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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**TITLE:**

**DNI: Help or Hindrance?**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
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**AUTHOR:**

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## Executive Summary

**Title:** DNI: Help or Hindrance?

**Author:** Donna R. Rumbaugh

**Thesis:** The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) created in 2005 by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 is not just another level of bureaucracy, but rather is the one leader and voice for the sixteen intelligence communities (IC) setting forth policies and allocating budgets to enhance information sharing and cooperation through the use of integrated technology for the good of the nation's security and defense.

**Discussion:** Derived from the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., Congress initiated the 9/11 Commission Report. The Commission believed the IC needed to establish new polices to enhance collaboration across the IC and prevent information from being stovepiped to assist in the prevention of future attacks on the U.S. Accordingly, the Commission recommended, and the government implemented, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This was the single largest change in the IC since 1947: it named one person to be the sole director of the National Intelligence Program. Previously, there were sixteen separate agencies unable and/or unwilling to share information, with no single individual able to force change. By the President giving overarching authorities to the DNI, this office has been able to implement new policies and technology to enhance IC cooperation. With the IC now having an overarching budget to facilitate communication and collaboration between agencies, information sharing has assisted intelligence analysts in collating all information on a subject in order to provide a better product to policymakers.

**Conclusion:** Contrary to the initial skepticism that the Commission merely added another layer of bureaucracy, the DNI, through its guidelines and policies has assisted with reducing intelligence gaps and allowing analysts across the IC to focus on the nation's top priorities. The requirement for intelligence sharing has ensured a holistic approach to the processing and analyzing of all necessary information. Accordingly, the IC has united analytically, technically and legally in the effort to protect the security of U.S.

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## **Introduction**

The Intelligence Community is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that perform their own analysis but works together to conduct intelligence activities necessary to facilitate foreign relations and protect the national security of the United States.<sup>1</sup> The United States intelligence community is composed of 16 different agencies with direction given by Executive Order 12333

to provide the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal. Answering to policy makers and warfighters our nation with the Department of Defense and Law Enforcement Agencies, while also answering to the policy makers in Washington D.C.<sup>2</sup>

The 16 agencies comprising the intelligence community are as follows: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Air Force ISR Agency (AFISRA), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI), Treasury Department, Department of Energy, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Appendix A).

Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, there was no individual or agency responsible for coordinating and directing the entire IC. The responsibility was split between the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Because the command climate of the IC at the time was to divulge information only if an

individual “had a need to know,” there was a lack of information sharing. The fear that information would get into the hands of someone not cleared to have it or who would misuse the intelligence was the overriding concern.

Apart from the CIA, all the intelligence entities are components of Cabinet departments with other responsibilities and duties. The CIA is significant in the intelligence community since it is the most recognized and has the longest history of any intelligence agency in the U.S. Its key role is conducting human intelligence (HUMINT) and using all-source capabilities analyzing the entire world except for the U.S. The three largest national level intelligence agencies that fall under the DoD are NGA, NSA, and NRO, with each having its own specialty. NGA is the functional manager of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), NSA is the functional manager of signals intelligence (SIGINT), and the NRO is responsible for producing and operating reconnaissance satellites. DIA manages the defense attaché program and ensures warfighters have the appropriate intelligence to meet their objectives.<sup>3</sup> The FBI is accountable for counterterrorism and counterintelligence intelligence within the U.S. Within the IC, sharing of large amounts of exploited intelligence information with other members having other intelligence functions (INTs) did not occur because of the diverse responsibilities of each of the members of the intelligence entities. A 2010 study of counterterrorism workers showed that there were 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies in homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.<sup>4</sup> The results of this study demonstrate how expansive the intelligence community is and why it would be beneficial to have a director in charge of coordinating information and the integration of collaboration technology within the community.

Before the 2004 intelligence reform, sharing information was difficult and complex in the vast intelligence network because of each agency's stovepiped architecture. This made it nearly impossible to visit, coordinate, or retrieve information from another agency. As the IC rapidly increased in numbers following the 9/11 attacks, this problem became even more burdensome and needed to change in order to effectively fight the new challenges facing the nation. Information sharing among analysts working on an issue was difficult because of the mindset in the IC that an analyst had to have a "need to know," even if they all had the same clearance level. Creating an office, overarching of all 16 agencies, was necessary to force intelligence integration.

