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TITLE:
RETAINING THE WARRIOR SPIRIT:
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OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Executive Summary

Title: Retaining the Warrior Spirit: Leadership and Command Climate in the Post-Conflict Army

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Thesis: If senior leaders do not create a command climate that fosters risk taking, trust, and leader accountability, the Warrior Spirit is likely to dissipate soon after the conclusion of combat operations.

Discussion: The transition out of current combat operations is unique for the United States Army because it ends the longest duration of warfare by an all-volunteer force in U.S. history. This transition, along with the current fiscal constraints on the immediate horizon, brings the possible loss of the Warrior Spirit. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan transformed the culture of the U.S. Army to the single focus of winning on the battlefield. Doctrine exists within the U.S. Army that recognizes the purpose and requirement for the “Warrior Spirit.” The company-level leader is the foremost steward of the warrior spirit in the Army. Combat allows company-level leaders, free of strict oversight and rote managerial responsibilities, to capitalize on the warrior culture in today’s force. The removal of personnel that negatively impact a command climate is a matter of both institutional and personal accountability.

Conclusion: Although the conclusion of combat operations will likely decrease the warrior spirit in the Army, actions are necessary to weed out those leaders who are detrimental to the overall cohesion and morale in individual units. The impact of ignoring the retreat of the warrior spirit is a hollowing out of an organizational ethos earned on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

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This project originated as a shared curiosity with Major Robert Stanton about what the Army will look like once combat operations ended. As two officers that remembered the pre-conflict Army, we wondered aloud if the Army could retain the lessons learned in the last decade, or if the personnel and culture would atrophy. Special thanks to Colonel Christopher Cavoli, USA, for taking the time to act as sounding board for a lot of disjointed ideas at the outset of this project. His input and observations brought ideas that helped craft my recommendations. Also, Ben Jensen, PhD, actively listened to my ideas and shared his experience as both a scholar and as a reserve Army officer. Finally, my project mentor, Dr. Charles McKenna, guided my efforts to create something that is, hopefully, of use to at least one Army leader, now or in the future. More than anything else, this project helped me to understand the influence that talented leaders bring to an organization, and to understand clearly the consequence of poor leadership in an Army unit.

Retaining the Warrior Spirit

Introduction

The transition out of current combat operations is unique for the United States Army because it ends the longest duration of warfare by an all-volunteer force in U.S. history. This transition, along with the current fiscal constraints on the immediate horizon, brings a number of challenges. The reduction in the size of the Army and the squeeze of a tighter defense budget are the most publicized issues that senior Army leaders are facing. Another concern that gets little attention outside of the military is the potential flight of talented and experienced junior leaders after the excitement of combat is no longer available. Related to this is another less visible, yet significant issue, namely, the possible loss of the warrior spirit that contributed so much to the U.S. Army success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many criticisms of military leadership practices and the Army's preparedness for war rose in the 1980's and 1990's. As a means of realigning the Army with the basic tenets of warrior heritage the then Army Chief of Staff, General Erik Shinseki, introduced the Soldier's Creed in 2003.¹ The purpose of the creed was to solidify a code within the Army to help produce victory on the battlefield. The Soldier's Creed contains four lines, dubbed the Warrior Ethos, intended to instill a certain spirit amongst professional soldiers. Internalizing the published ethos took little time, given the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the spoken ethos endures as part of the officially published creed, the spirit of the individual warrior that provided true meaning to the ethos may diminish as combat becomes more remote as a normal part of organizational culture. Fortunately, evolutionary changes in the military are rapid in wartime and much slower during peacetime.² This affords senior Army leaders a window of opportunity for maintaining the spirit and preventing the published warrior ethos from degrading

to nothing more than a few lines of memorized text. If senior leaders do not create a command climate that fosters risk taking, trust, and leader accountability, the Warrior Spirit is likely to dissipate soon after the conclusion of combat operations.

In the history of warfare certain states created a specific warrior social class to conduct campaigns to secure the state or increase the riches or territory of the sovereign. In his book, *The Warrior Ethos*, author Steven Pressfield offers assertions and anecdotes about the warrior ethos as a code adopted by warriors to stifle the effects of fearing death.³ When viewed from a different perspective the ethos that Pressfield describes creates unity amongst the warriors and enhances the ability to overcome hardship and ultimately leads to victory. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan transformed the U.S. Army from a garrison-based and training focused force into arbiters of violence with the single focus of winning on the battlefield. While it is true that the counter-insurgency operations include stability tasks, and not always conventional tactics associated with fighting against a uniformed opposing force, the constant threat of attack by an indistinguishable foe necessitated setting aside personal fear. The responsibility placed upon military personnel, specifically junior leaders, during these conflicts greatly exceeded the expectations of even senior Army leaders.

