and conflict of interest are neither recognized nor valued.”<sup>37</sup> Even more significantly, in states where the citizens are not able to rely upon the government for the provision of basic services and security, disaffected or criminal groups are able to take root and thrive since the absence of law and order allows such networks to profit. Stephen Krasner and

Carlos Pascual assert, “When chaos prevails, terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish. Left in dire straits, subject to depredation, and denied access to basic services, people become susceptible to the exhortations of demagogues and hate mongers.”<sup>38</sup> Nowhere has this been better demonstrated than in Afghanistan, where the acceptance of the Taliban as a shadow government in villages throughout the country reflects the perception by the Afghans that the national government is too corrupt and far away to care about their needs.

The crisis in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that the government’s unresponsiveness traps the most disenfranchised citizens in a cycle of poverty. In the words of Ghani and Lockhart, “prolonged conflict that often follows state dysfunctionality produces an institutional syndrome that in turn has significant implications for the economy.”<sup>39</sup> These countries are more likely to experience internal strife due to the lack of rule of law and the inability of the government to secure its borders and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

According to Brinkerhoff, Johnson, and Hill, “Insufficient checks and balances open the door to renewed opportunities for state capture and corruption, and reactivation of greed and grievance dynamics that contribute to stability.”<sup>40</sup> When a country is unable to provide for its citizens’ most basic needs, the country’s citizens are more likely resort to any means possible, to include violence, to ensure their basic needs are achieved. In turn, this ensures that the country will be unable to improve its ability to develop its human potential. Further, when a country’s burgeoning youth population has known nothing other than chaos and corruption and has no constructive means of improving their straits, their country becomes a ticking time bomb prone to state failure.

## **Corruption and State Failure**

When the fabric of a nation dissolves, the people become focused on achieving their basic needs by any means possible. With no monopoly on the legitimate use of power, the state is rendered helpless to control the populace, resulting in a continued cycle of corruption and violence. In fact, the effects of corruption on a given state are not limited to those felt by its citizens. As stated by Ghani and Lockhart, "A number of contemporary global crises have their roots in forty to sixty fragile countries. As these states have experienced prolonged conflict or misrule, networks of criminality, violence, and terror have solidified, providing an ever expanding platform that threatens the entire globe."<sup>41</sup>

There is, in fact, a strong correlation between corruption and the likelihood that a state will fail. The Fund for Peace, an independent nonpartisan think tank committed to promoting long term international security, publishes the failed states index annually. Using quantitative data from institutions such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations and information gleaned from scanning millions of news and magazine articles, speeches, and reports, the index ranks 177 states across the spectrum of the 12 factors leading to state failure.<sup>42</sup> Each category is assigned a score between one and 10, with a score of one being the most stable, and a 10 being the least stable.<sup>43</sup> Once the 177 states are provided rankings for each of the 12 categories, the scores are added together. The total scores are used to determine if the states should be placed in the "alert" (red), "warning" (orange), "monitoring" (yellow), or "sustainable" (green), categories.<sup>44</sup>

Among the 12 factors which most contribute to state failure is the erosion or delegitimization of legitimate authority. According to the Fund for Peace, the erosion of legitimate authority is characterized by "massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites,

the resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, the widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, and the growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites.”<sup>45</sup> When corruption is prolific in a given country, the greater its scope or influence is felt across the span of the functions of government and the less capable it is to provide public services as health, education, sanitation, and transportation for its citizens.<sup>46</sup> As Appendix A demonstrates, a country that receives a high mark for the de-legitimization of the state will also receive high scores in the categories of public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites, uneven economic development, economic decline, and external intervention. In other words, the less legitimate the state is perceived to be, the less likely it will be able to satisfy the rights, needs, safety, and economic security of its citizens.

Not surprisingly, in 2010 Somalia was ranked as the most failed state, achieving scores of 10 for the de-legitimization of the state, the security apparatus, and factionalized elites. Chad placed second on the list, with a score of 9.9 for both the de-legitimization of the state and the security apparatus. On the other side of the spectrum, Norway was considered to be the least volatile state, with a ranking of 177 and a score of .08 for the de-legitimization of the state, while Finland was determined to be the second least volatile state, with a score of .07 for the de-legitimization of the state.<sup>47</sup>

As Appendix A demonstrates, for countries in the red zone, the average scores for the nine categories most germane to this research were as follow: uneven economic development, 8.4; economic decline, 7.9; de-legitimization of the state, 8.8; public services, 8.4; human rights, 8.4; security apparatus, 8.4; factionalized elites, 8.8; and external intervention, 8.2. Twenty of the 37 countries in the red zone achieved scores of 9.0 or greater for the de-legitimization of the

state category, compared to just one out of the 91 countries in the orange zone. For the yellow and green zones, the highest score in the de-legitimization of the state category was from Bahrain with a 6.7, but the averages for the yellow and green zones were 3.9 and 1.3, respectively.

One significant consequence of the de-legitimization of the state is that countries with weak government institutions are more susceptible to military coups and destruction from within, which often requires intervention by the international community. As Robert Rotberg, director of the Kennedy School's Program on Intrastate Conflict, explains, failed states "are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international system that demands -- indeed, counts on -- a state's capacity to govern its space."<sup>48</sup> When a corrupt government ignores the traditional rule of law in favor of regulations that will support the generation of profit for the elites on the backs of the people, it will be prone to suffer from a heightened paranoia and the need to create additional layers of internal security to insulate them from the people. The increased potential for military coups or rebellion reinforces George Ayittey's point that, "Quite often, it is the very same security apparatus that fails to protect them and even overthrows them. The Asante have this proverb: If a bed bug bites you, it is from your own cloth."<sup>49</sup> As recent events in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain clearly demonstrate, the de-legitimization of the state and factionalized elites due to massive corruption are major predictors of state unrest and failure.

