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MALIAN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE STUDY

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14. ABSTRACT The 2012-2013 Mali crisis clearly demonstrated the need for substantial reform in the Malian security sector. The Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) suffered severe defeats at the hands of militant groups, overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d'état, and ultimately lost control over more than half the country. As a result of the coup d'état, the U.S. Government halted all security assistance to Mali, but the lifting of restrictions on assistance in September 2013 has created the potential for this activity to resume. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) sponsored this study to analyze Malian security challenges and reform requirements so as to inform USARAF and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) planning in the event that the U.S. Government decides to resume security assistance to Mali. The study did not analyze the merits of U.S. security assistance to Mali and therefore offers no recommendations for U.S. policy. It is only intended to inform future security cooperation planning. Subsequent analysis, especially in terms of costs, benefits, and prospects for success, could help policymakers determine if renewed security assistance to Mali would support U.S. interests in the region. The study concluded that due to severe political, social, and economic challenges, a low starting capacity, and limited resources, building a professional and independently functioning Malian security sector will be a very difficult and lengthy endeavor with no guarantee of success. If a significant program of reform is to be attempted, the primary focus should be on building institutions rather than increasing tactical or operational capacity.					
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MALIAN SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE STUDY

SUMMARY

ABSTRACT

The 2012-2013 Mali crisis clearly demonstrated the need for substantial reform in the Malian security sector. The Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) suffered severe defeats at the hands of militant groups, overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d'état, and ultimately lost control over more than half the country. As a result of the coup d'état, the U.S. Government halted all security assistance Mali, but the lifting of restrictions on assistance in September 2013 has created the potential for this activity to be resumed. U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) sponsored this study to analyze Malian security challenges and reform requirements so as to inform USARAF and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) planning if the event that the U.S. Government decides to resume security assistance to Mali. This unclassified study synthesized an extensive literature review, subject matter expert consultations, and two analytical exercises to derive its findings and recommendations. As much as was possible, the study team attempted to assume a Malian rather than U.S. perspective while conducting the analysis.

THE PROJECT PURPOSE was to provide an analysis that will inform USARAF and USAFRICOM security cooperation planning in Mali.

THE PROJECT SPONSOR was USARAF G5.

THE PROJECT OBJECTIVE was to develop a report that includes an analysis of the operating environment, potential threats, and MDSF requirements, as well as recommendations for Malian security sector reform.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT is:

The study explored the MDSF, including military and police forces, the Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs, and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection over a 10-year period (2013-2022). This exploration considered institutions, missions and command relationships, force capabilities and structures, logistical requirements, and training systems. It did not, however, consider other critical elements of security sector reform, such as the criminal justice system, prison system, or legislative issues.

The study did not analyze the merits of U.S. security assistance to Mali and therefore offers no recommendations for U.S. policy. It is only intended to inform future security cooperation planning. Subsequent analysis, especially in terms of costs, benefits, and prospects for success, could help policymakers determine if renewed security assistance to Mali would support U.S. interests in the region.

THE MAIN ASSUMPTIONS are:

Malian defense spending will stay constant in real terms over the period under consideration.

Legal and policy restrictions on U.S. security assistance to Mali will be resolved (all U.S. security assistance to Mali had been suspended as a result of the March 2012 coup d'état, but restrictions were subsequently lifted in September 2013).

THE PRINCIPAL FINDINGS are:

- (1) Reforming the MDSF constitutes only one aspect of a much more significant set of political, social, and economic challenges faced by Mali.
- (2) Due to a low starting capacity and limited resources, building a professional and independently functioning Malian security sector will be a very difficult and lengthy endeavor with no guarantee of success.
- (3) The most pressing security challenge for Mali is to build a security sector that is not a threat to the Malian state or the Malian people.
- (4) For the foreseeable future, local irregular forces will be required to play a role in providing security in northern Mali. However, determining with whom the Malian Government should partner remains difficult.

THE PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS are:

- (1) The primary focus of reform should be on building institutions rather than increasing tactical or operational capacity. Emphasis should specifically be placed on developing basic ministerial-level functions, delineating responsibilities and command relationships between security services, and building a training base and professional education system.
- (2) MDSF force structure should be centered around interoperable and mutually supporting civic and paramilitary police, with the army in a supporting role to counter major threats.

THE PROJECT EFFORT was conducted by Mr. William M. Fabian.

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS may be sent to the Director, Center for Army Analysis, ATTN: CSCA-OA, 6001 Goethals Road, Suite 102, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5230.

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1 BACKGROUND

The 2012-2013 Mali crisis¹ clearly demonstrated the need for substantial reform in the Malian security sector.² The Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF)³ suffered severe defeats at the hands of militant groups, overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d'état, and ultimately lost control over more than half the country. As a result of the coup d'état, the U.S. Government halted all security assistance Mali, but the lifting of restrictions on assistance in September 2013 has created the potential for this activity to be resumed.⁴ U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) sponsored this study to analyze Malian security challenges and reform requirements so as to inform USARAF and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) planning if the event that the U.S. Government decides to resume security assistance to Mali. This unclassified study synthesized extensive research, subject matter expert consultations, and two analytical exercises to derive its findings and recommendations. As much as was possible, the study team attempted to assume a Malian rather than U.S. perspective while conducting the analysis.

The study did not analyze the merits of U.S. security assistance to Mali and therefore offers no recommendations for U.S. policy. It is only intended to inform future security cooperation planning. Subsequent analysis, especially in terms of costs, benefits, and prospects for success, could help policymakers determine if renewed security assistance to Mali would support U.S. interests in the region.

¹ This report use the phrase “2012-2013 Mali Crisis” to refer collectively to the recent conflict in northern Mali, the resulting humanitarian crisis, and the March 2012 coup d'état in Bamako.

² For an overview of the recent events in Mali see Alexis Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013, François Heisbourg, “A Surprising Little War,” *Survival* (April-May 2013): 7-18, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali*, United Nations, November 28, 2012, and *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali*, United Nations, March 26, 2013.

³ This report uses “Malian Defense and Security Forces” or “MDSF” to refer collectively to all Malian state security forces, including both those belonging in to the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection (National Police) and those belonging to the Ministry for Defense and Veterans Affairs (Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, National Guard).

