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
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
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Marine Corps is currently embroiled in a Counter Insurgency fight in Afghanistan, but every Marine is not an Infantry Marine. My background is Aviation Logistics, the furthest one could get from infantry. I chose the subject of Counterinsurgency and the Battle of Algiers to increase my understanding of the fight the Marine Corps is currently engaged in and to get a better appreciation of the challenges facing my infantry brethren. The experiences of the French Army in Algeria have been incorporated into the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, along with the ideas of French COIN theorists, Roger Trinquier and David Galula; but there are lessons from the Battle of Algiers that can be learned that 3-24 does not contain.

This paper would not be possible without the firm guidance from my mentor, Dr. Robert Bruce. Thank you for your patience and keeping me focused. Additionally, I would like to thank my wife Angel for her continued and unwavering support. The time we spend apart only brings us closer. To Winter and Trinity, I'm sorry I'm not always there, but you are my world and my reason for being. Last, I want to thank LtCol Donald Chipman for his advice at the beginning of this process: take a break, research and write on a topic not related to Aviation Logistics, find something you are interested in and have fun with it.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Battle of Algiers: Counter Insurgency Success

Author: Major Lou H. Royer, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: American forces conducting future COIN operations can achieve success using the same tactics that the French Army used in 1957, either in true form or with slight modification, but we leave ourselves exposed to greater risk to life, limb and mission failure by not rigorously employing the same tactics.

Discussion: As the Marine Corps and Army continues to prosecute the long war, they can expect to be confronted with similar conflicts like the French Army experienced almost sixty years ago in Algeria. Parallels exist between the Battle of Algiers and the U.S. experience in Iraq. By drawing upon and understanding the tactical experience of the French in Algiers, we can prepare ourselves for future insurgencies our military may face. The tactics the French employed in the Battle of Algiers have come under great scrutiny by modern scholars despite the successful results they produced. The Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) incorporates many of the experiences of the French Army in conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN).

Conclusion: The tactics employed by the French Army in the Battle of Algiers resulted in successfully eradicating the insurgent movement in Algiers. The success achieved by the French Army will be hard to replicate in future COIN scenarios if the United States and its military focus on partnership building and not on destroying the enemy.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1957, the French Army had disrupted and virtually destroyed the insurgent movement of the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria in the city of Algiers. Originally, the FLN intended to conduct a terror campaign in the predominantly non-Arab city of Algiers in an attempt to destroy French resolve for support of the war. It ended in the near destruction of the Algerian independence movement with much of the leadership either dead or fleeing for their lives. The Battle of Algiers is considered a watershed moment in the French Algerian War with the French Army achieving a great tactical victory, but strategically, French troops would leave Algeria five years later and leave behind a colony it had controlled for over 130 years.

As the Marine Corps and Army continues to prosecute the long war, they will confront similar conflicts like those that the French Army experienced almost sixty years ago in Algeria. Parallels exist between the Battle of Algiers and the U.S. experience in Iraq. By drawing upon and understanding the tactical experience of the French in Algiers, we can prepare ourselves for future insurgencies our military may face. The tactics the French employed in the Battle of Algiers have come under great scrutiny by modern scholars despite the successful results they produced. The Army Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) incorporates many of the experiences of the French Army in conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN). American forces conducting future COIN operations can achieve success using the same tactics that the French Army used in 1957, either in true form or with slight modification, but we leave ourselves exposed to greater risk to life, limb and mission failure by not rigorously employing the same tactics.

Comprised of six sections, this paper will look at how the French Army were able to root out an insurgency embedded in within a city population of almost one million inhabitants by the

use of interrogation, information operations, martial law and ingenuity. Section One will discuss the background of the French Algerian War to include the key events leading up to the Battle of Algiers, the origins of the Algerian Independence movement and the evolution of the FLN, the political environment, and the French military presence in Algeria up to 1957. In Section Two, looks at the how vested an interest Algeria was to France, the French stake in Algeria, the layout, demographics and the importance of the city of Algiers and compares the troop deployment of the French Army in Algeria with the troop deployment in Afghanistan from the United States. Section Three looks at the actions taken by the FLN during the Battle of Algiers and French Army action and counteraction. Section Four looks at the topic of interrogation where military action has political consequences. Section Five challenges that a weakness in the Army and Marine Corps handbook on Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, is a lack of guidance in the destruction of the enemy. Section Six provides conclusions and lessons learned.

SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND

Situated on the northern coast of Africa, Algeria is the largest country on the Mediterranean Sea with a landmass of approximately 2.4 million square kilometers or 3.5 times the size of the state of Texas.¹ In the 1950s, the population of the country was approximately 10 million with 1 million being European settlers of various origins living in the country.² Known for the black shoes early French settlers wore, this demographic was the *pieds noirs* or black feet. The remaining population, 9 million strong, was primarily Arab of Muslim faith.³

France has maintained a colonial presence in Algeria since 1830 after it invaded and defeated the Turk Dey Hussein. The French Army moved inland and within twenty years conquered the whole country after securing the coast.

A great distinction must be made in regards to how Algeria was occupied compared to other Arab nations. Other Arab colonies kept in place existing regimes under treaties that maintained national rights. The French in Algeria did not recognize Muslim festivals and the Arabic language and used their land for colonization. Algerian Muslims would not forget actions like the conversion of mosques into churches by the French.⁴

Inequality existed between the Algerians and the *pieds noirs*. The Algerians were not French citizens; they did not attend French schools or attend French churches. During a visit to Algeria, Emperor Napoleon III remarked, "This is not a French province. It is an Arab country, a colony of Europe, and a French camp." Napoleon III understood that in order for France to maintain Algeria, "We must give them a status that will cause them to be envied by other Arabs." No major attempts to give Algerians the envied status Napoleon envisioned occurred until the end of World War Two in 1945.⁵

From the moment the French landed in 1830, there had been numerous uprisings, some escalating to that of a small war. The nationalist sentiment that many Algerians had would find embodiment in the Front de Liberation Nationale or National Liberation Front (FLN). The outbreak of rebellion would occur on All Saints Day, November 1, 1954, a day of celebration for the Catholic *pieds noirs*.

The FLN conducted seventy simultaneous attacks on police stations and *pieds noirs* farms throughout Algeria resulting in seven dead and four wounded. The FLN gained very little and compared to damage calculated at 200 million francs. The FLN was undermanned, under armed and under funded. France's reaction to the revolt would set the stage for the next seven and a half years. To avoid war, France would have to cut all ties with Algeria or rapidly integrate Algeria into France. Neither was acceptable to the French politic. Algerians were

culturally and ethnically different from the French. Losing a colony like Algeria would be a devastating blow to French Nationalist pride in light of the humiliating events of World War Two and the recent defeat at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina.

On All Saints Day, 57,000 troops were in Algeria. Most of the troops belonged to transient units or were garrison soldiers. Of the total, only 3,500 were fighting troops. Economically, newly found oil deposits in the Saharan region of Algeria would motivate the French to retain its hold on its largest trading partner.⁶ The economic situation helped foster the outbreak of revolution for the economic sector was strong enough to divide the Muslim society, yet it was too weak to support a disenfranchised population that was growing.

FLN can trace its roots back to the Algerian Peoples Party (PPA) formed in 1944. Members of the PPA participated in a demonstration that ended in violence in the city of Setif in 1945. After the Setif massacre, the government outlawed the PPA and the PPA would go through numerous transformations over the next nine years eventually evolving into the FLN.

Shortly after All Saints Day, the National Liberation Army (ALN) formed. The ALN comprised of six commanders in charge of their own region or willaya. Each willaya commander was responsible for his zone to include recruitment, support and organization. Initially numbered just a few hundred, the ALN would grow to a fighting force of almost 15,000 regulars.⁷ The ALN would conduct operations that harassed the French Army and police with sabotage, assassinations and terrorist acts for the next year and a half. The ALN escalated their military actions to direct confrontations with the French Army resulting in the ALN suffering great casualties.