After combat operations conclude military necessity requires preparation for the next conflict. The excitement, responsibility, and attitudes of those involved must adjust to the new reality of the army. Concerns exist about this transition. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recognized inherent problems associated with a changing military situation prior to his departure in 2011. “Men and women in the prime of their professional lives, who may have been responsible for the lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or millions of dollars in assistance, or engaging or reconciling warring tribes, may find themselves in a cube all day re-formatting

PowerPoint slides, preparing quarterly training briefs, or assigned an ever-expanding array of clerical duties,” Mr. Gates said. “The consequences of this terrify me.”⁴ While Mr. Gates may have alluded to potential retention issues of our proven warriors, it is the loss of the spirit that these leaders bring to the Army that is the greatest cause for concern.

There are a few assumptions that underscore the scope of this analysis. The first is that the absence of combat operations will decrease the warrior spirit within the Army. This is something that cannot be avoided despite leader actions, but appropriate leadership techniques can limit warrior spirit atrophy. The second assumption for this analysis is that the warrior spirit is important within the profession of arms, contributing to the Army’s ability to fight and win the nation’s wars. The scope of this analysis is not a study of retaining junior leaders, but retaining good leaders is a key element in fostering a climate that allows the warrior spirit to persist. Studies that contribute to retention are ongoing within the Army Staff, so, in order to avoid duplication of effort, retention is not covered in this analysis. This is also not a study of the war fighting function of Mission Command, even though the principles that enable the warrior spirit and command by intent are similar.

The Warrior Spirit and the Warrior Ethos

To properly define the warrior spirit it is necessary to break the term apart and define its individual components. “Warrior” is a term synonymous with soldier in contemporary times. Military professionals are comfortable with the definition of warrior while “spirit” is defined in several different ways. The Google definition of spirit is “the nonphysical part of a person that is the seat of emotions and character.”⁵ A further definition of spirit is “the principle of conscious life.”⁶ Combining these two definitions provides an understanding of spirit as the nonphysical

principle that guides emotions and character. When packaging the individual components of the warrior spirit it produces the following: a soldier guided by nonphysical principles of emotions and character. These nonphysical principles, embodied in the Army's Warrior Ethos, are subject to adjustment based on the environment in which the soldier operates.

When a warrior spirit is common amongst the members of the military, that shared set of principles becomes part of the culture. In previous wars the warrior spirit emerged in only those soldiers who fought directly against the enemy. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan removed the barrier that separated combat functions from administrative and logistics functions because the concept of battle lines did not exist, exposing almost every member of a deployed force to enemy aggression. The threat of enemy action against nearly all deployed members of the Army gave credence to the ethos. The Center for Strategic and International Studies bridges the gap between spirit, culture, and ethos by defining the warrior ethos as "a code that expects individuals to aggressively engage and defeat an armed enemy in battle, promoting and valuing traits of moral and physical courage, tactical skills, emotional and physical stamina, loyalty to comrades and determination to accomplish the tactical mission regardless of personal risk."⁷ Recognizing the benefits of an Army that embodies the Warrior Ethos caused the Army to codify these qualities in an officially sanctioned document.

The Army's Warrior Ethos consists of four lines within the Soldier's Creed. These lines are "I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen comrade."⁸ After introducing the concept in 2003 General Shinseki included the Soldier's Creed in the 2004 Army Posture Statement.⁹ With the U.S. Army simultaneously fighting two wars that consumed nearly half of the available force at any given time the official pronouncement of the ethos attempted to unify the organization to endure the hardships faced by

an overburdened force. In 2007 the Army began providing links to information papers associated with the annual posture statement, giving access to clearer explanation of the Soldier's Creed and Warrior Ethos. In 2008 the information paper on the Warrior Ethos defined the ethos, discussed current and future Army initiatives to instill the ethos, and outlined why the ethos is important to the Army.¹⁰ The paper demonstrated that the Army recognized both the cultural shift occurring in a combat-hardened organization, and also that the spirit embodied in the ethos increased the effectiveness of the Army and a willingness of soldiers to embrace personal sacrifice in order to fight and win.

The information papers on the Warrior Ethos have not significantly changed since the original publication in 2008. This suggests that senior Army leaders may be assuming that the spirit embodied by the current force is sustainable indefinitely without adjusting the approach to account for a lack of actual combat operations. While the 2012 Army Posture Statement includes a link to the Warrior Ethos information paper, neither the terms 'warrior ethos' nor 'warrior spirit' are used in the document.¹¹ The statement instead focuses on technological innovation, networked forces, and transition to a leaner, more efficient and adaptive force.

