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14. ABSTRACT

The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future.

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security Forces. The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non-linear interplay of these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension. The 1998 Belfast Agreement established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee success.

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the framework for peace. These include Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical enquiries, the difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and implementing demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor economic performance are the most significant forces today. There has been a persistent rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents' are determined to remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity has brought a rise in Republican violence, a potent combination of political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more slowly than any other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure and grants. Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and development with sustainable growth and prosperity.

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To combat these forces have been a strong civic society and their eventual distaste for terrorism, violence and hatred.

The Northern Ireland peace process will become ever reliant on the strong civil society of Northern Ireland, and their moral authority, to keep on its path to peace. In order to overcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a stable and secure future, the Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in governance inherent in the Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and economic challenges. A reformed Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future.

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United States Marine Corps
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Marine Corps University
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Marine Corps Combat Development Command
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The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace – Terrorism and its Aftermath

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
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Major Simon Urry MBE Royal Marines

(United Kingdom)

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member:

Approved:

Date:

Christopher E. Hartman
6 April 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: *Angela G. Samuel*

Approved:

Date:

[Signature]
6 April 2012

[Signature]
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Preface

During my military career I have spent more of my military career in Northern Ireland than anywhere else. I have covered the range and scope of military operations, from Conventional Patrolling in the county of South Armagh, to Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance across the Province of Northern Ireland, and served in every officer rank up to and including Major.

I have found Ireland intriguing. Its history, identity and charm have influenced me and played a formative role in my military leadership experiences and operational service. I have focused my research on the future trends rather than the past because Northern Ireland will face greater difficulty in the future than it has since the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

It is said that no prudent Englishman should write about Irish affairs. I chose this topic as I have participated and read about actions there without fully understanding or appreciating actions and significance. My operational service in Northern Ireland has shaped my professional development and developed my approach to military leadership. The issue of Northern Ireland remains at the forefront of the British domestic politics. The *National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS)* gives Northern Ireland priority. I hope that by analyzing the future rather than past, this paper can add value to future military professionals about to embark on operations either in Northern Ireland or in a similar conflict elsewhere.

This is a contemporary topic that is constantly evolving. This factual and analytical interpretation is accurate as at April 2012.

Executive Summary

Title: The Northern Ireland Framework for Peace: Terrorism and its Aftermath.

Author: Major Simon Urry MBE Royal Marines.

Thesis: The Northern Ireland peace process today is not a stable and secure framework for peace in the future.

Discussion: The focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its evolution, and recommendations for the future. As shall be seen, the Northern Ireland framework for peace today is not stable and secure for the future.

The complexity of the problem begins with the number of actors involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security Forces. The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non-linear interplay of these actors. The mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist nationalisms remain unresolved, co-existing in tension. The 1998 Belfast Agreement established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests, but does not guarantee success.

There are violent and non-violent forces that threaten the integrity of the framework for peace. These include Republican efforts to de-stabilize the process, the division of the unionist movement, the divisive effects of historical enquiries, the difficulties in reforming the police service and the criminal justice system, and implementing demilitarization. Dissident Republican threats to security and poor economic performance are the most significant forces today. There has been a persistent rise in dissident Republican terrorism since 2007. The dissidents' are determined to remain relevant to the nationalist community. Their use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity has brought a rise in Republican violence, a potent combination of political significance. The Northern Ireland economy has grown more slowly than any other part of the United Kingdom and depends heavily on dwindling public expenditure and grants. Northern Ireland must provide greater economic self-reliance and development with sustainable growth and prosperity. To combat these forces have been a strong civic society and their eventual distaste for terrorism, violence and hatred.

Conclusion: The Northern Ireland peace process will become ever reliant on the strong civil society of Northern Ireland, and their moral authority, to keep on its path to peace. In order to overcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a stable and secure future, the Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in governance inherent in the Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and economic challenges. A reformed Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future.

The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem begins with the number of actors involved: the nationalist and unionist people, the British and Irish governments and the military, including the Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries and the mix of Security Forces.¹ The most difficult challenge for the peace process has been to manage the complex and non-linear interplay of these actors. The 1998 Belfast Agreement established a framework for channeling these conflicting interests. The Northern Ireland framework for peace today is not yet stable and secure for the future due to a number of violent and non-violent forces, but principally security and economic influences.

For security, there has been a rise in dissident Republican violence, terrorism and ambition since 2007. The dissidents' use of criminal enterprises and terrorist activity provides both a potent mix for support and capability for the organization. There is significant economic instability. Northern Ireland has the lowest economic activity in the United Kingdom (UK), a high dependence on public expenditure and grants, and a 6.9% reduction in funding over the next four years from the government's coalition spending. Finally, within the Northern Irish society, mutually exclusive Republican and Loyalist nationalisms have not yet found an ability to forge a common British-Irish identity.

This paper does not attempt to provide a detailed history of the Troubles, as the conflict since 1969 became euphemistically known; nor is it an account of the policies of successive British governments towards Northern Ireland; still less is it a definitive record of the operations of the security forces and their battle of attrition and containment. Rather, the focus of this paper is on assessing the stability and security of the framework for peace in Northern Ireland, lessons that have been learnt through its evolution and recommendations for Northern Ireland or a similar conflict elsewhere.

Overview of the Troubles

It is important to understand the background and causes of the conflict, so that their implications for the present and the future framework for peace can be realized. Although Ireland had fallen under English influence from the 12th century Norman invasion, it has only been officially part of the United Kingdom since the Act of Union in 1801. The IRA's Easter Rising of 1916 was a turning point in Irish history that led to the Anglo-Irish War of 1919 to 1921. The continued British repression of Republican political expression led to widespread support across Ireland for the Irish rebels. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act partitioned Ireland and established a separate Northern Ireland that included only six counties rather than the ancient nine-county Province of Ulster. This was to guarantee a Protestant majority in the north. The provincial government of the conservative Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) then controlled Northern Ireland for the next fifty years. It employed its own dominance of *orangeism*² to bind together an uneasy class alliance of Unionist control and authority.

In the late 1960s a conglomerate of Catholics, nationalists, Republicans and agnostic socialists, along with a handful of Protestants, opposed to Unionist dominance, discrimination, and their social marginalization,³ founded the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). It was designed to "bring Northern Ireland effective democracy, and to end all of the forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination and deprivation, which result from the partisan rule of the Stormont regime."⁴ Although many perceived this as a peaceful civil rights protest movement, the minority intended to spark civil unrest and anarchy, using dangerously confrontational tactics to draw attention

to their cause.⁵ This catalyst of NICRA protest marches mobilized a huge swell of Catholic and minority support to redistribute civil rights evenly amongst the Protestant and Catholic communities. Association with the growing militancy of the Republican movement tainted NICRA, as the Stormont government saw NICRA as a direct threat to its own authority and the start of a Republican plot.⁶ When the nationalists marched through predominantly Unionist residential areas, it sparked a counter movement by the Protestants and evoked heavy-handed responses by militant Loyalists, elements of the RUC, and the auxiliary Ulster Special Constabulary (USC, or 'B' Specials).⁷ Northern Ireland spiraled into sectarian clashes, militancy, vigilante groups, and civil disorder. It fed a vicious cycle. The turning point of the Troubles was in August 1969, when nationalists targeted the Orangemen march in Londonderry. The RUC were incapable of controlling unrest across Londonderry and Belfast and on 14 August 1969, the Home Secretary James Callaghan answered a request from his counterpart in the Northern Ireland government at Stormont to call in the British Army for help. 1969 started the period of the Troubles. Twenty-nine years later, the 1998 Belfast Agreement initiated the start of the peace process. The destabilizing influences on the framework for peace today have historical significance (see Appendix A, B, D & E).

Defining the Problem. In order to establish a framework for peace in 1998, the Northern Ireland problem was a complex of social, ethnic, and nationalist issues played out by many actors who represented the diversity of Northern Ireland (see Appendix B). One may speak of three main protagonists: the people, the government, and the military.

- **The People.** Within its borders were the majority Protestant Unionist communities, who intended to keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and

resisted the perceived threat of a united Ireland. The minority Catholic nationalist communities either perceived the issue as a nationalist struggle for self-determination or a problem of corruption or unfair practices by successive Unionist governments. Both communities have had to withstand the indiscriminate character of violence, politics and allegiances, demographic segregation of Protestants and Catholics within communities, and socio-economic inequality, entrenched from bitterness and hatred that polarized both communities (see Appendix D). The stoic people of Northern Ireland have always provided moral authority throughout the Troubles. Communities have identified what they perceived as just and fair, resisted marginalization, forced accommodation and change that community and political leaders found difficult to overcome. Religion and demographics have not been sources of the conflict rather they have reinforced, and at times acted as a catalyst, to the violence between the communities.

- **The Government.** The internal influence was the British Government, with no strategic, selfish, or economic interest in Northern Ireland but instead committed to support and protect its people as an integral part of the United Kingdom. The external influence was the Dublin Government, which had pledged to take over Northern Ireland and form a united island (see Appendix E & F). Both governments sought a reasoned end through negotiation and political settlement rather than violence or chance.

- **The Military.** The military is split between the paramilitaries and the security forces. For the paramilitaries, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) represented the mainstream Republican movement, and used political violence against the state both internally and externally (see Appendix I). Protecting the Unionist communities were the Loyalist paramilitaries, the defenders of their Protestant Ulster (see Appendix J). Caught

between the violence and hatred of the communities were the security forces: the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the locally recruited Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR, later the Royal Irish Regiment Home Service Force), and the British Army whose role was to provide military assistance to the civil power (see Appendix K).

- **The Trinity.** The complexity of the Northern Ireland problem can be described using the Clausewitz Trinity and his concept of war as an analytical framework and a basis for study. He used “war is more than a true chameleon”⁸ as his metaphor that explained unlimited variations in conflict, shaped by contextual specifics where the cause and course of war cannot be planned or controlled. The character of the Northern Irish conflict changed constantly due to the ever-changing human dynamics of personalities, public will, and public perception. The Troubles ably demonstrated the three components of the Clausewitz “remarkable trinity.”⁹ First, pulling and pushing the central underlying forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity were the polarizing nationalisms of Irish Republicans and Ulster Unionists (irrational forces). Secondly, the play of chance and probability were reflected by the sectarian and political violence of paramilitaries and the actions of the security forces (non-rational forces).¹⁰ Thirdly, was the rational purpose and policy of two governments and the international dimension (rational forces), influenced by circumstance and time that attempted to determine the locus of the crisis between a “political or operational center of gravity.”¹¹

Overview of the framework for peace

The framework for peace was the beginning of the management of negotiations without conflict, through supporting effects of political, security, economic, and social/perceptual lines of development (Appendix A). The peace process has been the

coordination of this framework, to ensure all the lines of development and decisive conditions have been met. The Belfast Agreement in 1998 brought the conflict to the negotiating table, and started the peace process. It was facilitated through settled political institutions, which enjoyed popular legitimacy always previously denied, a “transition of unsustainable approaches to more sustainable ones.”¹² Unionists and nationalists then realized that they had to make the necessary compromises to reach an agreement.

The Belfast Agreement was a success compared to other agreements, as it developed different approaches to the business of making peace, new structures, and processes of interaction. Firstly, the Agreement had joint custody from the British and Irish governments and included the parties actively involved in the conflict (inclusion rather than exclusion of political parties with paramilitary associations [see page 7]). Secondly a political and constitutional framework was agreed but with a detailed and comprehensive implementation process to meet decisive conditions across each line of development.¹³ The agreement involved a sophisticated devolution package, with significant power resting with an inclusive power-sharing assembly of Northern Ireland’s elected representatives. Northern Ireland’s constitutional position within the United Kingdom was re-affirmed, the constitution of the Irish Republic was amended to remove its territorial claim on Northern Ireland, and Northern Ireland’s future constitutional position was linked to the consent of the people.¹⁴ A British and Irish Council, and a North-South Ministerial Council would enable co-operation between the British and Irish governments. The durability of the Belfast Agreement was its strong popular support (71% support from the electors), underpinned by a strong civil society in Northern Ireland.¹⁵ From the negotiations perspective, positional bargaining of the parties was

replaced by principled negotiation using an all-purpose strategy, dealing directly with the interests of the people rather than party positions.¹⁶

The framework for peace identified many decisive points and conditions on political, security, economic, and social lines of operation to be met along the way.¹⁷ Appendix A is not intended to be comprehensive, but an overview of the framework for peace with the key inputs, influences, and the *so what*. For example on the security line of development, the most contention has concerned the declared decommissioning of IRA weapons in 2005;¹⁸ this allowed the statements from Loyalist paramilitaries committed to end their terror campaigns. Other decisive points that followed were the normalization of security and the termination of the British Army Operation BANNER in July 2007.¹⁹ What followed have been the devolution of the power-sharing institutions by the British government to the local Stormont Assembly in May 2007, and the final hurdle of the devolution of Policing and Justice in April 2010.

