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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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**TITLE:**  
**The Integration of Intelligence into the Surface Warfare Communities**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR:**  
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## Executive Summary

**Title:** The Further Integration of Intelligence and the Surface Warfare Communities

**Author:** Lieutenant Commander Christopher H. Smith, United States Navy

**Thesis:** The establishment of the Information Dominance Corps and the subsequent adjustment of naval resources to accommodate this newly formed cadre provide a ripe opportunity to close the gap between the Surface and Intelligence communities, and in doing so, enhance United States Navy's ability to dominate the global maritime domain.

**Discussion:** The Intelligence Community and the Surface Community have had a distant relationship since the Office of Naval Intelligence was established in 1882. While this distant relationship can be explained by mission, command and control constraints, community cultures and funding, today's threat environment demands the necessity for a closer relationship with and reliance upon the Intelligence Community. With the establishment of the Information Dominance Corps the Chief of Naval Operations has laid out a number of initiatives that will help build upon already existing relationships. These initiatives, however, lack the critical step of establishing a professional relationship between the two communities. Drawing on the positive professional relationship enjoyed by the Aviation Community and the Intelligence Community, the Surface Community could establish a foundation for a positive professional relationship by creating an Intelligence Department at the Naval Surface Warfare Training Center of Excellence in Newport, Rhode Island. An organic Intelligence Department, would allow all Surface Warfare Officers to interact with an Intelligence Officer and staff at all levels of their schoolhouse level training, ensure the threat briefs populated with current threat data, and provide Fleet Surface Warfare Officers with an understanding of what Naval Intelligence and the Intelligence Community as a whole can provide for them while deployed. Furthermore, with respect to the Fleet Readiness Training Plan, intelligence should be better nested in the training scenarios allowing fused intelligence to drive the operational missions required for evaluation.

**Conclusion:** By integrating intelligence requirements and personnel into the surface warfare training requirements and schools, Surface Warfare Officers who may have been previously unfamiliar with the Intelligence Community will become more familiar with intelligence requirements, procedures, capabilities, and limitations.

## **Introduction**

The United States Navy has always been an instrument of national power and in 2011 alone it demonstrated its impressive diverse and forward reaching capabilities. Following the tsunami in Japan, Navy ships were on station delivering critical humanitarian aid and relief. The Law of the Sea compels mariners to provide assistance to fellow mariners in distress. The Navy regularly responds this traditional obligation and it is common for the Navy to render aid to sailors in need, even if those sailors are Iranian fisherman. When Somali pirates attack commercial shipping, the Navy is there, assisting with the safe return of the crew. These news stories complement the Navy's recent recruiting slogan, "A Global Force for Good," yet the Navy is also prepared to use force when required. With rising tensions between the United States and Iran, the Navy's presence in the Persian Gulf provides a constant reminder to the Iranian Government of the military options available to the United States. The Navy/Marine Corps team also conducted strike operations and personnel recovery missions from amphibious shipping in support of OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya. Perhaps the biggest recent news story of all for the Navy was when President Obama called upon Navy SEALs and the CIA to execute the raid on Bin Laden's hidden compound, deep inside Pakistan. Using just the 2011 headlines as a gauge of the Navy's capabilities, the Navy is the "Swiss Army knife" of organizations the United States has to influence and shape policy, world events, and even history.

While news stories such as these have dominated headlines, behind the scenes the Navy quietly reshaped its organizational structure and changed the way it thinks about information by

creating the Information Dominance Corps (IDC) in October 2009. While the creation of the IDC may not be as news worthy as eliminating Osama Bin Laden, it is a fundamental shift in the way the Navy will collect, disseminate, and even view information. The Navy merged five previously stove piped communities; Information Professionals, Information Warfare, Intelligence, Oceanography, and the Space Cadre Professionals into one entity, the IDC, for greater effectiveness. All five communities play a pivotal role in providing the information to the decision maker where no community is more important than another. It is crucial for the end users of this information to have an understanding each of these communities' strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, if knowledge is a weapon, it is critical that the warfare communities develop a closer relationship with the IDC and just as important that the individual communities that comprise the IDC develop a deeper understanding of each other. However, while the five communities merged to improve coordination between them, a dangerous communications gap between the Intelligence and Surface Communities exists.

The Surface Community and the Intelligence Community have always experienced a distant relationship. History, force structure, funding, and necessity all factor into the rapport, or lack thereof, between the communities. The establishment of the IDC and the subsequent adjustment of naval resources to accommodate this newly formed cadre provide an opportunity to close the gap between the two communities. The creation of the IDC forces the Navy to view information, and specifically intelligence, as a warfighting function rather than simply a warfighting enabler.

