



AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES OF JOINT BASING

THESIS

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AFIT-ENS-T-14-J-16

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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THESIS

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Abstract

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) went farther than any other previous BRAC in attempting to discover budgetary efficiencies by redefining domestic military infrastructure. BRAC recommendation #146 set into motion the construct of joint basing in which installation support responsibilities were transferred to lead-Components resulting in 12 major mergers of 26 military installations. Much has been written on the cost savings progress of joint bases; however little has been written in academia as to the implementation challenges that have hindered true cost savings from being realized.

This research leverages the Delphi Method in capturing and ranking the top issues to aid senior leaders in resource allocation decision-making. Leaders from base support functions such as logistics, force support, security forces, civil engineering, and command staff comprised the expert panel that led to the identification of the top 13 joint basing challenges. This research was scoped to one AF-led, Navy-supported joint base, but has transportability to other joint bases and contributes to the mergers and acquisitions body of knowledge. The results of this research validate the current issues plaguing joint bases and consider the implications of future joint basing efforts.

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Charles H. Morton III

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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHALLENGES OF JOINT BASING

I. Introduction

Background

Necessity for Change: General Case

Resource constraints drive organizations, both large and small, toward decisions that reduce its fiscal footprint while, at the same time, improve efficiency and effectiveness. Historically, businesses have accomplished this by downsizing their personnel, redirecting and repurposing assets, and reshaping their organizational mission. As time marches on, the operating environment inevitably changes which causes organizations to change as well or face the consequences of becoming irrelevant and ineffective. The commercial sector has transformed itself as products become obsolete, competition intensifies, and stakeholders continue to demand that value be maximized and waste, as a corollary, be minimized. The government arena, specifically the Department of Defense (DoD), is no different.

Necessity for Change: Military Case

It is important to see the parallels between the DoD and commercial sector in order to understand why certain resource decisions are made. The DoD produces a product (war and humanitarian assistance) for stakeholders (the American people) with resources (land/bases, personnel, assets, etc.). The object of war and humanitarian endeavors continually shift in the strategic sense, which, in turn, drives operational

requirements. Emphasis on suppression of communist influence during the Cold War necessitated heavy resource-staging across the world. In today's political environment, a lighter and more agile force has proven more appropriate against the current global threats. Technological changes have increased the capability of both kinetic and non-kinetic effects, further decreasing the need for Cold War-level resource-staging. In the midst of technological advances and redirection of strategic mission, the U.S. fiscal environment has become more tenuous as the national debt and deficit continue to climb and the effects of sequestration and a slowly recovering American economy continue to severely restrict DoD spending. One of the main vehicles used for reallocating of DoD resources was the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) of 2005 which birthed the concept of joint basing.

Joint Basing

The 2005 BRAC was utilized as the system for the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the U.S (Department of Defense, 1990). The impetus for this round of military base restructure was not only value creation through base closing but transformation as intimated by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a 2004 report to Congress,

“BRAC realignments will provide the flexibility to reconfigure forces to meet new and emerging threats and to capitalize on emerging technologies. Further, recognizing that military operations almost invariably involve multiple services, BRAC 2005 will focus on opportunities to collocate forces from multiple services in ways that enhance training and operational readiness.”

Department of Defense, (2004).

The idea of transformation manifested in the form of joint basing, which was

labeled a priority for this round of base realignment (Defense, 2004). As a result, 12 joint bases were created:

- Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA: McChord Air Force Base (AFB) and Fort Lewis.
- Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ: Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, Fort Dix, and McGuire AFB.)
- Joint Base Andrews- Naval Air Facility Washington, MD: Naval Air Facility Washington and Andrews AFB.
- Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, DC: Bolling AFB and Naval Station Anacostia.
- Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA: Henderson Hall (USMC) and Fort Myer.
- Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK: Fort Richardson and Elmendorf AFB.
- Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI: Hickam AFB, HI, to Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI.
- Joint Base San Antonio, TX: Fort Sam Houston, Randolph AFB, and Lackland AFB.)
- Joint Base Charleston, SC: Naval Weapons Station Charleston and Charleston AFB.
- Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: Fort Eustis and Langley AFB, VA.
- Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA: Fort Story and Naval Expeditionary Base Little Creek.
- Joint Region Marianas, Guam: Andersen AFB and Naval Base Guam.

(Office of the Defense Under Secretary of Installations and Environment, (n.d.)

In light of this move toward transformation, a study into the challenges of joint basing is useful.

Problem Statement

The relatively brief history of joint basing coupled with its recency has led to a gap in the academic literature regarding the topic. Little has been written on its implementation challenges and issues even though many have experienced its effects. This research attempts to provide insight into the challenges and issues of merging two distinctly different bases with diverse mission sets into one functional joint base.

Research Focus

Current research zeroes in on the cost effectiveness of joint basing and leads to conclusions of whether the decision saves the DoD dollars over time, and ultimately, whether joint basing is a viable option for future BRACs. The context of this particular study is that joint basing remains a current reality and it could be implemented again in the future in order to achieve a greater degree of Service jointness. This may or may not result in overall cost savings. An evaluation of all the joint bases that resulted from the 2005 BRAC would, no doubt, bear fruitfulness in highlighting the challenges that result from base mergers; however this study is scoped to one Air Force led joint base. Even though base consolidations have a wide variety of combinations between the organizations being joined, especially in terms of mission, geographic location, Service culture, personnel systems, and Service leads; the support functions (i.e. manpower, logistics, security) share some common components that make the single base sample generalizable and useful. The functions providing research data represent base support

functions vice operations (flying, training, fighting, etc.), since the impetus for joint basing is consolidation of resources and support functions.

Investigative Questions

The concept of joint basing fundamentally veers away from the path that BRAC has historically travelled; therefore it would be useful to study the issues inherent in the process. The first area of concern is unity of publications and governing instructions given that joint base lead Services bring the supported Service(s) into compliance with its Service-specific instructions, regulations, and headquarters directives. Manpower is another interesting topic as supported organizations under the coordination of the lead Services follow differing staffing philosophies, especially with regards to civilian manpower. Next, financial systems of joining bases may be problematic since working capital funds could be converted to fully manned/funded operations and vice versa in order to have a unified funding process. Finally, the organizational structure up and down the chain of command could present some challenges as there is no “joint base in the sky” to give full implementation direction to each joint base. Much of the decision-making falls on local joint base leadership with general guidance from the lead-Service headquarters. The following investigative questions provide clarity to these curiosities:

IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?

IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing?

IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in mission impact?

IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?

Methodology

The primary data gathering method used in this research is the Delphi technique. Much of the information regarding joint basing challenges resides in the experiences of the personnel navigating its waters. A purely quantitative research method may provide insight into a function's performance, but it cannot necessarily capture the ranking of issues. The Delphi method utilizes both a qualitative (questionnaire) and quantitative (statistical analysis of answers) tool that leverages human intellect, opinion, and experience as well as providing quantitative context for the data (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). The objects of the study include functional "experts" from the mission support field, as identified by joint base leadership.

Assumptions/Limitations

The assumptions of this research are listed:

- The panel of "experts" have adequate knowledge concerning joint basing challenges to represent the opinions of their particular function in the study
- The results of the study are general enough to be generalizable to other joint base constructs
- Operational functions should not be considered for inclusion in the expert panel due to the base support nature of the joint basing
- The Delphi Study is an appropriate tool to unearth valuable insights into joint base challenges
- Future BRACs will consider expanding joint basing giving further utility to this study

While it would be beneficial to study the implementation challenges of all twelve joint bases, this study will be limited to one. This is due to the time constraints of the

study and complexity. The narrow focus may not capture the entire complexity of operations and may not be completely transportable to some joint base locations.

Implications

The results of this study will provide insight into the challenges of joint basing with various benefits to stakeholders at different organizational level. First, the site specific nature of the study will give an academically rigorous backing to joint base installation resource gaps, whether personnel, funding, or assets. Also, the research will validate the anecdotal information concerning the implementation challenges through the lens of an iterative research methodology. From an academia perspective, the results of the study will lead to generalizable results in the context of “business” mergers within the Department of Defense. Lastly, and most far-reaching, a deep dive into the implementation problems and issues from a construct as new as joint basing will provide opportunities for focus and improvement for current joint bases and lessons learned should the next round of BRAC include further base consolidations.

II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature that addresses the precursors to joint basing by analyzing the pre-2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds, 2005 BRAC that led to joint basing, critiques of joint basing, and a review of corporate merger findings. The BRAC rounds in the late 80's and 90's proved to be a paradigm shift in the way the Department of Defense realized cost savings via infrastructure cuts. The 2005 BRAC commission approved recommendations that were much more far-reaching than previous base closure rounds and created the construct of joint basing. In a non-governmental view, joint basing can be viewed as a corporate merger; therefore a look into the corresponding literature on mergers and acquisitions is warranted.

History of BRAC

Overview

The 2005 BRAC provides the backdrop for the purpose of this research; however it is crucial to review previous BRAC rounds that set the precedent for military base drawdown and consolidation. Before the idea of transformation via joint basing was birthed in 2005, the burning platform of burgeoning military spending, changing political climates, and shifting mission priorities resulted in drawdown of military installations decades earlier. A look at BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 set the stage for BRAC 2005 in which joint basing was created.

Pre-BRAC Years

The pre-BRAC years, spanning the 1960's to the late 1980's, were marked by distrust between Congress and the Department of Defense on the closure and realignment of military installations. In the 1960's, the DoD working in concert with the executive branch, unilaterally closed 60 major military installations as part of the largest restructuring in U.S. history (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The criteria for determining which installations would be affected were established by the DoD in absence of Congressional approval (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The political windfall resulting from the closure and realignment program constrained Congress to enact legislation to prevent the DoD from future restructuring efforts (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). President Carter approved legislation in 1977 requiring future programs to take into account local economic impacts along with environmental and strategic implications. This legislation coupled with the Department of Defense requirement to give Congress advance notice of any installation identified as a candidate for closure halted most attempts at changing the military base infrastructure pre-BRAC (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). This stalemate between the executive and legislative branch was broken in 1988 with the advent of the Base Realignment and Closure commission.

1988 BRAC

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) was commissioned on May 3, 1988 for the purpose of recommending military installations for closure or realignment (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The goal of the 1988 BRAC was to reduce cost and improve the national defense structure through improving military installation efficiency (Ribicoff &

Edwards, 1988). In years previous to the 1988 commission, Congress prevented military installation closures by requiring that any bases with more than 300 personnel be approved by Congress with additional requirements to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The new legislation authorizing base realignment and closure via an independent and bipartisan commission overruled the decade-old way of direct Congressional approval and allowed the Department of Defense to reevaluate the military value and cost effectiveness of its installations (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The military value factors, which became the basis for closure and realignment for the 1988 BRAC, are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Military Value Factors and Physical Attributes:

Military Value Factors (1988 BRAC)
Mission Suitability
Availability of Facilities
Quality of Facilities
Quality of Life
Community Support

Adapted from Ribicoff & Edwards (1988).

The commission in consideration of the military value factors ultimately decided on 145 actions affecting military installations with 86 of those fully closing bases (Ribicoff & Edwards, 1988). The 1988 BRAC was the template for further realignment and closure efforts.

1991 BRAC

The 1991 BRAC continued the multi-year installation realignment and closure program by justifying drawdown on the basis of America's post-Cold War status. A focus for this round of BRAC was the reduction of domestic military bases. In total, 43 base closures and 28 realignments were approved by the commission promising savings of \$6.5 billion (Department of Defense, 1991). A force structure plan was submitted to Congress assessing national security threats, addressing projected military end-strength in light of the reduced Soviet threat, and substantiating the need for continued overseas basing (Department of Defense, 1991). The criteria presented to Congress for installation closure and realignments are presented below:

- Military Value
 - Current and future mission requirements
 - Availability and condition of land, facilities, and airspace
 - Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements
 - Cost and manpower implications
- Return on Investment
 - Extent and timing of potential costs and savings
- Impacts
 - Economic impacts on communities
 - Ability of communities to support forces, missions, and personnel

(Department of Defense, 1991)

1993 BRAC

The 1993 BRAC commission emphasized the declining Department of Defense budget and across the board military manpower reductions as the burning platforms for further installation closures and realignments (Department of Defense, 1993). Reduced spending for overseas military bases and reduction of the overseas military footprint were emphasized as major vehicles for reinvestment in the U.S. (Department of Defense, 1993). The commission recommended 165 actions that included 31 major base closings with projected savings of \$3.1 billion (Department of Defense, 1993). The military value criteria used in 1993 was almost identical to that of the 1991 BRAC with the one addition of environmental impact (Department of Defense, 1993).

1995 BRAC

The impetus for BRAC '95 was the thinking that Department of Defense infrastructure should fall in line with the 1/3 reduction of military personnel over the previous decade (Department of Defense, 1995). In the end, the 1995 commission reduced continental U.S. infrastructure by 21% (146 installations closed or realigned) with \$4 billion promised in savings over the following six years (Department of Defense, 1995). The criteria for base closure and realignment remained the same in 1995 as previous years; however the method of savings generation expanded to the closure of Army, Navy, and DLA depots/shipyards along with reducing activity at the Air Force's Air Logistics Centers (Department of Defense, 1995).

BRAC Impact 1988 to 1995

The Base Realignment and Closure construct busted the logjam of efforts to reduce the domestic military infrastructure in the new post-Cold War era. This is evidenced by the fact that only four bases were closed in the decade prior to the first BRAC (Department of Defense, 1995). Figure 1 captures the cost savings of the BRAC actions from 1988-1995.

	BRAC Costs & Savings (Billions of FY 96\$)				
	BRAC Actions	Closure Costs ¹	6 Year Net Savings ²	Recurring Annual Savings ³	Total Savings ⁴
BRAC 88	145	\$2.2	\$0.3	\$0.7	\$6.8
BRAC 91	82	4.0	2.4	1.6	15.8
BRAC 93	<u>175</u>	<u>6.9</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>15.7</u>
Subtotal	402	13.1	3.1	4.2	38.3
BRAC 95	<u>146</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>1.8</u>	<u>18.4</u>
Total	548	\$16.9	\$7.1	\$6.0	\$56.7

Figure 1: BRAC Costs & Savings (Department of Defense, 1995).

The BRAC process resulted in the closure and realignment of hundreds of domestic DoD installations and billions of dollars in savings. The 2005 BRAC process went further than previous rounds by not only considering cost savings, but also military transformation.

BRAC 2005

Overview

The 2005 BRAC was unique amongst other rounds of closure and realignment, in that, it not only sought to reduce military domestic infrastructure, but also transform the way bases were administrated. Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear that this round

of BRAC would focus on achieving a level of jointness in installation operation (Principi, 2005). The resulting recommendations by the Department of Defense were deemed “more complex than “all four previous base closure rounds combined” (Principi, 2005). A total of 190 recommendations were made by DoD with the independent commission approving 119 outright and 45 others “with amendments” (Principi, 2005). Eight criteria for closure and realignment were approved and are illustrated in Figure 2.