Assessment of the framework for peace

The stability and security of any emerging peace process depends on the interaction between a range of violent and non-violent forces, challenges and influences that are both historic and current. Although there are too many for this paper to summarize succinctly, the following are the immediate and most significant that have affected the stability and security of the Northern Ireland peace process. The assessment starts with areas that have generally worked well for the framework for peace, followed by areas that have not worked so well, finishing with what has failed to be addressed.

Political Inclusion, Messaging and Reconciliation - A core component of the peace process was inclusion or as Ramsbotham describes, “Clausewitz in reverse,”²⁰

although it was never a straightforward battle between principle (exclusion) and pragmatism (inclusion).²¹ The big unknown of integrating Republicans and Loyalists into constitutional politics could either have intensified ethnic resentment (a continuation of efforts to destabilize) or helped to contain it (poachers becoming gamekeepers). The ability of accomplished former paramilitaries to hold political office has proven that inclusion has helped to contain mainstream Republican and Loyalist resentment within the framework for peace. However sincere these leading figures may be portrayed, they have discredited acts of political violence they used to command. Their influence and open messaging to a disaffected youth has made a difference. It has been a compromise but a necessary condition to secure the framework for peace. Reconciliation has been the reconfiguration of relationships and acceptability between the military (paramilitaries and security forces) and society, removing any sense of threat. Although many mainstream Republicans are better off for this (e.g. Martin McGuinness), there is still a risk of Republican destabilization and inflammation of the dissident cause.

A Strong Civic Society Distaste for Terrorism - The biggest single group affected by the Troubles was the local population, segregated by ethnic affiliation and determined political allegiances. The loyalist strikes in 1974 portrayed a civil society that was sectarian, uncompromising, and negative. Public perception and influence had shifted almost full circle by 1998 into a strategically focused and effective civil force for peace.²² This was an important factor. The church, the media, and the business community strongly supported the Belfast Agreement, almost breaking ranks with political orthodoxy. By 1998, the Northern Irish society had had enough of the Troubles,

the violence and hatred of the past. Their fatigue translated into power of the popular support for a singular direction.

The Political Principle of Consent - The route to the Belfast Agreement in the 1990's saw the elevation of the principle of consent into a relevant political mechanism to decide Northern Ireland's constitutional status. The decision by the British and Irish governments to put the agreement to the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum formed a cornerstone to the Agreement. Northern Ireland's constitutional status would only change if the people of Northern Ireland voted for it.²³ The democratic validation expanded the peace process to then encompass political parties, civil society, and even paramilitary groups. It also provided moral authority that opponents found difficult to counter into the process.

The Influence of Key Personalities/Leaders - The peace process involved concessions to end the violence of paramilitaries in return for their entry into negotiations and the broader deal for their constituents. In Northern Ireland there were key personalities and leaders that influenced the process in both a stable and destabilizing way, but ultimately their actions led to final devolution of power to Stormont in 2007. There were four larger-than-life personalities who were the Troubles' 'four musketeers': David Trimble and Ian Paisley from the unionist side, and from the nationalist side Gerry Adams and John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) from 1979 to 2001 and co-recipient of the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize, with David Trimble. The musketeers role and responsibility is just as important today, in whatever public position or role they hold, to influence either radicals or conservatives, politicians and leaders, to ensure the framework for peace they fought for stays on track.

John Hume is analyzed briefly as he was the influential nationalist figure to unlock the Republican strategy of political violence. He alone realized that there was more to just the perceived anti-English mantra of “eight centuries of English subjugation of Ireland” and long favored a peacemaking model.²⁴ He embarked on a dialogue with Sinn Fein/IRA (the Hume-Adams dialogue) to rethink Sinn Fein’s entrenched views on the role of the British Government and the position of the unionist community in Ireland, and find a united and political way out of the conflict.²⁵ He brought together the nationalist consensus by linking Sinn Fein, the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), Irish Government, and Irish American supporters. He was also instrumental in establishing the north/south institutions set out in the ‘Frameworks for the Future’, an acknowledgement of the SDLP claim that there could be no exclusively internal solution to the Northern Ireland problem.²⁶ From a nationalist perspective, his influence as an old hand cannot be understated, more so than Gerry Adams or Martin McGuinness.

The International Dimension - A range of international initiatives were tried and tested; some met with success, and others failed completely. The British Government’s initial desire to keep the Troubles within its domestic orbit and out of the international agenda at the start blocked third-party mediators. The misperception was that the British Government thought it could fulfill this role from the start. Then the appointment of US Senator George Mitchell as chairman of the international body on arms decommissioning became an integral component of the British and Irish government’s twin-track process.²⁷ Mitchell then stayed on to chair the all-party talks that evolved and led up to the Belfast Agreement in 1998. Also influential was President Bill Clinton visiting Northern Ireland three times in his Presidency,²⁸ three visits more than any other serving President. For

Clinton, Northern Ireland would be a low-cost, low-risk foreign policy endeavor, pushing at a door half-open.²⁹ He encouraged US companies to invest and included the Republicans, encouraging them to leave violence behind.³⁰

The international dimension was supportive, strategic, and occasional rather than the dominant force in setting the conditions for the framework for peace. The use of independent mediators and international statesman with the trust and respect from all the opposing sides, and the public's ability to identify with them, was the success, rather than using an international body influenced by broader agendas. This is why the US influence was so critical compared to others.³¹ The instability of the framework for peace since 1998 has not yet reached the level of influence or interest for international mediation.

Secret Talks and Ceasefires - Secret talks between representatives of the main warring factions, in this particular case the IRA and the British Government, can often facilitate the start of open political dialogue.³² For Northern Ireland, it involved taking political risks, overcoming rival intelligence battles, and influencing protagonists to provide a conduit to start negotiations.³³ The Northern Ireland conflict proved the value of secret talks and ceasefires. Before the 1994 ceasefires, the talks brought agreement in principle on a number of sensitive issues of compromise, such as the early release of prisoners and the public inclusion of Sinn Fein to negotiations, which had not been done before.

Terrorist Disengagement and De-Radicalization to enable Negotiations - The Northern Ireland peace process required an ingenious approach to the tricky problem of how to disengage and de-radicalize a terrorist movement while also negotiating with ex-militants. The Mitchell Principles (see Appendix G) set conditions for entry to talks,

enforced them, and succeeded in imposing unwelcome norms during the critical negotiations period, that Sinn Fein in particular were unused to. In late February 1998 after the use of Republican vigilante violence by the IRA, Sinn Fein was expelled, and not allowed to take part in the negotiations for two weeks. It was at considerable cost in terms of party distraction and lost negotiating time.³⁴

Military Lessons - Initially the Army had not set out a clear campaign plan or strategy. The British contemporary doctrine at the time *Counter Revolutionary Warfare* was based upon the jungle, rural operations, and colonial territories. As a result the troops expected some kind of internal security situation of Cyprus, Aden, or British Guiana. The military had to learn and adapt to a campaign that contained elements of a classical and modern insurgency, coupled with the integration of the population and high profile information operations.³⁵ The key lessons learnt were a need for an over arching campaign authority, understanding the root causes of the violence, and realistic expectations about the length of time needed to resolve the situation (the long war).³⁶ Other lessons included the value of a dedicated operational training team system; a policy of preventing violence in the first instance;³⁷ developing first rate intelligence structures, processes, and capabilities; and finally to fully appreciate how covert offensive action by special operations or intelligence organizations would play out in the political arena and other spheres.³⁸ These lessons have been valuable to ensure a secure framework for the future; unfortunately demilitarization and organizational change of security structures has led to a requirement for these lessons to be relearnt.

The key areas that have lead to the instability and insecurity for the framework for peace are political, security, social, and the most recent area, economics.

Strategic Understanding - The British Government and Army failed to understand, let alone influence, Irish policy and planning leading up to 1969 and served at times to reinforce the polarizing effect that has made the Troubles so enduring.³⁹ Understanding and knowledge of the problem improved but as John Belloch, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1988, stated: “neither a London nor a Belfast (let alone a Dublin) picture was complete in itself. Ministers, officials, others of our governing community were all at risk of losing the essential binocular vision of the Northern Ireland situation, without constant and conscious self-awareness of it.”⁴⁰ This lack of strategic understanding of the character of the Troubles is unfortunately still seen today within the British and Irish governments, leading to a lack of strategic insight towards planning for a secure and stable framework for peace in the future. Political leadership from within Northern Ireland is also part of the problem. The First Minister Peter Robinson said in his Christmas 2011 message that “he is determined to do all he can to build upon peace and stability in Northern Ireland in 2012.” We still await his leadership and strategic direction as to how he will achieve this, for it is lacking.

The division of the unionist movement – the Unionist movement has been obliged to move towards a new pluralist politics, embracing new economic and political relationships with an Irish Republic.⁴¹ This has weakened the link between Unionist politics and its cultural and religious heritage of Protestant-Britishness.⁴² There remains disunity over the best means of retaining their constitutional link to Great Britain.

Security - Dissident Republicans - Contrary to British Security Service

assessment in 2007 that the residual threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland was likely to decline, there has been a persistent and significant rise in terrorist activity and ambition in Northern Ireland over the last three years; the terrorist threat level in Northern Ireland is graded SEVERE⁴³ (see Appendix H). Dissident Republican groups, significantly the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) have not supported the peace process and remain active. Recently other dissident groups have joined the mix including Republican Action Against Drugs, Eirigi, Republican Network for Unity, and most notably the growing threat of Oghlaigh Na h'Eireann (OnH). Dissidents purport to reject any political agreement that falls short of a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and the establishment of an independent and united Ireland, reflecting the capacity of a tradition to endure. Their ideological Totalitarian Republicanism holds sympathy with the nationalist population. Despite their number of approximately six hundred, with RIRA posing as the largest membership, they do have a mobilization potential within the nationalist community. The threat to GB remains. In May 2011, a number of coded warnings were received which suggested a bomb had been left in Central London. Although it was a hoax, these were the first coded warnings related to GB from Northern Ireland terrorist groups for ten years.

