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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)	2. REPORT DATE 17 MARCH 2010	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER AY 2009-2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION: A BUILDING BLOCK TO COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION.		5. FUNDING NUMBERS N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) CHAD A. CHORZELEWSKI, MAJOR, USMC			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER NONE	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME AS #7.		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER: NONE	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES NONE			
12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT NO RESTRICTIONS		12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE N/A	
ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) This document will explain how the cooperative security paradigm has developed and been established as a Military Contributions to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC). Further examination will identify how U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy supports the JOC in order to foster a new cooperative security paradigm across the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, this document will demonstrated how the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) and Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) have been effectively utilized to support PACOM's strategic efforts over the last decade to promote inclusivity, build capacity and capability of its partner nations, and support concept of common interest of regional security and stability.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH)		15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 34	
		16. PRICE CODE: N/A	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES


**U.S. Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation: A Building Block to Cooperative
Security in the Asia Pacific Region.**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

AUTHOR:


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Date: March 16, 2010

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Date: 16 March 2010

Executive Summary

Title: U.S. Pacific Command Theater Security Cooperation: A Building Block to Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific Region.

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Thesis: U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has worked to integrate its security cooperation programs with interagency, non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions in order to develop a “whole of government” approach to leverage all elements of national power to enhance cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Discussion: Through the security engagements conducted in the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of operations (AO) the U.S. has been able to promote diplomatic, economic, informational, and military relationships while building confidence among its partners. The Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) and Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) programs will continue to mature and develop while the Asia-Pacific environment provides numerous opportunities for engagement and operations to support regional security interests. This document will explain how the cooperative security paradigm has developed and been established as a Military Contributions to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC). Further examination will identify how PACOM strategy supports the JOC in order to foster a new cooperative security paradigm across the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, this document will demonstrate how the APAN and MPAT have been effectively utilized to support PACOM’s strategic efforts over the last decade to promote inclusivity, build capacity and capability of its partner nations, and support concept of common interest of regional security and stability.

Conclusion: PACOM has integrated its security cooperation programs with interagency, non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions in order to develop a “whole of government” approach to leverage all elements of national power to enhance cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the last decade, PACOM has established and developed the APAN and the MPAT programs that allow all elements of U.S. national power to integrate and engage with our regional partners and allies through the maturing paradigm of cooperative security.

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Preface

This research thesis was developed to expand my understanding of how U.S. Pacific Command security cooperation programs support U.S. security interests across the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to attending U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, I was assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (USMARSOC). During this assignment, I spent three years learning about the language, culture, and history of several countries in Southeast Asia. This assignment provided me an opportunity to learn about many new concepts that I had not been previously exposed to in my career. After deploying to several countries in Southeast Asia and listening to their opinions on U.S. policy and behavior, I started considering how our military exercises can help improve communication with our allies and partners. Often, security cooperation exercises are viewed as random acts of training by those who participate, the bigger picture is lost. There is no clear understanding of how the exercise fits into the larger operational or strategic plan for the region, therefore the participant may not actually be aware of what their higher command is attempting to achieve. This research thesis was designed to help me develop a better understanding of how U.S. PACOM employs military and interagency assets in order to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the Asia Pacific region.

I have no experience with the PACOM staff. My deployments to Southeast Asia were in support of the PACOM Theater Security Cooperation Program, however all my contact was through Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). My discovery of the Asia Pacific Area Network and the Multinational Augmentation Team was purely serendipitous. I found the programs while hunting through the PACOM website for information concerning security cooperation. However, after researching these two programs, I was amazed at what they do and what they have accomplished. I discovered the concept of “cooperative security” during my research, primarily through academic readings about the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, I discovered that the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) had published a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) titled *Military Contributions to Cooperative Security* which was critical in helping me to connect PACOM strategy and the APAN and MPAT programs.

Finally, I have enjoyed researching the APAN and MPAT programs. In my humble opinion, these two programs have remarkable potential for growth and achieving regional cooperative security, especially at this critical time when we start to transition forces out of Iraq. These innovative programs demonstrate great vision and creativity in building military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations relationship in a cooperative and mutually supporting capacity to improve regional responses to crisis situations. My only hope is that this document can help to spread the word about what these programs are doing for U.S. and Asia-Pacific relations.

Introduction

The United States (U.S.) has acknowledged that unilateral actions will become harder to sustain and even harder to justify in the international arena. As a result, the U.S. has deliberately sought out and developed mechanisms to support multinational opportunities to improve regional and global security and stability. This trend towards a cooperative security paradigm modifies previous concepts and frameworks that often required the U.S. to act unilaterally or take a domineering role in security across various regions of the world. The recent guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 21 December 2009, states that:

Persistent global engagement underpins our strategic priorities. It supports our allies and partners through programs abroad and at home – programs that are best conducted hand-in-hand with our interagency, commercial partners, and non-governmental organizations to achieve sustainable results. Our capacity building efforts are good examples of long-term investments that bolster security and stability by helping emerging powers become constructive actors. Enduring international relationships are essential to our strategic priorities, global security and stability, and securing our vital national interests. Our military must be capable of reassuring our allies while tempering potential adversaries' offensive designs, imposing prohibitive costs on those who would destabilize the commons or attack our interests.¹