Appendix A provides the basis for the comparison of failed state index rankings and corruption perception index scores. The average corruption perception index score for the countries in the red zone is 2.0, or highly corrupt, with only three red zone countries, Georgia, Liberia, and Malawi, achieving CPI scores of 3.0 or higher. For countries in the orange zone on

the failed states index, the average corruption perception index score was 3.0, while countries in the yellow zone achieved an average corruption perception index score of 6.0. For the 13 countries least likely to fail, the average corruption perception index score was 9.0, with 10 being the highest mark possible. These statistics demonstrate a strong correlation between rampant corruption and the potential for state failure. Robert Rotberg explains, “As a state's capacity weakens and its rulers work exclusively for themselves. The social contract that binds citizens and central structures is forfeit. Perhaps already divided by sectional differences and animosity, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords. Domestic anarchy sets in.”<sup>50</sup>

A prime example of weakened state capacity, Afghanistan figures prominently as sixth on the failed states index, achieving scores greater than the averages for the red zone countries in all categories except economic development. Since convincing the Afghan population to support the central government is essential to the coalition’s ability to achieve its counterinsurgency and exit strategy objectives, the fact that the country achieved a score of 10 in the de-legitimization of the state category is most vexing. This score is a direct reflection of the amount of graft and corruption which exists at the highest levels of the Afghan government, even after years of intervention by the international community. With 50 percent of the Afghans surveyed by Transparency International having admitted having to pay a bribe to a government official in the past 12 months and the judicial branch of the government perceived as the most corrupt, the credibility of the Afghan National Government has been seriously diminished, providing the Taliban with ample fodder for their information operations machine. As Andrew Garfield notes, “The Taliban have been quick to fill this rule of law vacuum. Their traveling ‘kangaroo courts’ administer a form of justice quickly and then ensure that a usually draconian punishment is

handed out quickly.”<sup>51</sup> To the Afghans, swift and brutal justice may be preferable to a perpetual state of chaos and no justice.

### **International Implications**

In the age of globalization, the threats resulting from failing states cannot be ignored by the international community. As Robert Rotburg points out, “In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now, these states pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe.”<sup>52</sup> His point is clearly illustrated by the fact that the more unstable and corrupt a country is, the easier it is for terror and criminal organizations to operate freely within its borders.

Appendix A demonstrates that the countries in the red and orange zones on the failed states index are home to 119 (81 percent) of the 147 known terror groups in the world.<sup>53</sup> This is a disproportionate figure, since the 119 countries in the red and orange zones, many of which are on the African continent, comprise just 72 percent of the total countries on the index. Scholars Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair underscore this point, declaring, “African states in particular have proven prone to failure caused by the activity of armed opposition groups that seize control over parts of the territory or at least deprive the government of effective control over it. The example of Sierra Leone shows clearly how some African insurgencies are dangerous less because of their strength than because of the weakness of the state they challenge.”<sup>54</sup>

Additionally, when a government loses its monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the resulting violence and mass exodus of citizens can destabilize neighboring countries which are often unprepared or unable to care for large numbers of displaced persons. Further, contemporary wars are lasting for longer periods of time. As Sebastian Mallaby points out, “In a

study of 52 conflicts since 1960, The World Bank found that wars started after 1980 lasted three times longer than those beginning in the preceding two decades.”<sup>55</sup> This means that the people who live in those countries which experience significant conflict as a result of rampant corruption will continue to fair poorly in terms of human development for the unforeseen future.

For the international community, this means that the countries in the yellow and green zones on the failed states index will be required to provide peacekeeping forces and aid to those countries in the orange and red zones of the failed states index. The 47 countries considered relatively stable in the world will have to contend with the 129 that have failed or are on the path to fail in the future. This is a disproportionate burden, both in the number of countries in stable versus unstable categories and in terms of sheer population. Additionally, although foreign aid is considered by most developed nations to be a critical tool of diplomacy, the vast flow of unregulated money into already corrupt countries with few actionable checks and balances in play only perpetuate the cycle, as demonstrated by the recent loss of over \$900 million in foreign aid and donations in Afghanistan due to fraud and questionable banking practices.<sup>56</sup> Until checks and balances are implemented at the institutional level in these countries, corruption will no doubt continue to thrive as the most destabilizing force in existence.

## **Conclusion**

Far from being endemic to specific cultures or countries, corruption results from a dearth of political checks and balances and a lack respect for the rule of law. When a government is plagued by corruption, it is unable to adhere to the social contract binding it to its citizens, and is either incapable or unwilling to provide basic services and security, creating opportunity for non-state actors to assume control as surrogate public officials. Further, corruption is measurable and its impact on human development and therefore the health of a state can be quantified.

Finally, there is a strong correlation between endemic corruption, low human development, and the likelihood that a nation will fail, with severe implications for the international community. As military officials quoted in a recent news article stated, "To that end, anticorruption efforts are every bit as important as killing or capturing militants, if not more so."<sup>57</sup>

Fortunately, as events in the Middle East have recently demonstrated there are ways of fomenting change in corrupt countries that do not entail foreign peacekeepers and military aid. Peaceful protests against the corruption and abuses of the governments in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Tunisia have resulted in significant changes to the governmental power structures. With thousands of citizens speaking out against graft and calling for change, political leaders from the United States and other stable countries were spurred into diplomatic action, resulting in a flurry of phone calls to Arab leaders pressuring them to listen to their citizens. Perhaps as a result, these Arab nations will implement the kind of checks and balances required to eliminate widespread corruption and protect their people. As New York Times columnist Nicholas Christoff recently wrote, "In the 1700s, a similar kind of grit won independence for the United States from Britain. A democratic Arab world will be a flawed and messy place, just as a democratic America has been - but it's still time to align ourselves with the democrats of the Arab world and not the George III's."<sup>58</sup>

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- <sup>6</sup> Aithey, "Cheetahs vs. Hippos."
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- <sup>12</sup> Barr and Serra, 24.
- <sup>13</sup> Ray Fisman and Edward Miguel, "Cultures of Corruption: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," USC FBE Applied Economics Workshop, [http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/AE\\_4-28-06\\_FISMAN-parking.pdf](http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/AE_4-28-06_FISMAN-parking.pdf) (accessed January 5, 2011), 1.
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- <sup>15</sup> Fisman and Miguel, 4.
- <sup>16</sup> Fisman and Miguel, 5.
- <sup>17</sup> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "John Locke," <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/#SocConThe> (accessed December 28, 2010).
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- <sup>19</sup> Brinkerhoff, Johnson, and Hill, 28.
- <sup>20</sup> Ayittey, "Heads of State or Chief Bandits?."
- <sup>21</sup> Ghani and Lockhart, 4.
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- <sup>23</sup> TI, "Global Corruption Barometer 2010."
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<sup>36</sup> Andrew Garfield, "What Afghans Want." *Foreign Policy Research Programs* (November 2009), <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.garfield.whatafghanswant.html> (accessed October 10, 2010).

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<sup>41</sup> Ghani and Lockhart, 23.