MILITARY VALUE (GIVEN PRIORITY CONSIDERATION)	
1.	The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2.	The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3.	The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4.	The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS	
5.	The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6.	The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7.	The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8.	The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance.

Figure 2: 2005 BRAC Criteria (Principi, 2005).

The most compelling changes made in this round of BRAC was the idea of joint basing

Joint Basing

Recommendation #146 of the 2005 BRAC established 12 joint bases with the purpose of consolidating base support functions and transferring installation management responsibilities to a lead-Service (Principi, 2005). The criteria for determining the lead-Service (receiving installation) was derived from a military-value score, which evaluates

the ability of an installation to “absorb new missions or provide surge capabilities”

(Principi, 2005). The final tally of Service-led bases:

- 2 Army-led
 - Joint Base Lewis-McChord
 - Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall
- 6 Air Force-led
 - Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst
 - Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson
 - Joint Base San Antonio
 - Joint Base Charleston
 - Joint Base Langley-Eustis
 - Joint Base Andrews
- 4 Navy-led
 - Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling
 - Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
 - Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story
 - Joint Region Marianas

(Daniel, 2010)

A recommendation made by the BRAC commission was to create a common language by which Services could measure their performance within the context of the joint base (Principi, 2005). The Department of Defense’s response to this recommendation manifested into common output level standards (COLS).

Common Output Level Standards

DoDI 4001.01 defines COLS as

Output or performance level standards established by the Department of Defense for installation support using a common framework of definitions, outputs, output performance metrics, and cost drivers for each installation support function. These standards provide a description of the capability associated with the particular installation support function. Where appropriate, standards will be tiered to provide options for managing risk. (Department of Defense, 2008).

A major transformation such as joint basing where a Service transfers installation support responsibility to another Service requires some way to measure performance in the form of cost savings and mission accomplishment. This would be impossible in the absence of common terms and definitions for various types of installation support, thus the COLS were born. The COLS break down to 11 program elements and 247 individual standards. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the full list of program elements with the corresponding number of subcategorized standards over the last three fiscal years along with a subset of specific standards, respectively.

COLS Count over FYs

Program Element	Function per JBIG atch D	Comments	2012	2013		2014	
			# COLS	Change	# COLS	Change	# COLS
			280	-20	260	-13	247
Housing Services	1 Family Housing		2		2		2
	2 Unaccompanied Housing		6		6		6
Community Services	3 Child & Youth Services		6		6		6
	4 Lodging		6		6		6
	5 MWR		7		7		7
	6 Military & Family Support		8		8		8
Operational & Mission Svcs	7 Airfield Ops		14		14		14
	8 Port Services		14		14		14
	9 Small Arms Range Mgt		7	-4	3		3
ITSM	10 ITSM		25		25		25
Environmental	11 Env Compliance		5		5	-2	3
	12 Env Conservation		7		7	-3	4
	13 Env Pollution Prevention		3		3	-2	1
	14 Env Restoration	No COLS, Cost/Manpower only					
Command Support	15 Chaplain Ministries		6		6	-1	5
	16 Command Management	Incls CPVF fncs of Advisory Svcs, Honors/Protocol, and Inspections	26		26		26
	History & Museums	Later deemed not an IS function					
	17 Financial Management		7		7	-2	5
	18 Installation Safety		5		5		5
	19 Legal Support		7		7		7
	20 Management Analysis		4		4		4
	21 Procurement Operations		6		6		6
	22 Public Affairs		11		11		11
Human Resources Management	23 MILPERS		4		4		4
Security Services	24 Law Enforcement Services		5		5		5
	25 Physical Security Patrols		4		4		4
Logistics Support	26 Base Support Vehicles & Equip		9	-3	6		6
	27 Food & Dining		4		4		4
	28 Installation Movement		6		6		6
	29 Laundry & Dry Cleaning		2		2		2
	SSD (Munitions)	Later deemed not an IS function (2013)	13	-13			
	30 SSD (Non-Munitions)		8		8		8
Facility Operations	31 Utilities		4		4		4
	32 Pavement Clearance		1		1		1
	33 Refuse Collection		3		3		3
	34 Grounds Maintenance		3		3		3
	35 Pest Control		1		1		1
	36 Custodial Services		3		3		3
	37 Real Property & Engineer Svcs		7		7		7
	38 Real Property Leases	No COLS, Cost/Manpower only					
	Readiness Engineering	Later deemed not an IS function					
	39 Fire & Emergency Services		4		4		4
Facilities Investment	40 Emergency Management		9		9		9
	41 Facility Sustainment		6		6	-2	4
	42 Facilities New Footprint	No COLS, Cost/Manpower only					
	43 Restoration & Modernization		1		1		1
	44 Demolition	No COLS, Cost/Manpower only (2014)	1		1	-1	0

Figure 3: Program Elements & COLS (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014)

PE	Function	Sub-Function	Metric #	Description of Standard	Standard	References	Response Type	Calculations/Instructions	Notes
VIII. Logistics Support (cont.)	BSV&E (cont.)	Vehicle / Equipment Maintenance	4c	Maintain Vehicle Mission Capable Rate	60% rate for 24-hour vehicle turnaround of government owned passenger/cargo carrying vehicles during scheduled Preventive Maintenance Inspections.	ADUSD (TP)	Percent	Calculation: (count of vehicles turned around in a 24 hour period) / (count of vehicles turned around)	Consolidate and clearly identify vehicle type and maintenance actions this standard measures. Construction equipment was included in the BSV&E definition. This Metric will be used by JB BSV&E activities (military, civilian and/or contracted) that perform organic/in-house scheduled Preventative Maintenance Inspections on general purpose (commercially manufactured) vehicles, which are used by JB activities in support of Installation Support missions, that fall into the following classes (as defined in DOD 4500.36-R, section C3.1): - Passenger Carrying vehicles – Class I – IV - Cargo Carrying Vehicles – Class I – III 24-hour turn around rates for the following will not be factored into Standard/CVPF reporting: 1) Vehicles/vehicular equipment that do not fall into the categories above. 2) Vehicles/vehicular equipment that are not maintained and managed by the JB BSV&E activity. 3) Vehicles/vehicular equipment that are retained and managed by the supporting or supported Component as mission specific equipment (vehicles) IAW Personal Property & Plant Equipment (PP&PE) Supplemental Guidance for Implementing and Operating A Joint Base, paragraphs 1.2 and 2.5, dated 15 Apr 08. 4) Vehicles/vehicular equipment that are exempt from BSV&E activities IAW DoD Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Basing Implementation (JBIG), page D-29, paragraph 1, dated 22 Jan 08. 5) GSA wet-leased vehicles/vehicular equipment.

Figure 4: Logistics Support COLS Example (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014)

In reference to Figure 3, the Base Support Vehicles & Equipment function involves providing vehicles and equipment (without and/or without an operator), vehicle maintenance services, and transportation services (Joint Basing Installation Support, 2014). In this specific case, the vehicle support function is defined along with a standard service level for all joint bases. While the COLS support the vision of jointness in BRAC 2005 in terms of improved performance as a goal, the main driver for joint basing, and the reason for this and previous BRAC commissions, was cost savings. It is important to review the literature for an analysis on joint base cost savings.

Joint Basing Cost

Overview

If the main driver of BRAC is to increase the efficiency of domestic military installations in order to maximize value to the taxpayer, then it is appropriate to compare the original promise of BRAC 2005 cost savings with cost savings actually realized in the literature, especially with regard to the phenomena of joint basing. The Department of Defense claimed that \$47.8 billion would be saved as a result of the 2005 BRAC (Principi, 2005). An analysis of that claim is given in the next sections.

2005 BRAC Commission Critique

The 2005 BRAC commission discounted and revised the DoD's original cost savings projection to be gained as a result of base closures, realignments, and joint basing claiming that the \$47.8 billion in savings was actually closer to \$15 billion over 20 years (Principi, 2005). The commission felt that the military manpower savings factor calculated by the Department, which was calculated based on the reassignment of over 26,000 military personnel, would not translate to actual cost savings (Principi, 2005). The commission claimed that, in absence of actually cutting these positions, real savings could not be achieved even though military effectiveness would increase due to personnel being reassigned to higher priority missions (Principi, 2005). If the military manpower savings due to reassignment versus elimination are not realized, the one-time upfront cost estimation of \$21 billion significantly reduces the cost savings claims (Principi, 2005). While this critique was written pre-BRAC, it would be interesting to review the analysis

by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with regard to post-BRAC cost analysis.

GAO Critique on Joint Basing Cost Savings

A summary of GAO reports evaluating joint basing cost savings is given:

- Joint basing projected cost savings are not validated since they derived from a formula rather than through deliberations of commanders in the field and in absence of actual manpower studies (Government Accountability Office, 2007)
- The personnel requirements for joint basing are difficult to surmise, thus making it equally difficult to estimate accurate cost savings. Projected cost savings are estimated at 58% less than original projections (Government Accountability Office, 2007)
- Joint basing implementation efforts actually decreased the originally projected annual net savings by \$84 million which was the largest decrease for any of the 2005 BRAC recommendations (Government Accountability Office, 2009)
- New joint basing standards require some installation service level areas to actually increase from pre-BRAC levels as a result of increased administration costs and loss of efficiencies (Government Accountability Office, 2009)

A more recent GAO report regarding joint basing written in 2012 addressed joint basing efficiencies to a greater depth than before. GAO claimed that joint basing savings projections had dropped off by 90% and that the DoD lacked a method to effectively track cost savings (Government Accountability Office, 2012). In the report, GAO

concluded that the newly formed joint bases would cost more joined than as separate installations (Government Accountability Office, 2012). The GAO directly challenged the COLS as an effective method, in its current form, to provide a common framework for installation support since reporting of the standards were, in some cases, Service-specific and not common at all (Government Accountability Office, 2012). Additionally, some definitions of support standards were still deemed unclear (Government Accountability Office, 2012). As follow-on, the GAO identified joint basing as a “high risk” area due to DoD official’s lack of a reliable implementation plan to achieve cost savings (Government Accountability Office, 2013). According to GAO,

In regard to joint basing, DOD has established 12 joint bases. However, DOD has not developed (1) an implementation plan to guide joint bases in achieving anticipated cost savings and efficiencies goals, (2) a reliable method of collecting information on the net costs or estimated savings and efficiencies, (3) a consistent interpretation and reported use of the common standards by the joint bases, (4) a process to prioritize the review and identify potential revision of those standards, (5) a communication strategy to meet the needs of joint base officials, and (6) guidance to the joint bases on developing training materials to be used to inform incoming personnel about the specifics of how installation services are provided on joint bases. (Government Accountability Office, 2013).

The report concludes that the promise of an immediate payback period on joint basing upfront costs had not been honored by the DoD based on the commissions original report (Government Accountability Office, 2013).

Mergers

Overview

The joining of bases can be viewed in terms of corporate mergers. It is important to distinguish between mergers and acquisitions since both are sometimes used interchangeably; however the differences are important. An acquisition is the case of one

organization subsuming another by transferring the assets; thereby maintaining the original identity of the acquiring firm. (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). A merger, on the other hand, is defined as two or more firms joining to form a brand new entity (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). One could argue that, in the case of joint basing, one installation is acquiring the other's assets and personnel and define the joining together as an acquisition. In another vein, one could make the argument that the Services are merging at the installation level to form a unique entity as is the case of mergers. Whether by merger or acquisition, it would be fruitful to review the literature of mergers to understand more about joint basing.

People Considerations in Mergers

In a 2005 case study, Ullrich discovers that among two merging firms, the employees attributed significant value to the strong culture of their pre-merger organization and placed value in identifying as one of its members. This is an interesting parallel to joint basing since each military Service exhibits its own unique organizational culture. In the case study, members of the merging organizations reacted negatively to the loss of organizational identification due to the fast-paced nature of the merger (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). Ullrich (2005) points to structural and procedural uncertainty as the general category of feelings experienced by merging employees in the new organization, such as the difficulty in knowing who to contact for vital information, the challenges presented by additional levels of bureaucracy, and the fear of an unclear future. In addition to uncertainty, merging employees struggled with the general category of symbols and symbolic actions from the top (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005).

Symbols were described as instances of one firm being underrepresented in key pre-merger leadership meetings or not identifying with the merged firm's new logo (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). Symbolic actions from the top were characterized as distrust of the new CEO who, in the case study, demanded more cost-saving, but also held meetings in locations that were seen as exorbitant in cost (Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005). Table 2 summarizes the discontinuity employees experienced by way of uncertainty and symbolism.

Table 2: Themes of Uncertainty and Symbols Found in Merging Organizations

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Uncertainty</i>	<i>Symbols and symbolic action from the top</i>
Examples	Implementation too fast, 'act of force' Higher complexity in communication system Unclear personal future Unclear company future/identity	Composition of company board Logo/name of company CEO behaviour Non-participative decision-making

(Ullrich, Wieseke, & Van Dick, 2005)

A quote from employees in Ullrich's case study (2005) sums up their recommendations for implementation of the merger, "During the implementation of the new structure it felt like one was trying to shorten a pregnancy from nine to two months. Of course we are unsatisfied with the result, but now it is too late."

Stepfamily Metaphor

The step-family view of corporate mergers refers to the study of sociology; in that, corporations are much like families with mergers being akin to marriages (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). This seems to fit in a joint basing context since the different military Services are like families who are quite different in the way they conduct

business. Corporations, like the military Services, have their own culture, hierarchies, and interrelationships (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Corporations are like to families since they are not static, but dynamic with different members taking on certain roles (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). In the context of merger and acquisition, the acquired company takes on the role as the stepchild and is subordinated to its new corporate family (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Despite the situation where both corporate families are seen as equals, a dominant firm typically emerges (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). In the joint basing case, the supported Service could be seen as the acquired firm, since the supported service transfers installation support to the lead-Service. In this case, the supported Service is the stepchild of the lead Service in the new military family. The same consequences (shock and high stress levels) that family members experience in the course of joining a new family are much the same as in mergers and acquisitions (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Some of the issues that need to be resolved in a merger, much like a remarriage, are high failure rates and boundary problems (Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005). Table 3 summarizes these points.

Table 3: Similarities Between Stepfamilies and Corporations Engaged in M&A Activity

Characteristics	Tasks	Issues
High Stress Levels Culture Shock Role Ambiguity Limited Shared History Complex Structures	Forming New Traditions Creating New Coalitions Establishing New Relationships	High Failure Rates Power Issues Coping with Loss and Change Life Cycle Discrepancies Boundary Problems Unrealistic Beliefs Information Asymmetries Insiders versus Outsiders Loyalty Conflicts Buyers Remorse

(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005).

