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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The South Sudanese vote for Independence in January of 2011 raised many questions about what the future would hold for that region of Africa. The potential for a return to all out civil war between Sudan and South Sudan and the potential for South Sudan to become the world's newest failed state was being discussed and debated throughout the region and world community. This paper analyzes the geography, demographics, history, and context of Sudan; the regional and international stake holders; and the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to successfully transition from an autonomous part of a larger country to an independent country that will stand on its own.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**TITLE: Assessment of the Government of South Sudan's Potential for Survival as an  
Independent Nation**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR: Major Michael Hyde**

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## *Executive Summary*

**Title:** Assessment of the Government of South Sudan's Potential for Survival as an Independent Nation

**Author:** Major Michael R. Hyde, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** The Government of South Sudan will succeed as a new country only with focused assistance from the United States and the international community.

**Discussion:** Following the Referendum for unity or secession that was completed between January 9<sup>th</sup> – 16<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the population of Southern Sudan voted for independence and a split from Sudan. This referendum was part of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed by the two leading political parties in the North (National Congress Party) and the South (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement). The vote was the final step in the separation of two separate groups of people that have lived autonomously from each other for the last century and have been mired in a bloody civil war for thirty-nine out of the last fifty years. Now the question that the continent of Africa and the international community has is whether South Sudan has the ability to effectively govern this new independent country and have the conditions been set by the North, the countries in the region and the international community to assist in this process.

The paper assumes that scenarios that include a regression back into all-out war or that all of the parties are going to get along amicably without any violence are not the most probable options.

This paper analyzes the geography, demographics, history, and context of Sudan; the regional and international stake holders; and the capacity of the Government of South Sudan that has had a six year head start during the interim period leading up to the referendum.

**Conclusion:** The road forward for the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) is a long and difficult one. They have had a head start in the area of governing, but the focus of effort and the ability to reach the rural areas of their country has been limited at best. Initially the GOSS will require a great deal of outside assistance, but if focused properly the outcome will be a positive one for the population in the South.

autonomous

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## **Introduction:**

The situation in Sudan has been of concern for the international community for the past 100 years. This thesis provides a brief historical background and then details the regional implications of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the region and the capacity of South Sudan to succeed in building a new and sustainable state and government. In early February 2011, the international community received confirmation that on July 10<sup>th</sup> it will be able to welcome a new country into its ranks. The country known as Sudan since 1956 will split in two parts. (See Appendix B and C.) Over the last six years, the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) allowed Sudan to coexist as two autonomous entities within one country. At the end of the six year period the planned referendum for unity or independence occurred on time, on January 9<sup>th</sup>, and the people of the South voted for independence from the North. Both the North and the South will start to work on a new constitution and systems of government that will be instrumental in the success of the two new states as well as integral in avoiding a collapse back into the thirty-nine years of civil war that existed for the last half century.

The successful transition of Southern Sudan into a viable state is important; first to the people in South Sudan who have fought for almost 40 years for their autonomy; second in order to strengthen and stabilize the region of Africa known as the Horn of Africa; and internationally to demonstrate that the world community, specifically the United States still has the diplomatic muscle to aid in the peaceful solutions to complex issues around the world.

Southern Sudan has an uphill struggle. With a vote for independence comes the task of writing a new constitution, providing stability and security for a war-torn and under-educated population, and economically developing a country that is one of poorest and least developed in

the world. The director of the African Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Jennifer Cooke, has stated that, “You are really talking about transforming what has been for many years a rebel movement into the government.”<sup>1</sup> While this is a fair statement and represents the possible road ahead, it does not take into account the six year head start that the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has had during the execution of the CPA. There are many concerns over the ability of South Sudan to succeed as a free and independent state. In the end, the Government of South Sudan will succeed in building a new country if it has focused assistance from major powers in the region and the international community.

### **Sudan: Geography and Demographics**

Until 2010, Sudan was the largest country in Africa and was the largest country in the Arab world. It had a total land mass of more than 960,000 square miles, which is just over one-quarter of the size of the United States.<sup>2</sup> It was considered to be a part of the Horn of Africa region and shared a border with nine countries (Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea). A vast majority of this land area was rural and underdeveloped and infrastructure in the country was relatively non-existent especially in the south. The Nile River runs from south to north and provides the country with the vast majority of its fresh water. The northern portion of the country contains the majority of urban areas and also contains the only access to maritime trade at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

Prior to the split, Sudan had a population of approximately 44 million people of which about 8 million live in the south.<sup>3,4</sup> The population is also divided along its ethnic and religious lines between the North and the South. (See Appendix D and E.) The population of the North

was largely Arab and Nubian in descent and follows the teachings of Islam, while the population in South Sudan was mainly Christian and Animist.<sup>5</sup> Within these two divisions of population the country was split into hundreds of ethnic and tribal groups that speak over 130 different languages and dialects.<sup>6</sup> (See Appendix F.) The perception is that the ethnic and religious differences that are prevalent in the area were the root cause of the conflict that has plagued the country over the last fifty years and are the catalyst for the separation.

### **Sudan: History and Context**

It is necessary to provide a brief history of Sudan, in order to better understand the differences between the North and the South that led to the current division. In 1899, Egypt and Great Britain established an Anglo-Egyptian rule over Sudan after 15 years of tyrannical Mahdiah rule in the region. Between 1899 and 1956, Sudan was run by an Egyptian appointed governor general and was effectively administered as a British Colony. The governors of Sudan ran the country as two separate territories that were split along the religious lines, Muslims to the north and Christian and Animists to the south.<sup>7</sup> The cultural differences in the country were recognized in the population long before this period and the British and Egyptian administration of the country did not do anything to change the already prevalent differences between the North and the South. It actually did the opposite, and created a culture where the separation and differences between the Arab population in the North and the Christian-Animist population in the South remained intact and segregated to a large extent.

During the next half century, the relationship between the Egyptians who had originally ruled Sudan and the British who were administering the government and the economics of the country became contentious. In 1954, the Egyptians and the British signed a treaty that guaranteed Sudanese Independence for Northern and Southern Sudan as one independent

country. Following the country's independence, on 1 January 1956, it elected its first Prime Minister, a northerner Ismail Al-Azhari.

Although the elections were in January of 1956, The First Civil War between the North and the South began four months prior. This Civil War that started in 1955 marked the beginning of conflict that ravaged the population for thirty-nine years. It defined the direction of the country and prevented the larger Sudan from moving into a stable and prosperous future.

