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
**THE SARATOGA CAMPAIGN:
A CASE STUDY OF A LEADER'S IMPACT ON DECISIONMAKING**

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

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
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Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Robert B. Bruce

Approved: 

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Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Brad Wineman

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Executive Summary

Title: THE SARATOGA CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY OF A LEADER'S IMPACT ON DECISIONMAKING

Author: Major J. R. Kenney, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: A leader's experience and willingness to assume risk, in an uncertain environment, are critical components of decision making and ultimately more important in determining success in combat than command relationships.

Discussion: Leading up to and during the execution of the Saratoga Campaign, the Northern Department was wrought with command challenges. The Northern Department Commander was relieved; another General refused to obey orders of the Northern Department Commander, and a Wing CG was relieved prior to the final battle of the Campaign. In spite of these numerous command challenges the Americans prevailed in achieving success.

The American leaders were able to achieve a decisive victory because of their overall experience in fighting and making decisions in a chaotic and uncertain environment. They had a wealth of experience from both the current war and the French and Indian War that shaped the decisions that they made. Though their personality and leadership styles were different they were the right leaders at the right time on the battlefield. Three American Leaders made bold decisions, focused their forces, gained the initiative over an advancing British Force, and ultimately set the conditions that allowed for arguably the most critical victory in America's War for Independence.

These commanders' displayed characteristics that have since been codified in the Marine Corps' Warfighting Philosophy and the Command and Control Doctrine. These theory's serve as the analytical framework for reviewing three critical decisions during the campaign. In addition, command relationships were reviewed for each leader and his decision point.

Conclusion: Command relationships are not necessarily critical for the successful execution of a Campaign. Unity of command was not the critical component of success during the campaign. Unity of effort was far more important in achieving a decisive outcome. A leader's experience and personality shape his decision making, therefore, his ability to command and control in combat.

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PREFACE

When I first started the research for this paper my understanding of the role of American leaders in the Saratoga Campaign was severely limited. I was initially under the impression that the Saratoga Campaign was a story of failed British strategy vice a resounding American success. As I dove into the research I became less impressed with the British shortcomings as I was of the exceptional American leaders. In my opinion, the Saratoga Campaign is a story of the 'right' leaders at the 'right' time.

The approach of this paper will look at four decisive points along the campaign. It highlights the American leaders at those decisive points and the choices available to them. It will then examine the decisions they made and the impact of their leadership.

It goes without saying that seldom research is done without assistance. I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to my mentor, Dr. Robert Bruce. His patience and professional advice helped steer me along the way. Dr. Bruce proved to be an asset as an exceptional mentor and gifted instructor.

I owe the most gratitude to my wife, Anne. Her patience and understanding proved instrumental in making this research and paper a thing of reality. In addition, my two boys deserve a special thanks for allowing their father the time to research this paper. Too often I failed to balance the time spent researching with the time I spent with my family.

Introduction

In the spring of 1777, few American or British military leaders could have forecasted that a British Army would lose an operation to a group of Americans. However, that is exactly what happened on October 17, 1777, just north of the town of Saratoga, New York, when British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne capitulated to American General Horatio Gates. The strategic implications of this resounding American victory led France to openly acknowledge American rebellion, turned a local insurrection into a world war, and ended British aspirations of stopping the American uprising.¹

The decisions and subsequent actions of three American leaders at four decisive points, during the Saratoga Campaign, led to the American victory. Initially, General Philip Schuyler, reeling from the complete abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga by General Arthur St. Clair, made the decision to delay the advance of General Burgoyne's force during the first month of the campaign. Then, General John Stark, acting as a commander of an independent force, developed a bold tactical scheme of maneuver, destroyed an enemy column, and attained a significant tactical victory for the Americans. Finally, General Benedict Arnold drove the actions of his senior commander, General Horatio Gates, and subordinate commanders during both Battles of Saratoga.² In spite of challenges to the American command and control, and as a direct result of these three leader's actions and their timely decisions the American campaign was a success.

A leader's experience and willingness to assume risk, in an uncertain environment, are critical components of decision making and more important in determining success than command relationships. This study will demonstrate the importance of experience and personality to a leader's decision making and to command

and control utilizing, elements of both the Marine Corps doctrine on Command and Control and Warfighting philosophy. During the execution of the Saratoga Campaign these three American leaders were not exposed to this doctrine, however, they exhibited some of the behaviors now codified in the doctrine.

Overview

Strategic Setting

The British achieved significant success during the campaign of 1776. The Continental army was routed from Manhattan, and an American army was driven from Canada, surviving due only to the onset of winter and a British shortage of supplies; and the American rebellion itself was on the brink of defeat.³

Yet, the American forces had achieved two tactical victories against the British at Trenton and Princeton, in the winter of 1776-77. The results of these victories were a significant morale boost for the beleaguered American army. In addition to the morale boost within the American Army, the victories increased foreign interest in the American Revolution and increased British determination to bring a swift end to the war.⁴

British Strategy

For the 1777 campaign season the British leadership devised a hybrid of three recently proposed plans.⁵ The plan set two distinct objectives. The first objective included the capture of the American capital, Philadelphia, by General William Howe's Army launching from New York. The second objective of the campaign was the seizure and isolation of the Northeastern colonies. The plan for achieving the second objective was to conduct a two pronged attack from both an invasion from Canada along the

Hudson River Valley and southern advance from General Howe, once he had seized Philadelphia.⁶

In particular, General John Burgoyne, commander of the detachment of British forces from the army in Canada, designed an operational plan that included campaigning through the Hudson River Valley, seizing Fort Ticonderoga, and continuing south towards Albany.⁷ In support of his main effort, he would launch a diversionary assault down Lake Ontario to the Mohawk River and continue towards Fort Stanwix from the west, where his forces would link up with General Howe's army advancing from the south. The British leaders believed that the combined effect of these efforts would essentially cutoff the northeastern colonies from the rest of the colonies. The leaders concluded that by isolating the more rebellious colonies, the British military would decapitate the rebellion and allow the British to clear out all other remaining pockets of resistance as necessary.⁸

American Strategy

The American leadership did not have a consensus regarding British military intentions for 1777. General George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army, believed the British would attempt to unite General Carleton's army in Canada with General Howe's army in America in vicinity of New York by moving them around the coastline.⁹

Washington believed that General Howe's forces in New York were the main effort of the British Army. Washington assessed that Philadelphia, then the capital of the United States of America, would be the objective for Howe's army. Thus, while distributing forces for the upcoming campaign season, Washington was reluctant to

release additional troops to the Northern Department as long as he believed Howe intended to capture Philadelphia. In addition, the American leaders believed that if an expedition was launched from Canada, the British forces would not overextend themselves into the interior of New York unless Howe attacked in unison from the South.¹⁰