⁴ When the study began, the U.S. Government was restricted from providing most forms of assistance to the Malian Government, including security assistance. This restriction was lifted in September 2013. See “U.S. Lifts Restrictions of Bilateral Assistance to Mali,” U.S. Department of State Press Statement, September 6, 2013, accessed September 28, 2013 (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/213910.htm>).

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2 METHODOLOGY

The study team began by conducting an extensive research effort consisting of a literature review and subject matter expert consultations. The study team reviewed and analyzed more than 100 written sources⁵ covering a variety of topics such as: Malian history, politics, society, and economics; historical case studies; and security sector reform best practices literature.

Additionally, the study team conducted consultations with subject matter experts with expertise on Mali and the Sahel region, security sector reform, internal conflict, and African security issues. Several of these experts also possessed practical experience in Mali. These experts represented a diverse set of organizations including the U.S. Department of State, the RAND Corporation, the National Defense University, the Army Irregular Warfare Center, National Geographic, the United States Military Academy (USMA), and the French Army. The research effort provided the study team with a foundational understanding of Mali and the challenges it faces, as well as informed the conceptualization and development of the two analytical exercises discussed below.

The first of analytical exercises (AE 1) consisted of a 1-day structured discussion that brought the study team together with a small group of outside subject matter experts to explore further the nature of the challenges faced by Mali. The exercise participants considered three primary questions:

- What aspects of the operating environment will significantly impact Malian security challenges and needs?
- What are the most significant challenges and threats faced by Mali?
- What should Mali's strategic priorities be?

The insights gained from this exercise contributed to the development of the second analytical exercise and informed the study findings and recommendations.

The centerpiece of the study methodology was the second analytical exercise (AE 2), which consisted of a 2-day tabletop exercise that explored four threat scenarios to generate insights into MDSF operational, strategic, and institutional requirements. The study team developed the scenarios from a synthesis of the research effort and insights from AE 1. These scenarios were not intended to be predictive, but rather illustrative in nature as a means for exploring MDSF requirements. Three of the scenarios considered threats from internal and transnational non-state actors, while the fourth addressed institutional problems, such as corruption, within the Malian Government and MDSF. The four scenarios were:⁶

- **Insurgency in Gao:** In this scenario, the ongoing insurgency in the Gao area, led by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), is kept in check, but not eliminated, by international peacekeepers. Once international peacekeepers depart, the insurgency begins to expand in both intensity and geographic scope.

⁵ Only sources cited in this report are included in the bibliography. A list of sources reviewed, but not cited is available upon request.

⁶ For more detail on the scenarios and the results of AE 2, see Appendix A.

- **Northern Restlessness:** In this scenario, opportunistic Tuareg clans in the Kidal region exploit continued northern grievances to spark a new rebellion against the Malian Government. After some initial success, the rebellion gains steam and threatens to expand to 2012 like proportions if not addressed quickly.
- **Illicit Trafficking and Criminality:** In this scenario, illicit trafficking in Mali, especially in narcotics, fuels conflict in the north as various factions struggle for control over routes. Insecurity in the north also allows outside militant groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to regain their strength through trafficking, kidnapping, and other illicit activities. Furthermore, the professionalism and capacity of some MDSF elements erodes due to complicity with organized crime.
- **Institutional Problems in the MDSF:** In this scenario, the MDSF continues to face many of the institutional problems that plagued their effectiveness prior to and during the 2012-2013 crisis, such as poor leadership, ministerial incompetence, factionalism, regional and ethnic tensions, corruption, and strained civil-military relations.

The exercise began with an introductory brief by the study team on recent Malian history and the current operating environment in order to ensure all participants shared a common frame of reference. Participants were then divided into two equally sized blue⁷ teams. Team composition was based on a desire to obtain a rough balance in experience and expertise between the two blue teams.⁸ The study team served as a combined white cell and red team, facilitating discussion and testing blue team assumptions and conclusion throughout the exercise.

For each of the four scenarios, the white cell instructed the two blue teams to separately analyze the threat from a Malian Government perspective and then develop an appropriate response concept. Furthermore, the blue teams were asked to approach the scenarios from a Prevent, Contain, Counter framework. That is, how could the Malian Government have prevented the threat from reaching the level indicated in the scenario start point, how could it contain the threat from increasing in intensity or geographic scope, and how could it counter the threat if it does increase in either aspect? Although the white cell instructed the teams to use the Prevent, Contain, Counter framework, the specifics of how the teams analyzed the threats and developed their response concepts, as well as what the response concepts contained, was left unconstrained. For example, one blue team analyzed the scenarios by using a Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economics (DIME) approach, while the other employed the Military Decision Making Process. Response concepts included insights and recommendations on institutional arrangements and processes, strategy, operational and tactical concepts, capability requirements, capacity requirements, force structure, and command relationships. The teams also identified gaps and risks in their response concepts, such as resource-related feasibility constraints. Response concepts were then discussed and evaluated by all exercise participants in an open forum facilitated by the white cell.

⁷ Blue teams approach the scenarios from a Malian rather than U.S. perspective.

⁸ For example, the study team assigned the two participants with logistics and enablers expertise to different blue teams so that each team would have at least some expertise in these areas.

Once AE 2 was complete, the study team consolidated the response concepts for each scenario, identified requirements, and examined gaps and risks. Figure 1 below depicts the key capabilities identified by scenario during AE 2. The team then combined these results with the insights derived from the literature review, expert consultations, and AE 1 to synthesize a set of findings and recommendations.

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4
Civic Police	X	X	X	
Paramilitary Police	X	X	X	
Criminal Investigations			X	
Local Auxiliaries	X	X	X	
Advising	X	X	X	
Combined Arms Operations	X	X		
Motorized Infantry	X	X		
Light Armor	X	X		
Fire Support		X		
Intelligence	X	X	X	
Interdiction			X	
Air Lift	X	X	X	
Tactical Air Support	X	X	X	
Ministerial Functions	X	X	X	X
Training System	X	X	X	X
Logistics/Sustainment/Services System	X	X	X	X

Figure 1. Key Capabilities Identified by Scenario

For example, from the literature review and experts consultations, the study team identified intelligence, especially human intelligence (HUMINT) as a critical capability for addressing internal threats. Both AE 1 and AE 2 also highlighted the importance of intelligence to securing northern Mali. In particular, AE 1 demonstrated that northerners with local knowledge would be vital to successful intelligence operations in northern Mali. While during AE 2, both blue teams identified intelligence collection and analysis capabilities as key requirements in three of the four scenarios. The study team then translated these intelligence requirements into recommendations and evaluated these recommendations by examining tradeoffs. The team considered both decentralized and centralized intelligence structures, but concluded a decentralized structure with fusion centers provided responsiveness to user needs while still enabling adequate intelligence sharing.⁹

Once this synthesis was complete, the findings and recommendations were reviewed by regional and functional subject matter experts. Reviewers included representatives from the U.S. Department of State, USMA, National Geographic, Columbia University, and RAND. The study

⁹ See the recommendation section for more on intelligence.

team incorporated the feedback received from the reviewers into the refined findings and recommendations included in this report.