The First Civil War between the northern and southern Sudanese was fought because of the Arab majority's treatment of the minority population in the south. Southerners were treated as second class citizens.<sup>8</sup> The Southern minority were concerned that the Muslim majority in the North would not provide them fair representation. The South administered its affairs separately from the North, when the English and the Egyptians were in control, and wanted to maintain the autonomy prior to the planned independence. Southerners did not believe that this autonomy would be an achievable reality under the planned system of government. The political and religious divide between the two regions of the country did not help to quell the violence or tensions.<sup>9,10</sup>

During the civil war the government of Sudan in the north underwent two separate military coups that resulted in regime changes. Turmoil, chaos and conflict became a way of life in both the North and the South. The First Civil War lasted from 1955 to 1972 and ended with the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 which would keep the peace for the next ten years. In the agreement the North and the South were united under one flag, but the South had essentially won the right to operate autonomously and the North and South were run separately. This Southern Sudan Autonomous Region was governed independently within the country of Sudan by its own president and legislature.

In 1982, the government of Sudan, specifically the President Gaafar Nimeiry in the north, enacted laws and policies that restricted the autonomy of the South. Southerners were being treated as second class citizens and they did not see themselves as an integral part of the country.<sup>11</sup> The Second Civil War began when Southern troops began attacks against the north in 1983. The situation was intensified following the attacks when the President enacted a revision of the country's constitution that imposed Shari'a Law throughout Sudan.<sup>12</sup> In 1989, the government of Sudan was subject to another military coup that paved the way for the current leadership of Sudan under President Omar al-Bashir. Aside from a ceasefire negotiated by then former President Jimmy Carter to get Humanitarian Aid into Southern Sudan in 1995, the fighting continued until 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

President al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) held the top leadership positions in, Khartoum, Sudan since the coup in 1983. The government was aligned with the National Islamist Front and began to introduce Islamic and Sharia law throughout northern Sudan. Al-Bashir began to strengthen the government's hold on the population by imprisoning opposition military and political leaders and placing government control over the media in the northern portion of the country.

Throughout the Second Civil War (1983-2005) many tribes and groups in the south put aside their differences in order unite against what was considered the common enemy, the Government of National Unity or the Government of Sudan (GOS) in the north. In southern Sudan, at the onset of the Second Civil War, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and later the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the political arm of the organization, became the leading group.<sup>13</sup> The SPLA was able to unite a majority of the militias in the south under one organization and it became the dominant force in the region.

## **Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement**

At the beginning of the Second Civil War in Sudan, a rebel group called the SPLA formed in order to fight the army of Sudan. This group was made up of former Sudanese army soldiers and many different ethnic groups and political factions from the southern portion of the country. The SPLA welcomed militias and armed groups that fought against the north.<sup>14</sup> Even with the increase in numbers, the SPLA was at a disadvantage throughout the war. The army of Sudan was much better equipped and possessed aircraft, heavy equipment and heavy arms. The SPLA accordingly fought the war in a more non-conventional fashion due to its equipment disadvantage and its inability to utilize the state to support the war effort.

Leading up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the SPLA began to form a political organization, called the SPLM, in order to meet the north in the diplomatic arena. The SPLA/M was led by Colonel John Garang until his death in July of 2005, when Salva Kiir Mayardit took charge of the organization. The SPLA/M is now a formal political party and as part of the 2005 CPA was represented in the legislature and the executive in the Government of Sudan (GOS), which rules the North. The SPLA/M and other opposition groups in the south control 23 percent of the seats in the legislature of the Government of Sudan<sup>15</sup> and Salva Kiir Mayardit has been the First Vice President of the GOS following the elections that were held in 2010. The SPLA/M also is the largest party in the governing body of the autonomous South. The 2005 CPA allowed the SPLA/M also to hold the Presidency, Vice-Presidency and 70% of the seats in the autonomous Government of South Sudan (GOSS). The 2005 agreements brought an end to the ongoing Civil War in Sudan.

## **The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement**

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement was the collection of agreements signed by the GOS and the SPLA/M over a three year period starting in July of 2002 and finalized on January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The most important provisions of the CPA were: (1) the ending of the Second Civil War in Sudan, (2) development of democratic governance country wide, (3) sharing of oil revenues between the north and the south, (4) establishment of an autonomous southern government and (5) the 2011 referendum for unity or independence.<sup>16</sup>

The CPA took major steps towards the creation of a democratic system of government in the Republic of Sudan. The “Machakos Protocol” was the first part of the agreement (Chapter 1) that was signed by the GOS and the SPLA/M. In this agreement, the two parties agreed on broad concepts of governance for the Republic of Sudan. This section of the agreement established the GOS as the ruling body of Sudan and the GOSS as the ruling body of the autonomous South Sudan. Included in the agreement was the design for the GOS into a three branch system of government.

The first branch is the Executive and is headed by the President, Omar al-Bashir. It also assigned positions for two Vice-Presidents, one of which had to be a member of the SPLA/M. Salva Kiir Mayardit holds that position until July 2011 when the two countries will split. A Judiciary was set up and the National Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court for Criminal and Civil matters were established as the highest courts. The legislature was divided into two separate houses, the Council of States (similar to the U. S. Senate) and the National Assembly (similar to the U. S. House of Representatives). The National Assembly was then divided up so that there was a relatively equal power distribution throughout the body according to the population of the country. The National Congress Party (al-Bashir’s party) received 52% of the

majority of the oil in Sudan, while the North controls the pipeline, refinery and port facilities that can get the product to the market. (See Appendix G.)

The other significant part of the wealth sharing agreement is the establishment of a National Land Commission and a Southern Sudan Land Commission. These two bodies were established to arbitrate disputed land claims in their respective portions of the country.<sup>22</sup> Each body is charged to arbitrate border differences between the North and the South. If no solution is reached then the dispute is sent to the Constitutional Court for resolution.

The final and most important piece of the CPA is the referendum for independence that was held on January 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011. This referendum allowed the people of the ten southern states the opportunity to vote and remain part of the Republic of Sudan or secede and establish their own country.<sup>23,24</sup> Prior to the referendum there were many milestones that needed to be completed. Many of the milestones were met in the final months and days leading up to the referendum including the voter registration and preparations for the vote, but some remained incomplete. One milestone that remains a major concern is that the Land Commissions still has not agreed upon the disputed borders between the North and the South. Despite some of the milestones not being met the referendum was held and the population in the South voted to secede from the Republic of Sudan.