Throughout the winter and spring of 1777, General Phillip Schuyler, Commander of the American Northern Department, attempted to strengthen his defensive positions (see **Appendix 1, Map No. 1**).¹¹ Schuyler knew that Fort Ticonderoga, the most northern fort in the Northern Department, lacked matériel and repair necessary to provide a solid defense against a determined British invasion.¹² Therefore, he requested Congress to provide additional forces and supplies. In turn, Congress requested troops and field guns from the Northeastern colonies and directed the commissary general to increase the supply base in the Northern Department. However, none of these requests and orders had been accomplished by the time the campaign commenced.¹³

Schuyler was tasked with defending against a British invasion from the North. Due to the challenging terrain in the Northern Department, operational movement was restricted to a single corridor. The defense of this corridor was designed around a series of forts. The northern most fort, Fort Ticonderoga, was located at a critical junction along the corridor. Fort Ticonderoga was considered impenetrable and often referred to as the “Gibraltar of the North.”¹⁴ Given the critical location and importance of Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler allocated 2,500 out of his approximate 4,000 available troops to defend the fort. Schuyler then distributed the rest of his available troops among the garrison posts to the south and west throughout his area of responsibility.

Analysis of Decisive Points

The following section will analyze four decisive points of the Saratoga Campaign. The situation surrounding the decisive points will be described followed with the leader's decision, and the results of that decision. Then the leader's military experience and leadership style will be discussed. Finally, a conclusion will be made that describes the impact of that leader's personal experience, personality, leadership style, and command relationship on the decision.

Decisive Point #1 Delay Burgoyne

On June 12, 1777 General Arthur St. Clair arrived at Fort Ticonderoga and assumed command of the fort and its defenses from Colonel Anthony Wayne. He quickly surmised that several items made the position less than adequate to fight a battle. He noted the fort was oriented in the wrong direction. It was originally designed to prevent an attack from the South versus an attack from the North. Thus, key terrain was left undefended. In addition, the fort was in disrepair and little had been done to prepare its defenses since the failed American campaign into Canada.¹⁵ Plus, artillery sent to Boston in 1775-76 had never returned. Finally, the troops and provisions for sustaining a long defense from such a large position were deficient.¹⁶

For two days, the combined British force occupied Mount Hope and began their investment of Fort Ticonderoga (see **Appendix 1, MAP No.2**). On July 5, the British occupied a firing position in the vicinity of Sugar Loaf/Mount Defiance.¹⁷ General St. Clair determined the British's firing position made defending Fort Ticonderoga untenable; held a council of war, and decided to abandon the fort. In the early hours of

July 6, the Americans hastily withdrew from Fort Ticonderoga with the intent of consolidating at Skenesborough, New York.

St. Clair's decision to abandon Fort Ticonderoga was in direct opposition to what Schuyler had directed him to accomplish.¹⁸ Serving as the subordinate within the Northern Department theater of operations, Schuyler had directed St. Clair to withdraw upon the approach of a significant force, however, his intention of delaying the enemy was ignored when St. Clair ordered the garrison to abandon the fort.

The situation was full of challenges and uncertainty at the time that Schuyler had to make a decision in reaction to Burgoyne's advance. First, Schuyler was uncertain as to the situation and disposition of St. Clair and his force. Second, Schuyler had the disadvantage of commanding a force consisting of a large portion of militia troops vice a seasoned professional army.¹⁹ Third, Schuyler had to deal with the psychological and public impact of having surrendered the "Gibraltar of the North." Finally, there was no pending hope of attaining reinforcements from Washington's main army as long as Howe's intentions were still unknown.²⁰

In contrast to Schuyler's challenges, Burgoyne had two distinct advantages. He had both the tactical and operational initiative leading up to and immediately following the capture of Fort Ticonderoga.²¹ Unlike the composite American force, Burgoyne had a seasoned professional force that was both capable and confident.

Schuyler had three courses of action available: retreat south to Albany and await the arrival of potential reinforcements, attack with his smaller force against the numerically superior British force, or he could attempt to delay the enemy along the restricted route of advance. If Schuyler advanced his force, then he was sure to be

significantly outnumbered. At the time, he could field approximately 650 Continental soldiers and fourteen hundred militiamen.²² Deciding to attack would have been similar to a gamble vice a calculated risk being executed by a commander that was more concerned with his own personal pride in responding to the open criticism of losing Fort Ticonderoga then accomplishing the assigned mission of defending against an attack from the North.²³

Given the circumstances, Schuyler would have been completely within reason as to retreat with his limited army in order to converge his forces upon Saratoga or south, establish a defense, and await the arrival of Burgoyne's advance. However, this action would not have set the conditions for future success within the campaign nor would it have afforded the opportunity to seize the initiative from the advancing force.

Decision. Schuyler quickly made the decision to delay General Burgoyne's advance. He focused his command and control by moving north from Saratoga to the vicinity of Fort Edward in order to better assess the situation, and then direct and control the actions of his army. In addition, he ordered the obstruction of the already limited road network that ran from North to South in the Northern department.²⁴ Finally, Schuyler ordered his units to destroy vital supplies throughout the area.²⁵

Schuyler's decision had two significant effects on the enemy force. His decision and subsequent actions forced Burgoyne's force to remain committed to their own weak supply line. In addition, it neutralized the advantage that Burgoyne had in initiative by slowing down his advance.²⁶

Many of Schuyler's subordinates believed that the success of the Saratoga Campaign was created by the decisions that were made to aggressively delay the enemy

once Fort Ticonderoga was lost.²⁷ The decision to delay Burgoyne's advance kept the beleaguered Northern Department from being destroyed by the more powerful and advancing British force. In addition, delaying the advance provided valuable time for the Northern Department to reorganize forces and request additional troops from General Washington.²⁸

Leader. Schuyler's decision making was based in large part on his personal experience and intuition. He was a veteran of four campaigns during the French and Indian War including action at Fort Ticonderoga in 1758.²⁹ He learned first-hand the challenges associated with moving and supplying troops along the New York frontier, the precautions against being ambushed, and the impact of foolish leadership.³⁰

Schuyler was a gifted organizer and administrator both of which served him well when he prepared the command to delay Burgoyne's advance. He tended much more towards an authoritative leadership style and was considered to be aloof and class conscious.³¹ However, due to both the boldness and decisiveness he displayed upon news of the loss of Fort Ticonderoga he unified the efforts of his force.³²

Schuyler originally decided to wait for his requested forces to arrive from Peekskill before he moved north to Fort Edward; however, he realized time was becoming critical to impede the advance of Burgoyne's force. As stated in a letter to Washington, "[i]f they [reinforcements] do not arrive by tomorrow, I go without them, and do the best I can with the militia."³³

Conclusion. Schuyler, at the time of the delaying action, had unity of command in the Northern Department. All units, during the execution of this delay, were responsible to him. However, unity of command alone was insufficient in achieving a

decisive outcome. Schuyler achieved a decisive outcome by unifying the efforts of his force through his personal positioning during the delay.³⁴

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from Schuyler and the decision to delay the advance of Burgoyne's force. First, the initiative that Burgoyne had had following the seizure of Fort Ticonderoga was lost by a combination of bold decision making and decisive action of the Northern Department Commander who assumed risk in an uncertain environment. Second, Schuyler's personal experience had shaped his understanding of the restrictive environment of the Northern Department and the challenges associated with moving and supplying an army. Third, Schuyler's leadership style, though leaning more to the authoritarian model, did not impede his ability to execute his actions. Finally, the unity of command in conjunction with his physical location during this critical part of the Campaign unified the efforts of his subordinates.

