

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Department of Defense, Executive Service Directorate (0704-0188). Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ORGANIZATION.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 09-04-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master of Military Studies Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) September 2011-April 2012	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Challenges & Concerns - Phase IV Stability Operations				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Jason A. Lacroix, USA				5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A	
				5e. TASK NUMBER N/A	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, Va 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER N/A	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A					
14. ABSTRACT Stability operations are not a new mission for the U.S. military. With a cultural bias towards combat operations, the Department of Defense implemented guidance establishing stability operations as a core U.S. military mission. Stability operations have become increasingly prominent in United States Government policies and doctrines. Even with years of experience, these missions present significant challenges to DOD. It continues as a challenge because we fail in addressing what tasks require commitment to planning and resourcing into the overall framework of the stabilization plan. This analysis reviews the doctrinal foundations of Phase IV and highlights the complexities of task synchronization during execution. The research suggests specific tasks that require commitment as long-term initiatives within the framework of Phase IV and highlight the challenges associated with them regarding unity of effort and time. Future planning for stability operations needs to focus in on non-standard considerations into the overall framework of the stabilization plan. Planners must research and evaluate creditable studies related to the operation and develop the appropriate plans to meet the commander's intent.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Stability operations, doctrine, Children in the Area of Responsibility, De-mining, Mass Atrocities, Unity of Effort.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Marine Corps University / Command and Staff
a. REPORT Unclass	b. ABSTRACT Unclass	c. THIS PAGE Unclass			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


TITLE:
CHALLENGES & CONCERNS - PHASE IV STABILITY OPERATIONS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:
Major Jason A. Lacroix, USA

AY 11-12

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Pauletta Otis, Ph.D, Professor of International Studies

Approved: 
Date: 9 April 2012

Oral Defense Committee Member: Edward J. Erickson, PhD
Approved: 
Date: 9 April 2012

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Getting Our Arms Around Phase IV Stability Operations

Author: Major Jason A. Lacroix, United States Army

Thesis: Phase IV (Stabilize) continues as a problem for the military because of a failure in defining what tasks require commitment to planning and resourcing into the overall framework of the stabilization plan.

Discussion: Stability operations are not a new mission for the U.S. military. With a cultural bias towards combat operations, the Department of Defense implemented guidance establishing stability operations as a core U.S. military mission. Stability operations have become increasingly prominent in United States Government policies and doctrines. Even with years of experience, these missions present significant challenges to DOD. It continues as a challenge because we fail in addressing what tasks require commitment to planning and resourcing into the overall framework of the stabilization plan. This analysis reviews the doctrinal foundations of Phase IV and highlights the complexities of task synchronization during execution. The research suggests specific tasks that require commitment as long-term initiatives within the framework of Phase IV and highlight the challenges associated with them regarding unity of effort and time.

Conclusion: Future planning for stability operations needs to focus in on non-standard considerations into the overall framework of the stabilization plan. Planners must research and evaluate creditable studies related to the operation and develop the appropriate plans to meet the commander's intent.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

TABLE OF COMMENTS

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
DISCLAIMER	ii
PREFACE	iv
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
CHAPTERS:	
INTRODUCTION.....	1
PHASE IV – WHAT IS IT?	2
Department of Defense – Phase IV (Stabilize)	3
Joint Doctrine – Phase IV (Stabilize).....	4
Army Doctrine – Phase IV (Stabilize)	4
PHASE IV (STABILIZE) COMPLEXITIES	6
What Do We Need to Accomplish?	6
Where is the List of Tasks?.....	7
The Purpose of Assessment in Phase IV (Stabilize)	8
TASKS REQUIRING COMMITMENT	10
Triage - Short Term	11
What about the Long Term?	11
Children in the Area of Responsibility	13
Humanitarian De-mining	14
Mass Atrocities	16
CHALLENGES TO THE LONG-TERM FOCUS AREAS	17
Challenge - Unity of Effort	18
Challenge - Time	19
CONCLUSION	20
APPENDICES:	
ENDNOTES	21
BIBLIOGRAPHY	24

PREFACE

In 2005, the Department of Defense implemented guidance establishing stability operations as a core U.S. military mission. In the last eight years, stability operations have become increasingly prominent in United States Government policies and doctrines. As a result, it has exposed military leaders and professionals to the challenges and complexities associated with these types of operations. As part of 1st BCT, 4th Infantry Division I was part of the initial ground operation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and prior to attending the Marine Command and Staff College, I worked in U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Iraq. I had a chance to witness the full circle and experience both full-blown kinetic operations and the complex world of stability operations. I wrote this paper to highlight the tasks associated with Phase stability operations and offer some potential long-term areas of emphasis the military could focus on while engaged during Phase IV. I hope that the paper will highlight how complex the tasks associated with stability operations are and how difficult it is to get our arms around them.