The 9/11 Commission Report identified that there were management and leadership issues within the IC. Highlighted in 1998, when DCI George Tenet issued a directive concerning Al Qaeda to CIA officials stating: "We are at war. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."<sup>5</sup> This memorandum had little influence in mustering the IC or Department of Defense (DoD) to focus its priorities on terrorism issues. Creating an unbiased leader of the IC whose main mission was to integrate the IC and be the principal advisor to the National Security Council for intelligence enhanced analysts' ability to share information by changing the IC culture and achieving technical integration advancements. Intelligence integration and sharing has assisted policy makers, the military, and law enforcement members in synthesizing information in order to prevent future terrorist attacks and support the strategies of the U.S. government.<sup>6</sup>

This paper demonstrates why the DNI was needed and how it has enhanced the IC. The central benefit of creating the DNI is the IC now has one voice to policy makers and customers.<sup>7</sup> By formalizing one boss in the IC with the authorities bestowed upon him to create one set of

policies for the entire IC, it now has the ability to facilitate community integration. Budgetary allocations for central technological advances and coordination of databases have improved the operational environment of the entire intelligence community. In addition to the authorities granted to the DNI and his office, an examination of the positive elements of the DNI, as well as some of the reasoning behind those criticizing the need for the role of the DNI will be addressed. At the conclusion of this thesis, items will be highlighted on how the DNI and its office can move the intelligence community even closer in integrating and collaborating to secure the nation and its polices.

### **Background**

Understanding the culture and business methods of the IC prior to the 2001 terrorist events in the U.S. revealed why intelligence community reform was necessary. The intelligence field consisted of 16 different entities with little ability or need to share information because of multiple impediments to do so. The lack of coordination limited the intelligence value since the pieces were not put together, and not given to the people who could have benefitted most from the information.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S., Congress demanded an inquiry asking how these attacks could have happened with no forewarning. This Congressional Commission was also to establish recommendations to the panel on how to prevent further terrorist activities in the U.S. The 9/11 Commission Report determined that many agencies in law enforcement and the intelligence community had suspicious information but did not know how, or with whom, to share that information to prevent them.<sup>8</sup> This was an easy assessment since each agency in the IC was operating in a “need to know” environment, with technology that was only helpful to its own intelligence agency and not for collaboration throughout the IC.

The 9/11 Commission Report made several recommendations to thwart future terrorist attacks. One of the results of these recommendations was the 2004 IRPTA, which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).<sup>9</sup> This restructuring of the intelligence community was the first reorganization of the IC since the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA.<sup>10</sup> Despite nineteen prior government commission recommendations, the 2004 IRPTA finally created the position of the director of the intelligence community.<sup>11</sup>

The 9/11 Commission Report determined that it had been difficult for the 16 different intelligence agencies to communicate with each other since they had their own computer systems and classification levels. Organization of the intelligence system induced chaos on analysts trying to share information since each agency had its own systems and ways of doing business. Unifying the communications capability of the intelligence community was a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report. The reasoning behind this not happening sooner was that there was not an overarching budget to handle creating a single system to be used by the NRO, CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, and NGA.<sup>12</sup> The commission report states “the terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our government.”<sup>13</sup> This alluded to the lack of coordination among the agencies. Even though different organizations had essential information that, if compiled, could have been useful to potentially stopping the terrorists from carrying out the attacks, they simply lacked the ability to quickly and efficiently share it with their IC counterparts.

Many critics of the formation of the ODNI believed that an additional layer of bureaucracy would only get in the way of collaboration between the intelligence agencies. Prior to the ODNI setting the standards for the IC, the community had mixed guidelines, priorities, and budgets: some of the 16 intelligence agencies worked for both the DoD and the

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) while others worked solely for one or the other. Since the DCI was dual-hatted as Director of the CIA and the Director of parts of the intelligence community, the perception existed that the DCI gave more accolades and money to the CIA over the other agencies because of a conflict of interest.<sup>14</sup> Other opponents contended that rather than strengthening control over the IC, the establishment of a DNI would actually weaken IC management and add to redundancies.<sup>15</sup> Those against creating the DNI believed that by not being the director of CIA, the DNI would lose influence in the federal government.<sup>16</sup> Some opponents of the DNI voiced concern about the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to position the ODNI in the executive office of the President because it would put intelligence at risk of politicization. Critics were also concerned that Congress would experience greater difficulty in conducting oversight of the IC because the proximity of the DNI to the White House would more frequently raise the issue of executive privilege.<sup>17</sup>

Before 9/11, the lead of the IC was the DCI, who was also in charge of the CIA. Because of this intimate relationship between the CIA and DCI, the CIA had unfair advantages over other members of the intelligence community. The DCI was fully aware of, and directly responsible for, the CIA mission and therefore gave it more time, attention, and funding. The reform act created an intelligence "czar," the DNI, to equitably control all intelligence agencies. The report was consistent with the findings and recommendations that a more centralized IC would benefit from broader analysis and assist in information sharing.<sup>18</sup> The role of the DNI is more expansive than that of the DCI because national intelligence also covers domestic issues including homeland security, changing its name post IIRTPA from the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the National Intelligence Program (NIP).<sup>19</sup>

As discussed, until the implementation of the DNI in 2005, the IC was plagued with stovepiped information and no leader with overarching authorities to guide the IC towards collaboration. To guide IC transformation and to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 commission report, the President created the position of the DNI. Formed in April 2005, the DNI and his office commenced the first reform of the intelligence community to improve integration of all the agencies and its technology.