At the same time, there was a second referendum that was to be held in the Abyei district a portion of the country that lies along the disputed border. The referendum was delayed due to the dispute over who would be allowed to vote in the area.<sup>25</sup> The registration was not completed and the timeline for that referendum had to be adjusted. The issue arose because the permanent land owners in the region were aligned with the GOSS, but the nomadic tribes from the North that have used the lands to graze for generations have claimed the area as their home land and

seats while the SPLA/M holds 28% of the seats. Opposition parties in the North (14%) and South (6%) round out the remaining seats.<sup>17</sup> The distribution is designed so that the CPA could be implemented, but also so that no major changes to the Constitution or Amendments could pass due to the fact that it would take a vote of 75% of each house.<sup>18</sup> The seats on the Cabinet are distributed with a power sharing model in mind.

The CPA grants the South the legal right to create its own governmental system. This system, like the one established for the Republic of Sudan, is a three branch system consisting of an executive, legislature and a judiciary. The Legislature is unicameral. The Executive consists of a President, a Vice-President, and various ministries. The Judicial system is set up in a hierarchical manner beginning with local and state courts, then a Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Southern Sudan.

Accommodations for power sharing between opposition parties in the GOSS were established at the same time as the CPA. Seventy percent of the seats in the legislature and on the executive cabinet are given to the SPLA/M. The last thirty percent are divided evenly between the NCP and other opposition groups in Southern Sudan.<sup>19</sup>

The next major chapter of the CPA was the Wealth Sharing Agreement that was signed on 7 January 2004. Its two main functions are to balance the distribution of oil revenues and non-oil revenues between the North and the South and to mediate the arbitration of land disputes. The oil and non-oil revenues generated from Southern Sudan are split up evenly by the two parties.<sup>20</sup> The oil producing states receive 2% of the oil revenues produced from the sale of oil to put back into the state as an investment prior to being split between North and South.<sup>21</sup> This revenue agreement is beneficial to the North and the South, because the South possesses the

want to be included in the voting process. Prior to July 2009, the matter was more complicated due to the rich oil reserves that were present in the region.<sup>26</sup> A ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not include any of the major oil fields when they set Abyei's boundaries.<sup>27</sup> The ethnic and cultural tensions make Abyei a very volatile area because it is on the border of the two new countries. If fighting starts it will likely begin in the Abyei region.

### **The Politics of the Split**

The North and the South have been at war for the better part of 50 years. Throughout the 20th century the North and South were often seen and treated as two separate and autonomous entities. For example, while under English and Egyptian rule, the two parts of the country were administered separately.<sup>28</sup> The second half of the century was spent with the South fighting for either independence or an equal stake and share in the government of Sudan. In 2005, the signing of the CPA gave the South autonomy and the prospect for independence.

Northern and Southern Sudan are still very much tied together even after the referendum. There are many southerners displaced and living in the North and the opposite is also true because of the many years of war. The two countries share a common border and will need to be sure that there is an agreement on the security of that boarder and a way to patrol the border that will not lead to the beginning of another conflict. Many nomadic tribes in the country cross the border between North and South to enter into traditional grazing areas.<sup>29</sup> There are many portions of the border that are still under dispute and a resolution needs to be completed in those areas.

Finally, the economic wellbeing of both the GOS in the north and the GOSS in the south are intertwined in the oil that is produced.<sup>30</sup> The South contains the majority of the reserves while the North maintains the means and the ability to get the oil to the market.<sup>31</sup> The question

of whether Southerners want to have an independent country has been answered. The next question is what southerners are willing to compromise in order to be an independent country at peace.

Without help from the international community, the South would be defeated by the North in a conventional conflict.<sup>32</sup> The CPA is set to expire on July 9<sup>th</sup>, 2011 and along with it the wealth sharing deal that has been in place. In order to continue the peace that was shared prior to Southern Independence, the North and the South must look towards a long term agreement.<sup>33</sup> The current CPA's Wealth and Power Sharing agreements have been successful over the last six years; therefore it could be used as the frame work for a new agreement.<sup>34</sup>

### **Stake Holders**

Since 2005, there have been many players that have had something to gain one way or another from the referendum and the possible succession of the Southern portion of Sudan. There was large international interest, especially by the United States, United Kingdom and Norway, in the CPA and the implementation of the agreement. These countries were instrumental in the building of the peace agreement and have remained involved in the process of implementing it.

Individually, African countries look at the results of the referendum with a great deal of interest. Sudan has accrued considerable debt during the years of war and many countries, specifically some Middle Eastern countries,<sup>35</sup> need to know how the debt will be distributed between the North and the South. There are many foreign investors that have or are ready to invest in the North and the South but only after the situation in the two separate countries stabilizes and a return to war is minimized.<sup>36</sup>

The United States has a good deal of political capital invested in the CPA and the eventual long term outcome of the North-South split.<sup>37</sup> In 2004 and 2005 when the CPA agreements were being negotiated, the United States took the lead in keeping the parties at the negotiations table and forging an agreement.<sup>38,39</sup> The successful completion of the referendum for independence was only the first step in the implementation process. The remaining steps, keeping the peace and assisting in the development of an independent democratic country, will not be easy tasks. The United States does not have any vital interests in this region of Africa, except to stop it from becoming a staging ground for international terrorists.<sup>40</sup> Although the U.S. is very involved and active in fighting and assisting host nations in fighting terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa, there does not seem to be any compelling reasons for the US to deploy to the area if hostilities were to begin again. It will also be difficult for the United States to get involved in yet another conflict in the world considering that it is still involved in Afghanistan and Iraq.

China has its own interests in Sudan and Africa. China reported that the two way trade between Africa and China increased to a record \$114.8 billion in 2010.<sup>41</sup> Specifically, China's relationship with Sudan has been warm and the political and military relations have also expanded since the early 1990s. China's main investments in Africa have largely targeted oil, gas and mining which are prevalent in Sudan.<sup>42</sup> China has also invested billions in the Sudanese infrastructure, including a \$1.2 billion agreement to upgrade the railway between Khartoum and the Port Sudan, and it exports 64 percent of Sudan's oil.<sup>43</sup> In return for the favorable economic conditions that are provided by Sudan it receives a large amount of its weapons from China.<sup>44</sup> Politically, for obvious reasons, China has not made any comments or commitments that would

indicate that they support the secession. China's interests begin and end with the amount of resources that they can export from Sudan and the rest of the African continent.