Britain's *National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS)* identified as a priority risk/ Tier One "international terrorism affecting the UK or its interests; and/or a significant increase in the levels of terrorism relating to Northern Ireland;" the strategy further states that "the security situation is unlikely to improve in the short term."⁴⁴ The threat of Irish terrorism and the risk to the peace process was also recognized as a Tier One risk in the *National*

Security Risk Assessment.⁴⁵ The *Strategic Defense and Security Review 2010 (SDSR)* stated “the ongoing recruitment of experienced terrorists and a younger generation will contribute to a continued high level of threat in Northern Ireland, as well as in Great Britain where the threat level was recently raised from Moderate to Substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility.”⁴⁶ Although UK arrest and prosecution data provides only a partial picture of the terrorist threat, the number of arrests in connection with terrorist related activity in Northern Ireland in 2010 was 98% higher than in 2009 (see Appendix G).⁴⁷ As a result of NI terrorism threat and risk analysis, in February 2011, an additional £245 million was provided to help cope with the dissident threat: £199.5 million from the Treasury and £45 million from the NI Executive.⁴⁸

The dissident Republicans (DRs) are determined to try to destabilize the Northern Ireland Executive (NIE) and continue to target the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in particular; they also aspire to mount attacks in Great Britain.⁴⁹ Once coordinated and cooperative, they have proved to be dangerous and resilient. Recently there have been different attack techniques, improved weapons capability, all have been Northern Ireland focused (especially under-vehicle IEDs).⁵⁰ There is little evidence of any political initiative on the part of the dissident Republican splinter groups, and even if they were in a position to articulate their strategy publicly, it is unlikely that the message would be coherent.⁵¹ Their political base is small and localized, as evidenced in the *2010 Economic and Social Research Council Election Survey*.⁵² The dissident makeup and support network bring a completely different security dilemma for the British and Irish security forces. The concern is that these are the ‘clean skins’ or unknowns, recruited from a new generation of Republican extremists.⁵³ They are uniting a network

of radicals dissatisfied with the route of mainstream Republicanism, and utilizing the power vacuum in disaffected communities left by the police and PIRA.⁵⁴ They view public support as useful but not essential, a key distinction between criminal and political insurgents. They lack the political ideology and operational capacity of the Provisional IRA; instead it is limited to the romanticized violent Republican tradition.⁵⁵ The use of their criminal enterprises in the day, with involvement in both smuggling and the illegal narcotics market, and their terrorist activity in the evening, has brought a rise in Republican violence mixed with criminality. This is a potent combination of political significance, but it is also an opportunity for a counter terrorist strategy to target dissidents for more common forms of criminality.⁵⁶ This disruption of the networks for vulnerabilities in lifestyles could bring local support back to the community policing, an area once the domain of the Provisional IRA. As illustrated in Appendix H, there are worrying trends, but to maintain some perspective from the Troubles, even in the last two years, the total number of incidents attributed to dissident Republicans in any one year is less than that recorded in two days at the height of the Troubles in the early 1970s. The dissidents are not at the scale of the Provisional IRA at their zenith, but a destabilizing influence on the framework for peace for the future nonetheless.

Reforming the Police Service – the political reform required of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to meet the milestones set out in the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland in 1998 (Patten Commission), has left its conventional policing within the PSNI unprepared to cope with the demands of counter-terrorism and serious and organized crime. The rush to readdress the demographic imbalances of a majority Protestant police force to recruiting more Catholic volunteers has created a

significant gap in counter-terrorist experience.⁵⁷ This is most telling at the local policing level. These changes, coupled with the demilitarization from the Army have led to a far weaker security apparatus to stop a growing national security threat and priority for policing. Although the PSNI had an extremely capable counter-terrorist organization, it is now ageing and it needs to recruit security conscious operators, which it is no longer finding. Eleven years on, the PSNI has now claimed it has had to rehire former officers on temporary contracts because “they have the skills and critical experience it needs to investigate crimes and combat terrorism.”⁵⁸ Nearly half of them are employed in the most sensitive areas of policing, including intelligence.⁵⁹ This is indicative of the social and personnel challenges the PSNI face for the future rather than a structural problem to the framework for peace itself.

Demilitarization (Normalization)/ Decommissioning - This proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks for the framework for peace after 1998. The pace of demilitarization of the security forces, to include force structures, capabilities, estate, fiscal, and the transfer of tasks to the PSNI and Security Services under the Op BANNER normalization directives, did not match the perceived pace of decommissioning of the paramilitary capability. The Belfast Agreement lacked a graduated program of decommissioning synchronized with any security force or state demilitarization. A synchronized program could have prevented the time consuming dispute over IRA decommissioning that eventually included an announcement by the IRA, on the 26th September 2005: “the IRA leadership can now confirm that the process of putting our arms verifiably beyond use has been completed.”⁶⁰ Despite promises, trust, and confidence there are still unanswered questions for the public such as, “what percentage

of arms have actually been destroyed” and “how do we know remnants are beyond use?” There remains too much ambiguity on whether this decisive condition has been achieved or merely appeased for political and perception reasons.

Dealing with the past - Enquiries have been an adjunct to the peace process, including the Office of the Police Ombudsman and Historical Enquiries Team (HET) reviewing historic crimes and incidents where evidence is unclear or conflicting. Legally, morally, and politically of help on the road to peace, they have been part of a process of appeasement to the communities that something is being done to heal the rift of alleged collusion, corruption, and public accountability. In June 2010, David Cameron announced in the House of Commons the results of the Lord Saville Bloody Sunday Inquiry as “unjustified and unjustifiable.” This was matched by jubilation by the nationalist community in Londonderry.⁶¹ At a cost of £195 million, the British Government stated, “there will never be such an open-ended and costly inquiry again.”⁶²

Economics – the economic development and financial self-sufficiency of Northern Ireland was not comprehensively addressed as part of the Belfast Agreement. Today, the economic crisis and downturn has exposed the vulnerability of Northern Ireland. It has the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United Kingdom,⁶³ and the rate of unemployment has increased in four years from 3.8% in 2007 to 19.1% in 2011.⁶⁴ The Index of Production (IOP) for Northern Ireland from the Department of Finance and Personnel has shown a steady decline in Northern Ireland’s production sector industries in real terms. The Northern Ireland index remains some 18.9% below the peak recorded in the boom of Quarter 4, 2007. In the same period the UK fell by 10.6% over the same period.⁶⁵ PricewaterhouseCoopers projects 2012 growth of 1.0%

for the UK economy and just 0.6% for Northern Ireland.⁶⁶ As the Chief of Defense Staff announced, “the single biggest strategic risk facing the UK today is economic rather than military.... a thriving economy must be central to any Grand Strategy.”⁶⁷ The extent and quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival has depended on five main factors: direct grants, increased investment, the tourism and retail sectors, the fair employment issue,⁶⁸ and the security factor.⁶⁹ The factor carrying the most risk today is that of direct grants coupled with the destabilization of the economic downturn.

In 1977 Northern Ireland was designated as a priority objective European Union (EU) region on the basis of its peripheral position and disadvantaged status. The EU has been the largest supporter of peace building through Peace Funds.⁷⁰ The current grant, the last of three, runs out in 2013. At the time of the last European elections, in 2009, it was generally assumed that PEACE III, worth 333 million euros, would be the last special hand out Northern Ireland and the Irish border counties would get from Brussels.⁷¹ There is not yet any new British Government support to the EU for Peace Fund IV. The risk is that this could become embroiled in the wider EU budget negotiations dragging up to 2013, when Peace III runs out, coupled with wider British Government financial austerity measures.⁷²

The UK Exchequer has been the largest contributor with an annual subvention, new government grants, and tax relief and peace bonuses. As a result of the economic downturn Northern Ireland is no longer insulated by public spending largesse, budget cuts driven by the British Government’s coalition spending review have reduced funding from central government to Northern Ireland by 6.9% over the next four years. In 2010,

Northern Ireland enjoyed public spending per head 25% above the UK average, with a third of the employed workforce in the public sector.⁷³

The final economic twist comes from the southern Irish National Asset Management Agency (Nama), which bought out the toxic debt left in Irish banks after the property crash at the end of 2007.⁷⁴ Nama now controls over £3.35 billion worth of debt in properties and businesses in Northern Ireland and is now ready to raise funds for the southern Irish taxpayer who ended up funding the project, by selling its assets in the north.⁷⁵ So after all of the Troubles, the southern Irish taxpayer is effectively setting the level of the Northern Ireland property market.⁷⁶

The assumption is that all of this is manageable. Northern Ireland is a small region within a rich nation-state, but the strength of the economic union has now become a source of instability (see recommendations).⁷⁷ The threat is that the Northern Irish business community has not seen a consistent “reduction of uncertainty, as it depends on the prospect of stability.”⁷⁸ The extent and quality of Northern Ireland’s economic revival is still very much dependent on its five main factors. The Northern Ireland Executive economic strategy, and the latest economic commentary by the department on 30th January 2012, fails to convince the public that there is a path for sustainable growth and prosperity for 2012 and beyond. Instead the strategy focuses on a path of “Rebalancing and Rebuilding to improve the economic competitiveness of the Northern Ireland economy.”⁷⁹ The strategy lacks any detail, progress and is not an economic path at all.⁸⁰

Recommendations for the future

Political party and ethnic bloc rivalries still dominate the political agenda, at the expense of a sense of collective responsibility to the interests of the Northern Irish

people. The parallel trajectories of the DUP and Sinn Féin have left them defined less by their constitutional preferences, and more by their political messaging and socio-ethnic influence, publicly opposing new violence. The provisions of the Belfast Agreement must be overtaken by a more open and accommodating political structure. This structure requires institutions of government to effectively deliver the range of public policy outcomes desired by the great majority of the people, irrespective of background or affiliative ideology. The coalition of nationalists and unionists to rule together (as First and Deputy First Minister) still negates any effective political opposition or oversight. Northern Ireland politics needs stronger governance and leadership to promote a comprehensive response to the critical challenges ahead.

For security the PSNI needs to be more rigorously trained in counter-terrorism to compensate for the lack of practical experience at the local level. The Security Policy Meetings (SPM)⁸¹ must continue to place counter-terrorism work as a high priority as part of policing. Key counter-terrorist capabilities should be maintained, along with enhancement of counter-terrorist capabilities in areas with significant intelligence collection gaps. A counter-dissident Republican strategy ought to take into account the constantly changing social and political circumstances within its community and criminal policing, specifically within Republicanism. Success should not be measured in terms of arrests, but prosecutions in the courts (only 21% for Northern Ireland).⁸² The Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland should reassess its criminal conviction and procedure in line with the recommendations set out in the Justice and Security Green Paper (October 2011).⁸³ This recommendation is worthy of further study as any terrorism case can fall at the charge, decision to prosecute, or committal and trial, due to

a lack of robust protection for safeguarding the disclosure of relevant sensitive material and collection techniques.

The Northern Ireland Executive requires an improved economic strategy that promotes private investment, growth, and a higher proportion of self-funding. There ought to be less self-reliance on public expenditure and grants and greater symbiosis of economic and social development. Securing a lower corporation tax should be a top priority to make the most of the Executive's planned capital expenditure plan. This will boost confidence in the business area. Finally Northern Ireland should diversify its export base to avoid over-reliance on a small number of markets and to take advantage of opportunities in the faster growing emerging economies.

There has been little social reintegration and reconciliation for members of paramilitary organizations transitioning to normal society in Northern Ireland, especially across the sectarian divide.⁸⁴ Successful prosecution does not eliminate risk, as terrorists can continue to pose a threat after their release.⁸⁵ A lack of social projects and education has simply let a number of ex-combatants relapse and join dissident groups, adding experienced operatives. Improved education and societal reintegration of former paramilitaries is required before the next generation is recruited by the very same disenfranchised ex-combatant paramilitaries.⁸⁶ The final social issue is the mutually exclusive British-Irish nationalisms and identities based upon Northern-Irishness that remains un-reconciled. The population needs an acceptable narrative and structure.⁸⁷ The Belfast Agreement only served to reduce this competitiveness.

There is no standard model across the different government departments and jurisdictions to analyze the framework for peace. Data is collected in different ways,

estimates, survey data, and there is no means to provide an analytical perspective on a consistent basis. The *Peace Monitoring Report*, February 2012, is the first attempt, fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement but it lacks comprehensive recommendations.

Conclusions

Fourteen years after the Belfast Agreement and subsequent framework, the core socio-ethnic dispute is unresolved; Northern Ireland remains a divided society. Two exclusive sets of nationalists are still locked in competition, destined by history to live side by side on the same land. The aims of many nationalists who took up arms originally to bring about a united Ireland have not been realized, any more than the aims of earlier generations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were fully achieved.⁸⁸

Jonathon Evans, Director-General of the Security Service, stated “the pattern of history over the last hundred years shows that whenever the main body of Irish Republicanism has reached a political accommodation and rejoined constitutional politics, a hardliner rejectionist group would fragment off and continue with the so called armed struggle.”⁸⁹ Northern Ireland politics needs to continue its reform, balance, and structure to enable a secure and stable framework for peace.

Uniting Ireland may no longer be a public priority, but Republican extremists may wish to return it to the public arena as part of their strategy. Instead their use of violence continues through dissidents who view the Provisional IRA as engaging “in a collective act of gross betrayal,” mirroring the history of the Irish Republican Army (see Appendix D). This threat has been most recently outlined in the British *National Security Strategy*, the *Strategic Defense Security Review* documents, and stated by Jonathon Evans, the

Director-General of the Security Service. From a security perspective, the framework for peace is not stable and secure.