Decisive Point #2 Bennington

On August 11, Burgoyne ordered a detachment of approximately 750 of his German forces, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, southeast to the town of Bennington in order to acquire cattle, horses, and supplies. Burgoyne believed that Bennington was guarded by only light militia forces.³⁵ However, on August 14, en route to Bennington, the detached German forces ran into an American force of approximately 2,000 men, commanded by John Stark. Baum, unaware of the size of Stark's detachment, requested additional support. Therefore, Burgoyne detached a second element under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich von Breymann to reinforce Baum's forces.

Stark faced three challenges at Bennington. First, he was uncertain as to the disposition of any additional forces that might support Baum's detachment. Second, the weather was poor and not conducive to employment of smooth-bore muskets. Third, his unit was newly formed, growing by the minute, and entirely made up of militia members.

There were multiple challenges associated with leading and employing militia units. Militia units were composed of volunteers that often lacked training and resisted regimentation.³⁶ The officers that led militia units were often elected for popularity vice military competency.³⁷ Often the size and capability of the militia unit that showed up to fight could not be predicted. In addition, the amount of time that a commander could expect to employ militia units was often unknown. A critical component to achieving success in employing a militia unit is a persuasive and aggressive leader that inspires the individual members to fight.³⁸

Stark had several options when facing Baum's detachment. He could attack by either immediately engaging or use the adverse weather conditions to his advantage by developing the situation, devising a plan, and attacking.³⁹ Stark could remain in place, establish a fortification, and allow Baum to make a move or he could retrograde from the area.

Decision. After a meeting engagement, Stark noted that Baum had stopped advancing.⁴⁰ Stark was initially unaware of the enemy's composition and disposition. Therefore, he withdrew his forces from contact and deployed patrols to develop the situation. Throughout August 15, the patrols gathered information and harassed Baum's force. By the next day, Stark was satisfied that he had sufficient information to create a tactical concept of operations.⁴¹

Stark devised an audacious plan aimed at trapping and defeating Baum's force. He would divide his forces in the face of the enemy into three columns. Two columns would encircle the enemy defensive position in order to attack Baum's strongest position, the Dragoon Redoubt, from the rear. The encircling column with the longest movement would initiate the attack once they had completed their movement. The final column, led by Stark, would unleash an aggressive frontal attack aimed at unhinging Baum's contingent of Loyalist and Canadians occupying the Tory Redoubt. The success of this operation required precise timing between the three columns.⁴² This tactical concept of operations would have been challenging for a seasoned force, however, it would be near impossible to execute when leading a force composed of only militia.

On August 16, Stark's tactical plan was executed with amazing precision.⁴³ Stark fixed Baum's forces while he infiltrated two columns to the rear of Baum's position (see **Appendix 1, Map No. 3**). The two columns in close coordination with a strong frontal attack surprised and quickly overwhelmed the defenders of the Dragoon Redoubt. Simultaneous to the success at the Dragoon Redoubt, Stark's frontal attack routed the Loyalist and Canadians from the Tory Redoubt. Following the loss of the two redoubts, the remainder of Baum's force fought from uncovered positions until their ammunition ran out. Without any hope of resupply Baum ordered a bayonet charge where he was mortally wounded. The remainder of his force that had not retreated nor been wounded surrendered to the Americans.

Shortly following the victory over Baum, Stark was informed that another British column was quickly advancing upon his position. Stark, in close cooperation with an adjacent American unit, quickly assembled enough force to engage the advancing British

column. Overwhelmed by the sheer number of forces opposing him and lacking resupply, Breyman and his force were routed from the field. The American militia force, led by John Stark, had achieved a complete victory.⁴⁴ The Americans had defeated an entire British column and routed another from the field. The battle had "...caused a sudden cessation of all [British] operations[.]" and had significant operational impacts.⁴⁵

In planning for the campaign, Burgoyne, with a finite number of professional soldiers, expected to reinforce his army with both Indian forces and Loyalist troops. The Indian forces provided the British with both the manpower and a capability of screening in wooded terrain that the British were not in "condition to dispense with[.]"⁴⁶ Following the defeat at Bennington, a large contingent of Indians, disheartened by the severity of the British defeat, decided to quit and return home leaving the British operationally deficient in the capacity to conduct screening operations in wooded terrain.⁴⁷ In addition to the loss of the Indian forces, the loyalists that Burgoyne had expected to support the British advance and planned to recruit never appeared in large numbers in part because they too were dissuaded by Stark's victory.⁴⁸ In the absence of new replacements and limited to the troops that he began the campaign with, Burgoyne now realized that any future engagement, win or lose, would leave his British army weaker in personnel.

At the beginning of the campaign, Burgoyne underestimated the threat of the Colonial militia throughout his area of operations. However, following the defeat, Burgoyne had a much different appreciation when he stated that "[t]he Hampshire Grants, in particular, a country unpeopled, and almost unknown in the last war, now abounds in the most active and most rebellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering

storm upon my left.”⁴⁹ Burgoyne knew that any plan to continue to advance south left his lines of communication exposed to a significant threat.⁵⁰

Leader. Stark’s persuasive leadership had been shaped by his wealth of combat experience. He had served with the Rogers Rangers in the French and Indian War, as a militia officer in the Battle of Bunker Hill, and as a Continental officer with General Washington in the battles of Trenton and Princeton.⁵¹ His aggressive personality and overall popularity was so profound that within a week it inspired fifteen hundred men to join the New Hampshire brigade.⁵²

The Battle of Bennington was no exception for Stark. His determined personality inspired the militiamen to fight tenaciously to first overwhelm and defeat Baum and then reorganize and repel Breymann’s relief force.⁵³ In the words of the fallen Baum, when asked what he thought of the fighting of the American militiamen, “they fought more like hell-hounds than soldiers.”⁵⁴

Conclusion. Stark was personally upset by not being selected for promotion by the Continental Congress.⁵⁵ Embittered by the experience, he refused to serve under the command of the Continental army. In spite of refusing to serve, Stark had been granted command of an independent brigade by the New Hampshire legislative body.⁵⁶

Schuyler ordered Stark to move his forces to Stillwater, New York, and unite them with the growing Northern Department. Stark, realizing that he had no responsibility to the Continental Army and refused the order.⁵⁷ His decision to refuse Schuyler’s request to join the main army and instead move to Bennington turned out to be very fortunate for the Northern Department.