The African Union (AU) is another entity that has a very large stake in the regional situation. The AU's views on the southern independence are complicated and tend to be aligned by the individual member states. The AU's membership consists of 53 of the 54 African countries on the continent. Many of the countries have different views on Southern independence. The AU as a whole does not want to see a return to the violence that has plagued the country of Sudan for the last half century. It does understand, however, that the vote for independence and the subsequent succession of the South create second order effects for other portions of the continent which have similar political instability.<sup>45</sup> The AU has stated that it is optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful and amicable conclusion to the process and it will be a major player and influence on the ongoing development, security and acceptance of the split between the two countries.<sup>46</sup>

The international community is taking its lead from the AU. In turn the AU is the leading organization when it comes to future decisions and outcomes, the dynamics of stability in the region, and its continuing response towards independence for the South. The organization's inputs into a new agreement and security will continue to affect its credibility internationally or more importantly on the continent.<sup>47</sup> The AU does not want the referendum to begin to set the precedence for other secessionist movements in Africa, but it also needs to honor the results and keep the peace.

Egypt is another country that is watching the newly independent South. Egypt has an Arab and Muslim population that maintains historical treaties and agreements with Sudan. A failed referendum and a peaceful and unified Sudan would have been the best case scenario for

Egypt and they politically pushed for unification very late into the CPA implementation until it became evident that unity was out of reach. Egypt maintains a great deal of influence over the North on most regional issues but also sees the south as a moderating force in Sudan.<sup>48</sup> Any instability in the North or South puts their agreements in jeopardy. One of these treaties is the Four Freedoms Treaty signed in 2004 that ensures freedom of movement, residence, work, and property ownership between the two countries.<sup>49</sup> Cairo views a separated north and south as a possible threat to stability in the region, but also does not want to see an Islamic fundamentalist government in Sudan.<sup>50</sup>

The protests and subsequent resignation of President Mubarak in February of 2011 could also have a significant effect on Egypt's relationship with the North and the South. One concern, however, that could drive Egypt to get more involved would be any threat to the treaties that guarantee the free flow of the Nile River north to the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>51</sup> Egypt receives 95 percent of its water for agriculture from the Nile and has consistently expressed its intent to go to war if the waters of the Nile were restricted from flowing north.<sup>52</sup> The best case for Egypt is that the South maintains all of the Nile River agreements that were signed with Sudan and that the status quo is upheld. GOSS officials have indicated that an independent GOSS would review the existing water usage with Khartoum and for the meantime operate within Sudan's current allocation of 25 percent thus not affecting the current agreements.<sup>53</sup>

Nigeria is one of the nations within the AU watching the CPA process in Sudan with apprehension. The successful secession of the South from Sudan following the referendum is not an encouraging sign or precedent for Nigeria. Nigeria is one of the world's fastest growing economies and is the eighth largest by population.<sup>54</sup> It has recently (1999) returned to a democratic system of government, but compromised and unfair elections along with corruption

have continued to plague the country over the last decade. The population is religiously split in half between Muslim and Christians.<sup>55</sup> The majority of Muslims live in the northern states while the southern states are primarily populated by Christians.<sup>56</sup> The central belt of the country is populated evenly by people of both belief systems. Nigeria is also the largest supplier of oil in Africa and a majority of the oil reserves are in the southern portion of the country. These similarities with Sudan and the current outcome in Sudan could have future implications for Nigeria should the political system begin to deteriorate further.

Ethiopia will remain as neutral as possible to the two countries. It has diplomatic and economic ties with both states and does not want to do anything that would be detrimental to the relationship with either.<sup>57</sup> Ethiopia in the past has been a large supporter of the SPLA and supported the idea of self-determination during the writing and negotiations of the CPA.<sup>58</sup> The South and Ethiopia have also begun to make agreements on trade, economic development, telecommunications, housing, electricity, transportation and security. The state owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia has also begun to do business in the southern capital city of Juba.<sup>59</sup> Since 2009, Khartoum has sought to neutralize Ethiopia's support for the South by linking road networks, sweetening trade deals and providing access to the Port of Sudan.<sup>60</sup>

For Ethiopia there are two major issues. First a return to hostilities or war in Sudan would create a great deal of instability in the region and Ethiopia is dealing with Somalia and Eritrea and has a volatile domestic agenda.<sup>61</sup> A flood of refugees from Sudan is not something that Ethiopia could handle. The second issue is the concern that they have over the increasing Islamic influence in the region. Ethiopia does not want to see a new hard line Islamic government in Khartoum and is against Islamic expansion in the region. This was demonstrated by the invasion and occupation of Somalia, in 2007, to support the Transitional Federal

Government and oust the Islamic Courts Union.<sup>62</sup> If Ethiopia was forced to make a choice they would end up on the side of Southern Sudan.

Eritrea, which received its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, is another country in the region that is paying attention to its western border. Khartoum initially supported the Eritreans in their bid for independence from Ethiopia.<sup>63</sup> That support began to wane as the government of Sudan took on a more Islamic face. Eritrea has serious concerns about the government of Khartoum but does not have enough political capital to do anything more than look out for their own interests.<sup>64</sup> Eritrea's relations with Ethiopia are strained at best and Eritrea has had no other choice than to side with anyone that will assist and aid them in the development of their new country.<sup>65</sup> Political similarities between itself and South Sudan make Eritrea sympathetic to its situation. Eritrea's own hard fought struggle for independence is not that far in the past and Eritrean private business has expanded noticeably since 2005 and the country would like to continue to expand its relationship with Southern Sudan in order to assist its own growth and gain regional allies.<sup>66</sup>

Kenya has significant political capital invested in the implementation of the CPA and has managed to be pro-South without being anti-North.<sup>67</sup> They were one of the major players that brought the two sides together and kept them together to get the agreement completed. In Khartoum, Kenya's participation was viewed as partial to the SPLA/M.<sup>68</sup> This Southern leaning attitudes of Kenya has created a relationship with Khartoum that is strained at times, but they continue to maintain a predominantly export trade relationship with both the North and the South and provide a good deal of food to the north.<sup>69</sup>

Kenya's real motivations for supporting the South are the shared ethnic communities that coexist along the northern border of Kenya and the economic prospects that are present in

Southern Sudan. Kenya along with providing support for the SPLA and refugees, during the civil war, is continuing to train and equip the SPLA.<sup>70</sup> The Kenyan government also maintains many liaison offices and organizations in Juba that are designed to enhance the links between Kenyan businesses and the GOSS.<sup>71</sup> Kenya has discussed major projects, including an oil pipeline from South Sudan to the Ethiopian Coast or Luma in Kenya. This would enhance infrastructure in East Africa, specifically South Sudan.<sup>72</sup> In Kenya, the motivation for support of the South is the untapped potential for development and financial gain, an opportunity that would be less likely had a vote for unity occurred.