Economics, as a line of development, did not prove a major hurdle in the way of a peace agreement, but it will arguably be a destabilizing force in the framework for the future. The five main factors of economic revival in 1998 are still prevalent in the framework for peace today. However, the business community lack confidence in the current economic downturn, there is a huge risk in the unemployment trap, and Northern Ireland is more reliant on external economic influences for its own revival. From an economic perspective, the framework for peace is not stable and secure.

The Northern Ireland problem was a trinity that harbored entrenched socio-ethnic communal divisions, was home to a protracted low-intensity conflict, and was characterized by the repeated failure of local politicians to reach agreement on sharing power. The contributions from all sides, British and Irish, helped accommodate a compromise of peace for a strong civic society long divided within itself.⁹⁰ The Troubles have left behind a terrible legacy fashioned by long years of emotion, suffering, fatigue and hate, of dead and wounded, with trauma that will take generations to heal. The social line of development within the framework for peace is still far from stable and secure.

Northern Ireland is unlikely to ever know perfect peace. In order to overcome the disruptive forces that threaten the framework and provide a stable and secure future, the Northern Ireland Assembly must overcome the weakness in governance inherent in the Belfast Agreement and address the critical security and economic challenges. A reformed Northern Ireland still seeks a secure and stable future.

THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

Framework for Peace



Appendix B

Defining the language

Words, definitions and nuances in language in the context of Irish history and politics are important. Geographically, Ulster was an historic province of Ireland and comprised the nine counties. Six counties of those nine now form Northern Ireland. The British Government only included six counties in Northern Ireland to guarantee a Protestant majority, leaving Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland. This is why Northern Ireland as *Ulster* is not correct. This paper uses Northern Ireland rather than Ulster, or alternatively the Province.⁹¹ The government of Northern Ireland is usually referred to as Stormont after Stormont Castle, where it sat and sits again.

It is also important to draw the distinction between nationalists and Republicans. Nationalists refer to the entity of the community seeking support for a united Ireland, which is almost universally Catholic. Republicans demand completed independence under a Republican government, and are associated with a willingness to use physical force or armed struggle to achieve political goals.

From the opposing side, the ideology of Unionism in Northern Ireland favors the continuation of some form of political union between Ireland and Great Britain and almost universally Protestant. Unionists are community focused on preserving the place of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. Finally a Loyalist is a militant unionist in opposition to Irish Republicanism.

Appendix C

Geography of Northern Ireland⁹²



Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom. It is situated in the northeastern portion of the island of Ireland. It consists of six of the nine counties that were part of the former province of Ulster: Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone.

Belfast is the Capital City and the Seat of Government. It comprises about one-sixth of the entire island with 5,463 square miles (14, 148 square kilometers), where the entire island consists of 32,595 square miles (84,431 square kilometers). The measurements of the island are 174 miles (280 kilometers) width, and 302 miles (486 kilometers) length. Northern Ireland measures about 85 miles (135 kilometers) north and south. It is about 110 miles (175 kilometers) east and west. There is a spot in Northern Ireland that is only thirteen and one-half miles from Scotland, although most sea crossings were fifty miles in the southern part of the island and 70 miles in the northern part. The centerpiece of Northern Ireland's geography is Lough Neagh, at 151 square miles (391 km²) the largest freshwater lake both on the island of Ireland and in the British Isles.

Appendix D

Timeline of the Troubles

Date	Event	Remarks
1920 - 1969		
1920	Government of Ireland Act passed	Partition of Ireland into North and South. Ancient Ulster was nine counties, but the British Government only included six counties in Northern Ireland to guarantee a Protestant majority – leaving Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan in southern Ireland.
1920	Formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) or ‘B’ Specials	It was a reserve force called out in times of emergency, such as wars or insurgency.
1922	Formation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC)	
1956 - 1962	Operation HARVEST	The IRA border campaign. The border campaign failed as it had minimal support from the Catholic minority. It invited repressive cross-border measures such as internment, and was countered by the political will of the Northern Irish Brookeborough administration that consistently urged restraint.⁹³ The IRA then sought to end partition by physical force, its statement that followed announced: “Out of this national liberation struggle a new Ireland will emerge, upright and free. In that New Ireland we shall build a country for all our people to live. That then is our aim: an independent, united, democratic Irish Republic. For this we shall fight until the invader is driven from our soil and victory is ours.”
1965	UVF formed	‘Gusty’ Spence appointed as the first UVF commander.
1966	50 th anniversary of the Easter Uprising	UVF murders several people across Belfast
1967	Northern Ireland Civil Rights (NICRA) formed	The nationalists sought an appropriate means of rectifying their inequitable treatment in a province in which they exerted scant influence. The political stagnation was replaced by NICRA challenge and confrontation. Although NICRA was essentially a moderate organization, it was prepared to extend earlier pressure group activity into civil disobedience.
1969		
4 January 1969	People’s Democracy march from Belfast to Londonderry attacked by Loyalists and Ulster Constabulary members (‘B’ Specials)	
10 August 1969	Rioting in Belfast and Londonderry	The ‘Battle of the Bogside’ in Londonderry
14 August 1969	British troops deploy onto Northern Ireland streets	Underlying tensions had manifested themselves into sectarian conflict. The British troops were to stabilize British rule of Ulster and restore order.
October 1969	Publication of the Hunt Report It resulted in reshaping the RUC, the disbandment of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the formation of the Ulster Defense Regiment.	The Hunt Report advised a re-shaping of the Northern Ireland’s Security Forces into a less partisan force, accountable to the public for its actions, and a police force civilian in nature. ⁹⁴

1970		
11 January 1970	IRA splits into Official and Provisional wings.	The IRA final break, over an issue of historical principal. The Marxist faction of the Republican movement wished to recognize the legitimacy of the Dublin government, the traditionalists regarded this as heresy, the IRA split, and the Provisional IRA (PIRA) was born. The PIRA vision was to cause the collapse of the Northern Ireland administration and to inflict casualties on the British forces that would force the British government, by public opinion, to withdraw from Ireland.
April	‘B’ Specials disbanded; Ulster Defense Regiment formed	Many Loyalists felt let down by this appeasement to the Nationalists and a threat of Irish Unity from the Hunt Report and the UVF started to retaliate themselves against Nationalists and create their own ‘vigilante’ groups called ‘defense associations.’
1971		
6 February 1971	First British soldier killed by IRA	Gunner Robert Curtis was the first British soldier to have been killed in Ireland since 1921.
9 August 1971	Internment introduced	The British Government reluctantly agreed for Internment without trial on the assumption that Law and Order would be restored without the troublemakers. Whole communities were uprooted, 300 Catholics lifted, 0 Protestants. The result after Internment was that it mobilized IRA to target Army/Security Forces rather than just the Protestant communities, and resulted in a four-fold increase in killings of soldiers.
September 1971	Ulster Defense Association (UDA) created	This loyalist and vigilante group. It was formed to defend loyalist areas from attack and to combat Irish Republicanism. It used the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) as its military arm.
1972		
30 January 1972	‘Bloody Sunday’	Soldiers from 1 st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, open fire on civil rights marchers. 27 people wounded, 14 killed. It was one of the most significant incidents that alienated Nationalists from the British Army, who had not yet significantly turned against them. The IRA swelled with supporters.
March 1972	Northern Ireland Parliament dissolved	Direct Rule established through the Northern Ireland Office at Westminster.
21 July 1972	‘Bloody Friday’	IRA detonates 22 bombs across Belfast, 9 killed and hundreds injured.
31 July 1972	Operation MOTORMAN	Security Forces retake the ‘no-go’ areas in the Nationalist areas of Belfast and Derry. Although it inflicted a short-term defeat on the IRA in both cities, it did not make the organization any less dangerous on other parts of Northern Ireland. ⁹⁵
9 December 1973	Sunningdale Agreement	This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a ‘cross-border’ Council of Ireland.

1974		
May 1974	Collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement	Unionist opposition, violence and a loyalist general strike caused the collapse of the Agreement in May 1974.
May 1974	UVF bombings in Dublin	Shankill and Portadown UVF units planted 3 car bombs in Dublin without warning. 33 killed.
October & November 1974	IRA bombings on mainland UK	Bombings of two Guildford pubs, 4 killed. Bombings of two Birmingham pubs, 19 killed
1975		
9 February 1975 – 23 January 1976	IRA ceasefire	The IRA agreed to a ceasefire in February 1975, which lasted nearly a year before the IRA concluded that the British were drawing them into politics without offering any guarantees in relation to the IRA's goals, and hopes of a quick victory receded. Loyalists were concerned that there was a sell-out between the British and Irish Governments and feared for a united Ireland. As a result, the IRA launched a new strategy known as "the Long War". This saw them conduct a war of attrition against the British and increase emphasis on political activity, via the political party Sinn Féin.
1976		
IRA reorganization for 'The Long War' strategy.		IRA reorganization into cellular lines (Active Service Units) from a larger conventional military organizational principle. It was aimed at improving security and operational capacity. The only exception was the South Armagh Brigade.
25 March 1976	Police Primacy	The announcement that the overt military lead in security policy would be scaled back in favor of 'police primacy'. The Intelligence lead transferred to the police into Tasking and Coordination Groups (TCG).
1979		
27 August 1979	Lord Mountbatten killed	The IRA blows up Lord Mountbatten, the Queen's cousin and former Chief of the Defense Staff.
	Warrenpoint bombing	The IRA in a double bomb attack near Warrenpoint kills 18 British Army soldiers. It was the most successful and best-planned IRA attack on the British Army of the Troubles.
1981		
5 May 1981	Hunger Strikes	Bobby Sands becomes the first of the IRA hunger strikers to die, after 66 days' fasting. 9 other IRA and INLA prisoners follow suit.
1984		
Secret talks with British Government		Gerry Adams begins the Secret Talks with the British Government.

1985		
15 November 1985	The Anglo-Irish Agreement	British and Irish governments sign the Anglo-Irish Treaty; start of the ‘Ulster Says No’ campaign (see Appendix E).
1986		
1 November 1986	Split of Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (Dublin) – birth of Republican Sinn Fein	The Provisionals realized that they had to enter constitutional politics as well as fighting a war. This meant recognizing the Dublin Parliament and taking seats in it. Traditional Sinn Fein wanted to reject the institutions created by partition (Stormont and Dublin Governments). The Provisional and Republican movement split.
1987		
8 May 1987	Loughgall	SAS kill 8 IRA terrorists.
8 November 1987	Enniskillen bomb	The IRA detonates a no-warning bomb next to the war memorial in Enniskillen, 11 killed, 63 injured.
1991		
7 February 1991	IRA mortars 10 Downing Street	IRA continues its mainland campaign in an attempt to force concessions from the British Government.
1994		
31 August 1994	IRA ceasefire – ends its military hostilities	This saw the development of the peace process. The politics of the conflict remained unresolved and there was little movement towards an all-inclusive dialogue at this stage. There needed a peaceful background, a non-violent situation to offer the prospect of permanent dialogue rather than increased polarization.
13 October 1994	Loyalist paramilitaries announce ceasefire	
1995		
Talks between British and Irish government and paramilitary representatives		The governments attempted the reconciliation of the seemingly irreconcilable in terms of the political problems of Northern Ireland
1996		
9 February 1996	Canary Wharf bomb – IRA ends ceasefire	Sinn Fein’s entry into all-inclusive talks was delayed. The IRA had felt that they had been duped by the British Government and could not withhold frustrations at grass roots any longer. The mainland attacks purposes were simply to get Sinn Fein into the negotiations rather than a united Ireland
15 June 1996	IRA bombs Manchester city center	
July	Widespread civil disturbance	Orange Order parade at Drumcree, County Armagh, leads to widespread civil disturbances across the Province.
7 October 1996	IRA bombs British Army HQ in Lisburn	Two 500lb bombs, 1 killed and 20 injured.
1997		
12 February 1997	Lance Bombadier Stephen Restorick killed by South Armagh sniper team	Last soldier to die under Operation BANNER
20 July 1997	IRA ceasefire	IRA reinstates its ceasefire. Political developments resumed with the election of a new government in Britain and Ireland.

