The Need for Transition

Abstract

In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the United States lead coalition floundered in exploiting the initiative of its successful initial operation. The reason for the slow development from Phase III to Phase IV was due to an institutional lack of knowledge on how to transition from high intensity operations to stability and nation building operations. Before, during and even after the invasion, there has never been a doctrinal approach described on how to conduct a proper military transition from Phase III to Phase IV. Using the invasion and occupation of Iraq as a case study, this study brings out the lack of understanding of the situation in which transition played a vital role in offensive operations, primarily the overthrow of a government and what that means. The U.S. planning effort to take strategic and operational objectives to create tactical tasks to meet those objectives was poorly developed and created a situation that would take years to overcome.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 2013
Accession Number
ADA601563

Entities

People

  • William H. Bowers

Organizations

  • Marine Corps University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civilian Personnel
  • Combat Operations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Department Of State
  • Interagency Coordination
  • International Organizations
  • Iraqi-War
  • Lessons Learned
  • Marine Corps
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • Personnel Management
  • Students
  • United States
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.