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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS IN LUZON: ARE WE COORDINATED?

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MAJOR HORACE JC BLY UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

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Executive Summary

Title: Theater Security Cooperation in Luzon: Are We Coordinated?

Author: Major Horace JC Bly, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Civil Military Operations (CMO) being conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and United States Department of Defense (US DoD) forces during bilateral exercises are not maximizing their effectiveness to combat the insurgency in Luzon. This is due to a lack of coordination and unity of effort amongst AFP and USG participants.

Discussion: Civic action projects and activities are an integral part of any counterinsurgency campaign, but must be coordinated and synchronized amongst all involved parties, military and government alike. Independent projects and activities that do not support the overall counterinsurgency plan waste resources, manpower, and are counterproductive to the long term defeat of the insurgent threat in Luzon. All civic action projects conducted by U.S forces in the Republic of the Philippines must support the long term country goals and objectives as established by the U.S. Country Team.

Conclusion: The selection and evaluation process currently being utilized to plan and conduct civil military operations during bilateral exercises between Philippine and United States forces is uncoordinated. It does not accurately evaluate the impact civic action projects have on the insurgent threat in Luzon. Though the program currently in place is having mixed effectiveness, it can be improved. A coordinated selection and evaluation process must be developed and implemented to assure that Philippine and United States programs support one another in order to effectively defeat the insurgency in Luzon.

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THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FORGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

Kinetic and non-kinetic operations are both significant components of any counter-insurgency campaign and must be employed in a balanced and quantifiable manner to succeed. Though kinetic combat operations are a necessity, historical examples demonstrate that without non-kinetic operations, which are essential to winning the support of the populace and thereby taking the power base from the insurgents, counterinsurgency will not succeed.

Civic action projects are one form of these non-kinetic activities available to commanders. Projects that achieve the most success and have the biggest impact are coordinated to support the long term objectives of both the host nation and the U.S. Country Team. Independent projects though initially successful, can significantly impact long term goals and objectives if not planned and developed to support the host nation's counterinsurgency campaign.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the United States Department of Defense conduct ongoing bilateral exercises and activities throughout the Philippine archipelago in order to strengthen their partnership, improve cooperation, develop increased capabilities within their militaries, and deter both internal and external threats. Coordinated U.S. CMO activities can complement this effort. This paper will discuss the deficiencies in the selection and evaluation of civic action projects and recommend improvements to improve their effectiveness.

I would like to say thank you to a few people, who without their assistance and support I would not have completed the Marine Corps Command and Staff curriculum or my Master of Military Studies.

My MMS was made possible through the efforts of Dr. Christopher Harmon, whose advice, counsel, and knowledge of the subject matter were essential to my success and LtCol Antonio C. Mangoroban, Philippine Marine Corps, who provided insightful and first-hand information about Armed Forces of the Philippines operations against the ongoing insurgency.

My mahal Karmina and my children Diego and Addison, you are my world. Your love and encouragement inspire me to be my best every day. My parents thank you for teaching me the value of hard work, persistence, and patience.

I hope and pray through the efforts of the Philippine Government, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the United States that one day the Republic of the Philippines is insurgency free, allowing the Filipino people to live in the peace and prosperity they deserve.

Introduction

The Bagong Hukbong Bayan (New People's Army, NPA) is the armed wing of the Philippine Communist Party. The Maoist organization has waged an ongoing insurgency since their establishment in 1969. ¹ As part of the Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and U.S. military under the Joint Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 and the Visiting Forces Agreement of 1998 conduct annual bilateral training and ongoing joint operations within the Philippine archipelago. As a component of these events and in partial response to the insurgency's ongoing threat, the U.S. Department of Defense and the AFP conduct Civil Military Operations (CMO) in Luzon. These operations support ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns designed to defeat the threat posed by the NPA and other armed groups within the country. However, the overall effectiveness of these joint/bilateral civil military projects and activities is debated, and thus a research question:

Are Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and United States (U.S.) Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) Civil Military Operation (CMO) activities properly coordinated to effectively counter the insurgency in Luzon?

Civil military operations must be meticulously coordinated to effectively counter an insurgency. They must win the support of the populace, integrate with long term political goals and objectives, and compliment the overall counterinsurgency strategy. Independent U.S. CMO projects that do not compliment and support established AFP counterinsurgency campaign objectives such as Operational Plan (OPLAN) Bantay Laya 2007-2010 and OPLAN Bayanihan 2011-2016 waste resources and manpower and are counterproductive to the long term defeat of the insurgency in Luzon. All U.S. DoD CMO activity conducted in the country, must be nested

in the long term country plan developed by the U.S. Country Team - U.S. Embassy, United States Agency for International Development (US AID), Joint United States Military Advisory Group Philippines (JUSMAG-PHIL), etc. – and support the overall counterinsurgency plan of the Philippine Government. U.S. CMO activities that do not meet these criteria should not be conducted.

United States DoD organizations currently conduct operations that support immediate commanders' goals and though they may benefit the targeted populace, they do not always support the overall AFP/U.S. plan for the country. In fact, the author believes some are counterproductive and may be inadvertently facilitating the insurgency's success. Although improvements to the process are necessary, U.S. Theater Security Cooperation Program civil military operations and activities are having mixed levels of effectiveness in assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines in their efforts to counter this threat within Luzon.

