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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Considering the significant budgetary and manpower constraints being levied upon the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the sustained foreseeable heavy reliance on the Reserve Component (RC), it is vitally important that the Marine Corps incorporate potential refinements to enable the most efficient and advantageous recruitment for the total force. One such refinement could be realized by the tailoring Active Component (AC) recruitment to a model which gives enhanced consideration to the manning requirements of the RC. Considering the fact that a large percentage of those who serve in the AC ultimately return to the same geographic region from which they entered service, the Marine Corps is missing an opportunity to harvest greater returns on its investment by not establishing a connection between the AC recruiting missions and the needs of the proximal reserve units. By establishing this connection, the Marine Corps has the potential to retain valuable experience, enhance the investment on training dollars, and to foster a culture which encourages the continuum of service. The end result of this transition is an opportunity to better meet the needs of the AC and the RC, while simultaneously enhancing the relationship between the Marine Corps and the individual Marine.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**TITLE:**  
**SHOULD THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS REFINE ITS SYSTEM OF ACTIVE  
COMPONENT ENLISTED RECRUITMENT IN ORDER TO TARGET THE NEEDS OF  
SELECT MARINE CORPS RESERVE UNITS?**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
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
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** Should the United States Marine Corps Refine its System of Active Component Enlisted Recruitment in Order to Target the Needs of Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units?

**Author:** Major Jason E. Burkett, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** If the Marine Corps were to modify its Active Component (AC) enlisted recruitment system, thereby factoring into the planning considerations the forecast Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) manning requirements of regional Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units, it would be postured to realize significant improvements in SMCR unit manning, retention of credible occupational experience, and building of a “Continuum of Service” commitment, while simultaneously reducing budgetary expenditures.

**Discussion:** Given the Marine Corps’ current, and foreseeable future, budgetary constraints, in conjunction with the anticipated continued unprecedented usage of the Reserve Component (RC), it is crucial that the Marine Corps review its recruitment business model in order to incorporate refinements which will more efficiently support the total force. Although a peripheral degree of liaison between the AC and RC recruitment efforts does exist, there is currently no direct connection between the individual SMCR unit’s forecast MOS manning requirements and the AC missions assigned to their respective regional recruiting stations.

Based on the analysis of the 372,771 Marines who left the AC between 30 September 1998 and 31 December 2011, 48.2% returned to the same relative geographic region from which they entered the AC. More specifically, the ideal enlisted candidates, those who leave the AC after 36-60 months of service, have a 57.3% probability of returning to the same region. Considering these migratory statistical prospects, the Marine Corps has the opportunity to harvest notable gains by targeting a larger percentage of the AC recruiting missions assigned to specific recruiting stations as based upon the forecast MOS manning needs of proximal SMCR units.

In addition to honing an increased portion of AC recruits based on the MOS needs of regional SMCR units, the USMC also needs to take proactive actions in order to establish a climate which is conducive to AC Marines transitioning over to the SMCR. These actions need to include developing alternate enlisted contractual options whereby recruits would be offered the opportunity to serve two to four years in the AC followed by two to four years obligated SMCR service. Additionally, as Marines transition out of the AC they need to be provided considerably enhanced information with regard to RC and SMCR opportunities. The net result of these changes will not only be cost savings and the retention of experience, but they will further serve as a potential catalyst for the genesis necessary to bring the “Continuum of Service” philosophy to reality.

**Conclusion:** If implemented, this shift in the recruiting business model will not solve all of the USMC’s manning and fiscal challenges. However, considering the limited cost associated with this transition, as opposed to the potential significant gains, as identified by the statistical analysis, it would be a mistake for the Marine Corps to not have the vision necessary to refine its recruiting process. Although presenting a change in the recruiting paradigm will meet significant resistance, the potential gains to the USMC overall, and to the individual Marines, are such that this recommendation merits consideration at the highest levels.

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## DISCLAIMER

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## ***INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW***

### ***Introduction***

Upon consideration of the United States Marine Corps' (USMC's) current, and foreseeable future, fiscal constraints, in conjunction with the inherent organizational responsibility to be prudent stewards of the tax dollars allocated, it becomes clear that there exists an absolute necessity for the USMC to identify and incorporate all available measures to reduce costs while maximizing on investments. Due to the fact that the costs associated with manpower consume approximately 60% of the USMC's over-all budget, the manner in which the USMC recruits and retains its personnel must be closely scrutinized and refined as possible.<sup>1</sup> One such area in which the USMC could potentially realize the benefits of increased efficiencies is in the seam between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) recruiting.

### ***Purpose and Focus***

The purpose of this paper is to propose, and objectively analyze, a potential modification to the USMC's recruiting and retention model, with the intent being to reduce costs, increase efficiencies, and maximize on the returns on investments made, by enhancing the coordination and vision between the AC and RC with regard to enlisted recruitment. Specifically, the analysis will assess the foreseeable cost and benefits associated with transitioning to an AC recruitment module that gives enriched consideration to the specific forecast needs of regional SMCR units. This assessment will be considered through the lenses of the current AC and RC recruitment models, USMC expenditure analysis, and the statistical analysis of the migration patterns of AC Marines upon their separation from the AC.

## ***Background***

During the preceding 10 years, the Marine Corps has relied upon the unprecedented sustained personnel augmentation from its Reserve component, in order to enable its successful support of multiple operations and engagements to include Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and the Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO). This unparalleled continuous support has equated to 75,705 USMC reserve activations between 11 September 2001 and 17 January 2012, with 64% of the entire reserve population having been activated at least once.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of the RC's sustained employment, in conjunction with their anticipated continued programmed usage, the role of the reserve force has shifted from the Cold War mentality of the reserves as a strategic asset available only in response to national emergency, to its current construct as a reliable "operational reserve." This perspective was codified by Congress in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 National Defense Appropriation Act (NDAA), wherein it stated that "the purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified personnel not just as the result of involuntary mobilizations but whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the active component."<sup>3</sup> This construct was then further reinforced on 31 December 2011, when President Obama signed the FY 2012 NDAA into law, specifically giving the military services the legal authority to "order to active duty units of the Selected Reserve for preplanned missions in support of the combatant commands."<sup>4</sup> This official transition cements the heightened roles and responsibilities prescribed to the reserve forces for the future. With this change in paradigm comes the necessity to build and maintain an appropriately manned, trained, and equipped reserve force, which, given the current fiscally constrained realities facing the USMC, and the Department of Defense (DoD) overall, will present a distinct challenge.

However, with this challenge comes opportunity, as it has the potential to serve as the catalyst necessary to spur the creativity and open-mindedness required for a comprehensive critical review of, and modification to, the USMC’s policies, procedures, and incentives used for the recruiting and retention of all Marines.

***STRUCTURE OF THE MARINE CORPS TOTAL FORCE***

The Marine Corps Total Force is made up of two components, the AC and the RC, which as of 20 January 2012 totaled 381,784 Marines, with 200,493, or 52.5%, residing within the AC, and 181,291, or 47.5%, residing within the RC. As depicted in Figure (1), the RC is comprised of three component parts, the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve, with subcomponents resident within each part. An expanded perspective of the manpower associated with each component and sub-component, as of 20 January 2012, is provided in Figure (2).

Figure 1. Components of the Marine Corps Reserve<sup>5</sup>





Figure 2. Manpower Composition of the Marine Corps Total Force<sup>6</sup>



The Ready Reserve is that portion of the RC which is tasked with providing forces available for immediate recall in the event of national emergency or any other mandated requirement. The Ready Reserve is comprised of two parts, the Selected Reserves (SelRes) and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The SelRes is comprised of the Active Reserve (AR), the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Units, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). As has been the case since FY 2001, and was again solidified for FY 2012 per the 2012 NDAA, the USMC authorized end strength of the SelRes is limited to 39,600 Marines. Because the SMCR is the principle RC organization to be focused on for the purpose of this thesis, supplemental insight will be provided with regard to this organization in the paragraph that follows. The AR is comprised of reservists who serve on full-time active duty in order to provide the necessary administration, recruiting, retention, instruction, training, and advocacy for the RC, and who serve as the liaison between the AC and RC. IMAs are individual reservists assigned to an AC organizational billet in order to meet the requirements associated with the support of mobilizations. The IRR is the Commandant of the Marine Corps' (CMC's)

manpower pool, comprised primarily of trained individuals who can be activated as required, but who have no associated unit affiliation or organization. Due to the fact that the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve branches of the RC have little impact on this thesis they will not be discussed further herein.<sup>i</sup>

Figure 3. Marine Corps SMCR Unit Locations Across the United States and its Territories<sup>7</sup>



The SMCR is the amalgamation of all reserve units under the command of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). These units fall either directly under the command of the Commander MARFORRES (Force Level Assets), or are under the organizational command of one of the MARFORRES Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), which are the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Division, the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Air Wing, and the 4<sup>th</sup> Marine Logistics Group. In total there are 327 SMCR units, which are located at 183 different sites throughout the United States (to include Hawaii, Alaska, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico).<sup>8</sup> As depicted in Figure (3), every state, with the exception of South Dakota and Vermont, has at least one SMCR unit residing within its borders, with most

<sup>i</sup> Significant supplemental granularity on the breakdown, subcomponents, associated missions, etc. of the USMC Reserve can be obtained from Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1001R.1K.

hosting several. Additionally, these individual reserve locations frequently serve as the Home Training Center (HTC) for more than one SMCR unit.