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## Appendix A

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Somalia	1	8.0	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.6	No Rank	No Rank	178	1.10	2	1	11.80%	
Chad	2	9.3	8.5	9.9	9.6	9.6	9.9	9.8	9.7	Low	163	171	1.70	4		8.00%	124.30
Sudan	3	9.5	6.7	9.9	9.3	9.9	9.8	9.9	9.6	Low	154	172	1.60	5	1	36.30%	119.10
Zimbabwe	4	9.4	9.6	9.6	9.4	9.5	9.2	9.5	7.5	Low	169	134	2.40	1		19.00%	45.60
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	5	9.5	8.7	8.8	9.0	9.4	9.8	8.9	9.7	Low	168	164	2.00	5	1	1.82%	
Afghanistan	6	8.2	8.3	10.0	8.9	9.2	9.7	9.4	10.0	Low	155	176	1.40	5	13	23.66%	
Iraq	7	8.8	7.6	9.0	8.4	9.1	9.5	9.6	9.5	No Rank	No rank	175	1.50	3	6	84.30%	
Gen. African Rep.	8	9.2	8.4	9.0	9.2	8.8	9.7	9.1	9.6	Low	159	154	2.10			2.70%	
Guinea	9	8.7	8.9	9.8	9.0	9.5	9.4	9.3	7.8	Low	156	164	2.00	2		9.79%	34.80
Pakistan	10	8.4	6.2	8.9	7.3	8.9	9.7	9.5	9.3	Medium	125	143	2.30	4	12	64.70%	69.40
Haiti	11	8.3	9.2	9.3	9.5	8.3	8.2	8.4	9.6	Low	145	146	2.20	2		24.30%	3.10
Ivory Coast	12	7.9	8.0	9.0	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.5	9.5	Low	149	146	2.20	4		8.12%	67.10
Kenya	13	8.7	7.4	9.3	8.1	8.0	7.5	8.7	8.4	Low	128	154	2.10	3	1	14.12%	7.70
Nigeria	14	9.3	6.9	9.4	9.1	8.8	9.3	9.4	6.2	Low	142	134	2.40	4		15.00%	58.60
Yemen	15	8.6	7.9	8.7	8.6	8.0	8.9	9.2	7.8	Low	133	146	2.20	2	3	15.53%	9.10
Burma	16	9.3	8.2	9.6	8.5	9.1	8.2	8.2	6.5	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	3		11.44%	
Ethiopia	17	8.5	8.0	7.7	8.1	8.7	7.8	9.0	7.9	Low	157	116	2.70	1	1	19.14%	59.70
East Timor	18	7.0	8.4	9.1	8.7	7.0	8.8	8.7	9.2	Medium	120	127	2.50				
Niger	19	7.8	9.2	8.9	9.7	8.5	7.3	7.6	8.2	Low	167	123	2.60	1	1	25.00%	19.90
North Korea	19	8.8	9.6	9.9	9.6	9.5	8.1	7.8	8.2	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank				
Uganda	21	8.4	7.2	7.9	8.2	7.6	8.7	8.6	7.9	Low	143	127	2.50	4	1	23.00%	3.50
Guinea-Bissau	22	8.4	8.3	9.1	8.8	8.1	8.9	8.9	8.5	Low	164	154	2.10			27.94%	10.80
Burundi	23	8.4	8.2	7.6	9.0	7.7	7.1	7.9	8.7	Low	166	170	1.80	5		10.44%	37.70

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Bangladesh	24	8.8	7.9	8.0	8.3	7.4	8.1	8.9	6.3	Low	129	134	2.40	3	1	9.50%	33.00
Sri Lanka	25	8.7	5.9	8.6	6.4	8.8	8.5	9.4	6.4	Medim	91	91	3.20	5	1	81.00%	17.20
Cameroon	26	8.7	7.0	9.0	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.7	7.0	Low	131	146	2.20	1		10.00%	43..6
Nepal	26	9.0	8.3	8.1	7.6	8.7	7.7	8.5	7.0	Low	138	146	2.20	3	1	30.30%	16.50
Sierra Leone	28	8.8	8.6	7.7	9.1	6.8	5.9	7.8	7.7	Low	158	134	2.40	3		8.00%	25.60
Malawi	28	8.3	9.2	8.1	8.6	7.3	5.4	7.8	8.6	Low	153	85	3.40			45.02%	13.00
Eritrea	30	6.2	8.6	8.8	8.6	8.4	7.6	7.9	8.1	No Rank	No Rank	123	2.60			21.80%	0.08
Rep. of the Congo	31	8.1	7.8	9.1	8.6	7.7	7.6	7.1	7.4	Medium	168	164	2.00	2		5.00%	
Iran	32	7.3	5.5	9.0	5.9	9.4	8.9	9.5	6.8	High	70	146	2.20	2	2	67.36%	15.70
Liberia	33	8.3	8.0	7.1	8.5	6.5	6.7	8.1	8.9	Low	162	87	3.30	5		6.20%	13.50
Lebanon	34	7.2	6.1	7.3	6.0	6.8	8.9	8.8	8.1	No Rank	No Rank	127	2.50	3	10	84.90%	1.30
Burkina Faso	35	8.8	8.0	7.7	8.8	6.6	7.3	7.6	7.9	Low	161	98	3.10			32.21%	
Uzbekistan	36	8.5	7.0	8.5	6.4	9.3	8.8	9.0	6.2	Medium	102	172	1.60	1	2	87.30%	8.80
Georgia	37	7.2	6.5	9.0	6.4	7.3	8.0	9.1	8.7	High	74	68	3.80	3		39.38%	9.70
RED AVERAGE		8.4	7.9	8.8	8.4	8.4	8.4	8.8	8.2		142	140	2		58		
Tajikistan	38	7.1	7.5	8.9	7.3	8.7	7.3	8.4	6.6	Medium	112	154	2.10	1	1	82.70%	4.30
Mauritania	39	6.8	7.7	7.5	8.3	7.3	7.9	7.9	7.6	Low	136	143	2.30		2	11.30%	11.20
Cambodia	40	7.1	7.7	8.7	8.3	7.7	6.4	7.7	7.0	Medium	124	154	2.10	2	1	6.29%	
Laos	40	5.8	7.3	8.3	8.1	8.7	7.4	8.5	7.3	No Rank	122	154	2.10	1		14.41%	6.10
Rwanda	40	7.2	7.0	7.5	7.4	7.5	5.0	8.0	7.5	Low	152	66	4.00	5	1	19.00%	12.90
Solomon Islands	43	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.2	6.8	7.0	8.0	9.1	No Rank	123	110	2.80			2.44%	