Though there are multiple exercises and engagement activities held on the archipelago annually, this research paper will focus specifically on the CMO projects conducted by the AFP/U.S. during Exercise Balikatan 2010, an annual joint/bilateral exercise conducted on Luzon that year. It will discuss the processes for engineering, medical, dental, veterinary, and community relations projects during the exercise. Activities including site selection, project nomination and validation, funding and resource allocation, evaluation metrics, and post exercise sustainment and evaluation. This will be done by using a case study from Balikatan 2010, historical exercise data, reports, and interviews from U.S. and Philippine military sources who have participated in the exercises and the authors' firsthand experience as a Civil Affairs Team Leader and planner for the exercise from 2009-2011.

The Main Insurgent Threat in Luzon

Since its establishment in 1969, the NPA has fought a protracted proletarian revolution aimed at overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.² Strongest during the Marcos regime in the 1980's, with over 25,000 members, the organization has fought the AFP in sixty nine of the eighty one Philippine provinces throughout the archipelago.³ The founder and leader of the NPA, Jose Maria Sison, has been in the Netherlands since 1988 and was granted political asylum in 1992. He continues being an active member of the organization as an advocate, negotiator, and ideological leader. As the founding Chairman of the Central Committee of the Philippine Communist Party, he established the NPA and modeled it after the Huks of the 1940's and 1950's.⁴ The NPA, as the armed wing of the Philippine Communist Party, uses violence as its modus operandi and provides force to the Party's revolutionary movement.

The organization has changed its operational approach throughout its existence to counter AFP programs, but it has always retained the same basic structure originally established by Sison. Organized into Mobile Armed Propaganda (Sandata Yunit Propaganda) units that consist of eight to ten members which consolidate to make up Regular Mobile Forces (Regular na Puwersang Makilos) of fifty-seventy members which act as a standing army for the NPA.⁵

New Peoples Army strength ranges between 4,000 to 6,000 active members spread throughout the Philippines Archipelago. The highest concentration (approximately 2,000) is located within Luzon in the Provinces of Isabela to the north, Quezon to the south, and the Bicol Region to the southeast. With pockets of members spread throughout the remaining provinces of the island, with significant concentrations of members located on the northern tip of Palawan Island and in Mindanao.⁶ Armed Forces of the Philippines counterinsurgency campaigns and

operations target these geographic areas with the intent on breaking the large concentrations into smaller less influential elements, thereby degrading NPA influence within the area to a negligible level.⁷ Total strength today is debatable. New People's Army sources claim "110 to 120 guerrilla fronts that cover significant portions of 800 municipalities in seventy provinces," while government sources place the totals at approximately 4,700 fighters across sixty fronts throughout the archipelago.⁸

Though the AFP has experienced occasional success against the NPA, the organization still continues as a significant insurgency within the country today. Peter T. Underwood states, "Armed groups fall into... categories along a spectrum, ranging from poorly organized, disjointed, and motivated by greed to highly organized, coordinated, and motivated by ideology."⁹ The NPA, which began as an ideological organization is trending left and shifting categories towards a more criminal organization in order to continue.¹⁰ Though still executing small scale attacks and inflicting casualties on AFP forces, the organization has significantly increased its involvement in criminal activity within the past decade. Activities include the extortion of mining companies, petty theft, and revolutionary taxation of the people. All of this is being conducted while the organization attempts to maintain legitimacy with the populace.¹¹

The cause for this trend is continually debated. Philippine government and AFP Officials claim it is the result of successful counterinsurgency operations, others argue it is the natural life cycle of armed groups; and the NPA still claims it is succeeding in carrying out its protracted insurgency within the archipelago.¹²

AFP Counterinsurgency Programs Overview

The AFP has implemented various counterinsurgency plans to combat the insurgents within the country. However, none have resulted in significant success until recently. This has been partially due to high levels of corruption, human rights violations, equipment shortfalls, a lack of professionalism within the AFP, and uncoordinated CMO activities during bilateral exercises.¹³ Though it still exists to some degree, through consistent training, government oversight, internal policing, international pressure to stop human rights violations, loss of foreign aid, and pressure from the Filipino people the situation is improving.¹⁴ A professionalized and accountable military that complies with the law of war and observes international norms on human rights while supporting and upholding its sovereign laws and constitution, holds the legitimacy needed to support counterinsurgency operations within Philippine borders. This was a key piece the AFP had been missing in its ongoing battle against the insurgency.

The second missing piece was a focus on the populace and the needs of the people. The insurgents recognized this and capitalized on it for years. They gained their strength in the villages (*barangays*) and neighborhoods (*seitos*) of the provinces by earning and demanding the people's support.¹⁵ They were able to do this because they lived in the area. The AFP did not, as demonstrated by excerpts from two of their counterinsurgency campaign plans, Operational Plan (OPLAN) OPLAN Bantay Laya I-II and OPLAN Bayanihan.

Operational Plan Bantay Laya I-II was the AFP's previous counterterrorism campaign plan which was executed from 2007-2010. It was developed as a four stage, single phase plan, and based on a clear-hold-consolidate-develop methodology.¹⁶ It focused on military action and intelligence gathering, with minimal attention to civic action. The plan was perceived as

ignoring the people's needs and lost public support shortly after it was implemented.