1998		
10 April 1998	The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement	The peace process arrived in April 1998, as political agreement was reached. This represented the culmination of exhaustive multi-party, intergovernmental and bilateral talks. At the heart of the agreement was the principle of consent for constitutional change in Northern Ireland.
May 1998	Sinn Fein Ard Fheis	Sinn Fein called a special Ard Fheis when delegates voted overwhelmingly to allow successful candidates to take their seats in the proposed Assembly at Stormont. As a result of this decision, the policy on Sinn Fein abstentionism now only applies to the British parliament at Westminster. ⁹⁶
15 August 1998	Omagh Bombing	The Real IRA, the Republican splinter group, explodes a no-warning car bomb in Omagh, County Tyrone, killing 29 people and two unborn children.
1999		
29 November 1999	Power-Sharing executive appointed	
2 December 1999	Power devolved to Stormont	Direct rule ends, power devolved to Stormont from Westminster.
2002		
14 October 2002	Suspension of devolution	IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of the power-sharing executive and the suspension of devolution. This started the longest suspension until May 2007.
2005		
28 July 2005	IRA calls an end to its armed campaign	IRA reports in the open media that it has allegedly decommissioned the last of its weapons and explosives.
2006		
October 2006	St Andrews Agreement	Multi-Party Talks (see Appendix E).
2007		
8 May 2007	Devolution returns to Stormont executive	Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a power-sharing executive.
31 July 2007	Operation BANNER ends	
October 2007	MI5 (Security Service) took over primacy for national security intelligence work in Northern Ireland. ⁹⁷	

Appendix E

Summary of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements

Date	Event	Remarks
1920	Government of Ireland Act passed	Partition of Ireland into North and South
7 June 1921 – 30 March 1972	The Parliament of Northern Ireland	The Parliament consistently chose the Ulster Unionist Party to govern the region.
1948	Republic of Ireland Act	Staunch lobbying from the Northern Ireland Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke saw Northern Ireland remain an integral part of the United Kingdom. ⁹⁸
30 March 1972	Suspension of the NI Parliament and the introduction of direct rule	The NI Parliament was initially suspended and then formally abolished in 1973 under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. Civil servants in Whitehall would have to assume all of the responsibilities previously exercised by the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS). ⁹⁹
9 December 1973	Sunningdale initiative	This was an attempt to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and cross-border Council of Ireland of shared Protestant and Catholic government power sharing. - For Loyalists this was a sell-out. The Ulster Workers Council initiated a huge strike; bringing down the agreement by paralyzing the Province, using psychological intimidation to the public. Universal loyalist support, of all loyalists' persuasions, was in revolt. Northern Ireland politicians in step behind the paramilitaries. Harold Wilson made his speech remarking that the people of Northern Ireland were "spongers." The Province was paralyzed; loyalists had defied Westminster, through a combination of sheer numbers, industrial muscle and paramilitary power. They had taken over state and the Sunningdale initiative was kicked out and caused the collapse of the initiative in May 1974.
1974 (Secret Talks)	Secret contact between British Government and the IRA was initiated.	The so-called 'Christmas-ceasefire' was negotiated.
1975 (Secret Talks)	IRA ceasefire	Serious negotiations on structures of disengagement. It was neatly ambiguous for both sides to interpret as they wished. The British Government had no intention of a Political withdrawal, the Loyalists began an autumn resurgence, suspicious of a sell-out, and the IRA walked out. ¹⁰⁰
1981 (Secret Talks)	Hunger Strike proposals	There was a set of proposals to manage the end of the first hunger strike, but only ended in revised prison rules, inflexibility on the part of prison staff and management, rather than the 'political prisoner' status the Republicans sought.
15 November 1985	Anglo-Irish agreement	Anglo-Irish agreement. Overall, it laid the foundations for future progress through shared understandings. It promoted cross-border cooperation. It did not involve concepts such as joint sovereignty and limited Dublin's involvement to a consultative role. Two principles were laid down which have been retained in all subsequent arrangements: that the Irish government should have a say in the affairs of Northern Ireland; there could be no change

		in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of the majority (the 'consent principle'). The Unionists, who believed that it gave Dublin a direct involvement with the affairs of NI, rejected it. They formed the slogan, "Ulster says no."¹⁰¹ The Republicans believed that it was aimed at blocking the rise of Sinn Fein and instead reward the Nationalist SDLP who rejected the use of violence.
9 November 1990	The Brooke-Mayhew Talks: Secretary of State Northern Ireland announcement	The Secretary of State Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, declares that Britain has no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.
1992-1993	The Hume-Adams Talks	The development of a nationalist position and an understanding of how the core principle of self-determination could be understood.
1993 (Secret Talks)	Route to Peace	This was the British Government strategy to show the IRA that their only progress was through the political process of Sinn Fein and not political violence.
15 December 1993	Downing Street Declaration	Downing Street Declaration – This established that there would be no constitutional change without the agreement of the people of Northern Ireland: the principal of consent. - In June 1993, the new Irish PM, Albert Reynolds, built a broad Nationalist alliance and coalition in negotiation with the British. On the 3rd December 1993, Major/Reynolds met. The position of the British was not persuaders for Irish Unity, and insisted on Unionist consent for any settlement. The Irish stood firm on self-determination. 15 December 1993 at Dublin Castle the deal was finally done. Reynolds got <i>self-determination</i> but in a separate referendum north and south. Major got his principal of Unionist consent but the unions had to be kept on board otherwise it was worthless. The result was a joint framework document, with 20 drafts. This led to the 1st September 1994 IRA declaration of ceasefire, believing that the declaration was genuine. This started a new phase, a turning point in the strategy. The IRA ceasefire allowed their representatives in Sinn Fein to conduct meaningful negotiations at the heart of the conflict, in essence political space.
10 April 1998	Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement. - The Northern Ireland Act 1998	The Belfast/ Good Friday Agreement (or Sunningdale for slow learners!) was based upon the principle of power sharing under the D'Hondt method to ensure that Northern Ireland's largest political communities, the unionist and nationalist communities both participate in governing the region. Acceptance of the Belfast Agreement owed far more to changes in republicanism than any fundamental change in British policy towards Northern Ireland.¹⁰² It instigated the Patten Report, which in Sep '99 recommended 175 major changes to the RUC, including a name change, a Policing Board and a Police Ombudsman.¹⁰³

29 November 1999	Power-Sharing executive appointed	IRA announcement that it is also in contact with the Decommissioning Commission
2 December 1999	Stormont rule	- Direct rule ends, power devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont from Westminster. - The North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Ministerial Council take effect. - The Anglo-Irish Agreement is replaced by the British-Irish Agreement. - Articles 2 & 3 of the Irish Constitution are amended to remove its territorial claim on Northern Ireland.
February – May 2000	Power devolved	Assembly suspended over the issue of decommissioning. Direct rule imposed from Westminster temporarily re-imposed until the IRA then announced that it would put its arms beyond use.
June 2001	Westminster and Local Government Elections	Significant swing towards the Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionist Party. ¹⁰⁴
14 October 2002	Suspension of devolution	IRA spy ring in Stormont prompts the collapse of the power-sharing executive and the suspension of devolution.
13 October 2006	St Andrews Agreement The Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006 The Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2007	An agreement between the British and Irish Governments and the political parties to broker a deal on the devolution of power to Northern Ireland. It set a target date for 27 March 2007. Key elements of the agreement were: • Full acceptance by Sinn Fein to support the Police Service of Northern Ireland, courts and the rule of law (devolution of policing and justice). • Restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly the following year with a new Northern Ireland Executive. • Commitment by the DUP to power sharing with Republicans and Nationalists in the Northern Ireland Executive.
7 March 2007	Northern Ireland elections	Northern Ireland goes to the polls to elect candidates to the Assembly. The DUP are the largest party, winning 36 of the 108 seats. Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 18, the SDLP 16, and the Alliance Party 7 seats.
8 May 2007	Devolution returns to Stormont executive (after almost 5 years)	Gerry Adams and Ian Paisley agree to enter a power-sharing executive. The Assembly met and elected Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness as First Minister and deputy First Minister.
5 June 2008	New First Minister – Peter Robinson.	Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness are appointed first and deputy first ministers of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Mr Robinson was nominated by former DUP leader Ian Paisley and Mr McGuinness by Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams
4 February 2010	The Hillsborough Agreement - Devolution of Policing and Justice	DUP reached a deal with Sinn Fein over the devolution of policing and justice powers from Westminster to Northern Ireland. This included the British and Irish Prime Ministers mediating talks at Hillsborough 25-27 January 2010.
12 April 2010	Powers of Devolution and Justice transferred to the Assembly	

5 May 2011	2011 election for the Northern Ireland Assembly	Following the results of the election, Peter Robinson of the DUP and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein were nominated and subsequently re-elected as First Minister and deputy First Minister on 12 May 2011. The DUP are the largest party, winning 38 of the 108 seats. Sinn Fein takes 28 seats. The UUP win 16, the SDLP 14, and the Alliance Party 8 seats.
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Appendix F

Analysis of the Political Negotiations and Political Agreements

Of all the political agreements, the Sunningdale Agreement December 1973 was the most problematic while the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 was the most significant as it laid the foundations for the successful Belfast Agreement of 1998. The resilience of the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) to strike in May 1974 in protest to the Sunningdale Agreement, inspired by the Vanguard Party and the DUP, brought Northern Ireland to its knees.¹⁰⁵ The strike effectively broke British policy in Ulster and ensured Protestant Unionists would not have power sharing with a nationalist dimension thrust upon them.¹⁰⁶ For the Downing Street Declaration, the British and Irish governments achieved in tortuous phraseology to 'square the circle' of Unionist and Republican rhetoric. It established the principled framework within which the future of Northern Ireland could then be discussed.¹⁰⁷ The considered ambiguity conceded the abstract principle of self-determination to the Irish people (the nationalist position) but retained the operative principle of self-determination for the 'greater number' in Northern Ireland (the Unionist position). This enabled the launch pad for the Belfast Agreement, which marked the most significant rapprochement in Anglo-Irish relations since the partition of the island of Ireland in 1921.

Appendix G

The Mitchell Principles

The Mitchell Principles were six ground rules agreed by the Irish and British governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland regarding participation in talks on the future of the region. They were named after the Senator George Mitchell who chaired the all-party talks. All involved in the negotiations had to agree to their commitment.

The principles appear in the report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning: Principles of Democracy and Non-Violence, January 1996:¹⁰⁸

1. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues.
2. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations.
3. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission.
4. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations.
5. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree.
6. To urge that "punishment" killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such action.


Lesson Learnt: the reason why the Mitchell Principles were so successful is best described by Fisher and Ury in the book "Getting to Yes:" "The more you bring standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit to bear on your particular problem, the more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise and fair."¹⁰⁹

Appendix H


Security Statistics

The security and stability of the framework for peace is more than just the measurement of overt cases of violence using security statistics for deaths, injuries, bombings, shootings, arrests and convictions but it does provide a suitable framework for analysis. By relying on these trends alone risks what Johann Galtung calls “negative peace” – that is peace defined simply by the absence of violence.

1. **Figure 1.** Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK – 2009 and 2010. Figures on the left are numbers of arrests; figures along the bottom are the terrorist related areas of arrest. This figure shows the increase in the Northern Irish Related Terrorism arrests in comparison to the rest of UK arrests. ¹¹⁰



2. **Figure 2.** Security Related Incidents (1998 – 2011). The following statistics are from the PSNI for shooting, incendiary and bombing incidents only.¹¹¹ The figures on the left are number of incidents against time on the bottom axis. It is important to note that the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity illustrated at Figure 6 uses a very different metric, across a wider range of activities, than this generalist PSNI statistic.




The following types of shooting incidents are included:

- Shots fired by terrorists
- Shots fired by the security forces
- Paramilitary-style attacks involving shootings
- Shots heard (and later confirmed)
- Other violent incidents where shots are fired (eg armed robbery)


An individual bombing incident may involve one or more explosive devices. Incidents recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used). Incidents involving hoax devices, petrol bombings or incendiaries are excluded.