According to Allred, Boal, & Hostein (2005), the success of a merger is influenced by the following factors:

- Dissimilarity in things like culture, management style, and organizational structure
- Problem children in the form of behavior problems like acting out, sabotage, providing misinformation
- Commitment such as viewing the corporate merger as non-permanent

(Allred, Boal, & Holstein, 2005)

Stepfamily Metaphor Summary

The step-family metaphor seems reasonable in explaining why mergers and acquisitions are difficult to successfully complete. In terms of the joint basing application, it is interesting to think of the lead-Service installations as subordinating the supported Service installations in a stepfamily type of relationship.

Post-Merger Integration

A study into post-merger integration yields some insight concerning the process by which firms, or military installations in the case of joint basing, become one entity. It is estimated that a half to two-thirds of mergers fail due to poor integration (Shrivastava, 1986). Integrating activities include:

- Coordinating activities
- Monitoring and controlling departmental activities

- Resolving departmental conflicts

(Shrivastava, 1986)

Why is integration necessary? Shrivastava (1986) explains, “Integration is necessary because large formal organizations operate through functionally different departments that perform a narrow set of specialized tasks.” Integration is a complex process that is influenced by variables such as the firm’s environment and size (Shrivastava, 1986). Firms have trouble integrating due to having their own unique systems and procedures and personnel show resistance to adopting a new way of doing things (Shrivastava, 1986). Shrivastava recognizes 3 types of post-merger integration, namely, Procedural, Physical, and Managerial & Sociocultural (Shrivastava, 1986). Procedural integration refers to combining systems and procedures in order to standardize work at various levels, including legal entities, accounting systems, and strategic business unit (profit center) (Shrivastava, 1986). Physical integration involves bringing together product lines, product technological systems, and immovable real estate (Shrivastava, 1986). Finally, Managerial & Sociocultural integration references the most difficult of tasks such as changes to the organizational structure, transferring personnel, maintaining morale and keeping employees motivated (Shrivastava, 1986). Shrivastava (1986) contends that a phased approach to integration is best and causes the least disruption to the merging firms and that particular attention should be paid the sociocultural aspects since they are the most difficult to integrate (Shrivastava, 1986).

III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to review the methodology utilized in the research. The primary method by which insights were gathered on joint basing challenges was the Delphi Method. The Delphi Method was developed by the RAND Corporation in the early 1950's and utilizes expert opinion to obtain consensus on a topic (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). Expert opinion was necessary in this study given the lack of available data necessary to answer the investigative questions. The Delphi Method is particularly helpful when the researcher must use expert opinion as the sole source of information (Cuhls, 2003). It is difficult to determine a specific metric that would point the researcher, unequivocally, toward the challenges of joint basing. There is no shortage of manpower, financial, and mission data to analyze; however, it is choosing the correct one at the exclusion of others that would make a metrics approach arbitrary at best. Additionally, choosing the correct metric is only feasible when the research problem is clearly understood. In this case, the Delphi Method does a good job of helping researchers understand a problem more clearly (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The best approach, and the one used in this research, was to gather a cross-functional panel of joint basing experts with the purpose of generating the appropriate data as part of a Delphi Study.

Method Overview

The Delphi Method operates under the assumption that “two heads are better than one” or in the case of an expert panel, n-heads are better than one (Dalkey, 1969). It was so-named after a Greek oracle from the city of Delphi in Greece. An oracle was someone who was known for substantial wisdom and knowledge, especially in the realm of prophesies (Yousuf, 2007). In this study, the panel of experts functions as “oracles” by leveraging a high level of expertise on the subject of joint basing implementation. The panel of experts interacts with the researcher in a systematic process through the use of questionnaires (Yousuf, 2007). One may question the use of opinion in a study, so it is useful to understand where it lies on the spectrum of validation. Opinion lies in the middle of the scale in terms of the kinds of information a researcher can gather. On the outer extremes are knowledge and speculation where there is a great deal of evidence on a subject and where is little or no evidence supporting a claim, respectively (Dalkey, 1969). It is in this middle area where the Delphi Method generates data. The bedrock by which opinion becomes the basis for understanding of a subject is anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback, and statistical analysis (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).

Anonymity

One of the features of the Delphi Method is its use of a panel of experts who are anonymous. Panel members are truly anonymous when they can freely express their opinions in the absence of group pressure, where ideas are judged on their quality rather than their source (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This is especially important in the context of a hierarchical type organization like the Department of Defense. In such

an environment, panel members' unique contributions could be lost through conformity (Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005). In the study, panelists' identities were kept anonymous by the use of questionnaires vice face-to-face interaction. The questionnaire allows the researcher to act as the facilitator without the physical presence of the panel members (Yousuf, 2007).

Panel Qualifications

The term "expert" should be qualified to some extent in order to validate the expressed opinions. The criteria used to determine expertise was:

- Knowledge and experience with the topic
- Capacity and willingness to participate
- Sufficient time to participate through the duration of the study
- Effective communication skills

(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahm, 2007)

The panel's knowledge and experience with the topic of joint basing proved strong with a combined 93 years of joint basing experience and 474 years of functional experience.

Each expert had an average four years of joint basing experience and 20 years of functional experience. Though four years of joint basing experience may appear low, as of this writing, joint basing was only six years removed from implementation.

Additionally, panelists were identified by their commanders and/or directors as the resident joint basing experts at their installation. In terms of functional representation, the panel spanned Logistics, Force Support, Security Forces, Civil Engineering, and Command Staff. In addressing capacity and willingness to participate, all of the

panelists volunteered to take part in the study. The tenor of the survey comments suggest that panelists were particularly interested in the topic at hand and were motivated to give their opinion. Potential panelists were notified of the time commitment in advance as a precondition for their participation. The effective communication aspect of the screening process was relatively easy to achieve since panelists represented senior level managers at their installation and require requisite communication skills for their position and grade. The grade breakdown for the initial panel with quantity is illustrated in Table 4.

Table 4: Panel Grade Breakdown

Military Officer	Military Enlisted	GS Civilian	WS Civilian
O-3 (1)	E-7 (1)	GS-11 (4)	WS-14 (1)
O-4 (2)	E-8 (1)	GS-12 (4)	
O-5 (2)	E-9 (1)	GS-13 (5)	
		GS-14 (1)	

With regard to the chosen number of panelists, between five and 30 yields the best results (Ogden, Carter, & Monczka, 2005).

Panel Demographics

The heterogeneous or homogenous nature of the sample of panelists is an important consideration that will, ultimately, drive the number of panelists upwards or downwards, respectively. A homogenous group allows for a smaller panel of 10-15 people while a heterogeneous panel may require more (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The researcher felt that the cross-functional nature of the panel merited a larger

sample, so 29 potential participants were initially invited to join the study. Ultimately, 23 panelists agreed to participate. The difficulty of surveying experts in a field is that they are often very busy which could lead to survey attrition (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). Attrition is also realized since, as the study moves to later rounds, more effort is required and response rate drops off (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).

Iteration and Controlled Feedback

Rounds

The Delphi Method is characterized by iteration, in that; panelists are allowed to refine their inputs in reaction to other group members' feedback (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The panelists' input is received in several rounds with a summary of results given from the previous round in order to move toward consensus (Dalkey, 1969). This study was designed with the intention of executing the process in three to four-rounds; which is typically sufficient for most research (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The rounds were conducted by formal questionnaire.

Method of Interaction

Delphi studies have typically been conducted by paper or electronic means (Cuhls, 2003). Use of electronic means vice paper aids in keeping panelists engaged and motivated due to the quicker turnarounds of information (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The geographic separation of the researcher and panel members necessitated an electronic questionnaire via website and email. The internet questionnaire and email (blind courtesy copy and one-on-one emailing) also helped achieve the aforementioned anonymity between the panelists.

Initial Questionnaire

The first questionnaire contained one open-ended question for the panelists to answer in order to elicit unconstrained response and ideas (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The panelists should be encouraged to list as many items as necessary (Schmidt, 1997). Though an open-ended question, as opposed to a focus question, is more time-consuming, it is important for the researcher to not lead the panel of experts to any conclusions (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The open-ended question was stated as such:

- What are the challenges of joint basing, either specific to your functional area or in general? Please expound on your thoughts and provide examples as necessary. Please provide a minimum of 3 challenges. There is no maximum.

The initial questionnaire was designed to validate the investigative questions, namely:

IQ 1. What publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?

IQ 2. What are the manpower challenges unique to joint basing?

IQ 3. What are the funding challenges, unique to joint basing, that have resulted in mission impact?

IQ 4. How is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization's mission?

The open-ended question design is an important aspect of this first step since panel Members can become frustrated or fail to give a meaningful response if the question is vague or confusing (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The initial question was defined with the help of the research sponsor in order to avoid this pitfall.

Categorization Validation

Once the panel of experts answered the broad question, the researcher conducted an analysis of the answers. The outcome of this analysis was a categorization of themes and the removal and/or consolidation of redundant answers (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). In this joint basing study, it was the researcher's intention to have the respondents rank the categorized items. In order to achieve this, the list was pared down to achieve a meaningful ranking (Schmidt, 1997). An important step before proceeding to the next questionnaire (in which the panelists rank the pared list), required the researcher to request feedback from the respondents regarding the categorization, or else it cannot be claimed that a valid list resulted (Schmidt, 1997). Panelists were given the opportunity to clarify their comments and opinions or expand their answers (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This was accomplished by emailing the panelists their comments and the correlating categorization. The respondent was given the opportunity to either accept or reject the categorization. If rejected, the researcher would require feedback to appropriately re-categorize the item. In this study, all of the panelists agreed with the schema.

Paring the List of Issues

After validating the veracity of categorized responses, the researcher examined the list to determine if an appropriate number of items remained for the panelists to consider. A list of 20 or less items is considered workable for a panel going into the next round (Schmidt, 1997). It is important to note that the researcher should not take it upon himself to decide the top issues from the comprehensive list. This task should be left up to the panel of experts (Schmidt, 1997). A good rule of thumb in selecting the top items

is to keep only those selected by a simple majority of the panel (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). After a reasonable number of items are agreed upon, the group can move to the next phase. An example of the process is illustrated in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Delphi study administration process (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004)

Ranking

The consolidated, categorized, and validated list agreed upon by the panel was ranked in subsequent rounds. The decision to press on with an additional round or to stop the polling is an important one. If too few rounds are executed, the result may not be significant while too many rounds may lead to a greater level of panelist attrition (Schmidt, 1997). According to Skulmoski (2007), a good stopping point is reached when the panel achieves consensus. The panelists are asked to rank the final list of items, which should be distributed randomly to avoid order bias (Schmidt, 1997). The individual joint base challenges were alphabetized in the rank-order questionnaire to

avoid this bias. The idea of controlled feedback was woven throughout this process. Panelists ranked and re-ranked items in subsequent rounds with input from the entire panel until consensus was reached. The power of the Delphi Method comes into play here since it is more difficult to achieve consensus through direct interaction than through anonymous survey iteration (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). An example of the second questionnaire, asking the respondents to rank the issues, is illustrated in Figure 6.

***2. Rank the following joint basing challenges in order of joint basing implementation impact with 1 being the most impacting and 13 being the least impacting.**

☐	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs (total obligation authority taxing; broad cuts such as sequestration)
☐	Civilian reclassification/position description changover lead-time (classification backlog)
☐	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services (Lead-Service inherited vehicles/equipment that required short-order replacement or maintenance under Lead-Service business rules)
☐	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure (the migrating of policy and procedure into Lead-Service terms)
☐	Difficulty merging organizational structures (managing ADCON vs. OPCON of the Services' personnel; managing contract vs APF personnel; span of control increases)
☐	Geographic separation of joining installations
☐	Incompatible Service cultures (perception of performing a particular process "better" than joining Service; fundamental differences in Service mission priorities, training, operations, and/or leadership/management structure)
☐	Incompatible Service finance methods (differences in Service financial processes; reimbursable vs fully-funded operations)
☐	Lack of a joint basing manpower standard (insufficient manning under Lead-Service rules)
☐	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures (policies and procedures mostly fall in-line with Lead-Service rules; inflexibility to change)
☐	Lead-Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets (some adopted missions foreign to Lead-Service or overwhelming in terms of manpower required)
☐	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly (the resulting duplicate Air Force structure or separate reporting chains to joining Services)
☐	Perceived subordination to Lead Service (inequity in position or financial priority between joining Services post-FOC; loss of Service identity; lack of communication)

Figure 6: Ranking Questionnaire Example

Comments were integral in latter rounds to justify an expert's ranking and aided in timelier consensus (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Joint basing panelists were given the opportunity to justify and/or explain their ranking via a comment box on the online survey instrument. The use of statistical analysis is integral in the feedback loop to the expert panel and in deciding when an adequate level of consensus is reached.

Statistical Analysis

Overview

Statistical group response of the experts' opinions ensured that every individual opinion was represented in the final result (Pill, 1971). The aggregated individual opinions minimized the biasing of dominant panelists and ensured opinions were not unduly influenced (Dalkey, 1969). Additionally, statistical analysis provided an avenue for the researcher to know when to halt the study (Schmidt, 1997). The primary methods used in the research to achieve these ends were the Kendall's W and Response Data-Based Weighted Mean method.

Kendall's W Coefficient of Concordance

Since the ultimate goal of the iterative ranking was for the panelist to achieve consensus, an objective measure was used to determine at which point consensus is achieved. Kendall's W Coefficient of Concordance was the measure utilized in this study to determine the stopping point of the rounds. Kendall's W is considered the best statistical measure of non-parametric rankings (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). This method utilizes a least-squares solution to measure expert agreement and provides a comparative way to measure concordance round-to-round (Schmidt, 1997). Schmidt (1997) points out that it is a relatively simple measure that is easy to understand, making it a great fit for a Delphi Study. The range of values produced by Kendall is between 0 and 1 with the former signifying little to no agreement and the later representing perfect concordance (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). The range of values and their corresponding meanings are illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Interpretation of Kendall's W:

W	Interpretation	Confidence in Ranks
.1	Very weak agreement	None
.3	Weak agreement	Low
.5	Moderate agreement	Fair
.7	Strong agreement	High
.9	Unusually strong agreement	Very High

Adapted from Schmidt (1997).

Once Kendall's W value reaches .7, then the panel ceased iterating the rankings as a satisfactory level of consensus had been reached (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). In the case of a W value falling below the threshold, the feedback was sent to the panelists and the next round began, unless the value leveled off or the experts no longer wished to participate in future rounds (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Even in the case of relatively low values of W, the results could still yield statistical significance if the panel is large enough relative to the population (Schmidt, 1997). In this study, the panel members represented a large majority of the joint basing experts at the installation being observed. According to Kendall (1990), the Coefficient of Concordance is calculated by the following formula:

$$W = \frac{12S}{m^2(n^3 - n)}$$

Where S = sum of square deviations of the rankings

n = the number of objects ranked

m = the number of judges

The more the experts agree with one another on the ranks, the bigger the deviations become, and as a result, the coefficient gets larger (Kendall & Gibbons, 1990). Another measure utilized in the study was the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean method.

