The Cost of an Expeditionary Army: Reduced Corps and Division Reconnaissance and Security
Abstract
The Army's transformation from the division-centric Army of Excellence to the modular brigade-centric Objective Force model has resulted in inadequate recon naissance and security forces and doctrine for their employment at the corps and division levels. There are three reasons for this. First, flawed assumptions regarding the substitution of ground reconnaissance troops for unmanned surveillance systems; second , the necessity of fighting for information; third , the requirement for a dedicated security force. Throughout its history, the United States Army has enabled divisions and corps to conduct security and reconnaissance operations through designated cavalry organizations. With the introduction of mechanized and motorized platforms and demotion of the horse as a viable means of maneuver, the cavalry had an identity crisis during the interwar period between the two world wars resulting in an initially ill-equipped force entering the war. Inadequate firepower, protection, and mobility during World War II led to the creation of the division cavalry squadron and armored cavalry regiment of the Army of Excellence force structure unveiled during the Cold War. The Army's most recent transformation to the modular brigade-centric Objective Force model, initiated in 2001, substantially changed the reconnaissance and security capabilities at the corps and division level. The transformation replaced the robust division cavalry squadrons and the armored cavalry regiments with the battlefield surveillance brigade. Ultimately, this study finds the underlying assumptions that the Army utilized in developing the new doctrine and resulting force structure to be flawed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 21, 2013
- Accession Number
- ADA601692
Entities
People
- Allan B. Carroll
Organizations
- Marine Corps University