I would like to thank Dr. Pauletta Otis, Ph. D. for her patience and guidance in the shaping and preparation of this paper. Her insight provided during my frequent office visits and her elective provided me with enormous perspective on the subject both personally and professionally. Finally, I would like to thank my loving wife Heather and children Micaela, Devan, Chase and Julianne. I am forever grateful for their support and understanding working through the requirements for my Master of Military Studies and the curriculum of Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Joint Phasing Model	1
Figure 2. Integrated Approach to Stability Operations.....	3
Figure 3. Stability Lines of Effort.....	5
Figure 4. Example of Stability Operations Assessment.....	9
Figure 5. District Stability Framework (DSF)	10
Figure 6. Stabilization Timeline	12
Figure 7. Casualties by Item: 2010	15

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACT	Advance Civilian Team
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events
AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
C2	Command and Control
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CSO	Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DOD	Department of Defense
DSF	District Stability Framework
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
ETM	Essential Tasks Matrix
FACT	Field Advance Civilian Team
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Actions
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
LOE	Line of Effort
MARO	Mass Atrocity Response Operation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OE	Operational Environment
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction

S/CRS	State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
UXO	Unexploded Explosive Ordnance

INTRODUCTION

The transition from war to peace is not smooth. The research paper has two objectives: 1) to examine the non-traditional problem set faced once hostilities cease and, 2) highlight three long-term variables that require military planners and professionals attention in order to achieve success when the military transitions from kinetic to stability operations. The military does not possess a firm grasp on the factors required to assess when transitioning from Phase III (Dominate) to Phase IV (Stabilize). The analysis in the research paper does not serve as a “one stop shopping” solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle to show that the difficulty in developing competency in Phase IV stability operations. Phase IV (Stabilize) continues as a problem for the military because of a failure in defining what tasks require commitment to planning and resourcing into the overall framework of the stabilization plan.

Military planners and professionals need to understand the challenges in the joint phasing model (see Figure 1). This six-phase diagram models the character and duration of a campaign




Figure 1. **Joint phasing model** (Source – U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 5-0, III-41) ¹

or operation. Phase 0 (Shape) is intended to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and shape perceptions of enemies and allies. The goal in all phases is to maintain or return to Phase 0 without progressing to the next phase. Phase I (Deter) deters adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. Phase II (Seize the Initiative) applies to both combat and noncombat situations with the implementation of joint force capabilities. Military superiority becomes the primary course of action if a campaign or operation moves into Phase III (Dominate). The focus in this phase is breaking the enemy's will to fight or retain control of the operational environment (OE). Phase IV (Stabilize) begins with a shift in sustained combat operations. In this phase, reduced threats become manageable and stability operations begin. This phase becomes necessary when no fully functional or legitimate civil governing authority exists. Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) occurs when joint forces move to a support role with the legitimate civil governance in theater and transition to redeployment operations. The joint phasing model provides a strong foundation to build on for a military planner, but does possess a significant shortfall. The model's flaw is it does not address the significant amount of time and resources required or complexities associated with Phase IV operations.

PHASE IV – WHAT IS IT?

Phase IV (Stabilize) continues as a problem for the military. "America's experience with stability operations began with the *Royal Proclamation of 1763*. Intended to stabilize relations with Native Americans, the proclamation established British foreign policy to regulate trade, settlement, and land purchases on the British Empire's large western frontier."² The occupation of central Mexico in the 1840's, reconstruction following the Civil War, U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan following World War II, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the most recent experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan are all historical examples of U.S. involvement in

Phase IV stability operations. In these lessons, the military has learned that Phase IV (Stabilize) requires vast amounts of efforts aside from military to achieve success. The State Department also realized that Phase IV (Stabilize) requires enormous effort to achieve success. In order to improve coordination between civilian organizations and the military, they created the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004. The diagram below (see Figure 2) depicts the areas of emphasis for both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the S/CRS.




