Joint Operations in the American Civil War: Blessings and Blunders
Abstract
Although the Union's military did not have a written joint doctrine during the Civil War, the Union's military commanders' unity of effort during their respective campaigns significantly influenced the outcome of battles, as seen in the successful Vicksburg Campaign and in the disastrous Red River Campaign. Therefore, this paper contends that the U.S. military needed to establish a joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning and not leave cooperation between Union commanders to chance. The paper analyzes the joint operations of General Grant's victory during the Vicksburg Campaign and General Nathanial Banks' loss during the Red River Campaign. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Union's military commanders' unity, or lack of effort, during their respective campaigns, which significantly influenced the outcome of both battles. The analysis concludes that in the absence of formal U.S. military joint doctrine as part of its strategic planning, Union victory on the battlefield was determined largely by the amount of cooperation among U.S. commanders. Unity of command is crucial to joint operations and should not hinge on the personality of the commander. The mutually supportive command relationship of Generals Grant and Sherman and Admiral Porter cannot always be guaranteed. A summary of both campaigns emphasizes the strategic importance of joint operations and focuses on the following: (1) command relationships between the Army and Navy; (2) unity, or lack of effort between the commanders at Vicksburg and at Red River; and (3) the commanders' personalities as the driving force between victory and defeat. Valuable lessons learned from both campaigns are addressed and applied to future United States' joint strategic naval and ground operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 04, 2012
- Accession Number
- ADA602725
Entities
People
- Randall K. Jones
Organizations
- Marine Corps University