The lED: Tactical Solutions for a Tactical Problem
Abstract
Five years ago, seventy percent of the United States' combat-related casualties in the Long War were due to tactical Improvised Explosive Device (lED) strikes. Today, six years and billions of earmarked dollars later, seventy percent of our nation's combat-related injuries still result from tactical lED strikes. An explanation for the apparent lack of progress commensurate with the enormous financial expenditure is that the US has made fundamental errors in the assessment of the lED problem. These errors have resulted in the already failed, techno-centric response to the lED problem. This paper begins with a discussion of the vast utility the lED possesses at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war. The paper examines how errors in problem framing, resulting from US military cultural influence, have spawned a technological response to the lED that has ignored basic problems. These include a decrease in tactical creativity, deviations from maneuver warfare doctrine, and violations of service-level, visionary guidance. The paper ends by offering an alternative to operating in an lED-rich environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 12, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA602995
Entities
People
- Matt T. Good
Organizations
- Marine Corps University