### **Implementation**

To force the integration of the intelligence community, the DNI was given the authority and budget to implement mandated changes. The DNI was given overarching authority to make rules and policies for mandatory integration of the IC. Along with its legal authorities, the DNI was given an overall intelligence budget to allocate money towards standardizing technological systems across the IC to allow for timely communication between agencies. As detailed below, the DNI's legal and budget authority allowed it to fulfill mission to lead the intelligence community.

The fundamental change stemming from the 2004 IRTPA was the power and mission given to the newly created DNI and his office. These authorities gave the DNI overarching control of the IC to implement necessary changes as identified in the 9/11 commission report. As evaluated below, the authorities given to the DNI made him the leader of the IC, capable of implementing change in the entire community.

The DNI's main responsibility is to be the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.<sup>20</sup> The rivalries between intelligence agencies have always existed, with each trying to lobby for a bigger budget and more clout. Ensuring agencies are not overshadowed by one

another, the ODNI continually enforces integration and fosters unity throughout the IC. ODNI has received money to integrate the technical systems of the IC. Prior to the Commission Report findings, there was no impetus for an IC member to spend their own money to integrate systems with another IC member; therefore, analysts had trouble technically and logistically coordinating with other agencies. The DNI's office also placed an emphasis on produced intelligence being coordinated throughout the community, and not from just one viewpoint or INT. The DNI became the honest broker of intelligence, promoting information sharing and teamwork, and providing the best, most timely intelligence to policy makers and warfighters.

The ODNI's goals include enhancing communication, collaboration, and coordination within the IC. As described by the ODNI, integration of intelligence analysis and collection to inform decisions made from the White House down to the warfighter is the primary responsibility of the IC. Because integration is so burdensome and costly, no government entity has ever wanted to deal with it. Since the ODNI was established and equally implemented applicable policies, budgetary allotments, and technical advancements, there have been fewer hindrances to information sharing.

With the dramatic increase of personnel and resources in the intelligence field post 9/11, as the "czar" of the IC, the DNI was assigned to eliminate the stovepipes and duplication of information throughout the IC. In order to ensure success, the DNI was given control of the IC budget and combined with the management of the DoD intelligence and the national intelligence community, streamlined its activities and focus. As a result of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the intelligence community has a better ability to be more effective than it was prior to the 9/11 attacks because of the demand of information sharing and the access and technology now available to collaborate throughout the intelligence field.<sup>21</sup> Formalizing the role

of DNI as the “czar” of the IC enhanced and forced greater information sharing and integration among the IC, leading analysts to be able to synthesize information from the different INTs.<sup>22</sup>

### *Authorities*

The DNI has the sole authority to establish national intelligence priorities for all agencies. The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is the mechanism to ensure that all intelligence entities are giving the appropriate priority of a topic as deemed by the National Security Council, Principals Committee, and approved by the President. The IC implements changes on a semi-annual basis to keep all national priorities relevant and up to date.<sup>23</sup> NIPF is a means to capture issues of critical interest to senior IC customers and communicate those issues to the IC for action. Along with a matrix of topics and priorities, written guidance is given to the IC identifying critical information requirements associated with the priorities in the matrix. IC members use the NIPF to guide and inform their decisions concerning the allocation of collection and analytic resources as well as the prioritization of requirements. The NIPF is the definitive statement of the DNI on intelligence priorities; as such, it allows IC managers to make collection and analytic resource decisions ensuring each agency is using the same analytical efforts against a subject.<sup>24</sup>

Along with aligning priorities on intelligence issues, the ODNI took control from the CIA of putting together the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) to align the IC perspective on high priority issues to the President. This was monumental since it gave legitimacy to the DNI, as well as gave exposure of the ODNI and its efforts daily to the President. The PDB also showed that it was intelligence compiled by all agencies, not just the CIA.<sup>25</sup> Each agency contributes to the PDB, giving the President a thorough look into subjects from all viewpoints of the

intelligence arena. This briefing forced teamwork within the IC, utilizing all INTs providing a better product to the President.

As chief of the IC, key relationships are a necessity for the DNI to succeed. The DNI also has to stay connected with Congress since they are the oversight committee and holders of approving the budget for the IC. Active and constant relationships between the DNI and other IC leaders contribute to the agencies' ability to implement integration of intelligence. The DNI is responsible for eliminating any turf wars that exist between agencies when they are trying to withhold information from community partners who may be seeking the limelight as the best source for a high interest topic.