Stark acted in support of Schuyler's intent to threaten the left flank of Burgoyne. By defeating a significantly sized force, Stark's effort was clearly in line with Schuyler's intent.⁵⁸ Therefore, the unity of effort in accomplishing the Northern Department Commander's intent was more important to success than unity of command.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the Battle of Bennington. The tactical initiative that Baum had on August 14 was lost by his inaction following the meeting engagement. General Stark demonstrated that to achieve a decisive victory a leader must make a bold decision and reinforce the decision with focused effort.⁵⁹ The Battle of Bennington highlights the impact of tactical actions on operational plans. In addition, the Battle of Bennington highlights the fact that command relationships are not necessarily critical to achieving unified efforts.⁶⁰

Decisive Point #3 Battle of Freeman's Farm

By September 19, 1777, the two opposing armies were encamped in relatively close proximity, in the vicinity of Stillwater, New York. Gates, the commander of the Northern Department had established a defensive position with the design of luring General Burgoyne to attack the fortified position.⁶¹ The American defense consisted of two divisions, the Left Wing commanded by General Benedict Arnold and the Right Wing commanded by General Benjamin Lincoln.

Opposing them was General Burgoyne's force. They had crossed the Hudson River north of Stillwater and were continuing south. At approximately 0900, on the morning of September 19, 1777, General Burgoyne and his forces advanced south in three columns towards General Gates defensive positions. Upon hearing the report of

British movement, General Arnold requested that General Gates launch an attack against the advancing force.

There were several factors that shaped Arnold's belief in assuming the offensive by attacking the British force.⁶² First, Arnold, commanding the Left Wing, was aware of the tenuous nature of the western flank. Arnold thought that if the British were allowed to advance against that flank they would turn the entire American position and route the army. Second, Arnold believed that Burgoyne's seasoned force had siege guns that could be used to physically destroy the American's positions. Arnold believed that the combination of fire from the siege guns and the advance of the British columns could potentially result in the route of the fragile American force.⁶³

Gates weighed Arnold's request against the several options available to him. He could stick to his operational design and remain in his defensive position, he could accept Arnold's advice and assume risk on his eastern flank by massing forces in order to execute a spoiling attack, or he could order the deployment of a relatively small force in order to develop the situation.⁶⁴ General Gates eventually submitted to the deployment of a small force to develop the situation.

Decision. Gates authorized Arnold to deploy an initial force led by Colonel Daniel Morgan (see **Appendix 1, Map No. 4**). Morgan's Riflemen were instructed to screen forward of the army's left flank and harass any British advance.⁶⁵ Morgan's Riflemen arrived at a clearing, in vicinity of Freeman's Farm, just moments before the advanced skirmishers of the British center column. Known for their marksmanship, Morgan's Riflemen took aim and delivered precision fire to a "devastating effect," upon the British skirmishers.⁶⁶ Excited by the initial success, the Americans advanced against

the British line. Unfortunately, for the Americans, the initial success had not been as overwhelming as they assumed.

The British quickly massed forces from both the western and center columns against Morgan's men and began to route them from the field. As Morgan's men were being routed from the field, Gates, operating from his Headquarters approximately two miles from the front, received a report that Burgoyne's entire force was about to attack his position. Gates, concerned that the current engagement was only a diversion, ordered only a portion of Poor's Brigade forward to assist Morgan.

General Arnold, anxious to join the battle, assess the situation, and effect the outcome, personally led Poor's Brigade towards a developing gap between the British western and center columns. As stated by one of the Continental Soldiers, "[Arnold was] riding in front of the lines, his eyes flashing, pointing with his sword to the advancing foe, with a voice that rang clear as a trumpet and electrified the line."⁶⁷ For the next several hours the two opposing forces engaged in grueling combat.

During the engagement, Arnold realized that the limited deployed American forces were insufficient to sustain the American line. Arnold left the field and returned to the American defensive position where he gathered an additional uncommitted force from Learned's Brigade. This force, led by Major William Hull, was placed into position along the right flank of the American line. This sudden addition of combat power swayed the advantage to the Americans. The British center was now reeling from the added pressure. On the western edge of the battlefield the British, with still uncommitted forces, directed an attack at the exposed American left flank.

General Arnold noted this British action and ordered additional forces to blunt the British advance. Following this deployment of forces, Arnold returned to General Gates' headquarters where he requested the deployment of Learned's Brigade. Gates, now realizing that Burgoyne had committed the preponderance of his force into the battle, authorized the commitment of the brigade. Once Learned's Brigade was committed, dusk had set in and the violent struggle between the two opposing armies was waning.⁶⁸

While Arnold was directing Learned's brigade forward, the British had committed elements from their eastern column into the fray. This last British deployment of forces threatened the American right flank and denied the American advantage against the British center column.

The battle concluded at the end of the day. The British remained in control of the battlefield as the Americans departed, in an orderly manner, and returned to their defensive positions. In Eighteenth Century warfare, the side that retained the battlefield at the conclusion of a battle was deemed the victor. For that reason alone, the British could claim a minor tactical victory following the Battle of Freeman's Farm. However, the Americans had achieved a compelling operational success.

There were several reasons the Americans could claim an operational victory. First, the Americans had proved a formidable enemy as they had operationally halted the British advance, for the first time in the campaign, and had fought with exceptional tenacity. Following the battle, the British forces had a new found respect for the Americans that they faced as indicated by a British officer when writing after the fact "...we now became fully convinced that they are not that contemptible enemy we had hitherto imagined them, incapable of standing a regular engagement, and that they would

only fight behind strong and powerful works.”⁶⁹ Second, the British were now in a precarious situation. They had sustained significant and irreplaceable casualties and were operationally limited to the finite supplies they had brought across the Hudson River.⁷⁰ In contrast, the American forces that stood in his path were strong and growing stronger by the day.

Leaders. General Arnold was, at times, one of the most talented leaders in the entire American Army.⁷¹ He was an aggressive and experienced leader and since the start of the war had led several daring operations to include, seizing Fort Ticonderoga, a grueling expedition to Canada, and a naval defense that thwarted the British advance south in 1776.⁷² In the Saratoga Campaign, he had already conducted an exceptional deception action against Burgoyne’s force at Fort Stanwix that resulted in the British quitting their operations.⁷³

From these experiences General Arnold learned several lessons that shaped his decision making. First, tactical actions, such as the Battle of Valcour Island, can have operational impacts.⁷⁴ The Battle of Valcour Island was considered a tactical success for the British, however, its impact led to halting British operations into the Hudson Valley. Second, in order to exploit opportunity a commander must make bold decisions and assume risk.⁷⁵ During the course of the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Arnold had positioned himself where he could inspire his subordinates, accurately assess the situation, command and control his forces, and provide sound recommendations to Gates. Though Arnold did not have the authority to commit forces, his tenacity and leadership had a persuasive and positive impact on Gates’ decisions.

