Logistics for the Gettysburg Campaign: Refocusing an Army in War
Abstract
Following the Battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863, the Confederate Government met and decided to launch a second invasion of the north. In response, the Union's Army of the Potomac (AoP) had to reposition itself and its supply base from the long-term fixed facility of Aquia Landing to several forward bases along the route, ending up at Westminster, MD. The actions of three senior leaders were critical to successfully shifting the AoP. Independently and in concert using railroads, waterways, and logistics convoys, these individuals rapidly repositioned supplies from northern Virginia to Maryland and Pennsylvania in order to support the army's changing main effort. This analysis is based on the logistics principles contained in Joint Publication (JP) 4-0. The conclusion is that senior leaders need to be intimately involved in the decision-making process in a rapidly changing environment. The logistics principles described in Joint Publication 4-0 are appropriate and sufficient. Federal logisticians successfully shifted the supply base to enable AoP operations and Meade's pursuit was not hindered by logistics.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 09, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA602915
Entities
People
- Christian B. Meisel
Organizations
- Marine Corps University