In addition to fostering relationships with and between agencies, the DNI must be mindful of their relationship with Congress. By law, Congress must be informed by the IC of on-going and anticipated intelligence activities. The Congress and IC relationship is important since Congress funds the IC, therefore expectations are that the DNI will portray as the honest broker where the entire IC is focusing its efforts. Both the legislative and executive branches of the federal government perform intelligence oversight activities. In Congress, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) are the congressional committees involved in overseeing all intelligence activities. The HPSCI and SSCI ensure all activities are abiding by applicable laws. In the executive branch, the National Security Council is the DNI's principal advisor, but the IC also works with the President's advisory and oversight intelligence boards. Through these oversight actions, the IC keeps decision makers well informed of intelligence related to national security issues, while Congress maintains general oversight of intelligence activities.<sup>26</sup> Having the DNI answer to the IC Congressional oversight committees has improved and streamlined the communication

between the IC and Congress. This allows Congress to concentrate its efforts on the DNI's recommendations and briefings.<sup>27</sup>

After the 9/11 attacks, counterterrorism became a national priority. The IRTPA created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), a fusion center established as a mechanism to close the gap between the CIA and the FBI, thus connecting foreign and domestic intelligence sharing. The NCTC broke the mold of the national government organization by having the national agencies working counterterrorism all at the same facility, being the center for joint operational planning and joint intelligence, to combat terrorism. The NCTC's mission statement is to analyze, share information, and integrate all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.<sup>28</sup> The director of the NCTC reports directly to the DNI with regard to counterterrorism intelligence operations and analysis.<sup>29</sup>

Based off the success of the NCTC, the DNI has pushed for the establishment of many interagency fusion and information centers that focus on key national priority issues. Establishing intelligence fusion centers allows all INTs to be in the same location thereby enhancing collaboration and communications. This is the intelligence community's way of facilitating "jointness" between government agencies and allowing the involvement of coalition partners.<sup>30</sup> Fusion centers integrate information and intelligence from the Federal, State, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector in order to provide a more accurate picture of the risks to people, infrastructure and communities. These fusion centers provide actionable intelligence to law enforcement agencies.<sup>31</sup> In addition to analysis, fusion centers identify intelligence gaps to provide law enforcement with a better situational awareness.

Other responsibilities of the DNI include facilitating the appropriate and secure flow of information to the applicable entities able to benefit from this intelligence. The DNI refers to

responsible sharing as being “compliant with law, regulation and policy; consistent with IC strategy and direction, to include protection of sources and methods, and civil liberties and privacy; and accountable through governance and oversight while maximizing the volume and variety of information that is discoverable and accessible.”<sup>32</sup> This is a new model of doing business in the IC because previously information sharing was minimal with no collaboration of all perspectives on a subject. At times, coalition partners will have information to supplement and improve intelligence products; rather it is regional or functional intelligence issue. The DNI is also in charge of ensuring that the IC is using the best technology available to produce intelligence and will disseminate new systems as they become available.

Creating the DNI was the first time control and power was given to one entity to enforce integration among the IC. With the authorities granted to the DNI, the DNI became the leader charged with enhancing the integration of IC. Because of its role as the intelligence “czar,” the DNI has the authority to create and enforce policy pertaining to the entire intelligence community to help alleviate the IC issues highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report.

### *Policies*

With the power over the IC, the DNI has the ability to make policy which each agency mandated to follow. The policies the DNI implemented after the establishment, made the changes necessary to eliminate the IC shortfalls that were found in the 9/11 Commission Report. Without the authority given to the DNI to make these policies, agencies remained reluctant to change for the common good of the IC.

Prior to the creation of the DNI, an analyst had to see if the other agency had a “need to know,” before sharing any information with another analyst or agency. In other words, if an analyst had pertinent information on a subject, it is the analyst’s responsibility to identify the

specialists in the intelligence fields who had a “need to know” prior to sharing information. This collaboration is to assist in analytical products and ensure that the dots are connected.

Changing the mindset from “need to know” to “need to share” was a massive undertaking by the DNI because it required analysts to come out of their comfort zone and learn how a different INT was approaching the same subject potentially providing additional information. In some intelligence products, analysts give credit to those who collaborated on the product from other agencies within the IC. By changing the policy on information sharing, the shared product has more legitimacy as it has been vetted through the IC and not derived from just one INT.

Another policy the DNI has implemented for the IC that has assisted with collaboration is the IC-wide badge reciprocity.<sup>33</sup> Common security and access standards around the IC have existed, but prior to the DNI policy, access to different facilities were hindered by different badges and pin codes. The IC badges allow analysts with different intelligence specialties in various locations easier entry into other agencies’ facilities increasing collaboration.

For the ODNI to succeed, collaboration between government entities is imperative. Although each organization has its own culture and way of doing business, learning to negotiate and share information for the greater good of the IC is instrumental to its success. To help facilitate this process, the DNI has set IC wide policy that joint duty assignments will become necessary if personnel want to achieve high-ranking positions within the IC. This joint assignment is to learn other organizations and cultures, and to share best practices within the IC, merging cultures when applicable. An analyst can take the best practices of his organization to another agency, while returning to his original institution with the best practices from the organization visited. Unifying the intelligence field has helped alleviate the burden of analysts only knowing their own particular intelligence function. The IRTPA also gave the DNI the

ability to transfer personnel within the intelligence community, for no longer than two years, to fulfill the IC's needs.<sup>34</sup> The joint duty program will assist those who do not know what they do not know, exposing them to other ways of conducting business and performing analysis.