Figure 2. (Source – U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, III-2) ³

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE – PHASE IV (STABILIZE)

In 2005, the *DOD Directive 3000.05* is a policy regarding missions known as “stability operations”. “The *Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations* designated stability operations as a core U.S. military mission. By elevating stability missions to the same priority level as combat, DOD believed

future operations would include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and assist with reconstruction during those transitions. Over the last eight years, stability operations have become increasingly prominent in United States Government (USG) policies and doctrines.

JOINT DOCTRINE – PHASE IV (STABILIZE)

Joint Publication 3-0 *Joint Operations* defines Phase IV stability operations as “an umbrella term for various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”⁴ Joint Publication 3-07 *Stability Operations* provides the following guidelines for Phase IV (Stabilize) in the joint phasing model:

“1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces will shift focus to stability operations, even as combat operations are ongoing. 2) Of particular importance will be Civil Military Operations (CMO); initially conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect or rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. 3) US military forces should be prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, USG, multinational, or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of assuming responsibility. 4) Once legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, U.S. military forces may support such activities as required/necessary.”⁵

For the past seven years, DOD put a large emphasis on the importance of stability operations. As we continue Phase IV stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, joint doctrine regarding the subject is still somewhat generic. In order to acquire the necessary specifics regarding the subject of Phase IV (Stabilize), military planners and professionals need familiarity with Army doctrine.

ARMY DOCTRINE – PHASE IV (STABILIZE)

Army Field Manual 3-0 *Operations* defines stability operations as “an overarching

term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”⁶ A Line of Effort (LOE) links multiple tasks using logic to focus appropriate efforts in toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations* focuses on five primary LOEs within the framework for Phase IV (Stabilize): 1) Establish Civil Security 2) Establish Civil Control 3) Restore Essential Services 4) Support to Governance 5) Support to Economic/Infrastructure Development (see Figure 3). Within the framework, the end state conditions include the following: 1) A safe and secure environment 2) Established rule of law 3) Social well-being 4) Stable governance 5) Sustainable economy.




Figure 3. (Source – U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, 4-10)⁷

On the subject of stability operations, Joint and Army doctrine are compatible. Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations* links stability operations doctrine to joint doctrine and expands on the fundamental principles of operations expressed in Army Field Manual 3-0 *Operations*. Army doctrine provides a comprehensive approach and emphasis to Phase IV (Stabilize) after it incorporated the DOD guidance to elevate the priority of stability operations to the same level as combat operations.

PHASE IV (STABILIZE) COMPLEXITIES

The military trains extensively on the essential tasks required for success during Phase III (Dominate) of the Joint Phasing Model. It is that disciplined training and familiarity that make “a decisive operation to drive an adversary to culmination and achieve the operational objective”⁸ successful. DOD is inherently familiar with Phase III (Dominate). The military trains for the tasks associated with kinetic operations on a habitual basis. However, military responsibility does not end once kinetic operations cease. The unit now enters Phase IV (Stabilize) of the Joint Phasing Model and “may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting multinational, Intergovernmental (IGO), Non-governmental (NGO), or USG agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.”⁹ In the highest levels, there is interest into the nation-building venture of a defeated enemy and rebuild a country in a way that poses no future threat. The major goal is to identify requirements on the ground and the time to think about these factors is before the shooting stops.

WHAT DO WE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH?

Countries emerge from conflict under many different conditions. The priority and execution of tasks will vary from case to case. The range of tasks often encountered when

rebuilding a country in the wake of violent conflict is infinite. With such a broad scope of potential efforts, the first step becomes identifying what we need to accomplish. The answer may seem overwhelming, but the focus should go toward efforts both good for citizens of the country and maintaining peace after conflict. Most of these complex concepts fall into the realm of unfamiliarity. Across the spectrum, violence continues in many forms even though the Phase III (Dominate) is complete. In many cases, military thinkers assume responsibility for planning efforts in areas where they have little to no expertise. Because of this, military leaders and planners assume much of the responsibilities where they have no expertise should fall elsewhere. The truth of the matter is “the military’s predominant presence and its ability to command and control (C2) forces and provide logistics under extreme conditions may initially give it the *de facto* lead in stability operations normally governed by other agencies that lack such capacities.”¹⁰

WHERE IS THE LIST OF TASKS?