## ***DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM***

### ***Budget Restraints***

As a result of the downturn of the global economy, in conjunction with the American population's growing weariness resultant from the preceding decade at war, the Department of Defense (DoD) finds itself facing significant budgetary reductions. For the DoD overall this translates to a Congressionally mandated budgetary decline (including the reduction in OCO funding) that will amount to \$41 billion less in FY 2012 as opposed to FY 2011, with an additional \$32 billion in cuts to be incorporated in FY 2013.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, as expanded upon in Appendix (A), the budget will be reduced by \$259 billion over the next five years (FY 2013 - FY 2017) and \$487 billion over the next ten years (FY 2012 – FY 2021).<sup>10</sup> Per the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Leon Panetta, "The 2013 defense budget request to be announced in the coming weeks reflects a lot of hard choices. When you cut a half trillion dollars from the defense budget, it affects almost every area in the defense budget."<sup>11</sup>

### ***Manpower Reductions***

A reality of the fiscal constraints facing the USMC is the necessity to make what Commandant James F. Amos referred to as difficult decisions as to which "lever to pull" with regard to where to incorporate cuts, and specifically on how much of the Marine Corps manpower end-strength to reduce, and from which core capability or grouping of Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs).<sup>12</sup> This same requirement for reduced military manning was echoed by President Obama on 5 January 2012, when he stated that the DoD would "ensure our

security with smaller conventional ground forces," adding that the armed forces "will be leaner" but "agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats."<sup>13</sup> Although time will be the final arbiter as to what the USMC manpower landscape will ultimately look like after the cuts transpire, what has been stated is that over the next five years the AC will be reduced to a force of not more than 182,000 Marines, which equates to a reduction of least 20,000 AC Marines, or approximately 10% of the total AC.<sup>14</sup> It is important to note, however, that the Reserve SelRes and Active Status manpower levels are anticipated to remain at their current authorized allocation.<sup>15</sup> This perspective was further reinforced within the DoD Strategic Management Plan FY 2012 – FY 2013, wherein it establishes the milestones that the DoD Reserve Component end-strength will vary by not more than (+/-) 3% during FY 2012 and FY 2013.<sup>16</sup>

### ***Foreseeable Continued Heavy Reliance on the Reserve Component***

Although the AC manpower is being reduced, the operational requirements being levied on the Marine Corps are not. In fact, manpower reductions being levied upon the Army (amounting to a reduction of more than 80,000 AC Soldiers) are going to result in an increase in the expectation that the USMC be forward postured and prepared to engage at a moment's notice.<sup>17</sup> An example of this is the fact that two of the four Army brigades currently stationed in Europe will be stood-down, and USMC will be required to place enhanced emphasis on training with European partners, as well as providing potential immediate engagement capabilities.<sup>18</sup>

With the anticipated diminished USMC AC manpower end-strength, in conjunction with the unrelenting high operational tempo, comes the necessity for the continued substantial reliance on the RC. On 15 February 2012, SECDEF Panetta noted that keeping a smaller force

effective requires a strong and robust National Guard and reserve force that can mobilize quickly, a robust industrial base capable of responding to urgent military equipment needs, and a core of highly trained active-duty troops.<sup>19</sup> As stated previously, Congress and the President have already set the stage to enable the usage of reserve forces in an operational capacity. However, in order for the reserves to be capable of meeting these momentous expectations, they absolutely must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped. Specifically, the SMCR units must be manned at, or near, their authorized Table of Organization (T/O), with Marines who have the requisite rank, MOS, and experience necessary to accomplish their assigned unit's mission.

#### ***SMCR Requirements Are Not Considered When AC Recruiting Missions Are Established***

As will be expanded upon in greater detail in the sections that follow, there is currently no consideration given to the forecast manning requirements of SMCR units when assigning AC missions to their regional recruiting stations. Although the same recruiters carry the responsibility of sourcing both AC and RC missions, it is only their assigned reserve missions that give any consideration to the requirements of the SMCR units located in the vicinity of their recruiting region. As a result of this disconnect, those Marines, who, upon separation from the AC, return to the same relative geographic region that they resided in when they entered the USMC (hereafter referred to as their Home of Record [HOR]), are statistically less likely to have an MOS that correlates with the specific critical MOS requirements of their proximal SMCR unit(s) than they would have been had their recruitment been tied to considerations of MOS needs of the regional SMCR units. Therefore, the USMC is missing the opportunity to fully benefit from its investments by harvesting Prior Service (PS) Marines within the SMCR who otherwise would have been MOS matches, with corresponding AC experience, and could have

seamlessly transitioned into open billets with SMCR units in the vicinity of their HOR. Furthermore, the ability for an AC Marine to begin his period of duty with either a contractual connection to an specific SMCR unit in the vicinity of their HOR, or with the insight that they have the specific MOS experience needed by their proximal SMCR unit(s) will increase the potential that the Marine will go on establish a long term relationship with the USMC in both the AC and RC, thereby fostering and giving life to that Marine's "Continuum of Service" (see Appendix (B)).<sup>ii</sup>

## ***MARINE CORPS ENLISTED RECRUITING***

### ***Overview of the Current USMC Enlisted Recruiting Process***

The Marine Corps executes its recruiting mission using a Total Force approach, whereby one agency, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), supports the recruiting requirements for all needed AC and RC enlisted Marines. Annually, the forecast manpower requirements are submitted to MCRC by the Marine Corps Manpower Plans and Policy (MP) division and the Marine Corps Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) branch for AC requirements, and Marine Corps Reserve Affairs (in conjunction with input from Marine Forces Reserve [MARFORRES]) for RC requirements. These identified recruiting requirements are then distributed by MCRC to their six Marine Corps Recruiting Districts, who, in turn assign this annual mission to their respective regional recruiting stations for solicitation and sourcing. Additionally, as high priority manpower shortfalls emerge throughout the year, they, too, are pushed through MCRC to the districts for immediate action.

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<sup>ii</sup> The concept of enabling Marines to easily shift from AC to various categories of RC and potentially back into the AC as it fits their personal life realities is referred to as the "Continuum of Service" mentality. Appendix (B) provides a philosophical model of how this would occur.

Due to the fact that the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC, M&RA) maintains functional control over MP, MCRC, and Reserve Affairs (RA), the Marine Corps is perfectly postured to enable enhanced coordination between AC and RC recruiting for the benefit of the Total Force. With all three functional areas falling under this same umbrella, there exists an unfettered opportunity to implement valuable system improvement modifications as identified, in order to maximize the recruiting, training, and manpower investments made by the USMC.


### *Manning the AC*

In order to satisfy the requirements of the AC, regional recruiters identify potential candidates who, based on test scores, aptitudes, and personal desires, are contracted into a functional occupational program, also known as a “Program Enlisted For” (PEF). These PEFs are tied to the USMC’s specific annual requirements, and are either linked to a particular MOS or, as is more common, are associated with a combination of multiple similar MOSs.<sup>20</sup> This listing of available programs is modified annually, with 35 assorted PEFs currently being offered for FY 2012.<sup>21</sup> The purpose of the PEFs is to ensure the USMC is getting the needed mix of occupational specialties in order to meet the specific requirements of the Corps, while also giving potential recruits foresight and input as to which program they are enlisting. It is important to note that these program assignments have no geographic link associated with them, and missions are simply divided up among the recruiting stations as deemed most appropriate by MCRC and the Recruiting Districts. As such, there is no current connection whatsoever between the PEFs assigned to a given region, and that region’s inherent SMCR unit requirements.

## Manning the RC

As with the AC, the RC's recruiting requirements are provided to recruiters via MCRC as part of the total FY mission. However, a significant difference is that the reserve mission is broken into two groups, those with prior military service (PS), and those without prior service, or non-prior service (NPS). NPS recruits are sourced by the same recruiters that source to the AC requirements, whereas PS recruiting actions are conducted by specifically tasked PS recruiters (PSRs). As expanded upon below in Figure (4), in an average year, the SMCR needs approximately 9,000 Marines to be recruited. Of this total, the standard planning metric is for 70% to come from NPS recruiting and the remaining 30% from the PS community.<sup>22</sup>

Figure 4. Reserve Recruiting Missions FY 2001 - FY 2010<sup>23</sup>




Because of the specific unit and regional ties associated with SMCR recruiting, SMCR recruitments are typically honed by a designated Quota Serial Number (QSN) which is linked to the specific requirement. These QSNs contain the corresponding recruiting requirement's specific or geographic unit indicator (a.k.a. Reporting Unit Code [RUC]), billet, MOS, and any

other pertinent billet information with regard to the needed individual (i.e. security clearance eligibility). Because these QSNs are tied to a specific billet and SMCR unit, the SMCR recruits identified must reside within a reasonable commuting distance from the SMCR HTC (typically not more than 100 miles), and are contracted for the specific needed MOS as opposed to the general PEF given to AC recruits.