According to the September 2009 DNI's policy guidance on implementing the IC civilian joint duty program, credit for completing a joint duty assignment will be considered a quality ranking factor in the merit promotion process and given additional weight in the consideration of candidates for promotion to the rank of GS-14 or above. However, a promotion for those with joint duty certification or credit will not be guaranteed.<sup>35</sup> In May 2011, the ODNI enacted new rules for joint duty assignments. To qualify for senior intelligence positions, employees now must work in top-level jobs at more than one agency. Implementing Joint Intelligence Community Duty Assignments is a major step toward breaking up fiefdoms and creating a common culture for the intelligence community. The ODNI defines a joint duty assignment as the permanent assignment of a civilian employee from a position in one intelligence organization to another that "requires and/or provides appropriate joint duty experience." Temporary duties also are included, and last anywhere from 12 to 36 months.<sup>36</sup>

The DNI is focused on alleviating duplicative work by relying on coalition partnerships. The U.S. cannot perform all the intelligence and military work of the world. Working with coalition partners allows analysts to look at a subject from a different perspective. In addition, coalition partners might have other avenues or expertise of getting information that would be of use to the U.S. on the same subject. The ODNI recognizes coalition partnerships as necessary for the IC and important to enhance U.S. and world security.

As discussed, the policies implemented by the DNI have assisted in alleviating some of the burdens associated with the 16 IC partners, namely with authority, policymaking, technology,

and budget issues. With the execution of these policies, the intelligence field has the same guidelines ensuring the collaboration of INTs with have a holistic view of analyzed intelligence.

### *Technology*

Another major responsibility for the ODNI is to lead the integration of the technological aspects of the IC. Technical integration is for multiple agencies to collaborate and communicate information to other INTs or entities such as law enforcement. In the past, sharing data and information was difficult since each member of the community had its own communications systems. New technical advancements available to the entire IC have aided in the collaboration of intelligence by analysts.

For example, the DNI has funded and created Intellipedia to the IC on all three classification systems, aiding analysts in finding and sharing information. Intellipedia is the IC's version of the famous on-line Wikipedia. Analysts, working groups, and engineers throughout the IC use it for information sharing. Since it is unveiling in 2006, Intellipedia has grown to more than 1.5 million edits on the top-secret network alone.<sup>37</sup>

These coordinating efforts have had success and are still expanding. Another DNI success has been A-space. A-space is a classified social website that allows analysts to come to one forum to discuss a particular topic. The designers of A-Space wanted to give analysts from all 16 intelligence agencies a place to share ideas and information more freely and the ability to collaborate across agency lines. A search function on this database assists analysts in finding people who are interested in the information they want to share.<sup>38</sup> A-space's ability to connect analysts across the IC overcomes one of the major hurdles of integration, prior to the 2004 IRTPA.

Another success was the creation of the Library of National Intelligence (LNI) by the ODNI in coordination with CIA. Used across the IC, the LNI is a storage area for all disseminated intelligence products. One of its key features is a card catalog containing summary information of each report, classified at the lowest possible level to enable analysts to discover nearly anything that had been published by the IC regardless of document classification. LNI allows users track trends on key intelligence topics, maintain statistics showing the most used or cited intelligence reports, and provides services that enable other Community portals and applications to link to appropriate intelligence in the LNI. The LNI also enables analysts and collectors to find people working on similar topics, allowing collectors to assess the impact of their information in finished intelligence. Finally, the LNI also provides IC managers and customers' insight into the alignment of IC production and national intelligence priorities.<sup>39</sup>

As discussed above, the DNI's ability to direct the use of new and integrated technology has been very beneficial. With the technological advancements available to all agencies, the flow of intelligence is more readily available to the analyst straight from the desktop. The benefit of this technology was that no one agency had to find money to fund these advancements. With this integration mission, the ODNI has the vision of becoming a more integrated intelligence community to provide judicious intelligence and information to customers and policy makers.

### *Budget*

The DNI's budget authority over the IC has allowed for these technological advancements. Being the honest broker of the IC, the DNI is in charge of budgeting based on need and national priorities. This section portrays where the DNI gets its funding, and what the DNI is in charge of distributing throughout the IC.

The IRTPA designated that the DNI has the responsibility for managing and directing the budgetary resources of the IC, including its capabilities, systems, and activities. This included developing and applying initiatives to ensure the best use of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) funding.<sup>40</sup> The DNI is also responsible for major acquisitions within the IC. Along with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), he shares this ability for the DoD intelligence program.<sup>41</sup> Having the national intelligence agencies lead many of the DoD intelligence programs, these authorities to direct the budget and acquisition of programs enhance the interoperability of the IC.