The days of getting several months worth of tasking sealed in wax just prior to setting sail have long since passed. When a U. S. Navy ship returns to homeport at the end of deployment, chances are it did not conduct the deployment the crew had planned. Sometime during a typical

Navy deployment, a unit will receive tasking to respond to some emerging crisis. That crisis could be a hostage rescue from pirates, a disaster relief mission, or even the rescue of mariners in distress. Unlike those independent sailing days of yesteryear, today's operational environment demands cooperation, especially between intelligence officers and surface warriors.

The effort to bridge the gap between Intelligence Community and the Surface Community shares many similarities with the struggle to integrate aviation into naval operations. At first, planes were a novel concept, and the Navy lacked a clear vision for how to use the airplane. During the interwar years, all branches of the military developed doctrine for this promising new weapon. In 1921 General Billy Mitchell of the Army Air Service, demonstrated that a surface fleet was vulnerable to a land-based air attack with the highly publicized sinking of the captured German battleship OSTFRIESLAND.<sup>1</sup> Then in 1929, the Navy proved that shore installations were vulnerable to attacks from carrier-based aircraft when the service conducted a simulated day-break strike on the Panama Canal that "theoretically destroyed the locks," a demonstration that, interestingly, bore a striking resemblance to the Japanese early morning attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.<sup>2</sup> During World War II (WWII), the Battle of the Coral Sea demonstrated that two surface groups could actually meet and engage each other without the surface ships coming into visual range. Fleets could now engage the enemy with airpower alone. Today, aviation is an integral part of the Navy and most U. S. ships can accommodate embarked aircraft. In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century the integration of surface and intelligence operations is vital, yet, what should be a close-knit relationship between the two communities remains underdeveloped.

This paper will explore the relationship of the two communities from a historical context. It will then explore the ever-increasing complexities of threats since the fall of the Soviet Union.

It will then assess the diverse mission sets of the surface fleet. Next it will explore some of the paths that the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Roughead, laid out when he established the IDC. Lastly, this paper will identify potential gaps in the former CNO's way ahead and offer potential solutions to these gaps.

### **Distant Relationship**

Why are there not more Intelligence Officers on ships? Commensurate sister service units have entire Intelligence staffs, yet a ship may have one Independent Duty Intelligence Specialist (IDIS), usually just a senior E-6. A United States Marine Battalion has an Intelligence Staff comprised of about 22 Marines.<sup>3</sup> An Army Battalion within a Stryker Brigade has an Intelligence staff of about seven soldiers.<sup>4</sup> While not directly assigned to Air Force fighter squadrons, a squadron commanding officer will have about five Air Force intelligence personnel providing support.<sup>\*</sup> However, the commanding officer of a destroyer or cruiser only merits a single E-6.<sup>5</sup> These numbers only tell a fraction of the story. The solitary Intelligence Professional on the ship is the conduit to the Naval Intelligence Community and the greater Intelligence Community.<sup>†</sup> The Navy Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) concept augments the single IDIS from large, shore-based intelligence commands and provides intelligence support ranging from flag-level operational intelligence support to individual unit support. In order to appreciate fully today's relationship between the Surface Community and the Intelligence Community, it is important to explore this relationship from a historical perspective.

### **History**

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\* Intelligence personnel in the Air Force are assigned to the Wing and are parsed out to the individual squadrons.

† The term Naval Intelligence Professional is an all-inclusive term meant to include Naval Intelligence Officers, enlisted Intelligence Specialists, and Navy Department Civilians working in Naval Intelligence.

The history of intelligence support to the Surface Navy provides the context for today's Surface/Intelligence relationship and may even provide insight into the potential trajectory for a closer, more integrated association in the future. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the oldest of all service intelligence communities, was established in 1882 specifically to report on foreign advances in naval technology with a focus on naval armor and artillery.<sup>6</sup> ONI used the already established attaché program to collect foreign technical information that was later analyzed and disseminated in the form of "Information From Abroad" bulletins.<sup>7</sup> These first products provided little of value to help the surface fleet ascertain how an adversary would employ assets against the U. S. Navy during an engagement. They did, however, assist naval engineers in the development of U. S. armament. Because they focused on foreign naval technological advances and not foreign naval operations, these first Naval Intelligence positions were all shore-based jobs; thus, there was no direct link between the budding Intelligence Community and the well-established Fleet.