In Uganda the support for the South is strong and the Ugandan government has publicly stated that they will support the side of the people when it comes to independence in Sudan.<sup>73</sup> This support was given to the SPLA because of the social, cultural and ethnic ties that the two areas have along their shared border. Currently trade between the two is thriving and South Sudan is the number one importer of Ugandan goods. To continue increasing economic opportunities, South Sudan has offered Uganda land in the capital city of Juba, to build a \$2 million dollar marketplace.<sup>74</sup> Politically, the bond between the two nations became stronger when Khartoum started to support the Lord's Resistance Army an insurgent group in Uganda that has been fighting the Government for many years. Uganda is a strong supporter of the South's opportunity for self-determination and the prospect of an independent South.<sup>75</sup> Uganda stands to gain politically and financially from a stable and independent South.

In summary, the populations of the Arab majority North and the Christian-Animist minority South are irreconcilably split along their religious and ethnic lines. The two regions of the country have essentially governed themselves for the last century, either while at peace or war with each other. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed in 2005 between the

two countries with the help of the United States, the European Union and the countries of the region has maintained the peace and set the conditions for the future. The North and the South have governed their regions of the country for the last six years autonomously and following the succession vote by the South in January of 2011 they will move forward into the future continuing to do so, but now as two independent states. The African Union, the countries of the region and the international community have invested heavily in the continuation of peace and stability in the country and the region.

### **Scenarios Going Forward**

There are generally three future scenarios possible going forward now that the referendum for independence has passed and the South has voted to be an independent state. The first and least welcome of the three scenarios is that the tensions in the upcoming months between the North and South begin to escalate and there is a renewal of the long and costly civil war that plagued the country for fifty years. The second scenario is that there is peace between the North and the South but, various opposition groups and political entities in the south are unable to work together in an amicable way and some level of internal violence erupts within the newly formed southern state. The last and most welcomed scenario is that all of the political groups and entities in the North and South will be able to peacefully work and develop a new agreement that meets the needs of both countries, and Southern opposition groups and the SPLA/M are able to amicably work on a plan to create a new state.

### **A Return to War with the North**

The first scenario, a return to tensions and conflict with the North, would be the worst case scenario not only for the newly formed southern state, but also for the region. There are many border and economic issues that have to be negotiated. A misstep by any of the parties in

negotiations or the unintended consequences of military units operating along the disputed borders of the two newly formed countries has the potential of becoming the spark that could ignite large scale violence.

A return to war has the potential to bring international parties into the conflict on both sides this time around. It is also more than likely that the war will be fought by proxy and the North and the South will engage using militia groups in an intense asymmetrical fight that will destroy the border area of the country.<sup>76</sup> This war will have regional consequences. Over the last half century there have been hundreds of thousands of refugees that have fled into neighboring countries due to the violence and war that has plagued Sudan. This trend would continue and would increase instability in the region and in the Horn of Africa.<sup>77</sup> All of the neighboring nations of Sudan and the newly formed South have a stake in keeping this scenario from occurring.

### **Internal Violence in the South**

The second scenario is that there will be limited violence internally between the SPLA/M and southern opposition groups, but the north continues to accept the referendum and continues to work with the newly formed South to build a strong political, economic, and security arrangement that will be beneficial to both sides and its neighboring countries.<sup>78</sup> This is the most likely scenario and also the most complex. The regional powers have mixed views on the process moving forward, but are willing to work with both the North and the South to forge lasting peace and stability. The international community will assist in the process and take its lead from regional leaders like the AU. In the South, however, there will be opposition and splinter groups that have put aside their differences in the past to fight the common oppressive enemy in the North.<sup>79</sup> These groups will now see an opportunity to seize and take hold of what

they believe they are owed in the South. Some of these groups will attempt to amicably be part of the process and some will resort to violence.<sup>80,81</sup> The transparency of the process of building a new independent nation and the inclusion of opposition groups in the process will be the key factor that will determine the extent of cooperation or violence in the South. It is inevitable due to the history of the country that there will be aggressive and violent outbreaks of fighting. The newly formed Southern Government must move quickly to incorporate these groups into the process or defeat them prior to wide spread violence. Diplomacy and inclusion will be the key to success.

### **Utopian Scenario**

The final and the most desired, but least likely outcome is the Utopian scenario. In this scenario the North and the South will be able to find common ground and build a strong political, economic and security agreement that will be beneficial to both sides. The GOSS will be able to fairly and equitably bring in all of the different groups that have a stake in the formation of a new and independent state. The regional effects of the splitting of Sudan would be negligible and the international community would work together to ensure the success of both states as they transition to a new beginning. As stated previously this scenario is highly unlikely and there are too many variables both at the local, regional and international level to assume that this will be the outcome moving forward.

### **The Challenge of Building a New State in the South**

The building of a new state in the South is going to be a monumental undertaking and one that will rely on the aid and assistance of the international and regional community. The CPA is set to expire on 9 July 2011. In order to ensure the security and wellbeing of the GOSS there will have to be some type of agreement forged between the two new states.<sup>82</sup> The major

concerns that will need to be addressed will be similar to those in the CPA. Border disputes must be resolved by the two parties and the resources and wealth of Sudan must be distributed between the North and the South. An agreement with regards to citizenship for displaced civilians and Southerners living in the North and vice versa will need to be established. In order to be sure that there is peace moving forward the South will have to make some concessions that will not be popular with the population or opposition group in the South.

Salva Kiir Mayardit was re-elected as the president of the Government of South Sudan following the elections that occurred in April. It will be his, and his ministries', job to ensure that the GOSS is successful in this transition period and has the capacity to govern. Internally there were many groups who have joined the SPLA/M only because of the common enemy in the North. Now that secession and independence are a reality, the old disputes that split the political groups in the south will resurface in the near term or sometime in the future. Opposition leaders and groups will expect that they are represented in the GOSS.<sup>83</sup> President Salva Kiir Mayardit is responsible for bringing these leaders into the fold to avoid conflict that would severely hinder the success of the South.<sup>84</sup> The first indications of how the South is moving towards a stable and independent future will begin when the GOSS start the process of writing the new constitution in 2011.<sup>85</sup>

### **Diplomacy and Politics**

The relationships between the North and the South must be maintained. The GOS and the GOSS, even in independence, are tied to each other socially, economically, and financially. A new CPA or another type of agreement will have to be struck between the North and the South in order to address these issues. Items that will need to be decided and agreed upon will be the distribution of oil revenues, the use of water from the Nile River with respect to the treaty

between Sudan and Egypt, the completion of the border dispute, a resolution to the outstanding issue in Abyei, the splitting of the Sudanese national debt and the security concerns along the border with the North.<sup>86,87</sup> The South and President Salva Kiir Mayardit, in order to avoid a fall back into conflict, will not be able to take a hard line stance on these issues. The GOSS and the North must enter negotiations and broker a deal that will be beneficial to both the North and the South in both long and short terms. This means conceding some of the issues and points that opposition leaders and groups have as foundations. A deft and agile diplomatic approach will be necessary in order to navigate this political minefield and expectations that be a third party will be necessary to ensure that the deal is lasting and equitable are high.