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has been a leader in developing mechanisms to enhance security and stability while supporting U.S. regional objectives. One of PACOM's primary avenues of engagement has been through its security cooperation programs. Generally, security cooperation is defined as, "all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation."² Over the last decade, PACOM, in conjunction with its regional partners, has established and developed several programs that allow all elements of U.S. national power to integrate and engage with our regional partners and allies through the paradigm of cooperative security. Through the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) programs conducted in the PACOM Area of Operation (AO) (see Appendix 1) the U.S. has been able to promote diplomatic, economic, informational, and military relationships while building confidence among its

partners. This document will demonstrate that PACOM has worked to integrate its security cooperation programs with interagency, non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions in order to develop a “whole of government” approach to leverage all elements of national power to enhance cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Historical Context

At the end of World War II, the United States began establishing itself as dominate player within international relationships. Advances in communications, transportation, and military capabilities reshaped the world and how governments and people perceived the international community as an entity, thus creating a new paradigm in international security. Later, following several decades of political and ideological conflict the collapse of the Soviet Union left the U.S. the sole “superpower” and once again changed the international security paradigm. Finally, on September 11, 2001, a terrorist attack on the U.S. by a non-state actor sent the world reeling as it struggled to address the new security threat. The U.S. along with its allies and global partners has been fighting for almost a decade to defeat this new global threat. The U.S. has been struggling to develop a new security paradigm that adequately addresses our new security concerns while engaging our allies and partners around the world. However, the leaders and planners have struggled to develop of a cohesive security concept that incorporates all the elements of national power to adequately engage threats while developing international security.

Unfortunately, the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom has received countless criticism from the world community for being primarily a unilateral decision by the U.S. and with complete disregard of the global and regional partners’ policies and concerns. The invasion of Iraq created a perception of an arrogant and antagonistic U.S. policy that focused on the Middle East and ignored the rest of the world. While the U.S. attention appears to have been primarily focused on the Middle East and the military’s Central Command (CENTCOM) for the last eight years, other regions of the world have felt somewhat ignored or marginalized by recent U.S. activities. As a supporting effort to U.S. global effort, other regional combatant commanders (COCOM) have continued to engage their available resources to accomplish U.S. regional objectives. The U.S. has struggled to maintain regional security and stability

because it has not efficiently engaged its diplomatic, military, economic, and informational efforts in order to maximize its national power. Subsequently, the U.S. has relied on inefficient bilateral activities or loosely organized regional activities to address regional security and stability requirements. The regional COCOMs have attempted to employ their resources to improve the strategic communications message that the U.S. is indeed invested in security interests around the world and engaged with its partners to build a cooperative structure for betterment of all.

The Emergence of the Cooperative Security Paradigm

On 19 September 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, and the Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Robert Gates, signed a new Joint Operating Concept (JOC) titled “Military Contributions to Cooperative Security” that was subsequently published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This new concept broadens the previous security concepts and models that have guided military and government agencies around the world. Rear Adm. Dan W. Davenport, USN, Director, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate (J-9), JFCOM, explains in the June 2008 edition of SIGNAL magazine, “that nearly two years ago the U.S. Defense Department recognized that it lacked a concept that covers its geographic combatant commanders’ day-to-day efforts that lead to a more stable security environment.”³ The new JOC defines cooperative security *“as the set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and non-governmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur.”*⁴ While JFCOM intends to use this concept as a basis for future development, it acknowledges much of this concept can be employed in the near term in order to improve operations in today’s security environment. Cooperative security is intended to change how military planners conceptualize engagements with international partners and allies. Prior to development of the cooperative security paradigm, military planners participating in a crisis response found themselves immediately engaged in planning and executing operations with representatives from foreign military organizations that have limited exposure to a detailed planning process or receiving directive instructions.

Additionally, U.S. military planners have been accustomed to perceived U.S. dominance in response operations resulting in planners and leaders directing regional partners by default. However, the changing world security environment has dictated that the U.S. avoids any actions that could be perceived as heavy-handed leadership. Instead, the U.S. will be required to employ influence in order to gain consensus for multinational operations that affect several national or regional security structures. However, the JOC further identifies that through cooperative security, the United States seeks to mobilize and sustain cooperation across a region. As a result of this cooperative security, the U.S. expects to achieve the desired ends of improved security, nonproliferation, political stability, good governance, sustainable development, legitimate competition and trade, and economic prosperity.⁵ This point is illustrated in Adm. Davenport's statement that by helping bring about more order and stability in a country, it is less likely that extremist organizations would be welcome. Adm. Davenport stated "What we find is that in countries that have poor governance and poor economic conditions, there are a lot of discontented populations that are going to be more inclined to be influenced by extremists' ideologies,"⁶

The identified end states of the cooperative security effort will develop and solidify a constructive security environment in a region whether it is accomplished by working in partnership with military, government, or non-governmental organizations. Militarily, the Cooperative Security JOC states this can be achieved through pursuit of the following five objectives by joint force commanders:

- Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region.
- Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.
- Thwart the emergence of transnational and host nation security threats in the region.
- Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy,
- Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.⁷

By examining the current PACOM programs, these newly identified objectives can be found already imbedded in many of the regional activities. Leaders and planners supporting PACOM operations or exercises can employ the Cooperative Security JOC in order to enhance overall effectiveness of mechanisms already in place around the Asia Pacific region while developing new initiatives as well.