The ALN restructured and reorganized themselves in the summer of 1956. In an effort to gain support from the local populace, the ALN adopted a strategy similar to Lyautey's *tache*

d'huile principle or oil stain. Instead of massing ALN forces within a densely populated area and slowly spreading out, the ALN sent units out to sparsely populated areas beyond the influence of the French. Their goal was to establish villages as safe havens, depots and recruitment centers. From there, the ALN oil stain would spread to other small villages, eventually surrounding the French areas of control. Once surrounded, the French left or retaliated with such repression as they had previously done driving the Muslim populace to the rebel side.⁸

The ALN had grown to such size and capacity that the decision was made to confront the French Army head on in conventional battle. The purpose was to show to the world its power. If it did not, it risked eradication by the French system of *quadrillage*: the French tactic of dividing of the country into sectors with permanent troops stationed in each to systematically wipe out the rebels and counter the rebel strategy of an inverted *tache d'huile* by concentrating French forces within the population providing the Muslim population with security.⁹ The ALN suffered major defeats at the hands of French air, armor and artillery superiority, forcing the ALN to return to conducting guerilla operations, for it could not succeed in a head-to-head confrontation with the French Army.

SECTION TWO: VESTED INTEREST

The United States military finds itself in a similar situation with that of the French Army. By 1957, the French Army had been at war for almost 17 years having fought World War II and a counterinsurgency in Indochina War. The United States is entering its tenth year of war with a majority of that time spent conducting COIN operations. A key difference is that the United States military does not view Afghanistan or Iraq as part of the United States, where Algeria was viewed as much a part of France as Texas is as part of the United States.

France had a true vested interest in defeating the insurgency in Algeria. France would fight to hold on to Algeria because of its wounded post world war and Indochina war pride, the presence of over one million *pieds noirs* and the notion that Algiers was a part of France as was any province in the country. By the mid 1950s, the French government was providing Algeria with 150 billion francs. Algerians were immigrating to France and Frenchmen were immigrating to Algeria. In France, 400,000 Algerians worked to support 2 million in Algeria. French anthropologist and sociologist, Germaine Tillon, stated bluntly, "Algeria was France."¹⁰

To counter the threat of the ALN, the French Army reinforced the 57,000 troops it had in Algeria. Within three years of the attacks on All Saints Days, the French Army had 400,000 troops in Algeria to meet the increasing threat of violence, to include an additional 100,000 local reserves and militia. To support the troops, the French Army increased their air assets from 197 aircraft in 1955 to 686 airplanes and 82 helicopters in 1957, reaching over 400 helicopters in 1960. With 500,000 trained and armed troops at its disposal incorporated with a wealth of air assets, the French Army was well prepared to fight an insurgency in a country of approximately 10 million.¹¹ Compared to the 130,000 troops assigned to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, of which 90,000 are from the United States,¹² it can be argued that the U.S. is either looking for victory with minimal investment or that they are not truly invested in defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan.

SECTION THREE: THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS

The ALN suffered many defeats at the hands of French Army. The tactic of quadrillage had countered the rebel's tactic of *tache d'huile*. In an effort to gain a quick victory, the ALN targeted the city of Algiers. The capital city of Algiers held nearly 900,000 inhabitants with one third of the populace European.¹³ In one square kilometer, roughly one hundred thousand

Algerians lived. At the time, it was France's second largest city, larger than Marseille or Lyon. Nestled on the Mediterranean, the city was far from the rural fighting that existed further inland. With such a large *pieds noirs* populace, the ALN and FLN sought to conduct a terror campaign within the city to break the French will and gain support from the Muslim residents.

The newly formed Autonomous Zone of Algiers (ZAA) was an underground terrorist network that grew to 5,700 strong by 1957.¹⁴ The first terrorist attacks occurred in late 1956 with bombings at local French hangouts Algiers; eventually escalating to 3 to 4 attacks daily with no discrimination against women or children. The assassinations of the president of the administrative council of Algiers and of the president of the Mayors Federation of Algeria sparked a demonstration of 20,000 that lynched Muslims. The local police were not equipped to handle such a threat as the ZAA and the *pieds noirs* were to the point of cordoning off the older part of Algiers, the Casbah, a predominately Muslim area, flooding it with gasoline and setting it on fire. Major Aussaress, an intelligence officer station in Algiers during this time, estimated casualties would have reached 70,000.¹⁵ This forced the French government to take action.