3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 Findings

Reforming the MDSF constitutes only one aspect of a much more significant set of political, social, and economic challenges faced by Mali.

Despite persistent low-level conflict and several episodes of major rebellion,¹⁰ the administration of former President Amadou Toumani Toure, commonly known as ATT, was reluctant to address security challenges in northern Mali.¹¹ But the 2012-2013 crisis demonstrated that ignoring security challenges in the north is no longer a viable long-term strategy for Bamako, as threats originating there have threatened Malian territorial integrity and regime survival. Reforming the MDSF alone, however, is not enough to address unrest in northern Mali. Northern grievances persist over the failure of the Malian Government to implement provisions from past peace agreements, especially in the areas of security force integration, decentralization, and resource distribution.¹² Although the Malian Government's Roadmap to Transition represents a good starting point, the cycle of rebellion will not be broken unless real progress is made.¹³ Different perceptions also contribute to the historical north-south divide. Northerners feel neglected by Bamako, while southerners resist recognizing that divisions even exist and are angered at the northern populace, particularly Tuaregs,¹⁴ for causing the recent crisis.¹⁵ The Malian Government cannot achieve a long-term solution to the challenges in northern Mali without partnering with the northern populace.¹⁶ The challenge for the Malian Government is choosing the right factions with whom to partner – a very difficult task. Partnering with the wrong factions could further alienate the northern populace or aggravate existing local disputes or ethnic tensions.

Social factors also contribute to the challenges faced by the Malian state in the north. Ethnic tensions between northern communities have been exacerbated by the recent conflict.¹⁷ Many

¹⁰ For an overview of previous rebellions in northern Mali see Stephen A. Emerson, "Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22 no. 4 (2011): 669-687, Kalifa Keita, "Conflict and conflict resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg insurgency in Mali," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 9 no. 3 (1998): 102-128, and Angel Rabasa et al, *From Insurgency to Stability* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), 117-156.

¹¹ Insight from AE 1.

¹² Susanna D. Wing, "Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict," *United States Institute of Peace Special Report* 331 (May 2013): 6-9. Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, *Towards a Secure and Stable Northern Mali: Approaches to Engaging Local Actors* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 5. Hannah Armstrong, "Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions," *United States Institute of Peace Peacebrief* 149 (May 2013): 1-2. Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, 6.

¹³ Insight from AE 1. For overview of the Roadmap to Transition see *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 2-3.

¹⁴ For a brief overview of Mali's Tuaregs, see Keita, 105-108.

¹⁵ Insight from AE 1. Rabasa et al, 117-118.

¹⁶ Insight from AE 1.

¹⁷ Corinne Dufka, "Addressing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North," Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Human Rights Watch, December 5, 2012, 7. Lydia Polgreen, "Islamists' Harsh Rule Awakened Ethnic Tensions in Timbuktu," *The New York Times*, February 1, 2013, accessed June 1, 2013 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/world/africa/timbuktu-endured-terror-under-harsh-shariah-law.html?ref=mali>).

communities blame the Tuaregs and seek revenge for Tuareg actions during the conquest and occupation of the north. Although it has been limited thus far, the potential for widespread ethnic violence persists, especially in terms of score settling.¹⁸ For example, there have been reports of Songhai militias compiling lists of Tuaregs and Arabs targeted for retaliatory killings.¹⁹

Low-level local competition, such as clan rivalries or contest over control of smuggling routes, animates much of the conflict in northern Mali. Social structures in northern Mali are very complex and fractious. For example, Tuaregs in Mali are divided into multiple confederacies, which are subdivided into multiple castes, which are further subdivided into multiple clans.²⁰ These traditional social structures have more influence over daily life than state institutions. Furthermore, the various northern tribal and clan groupings are engaged in regular competition for power, prestige, and influence, with constantly shifting alliances between factions.²¹ Often this competition can be violent and spark the outbreak of larger conflicts. For example, the actions of Ansar Dine leader Iyad Ag Ghaly throughout his career have much to do with personal and clan rivalries within his confederacy.²² These micro-level drivers of conflict are often obscured from the outside observer by macro-level cleavages, such as ethnicity. It is likely that this competition will remain a persistent problem for years to come.

The north-south divide and intra-northern conflict are not the only political challenges faced by Mali. Although on the surface it appeared to be a model for democracy in West Africa, the recent crisis revealed significant problems in the Malian political system. The consensus politics practiced by the ATT regime, ostensibly a system of state patronage and cronyism, led to political stagnation among elites in Bamako and caused widespread disenchantment amongst the Malian populace.²³ In fact, many Malian citizens at first praised the coup d'état.²⁴ Elections are a positive first step in restoring democratic legitimacy, but substantial reform throughout the political system is required.

¹⁸ Anouar Boukhars, "The Mali conflict: avoiding past mistakes," *FRIDE Policy Brief* 148 (February 2013): 2. *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 4. For score settling and communal violence in the wake of past conflicts see Keita, 116.

¹⁹ Boukhars, "The Mali conflict", 2. Polgreen, "Islamists' Harsh Rule".

²⁰ For an excellent overview of social structures in northern Mali, see Pezard and Shurkin.

²¹ Wolfram Lacher, *Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region*, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 11-12. Anouar Boukhars, "Mali's Challenges Post-French Intervention," *CTC Sentinel* 6 Issue 5 (May 2013): 9. Pezard and Shurkin, 2, 5, and 7. Boukhars, "The Mali conflict", 2.