The NIP falls under the Office of management and Budget (OMB) to secure funding for intelligence activities in several Federal departments as well as the CIA. The NIP's work is critical to not only protecting American citizens, but also safeguarding our economy from outside threats to foster continued economic growth. The NIP has recognized that the DNI has conducted an efficiencies review in the IC, as mandated by the DoD, to reduce the growth in spending and present fiscal discipline, even though they are not subject to the President's restriction on non-security discretionary spending. The budget discloses for the first time the aggregate funding for NIP, \$55 billion in 2012, though details of the intelligence budget requests by individual members of the IC remain classified.<sup>42</sup>

Managing intelligence budgets and authorities also became the responsibility of the DNI upon the office standing up, which was not a role previously given to the DCI. By having one director of the entire IC budget, the DNI sets direction and allocation of assets for the IC. The DNI is in charge of developing and executing 80% of the intelligence budget with the remainder residing in the Office of the SECDEF. Based on the DNI's guidance, the Director of the OMB will distribute funds from the Treasury Department to those performing intelligence functions.

The IRTPA gives the DNI the authority to partake in development of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program set by the Secretary of Defense.<sup>43</sup> With these stronger budget authorities, the DNI has more power to influence and shape how the DoD will finance its intelligence budget and spending.

As demonstrated by the DNI having the role of managing the intelligence budget, proper allocation can go toward appropriate national priorities. Moreover, as stated above, this allows budget resources to be applied to the entire community, not just one entity. As the director of the IC, the DNI ensures the funding of what is necessary to integrate the community to enhance intelligence.

Bequeathed with the authority to govern the intelligence field, the DNI has the capability to make the policies to encourage, implement, and produce intelligence integration from all the INTs and agencies. With the ability to distribute the intelligence budget to achieve national intelligence priorities and objectives, allocation of money to enhance intelligence collaboration has occurred. Designating the DNI the authority to put into effect policies, technological advancements, and the ability to govern the budget has assisted the IC. With these changes, the government is trying to prevent the mistakes made prior to 9/11 and aid in the whole of government approach to intelligence collaboration.

### **Way Ahead**

As with the rest of the U.S. federal government, the IC is under tight review of its budget and is facing difficult budgetary reductions. DNI James R. Clapper Jr. recently confirmed that he has made recommendations to OMB for budgetary reductions in the next 10 years.<sup>44</sup> Primarily, the focus of these cuts are on redundancies, whether technical or analytical. What will be difficult for the ODNI is to continue to succeed, although additional financial resources is

necessary to enhance integration of the various computer networks in the IC. One option currently being implemented is eliminating contractors where applicable, who have been integral in easing communication gaps and getting the IC on the same system. Where the DNI can continue to reduce fiscal expenditures is to eliminate duplicative efforts, whether the job is a contractor or government work role. Eliminating duplication throughout the IC will allow a reallocation of funds to fix the technical limitations that inhibit coordination across the IC.

As learned from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, military “jointness” is important and effective. These same joint characteristics would provide better mission success in the intelligence field. Investing more into the joint mentality will benefit the IC from different organizations doing the same projects, giving a more holistic analysis. Sharing information from all INTs on a subject will give an analyst evidence to prove the reasoning behind why they believe a subject is, as they believe it to be. More fusion centers, cells, and working groups with members of all organizations working the same issue, but with a different INT or perspective will assist the IC with better analysis and collaboration. In the wake of recent events around the world such as the Syria unrest, regional topics are top tier issues for the intelligence community, requiring many different perspectives and INTs looking at the same issue.

### **Recommendations**

Despite its named successes above, the DNI still has room for improvement. As the forefront of the IC, the DNI and his office continually need to evolve as the IC and national issues change. Even with planned reductions in the national budget, some of the recommendations only require a change in culture and policy, not in funding.

To assist the DNI in setting and achieving the goals of the ODNI, personnel accountability ensuring analysts are doing their part to share information for holistic intelligence.

Prioritization of work would assist IC employees cannot be responsible for all goals of the DNI, but where applicable, managers should make the recommendations in the employee's evaluation of what employees should be liable to complete. Managers should also monitor the ease with which personnel assist others with collaboration and information sharing. If a person or organization makes it difficult to get information, other agencies will not use them, potentially losing information that could be beneficial for a problem set. Especially at a time of fiscal constraint, it is unacceptable for people to not willingly provide support to other agencies. Holding IC personnel accountable for doing their part in making the IC better through implementation of the DNI's goals, even at lower echelons, is imperative. Maintaining the status quo should no longer be acceptable in an IC member's evaluation.

Information sharing remains a struggle for the intelligence community. In many cases, it is not because the information is not available, but rather the analyst did not know the information existed. It would benefit the IC if the DNI would develop a policy to streamline web postings. It needs to be mandatory that products posted on the web have a good point of contact for the producer of the intelligence and the date the product was created. Agencies should also have a better POC listing on their websites cross-referenced so that a customer could find the POC able to assist them in finding more information. There are numerous ways to get information on a subject; however, many customers do not know where to begin. Allowing improvement of existing capabilities of tools and databases for enhancement, but reinventing the wheel on information sharing only confuses the customer.