Doctrine exists within the U.S. Army that recognizes the purpose and requirement for both an ethos and culture amongst warriors. Field Manual (FM) 3-21.75, titled *The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, acknowledges that the critical component of the Warrior Ethos "is the spirit represented by these four lines that - -

- Compels Soldiers to fight through all adversity, under any circumstances, in order to achieve victory.
- Represents the US Soldier's loyal, tireless, and selfless commitment to his nation, his mission, his unit, and his fellow Soldiers.

- Captures the essence of combat, Army Values, and Warrior Culture.”¹²

This document specifically addresses the importance of a warrior culture, although it does so without reference to either the ethos or spirit that it contends are the critical factors that embody it. Identifying the warrior culture as “a shared set of important beliefs, values, and assumptions, is crucial and perishable” suggests that there is an institutional understanding that maintaining the warrior spirit is important.¹³ Unfortunately, FM 3-21.75 dictates that the method for building and retaining the warrior ethos relies on the ability to perform nine specific combat skills.¹⁴ Retaining the warrior ethos and culture of the organization requires more than this. Training and readiness are important factors, but leadership and appropriate leadership styles are the key to dealing with periods of organizational change.

Theoretical Leadership

Leading an Army in transition away from combat operations is not a new problem, and the contemporary transition is less problematic than at any other time in history. Not only is the force comprised of volunteers, but the constant employment of new technologies onto the contemporary battlefield prevents the current class of warriors from needing drastic educational leaps to inject technological solutions into the military arsenal. The period of transition at the conclusion of the Vietnam War was more complex because of the pace of technological change due to the advent of computers, the incorporation of the all-volunteer Army, and the negative views of the Armed Forces by the civilian society. The Army transition following Operation Desert Storm appears easier than what the Army faces today because of the short duration of combat operations. Despite this advantage over the current transition, manpower cuts of over 100,000 within a year of the troops returning home crippled the force structure that existed in the

early 1990's.¹⁵ Regardless of the level of difficulty of the transition that the Army faces, studies in leadership from the Vietnam era remain pertinent to the discussion of the pending changes in the Army.

Sociologist Dr. Morris Janowitz conducted extensive studies of the military before and during the Vietnam War and published several books on the military in transition. His analysis and findings are as relevant today as when first published. One of his works, titled *The Professional Soldier*, presented a timeless characterization of the military professional. Janowitz conducted his research amid concerns that the rapid advancement of technology, to include the introduction of nuclear weapons during World War II, would deplete what Janowitz categorized as the “fighter spirit.” Admitting that this spirit was difficult to define he offered that “it is based on a psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety.”¹⁶ This definition reflects the intent of the Army’s Warrior Ethos. Janowitz studied the warrior (fighter) spirit in combat and concluded that “under these conditions [combat] authority is based less on formal rank and legal authority and more on personal leadership and the ability to create primary group solidarity and small unit effectiveness.”¹⁷ His studies also concluded that different leadership characteristics exist, and that increasing technology would transform military leadership towards management and away from the heroic, inspirational leader that united units in combat.¹⁸ The application of managerial leadership, necessary to deal with rapid technological change, threatened to decrease the warrior spirit and carry the Army away from the values that historically won the nation’s wars.

A positive characteristic associated with managerial leaders, besides an acceptance of technological change, is the ability to innovate common practices to increase effectiveness and efficiency. Heroic leaders inspire subordinates, and “the heroic leader is a perpetuation of the

warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.”¹⁹ The downside to heroic leadership, according to Janowitz, is a reliance on traditionalism that forges ahead in face of the enemy without embracing technological innovation. The truth of the matter is that the Army needs both leaders to succeed. The reemergence of the warrior spirit in Iraq and Afghanistan would not have occurred without the presence of heroic leadership, but the presence of military managers maintains the fighting force by forcing technological change that ultimately can decrease stress on the soldier.

From the improvement of basic Army system processes, through networked communications to the introduction of vehicles that better survive an explosive blast, the managerial leader affords the heroic leader the opportunity to lead soldiers in direct combat with the enemy. Not only does the Army require both kinds of leaders, but the leaders who can exercise both managerial and heroic leadership have the capacity to maintain the warrior spirit at the conclusion of combat operations. Retired Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., USA, contests the notion that heroes and managers come together to form the nucleus of elite leaders, and that “It is the enlightened integration of leadership and management which is essential to creating the climates from which high-performing units emerge.”²⁰ This combination of tangible and intangible skills is the ultimate measure of talent in an officer, and the key to fostering the climate necessary for the warrior spirit to survive.