Compounded by human rights abuses committed by AFP forces, the plan was unsuccessful and became a significant propaganda tool for the NPA and other insurgencies in the country.¹⁷

Operation Plan Bayanihan began 1 Jan 2011 as part of the new AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan.¹⁸ It is a six year four phase, "whole of nation approach", slated to run from 2011-2016. In its first year, it differs significantly from previous plans with the addition of the "People-Centered/Human Security Approach" supporting the AFP's paradigm shift towards human rights and compliance with the law of war. The new approach is population centered and focuses on "Winning the Peace - not just defeating the enemy."¹⁹ Utilizing a combination of focused military operations against insurgent groups, requirements for military forces to support the peace process and activities, support to community based development efforts, and professionalizing the ranks of the AFP, this program has shown marked success since its inception.²⁰

The two plans cited differ significantly, but one particular aspect of OPLAN Bantay Laya II destroyed AFP efforts: the lack of a distinction between combatants and non-combatants. This plan is cited by numerous organizations with being directly responsible for numerous extra-judicial killings during its implementation, including the UN, the Philippine Government's Melo Commission, and Amnesty International.²¹

The new plan, OPLAN Bayanihan, recognizes this and takes a holistic approach to win the support of the populace by emphasizing the provisions of essential services, economic reconstruction, sustainable development, and putting the people first.²² Utilizing this approach with focused attention on human rights, places the AFP on the correct path to defeat the

insurgency. Coordinating U.S. and AFP civil military operations during TSCP bilateral/joint exercises to support the existing operations plan will complement this counterinsurgency effort, especially on Luzon.

Theater Security Cooperation Program

The Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP) was developed as a result of the publication of the 1995 *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. In this document, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, regional commanders, and the joint staff developed and published a formal peacetime engagement process that facilitates interaction between the United States military and foreign militaries. Its purpose is to increase interoperability and coordination between the U.S. and its allies, partners, and foreign militaries in order to increase and promote regional security throughout the globe.²³

To accomplish this, each of the military services conducts both formal and informal exchanges to improve military capability or interoperability. Engagement takes place in many forms and along several lines of operation including military professionalization, democratic humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and counter-drug and counter-terrorism operations. To ensure the subordinate plans are relevant and focus on specific regional issues, the geographic combatant commanders are tasked to develop and execute a regional strategic plan, known as the Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP).²⁴

In the TSCP, the commanders identify engagement objectives and develop associated activities that support these objectives. History suggests engagement to be a useful tool in establishing security cooperation. It is under this program that PACOM conducts military interaction and bilateral activities to support national security objectives during peacetime within

its area of responsibility. Exercise Balikatan is an example of TSCP activities in the Philippines.²⁵

Exercise Balikatan

Exercise Balikatan is an annual U.S. joint bilateral exercise between the U.S. DoD and the AFP that focuses on “improving RP-US combined planning, combat readiness, and interoperability while enhancing security relations and demonstrating US resolve to support the Republic of the Philippines against external aggression.”²⁶ Conducted for the first time in 1991 and suspended temporarily in 1999 - the exercise resumed in 1999 and runs annually to this day.²⁷ The activities conducted during this exercise are generally well received by the Filipino people and help to promote a positive image of U.S. forces within the country. Utilizing service members from all branches of the U.S. military, Exercise Balikatan serves to improve interoperability between AFP and U.S. forces and reinforces the U.S. commitment to our partner.²⁸

As part of Exercise Balikatan, AFP and U.S. Forces conduct live fire training events, amphibious/airborne operations, civil military operations, and command post exercises. All of the activities are designed to increase interoperability, deter external aggression, and support ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. The civil military operations are driven by an AFP/U.S. process in which selected areas targeted by the AFP containing insurgent influence are identified and selected to receive civic action projects during the course of the exercise.

Project Nomination Process

The Armed Forces of the Philippines creates a project nomination list based off several factors. Force protection, scope and scale of the project, field unit commander recommendations,

proposed location and potential impact the project will have on enemy presence in the area, and finally the willingness of the local government to support the project.²⁹ Once this initial list is created, it is submitted to the respective AFP General Headquarters (AFPGHQ) dependent on the province, either the Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) for all provinces north of the National Capital Region (NCR) or the Southern Luzon Command (SOLCOM) for all provinces south of the NCR, for review and consolidation. It is at this respective general headquarters where the lists are reviewed, vetted, and approved for release to the Joint United States Military Advisory Group-Philippines (JUSMAG-PHIL) CMO representative in Manila.³⁰ Though infrequent, it is possible to have projects conducted in both Northern and Southern Luzon during one exercise period, dependent on the capabilities, funding, and resources of the both the AFP and U.S. Forces allocated to the exercise. According to another source within the AFP this process can change year to year with some projects remaining on the list indefinitely. This may be due to political pressure, individual prejudices, personal agendas, or simple laziness.³¹

However, if these projects are not identified and reevaluated for validity or deleted, they remain on the list diminishing the potential for a valid and necessary project to be completed. The problem with this process is that no hard and fast procedure for project nomination, submission, review, or validation exists that the author was able to discover through his experience or in his research. Deadlines remain standard and are based on fairly consistent exercise dates, but project ideas and approvals are as diverse as the imagination of the individuals submitting and reviewing them. The entire nomination and approval process is fluid and changes year to year.³²

Project Selection Process

Once the AFPGHQ approves the list, several months prior to the exercise start, and normally during the initial site survey, the JUSMAG-PHIL CMO project officer receives a list of proposed project sites depending on the area in which the exercise will be held. During Exercise Balikatan 2010 this list came from both the Northern and Southern Luzon Command Headquarters as multiple provinces were identified as project eligible for the particular exercise. A typical list contains upwards of 100 projects that range in scope from “farm to market roads”, well and classroom construction, repair of public facilities, and identifying proposed locations for medical, dental, and veterinary programs (MEDCAP/DENCAP/VETCAP). The JUSMAG representative reviews the list to ensure nominated projects support the U.S. Embassy, US AID, and PACOM TSC mission objectives for the country plan; however, the author could not confirm this actually occurs during his research or in his experience. Any projects that do not meet the requirements are identified and discussed with AFP counterparts. If an agreement cannot be reached to modify the project scope, duration, or location to support both AFP and U.S. objectives then it is normally removed from the list.