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Kyrgyzstan	45	7.9	7.9	8.4	6.3	7.6	7.6	7.4	7.6	Medium	109	164	2.00		1	91.10%	5.20
Colombia	46	8.3	4.6	7.7	5.8	6.9	7.7	8.0	8.0	No Rank	79	78	3.50		3		
Togo	47	7.6	8.0	7.5	8.4	7.7	7.6	7.6	6.9	Low	139	134	2.40	2		31.60%	9.90
Syria	48	7.8	6.3	8.6	5.5	8.8	7.6	7.8	5.8	Medium	111	127	2.50	1	4	52.70%	52.70
Egypt	49	7.4	6.8	8.4	6.1	8.2	6.5	8.1	7.8	Medium	101	98	3.10	3	2	81.00%	139.60
Bhutan	50	8.5	7.5	6.9	7.3	7.9	5.8	7.7	6.6	No Rank	No Rank	36	5.70		1	62.00%	18.40
Philippines	51	7.4	5.8	8.6	6.3	7.5	7.9	8.0	6.6	Medium	97	134	2.40	4	5	21.64%	11.50
Comoros	52	6.1	7.6	8.2	8.5	6.8	7.5	8.0	9.0	Low	140	154	2.10			76.50%	9.90
Bolivia	53	8.7	6.8	7.1	7.5	6.6	6.5	8.3	6.7	Medium	95	110	2.80	1		7.00%	3.10
Israel/West Bank	54	7.7	4.4	7.3	6.8	7.8	6.5	8.2	7.8	Very High	15	30	6.10	4	6	100.00%	
Azerbaijan	55	7.3	5.9	8.0	5.5	7.2	7.3	7.9	7.4	High	67	134	2.40	1	1	49.36%	
Papua New Guinea	56	9.0	6.3	7.8	8.3	6.3	6.5	7.1	6.1	Low	137	154	2.10	1		3.50%	5.50
Zambia	56	7.3	8.0	7.5	8.0	5.9	5.0	6.1	7.3	Low	150	101	3.00	1		22.00%	60.40
Moldova	58	6.8	7.0	7.9	6.7	6.8	7.8	8.0	7.4	Medium	99	105	2.90			86.20%	0.07
Angola	59	9.1	5.0	8.1	8.0	7.3	5.9	6.8	6.7	Low	146	168	1.90	4		10.40%	81.70
Bosnia and Herzegovina	60	7.1	5.7	8.0	5.4	5.9	7.2	9.2	8.3	High	68	91	3.20	2		52.30%	
Indonesia	61	7.9	6.7	6.9	6.7	6.5	7.3	7.1	6.7	Medium	108	110	2.80	5	2	58.00%	36.10
China	62	9.0	4.3	8.3	7.0	9.0	5.8	7.2	3.1	Medium	89	78	3.50	3	1	82.50%	9.50
Swaziland	63	6.2	8.2	8.6	7.6	7.7	6.6	6.9	7.3	Medium	121	91	3.20	1		28.20%	4.30
Madagascar	64	7.7	7.2	7.1	8.6	5.8	6.4	7.7	8.0	Low	135	123	2.60	1		11.60%	
Turkmenistan	65	7.4	6.6	8.4	7.0	9.0	7.7	7.7	5.6	Medium	87	172	1.60			81.20%	5.80

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Nicaragua	65	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	6.2	6.5	7.0	6.8	Medium	115	127	2.50	1		11.36%	4.90
Lesotho	67	5.7	8.7	7.2	8.5	6.3	5.9	7.2	6.8	Low	141	78	3.50	1		18.30%	18.80
Djibouti	68	6.5	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.6	6.0	7.1	8.7	Low	147	91	3.20			12.60%	6.50
Ecuador	69	8.0	6.7	7.4	7.0	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.1	High	77	127	2.50	1	1	14.97%	
Mozambique	69	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.9	7.3	6.2	5.4	6.2	Low	165	116	2.70			18.70%	110.70
Algeria	71	7.1	5.1	7.5	6.5	7.6	7.5	6.8	5.7	High	84	105	2.90	5	2	70.20%	25.20
Tanzania	72	6.7	7.2	6.5	8.3	5.9	5.6	6.0	7.0	Low	148	116	2.70	1		8.63%	8.30
Guatemala	72	8.0	6.9	7.1	6.8	6.9	7.2	6.3	5.5	Medium	116	91	3.20	2		34.50%	
Fiji	74	7.5	6.7	8.9	5.5	6.7	6.8	8.2	6.1	Medium	86	No Rank	No Rank	1		49.20%	15.50
Gambia	75	6.8	7.5	7.6	7.2	7.4	5.8	6.2	7.3	Low	151	91	3.20	1		19.32%	1.50
Honduras	76	8.3	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	7.0	6.8	6.5	Medium	106	134	2.40	1		20.40%	5.40
Cuba	77	6.6	6.3	7.0	5.0	7.5	7.3	7.1	7.5	No Rank	No Rank	69	3.70			49.00%	
Mali	78	7.0	8.1	5.4	8.5	5.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	Low	160	116	2.70		2	18.00%	37.40
India	79	8.7	5.1	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.6	6.2	4.9	Medium	119	87	3.30	1st/5	4	47.40%	6.10
Russia	80	7.9	5.1	8.1	5.5	8.0	6.8	7.6	4.8	High	65	154	2.10	4	4	67.40%	2.00
Thailand	81	7.5	4.3	8.0	5.4	7.0	7.4	8.0	5.3	Medium	92	78	3.50	1			24.50
Venezuela	82	7.6	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.2	6.7	7.5	5.7	High	75	164	2.00	1	2	33.60%	9.10
Belarus	82	6.7	6.7	8.7	6.2	7.9	6.2	7.8	6.9	High	61	127	2.50	1		87.00%	2.70
Maldives	84	5.3	7.0	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.1	7.4	5.8	Medium	107	143	2.30				
El Salvador	85	7.9	6.6	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.7	4.5	5.1	Medium	90	73	3.60	2		19.80%	1.70
Serbia/Kosovo	86	6.9	6.2	6.8	5.2	5.6	6.5	8.0	7.0	High	60	78	3.50			62.00%	38.00
Saudi Arabia	87	7.3	3.1	8.2	4.1	9.1	7.8	7.8	6.3	High	55	50	4.70	1		29.90%	33.80
Cape Verde	88	6.0	7.0	7.2	7.4	6.0	5.5	6.1	7.6	Medium	118	45	5.10			69.04%	

