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
THE FUTURE OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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**MAJOR KYLE CERFOGLIO
NEVADA AIR NATIONAL GUARD**


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Executive Summary

Title: The Future of the Air National Guard

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Thesis: When examining the monetary and political costs, and the security risks both home and abroad, it is in the best interest of the United States that the U.S. Air Force continue to rely on the Guard and replace aging missions with new ones.

Discussion: The Air National Guard has a dual mission both federally and domestically. This paper examines the Nevada Air National Guard as a case study to some of the options that are available for the Air Force to replace older aircraft with new missions. After a failed attempt to simply cut older missions residing in the National Guard, the Air Force must examine other options. In February of 2012 the Active Duty Air Force proposed an un-proportionally large cut to the Air National Guard. The personnel cuts were 3,900 Active Duty, 5,100 Air National Guard and 900 Air Force Reserve billets. The reason for the excessive cuts to the Guard was largely because of the aging aircraft. An eight month political debate followed, and resulted in name-calling, mistrust, and finally in congressional oversight. The logical answer was to retire the older aircraft mainly residing in the Air Guard. The political debate was because of the importance of Air Guardsmen to the Governor and the state mission. The Air Forces need to modernize its fleet during a time of budget cuts further complicates the issues. The solution will require creative thinking but answers are available that could help the Air Force and each state. It is possible to replace out of date missions within the Guard with newer needed missions, and still allow the Air Force to modernize at the same time.

Conclusion: The Air Force and Air National Guard must work together to find creative solutions to replace the older missions in the Air Guard with newer missions. The traditional answer is to retire the older aircraft and replace with a newer version. In places where the traditional answer is unreasonable, missions without aircraft like intelligence, cyber or as a force multiplier for the Department of Homeland Defense could be the answer. By doing this the United States Air Force will stay a step ahead of the rest of the world and continue to protect its citizens, and the interests of the United States of America.

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Preface

The origins of this research paper began with an interest in examining the reasons why the Air Force proposed to cut the Air National Guard force structure without the Air Guards consent. My initial research led me off subject and to why the Air Guard has become, and will stay an operational part of the Air Force structure. With the guidance of my mentor, Dr. Bradford Wineman, I was able to get back on task by looking at my unit, the 152 Airlift Wing and the alternatives for the Air Force to cutting the Air Guard. I have a lifelong interest and love for the Air National Guard. As a child of a Nevada Air Guardsman, and for the last 21 years as a member of the unit it has been a major part of my life.

I want to thank my mentor, Dr. Wineman, for his guidance, and input into the paper and helping me to complete this project.

Additionally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to my family, co-workers and loved ones for their patience, understanding, and encouragement. I want to especially thank my father for his continual input, and my wife and children for the time they gave up to allow me to be here in this class and write this paper.

With shrinking budgets and aging equipment the United States Air Force is at a major decision point concerning the future of its service. As the draw down in Afghanistan begins, one of the major choices for the U.S. Air Force is if the Air National Guard can and will continue to be used and funded as an operational force while concurrently performing its individual state mission, responding to the Governor's needs. The active duty Air Force will decide how it incorporates the Air National Guard in the looming budget cuts while concurrently modernizing its equipment. With the preponderance of the older aircraft in the Air National Guard, the Air Force must decide if it will retire the aging ANG aircraft and replace them with another mission, or simply retire the unit along with its aircraft. The decision warrants careful examination; the outcome, regardless of the decision, does not come without risk. When examining the monetary and political costs, and the security risks both home and abroad, it is in the best interest of the United States that the U.S. Air Force continues to rely on the Guard and replace aging equipment with new missions.

The past 20 years of operations has exposed the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. Air Force. One area that has proven to be a strength is the Air National Guard. The Air National Guard has successfully deployed and completed numerous missions in support of Gulf War I, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and various other federal missions over the last 20 years. During this time, the Air National Guard has also been activated repeatedly in support of its state mission.

The Air National Guard is often referred to by Air Force leaders as being the same as the Air Reserve, and both considered the 'Reserve Force.' The Air National Guard is distinctly different from the Air Reserve because of its dual mission set. The Air Guard may have the

same federal mission but it also has a concurrent state mission. For this reason, it is a mistake to use the term Reserves and Guard interchangeably.

When an Air National Guard unit or member is federally activated, they are placed on Title 10 orders and are expected to ‘Fly, Fight and Win’ just as if they belonged to the active duty. The Air National Guard has many different federal missions which include fighter aircraft, strategic and theater airlift, special operations capabilities, refueling aircraft, and a wide range of support functions.¹ These federal missions are decided by the active duty Air Force in conjunction with the National Guard Bureau and State Governors as to what best fits the individual state.