Naval Intelligence continued to provide little value to the operating fleet even as hostilities in Europe broke out with the beginning of World War I (WWI) in 1914. A majority of foreign intelligence was still collected by attachés, which meant collection was limited to what they could actually observe, especially in Axis countries. Despite this setback, ONI's mission did expand once hostilities ensued. Since the homeland was not directly threatened, ONI focused attention on the largest perceived threats to national security: espionage and sabotage. While gaining two additional mission sets, these new responsibilities contributed little information of value to the operating forces' ability to counter the enemy surface fleet and far less to counter the German's use of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic.<sup>8</sup> Despite the absence of support ONI provided the surface fleet during WWI, the fledgling aviation

community began to request intelligence support and personnel. In fact, Aviation Intelligence Officers were required to provide their Commanding Officers with daily reports that included updates to enemy order-of-battle and changes to the disposition of both enemy and friendly positions.<sup>9</sup>

During the inter-war period, Naval Intelligence continued to focus attention on the Attaché missions, but it expanded reporting requirements from simply naval technological advances to include information deemed of value to the United States and particularly of foreign commercial interest.<sup>10</sup> It was during this time that then Commander William “Bull” Halsey Jr., was assigned to Berlin as a Naval Attaché. He collected and produced reports to ONI on a Treaty of Versailles violation; the Japanese purchased diesel submarine engines from Germany. He also obtained technical data on stereoscope techniques that both the U.S. and the British benefited from during WWII.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, in 1937 as the storm clouds of impending conflict grew darker, the CNO issued a memo and ordered ONI to begin collection on all things navy related with a focus on foreign naval order-of-battle, to include possible intentions.<sup>12</sup> For the first time since ONI’s creation, Naval Intelligence was explicitly instructed to provide products to the fleet that could have a direct impact on operations; this 1937 memo provided the first direct link between the surface fleet and intelligence.<sup>13</sup>

Command and control limitations of the day confined dedicated intelligence support to shore-based Fleet Intelligence Centers. This demand and the importance placed upon good actionable intelligence thrust intelligence professionals into a position to influence the outcome of the war. However, this demand for quality intelligence products came at a price, and in WWII that price was manpower. The Intelligence center in Hawaii grew from just 126 personnel at the beginning of WWII to 1,767 at war’s end.<sup>14</sup> Intelligence analysts collaborated and fused reports

from reporting units all across the Pacific and turned these reports into solid analytical judgments that in turn provided insight into the Japanese Fleet's next move.<sup>‡</sup> It did not take much time for the Pacific Fleet to reap the rewards of these shore-based intelligence centers' labor. Prior to the Battle of Midway in 1942, using signals intelligence and solid analytical assessments, Commander Layton, Admiral Nimitz's Intelligence Officer, provided accurate information of when and where the Japanese attack would occur. The intelligence turned what was going to be a surprise Japanese attack on Midway into an American surprise attack on the Japanese invasion fleet.<sup>15</sup> In 1943, signals intelligence revealed Admiral Yamamoto's detailed air transport itinerary. With the help of the Army Air Corps, Admiral Yamamoto, was shot down and killed.<sup>16</sup> While these two examples highlight successes against Japan, there were similar success stories in the Atlantic against German submarine operations.

The centralization of intelligence personnel provided a unified voice to the operating forces of potential enemy intentions as opposed to many different, views that may not have been privy to the multiple intelligence streams. This concept would come to be known as Operational Intelligence or OPINTEL. Today, the Director of Naval Intelligence defines OPINTEL as, "the art of providing near real time information concerning the location, activity, and likely intentions of potential adversities."<sup>17</sup> This all-source approach helped defeat the Japanese during WWII and would later play a pivotal role in the Cold War. Today, OPINTEL remains a Naval Intelligence Professional's core competency and a competency the surface fleet continues to recognize and call upon.

Shore-based centers of WWII were reaping the benefits of the analytical work and some sought ways to close the response time of intelligence products by moving the analysts closer to

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<sup>‡</sup> It was also at this time that Fleet intelligence integrated with the other services to have a truly joint intelligence center allowing for greater understanding of the enemy.

the operating fleet. In 1942, now Admiral Halsey experimented with the concept of placing Intelligence Officers on ships. Halsey thought it relevant to link the surface and intelligence communities at sea, thus reducing the time spent between collection, analysis, mission planning, and tactical execution of the intelligence product. The experiment did not yield the desired results due to the limited range of radio collection, and the fact the Intelligence Officer had access to the same intelligence report, the Fleet Intelligence Bulletin, that the task force commander read. As a result, the Intelligence Officer provided very little value added to the commander's knowledge of the battlespace.<sup>18</sup> Intelligence Officers would not be assigned to ships again until late in the Cold War when technology and demand for the capability warranted the requirement.