Each of these mechanisms put in place can often be leveraged to generate action in other areas of concern and promote greater interdependence in order to enhance regional stability. As a result, while cooperative security can greatly improve interoperability for regional security, it will also serve as a confidence building measure among the regional partners in order to deter intra-regional conflicts.

Academically, David Dewitt and Amitav Acharya are referenced in The Asia Pacific Security Lexicon as requiring cooperative security to require three components; inclusivity, habits of dialogue, and the understanding that many security questions (such as piracy, terrorism, and disease) are no longer amenable to unilateral action, but require cooperative action between states, as well as between the relevant actors within a state.⁸ The recent examination of cooperative security by U.S. CENTCOM identified these terms in a manner designed for military understanding. CENTCOM states that cooperative security requires common interests, inclusivity, and capacity building. Preventing terrorism, reducing illegal drug production and trafficking, responding to environmental disasters, halting the proliferation of WMD and related technology, countering piracy, and deterring aggression are security challenges that act as a common interest to focus regional attention and increasing cooperation. Inclusivity creates an atmosphere of cooperation among a network of partners to leverage each country's comparative advantages. The network is not an alliance or bloc, and countries are able to link into this network to address issues as they desire. This suggests that there may be room for cooperation between countries inside and outside the region and even some who may have been seen as competitors. Finally, capacity building requires strengthening each country's ability to maintain security inside its own borders and to participate in joint endeavors in order to improve overall effectiveness. Capacity building includes collective and individual training programs, educational exchanges, and the development of security-related facilities and infrastructure, as well as equipment modernization efforts.⁹ Additionally, this capacity building will be required to focus not just on military efforts, but the "whole of government" approach to enhance regional security through economic and diplomatic agencies efforts as well.

Implementation of the PACOM Strategy

Theater strategy and theater security cooperation (TSC) are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises.¹⁰ In April 2009, PACOM published the U.S. Pacific Command Strategy identifying three major tenets of “partnership, readiness, and presence”. PACOM operations have a significant value to national interests; the area of operation includes over 3 billion people, in 36 nations, spread across half the world’s surface, with the world’s six largest militaries, and three major U.S. trading partners. As a result of these factors, PACOM can easily find its U.S. resources drained and unable to respond to multiple crises at one time. However, by implementing a cooperative security concept within its 2009 strategy, PACOM and its partners can seek a cooperative, multilateral solution that exponentially expands the collective pool of resources to address additional security requirements. PACOM has identified that their strategy is a long term plan of action that must address numerous issues that cross regional and international common interests. Admiral Keating, the Commander of U.S. PACOM explains that his strategy:

...underscores the fundamental importance of sustained and persistent cooperation and collaboration in times of relative peace to mitigate situations that could lead to conflict and crisis. The emphasis on security cooperation and capacity building does not signal a departure from our primary responsibility to fight and win. Instead, it acknowledges the complexity of our security environment and the importance of proactively employing forces in ways that strengthen partnerships and support conditions that preclude the necessity for combat operations.¹¹

Operationally, PACOM has enhanced two programs that embody this new strategy and encompass the tenets of cooperative security. The Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) have demonstrated PACOM’s effort in developing cooperative security paradigm. The development and enhancement of these mutually supporting programs have provided PACOM the opportunity to foster a multilateral approach to security that improve interoperability, build capacity and capability, and leverage the “whole of government” approach to common regional security concerns. Each program is designed to provide inclusivity of regional militaries, governments, and non-

government organizations and institutions by providing access to information, improving planning, and pooling resources for greater regional security and stability.

Information Accessibility; the Asia Pacific Area Network

The rapid exchange of information and a common understanding of the situation are critical to successful multinational operations. Multinational leaders and planners must have a way to communicate, consolidate information, and disseminate vital information in order to effectively achieve Multinational Force (MNF) or Combined Task Force (CTF) mission objectives and manage available resources. During a crisis response a MNF would normally address two problems involving information sharing and technology. First, the revolution in military affairs has allowed the U.S. military to leap ahead of some of its allies and partners in technological development causing significant disparity in the quantity and quality of information systems. However, this technology gap created a dilemma because partner nations will still require access to information in order to best support a MNF mission. The solution would require an information network that allows partner nations to integrate into the information system and remain an active participant in information collection and dissemination. Second, magnifying this problem, a MNF responding to a crisis will find other governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations and institutions with separate, but similar objectives operating in the response area. The MNF will need to collaborate with these institutions and organizations in order to maximize the efforts within a disaster area (manmade or natural). A MNF can always assume that relief organizations will always respond to a crisis to provide the essential support required by the affected population. In order for a MNF commander to synergize a complete response, the commander will have to determine how to integrate these efforts with a multinational military response. Relief organization, whether governmental, non-governmental, or international, will not have access to military networks and information systems, but will need access to information to provide better situational awareness and response coordination.