Once the initial list is vetted and approved by JUSMAG, it is distributed to the participating U.S forces and the assessment process begins. Planners from participating organizations look over the list and apply their respective capabilities, resources, and estimated budget to each project. Projects are eliminated due to cost, lack of capabilities and resources, time constraints of the exercise or forces, and location. Once the list is finalized Initial Site Surveys (ISS) are scheduled.

Initial Site Survey (ISS)

During the initial site surveys, U.S. and AFP planners physically visit each site to validate initial estimates and confirm their planning assumptions. Discussions with local leaders, the population to be served and assessments conducted by civil affairs teams assist in this validation process. As they progress down the list, some sites are removed and the list narrows. The criterion for site approval or denial is based on the individual surveyor's assessment. This being the case, it is essential that well trained and capable personnel are sent on the surveys. Once all the sites have been surveyed and "untenable projects" have been removed from the list the planners make a final evaluation and identify a primary and alternate project site for each area. A "semi-final" list for Balikpapan usually consists of four to six engineering projects, nine to twelve medical, dental, veterinary projects, and six to eight community relations projects. Each participating unit is assigned a primary and alternate project based off this list. Upon completion of the site survey, the planners take their assigned project lists back to their respective commands and begin the detailed planning process in preparation for the next step the Initial Planning Conference (IPC).

Initial Planning Conference

During the IPC, both AFP and U.S. planners reconvene to update, adjust, eliminate or change any projects that may require it. It is not uncommon during an IPC to eliminate a project due to political, security, or environmental reasons. The goal of this conference is an "eighty percent solution" in regard to project planning. This includes but is not limited to contract initiation, materials survey and procurement, site proprietor notification, permit application, manpower and resource validation and requisition, vendor solicitation, force protection, bilateral

training objective development, and diplomatic clearance submission. At the completion of the IPC, all participants are expected to depart with a defined task matrix and agenda to guide their planning and effort until the Final Planning Conference (FPC).

Final Planning Conference

The FPC is the final evolution before actual project construction begins. Final coordination is conducted between the U.S., AFP, vendors, site proprietors, government officials, and the populace involved in the projects. Outstanding shortfalls and issues are addressed and mitigated, if possible. If no mitigation is possible, the issue is identified and the participants move forward as planned. Upon completion of the FPC, all participants leave with a final project list and task matrix and are aware of any outstanding issues or shortfalls with their assigned projects.

Project Nomination and Selection Process Deficiencies

The entire CMO project nomination and approval process needs to be reviewed, updated, and formalized to better utilize the resources, funding, manpower, and capabilities assigned to it. The TSC Program is an important component of the overall U.S. contribution to regional stability in the Pacific Theater. Department of Defense bilateral exercises such as Balikatan are essential elements of this program. Of the many components that comprise the exercises CMO activities are small but extremely significant contributions, and when conducted appropriately and effectively, can have substantial and lasting effects as stated by LTC Medel M. Aguilar, Philippine Army CMO Planner:

In an insurgency situation such as ours, the battlefield is not a place where soldiers and rebels fight each other. It is the minds of the people and whoever wins the support of the people, [sic] wins the battle. The force needed therefore, may not be the lethality of the

weapon, but the effectiveness of the delivery of basic services which will translate to the people's support for the government. CMO events conducted during Balikatan and like exercises is [sic] an example of an opportunity we can capitalize on to defeat the insurgency without firing our weapons.³³

The previously described process being utilized by both the AFP and U.S. is somewhat effective but needs to be improved. The ideal solution would be long term in scope and initiated at the tactical level. Projects nominated by the field commanders within the AFP, vetted by the respective general headquarters, passed to the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs for review and approval, on to JUSMAG-PHIL for review and endorsement and finally over to the U.S. Embassy for final U.S. approval. Once the country team endorses the list and ensures overall tie in to long term projects, as feasible, it would be submitted to JUSMAG-PHIL for final dissemination to the participating forces.³⁴

This may appear to be a long and bureaucratic process, and it is. In order for any CMO activity to be effective and support host nation and U.S. agendas, consensus at all levels is essential. Some may argue that it is not possible, and the timing will not allow for this. The author disagrees. The exercises operate on a fixed schedule. The projects are all short term, low cost, high impact activities that provide the necessary basic services desired by the populace while countering the insurgent influence within the targeted areas. The key is to force the players at all levels to operate with a unity of effort and eliminate individual agendas. Though DoD efforts may not be able to affect the AFP's process, they can affect their own and ensure it supports both the TSC and the U.S. Country Team's objectives.

An example of a mechanism that can facilitate this is currently in place within the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) G3, Civil Affairs Detachment. As a single point of effort within the MEF headquarters that is tasked to plan, coordinate, and support III MEF TSC

activities and real world humanitarian assistance/disaster response HA/DR, the detachment is trained, manned, and ideally suited to effect the necessary change.³⁵ However, the author does not believe it is being utilized to its full potential.

The pre/post-exercise project assessments, surveys, and measures of performance and effectiveness evaluations can be conducted by trained civil affairs personnel who understand the objectives of the TSC Program, the U.S. Country Team and the AFP's counterinsurgency plan. In coordination with their AFP counterparts, utilizing established processes and procedures to maintain objectiveness, complying with Philippine and U.S. policy, and acting as the JUSMAG-PHIL CMO agent, they would select projects and activities to support both AFP and U.S long term objectives. This small change would help to minimize individual projects, mismanagement of resources, mitigate bias in project selection, and facilitate a unity of effort amongst forces.