The Cold War helped strengthen the relationship between the two communities, particularly in the collection and dissemination of OPINTEL. However, it took some time for the two communities to warm up to each other and even then the Intelligence Community seemed to benefit more from the relationship than the Surface Community. The in depth analysis of the single Naval threat, the Soviet Union, meant the United States Intelligence Community could direct its efforts with precision. Technological advances such as high altitude reconnaissance aircraft and imagery satellites provided the Intelligence Community access to previously denied areas, such as Soviet ports and the OPINTEL concept provided a foundation for the allocation of resources and analysis. Above all, the shore-based intelligence centers continued to provide the fleet with a single threat picture.

Although intelligence centers produced quality products, Naval Intelligence Officers now faced another problem; they lacked credibility. While some had transferred from other communities, there were some Intelligence Officers who may have never set foot on a ship.

How could that OPINTEL Officer, standing watch at the shore-based intelligence center, relate to the fleet's requirements without ever being underway? Placing Naval Intelligence Officers onboard ships forced them to learn why requirements were drafted the way they were. It reinforced the importance of knowing the customer. It forced Naval Intelligence to produce reports tailored to the fleet's requirements while also establishing the credibility that previous OPINTEL officers lacked.

The debate regarding the relevance of placing Naval Intelligence Officer on ships created a rift in the community reaching as high as the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) Rufus Taylor, who stated in the early 1960s "We do not send junior [Intelligence Officers] to sea!"<sup>19</sup> He argued that real intelligence work was conducted at shore in intelligence centers where the all source fusion analysis of multiple data streams occurred. The OPINTEL officer could paint a more accurate picture of an adversary's intent and thus be more relevant to the fleet at a shore based command. However, unlike the opposing armies of the Cold War, the Navy had routine interactions with the Soviet Navy.

The Navy operated continuously inside and among our opposing [forces] maneuvering against real Soviet units on a daily basis in an every day life of "war without shooting" on, above and below the sea's surface. In other words, far from merely eyeing each other across a frontier or demilitarized zone, the Soviet and US navies flew and sailed around and under and occasionally into each other as a matter of course.<sup>20</sup>

These interactions provided the junior intelligence officer an opportunity to observe and sometimes even interact with the enemy. In addition, he provided the Commander with his valuable perspective that he had gained from shore duty assignments. The Intelligence Officer could observe, first hand, the adversary. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union the Navy no longer enjoys a single axis threat.

## **The Current Threat**

Admittedly, the United States was involved in a number maritime events not directly tied to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Events like the Tonkin Gulf incident of 1964, USS LIBERTY incident in 1967, and the North Korean capture of the USS PUEBLO in 1968, while significant in their own right, are single issues events and pale in comparison the direct to campaign against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Similarly, the naval engagements like the “Tanker Wars” in the 1980s posed a threat to international commerce and not directly tied to national security.

The fall of the Soviet Union created a new set of problems and a new level of complexity. Once contained by the superpowers jockeying for influence around the globe, smaller nations and non-state actors are now expanding their maritime influence. These entities’ ambitions may now conflict with U. S. national interests. Today’s Surface Navy is threatened by a diverse set of state, non-state, and hybrid actors in multiple domains to include space and cyberspace, coupled with the possibility of operating in an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment. This is a truly daunting task for any Commanding Officer asked to take an U. S. Navy ship into any foreign port. While the threat may look familiar because the some equipment is either old Soviet equipment or copies of Soviet equipment, the end user may not employ the equipment as the Soviets would have, doctrinally, making it even more difficult to recognize a threat signature. Furthermore, both the Soviet Union and the United States always had the looming deterrence of mutually assured destruction where even the slightest misunderstanding could escalate into a nuclear exchange. The Cold Warriors had the luxury of only having to study Soviet doctrine and logic of mutually assured destruction, while today’s Surface Warrior must be well versed in a

wide variety of navies in addition to any number of asymmetric threats where mutually assured destruction is no longer a factor.

Recent history is rich with examples that highlight this diverse threat. In 1987, just before the demise of the Soviet Union, the USS STARK was hit by two Iraqi air-to-surface Exocet missiles launched from a shore-based F-1 aircraft killing 37 Sailors.<sup>21</sup> It is important to reinforce that at the time of the attack, the U.S. was allied with Iraq. In 2004, the INS HINAT was attacked by a Hezbollah C-802 missile, a shore-based cruise missile, killing four Israeli sailors. Reports indicate Hezbollah acquired the missile from Iran.<sup>22§</sup> In 2009, a North Korean submarine attacked the RKON CHOENAN with a wake homing torpedo sinking the ship and killing 46 South Korean Sailors.<sup>23</sup>

While Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to employ advanced conventional weapons systems against a military force, other non-state actors have successfully employed less sophisticated improvised explosives against maritime targets, the most well know being the USS COLE attack, which resulted in the loss of nineteen Sailors. Other lesser known attacks include the M/V LIMBURG, a tanker ship, was attacked in the Gulf of Aden by Al Qaida in 2002, killing one,<sup>24</sup> and the Japanese tanker M/V M. STAR, attacked by the Abdullah Azzam Brigade while transiting the Strait of Hormuz in 2010. While there were no deaths to the crew the M. STAR and damage to the ship was only superficial, the fact that non-state actors are targeting vessels transiting through international choke points is significant.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, terrorist

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§ An additional reason to care about this particular attack is that the HINANT was constructed at the Ingalls Ship Yard, near Pascagoula, Mississippi. This Ship Yard produces many of the Navy's cruisers, destroyers and frigates, but also ALL of the U.S. Navy's big deck amphibious assault ships. This attack highlights battle damage to an U.S. constructed ship from an Iranian missile.

organizations have a long and demonstrated history of conducting attacks until they “get it right.”\*\*

Terrorist organizations have demonstrated the ability to attack the ships in port as well as underway, employing anything from homemade explosives on small boats to complex military-grade weapon systems. The conventional military threat can come from the air, the surface, or sub-surface and no longer limited to a single doctrine. The threat can come from any number of foreign weapon systems, but is not only limited to enemy systems as history shows attacks have even come from allied nations. Today’s threat environment is multi-axis, multi-nation, conventional, and asymmetric. Today’s threat is far more complex than that of the Cold War. The Navy can no longer rely on a Commanding Officer’s experience from operating in and around the known enemy under a single known doctrine.

### **Diverse Mission Set**

Today’s deployments are rarely executed exactly as planned. Therefore, naval units are never completely prepared for any deployment. Because of the near continual forward presence, the Navy is often the first to respond to disasters, such as the 2011 Japanese tsunami, the 2010 Pakistan flooding, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. As such, Naval intelligence can play a critical role in establishing the situation as the first on scene commander for a transition to follow on commanders. Following the Haiti earthquake in 2010, USSOUTHCOM used both traditional and non-traditional collection assets in addition to commercial Internet based tools for situational awareness.<sup>26</sup> Many of the same skill sets used for Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment for combat operations can be easily transposed into disaster relief products such as

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\*\* The USS SULLIVANS attack before the USS COLE attack, and the relatively unsuccessful 1993 World Trade Center truck bombing prior to the September 11 attacks, demonstrate terrorist organizations attempt and modify tactics until they achieve success.

route studies, port facility studies, and airfield suitability studies. Because the operating forces have a diverse operating role, so does Naval Intelligence.

Regardless of the operation, the Commanding Officer, the Operations Officer, and the Tactical Action Officer watch station will be right in the center of these encounters. These officers will all be proficient and qualified Surface Warfare Officers (SWO), having multiple sea tours and valuable naval experiences. However, chances are these core operationally proficient officers will likely have had limited exposure to the intelligence community. These officers and all SWOs need to be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence Community in order to leverage the unique skill sets and capabilities the community can offer.

### **Missing Interface between the Surface Community and Intelligence**

In both the USS STARK incident and the USS COLE attack, intelligence organizations provided indications of the threat prior to the attacks. Just days before the strike against STARK, the ship received intelligence products indicating Iraqi flights would be operating in the vicinity, but more importantly, the Intelligence Community provided STARK with Iraqi attack flight profiles.<sup>27</sup> Yet, they were operating with the primary defensive weapons systems turned down thus, the operator failed to identify the audible warning.<sup>28</sup> Prior to the COLE attack, intelligence provided data dictating the Threat Condition of BRAVO, which labeled Aden, Yemen as high threat area, yet COLE was still tasked to re-fuel there and the captain requested and received approval to omit some BRAVO level force protection measures.<sup>29</sup> Israeli intelligence provided HANIT with warnings that Hezbollah may have obtained advanced anti-ship weapon systems, yet those warnings, like the STARK and COLE, were ignored.<sup>30</sup>

Why is the Surface Community seemingly ignoring the Intelligence Community? They are receiving the intelligence, but are just not acting upon it. If the OPINTEL concept truly

negates the need for an intelligence staff on ships especially if threats and threat warnings are produced and disseminated from shore-based intelligence commands, why is there an apparent issue? More importantly, how can the Navy fix this issue before the next incident?

The answer is developing mutual understanding. By placing junior Intelligence Officers on ships, the Intelligence Community gets exposure to the Surface Community, but this relationship is not a two way street. These junior Intelligence Officers enjoy all the benefits of serving onboard surface ships. They understand the demands of running a division, maintaining the material condition of the ship, training requirements, and even gain limited exposure to shipboard operating requirements. The Intelligence Community is getting to know the Surface Community, but the Surface Community is missing out on a similar exposure to the Intelligence Community. The Surface Community is simply not getting the exposure to the Intelligence Community early or often enough in their careers.