²² William Lloyd-George, "The Man Who Brought the Black Flag to Timbuktu," *ForeignPolicy.com*, October 22, 2012, accessed June 10, 2013 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/the_man_who_brought_the_black_flag_to_timbuktu). Pezard and Shurkin, 8-9. Lacher, 14-15.

²³ Bruce Whitehouse, "What went wrong in Mali?" *London Review of Books*, August 30, 2012, accessed June 08, 2013 (<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n16/bruce-whitehouse/what-went-wrong-in-mali>). Tristan McConnell, "Cracks at the Core," *ForeignPolicy.com*, February 7, 2013, accessed June 12, 2013 (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/07/cracks_at_the_core_corruption_mali). *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 12, 1. Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, 6. Wing, 2-6.

²⁴ *Mali and the Sahel-Sahara: From Crisis Management to Sustainable Strategy*, (New York, NY: International Peace Institute, 2013), 4. Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, 7.

With a per capita income of \$660, a 46% poverty rate, and a ranking of 182nd on the Human Development Index, Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world.²⁵ Desertification and other ecological trends have diminished the viability of traditional pastoralist patterns of life, forcing northern populations to seek out other economic opportunities.²⁶ Poor infrastructure also inhibits economic activity.²⁷ In both the north and south, although more so in the north, economic opportunities are scant and many people live a marginal existence. As a result, economic necessity forces many to become involved with illicit trafficking, banditry, criminal organizations, and militant groups.²⁸ Furthermore, Mali's poverty limits resources available to the Malian Government to provide government services or institute reform measures. The Malian Government remains largely dependent on foreign aid for all state functions.

The nature of the physical terrain further complicates the ability of the Malian state to control the north beyond the main towns or to provide government services. The terrain in northern Mali is very rugged, sparsely populated, and expansive. The porous borders and numerous secluded hiding spots provide armed groups and criminals with freedom of movement and sanctuary.²⁹ The poor quality and limited extent of Malian road networks, especially in northern Mali, inhibit MDSF mobility, the provision of government services, communication, and economic activity.

Due to a low starting capacity and limited resources, building a professional and independently functioning Malian security sector will be a very difficult and lengthy endeavor with no guarantee of success.

Prior to the 2012-2013 crisis, the MDSF suffered from serious problems, such as complicity with criminal organizations, predatory behavior towards the populace, and lack of resources.³⁰ As a result, ill-equipped, poorly trained, and unprofessional MDSF units suffered severe defeats at the hand of militant groups during the early stages of recent conflict, ultimately losing control over more than half the country. The MDSF also experienced mass defections of personnel during the conflict, especially amongst irregular units of former northern rebels.³¹ Renewed militant offensive operations in January 2013 again routed forward MDSF units, and although the militants' final objective remains unclear, the road to Bamako laid open. The French-led intervention halted the militant push and spearheaded the re-conquest of northern Mali, but the MDSF played only an ancillary role, with French and Chadian forces shouldering the bulk of the

²⁵ Per capita income (2012 estimate) and poverty rate (2010 estimate) from the World Bank (<http://data.worldbank.org/country/mali>). Human Development Index from the United Nations Development Programme (<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MLI.html>).

²⁶ Insight from AE 1. Pezard and Shurkin, 5. Keita, 110. Rabasa et al, 118.

²⁷ Insight from AE 1. Rabasa et al, 118-119.

²⁸ Pezard and Shurkin, 5. Bouhkars, "The Mali conflict", 2.

²⁹ Insight from AE 1. Emerson, 670.

³⁰ "Mali: making peace while preparing for war," *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report* Issue 1 (October 2012): 3-4. Lacher, 10. *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 1-2, and 4.

³¹ *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 1-2. Heisbourg, 7-11. Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, 7.

fighting.³² Based on recent assessments, it seems likely that the recent crisis has further reduced the MDSF's already limited capabilities and capacity.³³

Malian resources to fund its security forces are extremely limited, which decreases the feasibility of successful reform and constrains force options that are sustainable in the long run. Even with continued international support, there is no guarantee that reform will be successful. Over the past decade, international actors, including the United States, have provided regular security assistance to Mali, both in terms of funding and training, for little result.³⁴ Security assistance programs must be well designed and their performance and effectiveness regularly assessed to ensure programs achieve their objectives at a reasonable cost.

The most pressing security challenge for Mali is to build a security sector that is not a threat to the Malian state or the Malian people.

Although the militant groups have not been completely defeated and will remain a persistent source of instability in the future, the ability of these groups to threaten Malian territorial integrity and sovereignty in the near-term has been significantly diminished. Furthermore, the presence of large numbers of international peacekeepers in the near-term should provide an additional buffer against major threats.³⁵ With the immediate threat to Malian sovereignty posed by northern militant groups under control for the time being, the most pressing security challenge facing the Malian Government is the MDSF itself.

In the past, MDSF corruption, complicity with organized crime, and incompetence eroded its professionalism and readiness, leaving the MDSF unable to contain the outbreak of rebellion in 2012.³⁶ The MDSF has also acted in a predatory manner against the Malian populace and has the potential to do so again, especially in the form of reprisals against the northern populace.³⁷ Reports have already surfaced of MDSF human rights abuses as the Malian Government retakes control over the north.³⁸ Most significantly, civil-military relations remain very problematic. In March 2012, a faction of junior MDSF officers, disgruntled by a perceived lack of government support for the security forces, overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d'état and established a military junta.³⁹ Although the junta quickly agreed to a transitional government and new elections followed, the coup leaders retain a strong influence in Malian

³² Heisbourg, 11. *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 9. Adam Nossiter, "French and Chad Forces Strike Militants in the Mountains of Mali," *The New York Times*, March 01, 2013, accessed June 9, 2013 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/africa/french-and-chad-forces-bear-down-on-militants-in-mali.html?ref=mali>).

³³ *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 9-11. *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 4-5 and 14-15. Bouhkars, "Mali's Challenges", 3.

³⁴ For an overview of U.S. security assistance to Mali see Brian M. Burtfon, "The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach," *Prism* 3 no. 1 (December 2011): 54-58 and Arief, *Crisis in Mali*, 16. For a critique of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), see *Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*, U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 2008.

³⁵ For details on the U.N. peacekeeping force and its mandate see *United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100*, April 25, 2013. Significant concerns exist, however, about the competence of the peacekeepers.

³⁶ See Lacher, 10-13.

³⁷ "Mali: making peace while preparing for war", 4. Dufka, 6.