Regardless of service, the best units in DOD do things routinely and out of habit. When a military unit acquires new members, the leaders within unit are ultimately responsible for the training of that new member in order to get them up to speed. Unit leaders rely on doctrinal manuals, checklists and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). During stability operations, where does the planner go to acquire their checklist? Many factors merit consideration when planning transitions between combat and stability operations and the military’s involvement in stability operations is not something new. The dilemma is that within the military, USG, NGO and academic community there is not an all-inclusive task list to draw requirements from. Instead, each community has a separate framework with tasks that each view as its responsibility.

The following list provides some examples:

1. U.S. Army - Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations*
2. Center for Strategic & International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army - *Post Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*
3. S/CRS - *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*
4. U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) - *Guiding Principles for Stabilization & Reconstruction*

The four different task lists above show that military and civilian agencies do not share a definition of the problems related to Phase IV (Stabilize). The military, USG, NGO and academic communities tends to define the problems in Phase IV (Stabilize) and their approach to solving those problems based on their own core competencies and predispositions. Civilian programs and military operations required synchronization if Phase IV operations are going to achieve success.

THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSMENT IN PHASE IV (STABILIZE)

The military's legacy is never going to be how spectacularly the military defeats the enemy during Phase III (Dominate), but by how military forces stabilize the country and return control to the host nation during Phase IV (Stabilize). "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations."¹¹ In order to achieve proficiency during stability operations, the military must thoroughly plan for them. To do this, an assessment of ground level truth at the end of Phase III (Dominate) is required.

The military requires the ability to show progress or lack thereof. Each action or task within stability operations requires analysis in terms of things we can measure and should relate back to achieving our desired end state. Joint Publication 5-0 *Joint Operation Planning* defines an assessment as "the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint operation toward mission accomplishment."¹² The effort of identifying and creating

solutions for stability tasks require assessments with accurate and measureable results. They are essential to success in stability operations.

“The process of assessment and measuring effectiveness of military operations, capacity-building programs, and other actions is crucial in identifying and implementing the necessary adjustments to meet intermediate and long-term goals in stability operations. As time passes and operations, programs, actions, and activities become effective, local institutional and societal capacity will increase and the drivers of conflict and instability will be reduced, meeting the goal of passing the lead to local authorities (see Figure 4).”¹³

The assessment is critical, but so is the framework used to analyze the current and future OE.

Planners can use Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII)




Figure 4. **Example of stability operations assessment** (Source – *CALL Handbook No. 10-41*, pg 2) ¹⁴

analytical framework or “an analysis of civil considerations in the six categories of Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events (ASCOPE).”¹⁵ Assessment in stability operations can be more complex than a traditional combat assessment in Phase III (Dominate). Because of these complexities, it may be time for the military to adopt a more non-standard methodology for measuring progress and success.

The NGO and IGO communities are progressing forward with their versions of assessments as well. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides a unique approach to gain a clear picture of progress in its District Stability Framework (DSF).

DSF is a common interagency and effects-based program management framework that encourages “unity of effort.” The DSF is unique in that it: 1) focuses on stabilization not development 2) provides a common civil-military operating picture 3) provides information for integration into higher level civil-military planning.”¹⁶ The suggestion to consider adopting an assessment outside the military may provide planners and units conducting stability operations what they need. The DSF provides a “unity of effort” based model to potentially bridge gaps between the military and the other stakeholders within stability operations. The figure below visually portrays the DSF framework (see Figure 5).




Figure 5. DSF (Source – <https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/CIW.references.html>, slide 5)

The challenge with our current assessments in Phase IV (Stabilize) is the same one we face with what tasks requires our effort - standardization. The lack of standardization in assessments does not allow for a common operational picture shared by U.S. military and government agencies in OE there are trying to stabilize. The lack of common operating picture hinders both sides to address destabilizing trends before they reach a critical stage. The challenge is establishing good metrics for impact.

TASKS REQUIRING COMMITMENT

The signing of a peace treaty marks the official end of war and signals the beginning of post conflict reconstruction. A country ravaged by war will have an infinite amount of problems to deal with, so the first step is to identify the most catastrophic and prioritize the tasks. As the military transitions to Phase IV (Stabilize), it will bear the burden of responsibility over USG agencies and NGOs:

“Tasks with a security component, such as enforcing ceasefires, disarming belligerents, and training host-nation security forces, fall into a category where the military has the highest expectation of responsibility, whereas tasks such as providing support and resources to restore essential services, assisting in local governance support, or implementing public works projects for economic development are often shared civil-military responsibilities.”¹⁷

Regardless of who is responsible for what, at this point the most pressing issue for the military are the basic emergency humanitarian services required to mitigate human suffering and stop immediate loss of life.