The timelessness of Janowitz and criticisms of the military during the 1980’s and 1990’s suggests that the capacity for leadership is not constant in the Army. A review of Janowitz’s leadership model in 1985 led Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Richard Baucom to conclude that the elevated status of the military manager superseded the military’s appreciation for the heroic leader. “The balance is being disrupted by several factors that are eroding the respect

traditionally accorded the heroic leader within the military profession; with his decline comes a deterioration of the warrior spirit he embodies.²¹ These factors include an overemphasis on management and a fascination with technology. The imbalance between manager and hero brought about detrimental effects on the warrior spirit.

Even at the conclusion of the Gulf War senior military leaders questioned the presence of heroic leadership and the warrior spirit that it produces. Based on external social pressures the military strayed from accepting the warrior as a special and unique individual, focusing more on the standardization of all military forces who were heavily reliant on technological solutions to win wars. Retired General William C. Moore, USA, showed concern about a departure from the warrior spirit caused by a softening of military training standards and prevailing attitudes regarding a widening separation of military and societal values. “The ethos of being a warrior is disappearing -- unit esprit built around "bonding" between warriors is now disparaged as an irrelevant concept and one that only serves to rationalize politically incorrect behavior and policies.”²² Abandoning the warrior ethos in order to conform to societal expectations is not a major factor in this situation, but a return to bureaucratic routine and acceptance of easily measurable statistics as indicators of leadership may have the same effect.

Managerial Routine and Risk Aversion

Prior to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan much of Army life consisted of accomplishing highly routinized tasks and responsibilities. Unit staffs focused their energy on creating the Quarterly Training Brief (QTB) by building lengthy slide presentations and managing resources to execute the approved training events. With a unit's final assessment consisting of an annual external evaluation at an Army training center the evaluation of the unit's

leaders rested almost entirely on a two week training exercise. Much of the preparation time of the unit was not controlled by the leadership, as various taskings and color-coded training cycles required manpower to support installation maintenance. For instance, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma prior to 2003 a unit in the “red” cycle conducted many non-military tasks such as mowing the grass on the installation and serving as lifeguards at family recreation areas.

It is a worthwhile endeavor to contribute to the appearance of the installation where the soldier lives and works because it builds pride, and maintaining a safe environment for family activities is a responsible leadership program. The problem with programs such as these was the number of soldiers required to perform the tasks. Those soldiers not assigned to these details assumed the responsibility for all of the unit maintenance and administrative duties with roughly half of the labor force. In the end, the leaders managed each red cycle to meet the installation requirements first, the administrative requirements second, and the maintenance requirements last. At no time during this cycle did the unit conduct substantial training, and as the unit transitioned to the next training cycle it performed as expected. The soldiers returning to the unit from external taskings were bored, frustrated, untrained, and lacked the spirit required to increase combat effectiveness. As leaders worked to instill the warrior ethos in their unit by the next QTB the unit faced another red cycle that depleted the readiness of the unit, as well as depleted the warrior spirit of the soldiers.²³ Possible reversion to this model creates potential problems because of the global uncertainty caused by failed or failing states and the unpredictable actions of terrorist groups.

Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, “prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for developing, managing, and conducting Army training and leader development.”²⁴ Revised in 2011, AR 350-1 prescribes the official methodology for

managing training and developing leaders within the Army. The 2011 version outlines twenty four different tasks that units are required to perform in an annual training cycle. These are not all of the annual training requirements, but AR 350-1 captures the majority of legally required training events for Army personnel. The number of tasks is not overwhelming, and some of them are completed as a byproduct of larger training events, but if combined with excessive requirements that detract from mission readiness a pattern could emerge similar to that of the pre-combat era. Additionally, reverting to a checklist of mandatory training that consumes training resources and available time can limit energy expenditure on achieving more than the minimum standards. Exhausted by managerial routine, leader creativity to plan and execute valuable combat training that produces a high level of readiness could be stifled. Warriors who are deployed do not necessarily have the constraints of an extensive training checklist placed on them by a higher headquarters, allowing most deployed leaders to address only those training requirements that they identify as valuable.

Building Talented Leaders

The roadmap for heroic leadership is part of the Army's doctrine. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22 *Army Leadership* defines leadership as "the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."²⁵ ADP 6-22 describes both attributes and competencies for leaders who are in line with the description of the heroic leader provided by Janowitz. The attributes that a leader needs to have are Character, Presence, and Intellect.²⁶ Within these attributes, the qualities that enable the retention of the warrior ethos in subordinates consist of: possessing the warrior ethos and confidence, using sound judgment, and exercising interpersonal tact. Leaders display

competencies when they do things. The competencies that a leader displays are Lead, Develop, and Achieve results.²⁷ The critical sub-competencies to fostering the warrior spirit are building trust, communicating, creating a positive environment, and becoming a steward of the profession.