In contrast to Arnold, Gates tended to be much less aggressive and often waited to make a decision when operating in an uncertain environment.⁷⁶ In particular, throughout the Battle of Freeman's Farm, Gates was indecisive and hesitated to deploy sufficient forces until he was certain of Burgoyne's intentions. Gates remained in his headquarters throughout the battle. He never positioned himself where he could assess the situation or properly exploit opportunity. The only influence that he maintained throughout the battle was the authority to approve or deny additional requests for forces. By the time that Gates approved the commitment of enough forces to overwhelm the British the opportunity for success had passed.

Conclusion General Gates had unity of command with the forces that engaged on September 19, 1777. He achieved an immediate response to his decisions to employ forces, however, his inability to assume risk coupled with his lack of aggression failed to unify the efforts of his forces. Had Gates committed sufficient forces when Arnold first requested it may have been enough to overwhelm the British advance.⁷⁷ In the Battle of Freeman's Farm unity of command by itself did not ensure a decisive outcome.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the Battle of Freeman's Farm. Gates' failure to make bold decisions, assume risk, and focus the efforts of his unit ensured that the Americans could not achieve a decisive outcome. The British advance could have caught the Americans in their vulnerable and unfinished positions. However, Arnold's aggressive personality coupled with his intuitive understanding of the enemy created a situation that allowed for the Americans to blunt the British initiative.⁷⁸ Arnold's leadership style, position throughout the battle, and tenacity in persuading his senior, directly led to both the decision to employ forces and the actions of those forces.

Arnold's decision and actions led directly to the prevention of the American Army being flanked by the British. During the Battle of Freeman's Farm, in the absence of decisiveness, the unity of command alone did not ensure success.

Decisive Point #4 Battle of Bemis Heights

Situation. In the three weeks between the Battle of Freeman's Farm and the Battle of Bemis Heights, the American force had several significant changes. The size of the American army swelled to approximately twelve thousand as compared to the less than six thousand of the British force. The American force, with a dispatched wing, threatened Burgoyne's lines of communication. Finally, the leadership of the Army changed. Following a series of personality conflicts, Gates relieved Arnold of command and personally assumed command of the Left Wing.⁷⁹

During the same period, the British situation remained relatively unchanged. The British had done some work to physically improve their positions to include the construction of both the Breymann and Balcarres Redoubts that anchored their western flank. The British supply system continued to be strained as the British force was now on half rations, with no ability to resupply and the winter season approaching. Burgoyne had to make a decision in order to affect the resupply of his army. He could suspend the British advance, retreat north, resupply his army, and position forces for future operations. The other course of action was to attempt to open up the path south by launching an attack to unhinge the American position.

Gates accurately assessed the British options. In a letter to his wife, he stated that the enemy would retreat or with "one Violent push endeavour to recover the almost ruined State of their affairs."⁸⁰ In reviewing courses of action for the Americans, Gates

could remain in defensive positions and await Burgoyne's move or launch an attack against the British position.

Decision. Gates remained committed to remaining in the defense and awaited the British move. On October 7, he received a report that the British were advancing in force. His initial reaction was to deploy a small element of forces forward. Gates intended to conduct the same piecemeal deployment of forces that he had committed in the previous battle. Upon hearing Gates decision Arnold, refused to leave camp, became enraged and stated "[t]hat is nothing; you must send stronger forces."⁸¹ In response to Arnold's statement Gates ordered Arnold to leave the battlefield. General Lincoln physically located with Gates continued to request more forces by highlighting the danger of leaving the left flank exposed. Gates, eventually persuaded, acquiesced and released sufficient forces.

Gates ordered Poor's Brigade and Morgan's Riflemen to encircle the British while Learned's Brigade remained in reserve ready to attack the British center (see **Appendix 1, Map No. 5**). At approximately 1500, Poor's Brigade slammed into the left flank of the British. While the British were reacting to the threat on their left, Morgan's Riflemen opened up on the British right flank. By 1600 the American forces had encircled the British.⁸² The British flanks were routed from the field as many of the British fell back to the two redoubts that anchored the British position. It was now time for Learned's Brigade to launch the final part of the attack against the isolated center of the British line.

Arnold departed Gates' Headquarters and assumed command, without authorization, of Learned's Brigade. He personally led the brigade into contact with the

British center. Initially, the British center held against Learned's Brigade, however, with the pressure from Morgan and Poor on both flanks the British center was now exposed to fire from three directions and unable to sustain the fight. The British center fell back to the prepared redoubts.

Once the Americans had driven the British from the field it would have been sufficient to cease the battle and assume a tactical victory. However, if the British redoubts were captured it would expose the entire British encampment. Arnold realized this and left his position with Learned's Brigade in order to position himself with Poor's Brigade opposite the Balcarres Redoubt. Arnold then ordered and personally led an attack to capture the redoubt. The defenders at the Balcarres Redoubt proved too well prepared and blunted the American advance. Assessing the situation, Arnold realized that the Breymann Redoubt was vulnerable. Arnold left his position, with Poor's Brigade, and assumed control of Learned's Brigade. In coordination with Morgan's Riflemen, Arnold led the final significant action of the battle that overwhelmed and captured Breymann's Redoubt.

At the conclusion of Bemis Heights, having lost Breymann's Redoubt, Burgoyne's western flank was exposed. In addition, he could no longer accomplish his operational objective of advancing to Albany and isolating the Northeastern colonies; because he had lost over half of the men he committed and no longer had the manpower to continue the offensive. In order to save his force, the only course of action available to him was to retreat north and fall back on his base of supply.

Leaders. General Arnold refused to quit the battlefield. As he heard the opening engagements of the battle he left his position and rode out to join the action. Throughout

the battle, Arnold led elements of two brigades, without authority, and was visible inspiring the Americans. His physical position allowed him to accurately assess the developing situation and make adjustments in order to exploit opportunities.

During the entire battle, General Gates though technically in command of both the Army and the Left Wing remained in his command post two miles from the field. Gates never moved to control the deployed troops or assess the situation. The only impact that Gates had for the battle, similar to the Freeman's Farm, was his decision to commit forces.⁸³

Conclusion. Though Gates accurately assessed the British, he was initially unwilling to assume risk in making a bold decision. Gates remained overly confident in the strength of the American position and ultimately content with allowing the British to retain the initiative. If Gates had not been persuaded by his subordinate commanders, the limited light force he initially committed could have been overwhelmed and the American position would have been in jeopardy of being flanked. In spite of being ordered from the battlefield, and not being in the chain of command, Arnold's actions led directly to unifying the efforts of the American forces and decisive victory.

Conclusion

Following the loss at Bemis Heights, the British were slow in action and eventually cut off by an element of the Northern Department. On October 17, 1777 General Burgoyne surrendered the combined British force to General Horatio Gates in what many have identified the turning point of the American Revolution.

