An Aversion to Risk; A Warning from the Past
Abstract
When U.S . forces departed Iraq on 15 December 2011 to return to the U.S., they did so much as General George B. McClellan had left the Peninsula to return to Washington, D.C. on 20 August 1862. The U.S. had lost a great deal of blood and treasure with little to show for its expenditure. This thesis addresses several aspects of the 1862 Peninsula Campaign and the 2003 Iraq invasion as well as the contemporary doctrine concerning risk. There were many contributing factors to the Anny of the Potomac culminating in 1862 and U.S. failures in Iraq in 2003. A major contributing factor was reluctance for leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical level to take risk. During the execution of these campaigns leaders focused on what might be lost instead of what could be gained. The 1862 Peninsular Campaign illuminates problems still with us despite 150 years of vast changes in the conduct of war . I contend that culmination in 1862, and culmination during the post 9/11 campaigns, resulted from inadequate responses to risk aversion by the government and military leaders, when faced with uncertainty.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 02, 2014
- Accession Number
- ADA603153
Entities
People
- Jay Briggs
Organizations
- National Defense University