***Enlisted Recruit Contracting***

As depicted by Figure (5), several variations of enlistment contracts are available, with the total duration of the contracts equaling eight years of service. However, the vast majority of initial entry AC enlisted recruits are contracted for four years of obligated AC service followed by four years of service within a segment of the Ready Reserve. This latter portion of obligated reserve service can be exchanged for extended AC service should the recruit decide to reenlist and extend their initial AC contractual obligation. For those who are contracted directly into RC service, the initial SMCR time can vary between four, six, or eight years of obligated SMCR service.

Figure 5. Configurations of Eight-Year Military Service Obligation (MSO) Contracts<sup>24</sup>



## ***ENLISTED MANNING POSTURE OF THE SMCR***

The USMC's SelRes manning has historically been maintained at, or in close proximity to, its authorized end strength. Likewise, the overall manning of the SMCR as a whole has also historically maintained manning levels near the authorized total Table of Organization (T/O). However, due to several inherent confounding variables, this does not translate seamlessly to appropriately manned SMCR units. The issues causing this disconnect are as follows.

First, there are several units which have historically been consistently manned well below their authorized T/O; however, these units are simultaneously counterbalanced by other units which are consistently manned well above their T/O. As a result, the whole of the SMCR appears healthy in overall manning, even though certain units are consistently considerably short. Second, as a whole, SMCR units are well manned in the junior enlisted ranks of Private through Corporal (E1 to E4); however, they are frequently short in the more senior enlisted ranks, particularly Sergeant and Staff Sergeant (E5 and E6). This reality is reinforced in detail by Figures (6) and (7).

Third, and arguably the factor that enables the continuation of the first and second issues, is the fact that it was only recently that steps were taken by MARFORRES to require SMCR units to accurately reflect their unit's billet assignments, and thereby enable a valid assessment of the units' manning posture. MARFORRES is facilitating this vision by requiring SMCR unit diary clerks to assign each unit member to an appropriate individual Billet Indication Code (BIC) within the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). The allocated BICs correspond with the respective unit's T/O, and each BIC is tied to a specific billet and therefore has prescribed associated rank and MOS requirements. BIC assignment is not a new requirement for SMCR

units, however, historically there was no enforcement of the BIC assignment process, and as a result it was abused and without value.

Figure 6. SMCR Unit Pvt – Cpl (E1-E4) Manning Patterns by State FY 2008 - FY 2010<sup>25</sup>





Figure 7. SMCR Unit Sgt - SSgt (E5-E6) Manning Patterns by State FY 2008 - FY 2010<sup>26</sup>



Once completely purged of erroneous data, the BICs will enable RA, MARFORRES, and all other interested agencies to see an accurate depiction of the manning reality of each SMCR unit. However, this transition remains a work in progress. As of 13 December 2011, there were 654 Marines without an assigned BIC, and 6,698 with an invalid, bad, excess, or duplicated BIC. Furthermore, of those BICs which have been correctly assigned, there were 285 grade mismatches and 416 MOS mismatches. An indication of the positive direction of these efforts however is the fact that more than 23,000 BICs have been assigned and deemed to be in line with the T/O.<sup>27</sup>

## ***STATISTICAL ANALYSIS***

### ***The Data***

Before presenting the statistical findings evidenced by the data analysis, it is important to expand upon the capabilities and limitations of the data which was used. In an attempt to develop a reliable picture of the migratory habits of Marines upon leaving the AC, the respective data was harvested from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) looking specifically at the timeframe of 30 September 1998 through 31 December 2011. This expansive period of time was selected in order to establish a reliable depiction of the migration patterns of Marines during periods of both war and peace, as well as during times of relative financial strength and economic weakness. Furthermore, this extended period enabled a sampling population large enough to establish a reliable statistical analysis, with the post AC migration habits of more than 370,000 Marines being analyzed.

However, it must also be noted that there are limitations to the data available. Due to the fact that the TFDW data was harvested from monthly snapshots taken from the Marine Corps

Total Force System (MCTFS), it will only be as accurate as the data populated within MCTFS. As such, of the 372,771 total Marines who left the AC during this timeframe, complete workable data was only available for 337,336, or 90.5% of the total identified population. Additionally, due to the sheer volume of individuals being considered, migration patterns were determined by identifying those who did, or did not, return to the same state as their HOR upon leaving the AC. By considering the information through this lens, two principle inherent realities must be accepted. First, a Marine could have returned to the same state as his HOR and still be a considerable distance from their actual HOR city. Conversely, those who have been identified as returning to a different state could still have possibly returned to the same relative region but be residing in a state which borders their HOR state. This is particularly an issue when considering the smaller states in the Northeastern region of the United States.

Finally, due to the combination of the volume of individuals being considered and the limited reliable respective data fields available, this statistical analysis does not take the potentially contributory issues of the individual's race, level of education, or social/economic status into consideration when developing migratory probabilities. Notwithstanding these limitations and considerations, the analysis of the migratory activities of the sample population, through the filter of the data available, was sufficient to establish the philosophical migratory probabilities of AC Marines upon detachment from their AC service.

### *Sample Population*

Based upon the information resident within the TFDW, a review of all Marines who detached from the AC during the period of 30 September 1998 to 31 December 2011 yields a

total population of 372,771 Marines. This composition of this population can be further broken down as expanded upon in Table (1):

Table 1. Total Population Departing the AC from 30 September 1998 - 31 December 2011

<b>TOTAL POPULATION: 372,771</b>	
<b>15,250 Officers (4.1%)</b>	<b>357,521 Enlisted Marines (95.9%)</b>
2,012 Warrant Officers	139,275 Jr Marines (Pvt-LCpl)
6,435 Company Grade Officers	185,660 NCOs (Cpl-Sgt)
6,685 Field Grade Officers	32,586 SNCOs
118 General Officers	

From this total population, by excluding those with missing, incomplete, or untraceable geographic data fields, the residual population available for statistical consideration breaks down as presented in Table (2) as follows:

Table 2. Population with all Data Necessary for Statistical Analysis

<b>TRACKABLE POPULATION: 337,336</b>	
<b>14,608 Officers (4.3%)</b>	<b>322,728 Enlisted Marines (95.7%)</b>
1,934 Warrant Officers	110,218 Jr Marines (Pvt-LCpl)
6,049 Company Grade Officers	180,799 NCOs (Cpl-Sgt)
6,509 Field Grade Officers	31,711 SNCOs
116 General Officers	

Of this residual population to be analyzed, the service member macro level point of original AC entry, or HOR statistics, are as presented within Table (3) as follows:

Table 3. Macro Level Locations from which Marines Joined the AC

	<b>LOCATION FROM WHICH MEMBERS JOINED THE AC</b>			
	<b>CONUS</b>	<b>Hawaii or Alaska</b>	<b>U.S. Territory</b>	<b>Foreign Country</b>
<b>Total</b>	334,529 (99.17%)	1,745 (0.52%)	856 (0.25%)	207 (0.06%)
<b>Officer</b>	14,482	64	47	17
<b>Enlisted</b>	320,047	1,681	809	190

Specific details on the corresponding numbers of AC Marines who originate from each state are provided in Appendix (C). The five states from which the largest numbers of AC

Marines originate their AC service (the HOR of approximately 36% of the total population) are as presented in Table (4) as follows:

Table 4. States with the Largest Number of AC HORs


STATE	OVERALL		ENLISTED (ALL RANKS)		ENLISTED (36-60 MOS SVC)	
	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF SAMPLE POP	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF SAMPLE POP	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF SAMPLE POP
CA	36,087	10.73%	34,912	10.85%	22,878	11.75%
TX	31,492	9.36%	30,376	9.44%	19,305	9.92%
FL	20,838	6.20%	19,954	6.20%	11,384	5.85%
NY	19,448	5.78%	18,449	5.73%	10,621	5.46%
OH	15,341	4.56%	14,693	4.57%	8,504	4.37%

### *Statistical Findings*

In order to substantiate the hypothesis that the assignment of AC recruiting missions should be tied to the regional SMCR unit requirements, the first statistic that must be established is the degree to which there exists a correlation between an AC Marine's HOR, and the geographic location in which they choose to reside upon their detachment from the AC. Analyzing the migratory activities of the previously discussed 337,336 Marines, the degree to which a correlation exists is captured in the table provided under Appendix (D).

Of note, this table captures return probability broken-out not only by state, but further looks at this information through the lenses of the total population, the enlisted population only, and the specific portion of the enlisted population who separate from the AC after only 36 to 60 months service. This third sub group is specifically broken out and considered due to the fact that it represents the population with the greatest potential for continued service and positive impact on the SMCR. This group is therefore identified as the population of key potential candidates which should be targeted for transition to the SMCR.

Figure 8. Return Probability of AC Marines by State (30 September 1998 - 31 December 2011)




As a result of this analysis, it was identified that the overall population had a 48.2% probability of returning to the same state from with they entered AC. More specifically, the enlisted population had a 49% return probability, whereas the target population of enlisted Marines who transitioned out of the AC after 36 to 60 months AC service had a 57.3% return probability. Specifically focusing on this target enlisted population, the five states with the highest return probability were California with 83.6%, North Carolina with 75.3%, Texas with 57.5%, Wisconsin with 57.3%, and Arizona with 57.1%. Of additional note, these five states comprise the HOR for 28.1% of this target population. Conversely, the states with the lowest return probability for this target group were Hawaii at 42.4%, Mississippi at 47.5%, Arkansas at 47.6%, North Dakota at 48.7%, and Rhode Island at 49.1%. These findings are provided in detail in Appendix (D) and a snapshot is also graphically captured and presented in Figure (8).