The surface community has a “Sea-Sea-Shore”<sup>31</sup> duty rotation, meaning back-to-back sea duty followed by a shore duty while the Intel Community has a “Sea-Shore-Shore”<sup>32</sup> duty rotation. While the two appear to align well, Junior Intelligence Officers are only assigned to carriers and the large deck amphibious assault ships, so there is actually very little opportunity for interaction at sea, unless surface officers serve on these big deck ships. The range of shore assignments is vast. Thus, unless the SWO is assigned to a shore assignment that requires direct interaction with intelligence the opportunities for a direct professional understanding and interaction are again minimal. About 25% of all Intelligence billets<sup>††</sup> are sea billets<sup>33</sup> and about 25% of all SWO billets are shore billets.<sup>34</sup> Due to the force structure and the mission

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†† Included in the 25% are the Aviation squadron Intelligence Officer billets, and Special Warfare units. The Intel Community codes these as sea billets. Intel Officers assigned to SEAL teams do not deploy on ships, however those assigned aviation squadrons assigned to carriers do experience a sea-based deployment.

requirements of OPINTEL and maintaining a Surface Fleet, the opportunity for Surface Officers to interact with the Intelligence Community is limited. Furthermore, about 40% of Intelligence billets are Joint billets with about half of those actually J-Coded billets, leaving about 30% of all other billets as shore based naval support billets.<sup>35</sup>‡ The force structure of both communities limits opportunities for professional interaction.

### **Opportunities to Interact**

The creation of the IDC, the “way ahead” vision of the CNO, and the Director of Naval Intelligence provide the Navy with an opportunity to bring the Surface Community and the Intelligence Community even closer together. Following the May 2011 Bin Laden raid, President Obama praised the union of operations and intelligence.<sup>36</sup> Then CNO Admiral Gary Roughead made similar comments in 2009 when he stated:

The biggest breakthrough of the current fight in OEF and OIF is the successful integration of intelligence and operations, and using the network to get information to the right person at the right time in the right way. That is where the power is.<sup>37</sup>

It is one thing to deliver the information but something entirely different to act upon that information.

### **CNO’s Way Ahead Vision**

The Surface Community and the Intelligence Community are destined to become more closely aligned. While evolution and operational requirements demand a closer union, the CNO has directed a closer relationship between the two communities. On 1 October 2009, CNO Roughead, established the Information Dominance Core in order to “...develop and deliver dominant information capabilities in support of U. S. Navy, Joint and national war fighting requirements.”<sup>38</sup> The CNO provided guidance for his vision and directed follow-up actions. In

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‡ The other 5% of Intelligence Officer Billets are student billets

Aug 2011, just before Admiral Roughead retired as CNO, he issued a memo to all Navy three and four stars reminding them of the IDC vision. Some of those milestones have a direct impact on bringing the two communities closer together.

One item tasked for action is for direct ascensions into the IDC from the Naval Academy and ROTC. Previously, these two commissioning sources directed graduates into the unrestricted line communities. Only graduates with certain medical conditions such as color blindness could choose the Intelligence Officer option, limiting Officer Candidate School as the sole direct ascension avenue for Intelligence Officers. This new directive will increase the number of Intelligence Officers who may have gone to school for four years with other line officers. It will spread the networking web across the line communities increasing the numbers of people who know and understand each other personally.

Additionally, Roughead directed Fleet Forces Command to integrate IDC training into the Fleet Training Continuum (FTC) and the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (F RTP). It is critical this step be taken seriously and implemented wisely. Ships already have a considerable number of training requirements and Navy Mission Essential Task Lists. Simply adding requirements will not facilitate integration. The new requirements must be focused on integrating intelligence in the ship's mission rather than stand-alone essential intelligence tasks. These tasks need to either augment the ship's mission or drive and re-task the entire mission of the ship. Additional Afloat Training Group (ATG) personnel will be required to help the ships train to these new requirements in order to maintain a standard.

In order to train to train to Fleet Forces Command's recommendations to the FTC and F RTP, ATG will need to increase the size of their intelligence staff to include an Intelligence Officer. Detailing Intelligence Officers to ATG will accomplish three goals. First, it will

establish additional opportunities for the two communities to develop a training curriculum together, which supports Fleet Forces Command's objectives. This cooperative effort will force the two communities closer together. Secondly, it will integrate Intelligence Officers into surface training commands helping bridge the relationship gap between the two communities. Thirdly, it is aligned with the CNO's directive to "...develop and deliver dominant information capabilities in support of U. S. Navy."