A campaign that began with the abandonment of the most important post in all of the colonies turned into the most important victory achieved by the Americans. The

defeat of Burgoyne was a result of decisive American leaders that demonstrated aggressiveness at critical times throughout the campaign. These leaders were comfortable in working in the uncertain and chaotic environment as described in the Marine Corps Warfighting philosophy. The American leaders focused on securing or retaining advantage of the initiative from the enemy. In addition, by making bold decisions their actions surprised the enemy and fostered unity of effort amongst their troops. France was so encouraged by the news of the American victory that it openly entered the war on the side of America.⁸⁴

Future Relevance

Based on the analysis of command and control components as they were applied by three leaders at critical times throughout the Saratoga campaign, there are several lessons that can be drawn about the impact of a leader on decision making and thus command and control. A leader's ability to make decisions in a chaotic and uncertain environment is timeless. Experience and personality affect decision making and therefore impact a leader's ability to command and control. Command relationships are not necessarily critical for the successful execution of a campaign. These conclusions are relevant to the current wartime environment as well as future warfighting scenarios that place leaders in the crux of accomplishing missions, in an uncertain environment, while working through complex command relationships (e.g. ISAF).

¹ George Athan Billias, *George Washington's Generals and Opponents: Their Exploits and Leadership* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994), 97. In the words of John Adams, when equating the importance of the success at Saratoga, "General Gates was the ablest negotiator you ever had in Europe."

² The Battle of Saratoga is actually composed of two distinct battles fought in very close proximity. The Battle of Freeman's Farm took place on September 19, 1777 and the Battle of Bemis Heights took place on October 7, 1777.

³ John E. Ferling, *Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence*, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 188. "So Fearful of French belligerency was Sandwich, the head of Admiralty, that on three occasions he refused Lord Howe's pleas for additional ships and he would not permit warships sent home for repair to return to America. During the autumn [1776], the dark cloud lifted somewhat. The disillusioned French appeared to pull back in the wake of the steady diet of gloomy tidings about the New York Campaign, even sending reassurances of their strict neutrality to London. When word of the American debacle at Fort Washington reached London at Christmas, fretting over French intervention largely vanished altogether, although one cynical member of Parliament remarked that 'France to us sends most fair words, to America, stores and officers.'" Hoffman Nickerson, *The Turning Point of the Revolution*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company 1928), 71. General Sir Guy Carleton decision to retire vice attacking south during the Fall of 1776 was a sound decision though it was seen as a weak decision in London. Opposing him at Fort Ticonderoga was an American force much larger than his own regular contingent. In addition, the winter season was not far from beginning and would have led to severe consequences if he had allowed his force to be exposed in the execution of a protracted siege. Unlike Carleton, General Burgoyne had never been through a northern winter.

⁴ Ferling, 574. "Washington's brilliant Trenton-Princeton campaign restored American Morale, captured the imagination of Versailles, and facilitated the recruitment of another army for the campaign 1777." Max M. Mintz, *The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 70. "Lord Germaine advocated the use of 'the utmost force of this Kingdom to the finish the rebellion in one campaign.'"

⁵ Ferling, 191. There were three distinct campaign plans proposed to the Secretary for the summer campaign season (1777). The first included Major General Sir Guy Carleton's (Commander of army in Canada) and General Sir William Howe's (Commander-in-chief in North America) army in New York executing a coordinated attack along the Hudson River valley and isolating the rebellious northeastern colonies from the rest of the colonies. The second plan included launching separate attacks from both Canada and New York with different aim points. The third plan called included a large contingent of the Canadian force sailing around the coast and linking up with Howe's army in New York. Once the linkup was complete this united army would execute a combined operation.

⁶ Richard M. Ketchum, *Saratoga: Turning Point of America's Revolutionary War*, (New York: Owl Book, 1997), 127.

⁷ General Burgoyne's operational plan was laid out in great detail to the King and Cabinet in his *Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada*. A copy can be found in the Nickerson book cited in this study.

⁸ Ketchum, 18. Mintz, 70. "[Lord] Germain, in stark contrast [to Lord Dartmouth], advocated the use of 'the utmost force of this Kingdom to finish the rebellion in one campaign.'"

⁹ Ketchum, 114. Before he left Philadelphia, John Hancock, the president of Congress, had assured him that most, if not all, of Britain's soldiers who had wintered around Montreal and Quebec would certainly be dispatched by ship to join General William Howe in New York. In Hancock's words, there was "no probability of an active campaign."

¹⁰ Ferling, 217.

¹¹ Ketchum, 42-43.

¹² New York Historical Society Collections, *Proceedings of a General Court Martial at White Plains, in the State of New-York by order of his Excellency General Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States of America, for the Trial of Major General St. Clair, August 25, 1778, Major General Lincoln, President.* (Vol 13, 1880), 16. Hereafter cited *Proceedings*. Extract of a letter to the House of Representatives of the State of Massachusetts dated December 30, 1776. "Should the enemy leave us unmolested this winter, I shall hope that they will not be able to penetrate from the Northward in spring or summer, provided troops, cannon and ammunition, are furnished me."

¹³ Ferling, 216. A multitude of reasons existed for the lack of success in accomplishing the stated objectives of Congress in regards to strengthening the Northern Department. From delays caused by the weather to the fact that Congress had no means of making states comply with their wishes.

¹⁴ The theater of operations upon which the Saratoga Campaign took place is composed of the most challenging terrain in all of thirteen colonies. The majority of the countryside was composed of a combination of thickly forested undergrowth and swampy impassable low ground. The ground movement was extremely limited by the vegetation and growth. Due to the relatively impassable ground movement the primary Line of Communication within the theater was along the waterways that run from Canada to New York. This system of waterways runs through the middle of the Adirondack and Green Mountain ranges. These mountain ranges were thick with nasty vegetation and swampy areas and created a natural funnel that constrained all forces to move north and south. A second minor corridor existed in the western portion of the theater. It ran from Lake Ontario, along the Mohawk River to the Hudson River. Both corridors passed the major population center in the Northern, Albany. Though the river system allowed for movement throughout the interior it created significant impediments to movement amongst the colonies. Therefore, this natural corridor made for a natural barrier between the Northeastern colonies and the rest of the thirteen colonies.

¹⁵ Ketchum, 30. "[T]he crown jewel of the northern forts was in no condition to withstand attack by a professional army."

¹⁶ Brendan Morrissey, *Saratoga, 1777: Turning Point of a Revolution*, Praeger Illustrated Military History Series, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), 33. In addition to the noted deficiencies the Fort was originally designed for a force of approximately 10,000 soldiers to man all the breastworks, however, at the time that St. Clair assumed command the garrison was only approximately 2,200. Mintz, 142. "If St. Clair's entire force were strung in single file along the lines of defense, the men would hardly be within shouting distance of each other."