To meet this challenge, the Governor-General of Algeria, Robert Lacoste turned to General Jacques Massu, the commander of the elite 10th Para Division. Massu's division was to reinforce the police and most importantly, take responsibility for the maintenance of order within the city; turning over civil control of the city over to the military. By mid-January 1957, Massu's four regiments entered the city and divided it into four sectors, one for each regiment. The focal point was the Casbah, assigned to Colonel Bigeard of the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment (RPC).¹⁶ The RPC quickly cordoned off the Casbah, established entry and exit points and initiated house-to-house searches.

The first challenge to meet General Massu was a general strike called upon by the FLN. To demonstrate the support of the Algerian people to the FLN and scheduled to last for 8 days, the strike coincided with the opening of the general assembly of the United Nations. Lacoste's orders to Massu were "...to break the strike at all costs – and by any means." Massu employed the full force of his division.¹⁷

The morning of January 28, 1957 dawned with shuttered shop fronts and workers failing to show up for work and school children staying home. Massu employed leaflet drops by helicopters over the Casbah and loudspeakers on jeeps ordering the populace back to work. To break the strike, Massu ordered his men to rip the steel doors off shop fronts, exposing the goods. Armored carriers arrived, rounded up workers and carried them off to work.¹⁸ Not everyone participating in the strike supported it wholeheartedly. One Algerian whispered to a French Captain requesting that he be roughed up before being carried off to work, to give the illusion he went unwillingly.¹⁹

Within two days, the strike was over. The victory the FLN sought did not materialize. The United Nations did not pay particular notice to the strike.²⁰ The rough handed tactics the French used attributed to the failure of the strike, but the FLN failed, too. Even if the French had not used the tactics they employed to get the populace back to work, it is doubtful the strike could have lasted the full eight days. Many of the striking participants needed their daily wages and hunger and survival would have overcome any nationalist ideals, forcing the strikers to return to work within days of the strike beginning.²¹

After crushing the strike, Massu's division could focus on its mission of destroying the FLN in Algiers. The leader of the FLN in Algiers was a man named Ben M'Hidi, one of the original nine historical leaders of the FLN and his deputies, Saadi Yacef, the leader of the

terrorist network in Algiers and Ali-la-Pointe. The FLN employed tactics of intimidation upon those they could not turn to their cause. Those that did not support the strike were beaten or killed. These three men would conduct the terror campaign throughout Algiers and become the key targets to Massu.²²

Massu's men moved into the Casbah and immediately conducted a campaign to gain control of the Casbah and secure the area. First, the men carried out a census of the population with new identification cards issued to the inhabitants of the Casbah. This enabled the French Paras to conduct random identity checks that were effective in catching FLN terrorists. Next, searches of houses and shops conducted randomly uncovered weapons caches, propaganda material or rebels. Third, checkpoints established throughout the Casbah controlled the movement of people.²³ Massu's men had tight control of the Casbah.

Massu used the Muslim Algerians in the "ilot" system, where one member of every family had responsibility for the whereabouts of the rest of the family members. The family men were responsible to a floor chief; in turn, the floor chiefs were responsible to building chiefs. This chain of responsibility continued all the way to block leaders. This enabled the French to be able to locate anyone quickly.²⁴

Colonel Roger Trinquier, an ardent admirer of Napoleon, used a tactic Napoleon used when administering a captured city, he would number the houses and count and identify the inhabitants. By using the information gained, Trinquier and his men would compile lists of the inhabitants, ask the oldest inhabitant of the house who lived in the building, and crosscheck the facts with names given by the next-door neighbor. Any discrepancies or people who were there that did not belong were considered suspects.²⁵

In spite of these measures, Yacef and la-Pointe continued their bombing campaign of Algiers. As the net cast by Colonel Bigeard tightened around the Casbah, it became increasingly more difficult for Yacef's minions to plant bombs throughout the city. The checkpoints expanded their searches to include women, severely limiting Yacef's freedom of movement in distributing bombs. Once evidence and eyewitness testimony accumulated and pointed to young girls as Yacef's accomplices in placing bombs, French Paras searched all women going through checkpoints.²⁶ This dragnet would seize Yacef's chief bomb transporter and the mason who built many of the tunnels connecting the houses in the Casbah. Their capture revealed the address of the bomb-making factory. Yacef barely slipped away without arrest.²⁷