Shifting the focus to the length of total AC service performed, an analysis was conducted in order to identify any correlation that exists between a Marine’s HOR state and the average

amount of AC performed. The detailed findings of this analysis are captured and provided in Appendix (E), and a graphic depiction of these findings is provided below in Figure (9). The primary finding for officer population was that there appears to be a correlation between the officer's HOR state and the amount of AC performed. Upon review of Figure (9) this becomes apparent and is further evidenced by the fact that officer population the overall average was 123 months of service whereas the range of state averages fluctuated from the high of 187.9 months (Alabama) to a low of 64.9 months (Connecticut). This same correlation, however, did not appear with the enlisted Marines, whose overall average amount of AC service was 60.6 months with the high average being 75.2 months (Hawaii) and a low being 53.2 months (Utah).


Figure 9. Average Number of Months of AC Service Performed by State



Finally, consideration was given to the correlation between a Marine's MOS and their probability to return to the vicinity of the HOR following AC service. The detailed findings of this statistical analysis are provided under Appendix (F), and a graphic depiction of the findings is provided in Figure (10). Upon consideration of these findings it becomes clear that a correlation does exist between the MOS held by the service member and that service member's

probability of returning to the vicinity of their HOR. Although the target enlisted population remains the group with the greatest likelihood on average of returning to the vicinity of their HOR, a significant variance is noted by occupation for the entire sample population. Looking specifically at the target population, the MOSs with the highest return probability were 13XX (Engineer, Construction, Facilities, and Equipment), 57XX (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense), and 73XX (Enlisted Flight Crews) each with approximately a 60% return probability which is only slightly above the 57.3% probability this group held over all. More notably were those MOSs of this target group with the lowest probability, as they were well below this group's overall return average. These MOSs were 26XX (Signals Intelligence and Ground Electronic Warfare) with 45.5%, 43XX (Public Affairs) with 45.4%, and 55XX (Music) with 44.6%.

Figure 10. MOS Correlation to the Probability of Marines Returning to the Vicinity of their HOR Following AC Service



### *Statistical Conclusions*

Considering the totality of the aforementioned findings developed from the statistical analysis, the data evidences several conclusions. First, with regard to the probability of those leaving the AC and returning to the vicinity of their HOR, the data supports the supposition of this document's thesis. With a 48.2% overall probability of returning, and a 57.3% probability for the target population, the data supports the correlation and justifies consideration to be given to associating AC recruitment with SMCR billet requirements.

Second, with regard to the average amount of time spent in the AC based upon the state of origin, although little correlation was evidenced for the enlisted population (as opposed to the officers which are not the focus of this research) what did prove insightful, was the fact that the average amount of time spent in the AC is relatively short. Upon further analysis of the data, a supplemental detail that arises is that although the average amount of enlisted time in the AC is 60.6 months, the fact is that after 48 months, 54.8% of the enlisted population is no longer serving with the AC. The confounding variable that causes this anomaly is the fact that there is a small enlisted population with an excessively large amount (in excess of 300 months) of AC service that counterbalances the population. With these statistics in mind, it is clear that the Marine Corps is not realizing the maximum benefits from the investments made, unless it finds a means to obtain the continued affiliation in the RC of these Marines who still have significant amounts of potential service.

Finally, with regard to the migration correlations based upon the Marine's MOS, it is apparent from this sample population that different occupations do have an effect on a Marine's probability of returning to their HOR. As the span of influence identified by this factor makes up

to a 15% difference in a Marine's likelihood of returning to their HOR, it is something that should be given consideration as to which MOSs would be the most probable candidates for connecting AC recruitment to SMCR requirements.

### ***SHOULD THE USMC CHANGE HOW IT RECRUITS FOR THE TOTAL FORCE?***

#### ***Position and Rationale***

The aforementioned statistical findings establish the foundation for the argument as to why the USMC should reconsider how it conducts recruiting for the total force. With nearly half of all Marines, and more than 57% of the target junior enlisted population, returning to the relative vicinity of their HOR upon completion of their AC service, the Marine Corps is missing out on potentially significant dividends that could be harvested from this trained and experienced manpower pool upon their return home. Enhanced consideration needs to be given to the needs of the SMCR units, particularly those units with high demand/low density MOS requirements, and those units which have historically faced challenges in meeting their manning requirements.

Furthermore, given the current fiscal constraints facing the Marine Corps, it is imprudent to have spent the budgeted \$4.6 million in FY 2010, \$3.4 million in FY 2011, or \$3 million in FY 2012 for the Prior Service MOS Retraining Program (PSMRP) in order to retrain SMCR Marines.<sup>28</sup> Granted, this is money well invested in those situations in which no other sourcing solution could be identified, and the critical billet would otherwise go unfilled. However, considering that PSMRP is not advantageous for either the USMC or the individual SMCR unit, it should only be used when no other option is available. When PSMRP is used, the Marine Corps is effectively paying a second time to train a Marine, and the SMCR unit ends up with a Marine, who, although school trained and filling a needed billet, is lacking in MOS experience or

credibility. Additionally, this situation often creates significant friction within ranks of the SMCR unit due to the fact that the newly joined PS Marine, who although senior in rank and billet, is junior to his peers and subordinates in MOS credibility and experience. Considering the fact that these situations are potentially at least partially avoidable with enhanced planning and vision, the best solution remains the identification and sourcing of a PS Marine who resides within commuting distance of the SMCR unit and who has the needed MOS with credible experience.

### *Theoretical Application Example*

In order to provide a more specific demonstration of the potential gains to be recognized, a micro-level analysis will be conducted looking specifically at the SMCR unit which has historically faced the greatest challenges with regard to recruiting and retention; Bravo Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 24<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment (B CO, 1/24), Saginaw, MI. Although most SMCR units in Michigan are healthy on manning, B CO, 1/24 continues to face challenges. Not only is this unit an ideal example due to its manning challenges, it is also unique considering the fact Michigan is one of the states most deeply affected by the economic recession that has plagued the nation for the preceding six years.

For this micro-level analysis, only those members of the target population, enlisted with 36 to 60 months of AC service, who reside within the reasonable commuting distance of B CO, 1/24 will be considered. For the sake of this analysis, “reasonable commuting distance” is being defined as those counties falling within 100 miles of the HTC. Furthermore, this review will look only at the five year period of December 2006 through November 2011 with the intent being to identify the probability of success under the most challenging of circumstances.

Looking specifically at this target population the following analysis is provided. During this period, 2,373 AC Marines whose HOR was within the relative commuting distance of B CO, 1/24 left the AC, of which 1,157, or 48.8% returned to a location within the commuting distance. Of note, as anticipated this return rate is lower than the national average of 57.3% due to the high state of unemployment and other associated issues in conjunction with the current state of the economy. However, if only 5% of those Marines in this target audience had been either recruited with a contractual obligation to B CO, 1/24, or honed by their specific preplanned MOS and then courted into an ongoing “Continuity of Service” opportunity to the SMCR, than B CO 1/24 would have been the beneficiary of 57 Marines with significant future potential, who possess both the requisite MOS needed for the unit’s mission, as well as the practical AC experience that the Marine Corps has invested to develop within the service member.

### *The Road Ahead*

As evidenced by the statistical analysis, this transition philosophically has considerable potential and should be further socialized by the respective leadership within M&RA at their earliest convenience. Furthermore, it is strongly encouraged that following M&RA’s assessment, a test cycle be conducted with a sample population in order to determine the real world applicability of what has been statistically developed and previously articulated herein.

Once incorporated, this transition would not necessarily require significant modifications to the way in which AC enlisted recruiting has been conducted to date. In theory, the basic process could be that MMEA would create and provide the FY AC recruiting plan, with the list of MOSs and the quantity needed, to MCRC, thereby formally identifying the AC requirements. RA and MARFORRES would simultaneously forecast their requirements, and build their list of

SMCR MOSs coded by geographic location. MCRC and RA would then meet and superimpose the AC recruiting plan over the SMCR MOS requirements and thereby generate the Marine Corps first true Total Force recruiting mission.

The actual implementation of this transition could become a reality by any action on the spectrum of potential associated visionary options. On the more limited end of the spectrum, MCRC could slightly modify the corresponding AC PEF missions assigned to specific recruiting stations in the vicinity of targeted SMCR in order to statistically increase the future pool of regional candidates for the respective SMCR unit. The likelihood of this making significant improvements to the future manning realities of the SMCR unit is slight, however statistically some gains would be recognized due to the increased number of AC Marines who ultimately return to the vicinity of their HOR with the corresponding MOSs and experience gained from their AC service. With this option, the amount of the recruiting missions weighted toward the SMCR requirements and the number of SMCR units identified for this planning assistance would dictate the amount of impact this transition would have (if any) on the respective recruiting station. An enhanced implementation option would include the both this increase in the PEFs assigned to specific recruiting stations and would further include targeted contracting modifications whereby NPS AC recruits would be contracted for a period of two to four years with the AC followed by a period of obligated SMCR service. This enhanced combination of options would guarantee improvements to the manning and capabilities of the SMCR units. However, this transition would represent additional challenges for the specific recruiting stations.