¹⁷ The British had learned from their own experience of fighting the French in the French and Indian War at Fort Carillon. They had been annihilated there in no small part due their inability to gain key tactical terrain.

¹⁸ John Robert Elting, *The Battles of Saratoga, Philip Freneau Press Bicentennial Series on the American Revolution*, (Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau Press, 1977), 29. General Schuyler had been at Fort Ticonderoga on June 20 to hold a council of war. Therefore, he had a complete understanding of the condition of the Fort and had worked continuously throughout the winter months to acquire items to strengthen the defense. He was clear to General St. Clair in his intent to delay an enemy advance as long as practical. Proceedings, 2. "That, although in this Council of War it was determined that the effective rank and file were greatly inadequate to the defence of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, but that nevertheless both posts ought to be maintained as long as possible..."

¹⁹ Mintz, 161. "Insubordination and desertion were taking a heavy toll. Increasing Indian Raids went largely unrepulsed. Two Massachusetts militia regiments sent as replacements turned around and went home. Schuyler lost nearly half of his force."

²⁰ Bayard Tuckerman, *Life of General Philip Schuyler, 1733-1804*, (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 199.

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, *On War [Vom Kriege]*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 363. Initiative is assumed the advantage of the offense whereas the defense holds the advantage of terrain. Leading up to this decision point General Burgoyne had both the operational and tactical initiative due to the fact that his forces were attacking a retreating American Force.

²² Nickerson, 173. At Fort Edward there were only six to seven hundred Continental soldiers and fourteen hundred of militia.

²³ Tuckerman, 185. "Schuyler found himself the object of the most violent personal attacks. In New England especially, he was openly accused of having treacherously delivered the fortress into the hands of the enemy."

²⁴ Mintz, 160. "In the meantime he sent a Massachusetts militia detachment under Brigadier General John Fellows to break up the roads and bridges between Fort Anne and Fort Edward."

²⁵ Proceedings, 46. Extract of Orders from General Schuyler to Captain McCracken, of Van Sebaick's, dated Head-Quarters, Fort Edward, July 13, 1777. "You will not leave any cattle, or any carriages of any kind, between you and the enemy, that you can possibly drive or bring off, nor will you suffer any to be left in your rear, in such a situation as that, if you should be obliged to give way, they may fall into the enemy's hands, before you can be supported by a reinforcement."

²⁶ Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763-1789*, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), 191. As a result of Schuyler's delaying tactics it took the combined British force twenty-three days to march twenty-four miles.

²⁷ Ketchum, 337.

²⁸ Ketchum, 246.

²⁹ Walter Borneman, *The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 132-138. The failed British attack, during the French

and Indian War, on Fort Carrillon (Fort Ticonderoga) cost the British 1,944 where the French defenders numbered 372.

³⁰ Billias, 56. Tuckerman, 64. In particular, by observing the failures of Abercromby's fateful exploits against Fort Ticonderoga served as a warning that would play a role in General Schuyler's future decisions. Higginbotham, 22. "The chief American accomplishments [during the French and Indian War] were in logistics, an area that would plague Britain in the War of Independence."

³¹ John F. Luzader, *Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution*, (New York: Savas Beatie), 35.

³² Mintz, 160. Upon arriving at Fort Edward, General Schuyler found the Fort in a state of disrepair and the soldiers lacking both in number and outfit. "The Americans collected there numbered no more than fifteen hundred, with no provisions, no shelter, no canon, and only five rounds of ammunition per man."

³³ Proceedings, 41. Extract of a letter from General Schuyler to General Washington dated July 5, 1777.

³⁴ Mintz, 161. Upon news of the fall of Fort Ticonderoga, General Schuyler took charge of the field himself.

³⁵ Ketchum, 237

³⁶ Ketchum, 152.

³⁷ Ketchum, 150. "By and large the companies were voluntary associations of neighbors who tended to have an easy, loose jointed way about them, and if discipline was often lax it was because they stood in no great awe of their Captain or Colonel, who was, after all, the farmer who lived down the road."

³⁸ General John Stark's leadership style fit this model. Higginbotham, 11. Though militiamen evinced a reluctance to travel to distant parts of America to serve in the Continental army, they were more willing to bear arms with the regulars for a limited time period if the brunt of the conflict engulfed their own region or state. But generally when the militia turned out, they preferred a fight under their own leadership: commanded by a John Stark, a Seth Warner, a Nicholas Herkimer, and Andrew Pickens, or an Elijah Clarke."

³⁹ This does not ignore the fact that the weather on August 15 had heavy rains and was not conducive to 18th Century weapons employment.

⁴⁰ Ketchum, 299.

⁴¹ August 15th was a day of heavy rains and uncommon to fight in those conditions.

⁴² Mitnz, 172. One of the better descriptions in regard to the scheme of maneuver for the Bennington action.

⁴³ Mintz, 175.

⁴⁴ Morrissey, 22. Only nine Germans and six British escaped from LtCol Baum's detachment.

⁴⁵ William L. Stone, *Letters and Journals Relating to the War of the American Revolution, and the Capture of the German Troops at Saratoga*, By Mrs. General Riedesel, *Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution*, (New York: The New York Times & Arno Press, 1968), 97. Mintz, 175. In addition to the physical losses and operational impact it highlighted to General Burgoyne the failure of three assumptions he made when planning the campaign. First, the Indians were at best unreliable. Second that

the hordes of loyalist did not exist. Finally, that the Americans were not a ragtag group of amateurs but a formidable force that when compelled could form into a tenacious opponent.

⁴⁶ Elting, 44.

⁴⁷ Elting, 44. The Indian forces employed as scouts and raiding parties would serve to screen the British advance. Following the loss at Bennington, the western chiefs informed Burgoyne that they were leaving the camp. General Burgoyne stated his "own army was by no means in condition to dispense with...for scouts...and outposts...."

⁴⁸ Elting, 44. "[T]he rough treatment captured Tories got from Stark's men damped Loyalist enthusiasm.

⁴⁹ Elting, 44. In a letter from Burgoyne, "[w]henver the King's forces point, militia, to the amount of three or four thousand, assemble in twenty-four hours; they bring with them their subsistence, etc. and, the alarm over, they return to their farms."

⁵⁰ Elting, 44. Burgoyne's letter, dated August 20, to Lord Germaine shifted blame for future failures of his army. In the letter he addresses the emerging threat, lack of local popular support, and challenges of moving through the difficult terrain.

⁵¹ Mintz, 169. "Stark was a popular, intrepid veteran of the French and Indian War."

⁵² Ketchum, 287. The number of men that joined the Brigade was more than 10 percent of the males over sixteen.

⁵³ Mintz, 175. General John Stark's leadership and aggressive spirit were instrumental in ensuring success during the battle. "He had been the superb leader who personified the New England spirit, inspired the turnout of a whole brigade of amateurs, and understood precisely how to use them against a professional foe."