The company-level leader is the foremost steward of the warrior spirit in the Army. Company or battery command is the lowest level where legal authorities and command responsibilities are present. This is also the only level of command where almost all subordinates come in contact with their commander on a daily basis. As the commander increases in rank and organizational size the percentage of subordinates he interacts with on a personal level decreases. The most effective way for senior leaders to maintain the warrior spirit within the Army is to enable the company commanders to take aggressive, calculated risks in training. In order to prepare company-level leaders to receive the trust and confidence of multiple command echelons, additional training and education are necessary. Adjustments within the institutional Army military education programs create a common experience regardless of branch specialty. Improvements to the Captains Career Course (CCC) demonstrate that the Army values leadership instruction at the highest level, and equally values a baseline of leadership training in all branches of service.

The adjustment of CCC curriculum across all Army branches is stipulated in AR 350-1. While branch courses still contain specific tactical, technical, and staff instruction there is a separate, common-core portion of each course that is identical across the Army.²⁸ A review of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course (OAC), the precursor to the CCC, Program of Instruction from 1978 reveals 39.7 hours of instruction directly related to leadership in a 26-week curriculum.²⁹ The common-core instruction in 2010 provides students with 44 hours of

leadership in only an 8 week curriculum. Appendix A contains a direct comparison of leadership instruction between the 26-week 1978 FA OAC and the 8-week 2010 Army Common Core CCC. In the case of the 2010 Field Artillery CCC, consisting of 24 weeks of instruction, another 119.9 hours in the classroom are dedicated to battery commander-specific leadership training.³⁰ This serves as a concrete example of the importance that the Army places on leadership development. More importantly, the increased emphasis on leader development is meant to perpetuate the warrior spirit.

Combat allows company-level leaders to put this instruction into practice. As the requirements outlined in AR 350-1 receive less emphasis during combat operations, the oversight on managerial-type tasks decreases as well. Even in the late 1960's "the elaborate regulations and procedures of the military are attenuated during operational assignments."³¹ By equipping the commanders with sufficient leadership education, and with combat providing a laboratory for experimentation, the company-level leader can build and maintain the warrior ethos in his subordinates. Even if the level of leadership education continues, a time-constrained environment where leadership is measured in a two-week external evaluation limits experimentation and risk-taking. This does not allow for experimentation on the part of the leader and can negatively impact the spirit of the soldier.

Leader Evaluation and Risk Management

In the absence of combat operations the retention of the warrior spirit requires rigorous and realistic training. Unfortunately, assessing the quality of a training event is subjective and particularly problematic for a senior commander who does not have the available time to observe the training of all subordinate elements. On top of the difficult assessment process the senior

commander needs a rehabilitation mechanism when a subordinate commander is identified as deficient.³² In a situation where a commander identifies an honest mistake in combat a correction can be put in place in short order to remedy the situation, allowing the subordinate to improve and not make that mistake again. Only mistakes attributed to inadequate leadership capacity should be cause for removal from a leadership position. In a training environment the commander is much more likely to hold a single mistake against a subordinate, not allowing him to recover from the incident. This reality stifles risk-taking and individual initiative in training, which are what allows company-level commanders to learn what works and what does not work. Subordinate commanders with fewer training opportunities may very well cease experimentation and adopt only proven training processes in order to make fewer mistakes. This can create less capable leaders and force commanders to compare their subordinates by objective measures.

The objective measures of commander performance are both easily collected and the least valuable indicators of heroic leadership.³³ Yet, these objective measures were the basis for many superior performance reviews prior to immersion in contemporary combat operations. Senior leaders provide warnings about basing leadership assessments on easily quantifiable data.³⁴ For instance, the Operation Readiness (OR) rate, historically a measure of command competence, provides no indication of leadership. Rather, it is a measure of management. If a subordinate knows that a performance evaluation relies on one quantifiable measure an enormous incentive is created to raise the measure. The least desirable method for raising the measure is by violating accepted ethical standards, but there are also honest means. In the case of OR ratings, it is much more palatable to cease using your equipment for fear of breaking it. This eliminates the ability to train on the equipment, but short-sighted and ineffective leaders see only the next evaluation or reporting period. Subordinates see this too, which can cause them to lose trust in their leader.

One quantifiable tool that is useful to the commander is the command inspection, but not for the obvious reason. The command inspection is a means to identify where subordinate leaders are not able to meet accepted standards of performance. If used correctly the command inspection is a teaching tool and not a measuring stick. By taking the time to identify why an inspection failure occurs the mentorship process begins. It starts with trusting that your subordinates are putting forth their best effort. More often than not an inspection failure results from resource shortfalls or misinterpreted priorities. On the other hand, when the reason for failure is negligence, or an ethics violation is discovered, the senior commander learns everything he needs to know about their subordinate and that subordinate should be replaced. By dealing with command inspections in this manner the commander can breed trust throughout the organization.