With the bomb-making network crumbling under the quick work of the French Paras, FLN leaders advised M'Hidi to leave Algiers before capture. Colonel Trinquier, acting on tips that were to lead him to a minor FLN leader, stumbled upon Ben M'Hidi in mid-February. M'hidi's arrest was highly publicized and subsequently handed over to Colonel Bigeard for interrogation.²⁸ Two weeks later, newspapers reported that Ben M'Hidi committed suicide, despite the fact that members of covert intelligence team hanged him.²⁹

By systematically identifying suspects and with enhanced interrogation techniques, Massu's men were able to dismantle the terrorist network that M'Hidi controlled. With M'Hidi's capture and death, Algiers would settle into an uneasy calm. March 1957 would be the first month in a long time that no bombs exploded in Algiers. It seemed the Massu's Paras were victorious, yet Yacef and al-Pointe were still at large.

In May 1957, terrorists gunned down two Paras and in reprisal; Paras targeted a nearby local bathhouse known to be sympathetic to the FLN. The reprisal left almost 80 Muslims dead. Some were just bums that sought shelter in the bathhouse. In vengeance of the overkill brought

on by the Paras, Yacef devised a new series of bombings planted in the bases of lampposts. The resulting detonations wounded nearly 90, some of which were children. The terrorist acts targeted Muslims and *pieds noirs* equally. This fact was not lost on the Muslim population and did not help the FLN cause.³⁰ In order not to further damage Muslim support of the FLN, Yacef chose a target that contained no children or Muslims and was purely *pieds noirs*.

Yacef's men targeted a Casino frequented by *peids noirs* and planted a bomb underneath the orchestra platform. Massu who went to the site to witness nine dead and 85 wounded heard the sound of the explosion. The carnage was unspeakable. The explosion resulted in a young female singer with her legs blown off and the bandleader disemboweled. The outrage from the *pieds noirs* spilled into the streets with attacks on Muslims and their shops ransacked. A mob of 10,000 converged on the Casbah and were turned away by Colonel Trinquier and eventually convinced to disperse.³¹

The hunt for Yacef and la-Pointe was in full force. The systematic apprehension and interrogation of suspected rebels and sympathizers would eventually lead Massu's men to Yacef in August of 1957.³² In October, an explosion killed Ali-la-Pointe when his hideout was surrounded. This, by many, accounts would end the Battle of Algiers.³³

The FLN leadership was either dead or captured. The terrorist network that had entrenched itself within the Casbah was in shambles. The government lifted curfews and life returned to normal in the city. The FLN had to accept that militarily they had lost their terrorist campaign in the city and with that realized the military arm of the FLN would not be able to face the French Army in any type of major confrontation. The French Army had achieved a great tactical victory, but in following years, military and political leaders would scrutinize their methods.

SECTION FOUR: INTERROGATION

No study of the Battle of Algiers would be complete without an in depth view of the interrogation techniques employed by the French and the political consequences of the actions taken by the military. Actionable intelligence was key to destroying the FLN. The use of torture to gain this intelligence was wide spread. General Paul Aussaresses, then a Major working as an intelligence officer, states "...once a country demands that its army fight an enemy who is using terror to compel an indifferent population to join its ranks and provoke repression that will in turn outrage international public opinion, it become impossible for that army to avoid using extreme measures."³⁴

One understands General Aussaresses words after one realizes what the French Army witnessed in Algeria. The attacks at Philipville and Constantine in August 1955 showed the extent of brutality the FLN would resort to. In Philipville, incidents of Muslim Algerians turning on their French neighbor without any remorse showed were numerous. Rebels targeted the 130 French inhabitants near Constantine, in a small town named El-Halia, comprised of 2,000 Muslims. The rebels went house to house and killed the French in the cruelest way possible. Children were chopped up, their throats slit or were crushed to death. Rebels disemboweled or decapitated the women. Men smashed babies against the walls and disemboweled women after raping them. Scenes like this were common throughout Algeria. The goal of such violence was to entice the French into such fierce reprisal that the Muslims would gravitate towards the FLN cause. Such reprisals did come from the French, but many Muslims would equally condemn such acts of the FLN.³⁵