³⁸ Dufka, 6. *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 4.

³⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 2. "Mali: making peace while preparing for war", 3-4.

politics.⁴⁰ A failed counter-coup by presidential guard units that remained loyal to the former regime led to infighting within the MDSF that further eroded readiness.⁴¹ Factionalism within the MDSF surrounding the coup and counter-coup persists. Unless the MDSF undergoes significant professionalization and reform, they will remain incapable of adequately countering threats and will continue to represent a threat to the Malian Government and people in their own right.

Beyond the MDSF, the most significant threats from a Malian perspective are internal in nature. Four ongoing or potential internal threats stand out:⁴²

- The ongoing low-level insurgency in the Gao area, especially if it increases in intensity or expands in geographic scope.
- Inter-communal and Intra-communal violence in the north, including ethnic conflict, score settling, and violent competition between groups.
- Continued northern resistance to central authority, especially amongst disgruntled Tuareg groups.
- A humanitarian crisis resulting from some combination of displaced persons and recurring natural disasters.

Additional, with continued insecurity and lawlessness, as well as the presence of numerous armed groups, persistent low-level violence will likely remain a challenge in northern Mali.⁴³ Over the short- to mid-term, transnational terrorism and crime will primarily be a threat to Mali by enabling internal armed groups with money, weapons, leadership, and experienced fighters.⁴⁴ For example, the support provided by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a primarily foreign militant group, quickly allowed Ansar Dine to surpass the National Movement for Liberation in Azawad (MNLA) as the most powerful Tuareg armed group during the recent rebellion.⁴⁵ Transnational threats also facilitate government corruption. Illicit narcotics trafficking is particularly troublesome since, unlike other forms of illicit trafficking, the large influx of money associated with cocaine smuggling fuels conflict in Mali and corrodes state institutions.⁴⁶

For the foreseeable future, local irregular forces will be required to play a role in providing security in northern Mali. However, determining with whom the Malian Government should partner remains difficult.

Due to the expansiveness and ruggedness of northern Malian terrain, small state security forces, and limited state resources, it is unlikely that the MDSF will be able to provide security

⁴⁰ *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013. *Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform*, (Brussels: International Crisis Groups, April 2013), 15.

⁴¹ Dufka, 6. Arief, *Crisis in Mali*, 7. *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 2 and 5.

⁴² These threats were identified from a combination of research and insights from AE 1.

⁴³ Insight from AE 1.

⁴⁴ Lacher, 13-17. *Report of the Secretary-General*, March 26, 2013, 11-12.

⁴⁵ Lacher, 14-15.

⁴⁶ Northern Malian populations have long been involved in cross-border smuggling and this trade plays an important role in the northern Malian economy. For an overview of smuggling in Mali see Rabasa et al, 119 and Lacher, 4. For the impact of cocaine trafficking see Boukhars, "The Mali conflict", 2, Lacher, 13-17, and *Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform*, 24-25.

throughout northern Mali.⁴⁷ Furthermore, some segments of the northern Malian populace genuinely dislike the presence of the southern Malian dominated state security forces.⁴⁸ Therefore, the Malian Government will likely need to rely on local actors to help provide security in the north.⁴⁹ There are several benefits for utilizing local forces to provide security. These types of forces are already integrated into the local community and have a personal stake in local security.⁵⁰ Furthermore, local forces possess significant local knowledge and can tap into preexisting intelligence networks, thereby providing a significant information advantage that is difficult for non-locals to duplicate.⁵¹ For example, during the Third Tuareg Rebellion in Mali (2006-2009), irregular local forces served as guides for the Malian Army during successful offensive operations against rebel base areas. The use of local forces is not without precedent in Mali. The French Colonial Government long used local proxies to police the north and the Malian Government has at times supported local irregular units.⁵² In fact, greater local responsibility for security in the north has been a key tenant of several previous peace agreements between the Malian Government and northern rebels.⁵³

The use of local defense forces does entail some risks. In particular, these forces can pursue interests that conflict with the objectives of the government and can prove difficult to control.⁵⁴ They can also become vehicle for the contesting of local power struggles and score settling. But these risks can be mitigated. Local forces should be fully integrated into the larger security system and should cooperate closely with the MDSF. A specialized and well-trained MDSF advisor force, principally recruited from the northern populace, represents one option to improve the effectiveness and reliability of local forces, while also improving MDSF-local force interoperability.⁵⁵ The most difficult aspect of employing local forces is determining whom to partner with. In the past, some Malian Government proxies in the north have proved unreliable, such as units of former rebels that defected during the 2012-2013 crisis, but others remained loyal and represent some of the most effective MDSF units.⁵⁶ Selecting appropriate partners will require very detailed and granular information.⁵⁷

The role of northern Malians in providing security should not be limited to local forces alone. The MDSF should also seek to integrate northerners fully into regular MDSF units. There are three primary reasons for this. First, integration in the MDSF will help address a persistent northern grievance. Second, integration will improve MDSF legitimacy in the north by giving regular security forces a northern face. Third, integration will remove some manpower from the

⁴⁷ Finding from AE 2.

⁴⁸ Pezard and Shurkin, 7.

⁴⁹ Pezard and Shurkin, 2 and 7. Rabasa et al, 153-154.

⁵⁰ Austin Long et al, *Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 1.

⁵¹ Long et al, *Locals Rule*, 1.

⁵² Pezard and Shurkin, 8-9. Rabasa et al, 145.

⁵³ Keita, 113-114. Arieff, *Crisis in Mali*, 6. Rabasa et al, 122-123 and 130-131.

⁵⁴ Long et al, *Locals Rule*, 2. In the Mali context, see Pezard and Shurkin, 8-9.

⁵⁵ Pezard and Shurkin, 10.

⁵⁶ Pezard and Shurkin, 8-9. Armstrong, 2.

⁵⁷ Pezard and Shurkin, 2.

northern armed groups by providing legitimate opportunities for young northerners who will otherwise stay under arms outside of state control.⁵⁸

3.2 Recommendations

The primary focus of reform should be on building institutions rather than increasing tactical or operational capacity. Emphasis should specifically be placed on developing basic ministerial-level functions, delineating responsibilities and command relationships between security services, and building a training base and professional education system.