Response Data-Based Weighted Mean Method

While Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance is the quantitative measure of consensus for this study, a method was necessary to determine the final group rankings from each round. This was accomplished by way of the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean method. This method is necessary when the researcher believes that the degree of disagreement should be factored into the overall measure and it is especially robust in minimizing the effect of data outliers (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002). When compared to an un-weighted mean, as is typical in a Delphi Study, this particular method reduces mean absolute percentage error by a greater amount (Bruggen, Lilien, & Kacker, 2002). The formula for the Response Data-Based Weighted Mean:

$$DIST_{xij} = [X_{ij} - UNWMEAN_{xi}]$$

In this first step, the absolute distance between each response and the associated un-weighted mean (arithmetic mean) is taken, where:

X_{ij} = a particular response, j (rank) in a particular group, i (item among the list of items)

Next, a weight is computed for each response (individual rank), where parameter α corrects for systemic error (reference value of 1):

$$WEIGHT_{xij} = \left[\frac{\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} DIST_{xij} \right)}{DIST_{xij}} \right]^{\alpha}$$

Finally, the weighted mean is measured, penalizing or rewarding panel members, depending on the distance of their response to the un-weighted group mean:

$$WDMEAN_{xi} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_i} \left[\frac{WEIGHT_{xij}}{\sum_{j=1}^{n_i} WEIGHT_{xij}} \times X_{ij} \right]$$

This approach to determining group ranking from each round typically revolves around the median and standard deviation. However the median is a poor measure of central tendency when the dispersion is large (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).

Statistical Analysis in Controlled Feedback

Schmidt (2007) contends that more than just the mean (or in this case, the weighted-mean), should be communicated to the panel of experts at the beginning of each round. The other important feedback points are the Kendall's W and any comments from the previous round that justify a ranking (Schmidt, 1997). The researcher communicated the weighted-mean and the Coefficient of Concordance along with comments in the latter rounds of the Delphi Study via email.

Limitations of the Delphi Method

One of the risks, among many, of utilizing a panel of expert methodology is the potential diluting of the foremost experts in a group by aggregating the opinion (Pill,

1971). There is a tradeoff between interviewing one or two experts, thereby, potentially missing out on certain insights that others might have and increasing the panel to the point of dilution (Pill, 1971). The researcher decided that it was far more harmful to utilize interviews in order to unearth joint basing challenges given the cross-functional nature of the installation. Another limitation is that this method is time-consuming compared to other methods and could suffer panelist attrition (Hsu, 2007). Despite these limitations, the Delphi Study is widely accepted as the method of choice when dealing with imperfect or insufficient knowledge in a particular area (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This certainly applies to the murky environment of joint basing where functional biases and the newness of the phenomenon have hindered rather than helped bring the real issues to light.

Summary

The Delphi Method proved to be an appropriate way to generate data in determining the implementation challenges of joint basing. The relatively new nature of this basing construct required the bringing together of the foremost experts to generate the issues and rank them in a meaningful way. An anonymous, iterative approach to surveying works well in a vertical organization like the Department of Defense.

IV. Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview

The purpose of this chapter is to communicate the results of the joint basing Delphi Study. The Delphi Method was utilized to elicit the opinions of a panel of experts who possessed intimate knowledge and experience concerning joint basing implementation. Specifically, the panel was asked to brainstorm the top challenges of joint basing implementation and then participate in an iterative ranking of the issues until a final ranking was achieved. In the following sections, the researcher will present the results of the study and connect the results to the original investigative questions.

Results of Delphi Study

Panel Selection

The researcher selected the panel based on inputs from top managers and leaders in the targeted functional areas. Leaders were asked to identify those within their areas with the most breadth and depth of experience regarding joint basing implementation. In coordination with the research sponsor, the following functional areas were targeted:

- Logistics (transportation, supply, aircraft fuels, vehicle management)
- Force Support (manpower & personnel, food & recreation, family care programs)
- Security Forces (force protection, armory, crime prevention)

- Command Staff (safety, plans, legal, inspector general, joint base business office)
- Civil Engineering (base infrastructure management, emergency management, facility management)

(Department of the Air Force, 2011)

Potential panelists were contacted via email to request their participation in the study.

They were informed that the study would require a commitment of three to four weeks of availability and that it would be conducted mainly via email and via an online survey tool. Ultimately, the study lasted for four weeks. The researcher initially identified and contacted 29 potential panelists. The breakdown of panelists contacted by functional area is shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Request for Panelists by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Panelists	7	6	4	7	5

The researcher prepared a brainstorming round so that the panel could identify the joint basing implementation challenges to be ranked later in the study.

Round One: Brainstorming

The expert panel was asked to brainstorm the top joint basing implementation challenges. The online survey was open for seven calendar days with 23/29 panelists responding resulting in a 77% response rate. The panelists were given one open-ended question and were encouraged to respond with their top joint basing implementation

challenges. The question called for a minimum of three different joint basing challenges with no maximum. The resulting panel of 23 members spanned all of the targeted functions and is shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Round 1 Panelists by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Panelists	5	5	4	6	3

Round One: Coding and Categorization

The panel contributed 106 individual joint base challenges in the brainstorming round (see Appendix A). It was then incumbent on the researcher to pare down the list to less than 20 individual challenges for the panel to rank (Schmidt, 1997). Table 8 summarizes the contributions of the panelists by number of issues and functional area:

Table 8: Round 1 Contribution of Issues by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Challenges	34	19	17	21	15

The categorization effort consisting of consolidation of themes resulted in a list of 30 issues as illustrated in Table 9. They are presented in no particular order.

Table 9: Categorized Listing of Issues from Round 1

Category
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Difficulty merging organizational structures
Frequent leadership rotations
Geographic separation of installations
Incompatible automated systems
Incompatible equipment between Services
Incompatible Service cultures
Incompatible Service finance methods
Insufficient continual funding for sustaining joint basing
Insufficient MOA funds transfer at FOC
Issues not transparent to leadership
Joint Bases operate uniquely from each other
Lack of a Joint Basing Lead Service Manpower standard.
Lack of buy-in pre-FOC
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs
Learning curve for migrated employees without formal training
Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs
Manpower vacancy lead time
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Pre-FOC preparation not adequately accomplished
Rank structure does not support JB Operations
Resistance to change
Supported organizations changed support requirements post-FOC
Union issues

An example of the categorization effort is shown in Table 10. In this particular categorization, four separate statements were consolidated under ‘Budget Cuts’. In terms of contribution to this category, two Logistics experts, one Command Staff and one Force Support panelist gave input under the Budget Cuts heading. The bolded print represents key information that the researcher keyed in on to make the coding decision.

Table 10: Budget Cuts Coding

Budget Cuts Categorization
Detailed budget reductions made well above the installation level instead of being made at the installation level (local joint base partnership council) where the reductions could be applied to best fit the base's need and not adversely affect mission accomplishment and partner/working relationships.
The "taxing" of the TOA. Very little of the TOA is allotted to the joint base resulting in limited available resources to support to supported component at pre-FOC levels.
Sequestration/budget reductions will potentially impact the 628 LRS's ability to maintain the 628 ABW and 437 AW vehicle fleets. Vehicle Management had a projected FY14 budget shortage. The proposed shortage of funds will require LGRV, along with supported units and agencies, to prioritize vehicle requirements to ensure the success of JB CHS's global mobility mission.
sequestration limited/reduced funding currently/out years. Decision has been made to eliminate numerous vehicles

The entire list of categorized challenges is given in Appendix A. After categorization of the issues was accomplished, the researcher sent the categorized issues back to the panelists for validation that the essence of their input was accurately interpreted. Panelists were given four days to respond with 20/23 panelists responding. All responding panelists agreed with the classification schema.

Round One: Paring Down the List

The resulting list of 30 issues was still too many for the panel to effectively rank. The researcher considered two different ways to reduce the list to a level below 20 total issues. The first method focused on the number of mentions by category. In this schema, the number of mentions could include the same panelists pointing out an issue more than one time in their survey response. The results are given in Table 11.

Table 11: Categories by Number of Times Mentioned and Functional Area

Category	Logistics	Cmd Staff	CE	SF	FS	Total Mentions
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	2	1			1	4
Civilian reclassification/Position Description change lead time	2	1		1	2	6
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	4					4
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	1	1		1	1	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	1		2		4	7
Frequent leadership rotations				1		1
Geographic separation of installations	1		1	1		3
Incompatible automated systems	1					1
Incompatible equipment between Services				1		1
Incompatible Service cultures	4	2	2	4	4	16
Incompatible Service finance methods	5		2			7
Insufficient continual funding for sustaining joint basing	1					1
Insufficient MOA funds transfer at implementation	2					2
Issues not transparent to leadership	1					1
Joint Bases operate uniquely from each other					1	1
Lack of a Joint Basing Lead Service Manpower standard.	1	1	3			5
Lack of buy-in pre-implementation	1					1
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	3	3		5	1	12
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	2			1	1	4
Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs			1		1	2
Learning curve for migrated employees without formal training				1		1
Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs		1			1	2
Manpower vacancy lead time		1				1
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	1	1		2		4
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	1	2	2	1	1	7
Pre-FOC preparation not adequately accomplished	1					1
Rank structure does not support JB Operations			1			1
Resistance to change	3					3
Supported organizations changed support requirements post-implementation	1					1
Union issues	2					2

The second method disregarded multiple mentions of a single issue by a single panel member and focused on the number of panelists that addressed the same issue. The result is given in table 12.

Table 12: Categories by Number of Individual Panelist Mention

Category	Logistics	Cmd Staff	CE	SFS	FS	Total Panelists
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	2	1			1	4
Civilian reclassification/Position Description change lead time	2	1		1	1	5
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	3					3
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	1	1		1	1	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	1		2		3	6
Frequent leadership rotations				1		1
Geographic separation of installations	1		1	1		3
Incompatible automated systems	1					1
Incompatible equipment between Services				1		1
Incompatible Service cultures	3	1	2	2	4	12
Incompatible Service finance methods	3		2			5
Insufficient continual funding for sustaining joint basing	1					1
Insufficient MOA funds transfer at implementation	2					2
Issues not transparent to leadership	1					1
Joint Bases operate uniquely from each other					1	1
Lack of a Joint Basing Lead Service Manpower standard.	1	1	2			4
Lack of buy-in pre-implementation	1					1
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	2	2		2	1	7
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	2			1	1	4
Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs			1		1	2
Learning curve for migrated employees without formal training				1		1
Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs		1			1	2
Manpower vacancy lead time		1				1
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	1	1		1		3
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	1	1	2	1	1	6
Pre-FOC preparation not adequately accomplished	1					1
Rank structure does not support JB Operations			1			1
Resistance to change	1					1
Supported organizations changed support requirements post-implementation	1					1
Union issues	1					1

Since the object of the Delphi Study is to achieve a level of consensus, the researcher chose the second method. The researcher started eliminating categories from the list by taking out issues that were mentioned only once or twice until a manageable list was left. In the end, 13 issues were identified as illustrated in Table 13.

Table13: Resulting Round One List of Challenges

Category	Logistics	Cmd Staff	CE	SFS	FS	Total Panelists
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	2	1			1	4
Civilian reclassification/Position Description change lead time	2	1		1	1	5
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	3					3
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	1	1		1	1	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	1		2		3	6
Geographic separation of installations	1		1	1		3
Incompatible Service cultures	3	1	2	2	4	12
Incompatible Service finance methods	3		2			5
Lack of a Joint Basing Lead Service Manpower standard.	1	1	2			4
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	2	2		2	1	7
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	2			1	1	4
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	1	1		1		3
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	1	1	2	1	1	6

The list of 13 items provided the basis for the next round of the Delphi Study in which the panel of experts ranked the issues.

Round 2: Ranking the Issues

With the issues identified, the panel was given the opportunity to rank the issues from 1-13, with one being the most impacting issue of joint base implementation and 13 representing least impacting. The survey was open for three calendar days with 20/23 panelists responding for an 87% response rate. Table 14 breaks down the respondents by functional area.

Table 14: Round 2 Panelists by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Panelists	4	4	4	5	3

The respondent's anonymity was maintained by way of an internet questionnaire.

Panelists were given the opportunity to rank the 13 items, which were presented in alphabetical order, and invited the panelists to provide any comments via a comment box.

Figure 7 depicts the survey along with descriptions of each issue. The descriptions were based on the initial round one responses.

*** 2. Rank the following joint basing challenges in order of joint basing implementation impact with 1 being the most impacting and 13 being the least impacting.**

☐	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs (total obligation authority taxing; broad cuts such as sequestration)
☐	Civilian reclassification/position description changover lead-time (classification backlog)
☐	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services (Lead-Service inherited vehicles/equipment that required short-order replacement or maintenance under Lead-Service business rules)
☐	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure (the migrating of policy and procedure into Lead-Service terms)
☐	Difficulty merging organizational structures (managing ADCON vs. OPCON of the Services' personnel; managing contract vs APF personnel; span of control increases)
☐	Geographic separation of joining installations
☐	Incompatible Service cultures (perception of performing a particular process "better" than joining Service; fundamental differences in Service mission priorities, training, operations, and/or leadership/management structure)
☐	Incompatible Service finance methods (differences in Service financial processes; reimbursable vs fully-funded operations)
☐	Lack of a joint basing manpower standard (insufficient manning under Lead-Service rules)
☐	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures (policies and procedures mostly fall in-line with Lead-Service rules; inflexibility to change)
☐	Lead-Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets (some adopted missions foreign to Lead-Service or overwhelming in terms of manpower required)
☐	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly (the resulting duplicate Air Force structure or separate reporting chains to joining Services)
☐	Perceived subordination to Lead Service (inequity in position or financial priority between joining Services post-FOC; loss of Service identity; lack of communication)

Figure 7: Round 2 Questionnaire

The results of panelists' ranks are shown in Table 15 in two parts with the following identification schema:

- L = Logistics
- F = Force Support
- S = Security Forces
- C = Civil Engineering
- CS = Command Staff

Table 15: Round 2 Rankings

Panel Rankings	L1	F1	S1	F2	S2	L2	C1	CS1	F3	CS2
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	7	3	3	4	2	4	8	2	8	2
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	10	5	6	8	3	8	3	5	4	8
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	3	12	8	10	11	9	4	6	10	11
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	5	11	7	1	6	1	12	1	2	3
Difficulty merging organizational structures	11	9	2	2	10	10	6	3	5	6
Geographic separation of installations	8	7	13	11	7	13	5	7	12	1
Incompatible Service cultures	9	8	9	3	1	11	10	4	1	5
Incompatible Service finance methods	1	10	5	6	8	2	1	8	6	9
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	12	1	1	7	5	3	2	9	7	10
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	6	6	10	12	9	6	13	10	9	12
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	2	2	11	9	4	7	7	11	13	13
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	13	4	4	5	12	5	11	12	11	7
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	4	13	12	13	13	12	9	13	3	4

Table 15: Round 2 Rankings (con't)

Panel Rankings	F4	CS3	S3	L3	C2	L4	CS4	C3	CS5	S4
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	1	2	4	10	7	4	2	1	4	7
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	10	3	13	7	2	6	3	2	5	2
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	13	7	7	2	8	1	9	3	8	4
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	3	6	6	8	1	7	8	4	7	6
Difficulty merging organizational structures	9	4	9	4	5	11	5	10	2	8
Geographic separation of installations	2	8	12	5	11	8	7	5	3	3
Incompatible Service cultures	4	10	3	11	6	3	6	12	9	9
Incompatible Service finance methods	12	9	11	12	10	12	12	9	10	10
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	6	1	10	6	3	2	1	7	6	11
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	8	12	2	9	12	5	4	13	13	5
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	7	11	5	1	13	10	11	6	11	12
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	5	5	8	13	4	13	13	8	1	1
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	11	13	1	3	9	9	10	11	12	13

Round 2: Ranking Analysis

Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance was computed to determine the level of round one consensus. Once again, values closer to .1 signify weak agreement and values closer to .7 represent very strong agreement. Utilizing Kendall's method, the round 2 resulting value was .15 with a corresponding p-value of >.001 (statistically significant at the .05 level); therefore, more rounds were needed to move toward consensus. The Response Data-Weighted Mean Method (WDM) was computed in order to generate the final group ranking for round two. The results of the round two ranking are given in Table 16.