The problem with the current process, though loosely based on the Civil Military Planning Model it is not formalized nor in writing for members to utilize or be held accountable. After actions are conducted and compiled at all levels of headquarters the quality and thoroughness is usually lacking. Planners, participants, personal and political agendas all change from year to year and from conference to conference. If a planner does not conduct an accurate and thorough assessment, attend all the surveys and conferences, or conduct a good turnover with his replacement, the information is lost.

Unfortunately, the later happens often and planners find themselves starting over during each step. In recent years a push has been made to drive all planners and participants, both AFP and U.S., to conduct and consolidate their planning material on a web based system, the All Partner Access Network (APAN). However, even the information posted is incomplete. The

operations specialists and executive agents for the exercises make an honest attempt to capture all the data. Yet, it is inevitable that significant portions do not make it into the database. Though the author believes they do the best work possible with the resources and personal allocated to the task, and they appear to be overwhelmed.³⁶

The author has been unable to confirm in his research if it is due to information overload, a weak IT infrastructure, inefficiency in data collection, or a lack of effort on the part of the planners, and does not believe it is the latter. However, this issue is a lack of an established process to collect, process, analyze, and consolidate the information and drive the planning.

Neither the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) nor the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is used to guide planning efforts during the conferences. However, the author was unable to find a separate or independent documented process in place to guide the specific exercise planning. Rather it appears to be conducted using the resident corporate knowledge of civilian and military participants and planners who have been involved in the exercises for years and a multitude of interpretations of directives, orders, and operations orders that authorize the exercises under the Theater Security Cooperation Program.³⁷

These changes will mitigate individual agendas, facilitate planning, resource allocation, and drive the necessary consensus to conduct measurable CMO activities during Exercise Balikatan and exercise planning. The last step of this process is the development of a mechanism and metrics to evaluate the success, and more importantly the effectiveness of the selected project/activity.

Project Evaluation Metrics

In order to determine if the project is successful, completed as planned, and achieves the desired effect, evaluation criteria and a mechanism to gather, analyze, and evaluate the data collected, must be identified and developed prior to any planning occurring. As planning develops and the endstate is identified, this mechanism may be modified based on a multitude of factors to include the change in a desired outcome, funding shortfalls, cultural or geographical issues, and changes in the host nation or the commander's policy - all of which affect evaluation criteria. Regardless of any of these factors, the mechanism that is chosen must produce quantifiable and objective data and must continually be utilized throughout the entire process.

Once this mechanism is identified it must be implemented and referenced throughout the planning, execution, and post exercise evaluation process. This is essential. Continual assessment and evaluation of the data will allow all parties involved to determine if the projects are succeeding as planned, require adjustment, discontinuation, or should be repeated in future exercises. A common and useful mechanism utilized by USG agencies to evaluate success or failure of a project are measures of performance and effectiveness.

Measures of Performance (MOP)/Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are a mechanism utilized by military and civilian practitioners when conducting CMO activities. Though each agency or commander may employ a different variable based on their requirements or experiences, the MOP/MOE referred to in this paper are defined as follows: ³⁸

MOP is a focus on task accomplishment and confirms or denies that actions have been conducted correctly: Was the building constructed to the required U.S. standard?

MOE is a focus on the end state attainment by demonstrating the impact that completed actions have had in shaping the desired adversary behaviors: Was the building the correct project to provide or does the populace require something additional/different?

An MOP is much easier to develop and evaluate than an MOE, as it can be applied against existing manuals, orders, directives, or orders. An example of this is the construction of two-room school houses by AFP/U.S. Forces during Exercise Balikatan. All are constructed in accordance with U.S. Navy Facility (NAVFAC) standards and specifications. Any deviation from this established standard must be documented and submitted by the site officer-in-charge to the Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) Commander, in this case, a U.S Navy Civil Engineering Officer.

If the deviation is deemed necessary a suitable alternative may be employed if approved as demonstrated by this example:

Local building materials do not meet U.S. standards and nothing else is available. The OIC requests to add additional rebar and concrete to compensate for vulnerability of the substandard cinder blocks to meet NAVFAC standards. The request is submitted and approved in accordance with established NAVFAC policy. All changes are documented on the final building plans and copies are submitted to all vested parties, both host nation and U.S.³⁹

Measures of effectiveness often appear to be intangible and require more effort to analyze and validate than a measure of performance. The key to an effective MOE is that it is quantifiable and utilized to evaluate a completed project or event and determine, not only that those things were done correctly and were the right thing to do, but that it is what the people wanted and needed.

As cited in the end noted example above, the construction of the school houses during Exercise Balikatan 2010/2011 to withstand typhoon level winds and thereby act as typhoon shelters for the barangays is thought to have begun as a request from the Barangay Tepping

captain during the initial site survey of the proposed sites in Ilocos Norte. The author has not been able to confirm this; however, it developed into a measure of effectiveness for the AFP/U.S JCMOTF Commanders. This MOP/MOE is an example of a quantifiable and measurable metric to evaluate both project standards and desired outcomes. Measureable and easily confirmed during the following typhoon season, this project was something the people wanted and needed while meeting established construction standards.

Additional MOP were developed for the exercise covering every CMO activity. During the MED/DEN/VETCAPs the providers (both U.S. and AFP) adhered to established and documented medical practices when providing physical exams, eye exams, tooth extractions, circumcisions, vaccinations, and delousing of animals. Every service provided was both quantifiable and measureable against a documented source. The MOE were always not so easily identifiable.⁴⁰

People are typically happy, initially when provided immediate services and the necessary essentials to improve their quality of life and that of their families. However, one purpose of the CMO activities during these exercises is to assist the AFP in counteracting insurgent influence within the area. According to AFP sources every Exercise Balikatan CMO activity receives positive accolades in the short term and U.S. sources normally agree.⁴¹ However, it is the long term effects that are of the most significance and this is where another deficiency in the current process arises.