In order to assist recruiters in their initiatives to recruit to challenging targeted MOSs from specific regions, contractual modifications could be provided wherein for specific cases depending upon the MOS, and needs of the Marine Corps, bonuses of between \$5,000 and

\$25,000 could be offered with the funding for this requirement either being sourced from what is currently the PSMRP budget, or from one of the other associated affiliation bonus pipelines which are currently being used. Although this bonus funding would foreseeably provide recruiters considerable assistance in filling more challenging billets, it should not be considered mandatory for program implementation should future funding become unavailable.

As stated previously, this spectrum of options that could be developed based upon the migratory findings of this research represents potential tools that the associated elements within M&RA could use in order to better apply a visionary Total Force solution to Marine Corps recruiting. With this in mind, it is strongly encouraged that additional working groups be chartered incorporating all interested agencies in order to give enhanced consideration to the findings identified within this dissertation and the potential opportunities that could be developed in concert with them.

Finally, it is important to also note that with the vision of targeting AC recruitment to the long-term SMCR needs, the Marine Corps will be laying the first pavestones on the path to bring to the philosophical “Continuum of Service” (as graphically depicted in Annex (B)) to a reality. This transition has the potential to foster an environment that will enhance the Marine’s ability to easily transition from AC to RC (in the various elements), and potentially back to the AC, as best suits the individual and the needs of the Marine Corps, thereby cultivating a lifelong relationship between the Marine and the Marine Corps. This is clearly in the best interest of the USMC, as it maximizes on the Corps’ investment, and it benefits the Marine by giving them the confidence of knowing that the Marine Corps will have an assortment of options available to them as they plan their future. With long term vision, and the willingness to incorporate change, the USMC and the SMCR stand to potentially realize significant gains.

## ***ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS***

Additional items for consideration were identified during the course of this research, and as such are presented as follows for additional attention. Communication is absolutely essential to maximize the potential for AC Marines to transitioning to the SMCR upon separation. As such, the Marine Corps needs to place an exponentially heightened emphasis on getting information to AC Marines well in advance of their transitioning off of active duty. Recent studies have shown that a large percentage of Marines separating from the AC, leave with little, to no, knowledge of the opportunities that are available within the RC.<sup>29</sup> This is a reality that the USMC needs to engage via a multipronged initiative.

First, the Marine Corps needs to explore alternate methods such as social media tools, which are low cost and high impact, in order to increase the information pushed to detaching AC Marines. This effort needs to start a minimum of six months prior to the member's separation in order to enable the Marine to appropriately factor the SMCR into their planning considerations. Furthermore, social media needs to be incorporated as a tool to reach out and energize those residents within the IRR as well, which is an initiative that is currently being discussed as a desired end state for all services' IRR components by the Office of the SECDEF for Reserve Affairs (OSD [RA]).<sup>30</sup>

Second, the Marine Corps needs to dramatically increase the information presented to Marines during their Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) classes. Third, PS recruiters should be invited to participate with MMOA/MMEA during their annual "road show". The totality of these actions would ensure that all Marines leave the AC fully educated on the spectrum of RC opportunities available to them.

Two additional items for consideration were identified during the development of this thesis, and both deserve supplemental study and consideration. First, the current locations of SMCR units are based on post-World War II populations. As articulated in Appendix (G), due to population migration, the unit locations no longer match up with national population density. It is understood that this is a politically charged issue, but it is one that needs to be given serious consideration. Second, Inactive Duty Training (IDT) travel reimbursement is a program that could potentially make significant headway in getting Marines to actively participate in SMCR units. IDT travel pay is philosophically sound, but the program needs to be revised to increase the distance limitations, and also to potentially be provided to a larger population.

### ***CONCLUSION***

If implemented, this shift in the recruiting business model will not solve all of the USMC's manning and fiscal challenges. However, considering the limited cost associated with this transition, as opposed to the potential significant gains, as identified by the statistical analysis, it would be a mistake for the Marine Corps to not have the vision necessary to refine its recruiting process. Although presenting a change in the recruiting paradigm will meet significant resistance, the potential gains to the USMC overall, and to the individual Marines, are such that this recommendation merits consideration at the highest levels.

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- <sup>2</sup> Commander Marine Forces Reserve. *MARFORRES Communicator, Marine Forces Reserve Culture of Responsible Choices. Monthly Newsletter January 2012*, Marine Forces Reserve Public Affairs Department, New Orleans, LA (January 2012): 1.
- <sup>3</sup> National Defense Appropriation Act of 2005. House Report 108-491, 108th Congress of the United States (May 14, 2004): 316.
- <sup>4</sup> National Defense Appropriation Act of 2012. House Report 1540, 112th Congress of the United States (December 31, 2011).
- <sup>5</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management (MCRAMM)*, MCO P1001R.1K, March 22, 2009, <http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%201001R.1K.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2012).
- <sup>6</sup> Charts built by the author using data extracted the Marine Corps Total Force System database. Information extracted on January 20, 2012.
- <sup>7</sup> Michelle Dolfini-Reed, Lauren Malone, and Adwoa Gyekye, *Demographic Dynamics of the Reserve Force Laydown*, CNA Research Memorandum D0025181.A2 (Alexandria, VA July 2011): 10.
- <sup>8</sup> Commander Marine Forces Reserve.
- <sup>9</sup> Department of Defense. *Fact Sheet: The Defense Budget*. Washington D.C., February 2012. [http://www.defense.gov/news/Fact\\_Sheet\\_Budget.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Fact_Sheet_Budget.pdf) (accessed February 17, 2012).
- <sup>10</sup> Department of Defense.
- <sup>11</sup> Karen Parrish. "Panetta: Coming Budget Cuts Demand Careful Balance," *U.S. Department of Defense; American Forces Press Service*, January 6, 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66698> (accessed January 8, 2012)
- <sup>12</sup> Amos.
- <sup>13</sup> David Cloud, and Christi Parsons. "President Obama Calls for Leaner Military." *Los Angeles Times*, January 5, 2012. [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-pentagon-spending-20120106\\_0.1697094.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-pentagon-spending-20120106_0.1697094.story) (accessed January 22, 2012).
- <sup>14</sup> The Stars and Stripes. "Budget cuts might slash additional Marine infantry units." *The Stars and Stripes*, February 1, 2012. <http://www.stripes.com/news/marine-corps/budget-cuts-might-slash-additional-marine-infantry-units-1.167329> (accessed February 20, 2012).
- <sup>15</sup> Amos.
- <sup>16</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Department of Defense Strategic Management Plan FY 2012 - FY 2013*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011: 16.
- <sup>17</sup> Loren Thompson. "Navy Wins Defense Budget Superbowl." *Forbes*, February 9, 2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/02/09/navy-wins-defense-budget-superbowl/> (accessed February 14, 2012).
- <sup>18</sup> David Cloud. "Defense budget plan would cut spending by half a trillion." *Los Angeles Times, Washington Bureau*, January 26, 2012. [http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-defense-spending-cuts-20120127\\_0.225365.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-defense-spending-cuts-20120127_0.225365.story) (accessed February 14, 2012).
- <sup>19</sup> Karan Parrish. "DOD leaders: Budget request supports adaptable future force." *The official homepage of the United States Army*, February 16, 2012, [http://www.army.mil/article/73930/DOD\\_leaders\\_Budget\\_request\\_supports\\_adaptable\\_future\\_force/](http://www.army.mil/article/73930/DOD_leaders_Budget_request_supports_adaptable_future_force/) (accessed February 16, 2012).
- <sup>20</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Enlistment Incentive Programs*, MCO 1130.53P, June 11, 2002, <http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCO%201130.53P%20W%20CH%201.pdf> (accessed February 3, 2012).
- <sup>21</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps. *Enlisted Incentive Programs*. Marine Administrative Message 569/11, Quantico, VA: Manpower Plans and Policy Division, September 29, 2011.
- <sup>22</sup> David Roberts, Recruiting and Retention Officer, MARFORRES. Telephonic interview conducted with the author on December 21, 2011.
- <sup>23</sup> Michelle Dolfini-Reed. *An Analysis of Marine Corps Reserve Recruiting and Retention Processes and Policies*, CNA Research Memorandum D0021795.A2 (Alexandria, VA January 2010): 45.
- <sup>24</sup> Michelle Dolfini-Reed. *An Analysis of Marine Corps Reserve Recruiting and Retention Processes and Policies*, 9.
- <sup>25</sup> Michelle Dolfini-Reed, Lauren Malone, and Adwoa Gyekye, 19.
- <sup>26</sup> Michelle Dolfini-Reed, Lauren Malone, and Adwoa Gyekye, 53.

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<sup>27</sup> Roberts.

<sup>28</sup> Major Trevor Thibodeau USMC, Reserve Incentives & Training (RIT) OIC, Reserve Affairs. In person interview conducted with the author on January 19, 2012.

<sup>29</sup> Anita Hattiangadi and Lewis G. Lee. *Transition Briefings*, (Memorandum for the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Manpower and Reserve Affairs. D0013834.A1, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, March 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Richard Dederer USA and Major Joseph Hall USMC. "*Individual Ready Reserve Situation Report as of Sep 2011*." Marine Corps Reserve Force Policy Board Presentation to Office of the SECDEF for Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2011.