Incidents recorded include explosions and defusings (devices used).


3. **Figure 3.** Firearms Finds (1998 – 2011). The following statistics are from the PSNI.¹¹² The figures on the left are the number of firearms offences against time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own unless checked against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is beyond the classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the number of offences continues to rise in the last five years.



4. **Figure 4.** Explosives Finds (1998 – 2011). The following statistics are from the PSNI.¹¹³ The figures on the left are the weight of explosive finds (kgs) against time. These are stand alone statistics and cannot be assessed on their own unless checked against other forms of intelligence collection and arrests, which is beyond the classification of this paper. What the Figure does illustrate is that the number of large explosive finds has reduced in the last five years, leading to more high tech UVIEDs.




5. **Figure 5.**¹¹⁴ The following chart shows the 2009/10 range of offence that charges brought against persons detained **in Northern Ireland** under section 41 of the Terrorism Act (2006) by individual offence. It demonstrates the significant number of offences that are linked to violent terrorist acts and the mix of terrorism and criminality for a police counter-terrorist strategy. Of those persons detained and charged, 50% were for membership, possession of terrorist purposes and collection of information.




5. **Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity.**


a. **Figure 6.**¹¹⁵ This illustrates the use of the Violent Dissident Republican (VDR) event activity 1997 – 2010. The data supports the argument that the threat posed by VDR organizations remains substantial with a dramatic rise in activity for 2009 and 2010. VDR as a metric is outlined in more detail below, in Figure 7.




b. **Figure 7.**¹¹⁶ VDR is activity measured by type. The chart below shows how the different types of activity for 2010 have led to the spike of VDR seen above. This data indicates that the strategy of the dissident groups is not just to disrupt normalization through attempted high-level bombings and hoax activity, but also to use violence from assaults and crime through robberies to demonstrate their own authority.”




c. **Figure 8.**¹¹⁷ This breaks out the VDR by grouping. The unknown perpetrators are unattributable to any dissident Republican grouping. Analysis has proven that this could be down to RIRA, consistent with previous patterns of failure to immediately claim responsibility for events or simply media confusion about the emergence of ONH. Aside from the attribution to a group, there remains a significant spike of attacks in 2010.



d. **Figure 9.**¹¹⁸ This shows the bombing incidents detonated and defused from 1997 to 2010. This increase in high-level activity supports the assumption that 2010 saw a growing sophistication in tactics, technology, and determination on the part of the dissidents. This bombing data supports the official rise in the threat level from moderate to substantial.




e. **Figure 10.** Hoax devices. A defining tactic of the dissident groups has been to disrupt the normalization of Northern Irish society. They have aimed to do so through the inducement of fear and the disruption of routine activity through their attacks and the resultant ongoing security alerts that intend to cause routine disturbance.



f. **2011.** Although figures for the second half of 2011 are yet to be released, there has been a reduction from 2010. Some analysts, especially the *Belfast Telegraph*, ascertain that this is firstly due to turf wars within the dissident groupings. Secondly the reduction is down to the success of the security forces, especially in the south of Ireland, where it has made “serious intelligence in-roads into the three main groupings.” There have also been suggestions that the dissident targeting has switched to an “economically driven campaign against strategic capitalist targets.” Whatever the statistics for 2011 say, there is still incoherence and division amongst the dissident groupings but with a goal to still continue their “armed struggle.”¹¹⁹

7. **Figure 11.** Deaths by status of the person killed (1969 – 1999).¹²⁰

- Total 3529.



8. At the height of its commitment in 1973, the Security Forces had 25,343 troops in Northern Ireland, distinctly more than the 9,000 British troops in Afghanistan today. The most deadly year was 1972, when the IRA went on the offensive against British troops; approximately 130 soldiers were killed in hostile action.¹²¹

Appendix I

Republican/ Nationalist Perspective

The Republican position – The motive for Irish Republicanism has been in opposition to British rule. It alleged discrimination and marginalization against Catholics by attempting to create an impression of inferiority and subdue/ eliminate their cultural identity, and a feeling that Ireland was economically disadvantaged and subservient to the United Kingdom.

From the late 1940's, there was a distinct lack of nationalists in the political process able to achieve the abolition of the border in a peaceful manner. As a result a more militant Republicanism quickly usurped constitutional nationalism. In 1969, there was a nationalist community perception that they were at war. At a Sinn Féin/ IRA Ard Fheis in January 1970, the Republican movement formally split. The dissidents' who left in favor of a more proactive defense of beleaguered Catholic communities became known as the Provisionals and they began its all-out offensive against what it claimed was British occupation. The IRA that was left called itself the Official Irish Republican Army, rejecting the political legitimacy of the Provisionals.

Republican strategy - The Provisional IRA strategy of Republican action has remained "the unswerving commitment to the armed struggle".¹²²

- **The 'Initial Phase' of 1970 – 1972** – This was what the Security Forces termed as the insurgency phase. 1972 was the worst year of the Troubles. In total, the IRA carried out 1,200 operations that year, bidding to make Northern Ireland unstable and hasten the departure of the British state.¹²³ By 1975, the hope of a PIRA quick military victory was low. A ceasefire was negotiated, the

IRA believing that this was the start of a long-term process of British withdrawal.

The ceasefire was troublesome for the IRA as it led to infiltration by informers, the arrest of many activists and a breakdown of IRA discipline. By early 1976, the IRA leadership, short of money, weapons and members, broke off the ceasefire.

- **The Long War** - Under the leadership of Gerry Adams, there was a transformation of the IRA. It evolved a new strategy termed the 'Long War,' which underpinned IRA strategy for the rest of the Troubles. The IRA was restructured, redefined and an increased emphasis on a political strategy with violence to achieve their aims (bullet and ballot box), maintaining a propaganda war using Sinn Fein as the voice of the Republican movement.
- **Political Violence/ Hunger Strikes** - The Republican hunger strike in the Maze prison in 1981, to recognize the Republican prisoners as 'political status'/prisoners of war, led to the death of ten IRA and INLA, including Bobby Sands who had been elected as a Member of Parliament for Fermanagh and South Tyrone.¹²⁴ Sands' death was the watershed for the Republican movement. It generated influence and national and international media interest.¹²⁵ More significantly as an unexpected byproduct of the hunger strike, it proved what Gerry Adams had long argued might be possible, of convincing Republicans, of the value of electoral politics much sooner than expected. Adams recognized from this that the nationalists had a reservoir of support that if skillfully tapped, could build the broad political base with a credible political strategy that he

believed was necessary to move the cause forward alongside their terrorist campaign.¹²⁶

- **Electoral Strategy** - The Republican electoral strategy then developed and by 1985 Sinn Fein had flourished and won 12% of the vote in the council elections. Sinn Fein was on the rise while IRA was being contained. The 'long war' strategy had exacted a heavy toll from the Republican community in terms of lives, prison sentences and quality-of-life opportunities.¹²⁷ It was matched by a dramatic increase in loyalist assassinations of Republicans in the early 1990s. The Republican use of violence was becoming counter-productive, risking alienating nationalist and Republicans' core support. Political violence started to lead to exclusion, demonization and lack of legitimacy.¹²⁸ This led to the Sinn Fein leader and the SDLP leader John Hume conceptualizing a political strategy for nationalist unity.

- **Exporting Republicanism** - Throughout this Republican strategy transition, the IRA continued to export Republicanism. The IRA/Libya connection smuggled a considerable amount of weaponry, ammunition and military capability that transformed the IRA's tactical operations.¹²⁹ In an attempt to exert more political concessions from the British Government the IRA bombed or threatened security forces in Germany, the Netherlands, Gibraltar and Great Britain,¹³⁰ opening new fronts in the terror campaign.¹³¹ They also sought support from Irish diaspora communities abroad, in particular from the United States, whose sympathizers provided financial and moral support, as well as weapons.¹³²

- **The Belfast Agreement of 1998.** The important reality was that Republicans had acknowledged and accepted that there was a choice other than political violence and that it was a choice that most of the leadership had made to mark a “generational truce.”¹³³ For Republicans, the acceptance of the consent principle was justified by the belief that the framework for peace was only a temporary construct and would give way in time to a united Ireland once demographics prevailed in favor of the catholic majority. Nationalists are still on this journey. In contrast, Totalitarian Republicanism will always believe in the armed struggle to achieve constitutional nationalism of a united Ireland. This extremist view perceives that the acceptance of the Belfast Agreement marked the Provisional IRAs’ great historical betrayal .¹³⁴

Appendix J

Loyalist/ Unionist perspective

The Unionist position - The motive for unionists has always been to resist any attempt to force Home Rule from Ireland upon them, fighting the nationalists attempting to hasten Britain's total disengagement, while the British Government have always hinted at a steady process of disengagement in Ireland since World War I. The resolve of Unionists in maintaining the link with Great Britain has been for a variety of economic, social and political reasons.¹³⁵

The Loyalist position - The establishment of the Ulster Volunteer Force was to protect the Unionists and the project of Home Rule for Ireland floundered amid the staunch opposition of Ulster Unionists. The coercive nature of the Unionist demands was persuasive, dictated primarily by the need to prevent anger boiling over into reprisals. The re-establishment of the UVF in November 1965 re-instigated the loyalist paramilitary structure, boosted further by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) by 1971.

Loyalism - In the 1960s, if there was one trigger that unleashed the loyalist sectarian 'genie', it was the fundamentalist Presbyterian preacher, the Reverend Ian Paisley. He saw the growing rapprochement between the Unionist Stormont government and Dublin as a treachery and a betrayal of the Protestant faith, Protestant Ulster and the unionist intransigent position that he would become infamous for. His leadership alone voiced the strong resentment of the Ulster people, more so than any leading Unionist leader at the time. He created the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV) as his support to attack the liberal leaning policies of Terence O'Neill in the Northern Ireland Parliament, who had promised to "transform the face of Ulster" but O'Neill fatally misunderstood the

dynamics of sectarianism.¹³⁶ Although his political rhetoric never endorsed sectarian violence, Paisley would use his leadership and influence to incite anger and fury towards the nationalist community. He flirted with the loyalist paramilitaries on-and-off throughout his career to further his own gains, whilst never overtly supporting their actions, ranging from the UVF, the UVP to the Ulster Resistance.¹³⁷ Protestant militancy emerged as a formidable force in Northern Ireland on the streets and then into politics.

Loyalist strategy - The Loyalist strategy throughout was the defense of their Protestant Ulster and to react to the conflict of Irish Republicans on their communities. The public perception was that if the security forces could not defend them, they would have to do it themselves. As a result the paramilitaries were thought of as defenders of their communities rather than psychopaths or killers. At a tactical level Loyalist paramilitaries did not possess the same degree of technical sophistication that marked the Provisional IRA out as a deadly organization. However, this made them no less dangerous. In the early 70s, the constant Loyalist attacks failed to degrade the nationalist popular support for the IRA, instead it strengthened its status. By the 1980s and early 1990s, they had shifted from a random sectarian campaign of violence to a more focused and coordinated effort to assassinate Republicans. Accused of collusion with the Security Forces, Sir John Stevens, the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, undertook investigations as to some of the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) murders between 1987 and 2003. His report concluded: "...there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the willful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being

involved in murder.”¹³⁸ While loyalism had acquired a greater military capacity, it also developed a more sophisticated leadership.

Electoral strategy - The Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) often appeared more pragmatic and willing to compromise than the constitutional unionist parties.¹³⁹ Key to the Unionist campaign throughout the Troubles was the threat of its raw strength of protest (evident in both the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements).¹⁴⁰ Unionist paranoia has always feared that they only have to be unlucky once, that they only have to make one serious error of judgment, and the pass to Irish unity would be sold.¹⁴¹ As an emerging Peace Process developed, unionist members of the business sector, civil society as well as influential members of the Ulster Unionist Party sought a closer engagement with the political process. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was intransigent, by maintaining a positional bargaining strategy,¹⁴² unwilling to accept the admission of Sinn Féin, boycotting inter-party talks. The Peace Process divided unionism between the pragmatists and the traditionalists, this division was still evident at the recent devolution of Policing and Justice in 2010. The division of unionism alone was one of the causes for the conflict to be so intractable.