The federal mission is the sole focus for the active duty and Reserves. This is not the case for the Guardsman, and where they differ from the active and Reserve components. When a member of the National Guard takes his/her oath they take it to not only “obey the orders of the President of the United States,” but also to obey the orders of the Governor of the State to which they belong. The state or Title 32 mission set is not available to a traditional Reservist or a member of the active duty. This Title 32 status, allows a Guardsman to respond to domestic emergencies, counterdrug efforts, and reconstruction missions with speed and efficiency.²

The Posse Comitatus Act, Department of Defense regulations and federal statute as required by title 10 USC section 375, states that members of the United States armed forces are unable to exercise law enforcement agency powers within a state unless declared by the President. These Acts and laws do not apply to the National Guard in Title 32.³ The key to Title 32 is the Governor has the ability to place a Guardsman in a full-time duty status at a moment’s notice under his/her control in times of need.⁴ This is important in times of a state emergency

and allows Guardsmen to provide protection of life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety.⁵

NEVADA AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The Nevada Air Guard (NVANG) is a useful case study and is similar to many other Air Guard units in the U.S. as to the possibilities for modernization for the Air Guard and the Air Force. Currently the NVANG has approximately 1,200 personnel, and is assigned eight C-130 Hercules Aircraft built in 1979.⁶ Its primary stated federal, or Title 10, mission for the NVANG and its C-130H aircraft is to “operate in all terrain including rough, dirt strips, and provide transport for airdropping troops and equipment into hostile areas.”⁷ This stated mission is the same for all C-130H units whether it is an active duty unit, Reserve unit or Guard unit like the one in Nevada.

The past 12 years the NVANG has been used federally while continuing to perform its concurrent state missions. When the NVANG has been activated, its members are placed on Title 10 orders. Its Airmen and planes have been deployed multiple times over the past 12 years in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). While performing its federal mission, the unit has also been tasked to respond to its state mission.

The state mission when called upon by the Governor, is to provide protection of life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety.⁸ Over the past two years alone, the NVANG has been called on multiple times to perform this mission. It has assisted local first responders during a mass casualty disaster at the Reno Air Races in 2011, two separate wild fires in the Reno city limits, and yearly, as a New Years Eve force-multiplier for the police in Las Vegas. This partnership or sharing of equipment and Airmen between state Governors, the Guard Bureau and the active duty Air Force as shown in Nevada, is the norm throughout the

United States. For these reasons, the NVANG refuses to place the state mission or federal mission as most important and plainly states regardless of aircraft, that its mission is to, “Provide Ready Airmen.”⁹

THE NEED FOR MODERNIZATION

The United States Air Force and all its components currently have complete air superiority in Afghanistan. So much so that it operates in a war zone, in an environment that allows slow moving cargo aircraft to take-off and land without danger of being shut down. With technology improvements happening exponentially, what is considered good enough today is not going to be good enough in the future. The Air Forces history has shown it understands this way of thinking. During the First Gulf War in 1991, the Nevada Air Guard’s RF-4 Phantoms were used as an important intelligence gathering airframe, only to be retired soon after, because of faster and improved ways to assess battle damage and future targets.¹⁰ This type of forward looking thinking between the Air Force and Air Guard must continue as it moves away from Iraq and Afghanistan.

After the retirement of its RF-4 the NVANG inherited C-130 Hercules. This is a historical example of an Air Guard unit changing its federal mission from a focus of a reconnaissance jet to one of a cargo plane. This conversion caused the pilots and most of the aircraft maintenance personnel to retrain and kept the unit from being fully capable for its federal mission for 24 months.¹¹ The change did little to affect the state mission to provide protection of life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety.¹² The reason for this is while the federal mission is tied to the equipment, the state mission is mostly tied to personnel.

Nevada’s C-130s are now some of the older aircraft in the Air Force inventory and considered for retirement or replacement. When the Air Force forecasts which mission set it

assigns to a Guard unit it takes into account several factors. The main factor is, in coordination with State Governors and the Adjutant General, the Air Force will look at infrastructure and airspace. This is to ensure the Air Force requirements are meeting the state's requirements. Once the Air Force decides these factors it looks at its internal percentage of aircraft and/or equipment throughout the total force. Currently the percentage of aircraft in the Guard in regards to the total force is as follows: fighter aircraft 31 percent; transport aircraft 28 percent; helicopters 8 percent; special operations 3 percent; intelligence surveillance, technology and reconnaissance 17 percent; bomber and trainer aircraft 0 percent.¹³ For Nevada or any Air Guard unit this shows the full range of options for equipment conversion.