Trust in the Organization

Trust is the cornerstone of an effective organization, and as previously mentioned it is also a component of a leader's competency. It is critical that trust exists in an organization because it is the "one specific component of the morale and cohesiveness mosaic which appears crucial, and whose absence or dilution is particularly detrimental to effectiveness over time and under stress."³⁵ A leader who fails to build trust in his organization, both up and down the chain of command, creates an environment of suspicion that stifles individual initiative. Trust creates transparency in a unit, allowing subordinates to provide constructive feedback on command decisions. Seeking feedback or opinions from subordinates prior to an official decision is a greater builder of trust, as it creates buy-in to the direction of the organization.

This level of trust is the cornerstone of the concept of Mission Command, requiring commanders to trust that their subordinates can achieve the intent of the operation.³⁶ Trust develops quickly in a combat environment because of the amount of time soldiers spend together and the stress under which they operate. Lacking a combat environment trust takes longer to develop. This is problematic given the timeframes that govern officer moves. Twelve to twenty-four months in a leadership position is insufficient outside of an environment like combat to establish trust throughout an organization. And at the same time the presence of an ineffective or incompetent leader anywhere in the organization has detrimental effects on the trust required to build effective units.

The Army strives to identify poor leaders to train them, rehabilitate them, or, in extreme cases, to dismiss them from service. The acute problem with this methodology is that subordinates suffer through the training and rehabilitation periods of leaders who are not performing at an acceptable level. As the Army transitions to “a leaner, adaptive, flexible and integrated force”³⁷ it may be necessary to remove poor leaders more quickly in order to maintain trust with the institution. The removal of poor leaders is a matter of both institutional and personal accountability. The continued employment of poor leaders violates the trust that “is the bedrock of our honored profession.”³⁸ Whether it is the bureaucratic nature of the organization that does not allow the rapid departure of poor leaders, or an inability to identify poor leaders, the Army needs to improve in this area.

The current officer and non-commissioned officer evaluation systems are tiered to take into account the perspective of the Rater and Senior Rater. This method is inherently flawed because it gives no input to those personnel most intimately knowledgeable about the leadership of the rated individual. Subordinate feedback is not included in the evaluation systems and it is

against Army standards of conduct to seek subordinate feedback when completing a performance evaluation. A 360° Leader Assessment is now required by Army Regulation for all Field Grade Officers, but this assessment is not incorporated into the evaluation process. In fact, the results of this requirement are seldom used for any purpose other than personal reflection. The sum-total of input of subordinates to a leadership assessment is a Rater asking a subordinate officer if they have completed the requirement, and many times the question is not even asked.

Implementing a subordinate leader assessment to determine leadership capacity is fraught with problems. The largest of which is that it potentially turns leadership positions into popularity contests. The popular leader is not necessarily the most effective in terms of mission accomplishment, and any impediment to performing the core missions of the Army needs close scrutiny and elimination. This concept boils down to trust because if we build trust throughout the organization then we can trust the judgment of our subordinates about the leadership that potentially puts them in harm's way.

Leader Accountability

A proposal for both capturing subordinate feedback and determining the authenticity of the remarks is necessary. Determining what level of subordinates gain input to the leader assessment is difficult, but for the purpose of example assume that only immediate subordinates provide input. By working through Army Knowledge Online accounts a subordinate can receive a survey on their leader. The first question in the survey asks "Is this person an effective leader?" If the subordinate answers 'yes' then the survey continues with questions to quantify the leader's positive attributes. If the subordinate answers 'no' then further questioning is required to peel back the reasons behind the negative opinion. The exact series of questions

requires the attention of experts in psychology, military leadership, and survey techniques and not just the opinions of the author. Once the feedback is compiled a copy is furnished to the rated officer, as well as to the Senior Rater. Given that Senior Raters are the most experienced leaders in the chain of command they can either incorporate the feedback into their portion of the evaluation or discard the results. To complete the feedback loop the Senior Rate must state that the Rated Officer was counseled on the subordinate feedback regardless of whether or not it affects the officer's evaluation.