Table 16: Round 2 Weighted Mean Group Ranking

Panel Rankings	WDM	WDM Rank
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	3.8	1
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	3.93	2
Incompatible Service finance methods	4.23	3
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	5.32	4
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	5.71	5
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	5.83	6
Difficulty merging organizational structures	5.95	7
Geographic separation of installations	7.13	8
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	7.49	9
Incompatible Service cultures	7.8	10
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	8.33	11
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	8.93	12
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	12.67	13

The consensus level value and the final group ranking for round two were utilized as the foundation of round three.

Round 3: Controlled Feedback

The panel of experts was given the opportunity to improve upon their individual rankings by the controlled feedback process. The researcher conveyed to each panelist via email their individual rankings from the previous round (round two) and the final group rankings. The round three questionnaire was open for five days with 17/20 panelists responding achieving an 85% response rate. A breakdown of the round three panelists by functional area is given in Table 17.

Table 17: Round 3 Panelists by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Panelists	3	4	4	4	2

Once again, the panelists were asked to re-rank the issues, 1-13, in light of the group ranking. The researcher also offered the opportunity for panelists to give comments on their ranking, especially if it significantly differed from the group ranking. The order of the items on the questionnaire was initially given in the group ranking order and panelists were given instructions to re-rank the issues. The next round questionnaire is provided in Figure 8.

***2. Rank the following joint basing challenges in order of joint basing implementation impact with 1 being the most impacting and 13 being the least impacting.**

☐	☐	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
☐	☐	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
☐	☐	Incompatible Service finance methods
☐	☐	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
☐	☐	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
☐	☐	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
☐	☐	Difficulty merging organizational structures
☐	☐	Geographic separation of installations
☐	☐	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
☐	☐	Incompatible Service cultures
☐	☐	Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.
☐	☐	Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
☐	☐	Perceived subordination to Lead Service

Figure 8: Round 3 Questionnaire

Round 3: Ranking the Issues

To maintain continuity, panelists' original designations were maintained. For example, a panelist labeled 'L-2' in the previous round kept the same label throughout the study. If 'L-1' were to drop out of the next round, then the panelist identified as 'L-2' would still keep the same designation and not be re-named 'L-1'. The results of the round three ranking by individual panelist are given in Table 18.

Table 18: Round 3 Rankings

Panel Rankings	L1	F1	S1	F2	S2	L2	CS1	F3	CS2
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	10	2	3	2	2	4	2	2	3
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	11	5	7	5	5	8	5	5	10
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	4	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	2	4	5	4	1	1	4	4	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	9	7	6	7	11	12	7	7	11
Geographic separation of installations	5	8	12	8	9	13	8	8	2
Incompatible Service cultures	13	10	10	10	3	2	10	10	6
Incompatible Service finance methods	1	3	4	3	6	7	3	3	5
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	12	11	2	11	7	5	11	11	12
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	7	6	8	6	8	11	6	6	8
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	6	12	11	12	4	6	12	12	13
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	3	1	1	1	12	3	1	1	1
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	8	13	13	13	13	10	13	13	7

Panel Rankings	F4	S3	C2	L4	CS4	C3	CS5	S4
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	1	7	7	4	3	2	2	5
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	12	12	3	6	2	4	5	3
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	13	9	9	1	10	6	9	9
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	3	5	1	7	5	8	4	7
Difficulty merging organizational structures	8	3	5	11	7	3	6	4
Geographic separation of installations	2	11	8	8	8	5	7	8
Incompatible Service cultures	6	13	6	12	11	12	11	10
Incompatible Service finance methods	4	8	10	3	4	9	3	6
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	11	10	2	2	1	7	10	11
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	9	1	11	5	6	13	8	2
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	7	2	12	10	12	10	12	12
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	5	4	4	13	9	1	1	1
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	10	6	13	9	13	11	13	13

Ranking Analysis

The consensus value for round three improved to .38 with a corresponding p-value of $>.001$, which is significant at the .05 level. Since the consensus value did not approach the .7 level of strong agreement, another round of rankings was required. The weighted-mean method produced a round three group ranking that was different than the round two ranking. Table 19 illustrates this point.

Table 19: Round 3 Weighted Mean Group Ranking

Panel Rankings	WDM	WDM Rank
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	3.34	1
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	4	2
Difficulty merging organizational structures	4.18	3
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	5.75	4
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	5.80	5
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	6.18	6
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	6.49	7
Incompatible Service finance methods	7.31	8
Geographic separation of installations	7.48	9
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	7.53	10
Incompatible Service cultures	8.37	11
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	8.89	12
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	9.56	13

The biggest movers in terms of rank among the issues from round two to three were:

- Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (7 spots)
- Lack of a joint base manpower standard (7 spots)
- Perceived subordination to Lead Service (6 spots)
- Incompatible Service Finance Methods (5 spots)

The panelists were prepped for round four given the results of the round three consensus value.

Round 4: Controlled Feedback

As preparation for round four, the panelists were given their individual rankings and the round three group ranking as comparison points. Two other pieces of feedback were given to the panel, namely, the consensus value from the previous round and any issues in which they were statistically different than the group ranking. The statistical difference was determined by calculating the inter-quartile ranges (IQR) of the ranks for each issue. If panelists were outside of the IQR for a particular item, the researcher pointed it out as a statistical outlier for consideration in the re-ranking. The ranges and results are given in Tables 20 and 21 with the shaded regions in Table 21 representing ranks that were statistical outliers.

Table 20: Inter-quartile Ranges

Quartiles	1st Q	2nd Q	3rd Q	IQR	LF	UF
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	2	3	4	2	-1	7
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	5	5	8	3	0.5	12.5
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	9	9	9	0	9	9
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	3	4	5	2	0	8
Difficulty merging organizational structures	6	7	9	3	1.5	13.5
Geographic separation of installations	7	8	8	1	5.5	9.5
Incompatible Service cultures	6	10	11	5	-1.5	18.5
Incompatible Service finance methods	3	4	6	3	-1.5	10.5
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.	5	10	11	6	-4	20
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	6	7	8	2	3	11
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	7	12	12	5	-0.5	19.5
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	1	1	4	3	-3.5	8.5
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	10	13	13	3	5.5	17.5

Table 21: Statistical Outliers of Round 3 Rankings

Panel Rankings	L1	F1	S1	F2	S2	L2	CS1	F3	CS2
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	10	2	3	2	2	4	2	2	3
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	11	5	7	5	5	8	5	5	10
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	4	9	9	9	10	9	9	9	9
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	2	4	5	4	1	1	4	4	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	9	7	6	7	11	12	7	7	11
Geographic separation of installations	5	8	12	8	9	13	8	8	2
Incompatible Service cultures	13	10	10	10	3	2	10	10	6
Incompatible Service finance methods	1	3	4	3	6	7	3	3	5
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.	12	11	2	11	7	5	11	11	12
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	7	6	8	6	8	11	6	6	8
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	6	12	11	12	4	6	12	12	13
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	3	1	1	1	12	3	1	1	1
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	8	13	13	13	13	10	13	13	7
Panel Rankings	F4	S3	C2	L4	CS4	C3	CS5	S4	
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	1	7	7	4	3	2	2	5	
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	12	12	3	6	2	4	5	3	
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	13	9	9	1	10	6	9	9	
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	3	5	1	7	5	8	4	7	
Difficulty merging organizational structures	8	3	5	11	7	3	6	4	
Geographic separation of installations	2	11	8	8	8	5	7	8	
Incompatible Service cultures	6	13	6	12	11	12	11	10	
Incompatible Service finance methods	4	8	10	3	4	9	3	6	
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.	11	10	2	2	1	7	10	11	
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	9	1	11	5	6	13	8	2	
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	7	2	12	10	12	10	12	12	
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	5	4	4	13	9	1	1	1	
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	10	6	13	9	13	11	13	13	

The round four questionnaire was open for four days with 15/17 panelists responding resulting in an 88% response rate. Table 22 illustrates the round 4 panel make-up according to functional area.

Table 22: Round 4 Panelists by Functional Area

Function	Logistics	Force Support	Security Forces	Command Staff	Civil Engineering
# of Panelists	3	4	3	3	2

The survey presented the rankings in the order of the group ranking from round three. Panelists were encouraged to consider the group rankings in their assessment of the issues. Round four questionnaire is illustrated in Figure 9.

***2. Rank the following joint basing challenges in order of joint basing implementation impact with 1 being the most impacting and 13 being the least impacting.**

☐		Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
☐		Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
☐		Difficulty merging organizational structures
☐		Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard
☐		Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
☐		Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
☐		Perceived subordination to Lead Service
☐		Incompatible Service finance methods
☐		Geographic separation of installations
☐		Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
☐		Incompatible Service cultures
☐		Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
☐		Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures

Figure 9: Round 4 Questionnaire

Round 4: Ranking the Issues

The results of the round 4 rankings are given in Table 23.

Table 23: Round 4 Rankings

Panel Rankings	L1	F1	S1	F2	S2	L2	CS1	F3
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	1
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	5	5	10	9	6	6	6	6
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	12	12	12	10	12	11	13	12
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	3	6	2	1	1	2	4	2
Difficulty merging organizational structures	8	3	3	3	3	4	3	3
Geographic separation of installations	9	8	8	11	9	13	9	9
Incompatible Service cultures	11	11	11	13	10	7	11	11
Incompatible Service finance methods	1	7	7	6	7	9	8	8
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	4	2	4	4	5	3	5	4
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	13	13	13	8	8	12	12	13
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	10	10	9	7	4	10	10	10
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	6	4	5	5	11	5	2	5
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	7	9	6	12	13	8	7	7

Panel Rankings	F4	C2	L4	CS4	C3	CS5	S4
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	1	7	4	1	1	1	3
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	9	3	6	5	6	6	7
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	13	9	1	12	12	13	13
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	2	1	7	2	2	4	4
Difficulty merging organizational structures	3	5	11	3	3	3	5
Geographic separation of installations	4	8	8	9	9	9	10
Incompatible Service cultures	5	6	12	11	11	11	12
Incompatible Service finance methods	7	10	3	8	8	8	9
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard	6	2	2	4	4	5	6
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	12	11	5	13	13	12	1
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	11	12	10	10	10	10	11
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	8	4	13	6	5	2	2
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	10	13	9	7	7	7	8

Round 4: Ranking Analysis

Kendall's W for this round was calculated at .63 with a corresponding p-value of >.001 which is significant at the .05 level. At this point, the researcher decided to end the study and forgo any further rounds of ranking for two reasons. First, the consensus value of .63 is near enough .7 (strong agreement) to warrant satisfaction with the round four

group ranking. The other reason to end the study was due to panelist survey fatigue and round-to-round panel attrition. Thus, the round four group ranking represented the final ranking of issues for the study. The final group ranking using the weighted-mean method is represented in Table 24.

Table 24: Final Ranking of Joint Base Challenges

Panel Rankings	WDM	WDM Rank
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs	1.9	1
Difficulty merging organizational structures	2.58	2
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure	2.66	3
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures	4.42	4
Geographic separation of installations	5.42	5
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.	5.68	6
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time	6.10	7
Perceived subordination to Lead Service	6.50	8
Incompatible Service cultures	9.08	9
Incompatible Service finance methods	9.28	10
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly	9.34	11
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets	11.16	12
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services	11.34	13

The most significant changes in these rankings from the previous round are:

- Lack of true jointness in adopting “best” policies and procedures (9 spots)
- Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly (6 spots)

Summary of Analysis

The panel of experts successfully generated a list of issues regarding joint basing, ranked those issues through several rounds of controlled feedback, and ultimately, came

to consensus on the order of the top 13 issues. The final consensus value of .63 gives a strong indication that the final ranking of issues is a good representation of reality.

Investigative Questions Answered

Given the results of the Delphi Study, it is useful to reference the original research questions to determine if they have been appropriately addressed and answered.

IQ 1.

Do publication conflicts exist within the joint base construct (i.e. AFIs, TOs, and/or other mandated publications) that are unique to joint basing?

Publication conflicts most certainly exist within the joint base construct. This issue was generated by the panel of experts and ranked as the #3 issue on the final list of 13 top joint basing issues (difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure).

IQ 2.

Are there manpower challenges unique to joint basing?

Manpower challenges were identified in the brainstorming round of this study and were agreed upon as the #6 joint basing issue (lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard). The answer to this question is undoubtedly “yes”.

IQ 3.

Are there significant funding challenges unique to joint basing that have resulted in mission impact?

Funding challenges were identified by the panel and ranked as the #1 issue of joint basing implementation (budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs).

IQ 4.

Is the joint base organizational structure, both internal and external to the joint base, conducive to successful operation of the organization’s mission?

The difficulties of joint base organizational structure were addressed in a couple of ranked issues, namely, #2 (difficulty merging organizational structures) and #11 (multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly).

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions of Research

The researcher, via the Delphi Study methodology, set out to illuminate the specific implementation challenges of joint basing. Joint basing is a relatively new military installation support phenomenon and much needed to be learned in terms of the effective merging of Department of Defense organizations. The information gained in this study, namely, the full list of top challenges, the pared-down list, and the final rank-ordered list provided some context to the difficulty military organizations can experience when merging.

The original list of 30 joint basing challenges generated by the panel of experts gives thorough context to the kinds of pain felt by senior managers and leaders within the logistics, force support, security forces, command staff, and civil engineering disciplines. The listing is given in Table 25.