A highly successful avenue to get Intelligence's message out to the fleet is ONI's Surface Analysis Branch for Evaluation and Reporting (SABER). In this program, SWOs are detailed to ONI in order for these SWOs to provide the operator's perspective to intelligence products. This is one of the few programs in the Navy where there are more Intelligence Professionals than operators, providing these SWOs a unique opportunity to observe the Intelligence Community in action. In the past many of these officers were leaving the Navy following their ONI tour. While today, many are staying in the Navy some still see the ONI SABER program as not operationally relevant. The Surface Community needs to endeavor to change this perception. Some solutions may be: Make the ONI billets complete screen billets, SWOs detailed to ONI will ensure a two year commitment following ONI to ensure they take their experiences and relationships back to the fleet, or even choice pick of orders following an ONI tour. These may provide the catalyst not only to make the SABER program desirable, but also to ensure the knowledge gets back to the fleet.

More training and more required tasks, however, may not be the full answer. Adding requirements to the units without taking tasks away means there is a potential for focusing on the requirements a commanding officer deems important and intelligence requirements may get downplayed. That path is truly a one-way street, and the Surface Officer is not trained on the

capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence community until late in a typical SWO career, especially compared to an aviator.

Aviation and Intelligence share a very close bond, especially the Aviation Strike Community. Aviators need to know the target and the threat along the ingress and egress route. They demand their Intelligence Officer provide them with timely and accurate information that ultimately could be the difference between mission success or failure, and even life or death. Aviators are familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the Intelligence Community and appropriately task their Intelligence Officer to fill gaps. A similar relationship would be ideal in the Surface Community. Complementing the Aviation Community bond with Intelligence, the Special Warfare Community shares a similar relationship with the Intelligence Community. Perhaps it is the reliance on good intelligence for mission success that fosters this relationship. These two communities establish and promote bond with the Intelligence Community early in their officers' careers. This bond is fostered and promoted and it follows these officers through the ranks all the way up through flag level. If the Surface Community could establish a similar bond earlier in SWOs' career path, SWOs may be better connected to what the Intelligence Community has to offer and will not have to catch up with peers in the other communities.

The Naval Strike Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) reinforces the strong relationship between the Aviation and Intelligence Communities. The NSAWC public homepage describes the Intelligence Department as "one of the most interactive" with a number of intelligence personnel "who gather data on potential trouble areas around the globe where deployed naval forces might be called for presence or action."<sup>39</sup> While there is no surface equivalent to NSAWC, the Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, Rhode Island, is the closest center of excellence to the NSAWC concept. Surface Warfare Officers regularly return to Newport to

hone their Surface Warrior skills. Training is an opportunity to expose the SWOs on a regular basis to what Intelligence can do for them at various levels of their career. There are no intelligence personnel assigned to N73, no Intelligence shop maintaining the threat briefs and no intelligence personnel presenting the threat. All threat-based training is conducted by Surface Warfare Officers. By establishing an Intelligence Department at N73, staffed accordingly, every SWO from the Ensign learning how to be a Division Officer, to the Lieutenant learning to be a Department Head, to Commanders and Captains heading off to Commanding Officer School would, at the very least, get exposure to the Intelligence Community.<sup>40</sup>

Having an intelligence staff produce and provide the briefs would facilitate that interaction and interdependence that appears to work so well for the Aviation Community. Additionally, assigning Intelligence Officers with an appropriate staff to the Surface Officers School, is aligned with the CNO's vision and directive to "Develop a holistic plan to integrate Information Dominance training, including cyber, into the Fleet Training Continuum and Fleet Readiness Training Plan."<sup>41</sup>

The bond between the communities needs to be reinforced outside the classroom and in the fleet. Training scenarios need to be robust and dynamic enough where scenario derived intelligence will actually help drive the commander's decisions. The commander's decisions will influence certain operational tasks to be conducted, which ultimately can be observed and evaluated. It is a wasted training opportunity to utilize a ship's intelligence personnel as simply presenters of a scripted scenario. A planted e-mail or note slid across a desk has no benefit to training the intelligence personnel on the ship and adversely impacts the relationship between the commander and the intelligence staff. This training technique reinforces the false perception that intelligence personnel are simply the "mail men" delivering the intelligence products from