In order to soften the blow for officers who receive negative leadership feedback from subordinates the Army needs to create a safety net. No senior officer wants to terminate the service of a career officer due to a talent shortfall. When a service member provides upwards of fourteen years to the institution it is considered by many as callous to deny continued service in an all-volunteer force. Fourteen years as a measure of commitment to the Army is significant because after that period of service the member is at sufficient rank to hold a leadership position and is firmly established in a career. At the same time retaining unqualified leaders breaks down the trust in the institution if an individual that exceeded their capacity for leadership is again given subordinates. A phased retirement plan encourages separation of unqualified personnel.³⁹ This provides the officer with recognition for service and a small stipend to aid in transition to another line of work, while at the same time alleviates the internal conflict of the senior officer that classifies the rated officer as a poor leader. A process to eliminate poor leaders would breed trust throughout the Army. The current method of shuffling poor leaders until they reach the retention point commensurate with their rank breeds contempt from subordinates, diminishing the overall trust in the organization, which in turn diminishes their warrior spirit.

Command Climate

The Army understands the importance of a positive command climate. Members of every company-sized unit are required to complete surveys that provide the commander feedback on factors such as leadership, morale, and unit cohesion.⁴⁰ While the feedback from these surveys often reinforces a commander's assessment of the status of the unit, it can also highlight specific leadership failures within the chain of command. The en vogue label for organizationally destructive leadership personalities is "toxic leadership." Because no exact definition exists it is accepted that "toxic leaders are individuals whose behavior appears driven by self-centered careerism at the expense of their subordinates and unit, and whose style is characterized by abusive and dictatorial behavior that promotes an unhealthy organizational climate."⁴¹ Removing leaders that fit this description is an important step to maintaining a command climate that allows the warrior spirit to thrive.

If senior leaders do not create the conditions for effective leaders to produce positive command climates then the warrior spirit will fall victim to risk aversion, distrust, and poor leadership in the Army. The Army is taking actions and making policies to develop leaders. Increasing leadership education among company-grade officers is an excellent step towards building the command climates required to sustain the warrior spirit in soldiers. Having transparent conversations about the negative effects of toxic leadership on the Army as an entire organization is also critical. This demonstrates that the Army's senior leaders are aware that toxic leaders exist in the ranks, but measures to identify them and remove them from service are inadequate.

Although the conclusion of combat operations will likely decrease the warrior spirit in the Army, actions are necessary to weed out those leaders who are detrimental to the overall

cohesion and morale in individual units. It is not enough to discuss the dangers of poor leadership. The Army must make a concerted effort to dismiss these leaders in order to gain the trust of the talented leaders who combine skilled management with heroic leadership. The talented officers in the midst of their professional lives will find another line of work if they lose faith that the Army is serious about remaining a combat-focused institution dedicated to retaining the warrior spirit.

The impact of ignoring the retreat of the warrior spirit is a hollowing out of an organizational ethos earned on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Put another way, “Let us be, then, warriors of the heart, and enlist in our inner cause the virtues we have acquired through blood and sweat in the sphere of conflict...”⁴² As the Army transitions to a leaner force there is an opportunity to identify poor leaders, thank them for their service, and force them to find a new line of work. By taking this step the warrior spirit can remain part of the organizational culture and the Army can remain capable of accomplishing the mission.

APPENDIX A: LEADERSHIP CURRICULUM COMPARISON

1978 Field Artillery OAC 24 Weeks
2010 Army Common Core CCC 8 Weeks

Class	Hours	Class	Hours
Effective Listening	.9	Think Critically and Creatively	4
Introduction to Leadership	2.5	Effective Writing	3
Communication	4.2	Staff Communications	3
Counseling	4.2	Leader Development Doctrine	4
Human Behavior	4.2	Analyze Variables to Creating a Positive and Ethical Climate	2
Leadership Styles	3.4	Lead in Organizations	3
Systems View of an Organization	3.4	Commanders Programs	3
OE Assessment	2.5	Resiliency for Mid-Grade Leaders	4
OE Planning	2.5	Establish and Exert Influence	3
OE Implementation	1.7	Military Professionalism & Civil-Military Relationship	3
OE Evaluation and Follow-Up	.9	Applying Moral Processing	1
Leadership Workshop	4.2	Counseling	3
Unit Application of OE	1.7	Engage the Media	2
The Commander and His Staff	3.4	Company Leadership Panel	2
		Battalion Leadership Panel	2
Total	39.7	Leadership Focus Groups	2
		Total	44

NOTES

¹Vernon Loeb, "Army Plans Steps to Heighten 'Warrior Ethos'; Leaders View Many Soldiers as Too Specialized," *Washington Post*, September 8, 2003, <http://www.lexisnexis.com.lomc.idm.oclc.org/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=sr&csi=8075>.

²Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier; A Social and Political Portrait*, (New York: Free Press, 1971), viii.

³Steven Pressfield, *The Warrior Ethos* (New York: Black Irish Entertainment LLC, 2011), 10.