⁵⁴ Henry Walker Herrick, General Stark and the Battle of Bennington, (New York: Harpers Weekly, 1877) 518.

⁵⁵ He stated that he had no confidence in the Generals commanding the northern department.

⁵⁶ Thus, when appointed the commander of the new brigade General Stark requested and received permission to only report to the New Hampshire political body vice reporting to the Continental congress.

⁵⁷ Tuckerman, 213. He stated that he owed his allegiance only to the state of New Hampshire and that it was only left to his opinion whether he should or should not cooperate with the Continental Army.

⁵⁸ Luther Roby, *Reminiscences of the French War with Robert Rogers's Journal and a Memoir of General Stark*, (Freedom, New Hampshire: The Freedom Historical Society, 1988), 241. In a letter from General Schuyler to General Stark dtd Aug. 19, 1777. The consequence of the severe stroke the enemy have received, cannot fail of producing the most salutary results....I trust that after what the enemy have received from you, their progress will be retarded and we shall see them driven from this part of the country."

⁶⁰ Unity of effort can be achieved without unity of command.

⁶¹ Congress had relieved General Schuyler upon news of the surrender of Fort Ticonderoga and the investment of Fort Stanwix. Unfortunately the relief of General Schuyler happened prior to Congress' knowledge of the victories at Fort Stanwix and Bennington.

⁶² On September 18, at the head of a column of advanced forces General Arnold had personally led a reconnaissance in force in order to harass Burgoyne's force. Upon returning from this advance he had decided that the Americans should assume the initiative and attack General Burgoyne's force.

⁶³ Williard Mosher Wallace, *Traitorous Hero; the Life and Fortunes of Benedict Arnold*, (New York: Harper, 1954), 146.

⁶⁴ Paul David Nelson, *General Horatio Gates: A Biography*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 116. Unlike Arnold Gates had a very different perception of what the common American Fighting man could accomplish. He believed that they were best utilized behind fortifications and fighting the enemy from a tactical defense.

⁶⁵ Ketchum, 360.

⁶⁶ Ketchum, 360.

⁶⁷ Ketchum, 363.

⁶⁸ Nelson, 117. Learned Brigade became disoriented as they approached the field. They had little effect on the outcome of the battle. *The view of this study is that this relationship of Arnold continuously having to engage General Gates for the deployment of forces was not ideal. However, a contrasted view is stated in John Luzader's study on page 46.*

⁶⁸ Mintz, 197.

⁶⁹ Mintz, 197.

⁷⁰ Burgoyne crossed the Hudson River with a limited amount of supplies. He had originally planned to resupply his advancing army once they secured the logistical hub of Albany. British losses during the Battle of Freeman's Farm were significant: 160 dead, 364 wounded, and 42 missing.

⁷¹ Billias, Pg 163. "Few generals in the Continental army demonstrated greater qualities of leadership than Benedict Arnold, but not one proved, in the end, so disloyal."

⁷² Wallace, 55-74. "Neither criticism nor the defects of his character—not even his subsequent treachery---could take from Arnold the credit due him for his great march." Following the courageous movement through the Marine wilderness, Arnold was wounded while fighting with the British during the Siege of Quebec. The same leg was wounded a second time at the Battle of Bemis Heights. Given the accuracy and distance of the average musket it must be assumed that Arnold was did not fear being close to the fight. Higginbotham, 110. "That the hearty band, gaunt and worn, eventually reached the St. Lawrence on November 8 was a credit to Arnold's magnificent leadership, along with that of Captain Daniel Morgan, the leader of the riflemen." Wallace, 119. Arnold is given credit by Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan for setting the conditions that ensured the success of the Saratoga Campaign by his brave actions in the defense of Valcour Island.

⁷³ Mintz, 163. General Arnold's aggressive reputation filled the ranks of Burgoyne's Force. For example, upon Burgoyne's force arriving at Fort Edward on July, 29, they discovered a letter pinned nailed to a tree warning them to not cross the Hudson. They attributed it to General Arnold who wasn't even present in Fort Edward when it was abandoned by the Americans.

⁷⁴ Wallace, 113-114. In action at Valcour Island, Carleton forced the issue on October 11. "At once Arnold called his captains aboard the Congress for a council of war. During the conference, Waterbury was anxiously insistent that Arnold change his battle plan. But

Arnold vehemently disagreed. To challenge the British in the open lake, as he himself had once thought of doing, would expose his fleet to the superior speed and gunpowder of the British. His strength, he knew, lay in his present position. Arnold, reasoned well, but he knew he could be surrounded and possibly starved out. This was a chance he had to take. Every day he could delay the advance of Carleton's army brought winter that much closer and the campaign season closer to an end."

⁷⁵ Wallace, 141. As indicated in his Relief of Fort Stanwix. At first he had agreed to a delay in advance to relief the besieged garrison in order to wait for more troops to be called. However, when he received a report that Barry St. Leger was closing in by trenching methods he decided to action. Higginbotham, 113. "In the Canadian Campaign, as in perhaps no other American operation of the Revolution, time was of the essence. Had Arnold's expedition been able to get over the St. Lawrence immediately upon emerging from the Maine Wilderness the previous month, the Kennebec column alone might have stormed the fortress city, sitting high on a rocky promontory. For several days Arnold delayed on the south bank of the river, searching for boats and then waiting for rains and wind-whipped waters to subside. Those were precious moments, for Colonel Allen Maclean, a crusty Highlander with a small body of regulars and British loyalists, arrived to reinforce the shaky Quebecers after an unsuccessful effort to relieve St. Johns."

⁷⁶ Ketchum, 365. "Gates concern was the possibility of attack by the German foot soldiers and British Artillery along the river, which made him withhold badly needed support from Poor's brigade."

⁷⁷ Wallace, 148.

⁷⁸ During the conduct of the battle General Arnold's aggressive actions were noted by his subordinates. His decision to engage General Gates and then to become himself engaged in the combat inspired and unified the efforts of his subordinates during the intense and brutal combat. Unfortunately, in spite of his audacity in the conduct of the battle the resulting engagement lasted all day without a clear victor.

⁷⁹ Elting, 58.

⁸⁰ Ketchum, 387.


⁸¹ Ketchum, 394.

⁸² Ketchum, 398. "From the time the first shot was fired that afternoon until the British left and right wings were in full retreat exactly fifty-two minutes had elapsed."

⁸³ Ketchum, 404.

⁸⁴ Billias, 97.


Appendix 1



Map1: Saratoga Campaign

Source: <http://www.britishbattles.com>


Appendix 1



Map 2: Fort Ticonderoga

Source: <http://www.britishbattles.com>


Appendix 1



Map 3: Battle of Bennington


Source: <http://www.warandgame.files.wordpress.com>

Appendix 1



Map 4: Battle of Freeman's Farm
 Source: <http://www.emersonkent.com>

Appendix 1



Map 5: Battle of Bemis Heights

Source: <http://www.emersonkent.com>

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