Internationally the South is in a slightly advantageous position. The international community, the African Union, and the border countries around the North and the South do not want a return to all-out war. The international community, especially the United States, the European Union, and Canada have spent a great deal of political capital to ensure that the CPA was executed and that the referendum for independence was held. The President of the United States, President Obama, has made public statements with regard to the success of the CPA including remarks at the United Nations in 2010<sup>88</sup> and even addressed the issue in the National Security Strategy stating, "...the United States remains committed to working with the international community to support implementation of outstanding elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ensure that the referendum on the future of Southern Sudan in 2011 happens on time and that its results are respected."<sup>89</sup> This international effort to insure peace between the North and South will allow President Salva Kiir Mayardit to leverage the international community to assist in giving concessions to the North. Issues such a debt

relief, financial aid and taking Sudan off of the International Terrorist Sponsor List will assist the South in the negotiations process as well as keep the peace and maintain the balance of power.<sup>90</sup>

### **Local and Regional Security**

Another step towards stability in the South is securing the country and its population. There are many nomadic tribes that have moved between the borders of the North and the South in order to use traditional grazing lands. These tribes are deeply concerned that a new two state environment would limit their access to these areas and ability or potential for survival.<sup>91</sup> This has caused much of the border tension and conflict in the past. The adoption of a “Soft Border,” one that will allow the freedom of movement of people and goods, would go a long way to ease the tensions of the nomadic tribes of the North and the permanent farmers in the South. That policy must also address a water and land sharing deal, since this is the main issue of concern between the two groups. This is a critical step in the continuing push for peace. There will be violence along the border and it will take a good deal of restraint on both sides of the border to be sure that it does not escalate into full scale war.

Southern Sudan currently has a military of approximately 165,000 militia members from all over the south. All are loyal to the south, but their loyalties to the SPLA/M will be tested over the next few years. Comments from Ambassador Vikki Huddleston, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, state that the SPLA is currently too large and will need to downsize following the referendum and independence. Accomplishing this task will require broader economic development in the South in order to provide ex-soldiers with non-military employment opportunities.<sup>92</sup>

The next step after downsizing the force will be the professionalization of the force. The SPLA is made of many different militia groups and they are limited in their capabilities because

they are really just a guerilla force.<sup>93</sup> The GOSS has spent a large amount of southern revenues to modernize the force while they have failed to curtail the escalating tribal violence in the rural areas.<sup>94,95</sup> Creating a viable military establishment will take years and in the short term assistance from other nations will be necessary.<sup>96</sup>

Securing the borders in the South is not the only piece of the system of security that is broken. Within the country itself a police service is extremely limited. It is composed mainly of former SPLA soldiers that do not have a back ground in professional policing and in most cases are illiterate and uneducated.<sup>97</sup> Since a majority of the equipment that is necessary to fight the War and secure the border is pushed out to the SPLA from the government much of the police force works without basic equipment such as cars, handcuffs, radios, and uniforms.<sup>98</sup> In many cases, the civilian population that they are trying to police, is heavier armed than the police themselves.<sup>99</sup> In order to help correct this problem, South Africa and Norway signed an agreement in 2009 to provide training for Sudan's police force focusing on the South.<sup>100</sup>

Civil education will be important for the new government in the south, they need to reinforce to its citizens that they are finally free, that the GOSS is working to provide security for its population, that the GOSS is working to educate the population and will work to develop and improve the infrastructure of the south in the future. The hardest part of this process is expressing to the population that this is going to take time and that patience is necessary. Skeptics of the South believe that the GOSS is woefully unprepared for the prospects of independence, and there is little evidence to suggest that they will not need a lot of outside help to get the country up and running.<sup>101</sup> The humanitarian situation is one of the worst in the world due to the lack of infrastructure and ordinary southerners believe that meaningful postwar development has been absent.<sup>102</sup>

Talk and promises about civil reform and infrastructure improvements is one thing, but showing actual results will be difficult at best. The economy and the development of the South must be addressed and it is not a job that the GOSS can do on their own.<sup>103</sup> Currently the South does not have a diversified economy and is solely dependent on revenues from the oil that they are sending to the North. Maintaining this stream of revenue is extremely important. The North also has a vested interest in keeping the oil revenues coming because the economy would be incapable of sustaining itself due to the amount of revenues that are generated from the resource.<sup>104</sup> Already there have been assurances from each side that the oil will continue to flow and that the mechanisms for protection of the oil fields and workers are moving forward.<sup>105</sup> It is foreseeable that each side will reach a middle ground on the issue of oil and its revenues and a long term or possibly permanent agreement would be made, because an inability to do so will push the two sides into either a conventional or unconventional conflict.<sup>106</sup>

### **Economics and Development**

Economic development of the Southern economy and infrastructure will be another part of a long solution to the stability and viability of South Sudan. Development is the piece of the puzzle that will allow for the population to buy into the newly formed government, but currently there has not been a lot of progress made since the CPA was signed in 2005. Corruption, lack of infrastructure and focus of effort have been the main contributors to the lack of post-war development throughout the South.<sup>107,108</sup> Some southerners argue that development has taken place, but that is really only the case in and around Juba and other smaller urban centers where the need is much less than in the rural areas.<sup>109</sup>

Growing and diversifying the economy while paying off its portion of the debt should be a large concern for the GOSS in the near future. Currently there are hundreds of thousands of

refugees that are spread out all over the nine neighboring countries and there will be a flood of them eager to return.<sup>110</sup> This possible wave of refugees will put an even further strain on the production of food and goods, the underdeveloped educational system, and poor infrastructure. Also, the South's only viable revenue making export is oil and recent reports have stated that the oil production in Sudan has peaked and that within the next five years the revenues seen from oil will start to decrease unless more infrastructure can be built.<sup>111</sup> While the oil industry will be very lucrative and profitable in the short term, maintaining it as a single point of failure in the economic system is bad business. The final portion of the equation that will be important for the South will be the assumption of a portion of Sudan's debt. This is a process that will take courts and arbitrators years to split the debt and give relief to both the North and the South.<sup>112</sup> Despite its claim that a majority of the debt was used to execute the war against them, the South will need to take on its and maybe more of its share to keep the peace. Economically the answer is that the South will need a great deal of help in order to be successful and start moving towards true independence.