The infrastructure and airspace options for Nevada are limitless because approximately 84 percent of its acreage is federally administered allowing for a large amount of land and airspace for military operations.¹⁴ In looking at current percentage of aircraft the top choices for Air Force leaders in assigning a new mission in replacement of its current C-130H's are as follows: 1. Replace the older C-130's with the newer 'J' model C-130 aircraft; 2. Retire the C-130 mission and replace it with a fighter, like the F-35 currently being flown at Nellis AFB; 3. Retire the C-130 mission and focus solely on non-flying missions like cyber, intelligence, remotely piloted aircraft and/or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The examination of a unit like Nevada shows a few of the possibilities for the Air Force to continue to provide meaningful federal and state missions within the Air National Guard as its older aircraft are retired. The key for all involved is pairing the right fit with the most cost effective model for the Air Force and for the state. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley understands the issues and sees a smart approach to modernization, saying, "We need to stay focused on the right priorities and be careful about adding more programs that we can afford.

Nonetheless, we must sustain forward momentum in modernization. The future success of the Air Force and the joint team depend on it.”¹⁵ Secretary Donley’s current approach may be sound, however, additional cuts and Congressional oversight could force the Air Force to go in an alternative direction.

The recent Air Force approach to modernization of the C-130 fleet which began in 1999 is a good example of a plan gone astray; “at the current rate only 42 percent will have been replaced by the new J-model by 2019, 20 years later.”¹⁶ The cost of this failed plan is that the Air Force is still flying not just the C-130Hs but also some C-130Es that came into service in 1962, 50 years ago.¹⁷ The Air Force has a plan to update its inventory; unfortunately aircraft replacement is not the only area the Air Force finds itself in need of modernization.

Airframes account for approximately 43 percent of the Air Force planned budget over the next five years. Technology driven investments in research, intelligence, defense, cyber and space are also large expenses and consume the rest of the budget.¹⁸ Secretary Michael Donley recently wrote in a four part opinion piece outlining his thoughts and he does not see many areas the Air Force can make cuts without taking some serious risk, saying, “The plans and resources available for modernization are not optimal, but we are making tough choices to keep them workable for the future. Future reductions in defense would make these choices harder.”¹⁹ Reliance on the Air National Guard allows a cheap alternative to help minimize the risk.

THE CHOICES

Passing down of aircraft from the active component to the Guard worked well in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, but times have changed. This model can still work in some cases, but today’s fiscal environment and needs of the Air Force have changed. The rising cost of new airframes or updating others continues to grow exponentially. Coupled with smaller budgets, the

rising cost of active duty personnel, and the Air Forces investment in technology, it is easy to surmise that much of the older aircraft which mostly reside in the Guard must be retired to the bone yard or sold/given to another country.

The Air Force is entering into an era of a smaller force and fewer planes. The logical answer to retire older aircraft, is what the Air Force is doing, and is not up to much debate. The debate comes in what to do with the people in those retired units in the Air National Guard. The Air Force must decide if it is better to cut the less expensive Air Guard personnel that would be politically opposed, or if they should reassign the personnel to a new mission. The initial proposed Air Force net reductions in February of 2012 was to cut Air Guard personnel with the older out of date aircraft.

The personnel cuts were 3,900 active duty, 5,100 Air National Guard and 900 Air Force Reserve billets, the excessive cuts to the Guard were largely because of the aging aircraft; mainly the C-130E's and H's.²⁰ An eight month political debate followed, and resulted in name-calling, mistrust, and congressional oversight. State Governors united and formed a 'Council of Governors' complaining about a lack of discussion and cooperation regarding the Air National Guard and therefore the states and caused the cuts to be reconsidered.²¹ Countering these arguments, Secretary Donley said, "Congress must cut the Guard now or face worse choices later."²² In the end Congress decided on a "compromise that cut far fewer aircraft and Guard personnel (1,000), than the Air Force had proposed in its original February budget, but more than the "zero" that Guard advocates countered with."²³ In summary, both the Air Force and Air National Guard saw the final decision as a loss because Congress made the final decision regarding its force. In reality, it could be a positive because it forced leaders on both sides to talk and further analyze other options.