Fortunately, the PACOM solution is the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN), which serves as an information coordination conduit in the Asia Pacific region. APAN enhances a cooperative security

paradigm of inclusivity by providing access to multinational, military, governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations and institutions that support humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts, as well small scale contingencies and other common interests across the Asia-Pacific region. APAN is a capability building asset that supports HA/DR, regional contingency (including maritime security and counterterrorism) exercises and conferences to improve and enhance regional security and stability. APAN operates as an unclassified, non-dot-mil internet service that provides a planning, collaboration and information sharing tool for Asia Pacific leaders and planners. APAN provides PACOM and its components access to web based collaborative information and social networking software applications and tools (such as chat, wiki, calendars, maps, etc.) to support distributed planning and coordination for multinational planning and Civil-Military Ops Centers (CMOC). APAN has been developed to support a wide range of participants to include military, non-military, state, civil defense, maritime and multinational communities with HA/DR conferences and events.¹²

Additionally, APAN routinely provides exercise support, security cooperation and crisis response collaboration, and information resources to a vast audience of users (see Appendix 5, Figure 1). Currently, APAN's exercise support provides portals for 11 major exercises in the Asia Pacific. For example, APAN provides multinational accessible portals for the Angkor Sentinel exercise between Cambodia, U.S., and all PACOM Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Partner Nations, the Cobra Gold exercise between Thailand, U.S., Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan, as well as several bilateral exercises. This allows multinational leaders and planners to have unimpeded access to information on APAN. APAN attempts to keep restrictions on access to a minimum in order to allow access to international and non-governmental organizations that routinely cannot get access to any .mil or .gov domains. Additionally, APAN employs a multi-tiered security system that allows information to be made available to the general public or hidden from other groups as necessary.¹³ An examination of the APAN internet services demonstrates its versatility and numerous applications for exercise planning through crisis response activities. APAN provides users the ability to exchange documents, submit Request for

Information (RFI), and view photo and video galleries, along with real time chat, video, and whiteboard applications.

As a result, APAN is able to facilitate collaboration across the spectrum of military, government, and non-government organizations and institutions throughout a multinational exercise or a crisis response operation from concept development, planning, and execution, including after action reviews to improve future operations. Under the security cooperation heading, APAN provides 18 different portals to major security cooperation agencies or events. The Joint Interagency Task Force- West (JIATF-West), the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, and the GPOI are just some of the major portals hosted by APAN. APAN provides direct support to USPACOM Multinational Personnel Augmentation Team (MPAT).¹⁴ APAN has become a one-stop network services for information relating to MPAT exercises and operations.

Recently, APAN portal for crisis response has transferred its information to a new collaboration portal for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. This new portal is identified as the All Partners Access Network (another APAN), which has expanded to provide collaboration, communication and situational awareness across the global community. PACOM connects to the All Partners Access Network for web services for the pandemic influenza providing information and collaboration concerning the Influenza and Influenza Like Illnesses Working Group. The working group was established to gather and share information relating to the spread of influenza and influenza like illness. The working group has several geographic focus areas to distribute timely information, coordinate the efforts of local government and non-governmental organizations, and encourage communication with the public. The website provides incident tracking maps, graphs, and histories related to the spread of a pandemic influenza. A blog and forum, to include an open source literature review, was created for the rapid dissemination of information. However, the crisis response site on APAN still provides links to HA/DR tracking sites as well as numerous humanitarian information sites.

Finally, one of the best information resources available through APAN is the Virtual Information Center (VIC), which possesses a large foundation of knowledge and has experience in tracking events in

the Asia-Pacific region. Information on the VIC is divided by the various sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific region and provides political, military, economic, social, infrastructural, and informational news articles that provide situational and environmental awareness for the readers. The VIC also provides detailed transnational issues and country primers, special press summaries, and a media roundtable. While the VIC's primary responsibility is to support USPACOM exercises, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), MPAT operations, and the future Pacific War-Fighting Center, it is available to provide other services to any customer for a fee-for-service basis. According to the website, the VIC analytical team

can produce a wide range of relevant products including Asia-Pacific Daily Press Summaries (for situational awareness of the media discourse in the region), executive level media summaries with analysis, tailored media summaries on particular events including analysis, long-term analytical studies, country and transnational primers, and Information Operations (IO) products providing quantitative and trend analysis.¹⁵

This information support capability can greatly enhance multinational leaders and planners understanding of the region and the interdependence of its partners.

Overall, APAN has already demonstrated that it is one of the finest collaboration mechanisms in response to major disasters and humanitarian operations that includes civil-military coordination.

APAN's HA/DR portals were used by government officials, military planners, and non-governmental organizations to coordinate relief efforts in several severe HA/DR incidents such as the response to the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia and the South Leyte Mudslides. The APAN support to Operation Unified Assistance for the tsunami relief effort will be addressed in later in this discussion. However, APAN's versatility and exceptional innovation has significantly enhanced regional capabilities across the Asia-Pacific region. APAN provides an engagement tool that will serve as a foundation for future technological improvement and development to provide greater access and collaboration by all partners providing support to the Asia-Pacific region.