As the IC depends on all INTs, private sector, and coalition partners, it is imperative that analysts appropriately classify their products. Many of those who have been in the business of intelligence for long periods of time are still using the Cold War method of just posting the

highest level of classification possible on the product. Reprimanding this lazy technique would assist in changing the culture and making information more accessible. Paragraph markings at the appropriate level is a great agent in facilitating information sharing, but is not used fully in the intelligence community. Paragraph markings are a good practice because an analyst will then know the specific classification of a piece of information.

## **Conclusion**

The Director of National Intelligence has proven to be not another level of bureaucracy hindering progress of integrating the IC. Rather, the DNI is uniting the intelligence community while keeping the culture and specialty of each INT. The DNI has publicly said it will not face bureaucratic hindrances to success and will ask the President for more power if necessary to fulfill his mission as the director of the intelligence community.<sup>45</sup> Because of technical, legislative, and keen oversight of the intelligence community, collaboration and the ability to do so is at the highest levels since the National Security Act of 1947. Embracing individual agency cultures while preventing the stovepipes of information is enhancing collaboration and communication. The ability for an analyst to phone, email, or visit a partner agency to share information has become much easier since the creation of the DNI and the implementation of its policies and technology.

With the formation of the ODNI and its mission statement as defined by the IRTPA of 2004, the IC can view the DNI as a single leader guiding each agency collectively. This guidance is monumental since it has previously not existed. The intelligence field is going in the right direction of making progress towards collective integration and collaboration because it has one set of priorities, guidelines, and authority, with the necessary tools to enhance communication between the agencies. With the budgetary constraints, duplication is being

eliminated, which can be seen as a morale builder since every analyst's work is essential and not a part of the repetition of other analysts doing the same thing. The ODNI refuses to wait until the next disaster to evolve into being a better principal of the IC, but rather has continuously reformed since its inception. Prior to 2004, the last overhaul of the IC was in 1947.

Staying with the status quo in the intelligence community is no longer acceptable: communication, collaboration, and information sharing to prevent further atrocities on the U.S. are the new standard for the intelligence community. The President and Congress have continually updated intelligence reform since the Commission Report from the 9/11 attacks. Overall, the DNI is still trying to enforce integration standards, while also providing current intelligence to the President and National Security Council. Previously, this goal was never given to any one entity in the IC. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the DCI had weak control over the intelligence community and focused on being the CIA director. The Office of the DNI has been successful in managing the intelligence field to collaborate and provide timely intelligence supporting both warfighters and policymakers. The DNI who have taken command since its inception in 2005 have been instrumental to the intelligence community.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> President George Bush, Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, 44, (Aug 4, 2008): 1064-1080.
- <sup>3</sup> Richard A. Best Jr, *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress RL33539 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 28, 2011, 3, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf> (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>4</sup> Priest, Dana and William M. Arkin. "A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control." *Washington Post*, July 19, 2010. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/7/> (accessed January 23, 2012).
- <sup>5</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 11, [http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report\\_Exec.pdf](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf) (accessed January 12, 2012).
- <sup>6</sup> Examples of the integrated IC successes are that by fusing domestic and foreign intelligence, homeland security threats posed by alleged extremists, including Zazi, Hoadley, and Muhammad were disrupted. The DNI employed IC resources to address emerging transnational public health emergencies because of the H1N1 virus. The DNI has funded more than 80 new technologies for inter-agency intelligence operations. ODNI, ODNI Factsheet, [http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/20100716\\_Fact%20Sheet.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20100716_Fact%20Sheet.pdf) (accessed 25 APR 2012).
- <sup>7</sup> Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006), 41.
- <sup>8</sup> Jerome P. Bjelopera, *Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress RL40901 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 10, 2011, 1, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/166837.pdf> (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>9</sup> Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., *The National Security Enterprise* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 139.
- <sup>10</sup> Lowenthal, 30.
- <sup>11</sup> Alfred Cumming, *The Position of the Director of National Intelligence*, CRS Report for Congress RL32506 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2004), 5, [www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32506.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32506.pdf) (accessed January 12, 2012).
- <sup>12</sup> Roy Mark, "Spy Agencies to Finally Link Up," eWeek, January 22, 2009, <http://mobile.eweek.com/c/a/Messaging-and-Collaboration/Spy-Agencies-to-Finally-Link-Up/> (accessed January 10, 2012).
- <sup>13</sup> Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 21
- <sup>14</sup> Every DCI gave priority to managing the CIA over the IC because he had clear authorities as Director of CIA, but very little authority or guidance to manage other elements of the IC. Thomas Fingar, "Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Promising State Despite Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Animosity." In *The National Security Enterprise*, ed. Thomas Fingar et al. (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 142.
- <sup>15</sup> Critics of establishing the ODNI believed that redundancies were wasteful. The ODNI views redundant analysis as beneficial because it will challenge analysts to have "competitive analysis," avoiding single points of failure and unchallenged views. Another benefit to redundancies in the IC is that specific intelligence products can be tailored to a specific customer. ODNI. "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11," [http://www.dni.gov/content/Question\\_and\\_Answer\\_IC.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/content/Question_and_Answer_IC.pdf) (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>16</sup> Cumming, 14.
- <sup>17</sup> Cumming, 15.
- <sup>18</sup> Posner, 7.
- <sup>19</sup> Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, eds., *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), 567.
- <sup>20</sup> ODNI, About the ODNI, <http://www.dni.gov/index.html>