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Nicaragua	65	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	6.2	6.5	7.0	6.8	Medium	115	127	2.50	1		11.36%	4.90
Lesotho	67	5.7	8.7	7.2	8.5	6.3	5.9	7.2	6.8	Low	141	78	3.50	1		18.30%	18.80
Djibouti	68	6.5	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.6	6.0	7.1	8.7	Low	147	91	3.20			12.60%	6.50
Ecuador	69	8.0	6.7	7.4	7.0	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.1	High	77	127	2.50	1	1	14.97%	
Mozambique	69	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.9	7.3	6.2	5.4	6.2	Low	165	116	2.70			18.70%	110.70
Algeria	71	7.1	5.1	7.5	6.5	7.6	7.5	6.8	5.7	High	84	105	2.90	5	2	70.20%	25.20
Tanzania	72	6.7	7.2	6.5	8.3	5.9	5.6	6.0	7.0	Low	148	116	2.70	1		8.63%	8.30
Guatemala	72	8.0	6.9	7.1	6.8	6.9	7.2	6.3	5.5	Medium	116	91	3.20	2		34.50%	
Fiji	74	7.5	6.7	8.9	5.5	6.7	6.8	8.2	6.1	Medium	86	No Rank	No Rank	1		49.20%	15.50
Gambia	75	6.8	7.5	7.6	7.2	7.4	5.8	6.2	7.3	Low	151	91	3.20	1		19.32%	1.50
Honduras	76	8.3	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	7.0	6.8	6.5	Medium	106	134	2.40	1		20.40%	5.40
Cuba	77	6.6	6.3	7.0	5.0	7.5	7.3	7.1	7.5	No Rank	No Rank	69	3.70			49.00%	
Mali	78	7.0	8.1	5.4	8.5	5.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	Low	160	116	2.70		2	18.00%	37.40
India	79	8.7	5.1	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.6	6.2	4.9	Medium	119	87	3.30	1st/5	4	47.40%	6.10
Russia	80	7.9	5.1	8.1	5.5	8.0	6.8	7.6	4.8	High	65	154	2.10	4	4	67.40%	2.00
Thailand	81	7.5	4.3	8.0	5.4	7.0	7.4	8.0	5.3	Medium	92	78	3.50	1			24.50
Venezuela	82	7.6	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.2	6.7	7.5	5.7	High	75	164	2.00	1	2	33.60%	9.10
Belarus	82	6.7	6.7	8.7	6.2	7.9	6.2	7.8	6.9	High	61	127	2.50	1		87.00%	2.70
Maldives	84	5.3	7.0	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.1	7.4	5.8	Medium	107	143	2.30				
El Salvador	85	7.9	6.6	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.7	4.5	5.1	Medium	90	73	3.60	2		19.80%	1.70
Serbia/Kosovo	86	6.9	6.2	6.8	5.2	5.6	6.5	8.0	7.0	High	60	78	3.50			62.00%	38.00
Saudi Arabia	87	7.3	3.1	8.2	4.1	9.1	7.8	7.8	6.3	High	55	50	4.70	1		29.90%	33.80
Cape Verde	88	6.0	7.0	7.2	7.4	6.0	5.5	6.1	7.6	Medium	118	45	5.10			69.04%	

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Nicaragua	65	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	6.2	6.5	7.0	6.8	Medium	115	127	2.50	1		11.36%	4.90
Lesotho	67	5.7	8.7	7.2	8.5	6.3	5.9	7.2	6.8	Low	141	78	3.50	1		18.30%	18.80
Djibouti	68	6.5	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.6	6.0	7.1	8.7	Low	147	91	3.20			12.60%	6.50
Ecuador	69	8.0	6.7	7.4	7.0	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.1	High	77	127	2.50	1	1	14.97%	
Mozambique	69	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.9	7.3	6.2	5.4	6.2	Low	165	116	2.70			18.70%	110.70
Algeria	71	7.1	5.1	7.5	6.5	7.6	7.5	6.8	5.7	High	84	105	2.90	5	2	70.20%	25.20
Tanzania	72	6.7	7.2	6.5	8.3	5.9	5.6	6.0	7.0	Low	148	116	2.70	1		8.63%	8.30
Guatemala	72	8.0	6.9	7.1	6.8	6.9	7.2	6.3	5.5	Medium	116	91	3.20	2		34.50%	
Fiji	74	7.5	6.7	8.9	5.5	6.7	6.8	8.2	6.1	Medium	86	No Rank	No Rank	1		49.20%	15.50
Gambia	75	6.8	7.5	7.6	7.2	7.4	5.8	6.2	7.3	Low	151	91	3.20	1		19.32%	1.50
Honduras	76	8.3	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	7.0	6.8	6.5	Medium	106	134	2.40	1		20.40%	5.40
Cuba	77	6.6	6.3	7.0	5.0	7.5	7.3	7.1	7.5	No Rank	No Rank	69	3.70			49.00%	
Mali	78	7.0	8.1	5.4	8.5	5.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	Low	160	116	2.70		2	18.00%	37.40
India	79	8.7	5.1	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.6	6.2	4.9	Medium	119	87	3.30	1st/5	4	47.40%	6.10
Russia	80	7.9	5.1	8.1	5.5	8.0	6.8	7.6	4.8	High	65	154	2.10	4	4	67.40%	2.00
Thailand	81	7.5	4.3	8.0	5.4	7.0	7.4	8.0	5.3	Medium	92	78	3.50	1			24.50
Venezuela	82	7.6	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.2	6.7	7.5	5.7	High	75	164	2.00	1	2	33.60%	9.10
Belarus	82	6.7	6.7	8.7	6.2	7.9	6.2	7.8	6.9	High	61	127	2.50	1		87.00%	2.70
Maldives	84	5.3	7.0	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.1	7.4	5.8	Medium	107	143	2.30				
El Salvador	85	7.9	6.6	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.7	4.5	5.1	Medium	90	73	3.60	2		19.80%	1.70
Serbia/Kosovo	86	6.9	6.2	6.8	5.2	5.6	6.5	8.0	7.0	High	60	78	3.50			62.00%	38.00
Saudi Arabia	87	7.3	3.1	8.2	4.1	9.1	7.8	7.8	6.3	High	55	50	4.70	1		29.90%	33.80
Cape Verde	88	6.0	7.0	7.2	7.4	6.0	5.5	6.1	7.6	Medium	118	45	5.10			69.04%	