MPAT fosters trust and confidence in MNF operations

Along with the success of the APAN, the MPAT has become another critical component of the cooperative security paradigm. Previously, during crises spanning the spectrum of military operations the U.S. has provided military personnel to lead or support an ad-hoc MNF in order to provide a

multinational response. Unfortunately, ad-hoc MNF planners may often lack experience working together and lack established procedures for effectively coordinating an adequate response, whether to relieve the suffering of the local population or apply military force during a limited scale conflict. Similarly, in a HA/DR response, non-governmental and international organizations might find themselves outside the coordinated response of the military and governmental response unable to collaborate effectively in order to provide relief services in the area. This gap in multinational coordination and collaboration can now be traversed by the MPAT, which was developed to create greater efficiency in multinational response. According to Mr. Scott Wiedle, the current MPAT Branch Chief,

The MPAT is made up of experienced personnel, cross-trained in crisis action planning procedures, and capable of producing supportable and feasible military plans within time-constrained parameters....The impetus for establishing the MPAT program is to continuously improve multinational responses through the development of procedures that facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of coalition or combined task force headquarters, and to ensure that operations are conducted with improved interoperability, efficiency, and unity of effort.¹⁶

The MPAT provides a mechanism to support cooperative security by providing inclusivity among multinational militaries, governmental, non-governmental and international organizations and institutions planning to support crisis response across the Asia-Pacific region. The MPAT develops capability building among all the above entities by providing planning conferences, exercises, and uniform procedures for multinational response. The MPAT provides its multinational partners the ability to operate effectively across the common interests of the Asia-Pacific region to include responses to HA/DR relief efforts, maritime security, pandemic illnesses, and counterterrorism.

Historically, the MPAT history began in the late 1990s when the PACOM Commander began hosting conferences attended by the Chiefs of Defense of Asia-Pacific militaries to find ways to improve military-to-military relations in the region. Additionally, after the United Nations (UN)-authorized multinational military operations to restore peace in East Timor, the participating militaries' chiefs recognized that there was room for improvement in multinational military responses for rapidly developing small scale contingencies (i.e. limited-intensity, combat operations of short duration) and military operations other than war.¹⁷ Therefore in 1999, the participating Chiefs of Defense worked to

establish a program called the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) with the purpose of improving multinational military response for these crises.

Consequently, this initial step to improve multinational response would eventually support the change in U.S. and regional security paradigm towards cooperative security. During the 1990s, there was academic discussion among scholars and political leaders in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) concerning differences in collective defense, collective security, or cooperative security. However, the previous paradigms, during the post-Cold War era the Asia-Pacific region had two distinct types of defense substituting for a genuine collective defense system. The first represented by the U.S. “hub and spoke” system and the second was represented by cross-cutting bilateral defense ties among pro-Western Southeast Asian states known as the “spider-web” model.¹⁸ Unfortunately, these security concepts focused on external threats to regional security and stability and did not adequately address the common security interests of the modern environment. During the 1990s and early 2000, the crises that impacted the Asia-Pacific region would represent intra-national threats and crises that would have an effect on the region as a collective whole. Terrorism, maritime security, and pandemic illnesses could quickly cross borders and have significant security implications by destabilizing multiple nations within a region through economic, military, or social factors. As the Asia-Pacific region has become more aware of the interdependence on each nation’s economic, social, and diplomatic stability, the adoption of a cooperative security paradigm can be understood as an enhancement to the collective pool of resources throughout the region. As a result, the MPAT, with its multinational focus, has become an effective mechanism for contingency and crisis planning and execution in support of operations concerning regional cooperative security. This concept is summarized in a statement from the Multinational Forces Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP).

The trend of increasing interdependence among nations was clearly demonstrated during the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Interdependence was further reinforced by numerous crisis response contingencies since then. These responses emphasize the shared interest for peace and prosperity desired by all nations and show how inextricably linked the nations have become. Nations within the Asia-Pacific region have a vested interest in working hand-in-hand to enhance common security and respond effectively during crises.

The climate of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is very conducive to multilateral dialogue and the development of an effective strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution skills to meet on-going and emergent security challenges.¹⁹

In a sense, the MPAT has developed and matured in an environment that was prepared for this new paradigm. As the Asia-Pacific civil and military leaders invested more resources and confidence into a cooperative security paradigm, the MPAT expanded its capabilities to become an excellent forum for planners to work hand-in-hand to accomplish their respective countries' objectives for regional security and stability.

Currently, the MPAT program has become a cooperative security effort among 31 nations (see Appendix 2) with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. This number has decreased from 33 countries in 2007 as Nepal and Mauritius are no longer listed as MPAT participants. However, the first MPAT Concept Development Workshop had only five nations participating in May 2000. The program rapidly expanded over the next four workshops to include 24 nations in just over a year.²⁰ The MPAT Secretariat is maintained at PACOM, Training & Exercises Directorate (J7) in Hawaii, however, the Secretariat identifies that the MPAT doesn't belong to the U.S. Instead, the MPAT Secretariat has stated:

The MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor in program success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without memorandums of agreement, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able to share information and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and procedures without formal policy constraints – a key inhibitor to multinational interoperability when working with other nations.