higher headquarters when actually these Intelligence Professionals possess vast analytical resources. Evaluated training scenarios provide an opportunity to showcase the capabilities of the ship's intelligence personnel. Furthermore, by having intelligence personnel preset the commander with tailored intelligence products it allows the intelligence team to build a relationship with the commander during the workup cycle. By developing a relationship early on, the commander can ask direct questions that may enhance the commander's understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the ship's organic intelligence systems. Commanders need to understand the intelligence personnel attached to their commands are there to provide relevant information that can augment or actually drive where and how assets operate, and not just use intelligence as filler to establish the scene setter for the next evaluated evolution.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Command and control architecture, manning, funding, and space all contributed to why Intelligence and the Surface Communities remained distant for so long. While the current operational support force structure is a competent and working arrangement capable of providing unit and fleet support, individual commanders need to have a better understanding of the intelligence support structure. While Intelligence Officers are afforded the opportunity to understand their customer, the benefit of the experience is greater for the Intelligence Officer than it is for the Surface Officer, due to minimal sea-going Intelligence billets on a limited number of platforms. Intelligence Officers need to be detailed to the various ATGs around the fleet, which will increase intelligence's visibility to the fleet, ensure exercises and evaluation scenarios are reasonable and accurate, and meet the CNO's vision. Additionally, the Surface Community Surface needs to take advantage of the limited opportunities of to interact with the Intelligence Community, and embrace the programs such as ONI's SABER department. Officers

lack a firm grasp of what the Intelligence Community can provide because of lack of exposure to Intelligence and an Intelligence Officer deficiency in the SWO training pipeline. More exposure to the Intelligence Community in the training pipeline, coupled with focused and directed training requirements, will assist our Surface Community to more effectively leverage the Intelligence Community as a weapon against the adversary.

#### **ENDNOTES:**

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<sup>1</sup> Emile Gauvreau and Lester Cohen, *Billy Mitchell Founder of our Air Force and Prophet without Honor* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1942), 65.

<sup>2</sup> Navy Department. *Annual Reports for the Navy Department for the Fiscal Year 1929* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), 43

<sup>3</sup> Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps, *Organization of the Marine Corps*, MCRD 5-12, (Washington DC: U. S. Marine Corps, 13 October 1998), Figure 4-6.

<sup>4</sup> U. S. Department of the Army, *The STRYKER Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion (Incl C-1)*, FM 2-21.21, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, April 8, 2003), Figure 1-4.

<sup>5</sup> Naval Vessel Register, Navy Fact File,

<http://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvrships/details/ddg89.htm>, accessed 2/6/2012.

U. S. Department of the Air Force, *Selected Typical Aircraft Squadron Strengths*, AFI 65-503, (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, May 2, 1996), Attachment 42.

<sup>6</sup> Captain Wyman H. Packard, USN (Ret) *A Century of U. S. Naval Intelligence* (Washington DC: Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1996), 3.

<sup>7</sup> Packard. 40. Packard. 142.

<sup>8</sup> Packard. 13.

<sup>9</sup> Packard. 170.

<sup>10</sup> Packard. 67.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 67.

<sup>12</sup> Packard. 19.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Packard. 230, 235.

<sup>15</sup> John Prados, *Combined Fleet Decoded, The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II* (New York, NY: Random House, 1995) 320.

<sup>16</sup> Packard. 459-462.

<sup>17</sup> Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, *The Admirals Advantage, U. S. Navy Operational Intelligence in WWII and the Cold War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 1.

<sup>18</sup> Ford. 121.

<sup>19</sup> Ford. 38.

<sup>20</sup> Ford. 49-50.

<sup>21</sup> Jeffrey L. Levinson and Randy L. Edwards, *Missile Inbound: The Attack of the Stark in the Persian Gulf* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 1997), 16-18 and 58.

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- <sup>22</sup> Hanan Greenberg, "Report: Ship crew didn't realize missile threat," Israel News, November 7, 2006. <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3325146,00.html> (accessed January 10, 2012).
- <sup>23</sup> Jim Garamone, "Report Concludes North Korea Sank South Korean Ship," American Forces Press Service, May 20, 2010. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=59260> (accessed January 10, 2012).
- <sup>24</sup> "Yemen ship attack 'was terrorism,'" *BBC*, October, 13, 2002. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2324431.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2324431.stm) (accessed February 7, 2012).
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- <sup>27</sup> Levinson. 12.
- <sup>28</sup> Levinson. 118.
- <sup>29</sup> United States Department of Defense News Transcript, *USS Cole Briefing - Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen*, Washington DC, January 19, 2001. [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/t01192001\\_t0119sn.html](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/t01192001_t0119sn.html) (accessed January 31, 2012)
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- <sup>31</sup> U. S. Department of the Navy, *PERS 41 Surface Warfare Officer Community Planning Seminar*, (downloaded January 25, 2012), Slide- 14.
- <sup>32</sup> U. S. Department of the Navy, *Information Dominance Corps, Intelligence Detailer Brief 20* September 2011, (downloaded January 19, 2012), Slide 19.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid. Slide 7.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid. Slide 19.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid. Slide 7.
- <sup>36</sup> The Whitehouse Blog, *Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden*, posted May 11, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead> accessed January 29, 2012.
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