## Appendix A

### Fact Sheet: The Defense Budget

#### Budget Control Act Mandated Reductions

- \$487B over 10 years (FY 2012-2021)
- \$259B over 5 years (FY 2013-2017)

#### Defense Budget over Time<sup>1</sup>

\$B	FY01	...	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17
Base	297		528	528	531	525	534	546	556	567
OCO <sup>2</sup>	13		163	159	115	88				
Total	310		691	687	646	614		TBD		

#### Budget Reduction from Peak FY10 Funding<sup>1</sup>

	\$B	FY10	FY17	\$ Change	% Change
Nominal	Base	528	567	39	7%
	OCO	163	44 <sup>3</sup>	-119	-73%
	Total	691	611	-80	-12%
Real (\$FY13)	Base	557	529	-28	-5%
	OCO	172	41	-131	-76%
	Total	729	570	-159	-22%

#### Change from the Base FY12 President's Budget<sup>1</sup>

\$B	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY13-17
FY12 Budget	553	571	587	598	611	622	2,987
FY13 Budget	531 <sup>4</sup>	525	534	546	556	567	2,728
\$ Change	-22	-45	-53	-52	-55	-54	-259
% Change	-4%	-8%	-9%	-9%	-9%	-9%	-9%

#### Annual Base Budget Changes<sup>1</sup>

\$B	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY13-17
Nominal	FY13 Budget	531	525	534	546	556	567
	% Change		-1.0%	1.5%	2.3%	1.8%	2.1%
Real (\$FY13)	FY13 Budget	538	525	527	531	530	529
	% Change		-2.3%	0.3%	0.6%	-0.2%	-0.1%

<sup>1</sup> Numbers may not add due to rounding

<sup>2</sup> OCO: Overseas Contingency Operations

<sup>3</sup> Placeholder of \$44B in FY17 for OCO


<sup>4</sup> Actual amount appropriated by Congress for FY12

Extracted from; The Department of Defense Webpage, on 17 February 2012.

[http://www.defense.gov/news/Fact\\_Sheet\\_Budget.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Fact_Sheet_Budget.pdf)

Appendix B

Theoretical “Continuum of Service” Model<sup>1</sup>:



Extracted from; Dolfini-Reed, Michelle. *An Analysis of Marine Corps Reserve Recruiting and Retention Processes and Policies* (CNA Research Memorandum D0021795.A2). Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2010. (p. 11)

<sup>1</sup> Of note, this model as presented in the source is intended to represent the “Marine Corps recruiting pool for the active and reserve components”. This same construct, however, also philosophically depicts the “Continuum of Service” mentality, and is therefore presented as such.

Appendix C

By State Point of Origin Into the AC Matrix:

STATE	OVERALL		ENLISTED (ALL RANKS)		ENLISTED (36-60 MOS SVC)	
	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF POP	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF POP	NUMBER PER STATE	% OF POP
CA	36,087	10.73%	34,912	10.85%	22,878	11.75%
TX	31,492	9.36%	30,376	9.44%	19,305	9.92%
FL	20,838	6.20%	19,954	6.20%	11,384	5.85%
NY	19,448	5.78%	18,449	5.73%	10,621	5.46%
OH	15,341	4.56%	14,693	4.57%	8,504	4.37%
IL	14,695	4.37%	14,104	4.38%	8,943	4.59%
PA	14,479	4.31%	13,549	4.21%	7,774	3.99%
MI	11,243	3.34%	10,748	3.34%	6,392	3.28%
VA	10,096	3.00%	9,384	2.92%	5,195	2.67%
GA	9,738	2.90%	9,385	2.92%	5,107	2.62%
NC	9,100	2.71%	8,732	2.71%	4,780	2.46%
NJ	8,050	2.39%	7,500	2.33%	4,511	2.32%
WA	7,286	2.17%	6,980	2.17%	4,795	2.46%
MO	6,989	2.08%	6,721	2.09%	4,129	2.12%
IN	6,892	2.05%	6,628	2.06%	3,906	2.01%
MD	6,843	2.03%	6,420	2.00%	3,632	1.87%
AZ	6,386	1.90%	6,191	1.92%	4,015	2.06%
TN	6,312	1.88%	6,091	1.89%	3,382	1.74%
MA	6,152	1.83%	5,747	1.79%	3,634	1.87%
LA	5,868	1.74%	5,668	1.76%	3,155	1.62%
WI	5,783	1.72%	5,531	1.72%	3,657	1.88%
SC	5,757	1.71%	5,543	1.72%	2,989	1.54%
AL	5,593	1.66%	5,416	1.68%	2,907	1.49%
CO	5,286	1.57%	5,046	1.57%	3,263	1.68%
OR	4,999	1.49%	4,788	1.49%	3,233	1.66%
KY	4,667	1.39%	4,488	1.39%	2,537	1.30%
OK	4,629	1.38%	4,464	1.39%	2,715	1.39%
MN	4,499	1.34%	4,254	1.32%	2,858	1.47%
CT	3,342	0.99%	3,152	0.98%	1,898	0.97%
IA	3,178	0.95%	3,015	0.94%	1,852	0.95%
AR	3,082	0.92%	2,987	0.93%	1,700	0.87%
MS	3,055	0.91%	2,959	0.92%	1,588	<b>0.82%</b>
KS	2,974	0.88%	2,860	0.89%	1,837	0.94%
WV	2,565	0.76%	2,496	0.78%	1,336	0.69%
NM	2,389	0.71%	2,299	0.71%	1,443	0.74%

Appendix C (Cont.)

<b>UT</b>	2,182	0.65%	2,109	0.66%	1,400	0.72%
<b>NE</b>	2,133	0.63%	2,025	0.63%	1,286	0.66%
<b>NV</b>	2,129	0.63%	2,064	0.64%	1,380	0.71%
<b>ID</b>	1,948	0.58%	1,874	0.58%	1,253	0.64%
<b>NH</b>	1,910	0.57%	1,799	0.56%	1,139	0.59%
<b>ME</b>	1,885	0.56%	1,804	0.56%	1,035	0.53%
<b>MT</b>	1,606	0.48%	1,539	0.48%	1,039	0.53%
<b>RI</b>	1,096	0.33%	1,015	0.32%	632	0.32%
<b>SD</b>	953	0.28%	913	0.28%	568	0.29%
<b>WY</b>	943	0.28%	898	0.28%	614	0.32%
<b>DE</b>	918	0.27%	874	0.27%	506	0.26%
<b>HI</b>	917	0.27%	878	0.27%	500	0.26%
<b>AK</b>	828	0.25%	803	0.25%	533	0.27%
<b>VT</b>	701	0.21%	670	0.21%	409	0.21%
<b>ND</b>	642	0.19%	614	0.19%	406	0.21%
<b>DC</b>	359	0.11%	321	0.10%	134	0.07%

## Appendix D

### By State Return Migration Probability Matrix:

STATE	OVERALL			ENLISTED (ALL RANKS)			ENLISTED (36-60 MOS SVC)		
	HOR	Returned	Probability	HOR	Returned	Probability	HOR	Returned	Probability
AK	828	359	43.36%	803	352	43.84%	533	272	51.03%
AL	5,593	2,221	39.71%	5,416	2,181	40.27%	2,907	1,461	50.26%
AR	3,082	1,218	39.52%	2,987	1,200	40.17%	1,700	810	47.65%
AZ	6,386	3,205	50.19%	6,191	3,152	50.91%	4,015	2,289	57.01%
CA	36,087	28,311	78.45%	34,912	27,761	79.52%	22,878	19,128	83.61%
CO	5,286	2,417	45.72%	5,046	2,355	46.67%	3,263	1,739	53.29%
CT	3,342	1,333	39.89%	3,152	1,295	41.09%	1,898	998	52.58%
DC	359	99	27.58%	321	94	29.28%	134	60	44.78%
DE	918	342	37.25%	874	336	38.44%	506	250	49.41%
FL	20,838	8,971	43.05%	19,954	8,707	43.64%	11,384	5,996	52.67%
GA	9,738	4,110	42.21%	9,385	4,010	42.73%	5,107	2,634	51.58%
HI	917	371	40.46%	878	357	40.66%	500	212	42.40%
IA	3,178	1,381	43.46%	3,015	1,355	44.94%	1,852	987	53.29%
ID	1,948	898	46.10%	1,874	878	46.85%	1,253	662	52.83%
IL	14,695	6,849	46.61%	14,104	6,704	47.53%	8,943	4,973	55.61%
IN	6,892	2,931	42.53%	6,628	2,880	43.45%	3,906	1,998	51.15%
KS	2,974	1,274	42.84%	2,860	1,256	43.92%	1,837	911	49.59%
KY	4,667	1,945	41.68%	4,488	1,896	42.25%	2,537	1,314	51.79%
LA	5,868	2,488	42.40%	5,668	2,428	42.84%	3,155	1,619	51.32%
MA	6,152	2,627	42.70%	5,747	2,529	44.01%	3,634	1,961	53.96%
MD	6,843	2,858	41.77%	6,420	2,730	42.52%	3,632	1,879	51.73%
ME	1,885	748	39.68%	1,804	727	40.30%	1,035	510	49.28%
MI	11,243	4,838	43.03%	10,748	4,277	39.79%	6,392	3,362	52.60%
MN	4,499	2,081	46.25%	4,254	2,015	47.37%	2,858	1,540	53.88%
MO	6,989	3,101	44.37%	6,721	3,049	45.37%	4,129	2,153	52.14%
MS	3,055	1,148	37.58%	2,959	1,129	38.15%	1,588	755	47.54%
MT	1,606	692	43.09%	1,539	679	44.12%	1,039	522	50.24%
NC	9,100	5,799	63.73%	8,732	5,652	64.73%	4,780	3,601	75.33%
ND	642	269	41.90%	614	266	43.32%	406	198	48.77%
NE	2,133	963	45.15%	2,025	942	46.52%	1,286	694	53.97%
NH	1,910	763	39.95%	1,799	745	41.41%	1,139	599	52.59%
NJ	8,050	3,201	39.76%	7,500	3,106	41.41%	4,511	2,320	51.43%
NM	2,389	1,032	43.20%	2,299	1,019	44.32%	1,443	730	50.59%
NV	2,129	920	43.21%	2,064	909	44.04%	1,380	680	49.28%
NY	19,448	7,816	40.19%	18,449	7,588	41.13%	10,621	5,521	51.98%
OH	15,341	6,351	41.40%	14,693	6,211	42.27%	8,504	4,505	52.98%
OK	4,629	2,021	43.66%	4,464	1,977	44.29%	2,715	1,391	51.23%
OR	4,999	2,307	46.15%	4,788	2,254	47.08%	3,233	1,724	53.33%
PA	14,479	6,067	41.90%	13,549	5,864	43.28%	7,774	4,225	54.35%
RI	1,096	423	38.59%	1,015	405	39.90%	632	310	49.05%
SC	5,757	2,896	50.30%	5,543	2,835	51.15%	2,989	1,627	54.43%
SD	953	402	42.18%	913	397	43.48%	568	292	51.41%
TN	6,312	2,518	39.89%	6,091	2,474	40.62%	3,382	1,707	50.47%