The MPAT program includes military planners from all interested nations and also incorporates expertise from International & Non-governmental Organizations and the UN. The MPAT program belongs to all interested nations.²¹

This statement furthers the strategic communications message of the MPAT's cooperative security concept. It is the MPAT's ability to bring together a trained and experienced cadre of planners from numerous military and governmental organizations, while collaborating with non-governmental and international organizations that enables it to maximize the power and resources of its respective participants, bringing the elements of national power to a cooperative form of regional power. The MPAT has adopted the tenets of multinational operations established in Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations; of respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience.

The MPAT efforts are focused primarily on the operational level, therefore most participants are mid-grade officers (majors to colonels), experienced in tactical operations, and usually members of their nations' various headquarters staffs at either a strategic or operational level. As a result, the participants must possess a high level of understanding of their nations' policies and military doctrine, even though they are focused on identifying procedures to improve multinational cooperation.²² The MPAT program is one of consensus-building and does not have formal agreements or formal policy oversight. Without formal participatory procedures or the bureaucratic oversight that often accompanies other multinational efforts, participants are able to rapidly agree on a solution, or more than one solution, and advance the goals of the program.²³ Early on, the participants recognized that the program should only be focused on the conduct of operations upon which all the nations could agree to undertake. Therefore, the program and its procedures have been developed to improve the planning and execution of operations for small-scale contingencies (i.e. limited-intensity, combat operations of short duration) and military operations other than war. These missions might include peace operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military-assisted non-combatant evacuation operations, and consequence management.²⁴

One of the primary tools available to the MPAT is the Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) developed over the last decade to provide a commonly developed set of operating procedures that supports capability and capacity building for the participating militaries. The stated objectives of the MNF SOP is to improve the speed of the multinational crisis response, achieve interoperability, improve overall effectiveness, and establish a framework in order to achieve unity of effort.²⁵ The SOP is viewed as a multinational document that is not prescriptive, binding, or directive. It is not designed to be a "signed document, but serves as a guide or start point for multinational operations.²⁶ These factors are critical to the strategic communications of the MPAT and PACOM in general. The MPAT and the MNF SOP is not a proxy organization for the U.S. to strong arm operations and dictate international policy. Instead it is a cooperative effort between nations to improve interoperability and incorporate other response organizations during crisis situations. The MPAT

Secretariat has identified three key principles required for the MNF SOP to establish the basis for a multinational unity of effort.

- 1) Provide pre-determined operational start points prior to a crisis in order to improve the speed of the multinational response.
- 2) Establish a clear understanding and communications in order to allow planners to “agree or disagree” based on a common set of terms and processes.
- 3) Maintain a common planning process that provides for an “integrated and managed process” for the development & execution of plans.²⁷

These key principles were developed to foster an “inclusive atmosphere” and “cooperative effort” between multinational militaries, civil governments, and international humanitarian organizations in order to achieve unity of effort. It is understandable that in order to achieve the objectives of these agencies and organizations in a crisis, the MPAT must function at the operational level focusing on campaigns and major operations. The operational level allows the MPAT and the MNF SOP to avoid getting involved in the “how” each partner accomplishes their objectives.²⁸ Consequently, strategic guidance for a multinational crisis response will come from a higher headquarters, which could be established by numerous sources, such as U.N. mandate, regional organizations, or a coalition. This strategic guidance must establish the purpose of MNF, its end state, and identify participating nations and their contributions.

The establishment of the multinational operational start points identified by the MNF SOP is critical to laying the foundation for multinational cooperation and coordination.

Start Point # 1: Terminology.

Start Point # 2: Lead Nation / Regional Organization Concept.

Start Point # 3: Multinational Command, Control, Coordination, and Cooperation.

Start Point # 4: CTF Headquarters Starting Template and Manning Roster.

Start Point # 5: CTF Planning Process.²⁹ (See Appendix 3 for further detail)

Joint Publication 3-16, Multinational Operations defines the lead nation concept, stating that a lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity.³⁰ The lead nation structure established by the

MNF SOP (see Appendix 4, Figure 1 and 2) reduces possible friction points among participating nations allowing them to maintain tactical control of their forces. The MNF SOP identifies that the lead nation identified by the U.N. or MNF participating nations will become responsible for the strategic consultation and coordination of the MNF and become the “single channel” of strategic direction for the MNF elements based on agreement with participating nations. The MNF SOP acknowledges that there will be two concurrent command structures operating during a crisis. Each nation supporting operations will have a national chain of command, therefore the MNF SOP assumes the requirement to coordinate with each partnering nation’s National Command Element (NCE) within the MNF headquarters.

As of January 2010, there have been 13 dedicated MNF SOP Development Workshops conducted by members of the MPAT. Each workshop is inclusive and further builds on the investment that each participating nation has committed to the program. Working groups are established to focus on a section of the MNF SOP that needs revision or improvement. Previous MNF SOP Development Workshops have provided revisions on intelligence, logistics, terminology, and reviewed various parts of the SOP. Overall, the MNF SOP has grown into an 878 page document that encompasses a broad spectrum of operations that MPAT participants may agree to respond to during a crisis. Recently, the MNF SOP has developed multinational procedures in a number of areas such as: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR); Maritime Security Operations; Personnel Recovery; and Coalition Coordination Centers (recently renamed Multinational Coordination Centers). Current efforts to refine and improve the SOP are focused on improving procedures in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief; Logistics; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Toxic Industrial Material defense; planning of transition operations to follow-on militaries’ activities or civil authorities; and development of an “effects-supported” crisis action planning process³¹. The MNF SOP latest version was posted on the APAN website for dissemination in January 2010.