TRIAGE - SHORT TERM

Initial response activities will dominate the beginning of stability operations and come immediately after the end of widespread violence. Triage is the process for determining the priority of something based on its condition. In the short term, it becomes a triage methodology to support an immediate humanitarian effort. Staffs must assemble data from across the country and build a knowledge base for providing humanitarian assistance including emergency food, water, sanitation, shelter and medicine. Many of these actions fall under the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix* (ETM) created by the S/CRS.

“They include tasks such as: 1) Assess total food needs for affected populations, 2) Determine the reliability of local market channels; assess availability of local supplies to meet needs 3) Be aware of local crop cycles so that local supplies can be used to feed populations 4) Evaluate water sources to meet needs and protect against contamination.”¹⁸

WHAT ABOUT THE LONG TERM?

When DOD executes full spectrum operations, Phase IV (Stabilize) is where we commit the most time. As the military enters Phase IV (Stabilize), the focus is on initial response activities in the form of humanitarian assistance. As initial response activities begin to slow down and the situation improves, what do military forces do in the long term? When DOD commits to executing Phase IV (Stabilize), military forces remain boots on the ground for a long period of time (see Figure 6). The timeline below portrays decline in the initial response effort




Figure 6. **Stabilization Timeline** (Source – U.S. Department of the Army, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively*, by Brian Watson, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2005, 11).¹⁹

around the beginning of the third year mark with forces remaining for another year. The military should seek a more active role in long-term initiatives while boots on ground. These efforts would focus on key social well-being challenges societies' face when emerging from conflict. In doing so, the military along with dedicated support of IGO's and NGO's can assist in the long-term well-being of these populations. It is at this point, where the military can

address these tasks and commit to planning and resourcing them into the overall framework of the stabilization plan.

Peace is not sustainable over the long term without addressing the population's social well-being. The *USIP Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* defines the social well-being as "ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement."²⁰ The long-term focus becomes the effort in helping the host nation coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement. For the purposes of this research paper, I chose children in the AOR (Area of Responsibility), Humanitarian De-Mining and Mass Atrocity Operations (MARO) as areas for military long-term focus during Phase IV (Stabilize).

CHILDREN IN THE AOR

An example of a problem requiring commitment is children in the AOR. Children are part of the equation for the military after combat operations and require long-term focus. They experience its horrors as casualties and combatants. The exposure to violence is something they have to carry the rest of their lives. Children may have emotional needs associated with posttraumatic stress. By not coping with them, these feelings could lead to prejudice against others the child may believe responsible for the conflict. During Phase III (Dominate), children go without. They lack structure, education and the necessary food and sustenance to keep them healthy as they grow. "Children are at particular risk from malnutrition because of war. A study in a war zone attributed only 2 per cent of deaths to violence; most were caused by the interaction of malnutrition and infection."²¹ War and children are not synonymous with one another when it comes to being involved in the fighting itself. A combatant organization views a

child as cheap because there is no need to pay them, easy to recruit through intimidation and easy to sustain because they require less food and water than an adult does.

“There are as many as 300,000 children under the age of 18 presently serving as combatants around the globe (making them 10% of all global combatants). Plunging children into a culture of war creates problems even after the war is over. For individual children, long-term trauma can disrupt their psychological and moral developments. For the wider society, the conversion of a generation of children into soldiers not only bodes future cycles of war within the country but also endangers regional stability.”²²

The decision by a country to solicit its children as soldiers is a costly one. During conflict, they face interrupted education, lack of quality health care and the loss of social interaction. After conflict, during Phase IV (Stabilize) the child is in danger. Their safety becomes paramount with the population wanting to seek retribution for their actions as former combatants. The military can assist in identifying the number and locations of the children that fit these circumstances. A long-term initiative can help these children with their feelings and foster resilience for their future. This can serve as the first step in rebuilding the lives of these children and assist in returning them to an appropriate level of normality.

HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING

Another example of a problem requiring commitment is humanitarian de-mining. During Phase IV (Stabilize), another long-term initiative worthy of military consideration is the “unsecured explosive ordnance in the form of landmines, Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO) or Abandoned Explosive Ordnance (AXO). Both pose a severe hazard to those unaware of their proximity and are enablers for criminals or insurgents to disrupt public order, impede development or continue the conflict.”²³ The military assessment of the numbers and locations of these is critical and assists the stabilization effort in a number of ways. Knowing the locations provides stability planners a more accurate picture of land that may or may not be used until a demining effort is complete. Landmines are often employed in soil used as agricultural land for

a host nation. Until the danger is countered by a de-mining effort, that land is not an option as a source provider for fruit, vegetables, grain or potable water.