Appendix D (Cont.)

<b>TX</b>	31,492	16,210	<b>51.47%</b>	30,376	15,748	<b>51.84%</b>	19,305	11,097	<b>57.48%</b>
<b>UT</b>	2,182	1,026	<b>47.02%</b>	2,109	1,008	<b>47.80%</b>	1,400	739	<b>52.79%</b>
<b>VA</b>	10,096	4,594	<b>45.50%</b>	9,384	4,233	<b>45.11%</b>	5,195	2,786	<b>53.63%</b>
<b>VT</b>	701	277	<b>39.51%</b>	670	271	<b>40.45%</b>	409	212	<b>51.83%</b>
<b>WA</b>	7,286	3,387	<b>46.49%</b>	6,980	3,319	<b>47.55%</b>	4,795	2,524	<b>52.64%</b>
<b>WI</b>	5,783	2,753	<b>47.61%</b>	5,531	2,714	<b>49.07%</b>	3,657	2,094	<b>57.26%</b>
<b>WV</b>	2,565	1,002	<b>39.06%</b>	2,496	992	<b>39.74%</b>	1,336	668	<b>50.00%</b>
<b>WY</b>	943	422	<b>44.75%</b>	898	410	<b>45.66%</b>	614	318	<b>51.79%</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>336,283</b>	<b>162,235</b>	<b>48.24%</b>	<b>321,730</b>	<b>157,671</b>	<b>49.01%</b>	<b>194,689</b>	<b>111,557</b>	<b>57.30%</b>
<b>PUERTO RICO</b>	581	145	<b>24.96%</b>	549	142	<b>25.87%</b>	280	92	<b>32.86%</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>336,864</b>	<b>162,380</b>	<b>48.20%</b>	<b>322,279</b>	<b>157,813</b>	<b>48.97%</b>	<b>194,969</b>	<b>111,649</b>	<b>57.27%</b>

Alternate factoring for small states (New England and DC regions) that otherwise counterbalance statistics:\*

		OVERALL			ENLISTED (ALL RANKS)			ENLISTED (36-60 MOS SVC)		
		HOR	Returned	Probability	HOR	Returned	Probability	HOR	Returned	Probability
<b>NEW ENGLAND CORRIDORE</b>	<b>MA</b>	6,152	2,782	<b>45.22%</b>	5,747	2,664	<b>46.35%</b>	3,634	2,047	<b>56.33%</b>
	<b>NH</b>	1,910	828	<b>43.35%</b>	1,799	805	<b>44.75%</b>	1,139	629	<b>55.22%</b>
	<b>CT</b>	3,342	1,407	<b>42.10%</b>	3,152	1,361	<b>43.18%</b>	1,898	1,028	<b>54.16%</b>
	<b>VT</b>	701	297	<b>42.37%</b>	670	287	<b>42.84%</b>	409	219	<b>53.55%</b>
	<b>RI</b>	1,096	456	<b>41.61%</b>	1,015	435	<b>42.86%</b>	632	327	<b>51.74%</b>
<b>DC CORRIDORE</b>	<b>DE</b>	918	463	<b>50.44%</b>	874	439	<b>50.23%</b>	506	302	<b>59.68%</b>
	<b>MD</b>	6,843	3,490	<b>51.00%</b>	6,420	3,250	<b>50.62%</b>	3,632	2,040	<b>56.17%</b>
	<b>DC</b>	359	192	<b>53.48%</b>	321	173	<b>53.89%</b>	134	81	<b>60.45%</b>
	<b>NJ</b>	8,050	3,967	<b>49.28%</b>	7,500	3,692	<b>49.23%</b>	4,511	2,495	<b>55.31%</b>
	<b>NE AVG</b>	13,201	5,770	<b>43.71%</b>	12,383	5,552	<b>44.84%</b>	7,712	4,250	<b>55.11%</b>
	<b>DC AVG</b>	16,170	8,112	<b>50.17%</b>	15,115	7,554	<b>49.98%</b>	8,783	4,918	<b>55.99%</b>
NEW ENGLAND CORRIDORE INCLUDES: MA, NH, CT, VT, RI, NY, AND ME										
DC CORRIDORE INCLUDES: DC, DE, MD, NJ, VA, AND PA										

Table developed using data extracted on 13 January 2012 from the Total Force Data Warehouse.

\*All stats covered within this thesis were looking only at individual states. No special considerations were given to the smaller states in the North East U.S. This special consideration is however provided for consideration in the table above.

Appendix E

By State Analysis of Average Amount of AC Service Performed Prior to Separation:

	<b>ENLISTED</b>		
	<b>AVG TIS</b>		
<b>HI</b>	75.2	<b>CA</b>	59.5
<b>GA</b>	68.3	<b>OH</b>	59.2
<b>VA</b>	67.3	<b>VT</b>	58.9
<b>DC</b>	67.2	<b>ND</b>	58.8
<b>MS</b>	67.1	<b>IL</b>	58.7
<b>LA</b>	66.6	<b>AR</b>	58.5
<b>AL</b>	66.4	<b>WI</b>	58.4
<b>MD</b>	66.3	<b>MT</b>	58.1
<b>FL</b>	66.1	<b>NE</b>	58.1
<b>NC</b>	65.2	<b>CT</b>	58.0
<b>WV</b>	65.0	<b>WA</b>	57.2
<b>ME</b>	64.1	<b>CO</b>	57.2
<b>MI</b>	64.1	<b>NJ</b>	57.1
<b>PA</b>	63.0	<b>RI</b>	56.9
<b>TX</b>	62.8	<b>MA</b>	56.3
<b>TN</b>	62.7	<b>MN</b>	56.0
<b>NM</b>	62.2	<b>ID</b>	55.8
<b>SC</b>	61.9	<b>OK</b>	55.6
<b>IA</b>	61.4	<b>OR</b>	55.5
<b>IN</b>	61.3	<b>WY</b>	55.5
<b>NY</b>	61.2	<b>KS</b>	55.4
<b>KY</b>	61.1	<b>NV</b>	55.2
<b>AZ</b>	60.8	<b>AK</b>	54.8
<b>DE</b>	60.3	<b>NH</b>	54.6
<b>SD</b>	59.9	<b>UT</b>	53.2
<b>MO</b>	59.5		
		<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>60.6</b>
		<b>OVERALL</b>	<b>65.9</b>