Additionally, there are two main sets of events that assist in the development of multinational planners. The first, hosted by nations on a rotating basis, are events organized and run primarily by the MPAT Secretariat called MPAT TEMPEST EXPRESS Staff Planning Workshops, generally held twice a

year. Staff personnel from the participating nations come together, as a simulated multinational task force headquarters, to become familiar and practice the procedures contained in the MNF SOP and improve their skills in crisis action planning.³² The scenarios are complicated, require a high degree of multinational cooperation and planning skills, and are tailored to focus on emerging mission areas. The second set of events that is available to build the cadre of MPAT planners consists of multinational exercises executed each year. The COBRA GOLD series, held annually in Thailand and hosted by the Royal Thai Armed Forces and the U.S. Pacific Command, has the most robust MPAT participation. The MNF SOP provides primary procedures for the command post exercise portion of the event and approximately 20 planners from the MPAT nations normally augment the COBRA GOLD CTF Headquarters.³³

Operation Unified Assistance

One of the first significant tests for the MPAT cadre of planners was the multinational response to the December 2004 tsunami that shattered portions of Thailand, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Later named Operation Unified Assistance, the multinational response was vital to reducing the mass suffering of the population of these areas while serving as a confidence building measure in the affected areas and across the region. The training and experience developed by the MPAT program served as a start point for the multinational response. The tsunami response was also a significant test for the APAN's ability to act as an information conduit for a crisis response.

Upon receiving the initial reports of the disaster and quickly ascertaining a degree of its magnitude, MPAT-experienced members from numerous nations began making preparations to deploy and plan military support operations, if required. The Secretariat quickly inventoried equipment and assembled a cadre of planners from the U.S. PACOM that rapidly deployed to augment the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Headquarters that was initially designated JTF 536 and was deploying to the Royal Thai Naval Air Base at Utapao, Thailand.³⁴ JTF 536 was re-designated as Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 536) and numerous nations were invited to send military planners to a Combined Coordination Center (CCC), set up as part of the CSF 536 Headquarters. According to Colonel Mark

Koh, a Singapore Officer assigned as a Liaison Officer (LNO), “the request to the Singapore Armed Forces from U.S. PACOM to support Operation Unified Assistance with LNO was a clear manifestation that the preparations of the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) have come to fruition.”³⁵ The function of the CCC was to integrate multinational planners and liaison officers to better orchestrate the efforts of their respective nations in a cooperative effort. The CSF 536 CCC was set up using base procedures developed for Coalition Coordination Centers contained in the MNF SOP. The MPAT planners in the CCC were a key element in coordinating the most rapid and effective means of military support among the 13 nations that coordinated efforts.³⁶ Subordinate commands Combined Support Groups (CSGs) were set up in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Thailand to manage relief efforts in each area.

Then APAN established the Operation Unified Assistance Tsunami Relief Information Exchange. The Information Exchange served as a collection site for situation reports, requests for assistance, requests for forces, and critical information to the day-to-day operation of Operation Unified Assistance. The Information Exchange enabled the respective CSGs and the Joint Forces Air Component Command (JFACC) to post their command briefs that included information on casualties, force laydowns, concepts of operations, and mission essential tasks, in addition to the shift change briefs and status brief on the international humanitarian organizations. The APAN provided connectivity with the Pacific Disaster Management Information Network managed by the Center for Excellence of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. APAN has several security protected portals for Operation Unified Assistance, which includes the lessons learned portal. This provides the network managers with the flexibility of protecting information or releasing it to the public domain, as required. Finally, APAN reported an average of 11,683 hits per day, 6,927 visitor sessions, with 36 countries, 450 registered users, and over 60 VIC products (such as primers and special and daily press summaries) from the Operation Unified Assistance Tsunami Relief Information Exchange throughout the duration of the relief effort (see Appendix 5, Figure 2).³⁷

Overall, Operation Unified Assistance is held to be a successful example of a multinational crisis response. The evaluation of the MPAT involvement can be summarized in an interview with U.S. Air Force Major General Gary North, who was the Director of Operation for PACOM during Operation Unified Assistance.

MPAT was a huge success because we were able to put together planners who had worked together in peace time in a non-stressful organization and environment; they were able to start talking to each other irrespective of what country you came from or what uniform you were wearing or what language you spoke. They all understood the common goals and efforts to make things work. That's one of the big lessons learned: you have to prepare for disasters before they occur. When and if they do occur you need to be able to fall into support immediately. That's the biggest lesson learned.³⁸

In the future, the MPAT is seeking to expand cooperative efforts to include a broader spectrum of organizations. Increasing cooperative efforts with the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration; and USAID, are critical for better civil-military coordination between the strategic and operational levels.³⁹ However, the motivation for MPAT remains one of continuously improving interoperability and multilateral cooperation to reduce crisis response time; increase planning effectiveness; strengthen command, control, and communications, and fine tune common operating procedures.⁴⁰ As regional partners develop their understanding of the transnational threats that exist in the modern security environment, the MPAT will become of greater value to the U.S. and its regional partners.


Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated how PACOM has integrated its security cooperation programs with interagency, non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions in order to develop a "whole of government" approach to leverage all elements of national power to enhance cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the last decade, PACOM has established and developed the Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) and the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) programs that allow all elements of U.S. national power to integrate and engage with our regional partners and allies through the maturing paradigm of cooperative security. First, this document explained how the cooperative security paradigm has developed and been established as a Joint Operating Concept. Second, this document has

explained how the PACOM strategy supports the Joint Operating Concept in order to foster a new cooperative security paradigm across the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, this document has demonstrated how the APAN and MPAT have been effectively utilized to support PACOM's strategic efforts over the last decade to promote inclusivity, build capacity and capability of its partner nations, and support concept of common interest of regional security and stability. Through the security engagements conducted in the PACOM AO, the U.S. has been able to promote diplomatic, economic, informational, and military relationships while building confidence among its partners. The APAN and MPAT programs will continue to mature and develop while the Asia-Pacific environment provides numerous opportunities for engagement and operations to support regional security interests.

Appendix 1 - USPACOM Area of Responsibility

36 Countries



<u>North East Asia (5)</u>	<u>South Asia (6)</u>	<u>South East Asia (11)</u>	<u>Oceania (14)</u>
China Japan Mongolia North Korea South Korea	Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Sri Lanka	Brunei Burma Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor-Leste Vietnam	Australia Fiji Kiribati Marshall Islands Micronesia Nauru New Zealand Palau Papua New Guinea Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, "Partnership, Readiness, Presence" United States Pacific Command Strategy, (Camp H. M. Smith, HI. USPACOM, April 2, 2009)

Appendix 2 - MPAT Participating Countries

MPAT Participants

<i>Australia</i>	<i>Bangladesh</i>	<i>Brunei</i>
<i>Cambodia</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>East Timor</i>
<i>France</i>	<i>Fiji</i>	<i>Germany</i>
<i>India</i>	<i>Indonesia</i>	<i>Italy</i>
<i>Japan</i>	<i>Korea</i>	<i>Malaysia</i>
<i>Maldives</i>	<i>Mongolia</i>	<i>Nepal</i>
<i>New Zealand</i>	<i>Papua New Guinea</i>	
<i>Philippines</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	<i>Solomon Islands</i>
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	<i>Thailand</i>	<i>Tonga</i>
<i>Tuvalu</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>US</i>
<i>Vanuatu</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>	

(31 countries)

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Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Secretariat, "What is MPAT" Powerpoint brief 1 December 2009, Slide 6
<http://www1.apan-info.net/Default.aspx?alias=www1.apan-info.net/mpat> (accessed 14 Jan 2010)

Appendix 3 - Multinational Operational Start Points

Start Point # 1: Terminology. A common understanding of terminology should be established for clear communications and coordination.

Start Point # 2: Lead Nation / Regional Organization Concept. MPAT Nations recognize the Lead Nation / Regional Organization concept as the basic way of organizing a multinational response to a crisis. Tailoring of this concept may be required to fully accommodate all nations' concerns and situational requirements. The Lead Nation / Regional Organization is the lead for strategic direction, organization, and coordination of the multinational effort with all participating nations, the affected nations and the UN.

Start Point # 3: Multinational Command, Control, Coordination, and Cooperation. Nations agree in principle to a common command and control relationship framework recognizing that foreign command of national forces may not be acceptable to all nations within the CTF and tailoring of command and control relationships may be required to build unity of effort. It is also recognized that the military cannot go it alone in today's contingency operations; rather, it requires a coordinated and cooperative multinational effort by the nations' militaries, nations' interagencies (governmental agencies), and the International Humanitarian Community (IHC). The SOP defines IHC as the aggregate of International Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations, International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of Red Cross and national Red Crescent Societies, and the UN and its programs/agencies.


Start Point # 4: CTF Headquarters Starting Template and Manning Roster. Nations accept a standardized headquarters template which can be tailored to the situation as the starting point for planning, organizing, and manning of the CTF HQs. This template inherently addresses the coordination and cooperation requirements outlined above and fully integrates the participating militaries, nation's interagencies, and the IHC into the multinational effort.

Start Point # 5: CTF Planning Process. The MNF SOP accepts a common, general planning and military decision-making process that can be tailored and adjusted to meet the situation and Lead Nation / Regional Organization requirements. The CTF Planning Process is the heart of the multinational effort, since only by effective planning and decision making can effective mission accomplishment be achieved. There are three components to the CTF Planning Process: (1) planning organization, (2) crisis action planning, and (3) Military Decision Making Process – Multinational (MDMP-M).

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Secretariat, "Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) Version 2.5," <http://www.mnfsop.com> (accessed 14 Jan 2010), B 1-1


Appendix 4 - Lead Nation Command Structure

Figure 1



Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Secretariat, "Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) Version 2.5," <http://www.mnfsop.com> (accessed 14 Jan 2010), B 2 A-4


Figure 2



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
Appendix 5 - APAN Support to Cooperative Security

Figure 1



Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) Secretariat, "MPAT and APAN in the Pacific" Powerpoint brief 20 February 2007, Slide 26
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Figure 2



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