During the battle of the Casbah, over 24,000 people were arrested over a period of nine months.³⁶ Of that number, approximately 3,000 were missing or killed.³⁷ Of the 24,000

arrested, not everyone was tortured.³⁸ Only those that could divulge any type of actionable intelligence were. These included high value targets like M'Hidi³⁹ or influential persons like Henri Alleg, the editor of the local communist newspaper *Alger Republicain*.⁴⁰

The Paras imprisoned Henri Alleg for a month and systematically tortured him. His experience of torture is similar to the experiences of many Muslims the French Paras arrested during the Battle of Algiers. Physical beatings were common as were forms of water torture, dunking of heads in water or force-feeding of water and what is commonly known as water boarding. Less dignified forms of torture include inserting bottles into vaginas and inserting high-pressure hoses in rectums, sometime causing internal ruptures. The most popular form of torture was the use of a portable generator or gegene to apply electric shocks.⁴¹

General Massu subjected himself to the electric shocks, but most probably not to the extent that Major Aussaresses utilized it or to the extent that Henri Alleg experience.⁴² In recounting his experience in his book, Alleg states, "...he pushed the naked wire as far as he could, right to the back of the palate, ...set the magneto in motion. I could feel the intensity of the current increasing, and my throat, my whole jaw, all the muscles of my face up to my eyelids contracted in a contortion that become more agonizing. My eyes were crossed with images of fire, and geometric luminous patterns flashed in front of them."⁴³

Major Aussaresses protests that he never tortured or killed anyone that was innocent. In his words, those he did put to the gegene or other methods were terrorists that were directly involved in attacks.⁴⁴ This group included the triggermen and women, the bomb maker, the lookout, the driver, and the chemist. Anyone who had a role in creating the terrorist act was equally guilty in Aussaresses's mind. Aussaresses does not waffle in his stance on torture. In a 2002 interview on the CBS news show *60 Minutes*, he was unhesitant when he said that he

would use torture on Al Queda operatives. On the same show, Harvard Law professor Alan Dershowitz agreed that the use of torture could be justified.⁴⁵

General Roger Trinquier, then a Lieutenant Colonel and intelligence officer on Massu's staff, viewed the Battle of Algiers like any other battle, the goal of which was the destruction of the enemy army or their surrender. He was not reluctant to the use of torture in interrogations, but was very systematic in its use. Trinquier states, "Interrogations in *modern warfare* should be conducted by specialists perfectly versed in the techniques to be employed." If the prisoner gives up the information quickly, then the interrogation is over.⁴⁶

Trinquier was very specific in stating interrogation questioning should be directly related to the background of the prisoner. He stated, "It is useless to ask a funds collector about caches of weapons or bombs. Every clandestine organization is strictly compartmented, and he would know nothing about them. To ask him would be a useless waste of time. On the other hand, he does know to whom he remits the funds and under what conditions. This is the only subject about which he should be questioned." Extraction of meaningful, actionable intelligence happened only by placing the prisoner exactly within the framework of the FLN and ZAA. This required Trinquier and Aussaresses to infiltrate those networks as deep as they could. To do this, they used torture.⁴⁷

Not everyone in the French Army shared Trinquier or Aussaresses' views on the need or necessity of torture. Major Jean Pouget, commander of the 584th Battalion recounted a situation where a prisoner brought to him that had evidence of being beat. Major Pouget punched the conscript responsible for the prisoner's beating twice in the face, reprimanding the soldier by stating, "That is on behalf of the prisoner... do not forget that a prisoner is a disarmed soldier. He is no longer an enemy and could be a friend tomorrow. ...prisoners will be treated as they

were already our comrades!”⁴⁸

General Jacques de Bollardiere shared a similar position with Pouget. After he arrived in Algiers, he protested his orders to Massu stating the orders were “in absolute opposition to the respect of man, which was the foundation of my life.” Bollardiere requested reassignment from Algiers back to France. Upon his return to France, he wrote a letter subsequently published in *L'Express* expressing his displeasure at the policy that Massu had instituted in Algiers. No matter what actionable intelligence torture could bring, Bollardiere stated, “[We] would lose sight, under the fallacious pretext of immediate expediency, of the moral values which created... the grandeur of our civilization and of our army.” For his outburst, Bollardiere was sentenced to 60 days solitary confinement.⁴⁹