Appendix F

MOS Correlation for Probability of Return to HOR Following AC Service

	OVERALL			ENLISTED (ALL RANKS)			ENLISTED (36-60 MOS SVC)		
	Total	Returned	Probability	Total	Returned	Probability	Total	Returned	Probability
01 Personnel & Administration	16,564	8,027	48.46%	15,854	7,837	49.43%	9,700	5,537	57.08%
02 Intelligence	3,905	1,583	40.54%	3,030	1,308	43.17%	1,314	731	55.63%
03 Infantry	73,447	38,039	51.79%	73,438	38,035	51.79%	52,213	30,303	58.04%
04 Logistics	7,884	3,738	47.41%	6,711	3,348	49.89%	4,226	2,499	59.13%
05 Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Plans	469	212	45.20%	469	212	45.20%	257	141	54.86%
06 Communications	22,877	11,098	48.51%	22,016	10,856	49.31%	14,527	8,217	56.56%
08 Artillery	9,174	4,459	48.60%	8,532	4,234	49.62%	5,862	3,342	57.01%
11 Utilities	6,256	3,162	50.54%	6,218	3,150	50.66%	4,265	2,460	57.68%
13 Engineer, Construction, Facilities, & Equipment	17,477	9,170	52.47%	17,030	9,030	53.02%	12,057	7,285	60.42%
18 Tank and Assault Amphibious Vehicle	5,686	2,836	49.88%	5,436	2,751	50.61%	3,723	2,196	58.98%
21 Ground Ordnance Maintenance	8,332	4,160	49.93%	8,202	4,120	50.23%	5,449	3,140	57.63%
23 Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal	3,416	1,490	43.62%	3,317	1,470	44.32%	1,969	1,039	52.77%
26 Signals Intelligence/Ground Electronic Warfare	3,847	1,504	39.10%	3,806	1,502	39.46%	1,968	896	45.53%
28 Data/Communications Maintenance	7,259	3,540	48.77%	7,133	3,516	49.29%	3,549	2,019	56.89%
30 Supply Administration and Operations	14,729	7,048	47.85%	14,217	6,893	48.48%	8,861	4,995	56.37%
31 Distribution Management	1,278	573	44.84%	1,246	565	45.35%	799	431	53.94%
33 Food Service	5,904	2,543	43.07%	5,860	2,536	43.28%	3,658	1,839	50.27%
34 Financial Management	2,802	1,145	40.86%	2,506	1,091	43.54%	1,444	748	51.80%
35 Motor Transport	27,943	14,358	51.38%	27,832	14,332	51.49%	19,468	11,439	58.76%
43 Public Affairs	890	316	35.51%	781	291	37.26%	401	182	45.39%
44 Legal Services	1,340	542	40.45%	926	390	42.12%	529	279	52.74%
46 Combat Camera (COMCAM)	1,040	420	40.38%	1,016	414	40.75%	635	313	49.29%
55 Music	1,409	522	37.05%	1,397	521	37.29%	897	400	44.59%
57 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense	1,779	877	49.30%	1,651	856	51.85%	1,110	668	60.18%
58 Military Police and Corrections	8,080	3,514	43.49%	7,870	3,446	43.79%	5,000	2,468	49.36%
59 Electronics Maintenance	2,695	1,200	44.53%	2,621	1,190	45.40%	1,277	665	52.08%
60/61/62 Aircraft Maintenance	24,110	11,688	48.48%	23,800	11,621	48.83%	11,919	6,730	56.46%
63/64 Avionics	11,352	5,426	47.80%	11,225	5,400	48.11%	5,749	3,140	54.62%
65 Aviation Ordnance	5,239	2,578	49.21%	5,141	2,555	49.70%	3,480	2,003	57.56%
66 Aviation Logistics	3,658	1,592	43.52%	3,462	1,530	44.19%	2,052	1,050	51.17%
68 Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC)	537	209	38.92%	504	203	40.28%	256	119	46.48%
70 Airfield Services	2,338	1,056	45.17%	2,297	1,048	45.62%	1,339	717	53.55%
72 Air Control/Air Support/Anti-air Warfare/Air Traffic Control	4,077	1,884	46.21%	3,592	1,721	47.91%	2,058	1,161	56.41%
73 Navigation Officer/Enlisted Flight Crews	434	207	47.70%	419	203	48.45%	208	124	59.62%
75 Pilots/Naval Flight Officers	2,798	713	25.48%	-	-	N/A	-	-	N/A
80 Miscellaneous MOS's (Category II)	9,466	1,768	18.68%	8,824	1,638	18.56%	33	24	72.73%
90 Reporting MOS's (Category III)	11,460	5,545	48.39%	10,617	5,403	50.89%	303	189	62.38%
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>332,027</b>	<b>158,765</b>	<b>47.82%</b>	<b>319,065</b>	<b>155,238</b>	<b>48.65%</b>	<b>192,555</b>	<b>109,489</b>	<b>56.86%</b>

## Appendix G

Comparison of 2010 State Population Rankings (Most to Least Populated) and the Number of Units and Total Billets by State Based on the FY 2011 Reserve Force T/O:

State	Rank 2010	Number of units	Total billets	State	Rank 2010	Number of units	Total billets
California	1	46	4,329	Kentucky	26	4	263
Texas	2	29	2,941	Oregon	27	5	353
New York	3	14	2,127	Oklahoma	28	11	366
Florida	4	13	1,133	Connecticut	29	4	265
Illinois	5	16	1,181	Iowa	30	1	138
Pennsylvania	6	18	1,798	Mississippi	31	4	198
Ohio	7	9	1,029	Arkansas	32	1	183
Michigan	8	10	1,170	Kansas	33	3	206
Georgia	9	15	1,025	Utah	34	2	231
North Carolina	10	12	834	Nevada	35	5	239
New Jersey	11	8	626	New Mexico	36	2	92
Virginia	12	23	1,428	West Virginia	37	4	285
Washington	13	9	535	Nebraska	38	1	185
Arizona	14	6	647	Idaho	39	2	106
Massachusetts	15	10	911	New Hampshire	40	1	183
Indiana	16	7	591	Maine	41	1	140
Tennessee	17	8	838	Hawaii	42	2	109
Missouri	18	6	532	Rhode Island	43	2	145
Maryland	19	4	413	Montana	44	1	59
Wisconsin	20	4	510	Delaware	45	2	180
Minnesota	21	3	419	South Dakota	46	0	0
Colorado	22	7	444	Alaska	47	1	55
Alabama	23	7	680	North Dakota	48	1	72
South Carolina	24	5	550	Vermont	49	0	0
Louisiana	25	15	1,058	Wyoming	50	1	64

a. We do not include the District of Columbia (DC) and Puerto Rico in this table. However, DC is home to 5 units with 389 billets, and Puerto Rico has 2 units with 70 billets.

Extracted from; Dolfini-Reed, Malone and Gyekye. *Demographic Dynamics of the Reserve Force Laydown*. (CNA Research Memorandum D0025181.A2). Alexandria, VA, 2011. (p. 15)

## *LISTING OF RELEVANT ACRONYMS*

AC	Active Component
ADOS	Active Duty Operational Support
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test
AK	Alaska
AL	Alabama
AR	Active Reserve
AR	Arkansas
AZ	Arizona
BIC	Billet Identification Code
CA	California
CG	Commanding General
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNA	Center for Naval Analysis
CO	Colorado
COMMARFORRES	Commander, Marine Forces Reserve
CT	Connecticut
DC	District of Columbia
DE	Delaware
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DOD	Department of Defense
EAS	End of Active Service
ECC	End of Current Contract
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FL	Florida
FMCR	Fleet Marine Corps Reserve

***LISTING OF RELEVANT ACRONYMS (Cont.)***

FY	Fiscal Year
GA	Georgia
HI	Hawaii
HOR	Home of Record
HTC	Home Training Center
HQMC	Headquarters Marine Corps
IADT	Initial Active Duty Training
IA	Iowa
ID	Idaho
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
I-I	Inspector – Instructor
IL	Illinois
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augment
IN	Indiana
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ISL	Inactive Status List
KS	Kansas
KY	Kentucky
LA	Louisiana
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MA	Massachusetts
MARDIV	Marine Division
MARFORRES	Marine Forces Reserve
MAW	Marine Air Wing
MCRC	Marine Corps Recruiting Command
MCTFS	Marine Corps Total Force System

***LISTING OF RELEVANT ACRONYMS (Cont.)***

MCTFSPRIUM	Marine Corps Total Force System Personnel Reporting Instructions User's Manual
MD	Maryland
ME	Maine
MI	Michigan
MLG	Marine Logistics Group
MN	Minnesota
MO	Missouri
MOB	Mobilization
MOBCOM	Mobilization Command
MOL	Marine On-Line
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MS	Mississippi
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSO	Military Service Obligation
MT	Montana
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NC	North Carolina
ND	North Dakota
NE	Nebraska
NH	New Hampshire
NJ	New Jersey
NM	New Mexico
NPS	Non-prior Service
NY	New York

***LISTING OF RELEVANT ACRONYMS (Cont.)***

OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
OH	Ohio
OK	Oklahoma
OR	Oregon
PA	Pennsylvania
PMOS	Primary Military Occupational Specialty
PQ / PR	Puerto Rico (FIPS abbreviation / standard abbreviation)
PS	Prior Service
PSMRP	Prior Service MOS Retraining Program
PSR	Prior Service Recruiter
RA	Reserve Affairs Division (HQMC)
RAP	Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans, Policy, and Programming
RC	Reserve Component
RCC	Reserve Component Code
RCCPDS	Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System
RI	Rhode Island
RS	Recruiting Station
RTC	Reserve Training Center
RUC	Reporting Unit Code
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SELRES	Selected Reserve
SC	South Carolina
SD	South Dakota
SMCR	Selected Marine Corps Reserve
SNCO	Staff Noncommissioned Officer
SRIP	Selected Reserve Incentive Program

***LISTING OF RELEVANT ACRONYMS (Cont.)***

TAMP	Transition Assistance Management Program
TECOM	Training and Education Command
TFSD	Total Force Structure Division
TFDW	Total Force Data Warehouse
TN	Tennessee
T/O	Table of Organization
TX	Texas
UD	Unit Diary
UT	Utah
VA	Virginia
VT	Vermont
WA	Washington
WI	Wisconsin
WV	West Virginia
WY	Wyoming

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