Resource constraints necessitate tradeoffs and prioritization. Although the development of operational forces is important, building institutions is critical to the long-term sustainability of an independently functioning MDSF. Robust and capable operational forces, even those built with international assistance, are unsustainable in the long run without adequate supporting institutions.⁵⁹ Furthermore, if institutions are sufficiently developed, Mali can play a much larger role in building their own operational forces, thereby allowing international actors to focus on providing advice and expertise. Institutions take a long time to develop properly and therefore the initial investment should be made as early as possible.⁶⁰ Unlike some other notable cases, such as Iraq or Libya, where there was a need to immediately address a severe security crisis, the French-led intervention and the presence of international peacekeepers have reduced the need for MDSF operational forces in the near-term, thereby allowing the initial focus to be on institutions.

Building institutions is also critical to the professionalization of the MDSF. In the past, failure to adequately pay, equip, train, and care for MDSF personnel substantially contributed to both MDSF ineffectiveness and corruption.⁶¹ Moreover, a perceived lack of institutional support was the major grievance behind the March 2012 coup.⁶² Properly functioning ministries would go a long way towards improving the professionalism of the MDSF and repairing civil-military relations. Simply paying MDSF personnel on time would be a good start.⁶³

The development of a professional cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) should also be a priority. If properly developed, this cadre of officers and NCOs can serve to stimulate a culture of accountability within the MDSF and a more professional organizational identity. Building this cadre requires an effective professional education system. The professional education system should include, at a minimum, an officer academy, NCO academy, and senior officer academy.⁶⁴ Figure 2 below shows a sample professional education system organization that could be implemented. Since the number of senior officers is likely to be small, the MDSF should explore sending its officers to a foreign senior officer academy in order to reduce costs. One potential option for limiting costs is to explore the regional

⁵⁸ Insight from AE 1. Keita, 114 and 120.

⁵⁹ James M. Dubik, *Building Security and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer* (Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of War, 2009), 6-8.

⁶⁰ Dubik, *Building Security*, 2.

⁶¹ Insight from AE 1. On the importance of institutions see James M. Dubik, *Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C., Institute for the Study of War, 2009), 7-8 and 11.

⁶² *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 2.

⁶³ Insight from AE 1.

⁶⁴ Finding from AE 2.

peacekeeping school system that Mali already participates in with Nigeria and Ghana as a potential basis for a regional professional education system.⁶⁵



Figure 2. Sample Professional Education System Organization

MDSF force structure should be centered around interoperable and mutually supporting civic and paramilitary police, with the army in a supporting role to counter major threats.

In Mali, the Army is by far the largest security service and has traditionally played a leading role in internal security, while police forces have been relatively neglected. But capable police forces are critical to internal security.⁶⁶ Police provide several important law and order functions that are outside the core mission set of military forces, such as dispute resolution, crime prevention, and criminal investigations. Moreover, police play a key role in countering internal threats, such as banditry and insurgency, especially in urban areas and other population centers.⁶⁷ This is because police are generally more comfortable operating amongst the population than the military, are competent in human source operations, and often possess pre-existing intelligence networks.⁶⁸ In addition to the security role, police are often the most visible element of the central government and can therefore serve either to enhance or diminish the central government's legitimacy with the populace. Civic police forces, however, may lack the combat power and tactical competence to counter well-armed and organized threats. Paramilitary police forces, such as a gendarmerie, combine police capabilities with sufficient combat power to match well-armed threats and serve to bridge the gap between civic police and military forces.

⁶⁵ Phone interview with National Defense University African security expert, June 20, 2013.

⁶⁶ Dubik, *Accelerating Combat Power*, 12-15.

⁶⁷ For an example of the utility of police forces in during an internal conflict see Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian Experience* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991), 18-19.

⁶⁸ Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, 18-19.

Police forces, however, are at least as susceptible to corruption and predatory behavior as military forces, and unlike military forces, generally cannot be isolated from the populace in garrisons. Building professional, competent, and non-predatory police forces requires investment in training, equipping, and other professionalization measures. As Malian police forces currently possess limited capabilities and capacity,⁶⁹ they should be prioritized for development so that they can eventually be transitioned to the lead for internal security. This is not to say the Army should be marginalized or eliminated. Rather, the roles of the various security services should focus on different levels of threats:⁷⁰

- **National Police:** A civic police organization focused on policing and criminal investigations in urban areas to counter low-level threats such as routine criminality.
- **Gendarmerie:** A paramilitary police organization focused on rural policing, public order, and interdiction to counter medium-level threats, such as banditry, illicit trafficking, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- **Army:** A military organization primarily consisting of motorized infantry focused on supporting the National Police and Gendarmerie against high-level threats, such as major rebellions.
- **Air Force:** A military organization focused on providing lift, reconnaissance, and light attack support to the National Police, Gendarmerie, and Army.

Figure 3 below depicts the proposed MDSF service missions and relationships.




Figure 3. Proposed MDSF Service Missions and Relationships

Interoperability and mutual support between the security services is critical to leverage the strengths of each service and prevent any one MDSF element from being overmatched. For example, without the rapid support of either the Gendarmerie or the Army, the National Police

⁶⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General*, November 28, 2012, 17.

⁷⁰ Service roles and mission were developed from research and findings from AE 2.

are vulnerable to attacks by major armed groups.⁷¹ A unified national and sub-national command structure for internal security operations may be an option for improving interoperability.⁷² Furthermore, Malian history, especially the Malian Government's measured approach during the Third Tuareg Rebellion, has shown that rapidly containing threats can prevent their expansion and allow for the possibility of a peaceful resolution.⁷³ But the MDSF also requires sufficient combat power to suppress major rebellions and bring armed groups unwilling to negotiate to terms.⁷⁴ Therefore, MDSF concentrations in northern Mali should be positioned to quickly react to crises and possess enough combat power to defeat major concentrations of rebels and other armed groups.⁷⁵ This combat power should include motorized paramilitary police and infantry, with organic heavy weapons, in the Gendarmerie and Army respectively, supported by limited light armor, artillery, engineering, and air assets.⁷⁶ The Gendarmerie and especially the Army will also need to be able to project combat power into the rugged Adrar des Ifhogas in northeastern Mali, which has been a traditional sanctuary for Tuareg rebels.⁷⁷