Post Exercise Sustainment and Evaluation

Based on the author's research and experience, post exercise sustainment and evaluation is a key deficiency with the CMO activities conducted during Exercise Balikatan. Initial success

is great. Measures of performance and effectiveness are developed to meet the exercise goals and support the population's immediate needs, which they normally do. However, long-term evaluation and follow up of the locations benefitting from the exercises, is not always conducted. If it is, this is sparingly and inconsistent. Perhaps it is an unfortunate by-product of the operational tempo, shortages in manpower, and competing priorities both for the AFP and U.S.. Perhaps it is a failure on the part of the local government to sustain and exploit the initial success of the CMO activities.⁴² Whichever the case may be, a solution must be identified and implemented.

The key to effective and long term change in counterinsurgency and after basic security needs are met, is to influence the people and win their support. Providing them the ability to sustain and or improve their livelihood is one way. doing this will remove the source of influence the insurgents hold over them. It may come in the form of increased or better employment, infrastructure development, the provision of basic services, or a self-sufficient means of sustenance. No matter which, it must meet the needs and desires of the people, more importantly, the solution must belong to and be within their organic capability to sustain. If no evaluations are conducted at the completion of an exercise with reoccurring evaluations and assessments conducted over the long term, no determination of the effects AFP/U.S projects can be determined. Accordingly, no successes can be exploited or necessary adjustments can be made. Post project evaluation is essential, and without this key component, one has nothing.

The Joint United States Advisory Group Philippines (JUSMAG-PHIL) is a prime candidate to facilitate this with the appropriate support. Civil Affairs teams from III MEF, USARPAC, or PACOM could be sent on temporary duty throughout the year to conduct the evaluations, facilitate future planning, and support ongoing CMO activities within Luzon. This

process is relatively inexpensive, very supportable, has minimal logistical or political implications, and is currently being done in other countries within the area of responsibility.⁴³

The case study below will demonstrate these deficiencies.

Case Study Balikatan 2010

All CMO events conducted in the province of Ilocos Sur during Exercise Balikatan 2010 were planned, conducted, and evaluated using the process described in this paper. A total of seven medical, dental, veterinary, seven engineering, and twenty humanitarian assistance civic action projects were conducted.⁴⁴ An example of these projects is included in appendix b.

The MOP and MOE developed for the exercise evaluated project completion, adherence to approved standards, and satisfaction of the local populace with the services provided, vice impact on the insurgent influence or support of AFP counterinsurgency objectives. Though initial assessments were made during the planning phase, with some additional assessments conducted during project execution, none were conducted at the completion of the exercise. No specific MOP or MOE were developed to evaluate the effects the projects had to counter insurgent influence and if any were, none were disseminated for employment.⁴⁵

Though the training goals for both the AFP and U.S. forces were met during the exercise, no documented information on the impact the civic action projects had in winning populace support or neutralizing insurgent influence within the province of Ilocos Sur was collected or available - a huge mistake (on the part of both AFP and U.S. forces). If assessments were conducted after the exercise, the author could find no information as to the results, either at a classified or unclassified level.

Findings

In the research conducted the following areas for improvement were identified.

Implementing these changes will facilitate better coordination and make the AFP/U.S. CMO activities more effective in Luzon:

1. U.S. forces do not utilize a single standard planning process when developing CMO activities in the Luzon.
2. APAN is not the required sole database for collection, storage, and dissemination of planning materials for planners and AFP partners.
3. Neither the AFP nor U.S. forces have a coordinated long term project list or plan for CMO projects and activities in Luzon to guide their planning or decision making process.
4. There is no single U.S. agency or department appointed and delegated the proper authority to coordinate, direct, and manage all CMO activities involving U.S. forces in the Philippines. JUSMAG-PHIL acts as a representative for DoD within the country.
5. Lead agents for each exercise or service develop and select projects in accordance with their respective commander's goals and objectives, which do not always support AFP counterinsurgency or U.S. country objectives.

Recommendations

In order to mitigate the problems identified in this paper, it is the author's recommendation that the following procedures be implemented:

1. Adopt, implement, direct, and ensure all planners utilize a common planning process or operational design for all CMO activities and development of MOP and MOE.
2. Utilize APAN as a database to facilitate planning, data collection, and information sharing between all planners and AFP partners. Post all exercise information, data, and requirements to this database and mandate utilization of it as the medium to facilitate procurement, metric development, and consensus between planners.
3. In conjunction with AFP partners, develop a five year project list; reviewed annually to facilitate long-term planning, evaluation, and effectiveness of all projects.
4. Develop a long term evaluation program to measure project effectiveness. Utilize existing U.S. DoD forces in the theater to conduct the assessments and evaluations.
5. Staff and appoint JUSMAG-PHIL as the lead agent for all U.S. DoD CMO activities in the country.

In doing this, the CMO activities conducted in Luzon will be more effective in supporting the AFP counterinsurgency campaign and long term U.S. objectives in targeted areas, the planning and evaluation process will improve, and a record of successes and failures will be documented and readily available to continually improve the civil military operations and activities in Luzon. In turn, this will better support Armed Forces of the Philippines counterinsurgency campaigns and the United States Theater Security Cooperation Program civil military operations and activities conducted during bilateral exercises like Exercise Balikatan.

Conclusion

This paper presented the process utilized by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and United States forces when planning, conducting, and evaluating civil military operations

executed during bilateral exercises within Luzon, Republic of the Philippines. It is the author's position that AFP and U.S. forces are doing a moderately effective job conducting these types of operations. However, as cited in the findings and recommendations these organizations can be more effective.