Appendix K

British Government and Security Force perspective

The Security Force position - The key objective for the Security Forces was to stabilize the situation to facilitate a political settlement.

The COIN Strategy - The Security Forces strategy started as largely widespread maintenance of law and order. Initially the Army kept a tentative peace; but the decision in 1971 by the IRA to go on the offensive saw the Security Forces (that included the police and military) respond with a counter-insurgency drive against the insurgents.¹⁴³ Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo, General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland between 1971 and 1973 perceptively concluded: “the hard fact is that in guerilla war the enemy holds the initiative for large parts of the time and information is the key to defeat.”¹⁴⁴ Without the flow of key sections of the population, the flow of information soon dried up.

The Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Successive British Governments tried to end the bloodshed with a variety of political solutions, even talking to the IRA, all of which had failed. It was clear that by 1976, politics had reached a dead-end and that the IRA was determined to carry on killing. The Government made security its principal line of operation and intelligence gathering became a priority.¹⁴⁵ The new “Way Ahead” security policy, known as Police Primacy meant that the RUC would assume the lead and the Army subordinate.¹⁴⁶ This had political and presentational attractions from the British Government’s viewpoint: no homeland war had to be declared, RUC confidence would be restored and place the police back on the front foot to start the long road to

normalization.¹⁴⁷ This started essential tripartite cohesion and coordination between the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), RUC and the Army.

Police Primacy - From 1977, the Army's role was scaled back to provide military support to the police in counter-terrorist operations; special operations became the cutting edge, with an evidence-based approach to counter terrorism.¹⁴⁸ The appointment of Roy Mason as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1976 radically bolstered the special operations forces with Special Air Service and Special Duties covert units. Mason's focus was covert action and the secret war against the IRA. The strategy was for "reassurance, deterrence and attrition. Overt activities reassured, by dominating the ground in the hope of raising public confidence in the security forces, and deterred by show of force, denying the terrorists the space to operate on; covert operations caused attrition."¹⁴⁹

Targeting - The difficulty in the counter terrorist targeting was the balance in maintaining the stability of the paramilitary leadership, to leave them in place long enough to secure credibility and influence to negotiate with, versus destroying their ability to destabilize the road to peace using political violence. In order to create the political space, different strategies were used against different individuals and groupings from coercing, cajoling and enticing into eventually suing for peace.¹⁵⁰

The Security Force effects - This effective combination of military operations led to significant attrition of the terrorist groups, an undermining of the terrorists purpose from within their own popular support and a growing public recognition of the futility of paramilitary activity. It forced the IRA back to the negotiating table in the early '90's.¹⁵¹ The Security Forces held the line with a battle of wills against the Republican and

Loyalist terrorist groups. The impact of the Security Forces allowed a wider and strategic plan to be implemented and developed.¹⁵²

Glossary

Ard Fheis	Sinn Fein Conference
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EU	European Union
GAA	Gaelic Athletic Association
GOC	General Officer Commanding
HET	Historical Enquiries Team
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LVF	Loyalist Volunteer Force
MP	Member of Parliament
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NICS	Northern Ireland Civil Service
NIE	Northern Ireland Executive
NIO	Northern Ireland Office
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
PUP	Progressive Unionist Party
RIR	Royal Irish Regiment
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RSF	Republican Sinn Fein
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAS	Special Air Service
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labor Party
SF	Sinn Fein
UDA	Ulster Defense Association
UDP	Ulster Democratic Party
UDR	Ulster Defense Regiment
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UKUP	United Kingdom Unionist Party
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
UVP	Ulster Protestant Volunteers
UWC	Ulster Workers Council

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¹ Roger MacGinty, “Northern Ireland: A Peace Process thwarted by Accidental Spoiling,” in *Challenges to Peace Building*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 154.

² Orangeism is derived from the Orange Institution (more commonly known as the Orange Order or Orange Lodge). It is a Protestant fraternal organization based mainly in Northern Ireland and Scotland. Politically, it is strongly linked to unionism.

³ Explanations of why discrimination occurred differ over three main issues: (1) the value of Protestant privileges, (2) the extent of Protestant unity across social classes, (3) the role, if any, of the British Government, in promoting sectarianism.

⁴ Aaron Edwards, *Essential Histories. The Northern Ireland Troubles; Operation BANNER 1969-2007* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2011), 7.

⁵ Edwards, 27.

⁶ Edwards, 29.

⁷ Peter Taylor, *Loyalists* (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2000).

⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

⁹ Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” *Parameters*, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, Autumn, 1995, 3. It is this work from Bassford that connects the Northern Ireland conflict into a trinity, rather than the “non-trinitarian” Martin van Creveld and John Keegan explanation that consigns Clausewitz to irrelevance.

¹⁰ There is risk that this over simplifies the complexity of the terrorist groupings. Categorizing Republican and Loyalist as simply “non-rational actors” ignores some of the deliberate terrorist strategies laid out in Appendix I (Republican), and Appendix J (Loyalist). The second and third order effects of their strategies did indeed lead to non-rational action.

¹¹ John Wilsey, *The Ulster Tales – A tribute to those who served 1969 – 2000* (South Yorkshire, United Kingdom: Pen & Sword, 2011), 123.

¹² Roger MacGinty, and John Darby, *Guns and Government – The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process* (New York, United States: Palgrave, 2002), 21.

¹³ Ministry of Defence, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* (Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009), 170. This defines Decisive Condition as: “a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve or support the desired condition.”

¹⁴ Roger MacGinty, “Northern Ireland: A Peace Process thwarted by Accidental Spoiling,” in *Challenges to Peace Building*, ed. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, 153-172 (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2006), 156.

¹⁵ MacGinty, & Darby, 4.

¹⁶ Roger Fisher and William Ury, *Getting to Yes – Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, (Middlesex, United Kingdom: Penguin Books Ltd: 1983), 7.

¹⁷ In comparison the Northern Ireland Progress Monitoring Report 2012 breaks the dimensions of the peace process into four distinct but interlocking dimensions of Security, Equality, Political progress, and Cohesion and Sharing.

¹⁸ It is the author’s opinion that the assurance from the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) and the announcement from the IRA that their “arms had been put beyond use,” is still a source of huge ambiguity. The issue of decommissioning was vital to progress the framework for peace, but to what level of decommissioning? There is still no open source evidence of paramilitary decommissioning or true definition of what condition has been met to progress the peace process. Many media reports still state that the paramilitary weapons and munitions are simply locked away in secure bunkers. Instead it was simply a risk mitigation

process for Republican movement, essentially how much did they have to bargain for political progress.

¹⁹ Edwards, 10.

²⁰ Oliver Ramsbotham in *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 214, explains that as the conflict is brought to an end by a peace process, its essence lies precisely in the effort to persuade undefeated conflict parties that their persisting and undiminished aims can best be served by non-violent politics rather than violence. This cessation of violence is traded for other commodities, such as political opportunity through inclusion. This is the “continuation of war into politics.”

²¹ MacGinty & Darby, 176.

²² MacGinty & Darby, 171.

²³ MacGinty & Darby, 177.

²⁴ MacGinty & Darby, 24.

²⁵ Edwards, 14.

²⁶ British and Irish Governments, *The Framework Documents - A New Framework For Agreement, by the British and Irish Governments* (London: Prime Minister's Office, 22 February 1995).

²⁷ Edwards, 73.

²⁸ First visit was in 30 November 1995, 15 months after the IRA's first ceasefire. Second visit was following the dissident Republican bombing in Omagh. Third visit was 12 December 2000 attempting to break the political deadlock threatening the power-sharing executive.

²⁹ MacGinty & Darby, 25.

³⁰ The Belfast Telegraph, “Bill Clinton visits Northern Ireland with plan for economic recovery,” *belfasttelegraph.co.uk*, September 30, 2010, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/bill-clinton-visits-northern-ireland-with-plan-for-economic-recovery-14962411.html> (accessed 06 April 2012).

³¹ Since May 2011, the position of US Special Envoy for Economic Affairs in Northern Ireland has not been filled since the resignation of Declan Kelly. In a leaked Wikileaks cable he was alleged to have conveyed the message that the Northern Ireland region's business community and political leaders had become too reliant on “Santa's sacks.”

³² Peter Taylor, *The Secret Peacemaker* (BBC2, United Kingdom: 26 March 2008).

³³ Wilsey, 158.

³⁴ Kevin King, *Words Over War – Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, ed. Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 206.

³⁵ Colonel (Retd) Michael Crawshaw, “*The Evolution of British COIN*”. Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40: 19.

³⁶ Brian A. Jackson, “Countering Intelligence in a ‘Long War’ – The British Experience in Northern Ireland,” *Military Review* (January-February 2007): 75.

³⁷ Preventing violence in the first instance should be via a policy of prevention, mastery of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, minimum force, rule of law, controlling territory and a denial of the emotional factors terrorism feeds off.

³⁸ Op BANNER, 8 – 15.

³⁹ Edwards, 14.

⁴⁰ Wilsey, 123.

⁴¹ The concessions made by unionists at the Belfast Agreement were immediate and apparent, early release of prisoners, admission of Sinn Féin into the Assembly, north-south institutions and reform of the RUC. In contrast concessions made by Republicans, were theoretical and deferred. This was the principle of consent and revision of the Irish constitution.

⁴² Jonathan Tonge, *"Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change,"* (Harlow, United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 213.

⁴³ Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.

⁴⁴ HM Government, *"A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty - The National Security Strategy,"* (October, 2010), 29.

⁴⁵ The United Kingdom is ranked only 26th out of 153 countries in the Global Peace Index (GPI), which is produced annually. The GPI provides an annual ranking of the countries of the world in terms of their proximity to peace, and stresses its relevance to global capital.

⁴⁶ HM Government, *"Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty – The Strategic Defence and Security Review,"* (October, 2010), 42.

⁴⁷ HM Government, *"CONTEST: The United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism,"* (The Stationary Office: July, 2011), 26.

⁴⁸ Paul Nolan, *"Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report – Number One,"* (Belfast, Community Relations Council: February, 2012), 43.

⁴⁹ Dissident Republican strategy (Real IRA, Continuity IRA & Óglaigh na hÉireann (OnH)) is threefold: (1) Dissident Republicans completely reject any negotiation with the British government on the issue of Northern Ireland, (2) Dissident Republicans view the Belfast Agreement as a capitulation, viewed at constraining the Republican movement, and take a zero-sum approach to Irish unification, (3) Dissident Republicans seek the dissolution of the Northern Irish Assembly and reject any cross-community arrangements.

⁵⁰ Jane's Intelligence Review, *"Broken Peace, Violence Returns to Northern Ireland,"* *jir.janes.com*, November 2011, 8 – 13, 10.

⁵¹ The 108-member Stormont Assembly does not have any dissident representatives, and neither does the 166-seat Irish Parliament. All the key institutions in Irish society are vehemently opposed to the dissidents, including the Catholic Church and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Given this, it is difficult to see how support for the dissidents is going to grow radically; at the same time, it is hard to imagine the threat going away.

⁵² Jocelyn Evans, and Jonathon Tonge, *"Menace without mandate? Is there any sympathy for 'Dissident' Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?"* (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 24:1, 2012), 76.

⁵³ As Paul Nolan describes in the *Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report*, these are from areas of high social disadvantage with a prevalence of anti-social behavior. This has created a market of opportunity for the recruitment of individuals who wish to present themselves as 'community police'.

⁵⁴ Roger MacGinty, 161.

⁵⁵ Tongue, Jonathon, *"They haven't gone away you know. Irish Republican Dissidents and Armed Struggle,"* (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 16:3, 2004), 690.

⁵⁶ Common forms of criminality could include drug-dealing, smuggling, drink-driving, fuel-laundering, petty criminality, fraud, counter-feit.

⁵⁷ While the Patten target of 30% has been reached for police officers, only 27.3% of all PSNI personnel are Catholic, as against estimates of 46% for the adult population.

⁵⁸ Vincent Kearney, "Temporary staff was seen a 'short-term fix', former senior police say," *bbc.co.uk*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-16783099> (accessed 06 April 2012).