Adequate human intelligence (HUMINT) is critical to providing security against internal threats. Therefore, all security services must strengthen their intelligence capabilities. Recruiting northerners with local knowledge is critical to successful HUMINT collection in the north.⁷⁸ Although each security service should have organic intelligence capabilities, national and sub-national fusion centers are essential for proper intelligence sharing.⁷⁹ The Malian Government should also continue to leverage information sharing agreements with international partners to gain access to more technical forms of intelligence collection, since developing organic capabilities is likely infeasible.⁸⁰

The expansive and rugged nature of the physical terrain in Mali, especially in the north, has several significant implications for the MDSF. First, the Gendarmerie and the Army units will need to be very mobile and able to operate across several types of difficult terrain, such as deserts and mountains. Second, isolated garrisons are vulnerable to destruction by massed rebels or other armed groups, so bases should be mutually supporting through quick reaction forces.⁸¹ Third, functioning logistical and services systems are vital to ability of the MDSF to sustain operations in northern Mali. Without these systems, MDSF units based in northern Mali will not be adequately supplied or supported.⁸² Depot based logistical and services system, with regional depots co-located with major garrisons, is one option well suited for Mali.⁸³

⁷¹ Finding from AE 2.

⁷² Finding from AE 2.

⁷³ Rabasa et al, 125-126 and 153. Emerson, 678.

⁷⁴ Rabasa et al, 145-147 and 153. Emerson, 676.

⁷⁵ Finding from AE 2.

⁷⁶ Finding from AE 2.

⁷⁷ For mountain fighting during the reconquest of northern Mali see Nossiter, "French and Chad Forces Strike".

⁷⁸ Insight from AE 1. Pezard and Shurkin, 7.

⁷⁹ Austin Long, *On 'Other War': Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 62. Finding from AE 2.

⁸⁰ Finding from AE 2.

⁸¹ Keita, 112. Emerson, 675.

⁸² Finding from AE 2.

⁸³ Finding from AE 2.

4 WAY FORWARD

This study did not attempt to determine what role the U.S. Government should play in Malian reform or whether renewed security assistance to Mali would support U.S. interests in the region. Before the United States embarks on a new security assistance program, subsequent analysis is needed to inform policy decision making and operational planning. First, analysis of gaps between MDSF requirements and current capabilities, as well as the feasibility of the Malians closing these gaps without assistance, can help planners identify the areas that Mali requires security assistance. Second, the security assistance programs of allies and partners can be compared to the previously identified gaps in order to determine what role the United States can play. Third, and most significantly, analysis of the costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of U.S. security assistance in Mali can inform policy makers' determination as to whether renewed U.S. security assistance is in line with U.S. interests in the region and if so what level of effort is appropriate. Finally, analysis can help planners design and assess the country engagement plan.

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APPENDIX A ANALYTICAL EXERCISE 2 SCENARIOS AND RESULTS

This appendix provides an overview of Analytical Exercise 2 (AE 2) and its results. AE 2 consisted of a 2-day tabletop exercise that explored four threat scenarios in order to generate insights into MDSF operational, strategic, and institutional requirements. The study team developed the scenarios from a synthesis of research and findings from AE 1. These scenarios were not intended to be predictive, but rather illustrative in nature as a means for exploring MDSF requirements. The rest of this appendix provides a brief overview of each of the four scenarios explored as well as a summary of the scenario results. These results include the Malian response concepts developed by the participants, the potential gaps and risks associated with the response concepts, and the key capability requirements identified for each scenario. The appendix also includes a chart summarizing of the key capability requirements identified by scenario.

A-1 Scenario 1: Insurgency in Gao

A-1.1 Scenario 1 Background

After suffering severe defeats during the initial phase of French intervention, the remaining members of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) dispersed amongst the villages in the countryside surrounding the northern city of Gao and initiated a low-level insurgency. French forces and international peacekeepers proved able to limit the intensity and scope of the insurgency, but could not stamp it out completely. Although its senior leaders are foreign, most of MUJWA's members are Malian. The group has strong linkages to the local community in the Gao area, especially among lower status Arabs, Songhai, and Peul. With the departure of French forces and international peacekeepers, MUJWA has increased the frequency and severity of its campaign against the Malian state. The group has also sought to make common cause with disgruntled Tuareg clans near Kidal and Arab clans in Tombouctou.

A-1.2 Scenario 1 Results:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concept: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Co-opt and empower local elites. — Increase police/gendarmerie presence. — Combined security operations with improved governance and development. — Partner with local factions to provide security. — Target foreign MUJWA leadership. — Suppress with combined arms if threat escalates. ● Gaps/Risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Underdeveloped training system (mobile training teams as a potential stopgap). — Lack of enablers / combat multipliers. — Underdeveloped command and control / joint operations capabilities. — Use of irregular auxiliaries. — Governance and development. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Requirements Identified: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Civic policing. — Mobile paramilitary police. — Intelligence collection and analysis (especially human intelligence). — Advisory capability. — Targeting and direct action. — Motorized infantry. — Light armor. — Close air support. — Tactical and intratheater lift. — Civil affairs. |
|---|---|

A-2 Scenario 2: Northern Restlessness

A-2.1 Scenario 2 Background

The Malian Government has failed to address adequately northern grievances, especially regarding integration of the MDSF, decentralization, and distribution of resources. Sensing an opportunity to exploit these grievances for their own objectives, several lesser noble clans from the Tuareg Kel Adagh confederacy have initiated a rebellion against the Malian state. Two top tier Kel Adagh clans (Kel Affella and Iriyaken), fearing a loss of position, have also joined the rebellion in an attempt to co-opt it. Some Tuareg dominated MDSF units, particularly those with ties to the clans in rebellion, have defected. Others have stayed loyal, but due to internal Tuareg politics rather than loyalty to the Malian state. After attacking several MDSF garrisons near Kidal, the rebels have retreated to a stronghold in the hills to the north. Ethnic tensions in the north have been rising. Arab, Songhai, and Peul communities, fearing a repeat of 2012, have formed defensive militias. Thus far, the rebels have conducted no further attacks and may only be posturing for an improved negotiating position. But if the rebellion is not defused quickly, the rebels may move to seize control of the north.