To increase effectiveness, it is essential that coordination amongst all Philippine and United States Government Agencies improve when planning these activities, and that a mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of the civic action projects is selected and implemented. This process must be a long term and must occur before, during, and after the exercise to truly identify the impact of the projects on the insurgency. Doing this alone will not remove the insurgent threat in Luzon. However, it will allow participants to identify projects and activities which can be improved, sustained, or discontinued thereby improving the overall effectiveness of the counterinsurgency campaign.

The object of the campaign is to win the support of the populace and defeat the insurgency. Accurately evaluating the impact of the civic action projects will allow the AFP to exploit successes and mitigate the threat posed by the NPA and other insurgent groups within the Republic.

Illustrations

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Menu Asia, Administrative Map of the Philippines. <http://menuasia.com/maps/gif.4/>

Figure 1



Library University of Texas, *Relief Map of the Philippines*. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/asia/philippines.jpg>

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Figure 2


Glossary of Acronyms

AFP.....	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPGHQ.....	Armed Forces of the Philippines General Headquarters
APAN.....	All Partner Access Network
CA.....	Civil Affairs
CMO.....	Civil-Military Operation
COMREL.....	Community Relation Project
CPP.....	Communist Peoples Party
DENTCAP.....	Dental Civic Action Project
DoD.....	Department of Defense
FPC.....	Final Planning Conference
G3.....	General Staff Section (Operations)
HA/DR.....	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HQ.....	Headquarters
IPC.....	Initial Planning Conference
ISS.....	Initial Site Survey
JCMOTF.....	Joint Civil Military Operation Task Force
JUSMAG-PHIL.....	Joint United States Military Advisory Group-Philippines
LTC (Army).....	Lieutenant Colonel
LtCol (Marine).....	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ (Army).....	Major
Maj (Marine).....	Major
MCPP.....	Marine Corps Planning Process
MDMP.....	Military Decision Making Process
MEDCAP.....	Medical Civic Action Project

MEF.....	Marine Expeditionary Force
MOE.....	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP.....	Measure of Performance
NAVFAC.....	Naval Facilities Command
NCR.....	National Capitol Region
NOLCOM.....	Northern Luzon Command
NPA.....	New People's Army
OIC.....	Officer in Charge
OPLA.....	Operation Plan
PACOM.....	Pacific Command
PNP.....	Philippine National Police
SOLCOM.....	Southern Luzon Command
TSCP.....	Theater Security Cooperation Program or Plan
UN.....	United Nations
US.....	United States
US AID.....	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC.....	United States Army Pacific
USMC.....	United States Marine Corps


Appendix A

BK10 CMO Projects



Appendix B

MED/DENCAPs 27 Feb – 13 Mar 10



MED/DEN CAP

Cabarambanan Elementary School

- **Location:** Cabarambanan Elem School, Sinait, Ilocos Sur
- **Grid:** Lat/Long N 17o 53.267'; E 120o 29.777'
- **LZ:** None available.
- **Description:** This site is located an hour away by land from Vigan. It is a small school district with approx. population of over 1000. Although it is a small school district, it has enough classrooms to support a day MED/DEN CAP.
- **Medical Facts/Problems:** Upper Resp Tract infection, Malnutrition, Flu, Skin allergies, Vision correction, dental problems, hypertension.
- **Proposed Services:**
 - Primary care (Peds, FP, IM)
 - Optometry
 - Dental
 - Minor Surgery
 - PHO/EHO
 - Veterinary
- **Risks to mitigate:** Travel time from Vigan is 1 hr from Vigan; insufficient number of personnel support from Bgys; availability of chairs, tents, tables; inclusion of minor surgical kits in the BOM
- **Feasibility:** 1 day MED/DEN CAP to cater for Bgys Cabarambanan and Maray
- **Life support:** Cabaao
- **Local Government POC:**
 - Bgy Capt Dionisio Ibe 09155001411
 - AFP POC: Lt Gonzaga Ex-O "A" Coy, 50th IB 09284568752
 - HNS: Corpuz Clinic and Hospital, Sinait



Appendix B
UNCLASSIFIED

MED/DEN CAP Teppeng Elem School

- **Location:** Teppeng Elem School, Sinait, Ilocos Sur
- **Grid:** Lat/Long N 17o 50.584; E 120o 27.330'
- **LZ:** Front of school Grid: Lat/Long N 17o 50.580; E 120o 27.311'
- **Description:** Pop est 1000+ of the two bgy's, Bgy Calanutan has no available School. Children from Bgy Calanutan goes to Bgy Teppeng Elem School across their bgy, approx 1.5 hour travel time from Vigan City. Electrical and water facility are available, school has several rooms and big open space for patient waiting areas.
- **Medical Fact/Problems:** Upper Resp Tract infection, Malnutrition, Flu, Skin allergies, Vision correction, dental problems, Hypertension, GIT, HIVs-4
- **Proposed Services:**
 - Primary care (Peds, FP, IM,)
 - EHO/PHO
 - Optometry
 - Dental
 - Minor Surgery
 - Veterinary
- **Risks to mitigate:** 1.5 hour travel time from Vigan
- **Life support:** Cabugao
- **Local Government POC:**
Bgy Capt Melchor Yadao
- **School Principal Villamor Tumbaga** 09176603460
- **AFP POC:** Lt Gonzaga Ex-O "A" Coy, 50th IB 09284568752
- **HN3/Referral Treatment facility:** Corpuz Clinic and Hospital, Sinait, Sinait District Hospital



Appendix B
UNCLASSIFIED

Gabion Wall Flood Protection

Location: Barangay Plas, Salcedo Municipality, Iloos Sur Province
Grid: N17°07'50.87" E120°31'33.50" MGRS: 51QTU 36771 95704

Population: 1023 resident, 203 households

Scope: 100 linear meters (estimated) of 1m x 1m x 2m gabion cages stacked in two levels. (3 rows wide at base, 2 rows wide at top).