“According to the *Landmine Monitor Report*, landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contaminate as many as 200,000 square kilometers of land in more than 90 countries around the world.”²⁴ The chart below depicts 2010 casualties in post conflict regions around the world (see Figure 7). In addition, the *Landmine Monitor 2011* “identified three governments laying antipersonnel mines: Israel, Libya and Myanmar. Use by non-state armed groups was confirmed in four countries: Afghanistan, Columbia, Myanmar and Pakistan.”²⁵




Figure 7. **Casualties by Item: 2010** (Source – *Landmine Monitor 2011*, pg 38)

Once kinetic operations cease, it is necessary to pick up the pieces and rebuild. In the case of landmines, UXOs and AXOs, it quite literally requires an effort to pick them up and adequately dispose of them. Because the U.S. military possess capabilities that surpass the interagency and United Nations (U.N.) De-mining communities, planners must consider these circumstances early on as military forces operate within these nations. The military response could come in the form of a humanitarian de-mining effort. “Humanitarian de-mining assistance is defined as activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other ERW.”²⁶ Although

humanitarian de-mining assistance normally does not support military operations, military planners can assist with education and training programs. The *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01B* provides the framework for Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions (HMA). “The goal of the DOD HMA program is to relieve human suffering and adverse affects of landmines and ERW on noncombatants. The program assists nations plagued by ERW by executing “Train-the-Trainer” programs of instruction designed to develop an indigenous capability for a wide range of HMA activities.”²⁷ A large portion of that training effort could go to teaching people how to recognize, avoid, and inform demining authorities of ERW and UXO locations. The assessment of such a threat by military planners is an effective way to counter these threats and a preventive measure in keeping the host nation safe from injury or death in a post-conflict setting.

MASS ATROCITIES

Another example of a problem requiring commitment is mass atrocity operations. When planning transitions between combat and stability operations, one must never forget the brutality of war. In a last ditch effort, there may be acts of retaliation and revenge or they may occurred throughout the conflict unbeknownst to the U.S military on the ground. “Over the last century, crimes of mass atrocity were reality, Cambodian genocide by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970’s, Rwandan genocide in the 1990’s and genocide in Darfur within the past decade.”²⁸ The stark reality is the world discovered these crimes after the fact. During Phase IV (Stabilize), the population is most vulnerable as they try to rebuild their lives. The country may have particular identity groups (ethnic, tribal, or religious) that engaged in fighting among themselves during Phase III (Dominate). In the long-term, the military may find itself acting as a “referee” in order to prevent these groups from fighting again or committing acts of violence on one another.

On August 4, 2011, the President of the United States stated, “Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States. America's reputation suffers, and our ability to bring about change is constrained, when we are perceived as idle in the face of mass atrocities and genocide.”²⁹ Civilian protection from physical violence, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, is vital. It is the responsibility of the military to plan for and intervene accordingly. In an effort to stop mass atrocities, a military planner may find themselves planning for and conducting a Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO).

“A MARO describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants.”³⁰ The focus is on those who were direct or indirect targets of the perpetrators. A potential framework for military planning objectives to support MARO could include:

“1) Vulnerable populations are secure from atrocities, 2) Leadership of perpetrators is identified, captured, and detained, 3) Humanitarian assistance is enabled where needed and 4) Transition to appropriate civil entity that will promote good governance, permanent security, and social well-being is accomplished.”³¹

In addition to the pre-mentioned objectives, military forces involved must identify and preserve evidence of war crimes for use in prosecution.

Intervention in mass atrocities is not standard practice for planning considerations or a military consideration when training forces, but it should be. The most effective method to address mass atrocities is to stop them before they begin, but this is not always the case.

“Planners should identify the key factors and tensions that are most likely to affect any potential operational approach and that offer insight into the specific tactics that can stop the killing effectively.”³² Bottom-line, the military must plan for the eventuality of intervention between victims and perpetrators.