Table 25: List of 30 Issues

Category
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
Civilian reclassification/Position Description change lead time
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Difficulty merging organizational structures
Frequent leadership rotations
Geographic separation of installations
Incompatible automated systems
Incompatible equipment between Services
Incompatible Service cultures
Incompatible Service finance methods
Insufficient continual funding for sustaining joint basing
Insufficient MOA funds transfer at implementation
Issues not transparent to leadership
Joint Bases operate uniquely from each other

Table 25 (con't): List of 30 Issues

Category
Lack of a Joint Basing Lead Service Manpower standard.
Lack of buy-in pre-implementation
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs
Learning curve for migrated employees without formal training
Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs
Manpower vacancy lead time
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Pre-FOC preparation not adequately accomplished
Rank structure does not support JB Operations
Resistance to change
Supported organizations changed support requirements post-implementation
Union issues

This data is significant since the responses represented the top issues on the minds of these leaders, and one could reasonably deduce that precious organizational resources, particularly time and attention, have been diverted to address them.

The pared down list of 13 challenges represented the issues that managers and leaders across multiple functional areas cared about the most. It may seem unreasonable for a leader to tackle 30 challenges at once, so identifying the top issues is an effective way to focus organizational resources in order to achieve the biggest bang for the proverbial buck. Furthermore, the top 13 challenges were rank-ordered by the panel of experts until the final list was achieved as illustrated in Table 27.

Table 26: Rank-Ordered List of Top 13 Issues

Panel Rankings
Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
Difficulty merging organizational structures
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Geographic separation of installations
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard.
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Incompatible Service cultures
Incompatible Service finance methods
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services

The rigor and iterative process of the Delphi Study research method adds credibility to these findings, since the research topic experts were given opportunity to contribute opinions that were tempered and strengthened through consideration of the opinion of other experts.

In terms of the original investigative questions, the joint basing Delphi Study revealed some insights. The panel of experts agreed that publication and policy differences between the joining Service installations were difficult to integrate, especially in terms of morale spending and equipment inspections. Manpower challenges were revealed by the panelists as a significant source of merger pain given the effects of most efficient organization cuts by the supported Service prior to joint basing implementation. Additionally, a lack of a manpower standard to match unique joint basing needs has necessitated expensive contracts to fill in the manpower gap. Funding issues presented themselves in the study in the form of budget cuts due to sequestration. One could argue

that the cuts came at a most inopportune time given the entire gamut of challenges that come from merging two organizations. Examples of organizational structure challenges were identified as multiple chains of command (the case of two different Air Force organizational hierarchies within the same joint base) and the case of having to report information to the different Services (via both Air Force and Navy chains of command).

Significance of Research

This study bridged the research gap in identifying the top challenges of joint based installations via a panel of expert study. Though some has been written on reported challenges by joint bases either anecdotally or via GAO reports, there exists no consolidated, rank-ordered list for managers/leaders. There are two contexts in which this information is useful. The first context is the present one. The top challenges intimated by the panel of experts are, in some cases, enduring issues that may or may not be truly resolved. There is no doubt that workarounds have been created in order to achieve mission success; however the optimal case entails fundamentally addressing the difficulties with the full range of resources at the Department of Defense's disposal. The second case is one in which future BRACs attempt to further expand joint basing, or in the extreme case, consolidate Services altogether. The list of challenges gives future BRAC commissions some considerations for attempting joint basing again. This is evident by the fact that GAO reports have correlated the lack of joint basing cost savings data with implementation challenges (Government Accountability Office, 2012).

Recommendations for Action

This section is organized by the researcher's and the panelists' recommendations for actions. The recommendations are given within the contexts of future joint basing attempts via the BRAC process.

Researcher Recommendations

The data suggests that there are 13 issues future BRAC commissions should consider when joining installations of different military Services. Since the list is rank-ordered by a cross-functional panel of experts, the issues ranked highest would have the broadest impact and, thus, should be addressed first. Senior military leaders should focus departmental resources on the top issues, so that the original intent of joint basing, namely cost savings, will be realized in the absence of major implementation challenges.

Panelist Recommendations

Table 27 summarizes the panelists' ideas to overcome implementation issues for future joint basing efforts. The information is given in context of the top 13 challenges identified by the panel. The full list of recommendations is in Appendix B.

Table 27: Panelist Recommendations

Budget Cuts
Dont simply look at an immediate cut to the budget, money needs to be placed in a joint account that both services can access. For instance our boat section was funded, but the money never made it to the unit paying the bill.
Funding received from other services should go directly to the joint base versus going to HAF and MAJCOM where it is taxed.
Field cuts to Joint Bases in a different program, not an "across the board" system
High profile customers demand higher levels of oversight and scrutiny.
Ensure joint bases are funded at an appropriate level to support their mission requirements.
Make sure HHQ understands how the money needs to flow so it doesn't get lost after the MOA is signed
Funding for unique programs should be identified by a separate line item
Joint Base more active in the POM / JBC more authority in installation decisions.

Table 27 (con't)

Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
The Air Force took over a boat section from the Navy but the Air Force does not understand, speak or do boat patrolling.
Joint policy and procedures need to be developed by OSD/JCS prior to merger.
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance
Lead is AF and doesn't use OPNAV requirements to match mission requirement
DOD regs should be utilized and created based on the best services regs.
AF lead bases are taught to implement AF policy across the board. We are not resourced to provide multiple standards.
Conference on AF vs. Navy (or other service) instructions to be certain the flexibility exists in the supporting service's policy guidance
Unique mission requirements of Services magnify this problem. As the lead AF AFIs do not address/recognize the unique mission of the Navy forcing Fleet and Family Support Center to operate under AFIs and OpNavs which is often confusion to staff and clients
Difficulty merging organizational structures
JBIG needs to address...current JBIG is weak
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance
AF procedures vice making procedures using both service requirements.
The AF have been in organization flux for too long now. Joint Basing affected that greatly as well. Time to stop reorganizing for a while so we can catch our breath.
If the intent is to flatten the organization to garner efficiencies, then actually flatten it.
Ensure all organizations transfer over using the lead Service model.
Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard
Support positions were cut causing one person to pick up the work of two people, this causes delays, slower completion time and slower customer service
OSD must develop a Joint Basing Manpower standard
Create standized teams w/parameters
Conduct manpower standards at intervals. 1yr, 2yrs, 5 yrs, etc. What is initially the standard will change once a merger is implemented.
Missed the Manpower study, should have done one before JOINT Basing. Now need one to match mission.
We essentially run two separate missions at a 15 mile gap between sections and a manpower standard could be used to ensure we have the right number of personnel in the right positions.
AF/A1 is ill prepared to service Joint Bases. Policies and processes do not serve Joint Base uniqueness. One size does not fit all. Review processes are too lengthy.
Ensure joint bases are properly manned to support their mission. Lead agency should have the ability to begin recruitment for projected vacancies ahead of FOC. Personnel and management need to anticipate recruitment needs and partner together to timely meet those needs.
We don't have enough manpower do support our partners/tenants and much of that has to do with the inability of the Air Force to understand the semantics of a joint/non-co-located population
Manpower standard application should be applicable to both Services vs. one. Example - recently release Airman and Family Readiness Manpower Study only applied to the AF; not to Fleet and Family Support Center (Navy component)
Manpower based on requirements, not on arbitrary cuts.

Table 27 (con't)

Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Too many bosses at a Joint Base. Every service O-6 has an agenda for their command.
Create one DoD military personnel system so we don't have two different sets of management chains.
Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
We are four years into Joint Basing and I have a percentage of my civilian workers on Navy PD's; due to the reclassification taking so long I can not replace any of those positions if they quit or are fired. This causes a shortage of personnel in an already lean environment.
AFPC must develop team which works exclusively with joint bases or allow classification to take place at base level.
AFPC implement a systematic process and/or increase manpower to review PDs
PD have taken years to accomplish and are still in works. This should not be lengthy process when compliance with AF instructions are necessary to complete the job appropriately. Civilians refer back to PD's on a regular basis for their job requirements and the PD is needed to hold them accountable to the mission we need them to accomplish.
A1 is not capable of servicing the uniqueness of Joint Bases.
Ensure Civilian Personnel office is properly manned at least one year in advance of FOC to allow time to work issues such as position management and organizational structuring including establishment of new position descriptions. There should be proactive joint efforts with management and personnel to facilitate processes to establish new and review existing civilian position description that accurately capture joint base mission requirements.
Understand this from the outset of the process and robust the systems/resources required to get it done!
Classification should take place with 12 months of FOC
Simplify the complicated HR/ hiring/ classification process. It's only a list of duties. It's only based on pass/fail performance. Why is it so complicated and timely? Businesses on the outside hire better qualified people than we do in two weeks and it takes us 6 months.
Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Culture issue, will only go away after years of Jointness
Change management has been implemented and like all change it is a slow reluctant process for personnel that have been under another service for 25-30 years to embrace.
Incompatible Service finance methods
Funding for large Navy projects was not forecast or money was not given over to the Air Force, this causes major delays in large scale projects or programs
Our situation is unique in that we provide crane service to one agency 98% of the time and that agency has front loaded money but we must use the GPC to pay for service. The GPC is restricted in what we can do, and takes a multitude of work to get extra funds to complete service needs at times.
Make the MOA as clear as possible as to where, exactly, the money will come from and how long it will remain programmed.
Geographic separation of installations
Acknowledge that installations without shared fencelines may not drive the efficiencies that Joint Basing intended
Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
The Air Force took over a boat section from the Navy but the Air Force does not understand, speak or do boat patrolling.
Service specific mission set training for our continuity...Civilian workforce
This is a culture issue. the Lead services understand mission sets, but may not have the resources to respond adequately.
If the Air Force is going to have to take care of things like boats and railways, be sure that manpower and policy expertise is included when identifying requirements.

Table 27 (con't)

Incompatible Service cultures
Culture issue, will only go away after years of Jointness. Also, DoD understand that not everything can be merged and be more efficient. Some functions are better left unchanged.
We just do things differently...and that's a fact
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
Demand LTIs/inspections of all equipment prior to merger.
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance. COLS are too vague, underfunded, and have not yielded additional funding/organizational changes/or benefits for units reporting on them. We spend more time justifying why we didn't meet them than we do working on resolution from HHQ to fix the issues and give the bases the tools and resources we need to meet the COLS.
This is a policy and resource issue. Example is RPIE. AF CE does not work on non-RPIE equipment. Navy Public works does if you pay them
Manage perceptions at the local level as adroitly as possible
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
The Navy has great ideas and programs that the Air Force does not want to use solely because the Navy came up with it.
There are no best practices, you must follow AF guidance or go home.
DOD should adopt best programs and implement at joint bases instead of one entity overruling the other just because they are the lead.
Best practices are adopted if they fall within lead service guidance leeway.
Because changing policy is so painful, we don't defer to the best way, we defer to the easiest.
Allow to adopt best practices that meet DOD requirements. The functional service leads prevent changes to lead service guidance.

Recommendations for Future Research

For future research, the researcher recommends the following:

1. Replicate this study at another Air Force-led installation in order to validate the results. An additional study utilizing the Delphi method as the methodology at one of the other six AF-led joint bases would further strengthen the findings.
2. Replicate this study at other joint bases with different combinations of Service-leads. There are many different combinations of supported and supporting Components among other joint bases. Delphi Studies concerning joint basing challenges on those bases would validate the

transportability of the findings and recommendations to joint basing at large.

3. Utilize other research methods such as mass survey or interviews to validate the results of this study. This study was conducted among a panel of the most senior personnel at the joint base being studied. A general survey in the functions studied would glean the perspectives of those lower in the organization. Interviews of senior leaders at the joint bases might yield even more information as to the specific issues as part of the general issues.

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel

Detailed budget reductions made well above the installation level instead of being made at the installation level (local joint base partnership council) where the reductions could be applied to best fit the base's need and not adversely affect mission accomplishment and partner/working relationships.	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
The "taxing" of the TOA. Very little of the TOA is allotted to the joint base resulting in limited available resources to support to supported component at pre-FOC levels.	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
Sequestration/budget reductions will potentially impact the xxx LRS's ability to maintain the xxx ABW and xxx AW vehicle fleets. Vehicle Management had a projected FY14 budget shortage. The proposed shortage of funds will require LGRV, along with supported units and agencies, to prioritize vehicle requirements to ensure the success of xxx global mobility mission.	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
sequestration limited/reduced funding currently/out years. Decision has been made to eliminate numerous vehicles	Budget cuts do not match unique joint base needs
Extremely long length of time required for changing a PD from one service to another and then re-classifying .	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Three and a half years into Joint Basing, there still is a disparity in classification between Navy and Air Force Civilian Employees who work in Security Forces. The process for classification does not appear to have the appropriate infrastructure in place at the local and AFPC level to execute timely classifications of existing Position Descriptions to the gaining services standards. In Security Forces for example, there is a GS-09 on the Air Base who works in Reports and Analysis and the same position on the xxx is held by a GS-06 employee and there are no signs equalling the classification any time soon.	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Conversion of Navy civilian positions (SCPD) to Air Force civilian positions (SCPD). Classificatio took almost three years for our squadron to convert.	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
no civilian Core Personnel Core Documents, or Performance Plans were in place. This allowed Navy employees to remain on former Navy PDs for over 4 years , and the employees sat idle a lot.	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Hugh classification backlog (approximately 500+ actions). Many employees took on additional duties and some with greater responsibilities without being adequately compensated.	Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
Equipment A particular rollback has been needed and utilized by the Navy for xxx forklift swap out (must take electrical forklifts in and out of xxx to recharge daily to meet their mission). The rollback wrecker however consistently breaks and currently is being placed on a condemn list for removal without having another vehicle to sustain the mission. **xxx or AF should place recharging stations at each magazine to keep forklifts in work centers unless actual maintenance is needed, this would eliminate manpower needed for this specific mission and reduce a vehicle asset needed along with costs associated with maintaining this vehicle.	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
Funding - I.E. Several facilities and numerous vehicles & equipment have been identified for major repairs due to lack of upkeep and preventive maintenance	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