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- <sup>21</sup> IC policy changed with the implementation of the Intelligence Community Directive 501, "Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information," which mandates actions to facilitate information sharing, including the ability to discover and request information from all IC elements. ODNI, "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11," [http://www.dni.gov/content/Question\\_and\\_Answer\\_IC.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/content/Question_and_Answer_IC.pdf), (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>22</sup> Established to integrate the IC, the DNI has the authority to make priorities and policies for the entire IC. Policies have mandated information sharing within the IC. ODNI technical advancements for the IC have created tools and means to access and share information. ODNI, "ODNI Factsheet 2011," [http://www.dni.gov/content/ODNI%20Fact%20Sheet\\_2011.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/content/ODNI%20Fact%20Sheet_2011.pdf) (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>23</sup> ODNI, Intelligence Community Directive Number 204, <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-204.pdf>
- <sup>24</sup> ODNI, NIPF, <http://www.dni.gov/content/AT/NIPF.pdf>
- <sup>25</sup> Lowenthal, 40.
- <sup>26</sup> ODNI, About the IC Relationships with Other Govt Orgs, [http://www.dni.gov/relationships\\_IC.htm](http://www.dni.gov/relationships_IC.htm)
- <sup>27</sup> The intelligence community had more than 100 IC oversight hearings in 2009, and as of July 2010, 70 such hearings. Also given were thousands of intelligence community briefings and meetings on all aspects of the IC to the oversight committees. In addition, the IC provided the intelligence oversight committees hundreds of thousands of pages of classified information on issues pertaining to national security. ODNI, "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11," 4, [http://www.dni.gov/content/Question\\_and\\_Answer\\_IC.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/content/Question_and_Answer_IC.pdf) (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>28</sup> ODNI, NCTC Hearing, <http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20111006%20DNCTC%20testimony%20before%20HPSCI.pdf>
- <sup>29</sup> Best, *Statutory Authorities*, 8.
- <sup>30</sup> The DNI has also created the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which comprises of policies, procedures, and technologies linking the resources of federal, state, local, and tribal entities with the private sector to facilitate terrorism information sharing, access, and collaboration. ODNI, "Questions & Answers on the Intelligence Community Post 9/11," 2, [http://www.dni.gov/content/Question\\_and\\_Answer\\_IC.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/content/Question_and_Answer_IC.pdf) (accessed on April 25, 2012).
- <sup>31</sup> Todd Masse and John Rollins, *A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress*, CRS Reports for Congress RL34177, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service September 19, 2007), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34177.pdf> (accessed April 25, 2012).
- <sup>32</sup> ODNI, IC Initiatives Information Sharing, [http://www.dni.gov/reports/11152526\\_strategic\\_intent\\_info\\_sharing.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/reports/11152526_strategic_intent_info_sharing.pdf)
- <sup>33</sup> Edward Maguire, "Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges," November 12, 2008, 5, <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/04/odni-ig-1108.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2012).
- <sup>34</sup> Best, *Statutory Authorities*, 7.
- <sup>35</sup> DNI, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 601.1, [http://www.dni.gov/electronic\\_reading\\_room/ICPG\\_601\\_1.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICPG_601_1.pdf)
- <sup>36</sup> Shane Harris, "Moving on Up," Government Executive, November 6, 2006, [www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/11/index.html](http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/11/index.html) (accessed January 12, 2012).
- <sup>37</sup> CIA.gov, "Intellipedia Marks Second Anniversary," March 8, 2008.
- <sup>38</sup> Ben Bain, "A-Space Set to Launch this Month," Federal Computer Week, Sept 3, 2008, [fcw.com/articles/2008/09/03/aspaceset-to-launch-this-month.aspx](http://fcw.com/articles/2008/09/03/aspaceset-to-launch-this-month.aspx) (accessed February 4, 2012).
- <sup>39</sup> ODNI, IC Initiative Analytic Transformation, <http://www.dni.gov/content/AT/LNI.pdf>
- <sup>40</sup> Maguire, 7.
- <sup>41</sup> Best, *Statutory Authorities*, 8.
- <sup>42</sup> NIP, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet\\_department\\_intelligence](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_intelligence), January 23, 2012.
- <sup>43</sup> Richard A Best Jr, *Director of National Intelligence: Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals*, CRS Reports for Congress RL34231, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service December 16, 2011), 6. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34231.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2012).

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<sup>44</sup> Best, *Intelligence Issues for Congress*, 1.

<sup>45</sup> Chris Strohm, "Clapper Downplays Need to Overhaul Agencies, Authority", *Government Executive*, July 21, 2010,

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


Figure 7.1 The U.S. Intelligence Community.

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