⁵⁹ Of the 304 rehired officers the breakdown is as follows: 63 in Intelligence Branch, 59 in serious crime and terrorism, 19 in Specialist Operations.

⁶⁰ O'Neill, P, "IRA Statement on Putting Arms Beyond Use," statement released to the BBC News Channel on 26th September 2005.

⁶¹ David Cameron. Bloody Sunday report published in the House of Commons. 15 June 2010.

⁶² The opportunity for reasoned discussion about how the past should be handled was lost in the furore surrounding the 2009 report of the Consultative Group on the Past – largely because of a clause which suggested a one-off payment to all families who had lost someone in ‘the Troubles,’ regardless of whether that person was seen as a victim or a perpetrator.

⁶³ Her Majesty’s Treasury in March 2011 stated, “Peace has not in itself been sufficient to raise Northern Ireland prosperity to the UK average. Northern Ireland still has one of the weakest economies in the UK.”

⁶⁴ Nolan, 32.

⁶⁵ Department of Finance and Personnel, “Northern Ireland Index of Production – Quarter 2 2011”, www.detini.gov.uk, October 12, 2011, http://www.detini.gov.uk/iop_q2_2011_statistical_bulletin_2.pdf, accessed 06 April 2012.

⁶⁶ Nolan, 32.

⁶⁷ Sir David Richards, Address at RUSI by the Chief of Defence Staff, <http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/>. December 12, 2011.

⁶⁸ Some nationalists continue to press for more progress in the area of human rights and equality, arguing in particular that Northern Ireland needs its own Bill of Rights and an Irish Language Act.

⁶⁹ MacGinty & Darby, 127.

⁷⁰ Nolan, 134.

⁷¹ The Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland takes in the counties of Cavan, Donegal, Leitrim, Louth, Monaghan, and Sligo.

⁷² Mark Devenport, “Is a new tranche of peace money on the cards for NI,” *bbc.co.uk*, June 27, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-13925081> (accessed 06 April 2012).

⁷³ Wilsey, 139.

⁷⁴ Nama was set up by the Irish government as part of the response to the country’s banking and property crisis. Its role is to buy and then manage property loans, which had been made by the Dublin-based banks. The main reason given for setting up Nama is that it would take an enormous weight of bad loans from the banks and allow them to increase lending to viable businesses.

⁷⁵ Jim Fitzpatrick, “Nama’s impact on Northern Ireland property market,” *bbc.co.uk*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-14332836> (accessed 06 April 2012).

⁷⁶ The British Banking Association, in its search to inspire confidence in the Northern Ireland banking sector, has called for a Nama-style bank in Northern Ireland.

⁷⁷ Southern Ireland is part of the single currency, compared to Northern Ireland, which still holds the British pound. Significant differences include company/ corporate tax, which is 12.5% in southern Ireland in spite of the country’s economic bailout and 28% in the UK and Northern Ireland. Business commentators state that this is sifting inward investment. If the tax is brought into line with the south, it could invigorate the economy and for Stormont to control it rather than the UK Exchequer.

⁷⁸ MacGinty & Darby, 134.

⁷⁹ Northern Ireland Executive, “Economic Strategy – Priorities for sustainable growth and prosperity,” (November, 2011), 5.

⁸⁰ This analysis had been supported recently (February 24, 2012), by Jim Fitzpatrick, the Business and Economics editor of BBC Northern Ireland. He stated, “Northern Ireland is suffering a “democratic overload” and needs a reworking of government that prioritizes the economy over the peace process,” <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2012/0224/breaking41.html>, accessed 06 April 2012.

⁸¹ As Bob Ainsworth (then Secretary of State for Defense) stated on 11 May 2009 as an answer to parliamentary questions, “There are regular Security Policy Meetings (SPM), chaired by

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, which discuss security arrangements in Northern Ireland” <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090511/text/90511w0028.htm>.

⁸² A distinction should be drawn early on between figures for arrest, charge and conviction.

Figures for arrest can appear very high, however that will not equate to convictions. Section 41 of the Terrorism Act, allow the police to arrest anyone they suspect of being involved in terrorism, these suspicions may later be proven unfounded. Even those charged with terrorist offences may have charges amended or dropped at a later stage. On 13 May 09 the Home Office Published: *Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain 11 September 2001 to 31 Mar 2008* (it does not include Northern Ireland). The report provided a full statistical breakdown of arrests, charges convictions and sentences and showed a conviction rate of 13% of which only just over half were eventually convicted for the offences charged or like offences. Horgan & Morrison, 2011, calculated that for Northern Ireland, of 641 individuals involved in dissident activity, 181 were classified as convicted: that is, a confirmed conviction for illegal activity in the context of involvement in a dissident Republican movement (that is 28%). Most of these have been from RIRA and CIRA affiliation. From the PSNI statistics for 2011 under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act alone it is 21%.

⁸³ Procedure in NI is broadly similar to that in England and Wales however there is a fundamental difference at the committal stage. In Northern Ireland a Magistrate first assesses the case. If there is a case to answer it is then referred to the Crown Court or it is dismissed. The defense can call witnesses at the committal stage and test the strength of the case and credibility of witnesses. This is a critical failing for terrorism cases, especially where there is a delicate balance of protecting information and capabilities in the interests of National Security.

⁸⁴ This was recognized as early as May 2000 in a joint letter developed by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern. They publicly pledged “to take measures that facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community, and to address related issues.”

⁸⁵ Over the next four years, 34 UK (including NI) terrorist-related prisoners will reach their release dates. It is vital that the transition of these individuals into the community, and their subsequent supervision manages the risks they may pose. There must be a continuing joint activity between the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), the police and other agencies to ensure that risk is effectively managed. Terrorist and terrorism-related offenders must continue to be subjected to Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), a statutory set of arrangements in which the police, prison and probation services are required to work together to assess and manage high risk offenders. As of February 2011 there were 36 terrorist offenders managed under MAPPA across the UK.

⁸⁶ As Paul Nolan in the Northern Ireland *Peace Monitoring Report*, “while the Northern Ireland Executive has pledged in its draft Program for Government 2011-15 to bring forward a new draft of *Cohesion, Sharing and Integration*, it is not expected that there will be a resource commitment that will match that which Northern Ireland has enjoyed from European and American funders.”

⁸⁷ James Dingley, “Northern Ireland and the Troubles,” *Combatting Terrorism in Northern Ireland*, ed. James Dingley (New York, United States: Routledge, 2009), 30.

⁸⁸ Wilsey, 175.

⁸⁹ Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.

⁹⁰ Wilsey, ix.

⁹¹ Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, <http://w1.publicaddress.net/assets/upload/224146/-1650345631/opbanner.pdf> , (Army Code 71842, July 2006).

⁹² <http://www.nidex.com/map.htm>, accessed 06 April 2012.

⁹³ Edwards, 18.

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- ⁹⁴ Baron Hunt, *Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland* (Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO), United Kingdom: 3 October 1969).
- ⁹⁵ Edwards, 43.
- ⁹⁶ CAIN Web Service, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1-2 November 1986, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/abstentionism/index.html>, accessed 06 April 2012.
- ⁹⁷ Jonathon Evans, 16 Sep 10.
- ⁹⁸ Edwards, 17.
- ⁹⁹ Wilsey, 107.
- ¹⁰⁰ Wilsey, 149.
- ¹⁰¹ Wilsey, 122.
- ¹⁰² Tonge, 196.
- ¹⁰³ CAIN Web Service, The Patten Report on Policing: Summary of Recommendations, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/police/patten/recommend.htm>, accessed 06 April 2012.
- ¹⁰⁴ MacGinty & Darby, xv.
- ¹⁰⁵ Wilsey, 42.
- ¹⁰⁶ Some commentators suggest that the Belfast Agreement in 1998 was the Sunningdale Initiative "for dummies!"
- ¹⁰⁷ Aughey, 55.
- ¹⁰⁸ Cox, Guelke, Stephen, ed., *"A farewell to arms? From 'long war' to long peace in Northern Ireland,"* (Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 2000), Appendix 10.
- ¹⁰⁹ Fisher & Ury, 86.
- ¹¹⁰ HM Government, *"CONTEST: The United Kingdom's strategy for countering terrorism,"* (The Stationary Office: July, 2011), 27.
- ¹¹¹ PSNI, "Security Related Incidents," http://www.psni.police.uk/security_related_incidents_cy.pdf, (accessed 06 April 2012).
- ¹¹² PSNI, "Security Related Incidents," http://www.psni.police.uk/finds_cy.pdf, (accessed 06 April 2012).
- ¹¹³ PSNI, "Security Related Incidents," http://www.psni.police.uk/finds_cy.pdf, (accessed 06 April 2012).
- ¹¹⁴ Northern Ireland Office, "Northern Ireland Terrorism Legislation: Annual Statistics 2009/2010," Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, http://www.nio.gov.uk/northern_ireland_terrorism_legislation_annual_statistics_2009-2010.pdf, accessed 06 April 2012.
- ¹¹⁵ John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, *"Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland."* (Terrorism and Political Violence, no 23:4 ,2011), 646.
- ¹¹⁶ John Horgan, and John F. Morrison, 651.
- ¹¹⁷ Horgan, 647.
- ¹¹⁸ Horgan, 649.
- ¹¹⁹ Belfast Telegraph, *"Dissidents pose less of a threat as splits widen,"* [belfasttelegraph.co.uk](http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk), January 3, 2012, <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/opinion/news-analysis/dissidents-pose-less-of-a-threat-as-splits-widen-16098050.html>, (accessed 06 April 2012).
- ¹²⁰ CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton – An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html, accessed 06 April 2012.
- ¹²¹ CAIN Web Service, Malcolm Sutton – An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland – 14 July 1969 – 31 December 2001, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html, accessed 06 April 2012.
- ¹²² M. L. R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland – The Military Strategy for the Irish Republican Movement* (New York, United States: Routledge, 1995), 1.
- ¹²³ Edwards, 40.

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- ¹²⁴ Wilsey, 111.
- ¹²⁵ Wilsey, 112.
- ¹²⁶ Jonathon Evans, "The Threat to National Security," Address at the Worshipful Company of Security Professionals by the Director General of the Security Service, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-threat-to-national-security.html>. 16 September 2010.
- ¹²⁷ MacGinty & Darby, 22.
- ¹²⁸ MacGinty & Darby, 23.
- ¹²⁹ Toby Harnden, "Libyan arms helped the IRA to wage war," *The Telegraph*, April 04, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/8425593/Libyan-arms-helped-the-IRA-to-wage-war.html> (accessed 06 April 2012).
- ¹³⁰ The IRA targeted Downing Street, London Stock Exchange and Heathrow in between the 1994 and 1996 ceasefires.
- ¹³¹ Edwards, 71.
- ¹³² Edwards, 72.
- ¹³³ Nolan, 16.
- ¹³⁴ Arthur Aughey, *The Politics of Northern Ireland – Beyond the Belfast Agreement* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2005), 57.
- ¹³⁵ Edwards, 15.
- ¹³⁶ Edwards, 19.
- ¹³⁷ Taylor, Loyalists.
- ¹³⁸ Sir John Stevens, "Stevens Enquiry 3 – Overview & Recommendations," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/northern_ireland/03/stevens_inquiry/pdf/stevens_inquiry.pdf, released on April 17, 2003.
- ¹³⁹ MacGinty & Darby, 24.
- ¹⁴⁰ Wilsey, 130.
- ¹⁴¹ Aughey, 55.
- ¹⁴² Fisher & Ury, 5.
- ¹⁴³ Operation BANNER, An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland, <http://w1.publicaddress.net/assets/upload/224146/-1650345631/opbanner.pdf>, (Army Code 71842, July 2006).
- ¹⁴⁴ Edwards, 34.
- ¹⁴⁵ Wilsey, 50.
- ¹⁴⁶ Wilsey, 87.
- ¹⁴⁷ Wilsey, 104.
- ¹⁴⁸ Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA* (BBC2, United Kingdom: 2002).
- ¹⁴⁹ Operation BANNER, 5 – 14.
- ¹⁵⁰ Edwards, 86.
- ¹⁵¹ Taylor, The Brits.
- ¹⁵² Taylor, The Brits.