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Turkey	89	7.8	5.8	6.0	5.4	5.5	7.4	7.8	6.0	High	83	56	4.40	4	5	41.59%	
Morocco	90	7.6	6.5	7.2	6.6	6.8	5.4	6.2	4.3	Medium	114	85	3.40		1	56.90%	60.00
Jordan	90	7.2	6.2	5.9	5.2	7.0	5.9	6.5	6.7	High	82	50	4.70			100.00%	2.90
Peru	92	8.0	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.5	7.4	6.9	5.5	High	63	78	3.50	3	3	14.40%	3.10
Benin	93	7.4	7.4	6.4	8.4	5.5	5.3	4.1	7.0	Low	134	110	2.80			9.50%	49.80
Dominican Republic	93	7.8	5.9	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.6	6.8	6.0	Medium	88	101	3.00			49.40%	0.10
Vietnam	95	6.5	6.6	7.3	6.4	7.3	6.0	7.0	6.2	Medium	113	116	2.70	3		25.10%	9.80
Mexico	96	8.0	6.5	6.6	5.8	5.8	7.5	5.5	6.9	High	56	98	3.10	3		49.54%	4.00
Sao Tome	97	5.9	7.3	7.3	7.3	5.1	6.0	6.7	6.5	Medium	127	101	3.00			68.10%	
Gabon	98	7.9	5.9	7.8	6.6	6.4	5.7	7.2	5.5	Medium	93	110	2.80			10.21%	2.20
Senegal	99	7.0	6.2	5.9	7.4	6.0	6.3	4.2	5.9	Low	144	105	2.90	2		29.26%	79.20
Namibia	100	8.9	6.5	4.8	6.9	5.8	5.6	3.7	6.0	Medium	105	56	4.40			12.80%	4.20
Armenia	101	6.5	5.8	6.6	5.3	6.4	5.1	7.0	5.8	High	76	123	2.60			100.00%	10.10
Guyana	###	7.7	6.9	6.8	5.3	5.2	6.6	5.1	5.5	Medium	104	116	2.70			7.40%	2.30
Kazakhstan	103	6.2	6.7	7.5	5.5	7.1	6.3	7.6	6.2	High	66	105	2.90	1		93.43%	21.10
Macedonia	103	7.1	6.6	6.9	4.6	5.1	5.6	6.5	6.6	High	No Rank	62	4.10			63.80%	3.30
Suriname	105	7.7	6.6	6.5	5.1	5.8	6.0	5.8	6.2	Medium	94	No Rank	No Rank			26.25%	
Paraguay	106	8.0	6.2	8.3	5.8	6.7	5.9	7.5	3.9	Medium	96	146	2.20				13.00
Samoa	107	6.6	6.2	6.4	5.1	4.5	5.8	5.3	8.1	No Rank	No Rank	62	4.10			14.21%	
Micronesia	108	6.8	6.4	6.6	6.6	2.8	5.1	5.5	8.1	Medium	103	No Rank	No Rank			17.50%	
Ukraine	109	6.2	6.3	7.2	4.0	5.3	3.8	7.9	6.6	High	69	134	2.40				12.90
Malaysia	110	7.0	5.1	5.9	5.0	6.8	5.9	6.3	5.4	High	57	56	4.40	1	2	81.32%	1.40
Libya	111	6.9	5.3	7.3	4.2	8.3	5.2	7.1	4.8	High	53	146	2.20		1	57.20%	8.20

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Turkey	89	7.8	5.8	6.0	5.4	5.5	7.4	7.8	6.0	High	83	56	4.40	4	5	41.59%	
Morocco	90	7.6	6.5	7.2	6.6	6.8	5.4	6.2	4.3	Medium	114	85	3.40		1	56.90%	60.00
Jordan	90	7.2	6.2	5.9	5.2	7.0	5.9	6.5	6.7	High	82	50	4.70			100.00%	2.90
Peru	92	8.0	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.5	7.4	6.9	5.5	High	63	78	3.50	3	3	14.40%	3.10
Benin	93	7.4	7.4	6.4	8.4	5.5	5.3	4.1	7.0	Low	134	110	2.80			9.50%	49.80
Dominican Republic	93	7.8	5.9	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.6	6.8	6.0	Medium	88	101	3.00			49.40%	0.10
Vietnam	95	6.5	6.6	7.3	6.4	7.3	6.0	7.0	6.2	Medium	113	116	2.70	3		25.10%	9.80
Mexico	96	8.0	6.5	6.6	5.8	5.8	7.5	5.5	6.9	High	56	98	3.10	3		49.54%	4.00
Sao Tome	97	5.9	7.3	7.3	7.3	5.1	6.0	6.7	6.5	Medium	127	101	3.00			68.10%	
Gabon	98	7.9	5.9	7.8	6.6	6.4	5.7	7.2	5.5	Medium	93	110	2.80			10.21%	2.20
Senegal	99	7.0	6.2	5.9	7.4	6.0	6.3	4.2	5.9	Low	144	105	2.90	2		29.26%	79.20
Namibia	100	8.9	6.5	4.8	6.9	5.8	5.6	3.7	6.0	Medium	105	56	4.40			12.80%	4.20
Armenia	101	6.5	5.8	6.6	5.3	6.4	5.1	7.0	5.8	High	76	123	2.60			100.00%	10.10
Guyana	###	7.7	6.9	6.8	5.3	5.2	6.6	5.1	5.5	Medium	104	116	2.70			7.40%	2.30
Kazakhstan	103	6.2	6.7	7.5	5.5	7.1	6.3	7.6	6.2	High	66	105	2.90	1		93.43%	21.10
Macedonia	103	7.1	6.6	6.9	4.6	5.1	5.6	6.5	6.6	High	No Rank	62	4.10			63.80%	3.30
Suriname	105	7.7	6.6	6.5	5.1	5.8	6.0	5.8	6.2	Medium	94	No Rank	No Rank			26.25%	
Paraguay	106	8.0	6.2	8.3	5.8	6.7	5.9	7.5	3.9	Medium	96	146	2.20				13.00
Samoa	107	6.6	6.2	6.4	5.1	4.5	5.8	5.3	8.1	No Rank	No Rank	62	4.10			14.21%	
Micronesia	108	6.8	6.4	6.6	6.6	2.8	5.1	5.5	8.1	Medium	103	No Rank	No Rank			17.50%	
Ukraine	109	6.2	6.3	7.2	4.0	5.3	3.8	7.9	6.6	High	69	134	2.40				12.90
Malaysia	110	7.0	5.1	5.9	5.0	6.8	5.9	6.3	5.4	High	57	56	4.40	1	2	81.32%	1.40
Libya	111	6.9	5.3	7.3	4.2	8.3	5.2	7.1	4.8	High	53	146	2.20		1	57.20%	8.20