### **Darfur**

Addressing the future prospects of South Sudan without mentioning the violence and the hostilities in the Darfur region of Sudan would be negligent. The region, following the separation of the two new states, will lie within the borders of the North. The major concerns for the South are that some of the violence spills over the border and that there are refugees from the region that make their way to the newly independent South. As mentioned previously, the southern armed forces will not have the ability to patrol the border with the North and that includes the border with the Darfur region. For the South, continued tensions between the Government of Sudan and the rebels in the Darfur region could actually move the attention of the

North off of the tensions between the North and the South. The GOSS will need to focus as much as possible on internal issues and keeping its distance from controversial issues such as Darfur. Inevitably they will be forced to get involved in one way or another so a diplomatic approach will be required to keep the military out of the conflict.

### **Conclusion**

The acceptance of Southern Independence by the Government of Sudan, the AU, and the international community is not where the road ends; it is the beginning of a long and complicated journey towards stability and peace. The conditions have been reasonably set, but the South has minimal capacity for nation building within its own borders and will rely on its economic ties to the North as well as significant help from the international community to become a truly independent nation. Other countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, will be able to reduce the tensions between the North and the South through the use of economic aid and the loosening of sanctions and restrictions currently in place. Regional support for the newly created country will continue because it is in their interests to avoid a return to war. Countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, will have a significant role in developing infrastructure and building the economic capacity of South Sudan. In the end, the fate of the country will solely lie in the hands of the leaders at all levels in the South, a prospect that seems daunting, but after a fifty year struggle for independence for Southerners anything would seem possible.

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## **Appendix A - Timeline of Significant Event in Sudan**

### **Turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

1899-1955 - Sudan is under joint British-Egyptian rule.

### **Independence and the First Civil War**

1956 - Sudan becomes independent.

1958 - General Abboud leads military coup against the civilian government elected earlier in the year

1962 - Civil war begins in the south, led by the Anya Nya movement.

1964 - The "October Revolution" overthrows Abbud and an Islamist-led government is established

1969 - Jaafar Numeiri leads the "May Revolution" military coup.

1971 - Sudanese Communist Party leaders executed after short-lived coup against Numeiry.

### **A Short Peace**

1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the government and the Anya Nya, the south becomes a self-governing region.

1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in southern Sudan.

### **Second Civil War**

1983 - Civil war breaks out again in the south involving government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang.

### **Islamic law imposed**

1983 - President Numeiri declares the introduction of Sharia Islamic law.

1985 - After widespread popular unrest Numayri is deposed by a group of officers and a Transitional Military Council is set up to rule the country.

1986 - Coalition government formed after general elections, with Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister.

1988 - Coalition partner the Democratic Unionist Party drafts cease-fire agreement with the SPLM, but it is not implemented.

1989 - National Salvation Revolution takes over in military coup.

1993 - Revolution Command Council dissolved after Omar Bashir is appointed president.

### **US strike**

1995 - Egyptian President Mubarak accuses Sudan of being involved in attempt to assassinate him in Addis Ababa.

**1998** - US launches missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, alleging that it was making materials for chemical weapons.

**1998** - New constitution endorsed by over 96% of voters in referendum.

**1999** - President Bashir dissolves the National Assembly and declares a state of emergency following a power struggle with parliamentary speaker, Hassan al-Turabi.

### **Advent of oil**

**1999** - Sudan begins to export oil.

**2000** President Bashir meets leaders of opposition National Democratic Alliance for first time in Eritrea.

Main opposition parties boycott presidential elections. Incumbent Bashir is re-elected for further five years.

**2001** Islamist leader Al-Turabi's party, the Popular National Congress, signs memorandum of understanding with the southern rebel SPLM's armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Al-Turabi is arrested the next day, with more arrests of PNC members in the following months.

Government accepts Libyan/Egyptian initiative to end the civil war after failure of peace talks between President Bashir and SPLM leader John Garang in Nairobi.

US extends unilateral sanctions against Sudan for another year, citing its record on terrorism and rights violations.

### **Peace deal**

**2002** - Government and SPLA sign landmark ceasefire agreement providing for six-month renewable ceasefire in central Nuba Mountains - a key rebel stronghold.

Talks in Kenya lead to a breakthrough agreement between the government and southern rebels on ending the 19-year civil war. The Machakos Protocol provides for the south to seek self-determination after six years.

**2003** February - Rebels in western region of Darfur rise up against government, claiming the region is being neglected by Khartoum.

**2003** October - PNC leader Turabi released after nearly three years in detention and ban on his party is lifted.

### **Uprising in west**

**2004** January - Army moves to quell rebel uprising in western region of Darfur; hundreds of thousands of refugees flee to neighbouring Chad.

**2004** March - UN official says pro-government Arab Janjaweed militias are carrying out systematic killings of non-Arab villagers in Darfur.

Army officers and opposition politicians, including Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, are detained over an alleged coup plot.

**2004 May** - Government and southern rebels agree on power-sharing protocols as part of a peace deal to end their long-running conflict. The deal follows earlier breakthroughs on the division of oil and non-oil wealth.

**2004 September** - UN says Sudan has not met targets for disarming pro-government Darfur militias and must accept outside help to protect civilians. US Secretary of State Colin Powell describes Darfur killings as genocide.

### **The Comprehensive Peace Agreement**

**2005 January** - Government and southern rebels sign a peace deal. The agreement includes a permanent ceasefire and accords on wealth and power sharing.

UN report accuses the government and militias of systematic abuses in Darfur, but stops short of calling the violence genocide.

**2005 March** - UN Security Council authorises sanctions against those who violate ceasefire in Darfur. Council also votes to refer those accused of war crimes in Darfur to International Criminal Court.

**2005 June** - Government and exiled opposition grouping - National Democratic Alliance (NDA) - sign reconciliation deal allowing NDA into power-sharing administration.

President Bashir frees Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi, detained since March 2004 over alleged coup plot.

### **Southern Autonomy**

**2005 9 July** - Former southern rebel leader John Garang is sworn in as first vice president. A constitution which gives a large degree of autonomy to the south is signed.

**2005 1 August** - Vice president and former rebel leader John Garang is killed in a plane crash. He is succeeded by Salva Kiir. Garang's death sparks deadly clashes in the capital between southern Sudanese and northern Arabs.

**2005 September** - Power-sharing government is formed in Khartoum.

**2005 October** - Autonomous government is formed in the south, in line with January 2005 peace deal. The administration is dominated by former rebels.