Shortly after Bollardiere expressed his displeasure to Massu, Paul Teitgen, the Secretary General tendered his resignation to Governor General Lacoste. Teitgen, a member of the French resistance in World War Two was sent to Dauchau concentration camp and tortured on nine occasions. Teitgen recognized wounds on prisoners that he himself had suffered at the hands of the Gestapo. He feared that “France risks losing her soul through equivocation.” Lacoste convinced him not to resign and keep the letter secret, but six months later, he would quit.⁵⁰

It is not the intent to justify or denounce the practice of torture used by the French Paras during the Battle of Algiers, but to paint a picture of contradiction. Clearly not everyone within the military or the government condoned such tactics. Massu never openly ordered such tactics used, but at the conclusion of the war, he affirmed such practices took place.⁵¹ Trinquier and Aussaresses both view the use of torture as another weapon at their disposal in fighting the FLN, showing neither remorse nor enthusiasm for their actions. It is clear to the observer that without the actionable intelligence obtained by men like Trinquier and Aussaresses, the Battle of Algiers

would not have been so successful.

Political and public outcry over the release of reports and allegations of torture overshadowed the tactical victory achieved by the French Army in Algiers. Bollardiere's letter and Henri Alleg's book, *The Question*, would change public and political support of war away from the French Army. The torture and acts of military violence had the immediate effect of transformation of the Algerian population in enemies of France.⁵²

SECTION FIVE: DESTROYING THE ENEMY

The Handbook on Counterinsurgency published by the Department of the Army draws upon a wide range of resources and experiences of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. Listed in the bibliography are the works of French COIN theorists Roger Trinquier and David Galula, but the omissions of Galula's First Step in Counterinsurgent Operations, the Destruction and Expulsion of the Insurgent Forces and Trinquier's Modern Warfare principle of destroying the enemy are unwarranted. Prior to the publication of the handbook, it is obvious the writers conducted heavy research and studies of the experiences of the French Army in Indochina and Algeria. This is evident when one reviews the table of contents. Many of the chapter subjects in the handbook are similar to the issues that Trinquier and Galula discuss such as the aspects of an insurgency and the importance of politics and the people. The subject of Intelligence is of such importance that the chapter is sub-divided into seven sections. A chapter that FM 3-24 needs is one focused on destroying the Enemy.

The Army's ability to destroy the enemy pinpoints the success of the French Army in Algiers. The use of actionable intelligence and rapid deployment of mobile forces eradicated most of the terrorist network in Algiers within three months. Within nine months, the 10th Para Division had accomplished its mission and left the city of Algiers. FM 3-24 provides extensive

guidance on Intelligence, Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations, Developing Host Nation Security Forces and Leadership and Ethics,⁵³ it only provides less than one page to killing the enemy under the sub-subject of Clearing the Area and a one paragraph covering neutralizing bad actors during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.⁵⁴

Violence, an aspect that is prevalent in all insurgencies, is mentioned throughout the handbook, but more emphasis is placed on the mission of diminishing support to the insurgency than it is on destroying the enemy. COIN forces should localize and destroy insurgent forces.⁵⁵ Galula covers the tactic of using mobile forces and static forces. The mobile forces would be used first to eradicate the enemy in a given area. Then employ static forces to provide security and participate in civic actions on a lower level.⁵⁶ Once the static forces are in place, what insurgents remain is isolated from their safe havens and they must either give up the insurgency or continue to be destroyed. Trinquier stated, "The fight must be organized methodically and conducted with unremitting patience and resolution."⁵⁷

SECTION SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

While many parallels can be made as to the tactics used by the FLN and the ones used by Al Qaeda, and the strategic failures of the French government and of the American government, one can look at Algeria and say that is the blueprint for successfully defeating an insurgency. There are lessons learned that can be directly applied to today's battlefield. The French Army conducted COIN operations in the countryside and when the mission brought them to the alleys of the Casbah, they applied many of the principles of COIN to the city. Four points of consideration can be drawn from the Battle of the Casbah: make a vested interest, military actions have political consequences, cut the insurgents off from the population that supports them with food, shelter, money, etc; and destroy the enemy.