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Belize	112	7.1	6.2	6.2	5.8	3.8	5.7	4.6	6.1	High	78	No Rank	No Rank			17.00%	
Botswana	113	7.7	6.1	5.3	6.4	4.8	4.0	2.9	5.8	Medium	98	33	5.80			36.45%	18.50
Cyprus	114	7.6	4.3	5.2	3.4	3.6	5.3	7.9	8.8	Very High	35	28	6.30	1		63.00%	2.50
South Africa	115	8.5	5.0	5.8	5.5	4.7	4.1	5.9	3.0	Medium	110	54	4.50	4	1	17.30%	34.00
Seychelles	115	6.9	5.8	7.0	4.5	5.9	5.6	6.0	6.3	No Rank	No Rank	49	4.80			96.00%	
Brunei Darussalam	117	7.8	3.7	7.7	3.5	6.9	5.9	7.4	4.7	Very High	37	38	5.50			78.07%	
Tunisia	118	7.0	5.0	6.4	5.7	7.5	6.5	6.0	3.7	High	81	59	4.30	1	1	65.80%	16.50
Jamaica	119	6.5	6.8	6.8	6.2	5.5	5.8	4.0	6.1	High	80	87	3.30			73.28%	
Brazil	119	8.8	4.0	6.2	6.0	5.4	6.7	5.1	4.2	High	73	69	3.70	4	1	5.50%	29.90
Albania	121	5.7	6.1	6.8	5.6	5.3	5.4	6.0	5.5	High	64	87	3.30	1		39.00%	84.50
Ghana	122	6.4	5.8	5.1	7.6	4.7	2.6	4.2	5.2	Low	130	62	4.10			17.92%	11.30
Grenada	123	6.7	6.1	6.4	3.9	4.6	5.4	5.8	7.6	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank			60.96%	
Trinidad and Tobago	124	7.2	4.8	5.9	5.2	5.4	6.0	5.6	5.1	High	59	73	3.60			51.10%	1.40
Kuwait	125	6.1	3.8	6.0	3.1	6.5	4.9	7.2	5.1	High	47	54	4.50	1		85.00%	246.20
Bulgaria	126	6.1	5.3	6.0	5.0	4.6	5.1	4.6	5.8	High	58	73	3.60			99.00%	
Antigua and Barbuda	127	6.1	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.0	6.2	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank			32.96%	
Romania	128	5.6	5.6	6.0	4.8	4.3	4.1	5.2	5.5	High	50	69	3.70	1		50.70%	3.50
Mongolia	129	5.9	5.7	6.2	5.3	6.4	4.8	5.3	6.9	Medium	100	16	2.70			3.50%	10.20
ORANGE AVERAGE		7.2	6.3	7.1	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.7	6.3		99.4	98.9	3.2		103.0		
Panama	130	7.5	5.6	4.8	5.5	4.5	5.2	3.0	4.0	High	54	73	3.60	1	1	34.60%	

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Belize	112	7.1	6.2	6.2	5.8	3.8	5.7	4.6	6.1	High	78	No Rank	No Rank			17.00%	
Botswana	113	7.7	6.1	5.3	6.4	4.8	4.0	2.9	5.8	Medium	98	33	5.80			36.45%	18.50
Cyprus	114	7.6	4.3	5.2	3.4	3.6	5.3	7.9	8.8	Very High	35	28	6.30	1		63.00%	2.50
South Africa	115	8.5	5.0	5.8	5.5	4.7	4.1	5.9	3.0	Medium	110	54	4.50	4	1	17.30%	34.00
Seychelles	115	6.9	5.8	7.0	4.5	5.9	5.6	6.0	6.3	No Rank	No Rank	49	4.80			96.00%	
Brunei Darussalam	117	7.8	3.7	7.7	3.5	6.9	5.9	7.4	4.7	Very High	37	38	5.50			78.07%	
Tunisia	118	7.0	5.0	6.4	5.7	7.5	6.5	6.0	3.7	High	81	59	4.30	1	1	65.80%	16.50
Jamaica	119	6.5	6.8	6.8	6.2	5.5	5.8	4.0	6.1	High	80	87	3.30			73.28%	
Brazil	119	8.8	4.0	6.2	6.0	5.4	6.7	5.1	4.2	High	73	69	3.70	4	1	5.50%	29.90
Albania	121	5.7	6.1	6.8	5.6	5.3	5.4	6.0	5.5	High	64	87	3.30	1		39.00%	84.50
Ghana	122	6.4	5.8	5.1	7.6	4.7	2.6	4.2	5.2	Low	130	62	4.10			17.92%	11.30
Grenada	123	6.7	6.1	6.4	3.9	4.6	5.4	5.8	7.6	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank			60.96%	
Trinidad and Tobago	124	7.2	4.8	5.9	5.2	5.4	6.0	5.6	5.1	High	59	73	3.60			51.10%	1.40
Kuwait	125	6.1	3.8	6.0	3.1	6.5	4.9	7.2	5.1	High	47	54	4.50	1		85.00%	246.20
Bulgaria	126	6.1	5.3	6.0	5.0	4.6	5.1	4.6	5.8	High	58	73	3.60			99.00%	
Antigua and Barbuda	127	6.1	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.0	6.2	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank	No Rank			32.96%	
Romania	128	5.6	5.6	6.0	4.8	4.3	4.1	5.2	5.5	High	50	69	3.70	1		50.70%	3.50
Mongolia	129	5.9	5.7	6.2	5.3	6.4	4.8	5.3	6.9	Medium	100	16	2.70			3.50%	10.20
ORANGE AVERAGE		7.2	6.2	6.9	6.1	6.2	6.1	6.4	6.1		95.0	92.0	3.4		182.0		
Croatia	131	5.3	6.2	4.8	3.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	5.4	High	51	62	4.10			84.00%	6.50