CHALLENGES TO THE LONG-TERM FOCUS AREAS

Regardless of how many problems we identify or resources brought to the table during Phase IV (Stabilize), it is almost certain planners cannot account for everything. Once the military commits to planning and resourcing efforts it is certain to come across its fair share of challenges. DOD cannot successfully execute Phase (Stabilize) on its own. To confront the challenges during stability operations, our military requires leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners and time. The lack of these two things contribute to the military's deficiency in achieving results in long-term focus areas such as children in the AOR, humanitarian de-mining and MARO.

CHALLENGE - UNITY OF EFFORT

Collaborative planning in a stability operation, especially among the many diverse participants, presents unique challenges. Within DOD and the USG, "unity of effort" became a buzzword phrase for the last few years. From our strategic documents like the *National Defense Strategy* to our doctrinal publications, it is virtually impossible to escape the verbiage. Joint Publication 1 *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* defines "unity of effort" as, "Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action."³³ Joint Publication 3-07 *Stability Operations* defines it further the concept as:

"A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach is driven by the search for those combinations of USG resources and activities that reinforce progress made in one sector or enable success in another."³⁴

On 22 November 2011, the Department of State introduced the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). Their role is "advancing U.S. national security by driving

integrated, civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace.”³⁵ The CSO is responsible for leading all aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The USG provides a wide variety of national resources to counter drivers of instability and assist countries in Phase IV (Stabilize) in its Civilian Response Corps. “The Civilian Response Corps is a group of civilian federal employees who are specially trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide conflict prevention and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict.”³⁶ The Corps draws members from nine agencies throughout the USG to include the U.S. Department of State and USAID, both play a huge role to successfully prevent and respond to conflict around the world. “They are the government agencies best capable, in terms of both mission and capacity, of carrying out non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks.”³⁷ In addition to the CSO and nine agencies within the Civilian Response Corps, Department of State provides enablers in the form of Advance Civilian Teams (ACT) / Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACT). “The ACT deploys to the U.S. embassy or the Joint Force Headquarters (in the event that there is no embassy) to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders.”³⁸ FACTs are similar to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghanistan. The main difference is the FACT consists of solely civilians versus the PRT, which contains a mix of military and civilian personnel.

Along with the military, there is the CSO and nine agencies within the Civilian Response Corps contributing to Phase IV (Stabilize) efforts in the short and long-term. When addressing the suggested long-term focus areas, the other entity involved is the U.N. All three initiatives: children in the AOR, humanitarian de-mining and MARO represent global areas of emphasis for

the U.N. “Unity of effort” is a critical effort in order to achieve success, but the lack of one executive agent responsible for them makes it impossible to get them moving toward any measure of progress.

CHALLENGE – TIME

When most Americans want something they want it fast and they want it now. Phase IV (Stabilize) is no different. Missions that do not achieve a degree of progress consistent with expectations inevitably drain the energy of those implementing them. Ideally, we desire swift results that produce and try to do everything everywhere. If an administration sees fit to commit our military, it requires the time to commit to Phase IV (Stabilize). There is never enough time devoted to this phase of the operation and it becomes impossible for the military to plan for long-term initiative areas like children in the AOR, Humanitarian De-Mining and MARO. Part the decision in committing forces to Phase IV (Stabilize) must be tying our success of long-term efforts to measurable improvements in stability.

CONCLUSION

Contending with the aftermath of war is no easy task. The success in complex stability environments require the military to plan for and respond quickly to rapidly evolving conditions on the ground. DOD must be able to replicate the basic functions of other USG departments and agencies that may not be present in the theater of operations at the start of Phase IV (Stabilize). In order to do that, military planners must become accustomed in dealing with non-standard planning considerations into the overall framework of the stabilization plan. The research paper reviewed the complexities of Phase IV (Stabilize) and offered some long-term focus areas the military may consider, but that is just scratching the surface. Because many things associated with stability operations are non-standard to DOD, planners must research and evaluate

creditable studies related to the operation and develop the appropriate plans to meet the commander's intent. DOD, USG agencies and the U.N. all contribute greatly to the success of Phase IV (Stabilize) and each possess a significant amount of resources to solve existing problems entering post-conflict. Although not all-inclusive, the research identified potential long-term areas of emphasis that each of the stakeholders can influence the success of a Phase IV campaign.

ENDNOTES

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011), III-41.

² U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, FM 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 1-1.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), III-2.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011), V-4.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), II-13.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 3-0. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2008), 3-10.

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, FM 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008), 4-10.

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011), III-43.