The Air Force may have originally preferred to have a smaller Air National Guard; however, judging from the political backlash, they seemed to have changed their direction. Air Force leaders are now looking at replacing the older aircraft in the Guard with new missions. The 188th Fighter Wing of the Arkansas Air National Guard was part of the original cuts of 5,000. Now with the Congressional oversight, they will be converting to a remotely piloted aircraft mission. Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Mark Welsh visited the unit, and seems to be leading this change and understands the importance of the manpower to the Governor saying, "...the strength of the unit is not the hardware on the ramp, it's the people who make it work."²⁴

C-130 MISSION

The NVANG was fortunate to not be one of the Guard units that were part of the original budget cuts. Its C-130H aircraft, however, is similar to other aging aircraft that are being considered for replacement and will most likely be replaced in the next 10-20 years. The most cost effective option for Nevada, the Air Force, and for the state would be to replace the H-Models with newer J-Model C-130's with little to no conversion time. This option would allow the NVANG to continue its operations, without changing federal or state mission, infrastructure, or personnel. The federal mission of airlift and airdrop that has been needed multiple times in support of OEF and OIF and will be needed in the future would also go unchanged.

For the state of Nevada and the entire western United States, the C-130J, or any transport plane, is a valuable asset for the state mission and the reason why it is believed Governors covet a transport flying mission. Montana Governor Brian Schweitzer confirms this belief saying, "In a place like Montana, we have a long distance from place to place with not a lot of infrastructure in between."²⁵ Nevada is similar in size to Montana and why the C-130J is a good fit for its

state. Additionally, the two major population areas, Reno, and Las Vegas are 450 miles apart and the ability to move people and equipment rapidly between the two in the event of a disaster area is an important factor.

In addition, the C-130 can be loaded with a modular airborne fire fighting system (MAFFS). MAFFS is a self-contained unit that can be loaded onto the C-130 and used for aerial firefighting and part of the state mission set. This allows the aircraft to be used as an air tanker against wildfires.²⁶ The NVANG was activated by the Governor of Nevada in 2011 and 2012 for wildfires that destroyed homes and caused evacuations of entire communities that may have been avoided if the C-130 had MAFFS. Without the MAFFS platform, Guardsmen were used to aid local law enforcement, but were unable to assist in fighting the wildfires from the air.

This choice seems like an easy one, however the cost of acquiring new aircraft is high. The unit cost of one C-130J is estimated at \$66.5 million per aircraft. Times that by eight (the normal number of aircraft for an Air Guard unit) and the cost becomes \$532 million just for the planes.²⁷ This does not take into account any other cost associated with the change in airframes. In these fiscally austere times the logical choice to replace the older C-130s is not always going to be possible. For this reason, other choices for Nevada, besides a C-130J conversion need to be explored.

FIGHTER MISSION

The second option for the Air Force is to replace the C-130's with an active duty fighter squadron like the F-35 now being flown at Nellis Air Force Base. This option would be costly up front as most personnel would need to be re-trained. A switch to fighters would also cause a costly move away from May Air National Guard Base to a larger active duty air base more rurally located. May Air National Guard Base shares a runway with the Reno-Tahoe

International Airport and is located in the heart of Reno. For this reason a fighter mission with loud jets flying within the city limits would be politically apposed at the current location and become an associate active duty base.

Closing a small stand alone base at the Reno airport would be costly up front, however, combining it with a larger active duty base does have positives long term. Federally, as long as the Guard as a whole has similar equipment diversity to the current 30% of fighters in its missions, it makes sense for the active duty. For the state mission, fighters can be used as a valuable asset to homeland defense, although Governors would prefer to have a transport plane over a fighter. A second reason for the Governor to accept a fighter wing absent of a real state flying mission is to have access to the manpower. A mission with some sort of aircraft is preferred, but more importantly to the Governor, is having the access to the manpower in times of need as a force multiplier.

For this move to happen the NVANG would need to be moved to an active/guard associate base at Naval Air Station in Fallon, Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas, or Creech Air Force Base also in Las Vegas. Active associate bases are ones that the Air Guard shares with active duty forces. Increasing Guard presence on these bases is a way to save money, while at the same time increasing capability. By sharing bases, much of the infrastructure, administration and the cost of running both bases are cut in half and offset the cost of training and moving. The idea, called an active associate base, was initially introduced in 1997 and is currently used throughout the force at Andrews AFB, Scott AFB and Seymour-Johnson AFB just to name a few. The benefits were identified in 1997 by now retired Major General Charles D. Link, who laid the groundwork for this concept stated, "When you put the ARC crew members in the active wing, they come in with the experience ratio that the active wing is already hurting for, by

putting the less experienced active pilots in the ARC unit, you are contributing to a healthy experience ratio. It solves problems going both ways."²⁸ For these reasons, additional active associate bases need to be looked at throughout the Air Force, not just in Nevada.