First issue is cost savings were not cost savings , but merely the Navy divested infrastructure and vehicle organic maintenance sustainment costs, and passed on the disproportionaely increased costs to the Air Force . Namely, the Air Force inherited a dilapidated facility , requiring \$1.6 million to renovate, and the Air Force inherited a fleet of vehicles worth about \$8 million dollars, of which 68% had already passed their expected service life , that required 'extensive' repairs, to the tune, that about 41 of the 71 had to be sent to DRMS, and the Air Force incur a \$4 million modernization cost earlier than expected.	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
For vehicle maintenance and fleet management, joint basing was fiscally an epic fail, in terms of quality of infrstrcture, vehicle/equipment that was inherited.	Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
In xxx case, the Air Force has taken the lead on joint basing. In our particular unit, we've had difficulty integrating Navy policies and procedures into Air Force policy and procedure.	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Lead unit Inspector General procedures need to be clearly defined for employees of the now "subordinate" units during Joint Base implementation.	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
MWR dollars - there were two different rulesets/philosophies in place when it comes to spending/budgeting in the NAF world and even four years after FOC, we are still fighting to change Navy practices that are not in line with Air Force policies.	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Differences between Air Force and Navy instructions. Example: Differences on how and when vehicles need inspected, how often mobile cranes need weight tested, or different safety requirements.	Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
Organizational construct. We combined 5 Navy Departments (200 people) into one AF squadron construct. The AF A1 process (manpower and personnel) was/is not flexible enough to handle this type of major corporate merger. Several CE transformation and force structure initiatives occurring at the same time have not helped the situation.	Difficulty merging organizational structures
Integration (merging two services together to function as one)	Difficulty merging organizational structures
The designation of so-called "Mission Partners" as if the supporting components resources are to be directed at a higher level to those than other "tenants"	Difficulty merging organizational structures
ADCON/OPCON - I have Navy personnel that work in the Galley (our supposedly Air Force Dining Facility on the xxx) but they are ADCON to the xxx. I don't rate them--the xxx does. I don't submit them for quarterly awards--the xxx does. I don't approve their leave/TAD--the xxx does. BUT, if the Galley fails to perform its mission or pass a safety inspection then the FSS owns it.	Difficulty merging organizational structures
Second issue is that the Air Force Civilian Personnel Management System was not postured, to support the migration of former Navy employees	Difficulty merging organizational structures
Disconnect between areas that didn't convey to the AF structure. Example: Personal financial management support offered in the Unit vs. through Airmand & Family Readiness.	Difficulty merging organizational structures
Fifty percent of Fleet and Family Support Center personnel are contact staff unlike Airman & Family Services which is all APF personnel. Continual fiscal constraints threatens current and future contract funding.	Difficulty merging organizational structures

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Additionally, there has been significant challenges with military leadership on Flight and in training. This continual rotation of military personnel on management positions leads to a lack of continuity and cohesion within the squadron.	Frequent leadership rotations
Geography - There are two separate locations (well, actually there are four, but one's an airfield and one's a recreation area) that create a separation of populations, activities, cultures. I only have one office and it's "over here" when part of my squadron is "over there."	Geographic separation of installations
Causes double the manning/management requirements for shops and elements. Being geographically searated also increase the vehicle requirements but this requirement is not recognized by the LRS community/command.	Geographic separation of installations
however this is going to hamper operations at either of the two facilities due to the facilities being geographically separated.	Geographic separation of installations
Little to no thought was studied on the impacts of merging funcitons which operate on different automated systems. For example, At Joint Base xxx, the base is still facing problems with automated systems today. Supported Services, Army and Navy, still maintain separate automated supply systems. The Army utilizes the Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) and the Navy is equipped with its Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) program. JB xxx has Airman operating three supply systems (SBSS, SARSS, and ERP) on two different installations supporting four Services.	Incompatible automated systems
Vehicles, Stations, and equipment, (although firefighting equipment is designed to function the same to perform certain tasks, they are not designed to intermingle). This caused additional costs, modifications to service contracts, and differences in standards.	Incompatible equipment between Services
Lack of respect between the services	Incompatible Service cultures
Differences in service culture.	Incompatible Service cultures
Percieved Service Component's uniqueness; Service Components leadership constantly fight/complain about the other services support citing critical mission effectiveness failures.	Incompatible Service cultures
AF performs at a minimum standard. All decisions are driven from the minimum; AFI and OPNAVINST are written to assist and direct decisions and processes. Every event, exercise, decision, budget, support and service is driven to the minimum standard. Navy does not operate in this arena; we provide the best support/service we can. Decisions and processes should be worked to be the best.	Incompatible Service cultures
AF CES process is behind the power curve. Their program does not allow anyone outside CES to view the status of Work Orders or Progress of Projects. The individual unit must call the CES help desk, provide the Work order number, or Project number then wait for an update to be sent to the unit. CES needs to allow the program to be visible to Base Units (View Only) in order to obtain information rapidly vice taking days.	Incompatible Service cultures
All of these continual changes are percieved as more of a hostile take over from incumbent Navy Military and Civilian employees. This way of doing business has created allot of unnecessary anxiety in the work place, that to some extent still exists today	Incompatible Service cultures

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

There is a fundamental difference in how the Air Force and Navy train their personnel. Specifically, Air Force training is focused on the active duty Airman heading down range, and not the civilian officer being paid to protect home station. The Airman executes more physical security duties, and the civilian police officer, though they do execute some physical security duties, primarily executes Law Enforcement duties. The Navy executes their training plans with more flexibility for OUTCONUS operations down range and INCONUS home station, whereas the Air Force sees no difference in INCONUS and OUTCONUS Operations and training requirements do not change. An example of this is in small arms training requirements. The Air Force course of fire is combat based for the military member going down range. That said, the civilian officers are required to shoot the same course of fire that does not enhance an officer in his daily duties. The Air Force requires qualifications in the M9 pistol and the M4 rifle and the Navy required their officers to shoot the M9 Pistol and the M500 shotgun. In other words, our officers are bringing M4 Rifles to domestic abuse scenes instead of the more appropriate M500 Shotgun. The point here is that all three should be tools in the officers tool bag.	Incompatible Service cultures
Levels of service across the DoD is not universal. Navy and Army levels of customer service and standards of maintenance is not equal to AF levels of service. The fighting platform for the AF is the base, for the Navy it is the ship, and for the Army it is the deployable units. Services used their money in different ways.	Incompatible Service cultures
Equity - There are perceptions across the base that one side has better QoL facilities than the other. We've been tasked to equalize fees and charges across activities (like golf or bowling or clubs) but the activities and the experiences they provide are different!	Incompatible Service cultures
The biggest issue that Security Forces has faced due to Joint Basing is a lack of overall guidance for unique missions. For instance, when the Air Force assumed control of the xxx we assumed the security for multiple missions that the Air Force has zero experience in. For instance, we took over a Harbor Security Unit responsible for protecting nuclear subs. The Navy looked at the Harbor Unit as an elite group and placed an officer over the section, the Air Force specifically Security Forces only placed 2-3 officers for an entire unit.	Incompatible Service cultures
Funding for boat replacement has been non-existent, under the Navy we would have replaced the boats years ago, under the Air Force we will not replace for at least 5 more years.	Incompatible Service cultures
Military support on the Navy side is almost nonexistent for the active duty AF personnel: AD AF personnel have to commute back to the AF side to accomplish clinic appointments, MPF support, dorm space, mandatory formations such as Prime Beef training and so on.	Incompatible Service cultures
and the quality of employees that were obtained for the most part.	Incompatible Service cultures
In short, the priorities of the former Navy employees, are not Air Force priorities, even though they have been told this countless times, and they put up impediments every step of the way. With more the 20 years of supervising organic maintenance work forces both at domestic and abroad locations, this is the worst dysfunctional process and program I've seen in my career	Incompatible Service cultures
Politics/Agendas - Officers and civilians had agendas for their organization (empire building/ Command and Control)	Incompatible Service cultures

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Them vs. us mentality within senior leadership ranks continues to flow down, leaves community with the impression loss of programs is because of joint basing (extreme resentment).	Incompatible Service cultures
The Air Force was not very well-versed in reimbursables. It became a huge problem after FOC because they/we did not know how to collect reimbursables to the degree that was necessary coming from the Navy. There are long delays in getting anything routed through for signature. There are meetings upon meetings upon meetings.	Incompatible Service finance methods
Expectations of supported components vary wildly (especially on the Navy xxx side). Resources are not of concern to them, but they are a supported component being serviced on an AF OM budget. It does not work.	Incompatible Service finance methods
Differing Business models between service branches causes severe challenges: Legacy Navy Public Works Department was a working capital fund organization that maintained ALL equipment and facilities throughout their naval station as long as the owning organization had the funds to reimburse them. AF civil engineering organizations only work on equipment and facilities that are considered real property installed equipment (RPIE). Tempering our customers expectations and training them on what we work on has been challenging especially when our Tenant organizations have the funds to pay for the work.	Incompatible Service finance methods
There is a distinct difference, between a revenue generating maintenance program that turns a profit in the Navy days, as opposed to an in-house Air Force organic maintenance function, that sustains/repairs vehicles and equipment. The former encourages sub-contracting work off-base, at the expense of needed repair skills. The exact opposite, of what the Air Force does day-to-day.	Incompatible Service finance methods
Funding - Figuring out reimbursable opposed to non-reimbursable entities whether supported or tenant units.	Incompatible Service finance methods
Dealing with financial restraints set-up from AF service opposed to Navy.	Incompatible Service finance methods
Funding crane rentals (crane service provided by LRS/cranes that meet the customers need have been down for a year / contract cranes are needed to meet the need) is a hassle at times, because of the service needed compared to costs associated. Navy was able to contact any company in the past and get the service needed immediately. AF requires anything over \$2,500 in services be placed on a BVD, then card limits must be raised and the process takes too long at times. Frustrations are noted when timely services cannot be granted.	Incompatible Service finance methods
No funding available for replacement of mobile cranes inherited from the Navy, which are utilized to support the xxx. Replacement cost according to the Vehicle Management Index File (VMIF) (https://webapps.robins.af.mil/vehicle/vmif/) is \$985K per crane or a total cost of \$1.97M. - No funding available for replacement of four Harbor Security Boats (HSB) inherited from the Navy, which are utilized to provide security for the two nuclear submarines for the xxx. Replacement costs have been estimated in excess of \$350K+ per boat or a total cost of \$1.4M+. Replacement boats must meet specific requirements as outlined in CNIC Instruction.	Insufficient continual funding for sustaining joint basing
Money provided during the MOA process was insufficient to implement Joint Basing	Insufficient MOA funds transfer at FOC

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Insufficient funding received from joint base partners.	Insufficient MOA funds transfer at FOC
No one ever wants to admit that there are problems so that a solution can be found. They seem to be afraid that it will reflect poorly on them. They candy-coat everything to keep leadership in the dark about what is really going on.	Issues not transparent to leadership
Standardization - every base did it differently (PB14/COLS/Organization)	Joint Bases operate uniquely from each other
Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard. The Navy Public Works department inherited was an MEO causing cuts to the bone prior to FOC.	Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard.
They filled the gaps with service contracts, which are now taking all of our Facilities Operations and Sustainment funds away from our emergency services Flights (CEF, CEX, CED) and we have no funding to remain effective in those areas. We also cannot fill the gaps with manpower without reapplication of the AF standard which shows we are at least 100 personnel short in CE Operations alone.	Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard.
Lack of manpower since FOC (2010) is the biggest concern. It has hampered all functions during the evolution of joint basing at xxx. It has directly impacted COLS and has been a huge strain on remaining personnel to meet mission requirements, out of hide. This has impacted morale, cohesiveness, and the health of the wings. It also caused multiple write-ups for non-compliance at the HQ Unit Effectiveness Inspection. As a Phase II JB, this installation has been consistently down about 200 civilian positions.	Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard.
Combining with an organization that was cut to the bone via an MEO evaluation, PWD had won an A 76 study: A manpower study should have been accomplished prior to FOC to see the true requirement of maintaining the facilities and installations that were combined. Current AF manning standards do not apply to JB's so we have what we have. Forces have been split to maintain the work load and supplement the 100% civilian work force on the Navy side.	Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard.
Lastly, not enough manpower was transferred either, proportionate to the resources that the Air Force inherited, and the work load that was absorbed	Lack of a Joint Basing AF Manpower standard.
Joint Basing was forced upon the base - no one chose it	Lack of buy-in pre-FOC
Middle management of lead service being lead service focused as opposed to joint service focused.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
AF EPRs/OPRs are and will always be behind. The way the process is conducted the Commanders have a hard time finding out whom or who needs an EPR/OPR. AF spends almost 30% of their day attempting to get in front of the EPRs/OPRs. Navy has a program that, is not perfect, works very well and is much easier to track and get completed.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
In other words, Joint Basing was advertised to the Navy civilian employees located on xxx, as a collaboration of best ideas from the Navy and Air Force. The reality was something totally different. More often than not, Navy managers viewpoints on Security topics are completely discounted and disregarded as not having any value of necessity in the Air Force processes. This was continually demonstrated by the local Air Force leadership in their presentation of the new Joint Basing way of doing things and continues each and every time their military commanders take charge of the unit.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Specifically, the Navy has been working with civilian DoD Police Officers for at least 50 years before the Air Force assumed the lead Supporting Component duties atxxx. That said, The Navy civilian managers strongly feels that we do a better job overall of working with civilian employees within the confines of OPM established guidelines.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Security Forces Training- Another challenge that again deals with civilians is the Air Forces inability to adapt training to meet their target audiences.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Yet the USAF doesn't even entertain the shotgun as a tool, and by doing so refutes a key item that is recognized through every Police department in the nation as a necessity for executing their duties.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
The Navy looks at Law Enforcement similar to that of a civilian police force. The Air Force looks at Law Enforcement as a part of war fighting and preperation. When the Air Force took control, we outfitted all personnel with an M9 and M4, this caused major issues with the Navy as they use shotguns verses rifles.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
AFIs versus Navy regulations - AF is the lead however sometimes the Navy has the best way and its not being insituted.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Too many inputs - AF lead bases should have been left up to the AF Manpower & Organization SMEs	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Each service believes that their way is the best way and no one is open to the idea of change.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
At an AF-led base, it is not truly a "joint" base - it is just another Air Force Base with the word "Joint" in its name. The Air Force can not fathom that another service could possibly have provided a service better/more efficiently than they.	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
The inflexibilities of the lead service in changing the way installation support services are provided that hinder adopting efficiencies, best practices and make it difficult to match the resources that were provided from the other service	Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
Rail mission It has been a challenge gaining training resources for the operations of a locomotive in the AF. Several bases have locomotives but an AF standard POI is/was unavailable during training research. Other AF agencies have rail, but they have all been contract personnel and do not have the same standard POI requirement. They all assisted in providing training aids and references, but it seems like the wheel needed invented.	Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Another challenge within the Security Forces Squadron community is the lack of support from the medical group regarding the required annual and three year physicals in order to meet directives listed in AFI31-122. At xxx, we are manned for 140 civilian Police Officers, however, for the past three and a half years we have been unable to complete all of the mandated physicals in order to execute the annual physical fitness testing requirements. This lack of support, resulted in a failure to meet all physical agility testing requirements for 2013. The current forecast of support for 2014 is questionable at best. Issues stem from a lack of medical infrastructure to support the number of officers . This is compounded by the Air Force Medical Group does not work with the xxx cohesively as a smooth process.	Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
Some of the work load should have remained with the Navy, as it was an inherent Navy tactical mission set , and not installation and mission support, that benefited both the Air Force and Navy, because of a common mission. There are many Examples include xxx, xxx, Navy Rererves, etc...	Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
Civilian Personnel Section (CPS) were undermanned to support increased workload associated with joint basing. CPS should be bolstered with additional staff at least one full year in advance of FOC to allow time to work issues including: - Employee transfer including data migration and OPF transfer - Position management and organizational structuring including establishment of new PDs - Recruitment surge to fill gained vacancies - Labor Relations surge to accommodate multiple bargaining unit agreements - Employee Relations surge to accommodate increased grievances, FLRA petition to define the new bargaining unit, and benefits and entitlements issues	Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
We see no help from A1 on the horizon in this area.	Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs
HQ Support - The Air Force "business processes" don't seem to have embraced joint basing , so they still call us xxx. We still report two separate MWRF numbers (even though they are actually only one fund) . They don't understand UFM funding...I'm leaving that acronym in there so you can be challenged to look it up! haaaaaa They refer only to AF policies when there are clear Navy policies/requirements that need to be met (i.e. fitness or ombudsman) IAW our Joint Base MOA.	Leadership above Joint Base level does not understand unique needs
Learning the Air Force's way of doing buisness, using their buisnes practices and systems without any formal training.	Learning curve for migrated employees without formal training
Blind manpower reductions made at Joint Bases well above the installation level without looking at actual installation level manpower requirements.	Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs
High staffing backlog. After numerous hiring controls/freezes coupled with a large number civilian separations (retirements/transfers), vacancies are at an all-time high of over 230.	Manpower does not meet joint base specific mission needs
Extremely long length of time to fill vacancies	Manpower vacancy lead time