⁹ *Ibid.*, III-43.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), II-13.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, DODI 3000.05. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009), 2.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011), xxiv.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *CALL Handbook -Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops*, No. 10- 41 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2010), 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24.2 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2009), 1-8.

- ¹⁶ U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare, District Stability Framework, <https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/CIW.references.html>, (accessed January 19, 2012).
- ¹⁷ Corri Zoli and Nicholas J. Armstrong, "Post-9/11 Stability Operations - How U.S. Army Doctrine Is Shaping National Security Strategy," *Prism* 2, no. 1 (December 2010), http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-1/Prism_101-120_Zoli-Armstrong.pdf (accessed January 9, 2012), 111.
- ¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*. (Washington DC: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, April 2005), III-2, III-3, III-8.
- ¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively*, by Brian Watson. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2005), 11.
- ²⁰ United States Institute of Peace & United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 10-162.
- ²¹ UNICEF, <http://www.unicef.org/sowc96/7trauma.htm>.
- ²² U.S. Department of Defense, *Armed Groups - Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency*, by Jeffrey H. Norwitz. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2008, 360, 365.
- ²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), II-11.
- ²⁴ United States Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining R&D Program, http://www.humanitarian-demining.org/2010Design/Threats_Overview.asp.
- ²⁵ Mines Action Canada, Action on Armed Violence, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch and Norwegian People's Aid, "Landmine Monitor 2011," *International Campaign to Ban Landmines* (October 2011): 1.
- ²⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), III-25.
- ²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01B. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 27, 2011), 1.
- ²⁸ Religious Tolerance-Atrocities Since World War II, <http://www.religioustolerance.org/genocide4.htm>

²⁹ President, “Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corresponding Interagency Review,” *Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities* (August 4, 2011).

³⁰ Sarah Sewall, COL (Ret) Dwight Raymond, Sally Chin. *MARO Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*. Harvard, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2010, 17.

³¹ Ibid., 56.

³² Ibid., 50.

³³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 20, 2009), GL-II.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011), B-1.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/g/cso/#>, (accessed January 22, 2012).

³⁶ Civilian Response Corps, <http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/who/index.htm>, (accessed January 22, 2012).

³⁷ Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), 7.

³⁸ Jay Liddick and David A. Anderson, “State Department/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Inception, Challenges, and Impact on U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Capacity.” *Inter Agency Paper*, no. 4 (April 2011): 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Civilian Response Corps. <http://www.civilianresponsecorps.gov/who/index.htm>, (accessed January 22, 2012).

Liddick, Jay and David A. Anderson. "State Department/Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Inception, Challenges, and Impact on U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Capacity." *Inter Agency Paper*, no. 4 (April 2011).

Mines Action Canada, Action on Armed Violence, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch and Norwegian People's Aid. "Landmine Monitor 2011." *International Campaign to Ban Landmines*, (October 2011).

President. "Creation of an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board and Corresponding Interagency Review." *Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities* (August 4, 2011).

Religious Tolerance - Atrocities Since World War II,
<http://www.religioustolerance.org/genocide4.htm>

Sewall, Sarah, COL (Ret) Dwight Raymond, Sally Chin, *MARO Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* (Harvard, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2010).

U.S. Department of the Army. *CALL Handbook - Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops*, No. 10- 41. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, May 2010).

U.S. Department of the Army. *Operations*. FM 3-0. Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 2008).

U.S. Department of the Army, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively*, by Brian Watson, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 2005.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Stability Operations*. FM 3-07. Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008.

U.S. Department of the Army. *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. FM 3-24.2. Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, April 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Armed Groups - Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency*, by Jeffrey H. Norwitz. Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2008.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication 1. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 20, 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operations*. Joint Publication 3-0. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication 5-0. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 11, 2011.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. DODI 3000.05. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Military Support to Humanitarian Mine Actions*. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3207.01B. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 27, 2011.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Stability Operations*. Joint Publication 3-07. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 29, 2011.

U.S. Department of State. *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*. Washington DC: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, April 2005).

U.S. Marine Corps. Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare, District Stability Framework, <https://www.mccdc.usmc.mil/CIW.references.html>, (accessed January 19, 2012).

United States Institute of Peace & United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009.

Zoli, Corri and Armstrong, Nicholas J. "Post-9/11 Stability Operations - How U.S. Army Doctrine Is Shaping National Security Strategy." *Prism* 2, no. 1 (December 2010). http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-1/Prism_101-120_Zoli-Armstrong.pdf (accessed January 9, 2012).