Another area the Air Force and Air Guard can capitalize on the use of these associate bases is how it employs its civilians. Currently the Air Force employs 150,595 civilians (this number does not include Guardsmen who are paid under the same pay federal pay structure), providing the Air Force an overall savings by using a federal pay structure and continuity at each base that is not available through the active duty model.²⁹ The positions held by these civilians may be considered important, but they normally are not deployable and consequently have reduced usefulness when it comes time to serve overseas.

The Air Force can maximize manpower by changing the way it utilizes these civilian jobs. Many civilian employees assist active duty forces in traditional military Air Force specialties working side by side, doing the same job as active duty personnel. By replacing the civilian positions with full-time, dual status federal Guard employees, the Air Force would have additional full-time trained, deployable Airmen. This would allow the Air Force to keep manpower in the Guard, and gives the Guard the full-time continuity that is so vital in its training its traditional Airmen. In addition, the Guard benefits from being on an active duty base with modern facilities and gains access to useful training opportunities not available on standalone Guard bases. On the surface this is a zero-sum gain with the budget; the federal pay system used by a full-time federal Guardsmen is the same as an Air Force federal civilian employee. The return is to have a trained full-time service member who is deployable.

The idea may take a few years to implement as current civilian employees leave federal service, are moved into non-Air Force specialty jobs or reach retirement age. An additional

outcome of guardsmen replacing civilians would be that when many active duty members leave the service, they take jobs as civilians on the same base. These employees would be offered to transition into the Guard as dual status technicians, and allow the Air Force to continue to get a return on its investment in the initial training, and aid Air National Guard recruiting efforts. This plan will save money and increase the number of qualified members who are deployable. By expanding active associate bases, making Guard members the civilian work force, and having a mixture of active and Guard personnel, the Air Force could maximize facilities, equipment, and training.

SUPPORT MISSION

The third choice for the NVANG is to replace or add a non-flying mission. This could be instituted as an addition to choice one or two, or could be instituted without aircraft. Nevada already has a 150 personnel assigned to an intelligence squadron and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) mission that is separate from its main C-130H mission.³⁰ Adding another manpower driven mission like cyber or a Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) force- multiplier mission, can either save or add manpower. In a situation where the final choice is to retire all the Guard planes, adding non-flying missions make sense for the federal mission, for the state mission and would be politically acceptable. Sixty percent of those cuts were aimed at the Guard and were strongly opposed by state politicians who were wary of losing portions of their state militia. For this reason, combined with the inherent cost saving of a Guardsman, the Air Force should explore additional Guardsmen in non-flying missions of cyber, intelligence, and DHS.

A move to change or add to the federal mission by the Air Force would be costly up front. Some infrastructure could be maintained, but costly modifications would be needed. Additionally, the cost of re-training forces to become cyber warriors, intelligence professionals

or DHS professionals would be high. Long term, however, adding one or more of these missions to the Air Guard would allow the Air Force to increase capability at less cost. If one of these missions came at the cost of flying, then the high operating cost of flying would be gone and future savings would more than make up for the initial costs.

Nevada already has 12 percent of its forces assigned to its intelligence squadron and RPA mission.³¹ Adding a cyber warfare squadron would allow many of the support personnel to remain even if its aircraft was retired. Initial re-training/training of personnel would take time; however, this delay is normal with any new mission. This option would still cause a cut to current unit manpower although it would not be as detrimental to state readiness. By having an intelligence squadron and cyber warfare squadron many of the base support personnel would remain in place. An entire unit of cyber warriors in the NVANG, planes or not, would meet state and federal needs. The Air Force would reap the benefit in the rapidly growing area of cyber warfare and the Governor would still have access to its personnel for its state mission.

Cyber is a relatively new phenomenon in the military realm and a controversial one at that. Some argue cyber should be handled solely in the pure civilian homeland security sector, however, the military computer attacks by other countries require the US to use all available resources to combat the cyber threat. The current combination of military and civilian agencies is the best approach and needs to be expanded. The cyber threat is real and the U.S. is being attacked constantly. Secretary Donely stated, "The new threats and investment in needs like cyber..., are not theoretical possibilities for the future. They are here."³² Well trained cyber warriors are needed to stop these attacks and the Air Guard is a solid match for the cyber mission.

With budgets and manpower being cut, cyber is one area where the Air Force sees as a priority, not because of cost savings, but because of importance. The Air Force is increasing its cyber force of more than 6,000 by adding three squadrons and 900 military members.³³ Two of the new squadrons will be placed in the Air National Guard and the current unit in Maryland will be expanded showing the Air Force commitment to the Air National Guard in cyber.³⁴ Additionally, the Air Force has allotted the Air National Guard a Major General slot to serve as the assistant to the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, National Security Agency/chief of the central security service which is currently being filled by Major General Tom Thomas.³⁵ By giving the Air Guard this two star position it shows the active duty's commitment to the Air Guard in the cyber realm.