### **Darfur Conflict**

**2006 May** - Khartoum government and the main rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement, sign a peace accord. Two smaller rebel groups reject the deal. Fighting continues.

**2006 August** - Sudan rejects a UN resolution calling for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, saying it would compromise sovereignty.

**2006 October** - Jan Pronk, the UN's top official in Sudan, is expelled.

**2006 November** - African Union extends mandate of its peacekeeping force in Darfur for six months.

Hundreds are thought to have died in the heaviest fighting between northern Sudanese forces and their former southern rebel foes since they signed a peace deal last year. Fighting is centred on the southern town of Malakal.

**2007 April** - Sudan says it will accept a partial UN troop deployment to reinforce African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, but not a full 20,000-strong force.

### **War Crimes International Criminal Court Charges**

**2007 May** - International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants for a minister and a Janjaweed militia leader suspected of Darfur war crimes.

US President George W Bush announces fresh sanctions against Sudan.

**2007 July** - UN Security Council approves a resolution authorising a 26,000-strong force for Darfur. Sudan says it will co-operate with the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (Unamid).

**2007 October** - SPLM temporarily suspends participation in national unity government, accusing Khartoum of failing to honour the 2005 peace deal.

**2007 December** - SPLM resumes participation in national unity government.

**2008 January** - UN takes over Darfur peace force.

Within days Sudan apologises after its troops fire on a convoy of Unamid, the UN-African Union hybrid mission.

Government planes bomb rebel positions in West Darfur, turning some areas into no-go zones for aid workers.

**2008 February** - Commander of the UN-African Union peacekeepers in Darfur, Balla Keita, says more troops needed urgently in west Darfur.

### **Border Clashes - Abyei**

**2008 March** - Russia says it's prepared to provide some of the helicopters urgently needed by UN-African Union peacekeepers.

Tensions rise over clashes between an Arab militia and SPLM in Abyei area on north-south divide - a key sticking point in 2005 peace accord.

Presidents of Sudan and Chad sign accord aimed at halting five years of hostilities between their countries.

**2008 April** - Counting begins in national census which is seen as a vital step towards holding democratic elections after the landmark 2005 north-south peace deal.

UN humanitarian chief John Holmes says 300,000 people may have died in the five-year Darfur conflict.

**2008 May** - Southern defence minister Dominic Dim Deng is killed in a plane crash in the south.

Tension increases between Sudan and Chad after Darfur rebel group mounts raid on Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city across the Nile. Sudan accuses Chad of involvement and breaks off diplomatic relations.

Intense fighting breaks out between northern and southern forces in disputed oil-rich town of Abyei.

2008 June - President Bashir and southern leader Salva Kiir agree to seek international arbitration to resolve dispute over Abyei.

### **President al-Bashir accused of War Crimes**

2008 July - The International Criminal Court's top prosecutor calls for the arrest of President Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur; the appeal is the first ever request to the ICC for the arrest of a sitting head of state. Sudan rejects the indictment.

2008 September - Darfur rebels accuse government forces backed by militias of launching air and ground attacks on two towns in the region.

2008 October - Allegations that Ukrainian tanks hijacked off the coast of Somalia were bound for southern Sudan spark fears of an arms race between the North and former rebels in the South.

2008 November - President Bashir announces an immediate ceasefire in Darfur, but the region's two main rebel groups reject the move, saying they will fight on until the government agrees to share power and wealth in the region.

2008 December - The Sudanese army says it has sent more troops to the sensitive oil-rich South Kordofan state, claiming that a Darfur rebel group plans to attack the area.

2009 January - Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi is arrested after saying President Bashir should hand himself in to The Hague to face war crimes charges for the Darfur war.

2009 March - The International Criminal Court in The Hague issues an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

2009 May - An estimated 250 people in central Sudan are killed during a week of clashes between nomadic groups fighting over grazing land and cattle in the semi-arid region of Southern Kordofan.

### **Alliance strained**

2009 June - Khartoum government denies it is supplying arms to ethnic groups in the south to destabilise the region.

The leader of South Sudan and vice-president of the country, Salva Kiir, warns his forces are being re-organised to be ready for any return to war with the north

Ex-foreign minister Lam Akol splits from South's ruling SPLM to form new party, SPLM-Democratic Change.

2009 July - North and south Sudan say they accept ruling by arbitration court in The Hague shrinking disputed Abyei region and placing the major Heglig oil field in the north.

Woman journalist tried and punished for breaching decency laws by wearing trousers. She campaigns to change the law.

**2009 August** - Darfur war is over, says UN military commander in the region, in comments condemned by activists.

**2009 October** - SPLM boycotts parliament over a Bill allowing intelligence services to retain widespread powers.

### **Independence Vote**

**2009 December** - Leaders of North and South say they have reached a deal on the terms of a referendum on independence due in South by 2011.

**2010 January** - President Omar Bashir says would accept referendum result, even if South opted for independence.

**2010 Feb-March** - The Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) main Darfur rebel movement signs a peace accord with the government, prompting President Bashir to declare the Darfur war over. But failure to agree to specifics and continuing clashes with smaller rebel groups endanger the deal.

**2010 April** - President Bashir gains new term in first contested presidential polls since 1986.

**2010 July** - International Criminal Court issues second arrest warrant for President al-Bashir - this time for charges of genocide. He travels to Chad.




**2010 October** - Timetable set for southern independence referendum, due to be held on 9 January, 2011.

**2010 November** - Voter registration begins amid doubt that referendum schedule can be met. Tension as North and South accuse each other of massing troops in border areas.


**2010 December** – Voter registration is completed.

**2011 January** - People of the South vote in a referendum in which they are given the option to split from the rest of the country.

# Appendix B – Political Boundaries of South Sudan




# Appendix C – Satellite Image of Sudan



Source: <http://southsudaninfo.net/2011/01/maps-help-understand-regional-differences-during-sudan-referendum/>


# Appendix D – Ethnic Breakdown in Sudan



Source: Dr M Izacy/www.Gulf2000.Columbia.ed.:


Source: <http://southsudaninfo.net/2011/01/maps-help-understand-regional-differences-during-sudan-referendum/>

# Appendix E – Distribution of Religious beliefs in Sudan




Source: <http://southsudaninfo.net/2011/01/maps-help-understand-regional-differences-during-sudan-referendum/>

# Appendix F – Linguistic Diversity of Sudan



Source: <http://southsudaninfo.net/2011/01/maps-help-understand-regional-differences-during-sudan-referendum/>

# Appendix G – Distribution of Oil Reserves along North South Border



Source: USAID