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Bahamas	132	6.4	5.0	5.5	4.4	2.8	4.8	4.8	5.3	High	43	No Rank	No Rank			57.40%	
Bahrain	133	6.0	4.0	6.7	3.1	5.4	4.7	6.1	5.7	Very High	39	48	4.90	1		79.13%	37.70
Montenegro	134	4.4	4.9	4.5	3.8	5.3	4.5	5.9	5.6	High	49	69	3.70				
Latvia	135	6.0	6.3	5.4	4.2	3.5	3.0	4.3	4.5	High	48	59	4.30	1		100.00%	
Barbados	135	6.7	5.4	4.1	3.1	2.8	4.5	4.5	5.7	Very High	42	17	7.80			100.00%	
United Arab Emirates	137	5.7	3.9	6.7	3.4	5.9	2.7	4.0	4.5	Very High	32	28	6.30			100.00%	
Costa Rica	138	6.5	5.4	3.9	4.1	3.3	2.5	3.2	4.6	High	62	41	5.30			24.40%	10.10
Qatar	139	5.3	4.1	6.3	2.6	4.7	2.7	5.0	5.0	Very High	38	19	7.70			90.00%	
Estonia	140	5.2	5.0	4.5	3.3	3.3	2.6	5.5	3.5	Very High	34	26	6.50			23.54%	10.50
Hungary	141	5.9	5.4	5.7	3.6	3.3	2.2	5.0	4.6	Very High	36	50	4.70	1		43.90%	3.30
Poland	142	4.8	5.0	4.5	3.7	3.8	2.4	3.7	4.0	Very High	41	41	5.30	1		69.66%	1.70
Slovakia	143	5.6	5.0	4.1	3.8	3.8	2.1	3.9	4.2	Very High	31	59	4.30	1		87.31%	6.40
Oman	144	2.7	4.5	6.0	4.5	6.7	5.2	6.6	2.0	No Rank	No Rank	41	5.30			27.66%	
Malta	145	4.4	4.2	4.1	3.2	3.7	4.0	2.0	4.8	Very High	33	37	5.60			87.53%	
Lithuania	146	6.0	5.7	3.9	3.2	3.3	2.2	3.2	4.1	High	44	46	5.00			91.30%	2.00
Greece	###	4.6	4.3	4.6	3.7	3.4	3.4	2.4	3.5	Very High	22	78	3.50	1	2	91.80%	
Argentina	148	5.8	5.1	3.6	3.7	3.8	2.4	3.2	3.1	High	46	105	2.90	1		30.00%	3.90
Italy	149	4.5	4.7	4.5	3.1	3.0	4.2	4.0	2.2	Very High	23	67	3.90	1	3	100.00%	14.60
Mauritius	150	5.7	4.1	5.1	4.2	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.6	High	72	39	5.40				20.50
Spain	151	5.0	4.4	1.6	2.4	2.5	5.3	5.7	2.0	Very High	20	30	6.10	2	2	99.00%	12.70

Country	Failed States Index Rank	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	Delegitimization of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Human Development Category	Human Development Index	Corruption Perception Index Rankings	Corruption Perception Index Score	Global Terrorism Indicator	Known Terror Organizations/Rank	Paved Roads	Parking Violations Per Diplomat Nov 97-Nov 05
Czech Republic	152	4.1	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.3	2.1	3.3	3.5	Very High	28	54	4.60			100%	18.90
South Korea	153	2.5	2.8	3.9	2.3	2.8	1.5	3.6	6.3	Very High	12	39	5.40			86.76%	0.40
Uruguay	153	5.0	4.0	2.6	3.4	2.5	3.4	3.0	4.2	High	52	24	6.90			90.00%	4.40
Chile	155	4.5	4.6	1.8	4.0	3.4	2.3	1.5	3.3	High	45	21	7.20	1		20.20%	16.50
Slovenia	156	5.0	4.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	1.3	2.6	Very High	29	27	6.40			100%	5.20
Germany	157	4.7	3.6	2.1	1.7	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.2	Very High	10	15	7.90	1		100.00%	1.00
United States	158	5.4	4.0	2.5	2.5	3.7	1.6	3.3	1.5	Very High	4	22	7.10	3	1	64.50%	
France	159	5.3	3.6	1.8	1.5	2.7	1.6	2.0	2.2	Very High	14	25	6.80	1	1	100.00%	6.10
Singapore	160	3.1	3.7	4.2	1.7	4.4	1.5	4.1	3.0	Very High	27	25	6.80			100.00%	3.50
United Kingdom	161	4.5	3.0	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.7	3.2	2.2	Very High	26	20	7.60	2	7	100.00%	
Portugal	162	3.7	4.7	1.9	3.6	3.5	1.4	1.2	2.8	Very High	40	32	6.00			86.00%	8.80
Belgium	163	4.7	3.7	2.3	2.1	1.5	1.8	3.0	2.8	Very High	18	22	7.10	1		78.00%	2.70
Japan	164	2.6	3.5	1.8	1.3	3.2	2.1	2.2	3.7	Very High	11	17	7.80	1	1	77.70%	
YELLOW AVERAGE		3.9	3.7	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.0	2.4	2.7		22	27	7		203		
Iceland	165	2.3	7.2	2.0	1.5	1.9	1.1	2.0	5.9	Very High	17	11	8.50			34.40%	
Netherlands	166	3.2	3.0	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.7	2.4	Very High	7	7	8.80			90.00%	
Canada	166	4.5	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.9	1.2	2.4	1.5	Very High	8	6	8.90	1	2	35.30%	

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Luxembourg	168	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.2	1.3	2.1	3.6	2.3	Very High	24	11	8.50			100.00%	
Australia	168	4.2	3.2	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.4	1.5	1.1	Very High	2	8	8.70	1		38.70%	
Austria	170	4.7	2.7	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.9	2.4	Very High	25	15	7.90	1		100.00%	2.20
New Zealand	171	4.3	4.0	1.0	1.6	1.5	1.1	1.2	0.9	Very High	3	1	9.30	1		64.33%	
Denmark	172	2.0	3.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.0	2.3	Very High	19	1	9.30			100.00%	
Ireland	173	2.8	3.3	1.6	2.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	Very High	5	14	8.10		8	100.00%	
Switzerland	174	2.6	2.4	1.0	1.4	2.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	Very High	13	8	8.70	1		100.00%	
Sweden	175	2.1	2.2	0.8	1.3	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.6	Very High	9	4	9.20	1		77.50%	
Finland	176	1.7	3.0	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.8	Very High	16	4	9.20			64.70%	
Norway	177	2.4	2.6	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.1	2.1	Very High	1	10	8.60			77.50%	
GREEN AVERAGE		8.4	2.9	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.6		10	7	9		10		

Failed States Index- [http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140)

Human Development Category/Index- <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>

Corruption Perception Index Ranking/Score- [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010)

Global Terrorism Indicator/Known Terror Organization/Rank- <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>

Paved Roads- <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>

Parking Violations Per Diplomat- Workshop, [http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/AE\\_4-28-06\\_FISMAN-parking.pdf](http://www.usc.edu/schools/business/FBE/seminars/papers/AE_4-28-06_FISMAN-parking.pdf)