A-2.2 Scenario 2 Results:

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concept: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Prevent: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Comply with previous peace settlement obligations. ● Integrate former rebels into MDSF. ● Information operations. ● Mutually supportive garrisons. — Contain: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Rapidly deploy quick reaction forces. ● Co-opt and partner with loyal factions. ● Coordinate with neighboring states. — Counter: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Offensive operations. ● Stability operations. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Requirements Identified: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Forward positioned forces. — Rapid reaction. — Motorized infantry. — Light armor. — Artillery. — Engineers. — Mountain operations. — Advisory capability. — Intelligence collection and analysis. — Paramilitary police. — Forward logistics. — Air support. ● Gaps/Risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Presence of MDSF in the north. — Uncontrollable local partners. — Inadequate logistics capability. |
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A-3 Scenario 3: Illicit Trafficking and Criminality

A-3.1 Scenario 3 Background

Illicit trafficking remains pervasive in Mali. Much of the trafficking, especially in basic commodities such as fuel and food, plays a significant role in the Malian economy. Cocaine trafficking has injected large sums of money into Mali and thereby fueled conflict in the north. In particular, traditional clan and ethnic rivalries have turned violent over control of the cocaine trade in Timbuktu. Weapons smuggled out of Mali have contributed to instability in southern Libya and Mauritania. Some MDSF units in the north have become complicit with cocaine and weapons trafficking. Bandits based in the north have raided both licit and illicit trade routes. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has regained some of its former strength and has increased its resources by taxing smugglers in its sanctuary in northern Mali and conducting kidnappings for ransom. It has also carried out terrorist activities in Algeria and Libya.

A-3.2 Scenario 3 Results:

- **Concept:**
 - Concentrate border security and customs at air and southern land points of entry (POEs).
 - Target facilitators in towns.
 - Interdict main routes.
 - Partner with local auxiliaries to police the desert.
 - Enact appropriate legislation.
 - Deny AQIM sanctuary.
 - Target AQIM foreign leadership.
- **Gaps/Risks:**
 - Cannot control green borders.
 - Uncontrollable local auxiliaries.
 - MDSF corruption.
 - Overmatched national police.
- **Requirements Identified:**
 - Urban civic policing.
 - Criminal investigation.
 - Quick-reaction paramilitary police.
 - Border security and customs.
 - Long-range desert patrol.
 - Air space warning and control.
 - Route interdiction.
 - Advisory capabilities.
 - Direct action/counterterrorism.
 - Mountain/desert operations.
 - Regional cooperation.
 - Professional education system.

A-4 Scenario 4: Institutional Problems in the MDSF

A-4.1 Scenario 4 Background

Prior to 2012 coup, the MDSF suffered from complicity with criminal activity, corruption, and lack of resources. Losses suffered during the conflict and factionalism surrounding the coup further reduced MDSF capacity. International reform efforts have made some progress in professionalizing the MDSF, but several severe challenges remain. Although the Red Berets were disbanded and dispersed into other MDSF units, they remain hostile to the dominant Green Berets. Northerners are disgruntled with the pace of their integration into the MDSF and their lack of opportunities for high command. Delays in the payment of salaries and a lack of supplies have led some MDSF units stationed in the north to feel neglected. Some units have become involved in illicit trafficking and other forms of corruption. Relations between the government and the MDSF have rapidly deteriorated.

A-4.2 Scenario 4 Results:

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|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Concept: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Improve core ministerial functions. — Develop professional education system. — Build long-serving non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. — Tie promotions to accountability and performance. — Rotation of personnel. ● Gaps/Risks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Lack of resources. — Poorly designed/built infrastructure. — Inadequate logistics/service capacity. — Limited resources for training base. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Requirements Identified: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Functional ministerial directorates. — Logistics/sustainment systems. — Medical/veterinary services. — Basing infrastructure. — Basic training. — Occupational specialty training. — Officer academy. — NCO academy. — War college. — Independent inspector general branch. |
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APPENDIX C PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS

C-1 PROJECT TEAM

Project Director:

Mr. William M. Fabian

Team Members:

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Other Contributors:

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C-2 PRODUCT REVIEWERS

Mr. Russell Pritchard, Quality Assurance

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Dr. Stephanie Pezard, RAND; Dr. Michael Shurkin, RAND; Dr. Andre LeSage, NDU; Dr. Austin Long, Columbia University; Mr. Peter Gwin, National Geographic; MAJ Jordan Becker, USMA; Mali-Sahel Team, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State.

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APPENDIX D REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

REQUEST FOR ANALYTICAL SUPPORT

Performing Division: OA		Account Number: 2013139		FY: 2014
Acronym: MSFAS		Start Date: 13-May-13	Est Compl Date: 15-Oct-13	
Title: Malian Security Force Assistance Study				
Category: Support to Strategic Analysis			Method: In-house	
Sponsor (i.e., DCS-G3) Name: USARAF			Office Symbol: USARAF G5	
Phone: (314) 634-8312	E-Mail: kevin.marcus@eur.army.mil		POC: Dr. Karsten Engelmann	
Resource Estimates:		a. Estimated PSM:		
		b. Estimated Funds:		
Models to be Used:		Product: Briefing and Report		
Description/Abstract: The Malian Security Force Assistance Study will examine the operational environment in Mali and Northwest Africa, develop an accurate threat picture, and assess the current state of Malian security forces in order to determine operational requirements and capability gaps. The study will inform USARAF and AFRICOM planning as they work to develop programs in support of Malian security forces.				
Study Director/POC Signature:			Phone: 703-806-6636	
Study Director/POC: Mr. William M Fabian				
PART 2				
Background/Statement of Problem: On January 11, French military forces intervened in Mali in order to halt the rapidly deteriorating security situation. The United States has offered limited assistance to the French military effort, including assistance with security cooperation activities.				
Scope: The study will focus on the requirements for Malian security forces, to include an analysis of potential threats and the operational environment, recommendations for force size and structure, and recommendations for the long-term development of a professional force.				
Issues: The draft analysis is due by the end of July 2013, therefore necessitating an aggressive study timeline. The study should be kept at the unclassified level if possible as it will need to be shared with international and regional partners.				
Milestones: Draft report due to sponsor no later than 31 July 2013.				
Signature	CAA Division Chief Signature:			Date
	CAA Division Chief Name: COL Edward T Powers			
	Sponsor Concurrence Signature:			Date
	Sponsor Name (COL/DA Div Chief/GO/SES): COL Kevin Marcus			

Print Date: 26-Nov-13

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