⁴Thom Shanker, "Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan," *New York Times.com*, February 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/26/world/26gates.html?_r=1&.

⁵Google, s.v. "spirit definition." http://www.google.com/#hl=en&tbo=d&site=&source=hp&q=spirit+definition&oq=spirit+definition&gs_l=hp.3..0l6.1034.4716.0.5016.19.13.1.5.5.0.75.752.13.13.0.les%3B..0.0...1c.1.1M60kSjY8qU&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&bvm=bv.41248874,d.dmg&fp=eea76b31d584b5f2&biw=1366&bih=643 (accessed January 21, 2013).

⁶Dictionary.com, s.v. "spirit." <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spirit?s=t> (accessed January 21, 2013)

⁷"Proposed working definition of the traditional 'warrior ethos'," (working paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 20, 1998).

⁸"The Warrior Ethos," U.S. Army, *Army.mil*, accessed on January 21, 2013, <http://www.army.mil/values/warrior.html>.

⁹U.S. Army, *Army Posture Statement 2004* (Washington DC: The Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2004) accessed on January 7, 2013, <http://www.army.mil/aps/04/core.html>.

¹⁰U.S. Army, *Army Posture Statement 2008 – Information Papers – Warrior Ethos* (Washington DC: The Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2008) accessed on January 7, 2013, http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/other/Warrior_Ethos.html.

¹¹U.S. Army, *Army Posture Statement 2012* (Washington DC: The Office of the Secretary of the Army, 2012) accessed on January 7, 2013, <http://www.army.mil/aps/12>.

¹²Headquarters Department of the Army, *The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, FM 3-21.75 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, January 28, 2008), 1.

¹³FM 3-21.75, 1.

¹⁴The nine skills listed in FM 3-21.75 are 1. React to Contact (visual, improvised explosive device[IED], direct fire), 2. React to Ambush (Near), 3. React to Ambush (Far), 4. React to Indirect Fire, 5. React to Chemical Attack, 6. Break Contact, 7. Dismount a Vehicle, 8. Evacuate Wounded Personnel from Vehicle, 9. Establish Security at the Halt.

¹⁵Garry L. Thompson, "Army Downsizing Following World War I, World War II, Vietnam, and a Comparison to Recent Army Downsizing," (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002) , 58, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415899>.

¹⁶Janowitz, 32.

¹⁷Janowitz, xix.

¹⁸Janowitz, 21.

¹⁹Janowitz, 21.

²⁰Walter F. Ulmer Jr. (Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Army), "Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate," *Armed Forces Journal International*, (July 1986): 55.

²¹Donald Baucom, "The Professional Soldier and the Warrior Spirit." *Strategic Review* 13, no. 4 (Fall 1985): 58.

²²"Special: The Military Must Revive Its Warrior Spirit," William Moore, *Hackworth*, accessed November 1, 2012, <http://www.hackworth.com/Warrior%20Spirit.html>.

²³From the author's experience serving in a FORSCOM General Support Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma from January, 2000 to August, 2004.

²⁴Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Training and Leader Development*, AR 350-1 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 4, 2011), 1.

²⁵Headquarters Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, ADP 6-22 (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 2012), 1.

²⁶ADP 6-22, 5.

²⁷ADP 6-22, 5.

²⁸AR 350-1, 70.

²⁹"The Process and Procedures Used For Job Preparation: Field Artillery and Infantry Officers and NCOs," 1980, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1314, ARI Field Unit at Presidio of Monterey, California, 150.

³⁰Frank J. Siltman, *Field Artillery Captains Career Course Program of Instruction*, February 1, 2010, 3-1.

³¹Janowitz, xix.

³²Christopher Cavoli (Colonel, U.S. Army) in discussion with the author, December 1, 2012.

³³Cavoli, December 1, 2012

³⁴Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), “The Use of Military Theory and History in the Profession of Arms,” (lecture, Breckenridge Auditorium, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, August 9, 2012).

³⁵Ulmer, 1986, 54.

³⁶Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command White Paper* (Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 3, 2012), 4.

³⁷*Army Posture Statement 2012*, 1.

³⁸*Army Posture Statement 2012*, Opening Remarks.

³⁹Benjamin Jensen (PhD teaching at Marine Command and Staff College), in discussion with the author, December 2012.

⁴⁰“Command Climate Survey,” U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, accessed 22 January 2013, <http://www.hqda.army.mil/ari/surveys/commandclimate.shtml>.

⁴¹Walter F. Ulmer Jr. (Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Army), “Toxic Leadership: What Are We Talking About?,” *Army*, June 2012, 48, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2012/06/Documents/Ulmer_0612.pdf.

⁴²Pressfield, 90.

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