The Posse Comitatus Act which hinders the active military in the cyber realm does not apply to Guardsmen in Title 32 status. The ability of a Guardsman to quickly change statuses between Title 10 and Title 32 is a good way to help combat a faceless, unknown, irregular combatant who maybe or may not be within the United States.³⁶ The federal and state mission in cyber many times would be exercised concurrently. Additionally, the Governor would also have access to the manpower during times of need.

Another area without aircraft where the NVANG or any Guard unit can move or add manpower is in assistance to the Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) as a force multiplier. The core missions of DHS are to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage US borders, enforce and administer US immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace and ensure resilience to disasters.³⁷ These missions are similar to the Guards state mission and the Guard can provide ready and trained personnel which DHS covets. This has precedence, the

Guard after 9/11 was used by DHS in airports to assist with the Transportation Security Administration and on the border to assist with Border Patrol.

A DHS unit would consist of mostly security forces, intelligence and civil engineers. DHS would be given operational control over the Guardsmen to be used as a force multiplier. Two key areas where DHS is in dire need of personnel are in Fusion Centers and Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism inspection teams.³⁸ The Guard can immediately provide trained forces to these missions. In times of fiscal austerity sharing of manpower amongst government agencies is something that needs to be explored.

DHS run Fusion Centers were designed and implemented in the US between 2003 and 2007 to promote information sharing at the federal level between agencies such as the CIA, FBI, US Department of Justice, US military and state and local government and the private sector.³⁹ These centers have recently come under scrutiny because of a 107 page Congressional report. DHS currently has 84 agents in more than 60 centers.⁴⁰ DHS can address many of the issues in this report by taking its agents out of the state centers and replace them with Guardsmen. DHS would gain by centralizing all its procedures and agents under one national center. This would also allow them to operate under common guidance, provide training and enhance share information.

By turning the sharing of information into a state-to-national-to-state model it will help answer many of the state focused issues detailed in the Congressional report, but still allow for the federal information flow to continue. This law enforcement/terrorist information model also assists the Guard in its state mission. In Nevada, one of the two fusion centers is located at the Nevada Guard State Headquarters in Carson City. This center is already used as the operation center anytime the unit is activated by the Governor. By giving these centers to the states and

the National Guard, it will allow DHS and the nation to keep the gains in law enforcement these centers have made and it will enhance the state's ability to respond in times of need.

Another area where DHS could be assisted by National Guard forces is in the area of Chemical Security Inspectors. Former assistant secretary to Homeland Security responsible for overseeing the Chemical Facilities, Todd Keil said, "After 9/11, America realized that more than 4,000 chemical plants were sitting ducks for a terrorist attack."⁴¹ Recent reports from DHS show that today most of those facilities are still vulnerable. Because of lack of trained manpower, DHS has only inspected approximately 10 percent of those facilities.⁴² The Guard in a partnership with DHS can be used as a force multiplier and a quick and safe answer to what could be a serious problem. Additionally, the continued use of the Air Guard teams by DHS allows the Air Force to keep the valuable support missions of intelligence, security forces and civil engineers personnel operational with or without a flying mission.

The Air Force is not all about planes; in fact two of the most deployed Air Force specialties are security forces and civil engineers showing the need for additional Airmen. The skill sets of these Airmen are a good fit for both the federal and state mission, making these support areas ideal for the Air National Guard. When being activated by the Governor for the state mission many times because of the need for additional law enforcement, and/or heavy equipment operators, security forces and civil engineers are the first skill sets requested.

Although the Air Force has many mission sets that do not involve aircraft, the best of the option when considering the factors is to update current airframes whether it is a transport or fighter mission. In examining the options for Nevada replacing H-Model C130's with newer J-Model C-130's is the logical decision fiscally, and for both the federal and state mission. In some states, where active and Guard missions are similar, an effective way to save money,

modernize, and stay operational, is becoming an active associate base. At these bases active duty and Guardsmen can share aircraft and jobs. Finally, where aircraft is retired and not replaced, Air Guard manpower should be integrated into other missions. Although difficult, this type of thinking has precedence as many current Intelligence Squadrons in the Air National Guard are former flying units. Members of those units had to make the decision to retrain, move to another unit or retire. Cyber warfare and DHS coordination shows that Air Guard members provide force multipliers in homeland defense and a good way to take advantage of dual status of a Guardsman.