Life Support:

COA1: Contract for messing and berthing required. Co-located with Plas Elementary School.

COA2: Contract for messing and berthing required on site coordinate with land owner to set up tents alongside the river.

Risks to mitigate:

- intermittent cellular phone reception
- nearest hospital is 18 km (30 min drive)
- medevac plan must be established
- heat exhaustion, vehicle safety, backing up incidents
- access to site restricted to travel in river bed during low water (dry season)
- Force protection required

Local Government POC: Mr. Augustus Wagayen, (Barangay Captain), Cell# 09276023599

Labor: USA, 6th Engineering Battalion

Cost estimate: \$10,000



Appendix B
UNCLASSIFIED

Baluarte Health Center

Location: Barangay Baluarte, Salcedo Municipality, Ilocos Sur Province, Republic of the Philippines

Grid: N17°05'56.22" / E120°31'16.55" / MGRS: 51QTU 36282 92185

Population: Barangay population of 900 residents. 145 households

Scope of Work: Demolish existing and construct new 6m x 8m masonry block building to be utilized as a health center.

Life Support:

COA1: Life Support contract for messing, berthing, and laundry required. Primary berthing location Candon City

COA2: Same as COA1 but instead of being housed at Candon City request to stay onsite in empty building until construction complete

Risks to Mitigate:

- Force Protection measures

- Limited access to site, narrow roads, low-hanging vegetation (requires demolition of a masonry building to prepare site for construction).

- Need to obtain standard Health Center design from AFP

- Proposed lot is very small (12m x 15m), requires a 3m offset off existing road.

- Quality sourcing and delivery of construction materials

- Safety (heat exhaustion, heavy lifting, falling debris)

Local Government POC: Mr. Michael Buquing, (Barangay Captain), Cell# 09173839175

Labor: USA, 6th Engineering Battalion

Estimated Cost: \$30k for new Health Center



Appendix B
UNCLASSIFIED

Marnay Primary School

Location: Barangay Marnay, Sinait Municipality, Sorsogon, Iloos Sur, Philippines. Grid: N 17° 52' 47.92", E 120° 29' 46.20", MGRS: 51QTV34766 76770

Population: Barangay population 600; 55 students currently attending school

Scope of Work:

- Renovate existing 6.14m x 16m two classroom masonry structure, new jalousie windows doors, masonry partition wall, lighting, steel roof framing corrugated roofing, guttering, interior and exterior painting.
- New electric pump for existing water well, construction of a masonry pump house, elevated steel water tower, and distribution piping to existing restrooms.

Life Support:

COA 1: Field berthing on site. Contract messing. 1 MRE daily
COA 2: Contract hotel for messing/berthing. 1 MRE daily, Partial Perdiem.

Risks to Mitigate:

- Project is contingent on local government providing additional teacher
- Limited access to site, narrow roads, low-hanging electrical lines and vegetation along route
- Need to minimize impact to students during construction operations
- Quality, sourcing and delivery of construction materials
- Safety (heat exhaustion, heavy lifting, falling debris)
- Will require life support contract for messing and berthing

Local Government POC: Ms. Melody Mae Garcia (Head Teacher); Phone 0916194521

Labor: USMC, 31+ MEU, 20 PAX

Estimated Cost: \$25,000

Appendix B
UNCLASSIFIED



Endotes

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- ² Ibid.
- ³ ABS-CBN Interactive, NPA’s down to 5,700, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?> (accessed September 16, 2011).
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- ⁵ Frank Scarpello, “Enduring Insurgency: New People’s Army Marches On.” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, February 2011, 20
- ⁶ LtCol Antonio C. Mangoroban, Philippine Marine Corps, interview with author, 7 January 2012.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Scarpello, “Enduring Insurgency”, 20
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- ¹⁰ LtCol Mangoroban interview, op. cit.
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- ¹⁶ AFP Bayanihan, <http://www.afp.mil.ph/pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf> (accessed October 20, 2011)
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- ¹⁸ AFP Bayanihan, <http://www.afp.mil.ph/pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf> (accessed October 20, 2011).
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Manila Bulletin, March 10, 2010, <http://w3.nexis.com/new/results/docview> (accessed September 16, 2011)
- ²¹ Scarpello, “Enduring Insurgency”, 21
- ²² AFP Bayanihan, <http://www.afp.mil.ph/pdf/IPSP%20Bayanihan.pdf> (accessed October 20, 2011).
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- ²⁵ Ibid.

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- ²⁶ Balikatan, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm> (accessed 14 February, 2012)
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Interview with local and provincial government officials, 2009-2010.
- ²⁹ LTC Medel M. Aguilar, Philippine Army, email correspondence with the author, February 1, 2012.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Interview with AFP Officer who requested to remain anonymous, March 9, 2012.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ LTC Medel M. Aguilar, Philippine Army, email correspondence with the author, February 1, 2012.
- ³⁴ Christopher R. Mohr, MARFORPAC G357 Operations Planning Specialist, email correspondence with the author, February 7, 2012.
- ³⁵ United States Marine Corps, III MEF, <http://www.marines.mil/unit/iiimef/>
- ³⁶ The author experienced this during planning for both Balikatan and PHIBLEX from 2009-2011.
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