The protection of the population is vital to the success of the counter insurgency and enough forces must be available to show there is a vested interest in the safety and security of the population. France deployed one half million troops to Algeria to provide security and fight the insurgency. Protection of the population cannot fall upon foreign troops alone. Host nation forces must be involved and local police.

Afghanistan is one-third the size of Algeria or the size of Texas, but with a population three times that of Algeria, almost 30 million. French COIN theorists Roger Trinquier⁵⁸ and David Galula point out that the population is the key to defeating an insurgency and to accomplish that, the people must be controlled.⁵⁹ FM 3-24 states that long-term success in COIN depends on the people and that security and rule of law must be provided.⁶⁰ The French Army deployed half a million troops to provide security and control a population of 10 million.

The 90,000 troops the United States has committed to Afghanistan pales in comparison and is not sufficient to achieve success similar to what the French Army accomplished in Algeria. FM 3-24 recommends 20 to 25 counterinsurgents to every 1,000 inhabitants as a minimum troop density to conduct effective COIN operations.⁶¹ The troop density includes host nation military, police and foreign counterinsurgents. Based on that ratio, there should be a minimum of 600,000 troops to conduct the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan based on the current population of almost 30 million. The total number of International Security Assistance Forces is 130,000 and added to the targeted end strength of the Afghan National Army of 171,600 troops;⁶² the largest possible number of forces that Afghanistan would be able to muster is barely half of the minimum the Handbook on COIN calls for.⁶³

If a shortfall still exists, incorporation of the indigenous population in a system of defense against insurgent or terrorist activities is required. The French Army did this by systematically

dividing the city or town into smaller administrative sectors and assigning a trusted native that carries influence within the administrative sector, one gains an extra set of eyes and ears on the ground. It is up to the sector chief to assign trusted deputies or assistants all the way down to the family level. This spread the responsibility of security throughout the populace. Any insurgent sympathizers or attempted infiltration by the enemy into this network would be extremely hard.

The key to this relationship is trust. The native that accepts such a position as a block chief or building chief is announcing clearly to both friendly and non-friendly where his loyalties lay. This choice is made in light of great risk to their personal safety and that of their family. In return for this loyalty and trust, reward it with protection from harm, but reward does not need to end at purely military endeavors. The U.S. must continue to provide humanitarian assistance and initiated civil projects. Merely providing brute force in response to enemy aggression will not ensure the continued support of the populace and the military must work to improve the over all situation of the populace.

Control of the population through a system of checkpoints, curfews and surprise home inspections makes it difficult for the enemy to operate. Their safe haven is gone, their support base has dwindled and their freedom of movement is restricted. Continuous exploitation of these enemy disadvantages is required to ensure the safety of the population. Once the population feels secure, the enemy has no recourse than either to escalate their terrorist campaign, risking exposure and death or to cease their insurgent activities.

Military actions of the French Army had political consequences. The use of torture in the interrogation of prisoners was effective for the French Army, but in the long term, it cost them dearly in the minds of the Algerians and native Frenchman alike. It is incomprehensible to think a country that espouses liberty and suffered so much at the hands of the Nazis during World War

Two would resort to acts of torture. Once evidence of the torture tactics reached public exposure, political support for the war diminished throughout France.

Population security is a goal of COIN, but the true measure of success must be in the eradication and destruction of the enemy or insurgent. This is done either by killing the insurgent or making the environment he operates in so prohibitive to insurgent activities that he capitulates. All the points of consideration and the examples of tactics used in the Battle of Algiers discussed in this paper aimed at destroying the insurgent to allow the population to live without fear under the established government.

An insurgency must be identified quickly. France was slow in addressing the growing threat of the FLN in Algiers, leaving the police to handle such unrest. Unfortunately, the police were not manned, trained nor equipped to confront such a unique situation. In the future, the United States will continue to find itself in foreign lands and in similar situations; ready to rapidly deploy its armed forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations in order to provide security to the local populace.

Endnotes

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- ³¹ Horne, *A Savage War of Peace 1954-1962*, 209-211.
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