The Air National Guard was not intended to be an operational force for the active duty Air Force. Changes in the 1970's led the Air Guard to where we are today and the reason a diverse force within Air National Guard is needed. This diversity in mission is important to ensure the Air Force has an additional ready force available for its federal mission and Governors have additional ready forces available for its state mission.

CHANGING THE GUARD: THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

The Air Force was established by the National Security Act of 1947. With the creation of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, the tactical air wings in the Army National Guard became the Air National Guard. That brought 49,500 officers and men in 514 units which operated out of 79 air bases into the new Air Force structure including the NVANG. This, in turn, changed the National Guard Bureau into a Joint Bureau in which the Bureau Chief reported to both the secretary and chief of staff of the Army and the Air Force.⁴³

The National Guard was not intended to be used as an operational part of the Air Force. Budget constraints, and the advent of the "Total Force Policy," changed the way the Air National Guard was used and made it essential to the active duty Air Force. The policy came about as an

answer to President Lyndon B. Johnson who chose not to activate the National Guard for political and social reasons, and rely solely on the active duty on conscripts instead. Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, set the stage in 1971 for “the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard.”⁴⁴ This policy is part of the reason why the Air National Guard is so important to the current Air Force mission and why modernization the Air Force must include modernizing the Guard.

The policy remains in effect today and some of the reason why the Air Force is unable to function without relying on the Air National Guard. Currently, Air Force leaders may prefer a larger active duty force and smaller Air National Guard as proposed in early 2012. This, however, was proven to be fiscally and politically unrealistic and the reason Air Force leaders have begun to explore alternative options. The Air Force is now exploring those alternative options, including some of the ones mentioned, allowing it to modernize equipment, and update the force.

THE RISK OF AN OPERATIONAL AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The Guard was designed to have hometown citizens who work in the community, be able to supplement the Army in times of war and more importantly support the Governor in protection of the state.⁴⁵ The original intention is no longer applicable, for good or bad the total force policy brought about significant changes to the use of Military and to include the Guard. One of the risks of continued high operational tempo within the Guard is it will have a negative effect to the nation. Noted military historian Richard Kohn, agrees saying, “the current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an ‘operational reserve’ is not sustainable over time...and that the reserves component’s ability to serve our nation will diminish.”⁴⁶ Kohn wrote this five years ago, and thus far the Guard continues to perform operationally. Even

though his assumption thus far may be seen as wrong, long term he may be at least partially correct. This is the reason why when older Guard aircraft are retired and a replacement is not possible, future Air National Guard missions should be ones that can be used for its state mission and on security of the homeland.

With the current force structure, the Air National Guard will be asked to continue to perform both its federal and state mission and some risk must be accepted. This risk can be mitigated when replacing older aircraft by replacing it with missions that can have dual usage such as the newer C-130J or non-flying missions like intelligence, cyber or DHS. Another area that could be of risk is the natural tension between the active duty and the Governor. Currently, the relationship is symbiotic because Air Force deployment cycles and protocol allow the Governor at least six months notice when his/her forces will be deployed.

The Nevada Air National Guard currently has a policy that ensures the Governor is aware of exactly how many forces are at his disposal at any certain time. Before anyone is placed on Title 10 orders a staff summary sheet is routed through the chain of command to the Adjutant General who reports directly to the Governor. This is a good way to ease the tension between the Governor and the Air Force, and seen as a safety net to avoid another hurricane Katrina type scenario.

In August of 2005, the hurricane hit the Gulf Coast with a fury that sent much of New Orleans underwater and some citizens of the city, into civil unrest. In a case like this, the Governor must decide to activate the Guard to assist in quelling the unrest and insure the safety of the people. One of the problems was that 40 percent of the Louisiana National Guard was deployed to Iraq.⁴⁷ In this case it was Army Guard forces that were deployed, however the

lesson is the same. Guard manpower was unavailable to the Governor and the Governor either did not know, or failed to make a contingency plan.

Minimizing the impact to homeland security needs to be taken into consideration anytime the Guard is activated or deployed. In cases where the Air Guard does have a federal mission, and a considerable amount of the force is needed to deploy as the case with Katrina, Governors, State's Adjutant Generals, and the National Guard Bureau, need to establish an inter-state compact, to allow an immediate sharing of forces. It should not take two days for a request for help through the Guard Bureau to reach the other states, as happened during Katrina.