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

Attitudes. Rollout and implementation could have been smoother. As an AF employee and lead agency, our thoughts going in were we could seamlessly transition. As the former Navy employees, not so much. They felt abandoned by their service, don't feel they have any ownership, many did not want to work for AF, and some did everything they could to uncut all AF attempts to transition. Still some lingering bad feelings 4 1/2 years in. Firefighters fight fires the same ways, you would have thought this would have been an easier transition. At the end of the day, all should be thankful they still had a job. Had the situation been reversed, I cannot say AF employees would have transitioned any better...I would like to think they would have. I cannot speak for other flights, squadrons etc...however I believe most thoughts I listed in challenge 3 are across the board.	Migrating Personnel's perceived subordination to Lead Service
The biggest challenge in Joint Basing is the two main chains of command we now have to report to on almost everything to do with AF ops. The xxx and xxx are the main Air Force Wings, and since joint basing, have created duplication in efforts in many ways... like two seperate CCE staffs, where there was just one, two CCS and or "CAG", or DS positions, etc. There is a communication problem in that xxx reports to xxx, and xxx to xxx. This whole Joint Basing construct would work just fine, and we'd be able to support all the 'mission partners' the way we do now, much more efficiently if we were just under one 'boss', and that boss had a beefed-up MSG. The cost savings of this is easy to demonstrate, but this concept goes against current mindset and progression steps for Command. Powerpoint on subject being provided.	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Working with two Chains of Command. Assigned to xxx but billet is within xxx. FITREP is written by xxx and I report directly to xxx Commander. Have tasking from both COC's.	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Meeting mandatory training and professional requirements for both services. GMT and training for AF/Navy programs and systems. Have professional requirements/obligations with both services.	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Who's In Charge - Unlike being in the AOR there is one combatant commander that everyone answers to, there appears to be many heads with joint basing.	Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
The Air Force culture made those that transferred from the Navy to the Air Force feel unwelcomed and below par. In numerous instances the leadership from the Navy was aligned in positions to be working for "Air Force" employees that were of a lower grade (e.g. GS-13 working for GS-12 or lower). Placing a GS-13 employee in a VERY low grade position so as not to disrupt an Air Force employee's placement (an employee who's position was cut, but a new position was made up for so that he could keep his job). Most of the Navy leadership have been so frustrated by the culture of disdain that they have either retired or moved on to other positions.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Effective communications with other services branches represented on the installation is a continual learning process, especially during the initial implementation of a JB. Some personnel felt as if they were no longer "in the loop" with regard to what was happening on the installation and they didn't know how/who to elevate concerns.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Initial implementation of Joint Basing caused the appearance (to some employees/sections of the now "subordinate" units) of financial inequity. Ex: Units believing they were not receiving funds at the same priority/rate as the lead unit for similar activities.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service

Appendix A. Ideas Contributed by the Panel (con't)

At the beginning of FOC for xxx which was 10/10/2010, the initial challenge was having to prove daily the Navy way of executing Law Enforcement duties had some value added to the Air Force process.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Also has created a big brother/little brother feeling among the shops on the Navy side because they don't have the interaction with squadron leadership like the AF side of the JB.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Community Needs Assessment surveyed AF personnel only. The largest population served by the installation is the Navy. Assessment failed to provide much needed information on the Navy community needs typically used to develop programs.	Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Third issue is, that experts were not in the migration meetings during the transfer of real property, vehicle, and equipment from Public Work to the Air Force. Word of mouth was accepted, as opposed to actually check, seeing, and validating what was migrating to the Air Force. The best way to describe this, is like buying a used car, with a bunch of flaws, that are deliberately covered up, and knowing, nothing said about.	Pre-FOC preparation not adequately accomplished
Too many Group/Wing level commanders from different commands: We have a multitude of O-6's at JB, all equal grade of the WG CC. The xx mission partners/tenant commanders communicate at the O-6 level to accomplish mx requirements that may or may not be required by AF AFI causing extensive explanations via email/taskers/meetings. An O-7 WG CC could be the tie breaker and stop the pushing and shoving amongst the O's.	Rank structure does not support JB Operations
Additionally most former Navy employees did not have the will, desire, or fortitude to want to learn their new jobs, nor be more frugal, and do the job using Air Force processes and procedures, which are more stringent.	Resistance to change
Needless to say, the Air Force had to continually allocate manpower resources to fill in the gaps, which ultimately lowered the morale of all concerned, because efficiency and productivity continued to decline over time. To the point, some employees finally opted to retire.	Resistance to change
Not to mention, what could be perceived of fraud, waste, and abuse of resources ensured, as unwise decisions were continuously made, wasting tax payer dollars over time. The former Navy employees were offered Air Force training, however, most opted not to go, and remained set in their way.	Resistance to change
Supported services either changed their mission or increased their requirement for support after implementation. For example, the Navy at xxx has added transportation requirements for one of their schoolhouses in the area as a required supported area. However, the Navy did not identify this requirement in the initial MOA. Costs to provide these services are beyond the funds received via the MOA.	Supported organizations changed support requirements post-FOC
Not only was the Union a barrier in trying to integrate the work force	Union issues
To this day, the Union continues to protect them, and not allow them to be cross utilized, so that they can be trained on the Air Base side, nor will they allowed them to go off of the Alternative Work Schedule, which just exacerbates the supervision, scope, and span of control, put the work force at the weapons station out-of-sync with the air base side, causing delays, and even more frustration.	Union issues
Continued delays in hiring and classification directly impacts the mission effectiveness for JB CHS organizations serviced by local CPS.	

Appendix B. Panel Recommendations

Budget Cuts
Dont simply look at an immediate cut to the budget, money needs to be placed in a joint account that both services can access. For instance our boat section was funded, but the money never made it to the unit paying the bill.
Funding received from other services should go directly to the joint base versus going to HAF and MAJCOM where it is taxed.
Field cuts to Joint Bases in a different program, not an "across the board" system
High profile customers demand higher levels of oversight and scrutiny.
Ensure joint bases are funded at an appropriate level to support their mission requirements.
Make sure HHQ understands how the money needs to flow so it doesn't get lost after the MOA is signed
Funding for unique programs should be identified by a separate line item
Joint Base more active in the POM / xxx more authority in installation decisions.
Difficulty integrating Service policy and procedure
The Air Force took over a boat section from the Navy but the Air Force does not understand, speak or do boat patrolling.
Joint policy and procedures need to be developed by OSD/JCS prior to merger.
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance
Lead is AF and doesn't use OPNAV requirements to match mission requirement
DOD regs should be utilized and created based on the best services regs.
AF lead bases are taught to implement AF policy across the board. We are not resourced to provide multiple standards.
Conference on AF vs. Navy (or other service) instructions to be certain the flexibility exists in the supporting service's policy guidance
Unique mission requirements of Services magnify this problem. As the lead AF AFIs do not address/recognize the unique mission of the Navy forcing Fleet and Family Support Center to operate under AFIs and OpNavs which is often confusion to staff and clients
Difficulty merging organizational structures
JBIG needs to address...current JBIG is weak
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance
AF procedures vice making procedures using both service requirements.
The AF have been in organization flux for too long now. Joint Basing affected that greatly as well. Time to stop reorganizing for a while so we can catch our breath.
If the intent is to flatten the organization to garner efficiencies, then actually flatten it.
Ensure all organizations transfer over using the lead Service model.

Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con't)

Lack of a Joint Basing Manpower standard
Support positions were cut causing one person to pick up the work of two people, this causes delays, slower completion time and slower customer service
OSD must develop a Joint Basing Manpower standard
Create standized teams w/parameters
Conduct manpower standards at intervals. 1yr, 2yrs, 5 yrs, etc. What is initially the standard will change once a merger is implemented.
Missed the Manpower study, should have done one before JOINT Basing. Now need one to match mission.
We essentially run two separate missions at a 15 mile gap between sections and a manpower standard could be used to ensure we have the right number of personnel in the right positions.
AF/A1 is ill prepared to service Joint Bases. Policies and processes do not serve Joint Base uniqueness. One size does not fit all. Review processes are too lengthy.
Ensure joint bases are properly manned to support their mission. Lead agency should have the ability to begin recruitment for projected vacancies ahead of FOC. Personnel and management need to anticipate recruitment needs and partner together to timely meet those needs.
We don't have enough manpower do support our partners/tenants and much of that has to do with the inability of the Air Force to understand the semantics of a joint/non-co-located population
Manpower standard application should be applicable to both Services vs. one. Example - recently release Airman and Family Readiness Manpower Study only applied to the AF; not to Fleet and Family Support Center (Navy component)
Manpower based on requirements, not on arbitrary cuts.
Multiple chains of command create duplication of effort/costly
Too many bosses at a Joint Base. Every service O-6 has an agenda for thier command.
Create one DoD military personnel system so we don't have two different sets of management chains.

Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con't)

Civilian reclassification/PD change lead time
We are four years into Joint Basing and I have a percentage of my civilian workers on Navy PD's; due to the reclassification taking so long I can not replace any of those positions if they quit or are fired. This causes a shortage of personnel in an already lean environment.
AFPC must develop team which works exclusively with joint bases or allow classification to take place at base level.
AFPC implement a systematic process and/or increase manpower to review PDs
PD have taken years to accomplish and are still in works. This should not be lengthy process when compliance with AF instructions are necessary to complete the job appropriately. Civilians refer back to PD's on a regular basis for their job requirements and the PD is needed to hold them accountable to the mission we need them to accomplish.
A1 is not capable of servicing the uniqueness of Joint Bases.
Ensure Civilian Personnel office is properly manned at least one year in advance of FOC to allow time to work issues such as position management and organizational structuring including establishment of new position descriptions. There should be proactive joint efforts with management and personnel to facilitate processes to establish new and review existing civilian position description that accurately capture joint base mission requirements.
Understand this from the outset of the process and robust the systems/resources required to get it done!
Classification should take place with 12 months of FOC
Simplify the complicated HR/ hiring/ classification process. It's only a list of duties. It's only based on pass/fail performance. Why is it so complicated and timely? Businesses on the outside hire better qualified people than we do in two weeks and it takes us 6 months.
Perceived subordination to Lead Service
Culture issue, will only go away after years of Jointness
Change management has been implemented and like all change it is a slow reluctant process for personnel that have been under another service for 25-30 years to embrace.
Incompatible Service finance methods
Funding for large Navy projects was not forecast or money was not given over to the Air Force, this causes major delays in large scale projects or programs
Our situation is unique in that we provide crane service to one agency 98% of the time and that agency has front loaded money but we must use the GPC to pay for service. The GPC is restricted in what we can do, and takes a multitude of work to get extra funds to complete service needs at times.
Make the MOA as clear as possible as to where, exactly, the money will come from and how long it will remain programmed.
Geographic separation of installations
Acknowledge that installations without shared fencelines may not drive the efficiencies that Joint Basing intended

Appendix B. Panel Recommendations (con't)

Lead Service ill-equipped for adopted mission sets
The Air Force took over a boat section from the Navy but the Air Force does not understand, speak or do boat patrolling.
Service specific mission set training for our continuity...Civilian workforce
This is a culture issue. the Lead services understand mission sets, but may not have the resources to respond adequately.
If the Air Force is going to have to take care of things like boats and railways, be sure that manpower and policy expertise is included when identifying requirements.
Incompatible Service cultures
Culture issue, will only go away after years of Jointness. Also, DoD understand that not everything can be merged and be more efficient. Some functions are better left unchanged.
We just do things differently...and that's a fact
Differences in equipment maintenance/replacement philosophies between Services
Demand LTIs/inspections of all equipment prior to merger.
DoD issue meaningful guidance instead of general implementation guidance. COLS are too vague, underfunded, and have not yielded additional funding/organizational changes/or benefits for units reporting on them. We spend more time justifying why we didn't meet them than we do working on resolution from HHQ to fix the issues and give the bases the tools and resources we need to meet the COLS.
This is a policy and resource issue. Example is RPIE. AF CE does not work on non-RPIE equipment. Navy Public works does if you pay them
Manage perceptions at the local level as adroitly as possible
Lack of true jointness in adopting "best" policies and procedures
The Navy has great ideas and programs that the Air Force does not want to use solely because the Navy came up with it.
There are no best practices, you must follow AF guidance or go home.
DOD should adopt best programs and implement at joint bases instead of one entity overruling the other just because they are the lead.
Best practices are adopted if they fall within lead service guidance leeway.
Because changing policy is so painful, we don't defer to the best way, we defer to the easiest.
Allow to adopt best practices that meet DOD requirements. The functional service leads prevent changes to lead service guidance.

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14. ABSTRACT The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) went farther than any other previous BRAC in attempting to discover budgetary efficiencies by redefining domestic military infrastructure. BRAC recommendation #146 set into motion the construct of joint basing in which installation support responsibilities were transferred to lead-Components resulting in 12 major mergers of 26 military installations. Much has been written on the cost savings progress of joint bases; however little has been written in academia as to the implementation challenges that have hindered true cost savings from being realized. This research leverages the Delphi Method in capturing and ranking the top issues to aid senior leaders in resource allocation decision-making. Leaders from base support functions such as logistics, force support, security forces, civil engineering, and command staff comprised the expert panel that led to the identification of the top 13 joint basing challenges. This research was scoped to one AF-led, Navy-supported joint base, but has transportability to other joint bases and contributes to the mergers and acquisitions body of knowledge. The results of this research validate the current issues plaguing joint bases and consider the implications of future joint basing efforts.					
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