COST OF THE AIRMAN

Air Force leaders worry that the active service manpower is at a dangerous level; in fact it is down to 329,000 which is approaching the size it was when it was established.⁴⁸ One realistic solution where savings could be achieved is by moving a small amount of manpower from the active Air Force to the Air Guard. Adding, small non-flying missions like cyber to states like Nevada rather than adding more expensive active duty Airmen is a way. Natural attrition rates in the active duty and an increase in recruiting in the Air Guard would allow this to happen. A 2012 study shows that because of the all volunteer force and the nations' fixation with "taking care of people" the cost per person in the active duty has increased by 46 percent since 2002; at this rate it is estimated that personnel costs will consume the entire defense budget by 2039.⁴⁹

The actual cost of a Reservist (in this context same as a Guardsman) as opposed to an active duty Airman has been argued many different ways. Like most statistics the numbers can be worked to favor both sides of the argument depending on where one stands. The best and most recent and in-depth report available, was completed and given to the Secretary of Defense in January of 2013. It ascertains that a reserve component service member is approximately 1/3

the cost of an active counterpart. The chart in *Appendix A*, breaks down the cost of each. During these fiscally austere times the Air Force can save money and assist in its modernization efforts by relying on the Air Guard instead of cutting it.

In addition to the cost savings of personnel, the Air National Guard brings 39 percent of the Air Force's total capability while only taking six percent of the budget.⁵⁰ It is easy to see that the National Guard is a good investment and allows the Air Force a cost effective way to have added capability and the reason why it should replace older missions with new ones. By examining creative ways either through newer aircraft, active associate bases or increasing needed manpower in support functions the Air Force should be able to safely maneuver through these tough fiscal times.

CONCLUSION

A healthy active component and a healthy Air National Guard is mutually dependent on each other. It is important that Air Force and Air Guard leaders work together so the entire spectrum of options is examined. When Air Force Secretary Michael Donely spoke about the reasoning behind the cuts he said, "Air Force leadership determined the best path forward is to become smaller in order to protect a high quality and ready force that will improve in capability over time. We simply do not have months to prepare or to rebuild the readiness of an unprepared force."⁵¹ With a smaller Air Force, special care must be taken when making cuts to aircraft and personnel. Units like the Nevada Air National Guard must continue to train and stay operationally ready for both its state and federal mission.

Cuts will happen but must be done effectively, which will allow for modernizing aircraft and technology. The Air Force commitment to modernization can best be done by including the cost effective Air National Guard. The United States Air Force and the Air Guard are reliant on

each other and must work together by looking at creative solutions in replacing older aircraft in the Air Guard by maximizing aircraft, and manpower. The decision, regardless of the solution, comes with a risk. By looking at the Nevada Air National Guard and the options available for a new mission it showed a few of the options available for the Air Force.

The mission statement of the Nevada Air National Guard, regardless of the mission, is to “provide ready Airmen.” This thought process is prevalent throughout the Air Guard community and the reason the Guardsman is equally important to the Governor and to the active duty Air Force. Good communication has allowed this partnership to work even through continuous deployments. Through budget cuts, modernization the Air Force and Air Guard will continue to prosper. When examining the monetary and political costs, and the security risks both home and abroad, it is in the best interest of the United States that the U.S. Air Force continue to rely on the Air National Guard and replace aging missions with new ones. Together, with the Air National Guard, the United States Air Force will stay a step ahead of the rest of the world and continue to protect its citizens, and the interests of the United States of America.

APPENDIX A

	Active Component	Reserve Component
Military Personnel Account Costs*	\$ 84,808	\$ 26,033
DoD Defense Health Program	\$ 19,233	\$ 8,157
DoD Dependent Education	\$ 2,034	\$ 33
DoD & Service Family Housing	\$ 1,235	\$ -
DoD Commissary Agency	\$ 996	\$ 49
TOTAL DoD Compensation Costs	\$ 108,307	\$ 34,272
O&M (Less DoD Dependent Education)	\$ 110,532	\$ 26,477
Procurement	\$ 71,601	\$ 3,771
Military Construction	\$ 5,556	\$ 1,512
RDTE & Other	\$ 34,348	\$ 34,348
TOTAL DoD Non- Compensation Costs	\$ 222,037	\$ 66,108
Dept of Defense Grand Total	\$ 330,343	\$ 100,380
Dept of Education "Impact Aid"	\$ 355	\$ 9
Dept of Treas - Concurrent Receipt	\$ 4,514	\$ 747
Dept of Treas - MERHCF	\$ 3,264	\$ 2,230
Dept of Treas - Mil Retirement	\$ 39,800	\$ 13,638
Dept of Veteran Affairs	\$ 6,334	\$ 6,334
Dept of Labor for Vet Education / Training	\$ 12	\$ 12
TOTAL COST TO US GOVERNMENT	\$ 384,622	\$ 123,351

**Data taken from 2012 Reserve Policy Board Report to the Secretary of Defense.⁵²*

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